

things—from which it is clear that this science is very subtle, useful, and evident.

#### REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the the main argument I reply that propositions that are true and known per se can be formed about things that are subject to the will, and these propositions are able to demonstrate many conclusions.

### Question 15

*Do the acts of the sentient appetite differ from the passions?*

*For the affirmative:* The acts of the sentient appetite are commanded by the will. But the passions are not commanded. Therefore, etc.

*For the opposite:* Plurality should not be posited without necessity. But everything can be accounted for without such a plurality and without such a distinction between the acts and the passions. Therefore, etc.

#### REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that passion and act do not differ in the sentient appetite. This is proved from the fact that, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2 [4.1105b19-21], there exist in the soul only powers, /179/ habits, and passions; but passions are not powers or habits; therefore, they are acts. Again, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, and love are counted as passions; but love is an act, and so is fear; therefore, etc. Again, in the place cited above, the Philosopher says, "Now by passions I mean concupiscence, anger, fear, daring, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, desire, zeal, justice"; and these are all acts of the appetite; therefore, etc. Again, the passions are to be curbed through virtuous habits; but it is sufficient to curb the acts; therefore, etc.

#### NINE OBJECTIONS

But against this view there are many arguments. First, if a passion were an act, then to the extent that someone were more passionate, he would elicit more acts of virtue.

Again, virtuous habits elicit acts. And they do not elicit passions, but rather moderate them. Therefore, etc.

Again, virtues are related to the passions as to objects. And they are not related to the acts as to objects. Therefore, etc.

Again, we are not praised or blamed for passions. But we *are* praised for acts. Therefore, etc.

Again, the same virtue is related to contrary passions; e.g., fortitude is related to fear and daring. But the same virtue does not simultaneously have contrary acts. Therefore, etc.

Again, a virtue has to quiet the passions, not stir them up. And it has to stir up acts, since it causes them. Therefore, etc. /180/

Again, if a passion were an act, then passions could be posited in the will, just as good and evil acts are posited in the will—which is contrary to everyone's opinion, since everyone posits passions only in the sentient appetite.

The same point is evident in the case of hunger and thirst.

Again, in *Ethics* 4 [3.1174b23] the Philosopher claims that delight is the perfection of an operation. Therefore, it is not itself an operation. But it is certain that delight is a passion. Therefore, etc.

#### REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS

To the first of these objections I reply that 'passionate' is taken in two ways: in one way broadly, for someone who has passions of whatever kind; in another way strictly, for someone who has passions that incline him in a way contrary to right reason. In neither sense is it the case that the more passionate someone is, the more virtuous he is. For the more virtuous person sometimes has fewer acts, since he sometimes curbs the acts of the sentient appetite.

Alternatively, one can reply that someone who is more passionate when he should be and where he should be and so on for the other circumstances, is more virtuous, because one who is passionate in this way elicits a greater number of the virtuous acts from which the virtue is generated. However, someone who is more passionate when he should not be [and where he should not be], etc., is more vicious, since such a person elicits a greater number of vicious acts.

To the next objection I reply that virtuous habits cause acts and, likewise, moderate disordered acts.

To the next objection I reply that the virtues of the sentient part are not related to the passions as to objects, but instead they elicit and cause the acts that are the passions. On the other hand, the objects of habits are the objects of the acts that are elicited by the habits and the objects of the acts that are generative /181/ of the habits. For example, if I desire by an act to eat, then the object of that act—and the object of the habit generated by that act—is the eating itself.

To the next objection I reply that we *are* praised and blamed for moderate or immoderate passions when they are in our power. Hence, such acts or passions do not determine praise or blame for themselves in such a way that praise and blame belong to them intrinsically. Rather, it is only by a certain extrinsic denomination that such a passion, in light of its conformity to a virtuous or vicious act of will, is called praiseworthy when it is elicited in accordance with suitable circumstances and blameworthy when it is elicited in accordance with unsuitable circumstances.

To the next objection I reply that there is no single sentient virtue that inclines one both toward acts of fear and toward acts of daring; instead, one virtue inclines one toward acts of fear and another toward acts of daring.

To the next objection I reply that the role of a virtue is to excite or cause virtuous passions and to curb vicious passions, reducing them to the mean by appropriately situating them.

The reply to the next objection will become clear below.<sup>72</sup>

To the next objection I reply that hunger and thirst are acts of the sentient appetite, since they are desires for food and drink.

To the last objection I reply that the Philosopher does not call an act of the sentient appetite an operation; rather, what he calls an operation is either a sentient cognition or an operation of the vegetative soul or some other operation that can exist without the senses.

#### REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the other argument I reply that praiseworthy passions and blameworthy passions are commanded by a virtuous will or a vicious will. /182/

72. See *Quodlibet* 2.17.

## Question 16

*Does a virtuous habit exist somewhere other than in the will?*

*For the negative:* The will alone is the subject of a virtue. Therefore, a virtue does not exist in anything else. The antecedent is evident from the fact that it is to the will alone that any merit\* or\* demerit is imputed.

*For the opposite:* There are acts in the sentient appetite. Therefore, there are virtuous habits there as well.

#### REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that 'virtuous habit' is taken in two ways. It is taken in one way for a habit that (i) is sufficient to elicit a praiseworthy act by means of the cognition and power of which it is a habit and (ii) in no way elicits a blameworthy act. In another way 'virtuous habit' is taken more broadly for any habit—or for anything at all—that is apt by nature to be caused by praiseworthy acts or to exist in the wake of praiseworthy acts. (i) A virtuous habit in the first sense does not exist in anything other than the will, but (ii) a virtuous habit in the second sense exists subjectively in something else.

I prove the first point from the fact that the will itself and an act of the will are always required in order to elicit a praiseworthy act. Therefore, nothing other than the will is a sufficient subject or principle of such a habit. Further, any act toward which any habit in the sentient appetite inclines one is able to be evil because of an evil intention on the part of the will—as is evident in itself. And, consequently, the will concurs in order to elicit a praiseworthy act. Therefore, nothing other than the will is a sufficient principle of such an act. /183/

I prove the second thesis from the fact that everyone experiences that after repeated acts in the sentient appetite, he is more inclined toward similar acts than he was before. Therefore, it must be the case that something which was not there before exists in that appetite—or at least it is necessary to posit something outside the will.<sup>73</sup> Again, when someone is, to begin with, well exercised in virtuous acts, then if he later loses the use of reason and becomes

73. As will become clear below, Ockham allows for the possibility that the quality that inclines one toward similar appetitive acts inheres immediately in the body rather than the sentient soul.

a madman or a simpleton, it is manifestly obvious that he is inclined toward acts similar to those he previously exercised. But this cannot be the case unless there is a persisting habit outside the will, or unless there is something else that remains in the wake of the praiseworthy acts.

#### A PROBLEM AND REPLY

But in that case there is a problem: What is it that remains in the wake of the acts?

I reply that it cannot be sufficiently proved, at least with respect to many virtuous acts, that what remains is something that exists in the sentient appetite. For one can sufficiently claim that there is some corporeal quality or qualities inclining one toward acts of the sort in question.

I prove this as follows: That which can be induced without any act of the sentient appetite should not be placed subjectively in the sentient appetite.<sup>74</sup> But everything that we are able to experience in ourselves can exist in us without any act of the sentient appetite. Therefore, etc. The major premise is obvious. The minor premise is proved from the fact that every inclination of the sort in question can be induced by the art of medicine and in other ways. For through the art of medicine physicians weaken concupiscence and in this way dispose people toward chaste acts. It is also evident that such inclinations are generated and removed by bodily changes—e.g., by the generation /184/ and corruption of heat or cold—without any act of the sentient appetite. Therefore, etc.

Further, if, after much exercise of the acts of the sentient appetite, the body is altered by sickness or drinking\* or eating, then there arise in the sentient appetite passions and acts that are as strong as they would have been if the person in question had never had any praiseworthy acts. And frequently this happens because heat is increased and coldness decreased through eating, and this causes an act of apprehension along with the relevant acts\* of the sentient appetite. This would not be true if the habits that incline one toward virtuous acts were placed in the sentient appetite, since in that case those habits would weaken such passions.

And so I claim that the acts of the sentient appetite do not immediately generate any habit that exists subjectively in the sentient appetite, even though many habits are generated immediately by apprehensive acts.<sup>75</sup> Also, in the

74. The translation here follows the variant reading that omits the term *necessario* before 'should not be placed' (*non . . . ponendum*).

75. Ockham is here pointing to a difference between sentient appetite or desire, and sen-

wake of a large number of appetitive acts one does not feel himself immediately more inclined toward similar acts through habits, but only mediately more inclined toward similar acts. For instance, if he desires to eat and drink, then after he eats something hot, he finds himself more inclined toward acts of concupiscence than he was before the act of desiring [to eat and drink].

#### A SECOND PROBLEM AND REPLY

But now\* the problem is: What is it that remains in the wake of appetitive acts of this sort?

I reply that, according to the Philosopher [in *Ethics* 2.5.1106b16-20], the passions are sometimes superabundant and sometimes deficient. Now when the passions are superabundant, then in order to elicit virtuous acts it is necessary to destroy a certain quality in a human being /185/ that inclines him to such passions—and perhaps that quality is oftentimes heat. An example: An intemperate and incontinent person, in whom the passions of concupiscence abound, weakens the quality that inclines him to those passions of concupiscence by mortifying his flesh and fasting from food. And it may perhaps be that by the very fact that a predisposing principle of this sort is weakened or destroyed, another corporeal quality that inclines one toward temperate acts is simultaneously generated. But whether this is so or not, and what sort of quality this has to be, is mainly a matter for physicians to determine, since they should have more experience with changes in bodily humors. On the other hand, if the passions are deficient, then what is first generated is something conducive to such passions—whether or not any preceding quality is corrupted. For perhaps it is not\* always the case that when\* one\* corporeal\* quality\* is\* generated\*, another\* is\* corrupted\*.

However, acts of the sentient appetite do not immediately generate a quality of this sort that inclines one toward similar acts; rather, they generate such a quality only mediately. It is instead other acts, subsequent to the appetitive acts, that immediately generate the sort of qualities that incline one toward the passions. An example: Someone who is cold and who, because of the coldness, has only a weak act of temperance desires to eat hot foods, which cause certain corporeal qualities that incline him toward acts of the sentient appetite similar to those he previously had. In such a case, the corporeal qualities are immediately caused not by acts of desiring food, but by the foods themselves. All this is especially true in the case of the virtue of

tient apprehension or cognition. He is claiming that whereas acts of sentient apprehension generate habits in the sentient soul itself, acts of sentient desire do not.

temperance and its acts, since its acts are stirred up and impeded by corporeal changes, e.g., by eating or by abstaining. But whether it is similar for the other virtues, and /186/ how it is similar, is too extensive an issue to be discussed now. My belief, however, is that it is indeed the same with the other virtues, and I see no necessity for positing any sort of habit that is immediately generated by appetitive acts and inclines one toward similar acts.

#### REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, it is evident from what has been said that even though there are acts in the sentient appetite, there are nonetheless no habits, since not every act generates a habit.

### Question 17

#### *Are there passions in the will?*

*For the affirmative:* There are acts in the will. But passions are acts, as was claimed above.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, etc.

*For the opposite:* Passions exist only in the sentient appetite. Therefore, there are no passions in the will.

Here I will first explain one of the terms of the question; second, I will reply to the question.

#### FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I state that by 'passion' I mean any form that exists in an appetitive power, is naturally apt to be regulated by right reason so as to be well ordered, and requires an actual cognition for its own existence. Or, in short, a passion is a form that (i) is distinct from a cognition, (ii) exists subjectively in an appetitive power, and (iii) requires an actual cognition for its own existence. Condition (i) excludes an actual cognition, since an actual cognition is not a passion; /187/ condition (ii) excludes all intellectual habits

<sup>76</sup>. See *Quodlibet* 2.15.

and vegetative operations; condition (iii) excludes habits in the will, since they can exist in the absence of any actual cognition, as is evident in the case of someone who is sleeping.

From this it follows that the passions include acts of the sentient appetite and, in short, all acts of the will as well as the delight and sadness that exist in the will. For these are all forms that (i) are distinct from a cognition, (ii) exist subjectively in appetitive powers, (iii) are able to be regulated, either mediately or immediately, by right reason, and (iv) require an actual cognition for their existence.

#### SECOND ARTICLE

As for the second article, I reply, first of all, that there are passions in the will, since love, hope, fear, and joy are in the will and yet are commonly regarded as passions. Similarly, delight and sadness, which are also passions, are in the will. Therefore, etc.

Second, I claim that some passions of the will are, and some are not, distinct from acts [of the will]. For love and hope are not distinct from acts [of the will], as is evident on the basis of their inseparability from acts; instead, they are acts that are immediately elicited by the will and by habits of the will. On the other hand, delight and sadness are distinct from acts [of the will]—which is clear from the fact that the acts of the will can remain in the absence of delight and sadness. This is evident in the case of a demon, who loves himself as intensely as possible and yet in no way delights in this. Likewise, a good angel has to will against something that [nonetheless] happens—e.g., he might will that a man to whom he has been assigned as a guardian not sin, /188/ and yet the man sins mortally. However, the angel is in no way saddened by this. For just as there is no delight in someone who is damned, so too there is no sadness in someone who is happy in heaven. However, delight and sadness cannot naturally exist in the absence of the acts, since they are caused and conserved by the acts. Therefore, these forms are passions and not acts.

#### AN OBJECTION

But against these claims: According to the Philosopher, we are not praised or blamed for passions.<sup>77</sup> But we are praised and blamed for every form that exists in the will. Therefore, etc.

<sup>77</sup>. *Ethics* 2.4.1105b29–32.

## REPLY TO THE OBJECTION

I reply that the Philosopher is talking about sentient passions that are not within our power—e.g., precipitate acts of the sentient appetite, such as fear and anger, by which (i) a human being is immediately overtaken once the objects are apprehended and that (ii) are not within his power. The same also holds for sorrowing and rejoicing, which belong [even] to children and simpletons, who do not have the use of reason. So we are neither praised nor blamed for such passions. However, precipitate acts of this sort do not exist in the will, since all the acts that exist in the will are within the power of the will.

## REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, I deny the assumption, since some passions are in the will. /189/

## Question 18

*Is it generally true that there are just as many distinctions among acts as there are among habits, and vice versa?*

*For the negative:* Acts of temperance are distinct. And yet temperance, which is a habit, is one. Therefore, etc.

*For the opposite:* A habit is generated by acts. Therefore, distinct habits are generated by distinct acts.

Here I will begin with a distinction; then I will reply to the question.

## FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I claim that 'habit' is taken in two ways, viz., broadly and strictly. It is taken broadly for any quality that is generated after the acts but that can be generated without an act. And that which is a habit in this

sense exists subjectively in the body, not in the soul. For certain corporeal qualities are generated after certain acts of the sentient appetite, and they are not generated immediately by those acts, but are instead generated through the mediation of other, subsequent acts; and yet these qualities can be generated without acts of the sentient appetite. For example, someone who lacks an inclination sufficient for eating at a particular time and place is such that, after an act of eating food, a certain corporeal quality—a quality that inclines him toward an act of desiring food and an act of eating food—is caused in him by alteration and the action of nourishment. Now this quality is not caused by the act of eating, but is instead caused immediately by the act of nourishment; and this quality is apt by nature to cause hunger. But when conditions are suitable, hunger can be adequately\* caused by the mediation of other causes such as vinegar, herbs, etc. /190/

Alternatively, 'habit' is taken strictly for a habit that is generated immediately by an act, and that which is a habit in this sense cannot be generated in any other way.

Habits taken in the first sense are in the body and in the apprehensive part [of the soul]; habits taken in the second sense are in the will.

## SECOND ARTICLE

As for the second article, I claim that the question concerns habits taken not in the first sense, but in the second sense. And as far as this sense is concerned, I reply that there are just as many distinctions among acts as there are among habits, and vice versa. I prove this (i) from the fact that habits that are distinct in species come from acts that are distinct in species, which would not be so if there were not equally many distinctions among them, and also (ii) from the fact that, conversely, acts that are distinct in species cause habits that are distinct in species, which is evident from the fact that a habit generated from those acts inclines one immediately only toward exactly similar acts and not to other acts; and a second habit generated by other acts inclines one toward other acts. Therefore, etc.

Further, causes of the same nature can produce effects of the same nature. But it often happens that the habits that are generated by the acts cannot themselves be of the same species. This is evident in the case of a habit with respect to a complex [sign] and a habit with respect to a noncomplex [sign], and in the case of a habit with respect to a principle and a habit with respect to a conclusion.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, the acts cannot be of the same species, either.

<sup>78</sup> Ockham is here speaking of intellectual habits that have terms and propositions as their objects.

## Problem 2

The second problem is this: Are pain and pleasure caused by acts of desiring and avoiding?

## Problem 3

The third problem is this: It seems that there can be pain and pleasure [in the sentient appetite]—and, likewise, sadness and delight in the will—with respect to /271/ an absent object that is not possessed. For everyone experiences that if he sees and desires a pleasurable object and does not acquire what he desires, he is still delighted in both his sentient appetite and his intellective appetite.

Similarly, if one apprehends a future war from which his senses flee and that his will opposes, then sadness is immediately caused in his will. And yet that war is not possessed [as present]. Therefore, etc.

## Reply to Problem 1

To the first of these problems I reply that the sensible thing that is apt to be sensed in, say, a beating or a wounding causes a bodily quality that is sensed after the corruption of the sensible thing. And that sensation is an immediate cause of the pain.

## Reply to Problem 2

To the second problem I reply that the answer is no—both because (i) desire and avoidance are related to an object that is not possessed, since no one desires what he already has; and because (ii) that which does not exist, when it does not exist, cannot be a cause of anything; but when there is pleasure or pain regarding some object, then the act of desiring [that object] ceases. For example, when someone is inclined toward an object and possesses that object, then he is delighted, as is evident from experience, and at that point the act of desiring [the object] is corrupted. Therefore, etc.

## Reply to Problem 3

To the third problem I reply that there is no sadness or delight, in either the sentient appetite or the will, with respect to absent things that are not possessed and concerning which there are acts /272/ of desiring or avoiding.<sup>56</sup> Instead, there is sadness or delight either (i) with respect to the apprehensive act by which the desired object is apprehended, or (ii) with respect to the act

56. It is important to remember throughout the rest of this paragraph that Ockham is assuming that the desired act—e.g., the act of eating in the example used below—is not possessed.

of desiring or avoiding, or (iii) with respect to both these acts; and each of these acts is actually possessed by the one who is delighted. Likewise, there is sadness or delight in the will with respect to either (i) an act of the intellect or (ii) an act of willing or (iii) an act of willing-against, since it is these acts—and not the desired act—that the will is delighted over or saddened by. For according to the Philosopher, the internal sense is able to apprehend an act of the external senses and also an act of desiring or avoiding, and it is an apprehensive act of this sort that is the immediate cause of pain or pleasure in the sentient appetite. The same holds for the intellect and the will. By contrast, it is evident that the will does not delight in the act that it desires, since someone can (i) be inclined to eat and (ii) will or desire to eat and (iii) will absolutely against the absence of that act of eating, even though he in fact lacks that act and knows that he lacks it. And, consequently, in willing to eat and desiring to eat he will be saddened. Therefore, someone like this cannot delight in the act of eating as long as he does not possess it.

## REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that the consequence is not valid, since it is sufficient that the thing outside the soul be a cause of a cause. /273/

## Question 18

*Do the moral virtues have the passions as their matter?*

*For the negative:* The passions are acts of the virtues. Therefore, they are not the matter of the virtues.

*For the opposite* is Aristotle in the *Ethics* [2.5.1106b16-17].

As far as this question is concerned, I claim, first, that 'matter' is taken in two ways. In one way it is taken properly for one of the two [essential] parts of a composite thing, and this is not the sense in which it is being taken here. In the second way it is taken improperly for the object, in the sense in which we say that what a given science is about is the matter of that science; and this is how 'matter' is being taken here, viz., for the object.

Second, I claim that 'moral virtue' is taken in two ways. In one way it is taken improperly for a quality that (i) is left behind after an act of the sentient appetite and that (ii) is a corporeal quality that inclines one toward appetitive acts. (This sort of quality was explained in the Second Quodlibet.)<sup>57</sup> In the second way 'virtue' is taken [properly] for a virtuous habit of the will.

#### THESIS 1

Given this, my reply to the question is that the moral virtues that are corporeal qualities do *not* have the passions for their matter or object. Rather, the passions are the acts of these virtues and are caused by these habits through the mediation of [sentient] apprehension. And /274/ the same thing that is the object or matter of the act is the object of the virtue that causes such an act and corresponds to that act—and this is a general truth.

#### THESIS 2

A virtue in the second sense has the passions as its matter, since the passions are the common objects of essentially virtuous acts and habits—even though not every such virtue has the passions for its object.<sup>58</sup> For some virtues have the passions as common objects and some have external operations and performances as their matter or object. An example of the first: Temperance and its act have the passions for an object. Justice, on the other hand, does not have the passions as its object and matter, but external operations instead, e.g., distributing goods equally, dividing them equally, [distributing them] liberally\*, etc. For an act of justice is a volition to carry out such operations in the appropriate way; and, consequently, these operations are the objects of the acts and hence also the objects of the habits that incline one to such acts. For it is a general truth that the object of an act and the object of the corresponding habit are the same.

Someone might claim that the object of an act of the will and the object of a passion are the same. I reply that this is not so.

But isn't there any virtue of the will that has *all* the passions for its object? /275/

57. See *Quodlibet* 2.16, Problems and Replies.

58. For the distinction between a common object and a principal object, see *Quodlibet* 3.16, Reply to Problem 2.

I reply that any passion can be an object of the will or an object of any virtue, since any passion\* can be commanded by the will. However, there cannot be one virtue for all the passions. So I therefore claim that a virtuous habit of the will has two kinds of act. One kind is an act elicited by the habit, and the other kind is an act in the sentient appetite, an act that is the object of the habit insofar as it is the object of the act elicited by the habit.

#### REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, it is evident from what has been said that the passions are acts elicited by the corporeal habits, but they are the matter or object of virtues in the will.

### Question 19

*Is any human being able to merit or demerit?*

*For the negative:* A meritorious act is not wholly within the power of a human being; therefore, a human being does not merit through such an act. The antecedent is evident from the fact that charity, which is not within the power of a human being, is required for a meritorious act. The consequence is evident in itself.

*For the opposite* is the Catholic faith.

#### REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that the answer is yes. This is proved (i) by the fact that a human being is able to act in a praiseworthy way and able to act in a blameworthy way and, as a result, is able to merit and demerit; and (ii) by the fact that a human being is a free agent, /276/ and every such agent is able to merit and demerit; and (iii) by the fact that many acts are imputable to a human being and he is thus able to merit and demerit through them.

## REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, I deny the consequence. For the antecedent is true, viz., that no act is wholly within our power. But the consequence is not valid. For even though no act is totally within our power in the sense that every principle required for the act is within our power, nonetheless an act of the will is within our power in such a way that no matter what other principle is posited, the will can still freely elicit or not elicit its own act. This suffices for a meritorious act, and it is in this way that the will merits.

## Question 20

*Is it necessary to posit habits?*

*For the negative:* Everything can be accounted for without habits. For when the object is present, acts can be elicited without habits. Therefore, there is no need to posit habits.

*For the opposite:* An act generates a habit. But it does not generate nothing. Therefore, a habit is something.

## REPLY TO THE QUESTION

*Thesis 1*

As for this question, I claim, first, that it is necessary to posit habits in the body. This is evident from the fact that /282/ after many acts have been elicited, the body's executive power is able to elicit exactly similar acts, acts that it was not previously able to elicit or at least not previously able to elicit as easily—as is clear in the case of scribes, weavers, and other artisans. Therefore, in those executive powers either something is added or something is taken away. And it does not appear that anything is taken away. Therefore, something is added, and this I call a habit.

*Thesis 2*

Second, I reply that it cannot be sufficiently proved that habits have to be posited in the sentient appetite. For all the things we experience to be in

us after a large number of acts of the sentient appetite are such that we can sometimes experience them to be in us after some change in the body without a large number of acts of the sentient appetite. This was explained at length in another Quodlibet;<sup>67</sup> so I will move on now.

*Thesis 3*

Third, I claim that habits have to be posited in the [sentient] apprehensive power. For after a large number of acts of imagining, one comes to be inclined toward exactly similar acts, and one is in no way inclined toward such acts before all the acts of imagining. Therefore, a habit is generated by those acts.

You might object that sometimes the imagination erupts into acts of imagining and acts of speaking without any similar previous acts. This is evident in the case of madmen and lunatics, who have many acts of imagining and say many things that they never previously imagined when they were sane. Likewise, those who are asleep dream of many things that they have not previously imagined. /283/

I reply that in such people there are many acts ordered in different ways. For such acts are ordered differently in health and in sickness, and they are ordered differently in one who is awake and in one who is asleep. But each of these acts [in sickness and in sleep] presupposes an act similar to itself in health and in the waking state. And it is in this way that one who is asleep seems to formulate propositions and syllogisms. For while awake, he has heard propositions and syllogisms and parts thereof, and then\* he imagines things that he heard as a child, and because of a different bodily condition he imagines such acts or sounds in a different order.

*Thesis 4*

Fourth, I claim that it is necessary to posit habits in the intellect. For (i) after a large number of acts of understanding, one becomes inclined and predisposed toward exactly similar acts, whereas before all those acts—especially abstractive acts—one was not at all so inclined or predisposed. Also, (ii) if there were no habits in the intellect, then before all the acts, the intellect would be in potency in the same way as after all the acts—which is false. For after the first act of understanding, when the object has been destroyed or is absent, the intellect is capable of acts that it was not capable of before the first act. And this is the reason why the Philosopher, in *On the Soul* 3 [4-5.429a10-430a25], posits intellectual habits. For once the object has been destroyed, it is by means of a habit that we bring it to mind when we want to. /284/

67. See *Quodlibet* 2.16, Problems and Replies.



## Thesis 5

Fifth, I claim that there is more of a problem concerning the will, since the will cannot will a thing unless that thing is cognized,<sup>68</sup> and at the first cognition it can elicit just as perfect an act as it can after it has elicited many acts. Therefore, it is difficult to prove that it is necessary to posit habits in the will.

Yet the view that there are habits in the will can be reasonably held and argued for. For the will issues forth into an act more easily after many acts than it did before, and it is more inclined toward its act. And, other things being equal in the sentient part of the soul, the will is able to elicit a more intense act after many acts than it was before. An example: Someone who is continent has improper sentient desires and does not follow them. Yet previously, before the [continent] act of the will, he used to follow them. And there is no change here in the sentient part of the soul, since all along he has desires in the sentient part of the soul. But after many [continent] acts, the will is inclined not to follow those desires, whereas previously it was not so inclined—otherwise, he would not be continent. Also, after many acts of loving, the will is more inclined to love than it was before. Also, as everyone experiences in himself, after many acts have been elicited with respect to a given object, the will is able to elicit a contrary act [only] with greater difficulty and sadness than was the case before all of the acts in question. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a habit that is generated by those acts.

## REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, from what has been said it is evident which things\* cannot be accounted for without habits. /285/

## Question 21

*Is a habit an efficient cause of an act?*

*For the negative:* If the answer were yes, then a habit would be a power, since nothing except a power causes an act.

68. Here the translation follows the alternate reading that omits the words *nec sine cognitione*.

*For the opposite:* A habit is a cause of an act, since an act depends upon a habit. And it is none other than an efficient cause.

## REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that a habit is an efficient cause of an act. This is evident from the fact that that upon which a thing depends in such a way that it is wholly unable to exist without it is a cause of that thing. But an act depends upon a habit in this way. Therefore, a habit is a cause of an act.<sup>69</sup> And, as is evident inductively, it is none other than an efficient cause.

Further, when a thing is capable of effectively producing something that it was not previously capable of producing, then either (i) it [now] possesses something that is an efficient cause of that thing or (ii) it now\* lacks some impediment (a clear example is when a candle illuminates a medium because an obstacle has been removed). This is how it is with a habit, because prior to the habit's existence one cannot produce the act when the [external] thing is absent, but once one possesses the habit, he can produce the act when the [external] thing is absent. And no impediment is removed here. Therefore, the habit is a cause.

Further, if a thing is such that (i) when it is posited, a given act is posited, and (ii) when it is not posited, the act cannot be posited naturally, then that thing is a cause of the act. This is the way it is with a habit and /286/ an act. Therefore, etc. For otherwise it would be totally pointless to posit habits, and there would be no need to posit them.

## FIVE OBJECTIONS

Against this: A first act is not caused by a habit. Therefore, not every act is caused by a habit.

Further, there is no circularity\* among essential efficient causes. But an act is an efficient cause of a habit. Therefore, it is not the case that a habit is a cause of an act.

Further, that without which something can exist is not a cause of it. But an act can exist without a habit, as is evident in the case of a first act.

69. It is important to notice that the proposition 'A habit is a cause of an act' is an indefinite proposition equivalent to the particular proposition 'Some habit is a cause of some act'. Below Ockham will point out that it does not follow from what he has said that every act is caused by a habit.

Further, a habit has to be posited [only] because of pleasure—in order that the act might be done pleurably—and not because of activity.

Further, if grace is infused into someone who has a habit that inclines him toward a mortally sinful act—e.g., toward doing something shameful contrary to a divine precept—then such a person possesses a perfect habit and yet cannot elicit the sinful act. And I am talking about an intrinsically vicious act, since such an act is incompatible with grace.<sup>70</sup>

### REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS

To the first of these objections I reply that a first act is caused not by a habit, but by other causes. This is evident from the fact that a first act is an efficient cause of a habit. Therefore, it is not caused by a habit, since it is impossible for what is numerically one thing /287/ to be both a cause and an effect of the same thing. (However, the first act produced in the apprehensive powers when the [external] thing is absent is caused by a habit.) So I did not claim that every act is caused by a habit.

To the next objection I reply that there can be circularity among essential causes with respect to the species but not with respect to what is numerically the same thing.<sup>71</sup> Now the one act is a cause of the habit, as is clear in the case of the first act, since without that act the habit cannot exist naturally; and afterwards the habit is a cause not of that same\* [first] act, but of another act. And this latter act will help strengthen the habit.

Against this: I prove that a habit is a cause of what is numerically the same act [that is a cause of it]: The first act, which generates the habit, can be conserved\* together with the habit, and in that case the habit that is generated will conserve that very same act.

I reply that there is no absurdity in an effect's conserving its own efficient cause in the same subject. And so it is in the proposed case that the habit generated by the first act conserves that act better than it can be conserved without the habit.

To the next objection I reply that different effects of the same species (though not [numerically] the same effect) can come from causes that differ in species—as is evident in the case of heat, which can come from a fire and

70. The point of this objection is to show that a habit is not sufficient to cause an act, with the example serving as a proposed counterexample to the claim that habits are sufficient to cause acts.

71. Let  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  be two acts of the same species, and let  $H$  be the corresponding habit. Ockham's point is that it is possible that  $A_1$  should be a cause of  $H$  and that  $H$  should in turn be a cause of  $A_2$ . But it is impossible that  $A_1$  should be both a cause and an effect of  $H$ .

from the sun. So it is in the case under discussion: The first act can be caused by the [external] object without the habit, and another act of the same species can be caused only by the habit.<sup>72</sup>

To the next objection I reply that it is not only because of pleasure that habits have to be posited. Rather, sometimes a habit is required in order for an act to exist, /288/ as is evident in the case of an act that is caused in the apprehensive powers when the [external] object is absent; sometimes a habit is required in order for an act to be more intense; sometimes a habit is required in order for an act to be elicited more easily, as is evident from the preceding question.<sup>73</sup> I also claim, further, that some habits pleurably incline one toward an act, e.g., a habit of loving, and some habits disagreeably incline one, e.g., a habit of hating—and this because the acts elicited by the habits are pleurable or disagreeable.

To the final objection I reply that one who has an intrinsically vicious habit of this sort along with the grace is able to elicit an act that follows the inclination of the habit, but in that case the grace will be destroyed. And so one cannot elicit such an act and have the grace remain.

You might object that experience shows the opposite.

I reply that the acts that we experience in the presence of the grace are in the sentient part of the soul and not in the will.

### REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that a habit is not a power in the sense in which the authors speak of a power. For what they call a first power is able to elicit and to receive diverse and contrary acts; and a habit is not a power in that sense.

## Question 22

*Does the inclination of a form differ in reality from the form itself?*

*For the negative:* A habit inclines the will [even] when the will is the subject of an act that is contrary to the habit; and, consequently, the habit's inclination

72. Here the translation follows the alternate reading that omits the word *aliquando*.

73. See *Quodlibet* 3.20, Theses 3, 4, and 5.

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*William of Ockham*  
*Quodlibetal*  
*Questions*

VOLUME 1

*Quodlibets 1-4*

*Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso*

*and Francis E. Kelley*

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