

## | Utrum virtutes sint connexae

### [Art. I: Conclusiones ad propositum necessariae]

Circa istam quaestionem<sup>1</sup> sunt quattuor facienda: p r i m o, praemittendae sunt aliquae conclusiones necessariae ad propositum; s e c u n d o, aliquae distinctiones; t e r t i o, respondendum est ad quaestionem; q u a r t o, movenda sunt aliqua dubia, et solvenda.

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### [Conclusio prima]

Quantum ad primum est prima conclusio,<sup>2</sup> quod quanta est distinctio habituum tanta est actuum, ita quod aequalis est. Hoc probatur primo, quia omnia individua aequae perfecta inclinativa, sive elicitiva sive receptiva, si sint eiusdem rationis, possunt in effectus eiusdem rationis, et si non possunt in effectus eiusdem rationis, illa principia non sunt eiusdem rationis; sed habitus generati ex actibus sunt effectus illorum, sicut alibi patet in tertio

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1. On the history of the question of whether the virtues are connected, see chapter 4 above.

a. In this translation, the paragraphs are numbered according to the line numbers with which the paragraphs begin in the critical edition. Apart from a few notes by the translator, most of the notes appear only on the facing page with the Latin text. The Latin notes are taken for the most part from the critical edition and have been slightly revised, chiefly by changing their form not their content.

2. Cf. OTh VI, 402–4; OTh I, 213–20.

## | On the Connection of the Virtues

### [Art. 1: Prefatory Conclusions]

3. Concerning this question,<sup>1</sup> there are four things we should do. First, we should preface the discussion with some conclusions necessary to the question being considered; second, we should make some distinctions. Third, we should reply to the question. Fourth, we should state and resolve some doubts.<sup>a</sup>

### [First Conclusion]

9. As to the first article, the first conclusion<sup>2</sup> is that the distinction between habits is as great as the distinction between acts. That the distinction is equal is proved, first because all equally perfect individual things of the same kind—whether inclinative, elicitive, or receptive—are capable of producing effects of the same kind; if they are not capable of effects of the same kind, they are not principles of the same kind. But habits generated by acts are effects produced by those acts, as is evident elsewhere—in

O c k h a m,<sup>3</sup> et non semper sunt eiusdem speciei nec esse possunt, sicut patet de habitu respectu incomplexi et complexi, de habitu respectu principii et conclusionis; igitur nec actus generativi istorum.

Praeterea si actus distinctorum obiectorum specie non distinguerentur specie, hoc non esset nisi q u i a causae<sup>4</sup> distinctae specie possunt in eundem effectum specie, et ideo non obstante quod habitus, qui sunt causa actuum, distinguuntur specie, tamen ipsi actus possunt esse eiusdem speciei; v e l propter ordinem obiectorum,<sup>5</sup> sicut est de principio et conclusione, respectu quorum possunt esse actus eiusdem speciei propter ordinem eorum. Sed primum<sup>6</sup> non impedit, quia si sic, cum actus sint causa habituum sicut e converso, numquam erit via ad probandum distinctionem specificam inter aliquos habitus, quia per te causae distinctae specie etc.; igitur quantumcumque ponatur distinctio specifica in actibus, numquam ponetur propter hoc quod erit in habitibus, quod falsum est. Nec secundum<sup>7</sup> impedit, quia habitus principiorum non possunt generari ex actibus conclusionum nec ad tales actus inclinare; sed si actus principiorum et conclusionum essent eiusdem speciei, possent habitus istorum ad tales actus inclinare; ergo ordo obiectorum non impedit distinctionem specificam actuum.

Praeterea, II *Ethicorum*,<sup>8</sup> habitus ex eisdem generantur et augmentantur; sed actus, per quos habitus distinctarum specierum augmentantur, sunt alterius speciei; igitur et actus ex quibus generantur.

Praeterea [probat] per idem argumentum per quod I o a n n e s probat in *Metaphysica*<sup>9</sup> distinctionem specificam inter habitum principii et conclusionis: quia scilicet aliquis potest habitualiter scire principium et errare circa conclusionem, sed idem

b. Here the reporter responsible for the written text has recorded Ockham's reference to his own works in the third person. It is not a sign that we should question the authenticity of *De connexione*, but that we have a *reportatio*, not a written version approved by Ockham. See the preface above.

3. Cf. OTh VI, 397–98; OTh VI, 205.

4. Cf. OTh I, 95.

5. Cf. OTh V, 393.

6. See lines 21–22.

7. See lines 24–25.

8. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 2.2.1105a13–15; OTh VI, 392.

9. Cf. Scotus, *In Metaph.* VI q.1 n.4, VII: 305; ed. St. Bonaventure n.20–21.

Ockham's<sup>b</sup> commentary on the third book of the *Sentences*<sup>3</sup>—and habits do not always belong to the same species, nor could they belong to the same species, as is evident in the case of habits pertaining to complex and incomplex [objects], and habits pertaining to principles and conclusions. Therefore, neither do the acts that generate these habits belong to the same species.

20. Besides, if acts [terminating at] specifically distinct objects were not specifically distinct, this would only be because (1) specifically distinct causes<sup>4</sup> can [produce] specifically the same effect, and therefore, notwithstanding [the fact that] the habits that are the cause of the acts are specifically distinct, the acts themselves can be specifically the same; or (2) on account of the order of the objects,<sup>5</sup> such as principle and conclusion, in regard to which there can be acts of the same species because of their order. But the first [reason]<sup>6</sup> does not stand in the way, since if it held, there would never be a way to prove a specific distinction between any habits. For acts are the cause of habits, just as conversely [habits cause acts], and according to you specifically distinct causes [produce distinct effects]. Therefore, however great the specific distinction of acts may be, there would never be [a distinction] among habits, which is false. Neither does the second [reason]<sup>7</sup> stand in the way, since a habit concerning principles cannot be generated from acts in regard to conclusions or incline us to such acts; but if the acts [terminating at] principles and conclusions were specifically the same, habits could incline to such acts; therefore the order of objects does not stand in the way of [concluding that there is] a specific distinction between acts.

37. Besides, [according to] *Ethics*, book 2,<sup>8</sup> habits are generated and augmented by the same [acts]; but the acts by means of which specifically distinct habits are augmented are specifically distinct; therefore so, too, are the acts on the basis of which they are generated.

41. Besides, the same argument that John used in the *Metaphysics*<sup>9</sup> commentary to demonstrate a specific distinction between habits in regard to a principle and a conclusion proves this point. Namely, a person can habitually, scientifically know a

principium non potest simul habitualiter sciri et ignorari ignorantia dispositionis, igitur est distinctio specifica inter tales habitus. Idem argumentum concludit distinctionem specificam inter actus cognoscendi principium et conclusionem. Quaere in Prologo Ockham, de unitate theologiae.<sup>10</sup>

Si quaeras utrum respectu omnium obiectorum distinguantur actus specie: respondeo quod non, sed universaliter respectu illorum obiectorum, sive complexorum sive incomplexorum, respectu quorum sunt habitus distincti specie, respectu illorum sunt actus distincti specie; et respectu quorum sunt habitus eiusdem speciei, sunt et actus eiusdem speciei. Et ideo respectu eiusdem principii tam habitus quam actus generati in diversis intellectibus sunt eiusdem speciei, et eodem modo est de obiecto aliquo incomplexo.

#### [Conclusio secunda]

Secunda conclusio<sup>11</sup> est quod respectu obiectorum distinctorum specie sunt actus distincti specie. Hoc patet, quia aliter non posset probari distinctio specifica actuum, quia si illi essent eiusdem speciei, multo magis actus respectu obiectorum eiusdem speciei essent eiusdem speciei, et sic omnes actus essent eiusdem speciei.

Praeterea habitus generatus praecise ex actibus respectu unius obiecti numquam inclinat ad actum respectu alterius obiecti alterius speciei, quia aliter habens habitum respectu unius obiecti praecise, posset statim in actum respectu obiecti alterius speciei, quod est manifeste falsum. Sed si actus [respectu] illorum obiectorum essent eiusdem speciei, tunc habitus respectu unius posset inclinare modo praedicto, quia si actus essent eiusdem speciei, et habitus, ex prima conclusione;<sup>12</sup> et per consequens possent causare effectus eiusdem rationis, ex eadem. Igitur etc.

Praeterea non est maior ratio quod aliqui actus habentes obiecta distincta specie sint distincti specie quam alii, ut videtur; sed aliqui distinguuntur specie, sicut patet de cognitione unius muscae vel albedinis et Dei; igitur etc.

c. Know scientifically (*scire*) refers to the Aristotelian concept of science in terms of logical demonstrations from first principles.

d. Dispositional ignorance is not knowing the truth because you believe something false—assent to the opposite of a true statement—not simple ignorance.

10. Cf. OTh I, 213–20.

11. Cf. OTh I, 62–63.

12. See lines 9–11.

principle and be mistaken about a conclusion;<sup>c</sup> but a person cannot at the same time habitually know scientifically and be dispositionally ignorant of the same principle;<sup>d</sup> therefore there is a specific distinction between such habits. The same argument shows that there is a specific distinction between the acts of knowing a principle and a conclusion. See Ockham's prologue, his discussion of the unity of theology.<sup>10</sup>

50. If you ask whether the acts pertaining to all distinct objects are distinguished by species, my answer is no. Rather, it is universally true that when habits are specifically distinct (whether they pertain to complex or incomplex objects), the corresponding acts are specifically distinct; and when habits are specifically the same, acts are also specifically the same. And therefore, with respect to the same principle, both the habits and the acts generated in the intellects of different people are specifically the same; the same is true of any incomplex object.

#### [Second Conclusion]

60. The second conclusion<sup>11</sup> is that there are specifically distinct acts with respect to specifically distinct objects. This is evident; otherwise it would be impossible to prove that acts are specifically distinct. For if these acts belonged to the same species, then a fortiori acts with respect to objects of the same species would belong to the same species, and thus all acts would belong to the same species.

66. Besides, a habit generated precisely by acts with respect to one object never inclines us to an act with respect to another object of a different species. Otherwise someone with a habit with respect to precisely one object could immediately elicit an act with respect to an object of another species, which is manifestly false. But if an act with respect to those objects were specifically the same, then a habit with respect to one could incline in the aforesaid manner. For if the acts were specifically the same, so, too, the habits (from the first conclusion),<sup>12</sup> and consequently they could cause an effect of the same kind (from the same [conclusion]). Therefore, etc.

75. Besides, there is no more reason that some acts having specifically distinct objects should be specifically distinct than others, as it appears. But some [acts] are specifically distinguished, as is evident concerning cognition of one fly or [one] whiteness and cognition of God. Therefore, etc.

Praeterea respectu eiusdem obiecti numero possunt esse actus distincti specie, sicut patet de cognitione intuitiva et abstractiva respectu incomplexi, de actu sciendi et dubitandi respectu complexi; igitur multo magis respectu obiectorum distinctorum specie sunt distincti actus specie.

Praeterea aliter posset, stante eodem actu in intellectu, aliquid primo intelligi per illum actum et postea non intelligi, quod falsum est. Assumptum patet, quia si per unum actum intelligam obiectum aliquod praecise, et per alium actum intelligam illud obiectum et aliud alterius speciei, cum secundum opinionem I o a n n i s<sup>13</sup> potest talis actus habens duo obiecta terminari ad primum licet non ad secundum, igitur per secundum actum primo intelligitur secundum obiectum et post non intelligitur, stante secundo actu; igitur etc. Et tunc respectu illius primi obiecti erunt simul duo actus eiusdem speciei, quod videtur inconveniens. Sed quia istud argumentum fundatur super falsum, scilicet quod aliquid primo potest intelligi per aliquem actum, et postea, stante eodem actu, non intelligitur, sicut patet in *Ordinatione Ockham*,<sup>14</sup> ideo huic non innitor.

### [Conclusio tertia]

Tertia conclusio<sup>15</sup> est quod aliquis actus est necessario et intrinsece virtuosus. Hoc probatur, quia impossibile est quod aliquis actus contingenter virtuosus, — sic scilicet quod potest indifferenter dici virtuosus vel vitiosus —, fiat determinate virtuosus propter novitatem alicuius actus non necessario virtuosus, quia per nullum actum contingenter virtuosum modo praedicto fit alius actus sive denominatur determinate virtuosus. Quia si sic, aut ille secundus actus, qui est contingenter virtuosus, erit determinate virtuosus per aliquem alium actum qui est necessario virtuosus, aut per actum contingenter virtuosum. Si primo modo, tunc eadem ratione esset standum in secundo, et similiter tunc habetur propositum, quod est aliquis actus in homine necessario virtuosus. Si secundo modo, erit processus in infinitum, vel stabitur ad aliquem actum necessario virtuosum, et sic habetur propositum.

13. Cf. Scotus, *Ord.* I d.1 p.1 q.2 n.42–43, II: 26–30; Ockham, *OTH* I, 451–52.

14. Cf. *OTH* I, 453–55.

15. Cf. *OTH* VI, 359–62, 375, 385–87; *OTH* VIII, 263; *OTH* IX, 255; *Summa Halesiana*, published as Alexander de Hales, *Summa theol.* II–II n.388 (Quaracchi, 1930) III: 388b; Lottin, *PM* II: 421–23.

79. Besides, there can be acts that are specifically distinct with respect to numerically the same object, as is evident from intuitive and abstractive cognition regarding an incomplex object or from acts of knowing scientifically and doubting with respect to a complex object. Therefore, a fortiori there are specifically distinct acts regarding objects that are specifically distinct.

84. Besides, otherwise, with the same act remaining in the intellect, something could first be understood by means of that act and afterward not understood, which is false. The assumption is evident, since if we may understand some precise object by means of one act, and by means of another [second] act we understand that object and another, specifically different [object], then by means of that second act we can first understand the second object and afterward not understand it. This is because in John's opinion<sup>13</sup> such an act having two objects can be terminated at the first, and yet not at the second object. This could happen while the second act remains, therefore etc. And then with respect to that first object there will simultaneously be two specifically distinct acts, which is absurd. But I will not rely on this argument, because it is based on something false—namely, [the assumption] that something can first be understood by means of some act and afterward not understand while the same act remains, as is evident in Ockham's *Ordinatio*.<sup>14</sup>

### [Third Conclusion]

99. The third conclusion<sup>15</sup> is that some act is necessarily and intrinsically virtuous. This is proved because it is impossible that some contingently virtuous act—namely, an act that can be called indifferently virtuous or vicious—be made determinately virtuous on account of some newly elicited act that is not necessarily virtuous; for no act that is contingently virtuous in the manner described makes another act determinately virtuous or causes it to be so denominated. For if this could happen, either the second act that is contingently virtuous will be determinately virtuous in virtue of some other act that is necessarily virtuous; or it will be determinately virtuous in virtue of a contingently virtuous act. If we choose the first alternative, then by the same reasoning the process will stop at the second act, and we have what we proposed to show—that there is some necessarily virtuous human act. If we choose the second alternative, there will be an infinite regress, or the process will stop at some necessarily virtuous act, so that we have what we proposed to show.

Sed actus hominis tam exteriores quam interiores, puta intelligere et velle, — secundum quod velle<sup>16</sup> est actus indifferens —, sunt contingenter virtuosus. Exemplum: ire ad ecclesiam propter finem debitum primo est actus virtuosus et, stante eodem ire ad ecclesiam, propter malum finem est vitiosus, et per consequens est contingenter virtuosus. Eodem modo est de intelligere et speculari: primo propter debitum finem, erit istud intelligere virtuosum, et post, stante eodem actu in intellectu, mutata intentione, scilicet quod talis actus continuetur propter indebitum finem, erit illa speculatio vitiosa, et per consequens est contingenter virtuosa illa speculatio.

Ideo dico quod est dare aliquem actum necessario primo virtuosum, qui est actus primo laudabilis et perfecte circumstantionatus, qui est ita virtuosus quod non potest fieri vitiosus, sicut velle facere aliquid quia est praeceptum divinum, est ita virtuosus quod non potest fieri vitiosus, stante praecepto divino. Et ex tali actu generatur virtus, de qua dicunt *S a n c t i*<sup>17</sup> quod virtute nemo potest male uti.

#### [Conclusio quarta]

Quarta conclusio<sup>18</sup> est quod actus primo et necessario virtuosus est actus voluntatis. Hoc patet primo, quia ille solus est primo laudabilis vel vituperabilis, alii autem non nisi secundario et per quandam denominationem extrinsecam, puta per hoc quod eliciuntur conformiter actui voluntatis. Praeterea quilibet alius actus ab actu voluntatis potest idem manens esse vitiosus vel virtuosus, iste autem solus sic est virtuosus quod non potest fieri vitiosus, sicut patet supra in tertia conclusione. Praeterea secundum *S a n c t o s*<sup>19</sup> nullus actus est laudabilis vel vituperabilis nisi propter intentionem bonam vel malam, intentio autem est actus voluntatis, igitur etc. Praeterea *A n s e l m u s*<sup>20</sup> sola voluntas punitur, sicut sola peccat, igitur etc.

#### [Conclusio quinta]

Quinta conclusio est quod nullus alius actus ab actu voluntatis est intrinsece virtuosus vel vitiosus, tum quia quilibet alius

16. Cf. OTh VI, 383–87.

17. Cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* II c.19 n.50 (PL 32, 1268).

18. Cf. OTh VIII, 297; OTh VI, 359–62, 375; OTh VIII, 428.

19. Cf. Lombard, *Sent.* II d.40 n.2, I: 557; Aquinas, *ST* I–II q.19 a.7.

20. Cf. Anselm, *De conceptu virginali* c.4, ed. Schmitt (Rome, 1950)

113. But both the exterior and the interior acts of a man—such as understanding and willing (insofar as the act of willing<sup>16</sup> is a morally indifferent act)—are contingently virtuous. For example, going to church on account of the proper end is a virtuous act at first, and yet the same act, continued on account of a wicked end, is vicious; consequently the act is contingently virtuous. The same thing can be said about understanding and speculating: the act of understanding is first virtuous on account of a proper end, and afterward, while the same act remains in the intellect, if our intention changes—namely, so that the act is continued on account of an improper end—it will be vicious speculation; consequently that speculation is contingently virtuous.

124. Therefore I hold that some primary, necessarily virtuous act must be granted: a primary praiseworthy act in perfect circumstances, an act so virtuous that it cannot be rendered vicious. Willing to do something because it is divinely commanded is such an act; it is virtuous in such a way that it cannot be rendered vicious, given divine precept. The saints<sup>17</sup> are speaking of the virtue generated by this kind of act when they speak of the virtue that no one can abuse.

#### [Fourth Conclusion]

132. The fourth conclusion<sup>18</sup> is that a primary, necessarily virtuous act is an act of will. This is evident first because that act alone is primarily praiseworthy or blameworthy, while other acts are so only secondarily and in virtue of some extrinsic denomination—for example, in virtue of their being elicited in conformity with an act of will. Besides, any act, other than an act of will, can be either virtuous or vicious while remaining the same; but that act of will alone is virtuous in such a way that it cannot be made vicious, as it evident above in the third conclusion. Moreover, according to the saints<sup>19</sup> no act is praiseworthy or blameworthy unless on account of a good or a bad intention; but an intention is an act of will; therefore etc. Besides, according to Anselm,<sup>20</sup> just as only the will sins, only the will is punished, therefore etc.

#### [Fifth Conclusion]

145. The fifth conclusion is that no act other than an act of will is intrinsically virtuous or vicious. For [1] any other act, while re-

idem manens potest indifferenter esse laudabilis et vituperabilis, et primo laudabilis quando conformatur volitioni rectae, et post vituperabilis quando conformatur volitioni vitiosae, sicut supra patet in tertia conclusione; tum quia nullus actus est vitiosus nisi sit voluntarius et in potestate voluntatis, quia peccatum adeo est voluntarium<sup>21</sup> etc.; sed actus exterior potest primo esse in potestate voluntatis, puta quod aliquis dimittat se in praecipitium, et post descendendo potest illum actum simpliciter meritorie nolle propter Deum, sicut supra patet in dubitationibus istius quaterni;<sup>22</sup> igitur etc. 150 155

[Conclusio sexta]

Sexta conclusio<sup>23</sup> est quod nullus alius habitus ab habitu voluntatis est intrinsece et perfecte virtuosus, quia quilibet alius inclinat indifferenter ad actus laudabiles et vituperabiles. 160

21. Cf. Augustine, *De vera religione* 14 n.27 (PL 34, 133): "Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium" (Indeed, the wickedness of sin is voluntary to so great an extent that it is not sin at all if it is not voluntary).

e. Here Ockham's truncated quotation has been completed.

22. Cf. OTh VIII, 263-64.

23. Cf. OTh VI, 366.

maining the same, can be praiseworthy or blameworthy indifferently; it can first be praiseworthy when it is in conformity with right will, and afterward blameworthy when it is in conformity with vicious will, as is evident above in the third conclusion. [2] No act is vicious unless it is voluntary and in the power of the will, because sin is such a voluntary<sup>21</sup> [evil that if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin at all];<sup>e</sup> but an exterior act can be first in the power of the will [and afterward cease to be in the power of the will]; therefore, etc. Suppose, for example, that someone throws herself over a precipice: while falling she can simply and meritoriously reject this act for God's sake, as is evident in the case described above in the doubts found in this quire.<sup>22</sup>

[Sixth Conclusion]

158. The sixth conclusion<sup>23</sup> is that no habit other than a habit of the will is intrinsically and perfectly virtuous, since any other habit inclines indifferently to praiseworthy and blameworthy acts. ★

## | [Art. II: Distinctiones praeviae]

## [Distinctio prima]

Circa secundum articulum est prima distinctio, quod prudencia accipitur quadrupliciter:<sup>1</sup> u n o m o d o, accipitur pro omni  
 ① notitia directiva respectu cuiuscumque agibilis mediate vel im-  
mediate, sicut accipit A u g u s t i n u s prudentiam, I *De libero*  
*arbitrio*.<sup>2</sup> Et isto modo tam notitia evidens alicuius universalis pro-  
 positionis quae evidenter cognoscitur per doctrinam, quia procedit  
 ex propositionibus per se notis, quae notitia scientifica proprie est  
 scientia moralis, quam notitia evidens propositionis universalis  
 quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, quae notitia  
 etiam est scientia moralis, est prudentia. Exemplum primi: 'omni  
 benefactori est benefaciendum'; exemplum secundi: 'quilibet ira-  
 cundus per pulchra verba est leniendus'.

② Alio modo, accipitur pro notitia evidenti immediate  
directiva circa aliquod agibile particulare, et hoc pro notitia ali-  
 cuius propositionis particularis quae evidenter sequitur ex univer-  
 sali propositione per se nota tamquam maiori et per doctrinam.  
 Exemplum: 'isti est sic benefaciendum,' quae sequitur evidenter ex  
 ista 'omni benefactori' etc.

1. Cf. Scotus, *In Metaph.* VI q.1 n.14, VII: 313-14; ed. St. Bonaventure n.68.

2. Cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I c.13 n.27 (PL 32, 1235).

## | [Art. II]: Prefatory Distinctions]

## [First Distinction]

2. The first distinction of the second article concerns prudence, which can be considered in four ways.<sup>1</sup> In one mode, it is taken as all knowledge directive with respect to any possible action what-  
ever, whether mediate or immediately; this is the manner in  
 which Augustine considered prudence in the first book of *On the Freedom of the Will*.<sup>2</sup> In this sense, prudence refers to two kinds of evident knowledge. It refers [1] to evident knowledge of some universal proposition that we evidently know from teaching, be-  
 cause it proceeds from self-evident propositions; this scientific knowledge is moral science properly speaking. Prudence also re-  
fers [2] to evident knowledge of a universal proposition that we  
can only know evidently in virtue of experience; this knowledge, too, is moral science. An example of the first kind of prudence is the proposition: "everyone who acts generously should be treated generously"; an example of the second, "any irascible person should be mollified with fine words."

14. In another mode, prudence is taken as evident knowl-  
edge that is immediately directive in regard to some particular possible action. In this sense it refers to knowledge of some particular proposition that evidently follows from teaching and from a self-evident universal proposition, as from a major proposition. For example: "this man should be treated generously," which follows evidently from the proposition "everyone who acts generously," etc.

③ Tertio modo, accipitur pro notitia immediate direc-  
tiva accepta per experientiam solum respectu alicuius agibilis. Ex-  
 emplum: 'iste iracundus est leniendus per pulchra verba'. Et haec  
 notitia est solum respectu alicuius propositionis particularis cog-  
 nita per experientiam; et haec videtur esse prudentia proprie dicta  
 secundum intentionem Philosophi,<sup>3</sup> prout distinguitur  
 a scientia morali.

④ Quarto modo, accipitur<sup>4</sup> pro aliquo aggregato ex  
omni notitia immediate directiva, sive habeatur per doctrinam  
sive per experientiam, circa omnia opera humana requisita ad bene  
vivere simpliciter. Et isto modo prudentia non est una notitia  
 tantum, sed includit tot notitias quot sunt virtutes morales requi-  
 sitae ad simpliciter bene vivere, quia quaelibet virtus moralis habet  
 propriam prudentiam et notitiam directivam.

Quod probatur, quia prudentia est notitia complexa; nunc au-  
 tem ubi est aliud et aliud complexum, ibi est alia et alia notitia;  
 cum igitur aliud et aliud sit complexum, cuius notitia est immedi-  
 ate directiva respectu operationum unius virtutis et alterius, igitur  
 erit alia et alia prudentia.

Praeterea aliquis potest evidenter scire unam conclusionem  
 practicam cuius notitia immediate dirigit, circa materiam unius  
 virtutis, operationes, et ignorare ignorantia dispositionis per ha-  
 bitum erroris aliam conclusionem cuius notitia esset immediate  
 directiva operationum circa obiectum alterius virtutis. Sicut aliquis  
 potest scire evidenter istam conclusionem, quod homo debet velle  
 temperate vivere, et errare circa istam conclusionem, pro defen-  
 sione huius articuli 'Deus est trinus et unus' est moriendum vo-  
 luntarie, quia aliquis potest credere hunc articulum esse falsum.  
 Igitur notitia directiva respectu unius et alterius est alia et alia,  
 quia aliter impossibile esset scire evidenter unam conclusionem  
 practicam et ignorare aliam.

Et isto modo potest probari distinctio, non tantum numeralis  
 inter istas prudentias, sed etiam specifica, quia quandocumque  
 aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei, cum quocumque stat unum, et reli-  
 quum; et si cum aliquo alio stat unum cum quo non potest stare  
 reliquum, illa distinguuntur specie; exemplum de albedine et ni-

3. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 6.5-9.1140a24-1142a16.

4. Cf. OTh VI, 419; Petrus I. Olivi, *Quaestio de connexion virtutum*  
 (Lottin, *PM* VI: 630); Scotus, *Collatio* I n.2-4, V: 132-34.

a. Dispositional ignorance is belief in the opposite of a truth. Cf.  
 the comment at a.1 41.

20. In a third mode, prudence is taken as knowledge, gained  
only in virtue of experience, immediately directive in regard to  
some possible action. An example is: "this irascible person should  
 be mollified with fine words." This knowledge applies only to  
 some particular proposition known by experience. It seems to be  
 what the Philosopher<sup>3</sup> intends by prudence properly speaking,  
 insofar as prudence is distinguished from moral science.

27. In a fourth mode, prudence is taken as an aggregate of  
all immediately directive knowledge,<sup>4</sup> whether gained from  
teaching or from experience, applied to all human works requi-  
site for living well, considered absolutely or unconditionally. And  
 in this mode prudence is not a single knowledge only, but it in-  
 cludes as many knowledges as there are moral virtues requisite  
 to living well, considered absolutely. For any moral virtue has its  
 own prudence and directive knowledge.

34. This can be proved because prudence is propositional  
 knowledge. But where there are different propositional expres-  
 sions, there are different knowledges. Therefore, since there are  
different propositional expressions whose knowledge is immedi-  
ately directive in regard to the operations of different virtues,  
there are different prudences.

39. Besides, someone can evidently and scientifically know  
 one practical conclusion, the knowledge of which immediately di-  
 rects operations in regard to the subject matter of one virtue, and  
 at the same time be ignorant of another conclusion (in virtue of a  
 habitual error producing dispositional ignorance),<sup>a</sup> the knowl-  
 edge of which would immediately direct operations in regard to  
 the object of another virtue. For example, someone can evidently  
 know scientifically this conclusion, "a man ought to wish to live  
 temperately," and be mistaken about this conclusion, "one ought  
 to be willing to die in defense of this article of faith 'God is three  
 and one'"; for someone could believe that that article of faith was  
 false. Therefore directive knowledge regarding one is different  
 from directive knowledge of the other; otherwise it would be im-  
 possible evidently and scientifically to know one practical conclu-  
 sion and be ignorant of another.

51. In this manner we can prove that there is not only a nu-  
merical distinction between these prudences, but also a specific  
distinction. For whenever two things belong to the same species,  
 whatever is compatible with one is compatible with the other;



gredine et dulcedine in lacte. Sed scientia unius conclusionis stat cum errore alterius conclusionis practicae, sicut patet prius, et non stat cum errore eiusdem conclusionis simul propter repugnantiam formalem. Igitur scientia unius conclusionis et alterius distinguuntur non tantum numero sed specie.

Si enim essent eiusdem speciei, sicut scientia stat cum errore alterius conclusionis, sic staret cum errore istius conclusionis, quia scientia alia alterius bene potest stare cum errore istius conclusionis. Sicut si albedo stat cum dulcedine in lacte et non stat cum nigredine, ideo nigredo et dulcedo distinguuntur specie, quia si non, sicut dulcedo stat cum albedine, sic nigredo staret cum dulcedine. De ista unitate quaere in I o a n n e et O c k h a m, de unitate scientiae et diversitate respectu diversorum principiorum et conclusionum speculabilium,<sup>5</sup> et dicas uniformiter hic et ibi, quia eadem est difficultas omnino et non maior neque minor.

Quomodo autem prudentia distinguitur a scientia morali et quomodo non, et exempla de prudentia tribus primis modis accepta,<sup>6</sup> quaere supra in isto quaternio, in dubitatione de virtutibus moralibus.<sup>7</sup>

#### [Distinctio secunda]

Secunda distinctio est quod habituum moralium quidam sunt geniti ex actibus imperativis executionis formaliter, quidam sunt geniti ex actibus respectu eorundem obiectorum, qui actus non sunt formaliter imperativi executionis sed tantum aequivalenter imperativi, quia ad illos actus non inclinatur habitus talis quando est impedimentum executionis, sed amoto omni impedimento, tunc ad tales actus inclinatur habitus de necessitate.

Exemplum p r i m i: aliquis vult patienter sustinere mortem pro defensione fidei, et intentata sibi morte, imperat potentiis sustinere talem poenam sine rebellione. Istud imperium non est nisi velle actualiter sine contradictione sustinere mortem quando mors

b. Milk is both white and sweet, but whiteness and sweetness are distinct, since sweetness is compatible with blackness, but whiteness is not. See line 65 below.

c. Here "whiteness" has been corrected from "sweetness," following Augustinus de Ratisbona, since otherwise the example fails.

5. Cf. Scotus, *Quaest. in Metaph. Aristot.* VI q.1 n.4, VII: 305; ed. St. Bonaventure n.20-21; Ockham, OTh I, 215-17; OTh VI, 287-89.

6. Lines 3-26.

7. Cf. OTh I, 317-21.

and if something is compatible with one and not compatible with the other, those things are specifically distinct; there is the example of whiteness, blackness, and sweetness in milk.<sup>b</sup> But scientific knowledge of one conclusion is compatible with error concerning another practical conclusion, as is evident from what was said above; and scientific knowledge is not consistent with error concerning the same conclusion at the same time, on account of formal incompatibility. Therefore scientific knowledge of one conclusion is not only numerically, but specifically distinct from scientific knowledge of another conclusion.

61. If they were of the same species, then, just as scientific knowledge is consistent with error concerning another conclusion, it would be consistent with error concerning this conclusion itself; for different scientific knowledge of another [conclusion] can well be compatible with error concerning this conclusion itself. Similarly, if whiteness is compatible with sweetness in milk and not with blackness, then blackness and sweetness are specifically distinct, since if they were not, then, just as sweetness is compatible with whiteness, so too blackness would be compatible with whiteness.<sup>c</sup> Concerning this unity, see John and Ockham on the unity of science and its diversity with respect to diverse speculative principles and conclusions.<sup>5</sup> And you should say the same thing here and there, since it is altogether the same difficulty, and neither greater nor lesser.

71. Now concerning how prudence is and is not distinct from moral science and the examples of prudence in the first three modes,<sup>6</sup> see above in this quire, in the doubt about the moral virtues.<sup>7</sup>

#### [Second Distinction]

76. The second distinction concerns moral habits. Some moral habits are engendered by acts that formally command execution. Others are engendered by acts with respect to the same objects but not by formally executive, imperative acts, only by equivalent imperative acts. For such a habit does not incline us to perform those acts when there is an impediment to their execution; although once every impediment is removed, that habit necessarily inclines us to such acts.

83. An example of the first kind of moral habit: someone wills patiently to sustain death for the sake of defending the faith; and intent on her death she commands her faculties to sustain this punishment without rebellion. This command is nothing other than willing without contradiction actually to sustain death

sibi offertur. Aliud exemplum est: aliquis habens multas divitias vult actualiter illas dare pauperibus pro amore Dei, et imperat actualiter, amoto impedimento, potentiis executivis ut exsequantur. Quod imperium non est aliud quam velle sic actualiter dare, amoto omni impedimento; si enim esset impedimentum, tunc non posset rationabiliter velle dare absolute sed tantum condicionaliter, puta si tale impedimentum non esset.

Exemplum s e c u n d i: aliquis vellet sustinere mortem pro defensione fidei, si mors immineret sibi, et non esset impedimentum. Similiter, quantum ad aliud exemplum, aliquis vellet libenter dare divitias pro amore Dei, si eas haberet, et non esset aliud impedimentum; sed quia non habet, ideo non potest rationabiliter illas actualiter absolute dare propter impedimentum. Istud velle est actus imperativus non formaliter sed tantum aequivalenter.

Ex istis actibus generantur distincti habitus specie, tum propter distinctionem obiectorum specificam, quia unus actus habet impedimentum pro obiecto, alius, qui est formaliter imperativus, non habet; tum quia quantumcumque habitus ille generatus ex actibus imperativis aequivalenter augeretur in infinitum, numquam inclinaret ad actum imperativum formaliter. Distinctio istorum patet per separabilitatem actuum, quia aliquis potest habere actum imperativum aequivalenter, etsi numquam habeat actum imperativum formaliter.

#### [Distinctio tertia]

Tertia distinctio est quod iustitia et quaelibet una virtus moralis, secundum quod non est alia virtus nec formaliter nec aequivalenter, habet quinque gradus, non quidem eiusdem speciei, sed distinctarum specierum.

#### [Quinque gradus virtutis]

P r i m u s g r a d u s est quando aliquis vult facere opera iusta conformiter rationi rectae dictanti talia opera esse facienda secundum debitas circumstantias respicientes praecise ipsum opus propter honestatem ipsius operis sicut propter finem, puta intellectus dictat quod tale opus iustum est faciendum tali loco tali tempore propter honestatem ipsius operis vel propter pacem vel aliquid tale, et voluntas elicit actum volendi talia opera conformiter iuxta dictamen intellectus.

~~when death is at hand.~~ Another example: someone possessing great riches wills actually to give them to the poor on account of love of God; and in the absence of an impediment, he actually commands his executive faculties to execute the act. That command is nothing other than willing actually to give in this manner, in the absence of an impediment; for if there were an impediment, then he could not rationally will to give absolutely, but only conditionally—that is, “if such an impediment did not exist.”

94. An example of the second kind: someone might be willing to sustain death in defense of the faith if death were imminent and there were no impediment. Similarly, in the other example, someone would gladly will to give riches to the poor on account of love of God if he had them, and there were no other impediment; but since he does not have them, he cannot rationally, actually will to give riches unconditionally on account of the impediment. This act of will is not formally an imperative act, but only equivalently.

101. On the basis of these acts, specifically distinct habits are generated. They are distinct for two reasons: [1] because of the distinction in their specific objects, since one act has an impediment as an object and the other, which is formally imperative, does not; and [2] because, however infinitely much habits generated by equivalently imperative acts were augmented, they would never incline to a formally imperative act. The distinction between these acts is evident from the separability of the acts. For someone can have an equivalently imperative act, even if she never has a formally imperative act.

#### [Third Distinction]

111. The third distinction concerns justice and any other single moral virtue insofar as it is not another virtue, formally or equivalently. Such virtue has five degrees, which belong to distinct species, not to the same species.

#### [The Five Degrees of Virtue]

116. The first degree is when someone wills the performance of just works in conformity with right reason, as it dictates that such acts should be performed, according to the proper circumstances respecting precisely this work, on account of the worthiness of this work itself as an end. Suppose, for example, the intellect dictates that such a just work should be performed in such a place, at such a time, on account of the worthiness of the work itself or on account of peace or some such end, and the will elicits an act willing such work in conformity with the dictate of the intellect.

**S**ecundus gradus est quando voluntas vult facere opera iusta secundum rectum dictamen praedictum, et praeter hoc cum intentione nullo modo dimittendi talia pro quocumque quod est contra rectam rationem, etiam non pro morte, si recta ratio dictaret tale opus non esse dimittendum pro morte; puta si homo velit sic honorare patrem secundum rectum dictamen praedictum loco et tempore etc., cum intentione et voluntate non dimittendi illum honorem pro morte, si immineret. 125 130

**T**ertius gradus est quando aliquis vult tale opus facere secundum rectam rationem praedictam cum intentione praedicta, et praeter hoc vult tale opus secundum circumstantias praedictas facere praecise et solum quia sic est dictatum a recta ratione.<sup>8</sup> 135

**Q**uartus gradus est quando vult tale opus facere secundum omnes condiciones et circumstantias praedictas, et praeter hoc propter amorem Dei praecise, puta quia sic dictatum est ab intellectu, quod talia opera sunt facienda propter amorem Dei praecise. Et iste gradus solum est perfecta et vera virtus moralis de qua *Sancti*<sup>9</sup> loquuntur. 140

Quod autem sit proprie virtus moralis patet primo, quia generatur ex actibus moralibus et inclinatur ad actus consimiles et dirigit in actibus respectu eorundem obiectorum, quod proprie pertinet ad virtutem moralem; secundo, quia variatio finis non variat virtutem quantum ad moralitatem et non moralitatem, quia respectu diversorum finium possunt esse diversae virtutes morales, hic autem solum variatur finis a praedictis gradibus; tertio, quia vitium oppositum est proprie vitium morale, igitur istud est virtus moralis. 145 150

**Q**uintus gradus<sup>10</sup> est quando aliquis eligit tale opus facere secundum praedictas condiciones excepto fine, quando<sup>11</sup> indifferenter potest fieri propter Deum tamquam propter finem, et propter honestatem vel pacem vel aliquid tale, — quod dico pro intentione philosophi<sup>12</sup> —, et praeter hoc eligit tale opus facere actu imperativo formaliter, non tantum aequivalenter. Et si tunc velit actu imperativo formaliter facere vel pati aliquid quod 155

8. Cf. a.4 451–67; Ockham, *Dial.* 1.VI.77, fol. 90r–v.

9. Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIX c.25 (PL 41, 656); *De Trinitate* XIII c.20 n.26 (PL 42, 1036); Ockham, *ibid.*

10. Cf. Ockham, *OT* VIII, 275–78, 285–86.

11. Cf. a.3 322–29.

12. Cf. *OT* VII, 58.

**124.** The second degree is when the will wills the performance of a just work in conformity with right reason as stated above, and beyond this has the intention never to give up such works for any reason whatever that is contrary to right reason, not even to avoid death, if right reason were to dictate that such a work should not be given up in order to avoid death. Suppose, for example, that a man wished to honor his father according to the aforesaid right dictate, at the proper time and place, etc., having the intention and the will not to give up honoring his father for the sake of avoiding an imminent death.

**132.** The third degree is when someone wills the performance of such a work in conformity with right reason as stated above, with the intention just discussed, and beyond this she wills the performance of such a work, in the aforesaid circumstances, precisely and solely because it is dictated by right reason.<sup>8</sup>

**137.** The fourth degree is when someone wills the performance of such a work according to all the conditions and circumstances discussed above, and beyond this wills that work precisely on account of love of God — because, for example, the intellect has dictated that such works should be performed precisely for the sake of love of God. Only this degree is the perfect and true moral virtue, about which the saints<sup>9</sup> speak. 150

**143.** That this is moral virtue properly speaking is evident, first, because this virtue is generated by moral acts, it inclines us to similar acts, and it directs us toward acts with respect to the same objects; and this properly pertains to moral virtue. It is evident, second, because varying the end does not result in a different virtue, as far as its being moral or immoral is concerned. For in regard to different ends there can be different moral virtues; but here only the end differs from the preceding degrees. Third argument: the opposite vice is moral vice, strictly speaking; therefore this is moral virtue.

**152.** The fifth degree<sup>10</sup> is when someone chooses to perform such a work according to the conditions described above, with the exception of the end, so that the end is indifferent,<sup>11</sup> and it can be for the sake of God as an end that the act is performed or for the sake of its worthiness or for peace or for some such end; I say this in order to take account of the intention of a philosopher.<sup>12</sup> Beyond this, in fifth-degree virtue someone chooses to perform such a work by a formally imperative act, not merely an equivalently imperative act. If that person then wills by a formally imperative

ex natura sua excedit communem statum hominum et est contra inclinationem naturalem, vel si tale opus non excedit communem statum hominum nec est contra inclinationem naturalem quantum est ex natura actus, sed solum ex aliqua circumstantia est contra inclinationem naturalem, talis inquam actus imperativus formaliter talis operis est generativus virtutis heroicae vel elicited a virtute heroica secundum intentionem philosophi et secundum veritatem, et nullus alius habitus generatus ex quibuscumque aliis actibus est virtus heroica. 160

Exemplum *p r i m o*:<sup>13</sup> aliquis vult actualiter actu imperativo formaliter, morte sibi imminente, pro defensione fidei, sive combustione sibi imminente, sustinere mortem vel combustionem. Exemplum *s e c u n d o*:<sup>14</sup> aliquis habens iustitiam, sic quod pro nullo quod est contra rectam rationem vult deserere iustitiam et facere iniustitiam, post exponitur igni vel carceri perpetuo nisi faciat iniustitiam. Hoc nolle facere iniustitiam non excedit communem statum hominum, sed nolle sic, quantum ad illam circumstantiam quae est recta ratio universalis, excedit communem statum hominum. Si tunc ille citius vult actu imperativo formaliter executionis actus exterioris intrare ignem quam deserat iustitiam, ille utique tam in primo casu quam in secundo est perfecte heroicus, et non alius. 170

Distinctio numeralis istorum habituum et actuum<sup>15</sup> patet per separabilitatem ipsorum. Distinctio specifica patet, *p r i m o* per distinctionem specificam obiectorum partialium, quia pono<sup>16</sup> quod illa quae ponuntur circumstantiae virtutum ab aliis, sunt obiecta partialia et secundaria ipsius actus virtuosus, et ideo quando talia obiecta variantur secundum speciem, actus et habitus istorum variantur secundum speciem; sed actus cuiuslibet gradus ascendendo habet aliquod obiectum et circumstantiam distinctam specie quod non habet alius gradus inferior. *S e c u n d o* patet, quia quantumcumque unus gradus augetur in infinitum, numquam inclinabit ad actum alterius gradus; sed illa quae sunt eiusdem speciei, possunt habere effectum eiusdem speciei; igitur etc. 185

#### [Distinctio quarta]

Quarta distinctio<sup>17</sup> est quod virtus theologica accipitur dupliciter, large et stricte: *l a r g e* accipitur pro virtutibus adqui- 195

13. Lines 158–60.

14. Lines 160–63.

15. Namely, the fifth grade.

16. Cf. a.4 401–3.

17. Cf. OTh VI, 281–82.

act to do or undergo something [1] that naturally exceeds the common human state and that is contrary to his natural inclination; [2] or if, though the work does not exceed the common human state and is not contrary to his natural inclination as far as the nature of the act is concerned, it is contrary to his natural inclination on account of some circumstance; then I hold that such an act formally dictating such a work is generative of, or elicited by, heroic virtue according to a philosopher's intention and in truth; and no other habit generated by any other acts whatever is heroic virtue.

168. Example of the first:<sup>13</sup> someone actually wills in virtue of a formally imperative act, in the face of imminent death or burning, to sustain death or burning for the sake of defending the faith. Example of the second:<sup>14</sup> someone possesses the virtue of justice, so that he wills not to abandon justice and perform an injustice for any consideration that is contrary to right reason, and is afterward exposed to burning or perpetual incarceration unless he performs an injustice. This rejection of injustice does not exceed the common human state; but to reject injustice in this way, according to that circumstance which is universal right reason, does exceed the common human state. If such a person then wills to enter the fire, in virtue of an act dictating formally the execution of the exterior act, rather than abandon justice, then that act is certainly perfectly heroic, both in the first and in the second case, and the other act is not.

181. That there is a numerical distinction between these habits and acts<sup>15</sup> is evident from their separability. A specific distinction is evident first on account of a specific distinction among partial objects, because I maintain<sup>16</sup> that what others suppose are the circumstances of virtues are the partial and secondary objects of a virtuous act itself. And therefore when such objects vary by species, the acts and habits associated with these objects vary by species; but an act of any higher degree has some object and some specifically distinct circumstance that a lower degree does not have. A specific distinction is evident second because however much one degree is increased, even if it is increased infinitely, it will never incline us to an act of a different degree; but things that belong to the same species can have an effect of the same species; therefore, etc.

#### [Fourth Distinction]

194. The fourth distinction<sup>17</sup> concerns theological virtue, which is considered in two ways: loosely and strictly. Loosely speaking,

sitis, puta pro fide acquisita, spe acquisita, caritate acquisita, quia isti habitus habent Deum pro objecto; *strictè* accipitur solum pro istis habitibus infusus.

[Distinctio quinta]

Quinta distinctio<sup>18</sup> est quod aliquis actus est intrinsece bonus 200  
moraliter, aliquis intrinsece malus et vitiosus, aliquis neuter sive  
indifferens. Exemplum primi: velle orare propter honorem Dei et  
quia praeceptum est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc. Exem-  
plum secundi: velle orare propter vanam gloriam et quia contra 205  
praeceptum Dei et contra rectam rationem. Exemplum tertii: velle  
simpliciter orare sine aliqua circumstantia dictata a ratione, quia  
nec propter bonum finem nec propter malum, quia propter nul-  
lum finem; et talis actus, sive interior sive exterior, solum dicitur  
bonus denominatione extrinseca et nullo modo intrinsece, nec  
vitiosus. 210

[Distinctio sexta]

Sexta distinctio<sup>19</sup> est quod aliquis actus est bonus ex genere  
vel malus, aliquis ex circumstantia, aliquis ex principio meritorio.  
Exemplum p r i m i quantum ad actum bonum ex genere: sicut  
orare, dare eleemosynam, sive velle talia facere absolute sine aliqua 215  
circumstantia bona vel mala. Exemplum quantum ad actum ma-  
lum: velle furtum facere, velle fornicari, absolute sine aliqua cir-  
cumstantia bona vel mala; de quibus dicit P h i l o s o p h u s  
et S a n c t i dicunt,<sup>20</sup> quod statim nominata convoluta sunt  
cum malitia. 220

Exemplum s e c u n d i: velle abstinere secundum cir-  
cumstantias dictatas a recta ratione propter honestatem tamquam  
propter finem vel propter conservationem naturae vel alium finem  
quem intenderet philosophus paganus. Exemplum secundi quan-  
tum ad actum malum: velle fornicari contra rectam rationem, loco 225  
indebito etc., et propter libidinem tamquam propter finem.

Exemplum t e r t i i: velle continere secundum rectam  
rationem et alias circumstantias, et propter honorem divinum quia  
talis actus est Deo acceptus.

18. Cf. a.1 99–130; OTh VI, 383–85; *Summa Halesiana*, published as Alexander de Hales, *Summa theol.*, II–II n.388 (Quaracchi, 1930), III: 388b.

19. Cf. Scotus, *Sent.* II d.7 n.11–12, XII, 386–87; *Ord.* I d.17 p.1 q.1–2 n.62, V: 163–64; *Rep.* II d.7 q.3 n.27, XXII: 636; d.40 n.2–3, XXIII: 209–10.

20. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 2.6.1107a8–12; Augustine, *Contra mendacium* c.7 n.18 (PL 40, 528–29).

it is taken to refer to acquired virtues—as, for example, acquired faith, acquired hope, and acquired charity—since these habits have God as their object. Strictly speaking, ‘theological virtue’ refers to those habits only when they are infused.

[Fifth Distinction]

200. The fifth distinction<sup>18</sup> is that some acts are intrinsically good morally speaking, some acts are intrinsically wicked and vicious, and some acts are neutral or indifferent. An example of the first kind of act is willing to pray on account of God’s honor and because it is commanded by God in accordance with right reason, etc. An example of the second kind of act is willing to pray on account of vainglory and because it contrary to God’s command and contrary to right reason. An example of the third kind of act is simply willing to pray without some circumstance dictated by reason—that is, on account of no end, neither for a good end nor for a wicked end. Such an act, whether it is interior or exterior, is called good only by virtue of extrinsic denomination; in no sense is it intrinsically good or vicious.

[Sixth Distinction]

212. The sixth distinction<sup>19</sup> is that some acts are generically good or wicked; some acts, on the basis of a circumstance; and some acts, on the basis of a meritorious principle. An example of an act of the first kind, which is generically good, is to pray, to give alms, or to will to do such things unconditionally, in the absence of any good or wicked circumstance. An example of a wicked act is to will the performance of theft or adultery, absolutely, in the absence of any good or bad circumstance; concerning these last acts the Philosopher and the saints<sup>20</sup> say that the very names [of the acts] are immediately tied to wickedness.

221. An example of the second kind is to will abstinence in accordance with circumstances dictated by right reason on account of worthiness as an end, for the sake of conserving nature, or on account of another end, such as a pagan philosopher might intend. An example of a wicked act of the second kind is to will fornication contrary to right reason, in an inappropriate place, etc., on account of lust as an end.

227. An example of the third kind is to will continence in accordance with right reason and other circumstances, on account of divine honor, because such an act is acceptable to God.

## [Distinctio septima]

Septima distinctio est quod habituum inclinantium ad actus quidam sunt subiective in parte sensitiva et quidam in voluntate. Primum membrum patet<sup>21</sup> per experientiam de brutis, furiosis et infatuatis, qui aliquos actus possunt elicere in absentia rerum sensibilibus; non per intellectum et voluntatem, quia in eis non est usus rationis; igitur per phantasiam et alias virtutes sensitivas. Hoc non potest esse sine habitu genito ex actu qui habetur in praesentia illarum rerum, quia impossibile est quod aliquid transeat de contradictorio in contradictorium etc.; sed phantasia in talibus et appetitus sensitivus post primum actum possunt aliquem actum elicere quem non possunt ante primum actum; igitur ex illo actu aliquid generatur in tali potentia; non species,<sup>22</sup> quia illa non est ponenda, sicut alibi patet; si etiam ponatur, illa praecedit actum; et si illa sola ponatur, numquam potest in actum in absentia rerum si non habeatur actus in eadem potentia in praesentia obiecti; igitur ex illo actu causatur aliquis habitus in tali potentia; igitur etc.

Secundum membrum patet,<sup>23</sup> quia aliquis habitus est simpliciter virtus et primo, et non nisi voluntatis, quia nullus actus generativus habitus talis est primo virtuosus nisi actus voluntatis; igitur etc. Praeterea si non, hoc non esset nisi propter libertatem voluntatis, quae non potest determinate inclinari ad unam partem contradictionis; vel propter conformitatem eius ad rectam rationem, quia scilicet non potest discordare a recta ratione. Primum non impedit, quia secundum omnes caritas est ponenda in voluntate ad eliciendum actum meritorium, qui libere elicitur aliter non esset meritorius, et tamen inclinatur voluntatem per modum naturae ad unum determinate. Nec secundum impedit, quia illud assumptum falsum est, sicut postea patebit.<sup>24</sup>

21. Cf. OTh VI, 356–57, 359.

22. Cf. OTh II, 314; OTh V, 253, 256, 269, 271–72, 302.

23. Cf. a.1 158–60; OTh VI, 357–58, 363, 365.

24. A.3 224–532, 690–95.

## [Seventh Distinction]

231. The seventh distinction concerns habits that incline us to acts. Some are subjectively in the sensitive part of the soul, some in the will. The first member of the distinction is evident<sup>21</sup> from our experience with brutes, with madmen, and with the insane, who can elicit some acts in the absence of sensible things. They do not do this by virtue of the intellect or the will, since they do not have the use of reason. Therefore they do this by virtue of the imagination and other sensitive virtues. This cannot be without a habit generated by an act that occurs in the presence of those things, since it is impossible that something should make the transition from one contradictory to another, etc. (cf. a. 4, 129). But fantasy and the sensitive appetite can elicit some acts in such persons after the first act that it cannot elicit before the first act. Therefore something is generated from that act in such a faculty: not a species,<sup>22</sup> since that should not be posited, as is evident elsewhere; also [a species], if posited, precedes the act; and if only it is posited, [the faculty] can never be in act in the absence of things if an act would not occur in the same faculty in the presence of the object. Therefore, some habit is caused on the basis of that act in such a faculty, therefore, etc.

248. The second member of the distinction<sup>23</sup> is evident because some habit is simply and primarily a virtue; and this could only be a habit of the will because no act generative of such a habit is primarily virtuous except an act of will; therefore, etc. Moreover, if it were not an act of will, this would only be for one of two reasons: on account of the freedom of the will, which cannot be determinately inclined toward one part of a contradiction; or on account of the will's conformity with right reason—namely, because it cannot diverge from right reason. The first consideration is no obstacle to the conclusion, since everyone agrees that charity must be posited in the will to elicit a meritorious act; a meritorious act is freely elicited, otherwise it would not be meritorious, and yet charity inclines the will toward a single act in the manner of a natural cause. Nor does the second consideration stand in the way of the conclusion, since that assumption is false, as will be evident later.<sup>24</sup>