AQUINAS, EXPOSITION OF BOETHIUS'S DE HEBDOMADIBUS 2

tr. D. Twetten from the Leonine ed.1

BOETHIUS, Quomodo substantiae (How Substances Can be Good in That They Exist, Without Being Substantial Goods)2

. . . Thus, as is customary in mathematics and in certain other disciplines, I have set forth terms and rules through which I shall devise what follows.

A common conception of the mind is a proposition that each person accepts as soon as it is heard. There are two kinds. For, one is so common that it belongs to all humans, as when you affirm, "given two equals, if you remove two equals, the remainders are equal," no one who understands will deny it. But the other belongs only to the wise, although it comes from such common conceptions of the mind; for example, "incorporeals are not in place;" and others that not the average person but the learned accept.

1. Being (esse) and that which is (quod est) are diverse.

For, being itself is not yet. But that which is, once the form of being is received, is and subsists (consistit).

2. That which is can participate in something, but being itself in no way participates in anything.

For, participation comes to be (fit) when something already is. But something is when it has received being.

3. That which is can have something beyond what it itself is. But being itself has nothing else beyond itself mixed [with itself].

4. Nevertheless, being something and being something in that which is are diverse. For, in the former accident is signified, in the latter, substance.

5. Everything that is participates in that which is being so that it is. But it participates in another so that it is something.

And thus, that which is participates in that which is being so that it is. But it is so that it participates in some other thing.

6. For every composite, being is one thing, 'it' [the composite] is another.

Every simple thing possesses as one its own being and that which is . . . .

AQUINAS, Exposition of De hebdomadibus 2

. . . As has been said, those propositions are most known that use terms that all understand. But those things that fall into the intellect of all are the most common, which are 'a being', 'one', and 'good'. Therefore, Boethius here first sets forth certain conceptions pertaining to 'a being'; second, certain ones pertaining to 'one', from which arise the concept of the simple and the composite, at For every composite [6], etc.

Concerning 'a being', moreover, being itself (ipsum esse) is considered as if it were something common and indeterminate, which is determined in two ways: in one way on the side of the subject that has being, in another way on the side of the predicate, such as when we say about a human or about any thing else whatsoever not that it is, without qualification, but that it is something, white or black, for example. First, therefore, he sets forth conceptions that are grasped through comparing being to 'that which is'. Second, he sets forth conceptions that are grasped through comparing that which is being without qualification to that which is being something, at Nevertheless, being something and being something in that which is are diverse [4], etc.

Concerning the first he does two things. First, he proposes the difference between that which is being and that which is. Second, he makes evident such a difference at For, being itself [1], etc.

He says, therefore, Being (esse) and that which is (quod est) are diverse. This diversity is not here to be referred to things, about which he does not yet speak, but to concepts (rationes) or intentions. But we signify one thing by saying 'being' and another by saying 'that which is,' just as also we signify one thing when we say 'running' (currere) and another when 'one running' (currens) is said. For, 'running' and 'being' are signified in the abstract as is 'whiteness'; but 'that which is,' that is, 'a being' or 'one running' are signified in the concrete, as is 'white'.

Then when he says, For, being itself [1] . . ., he makes evident the aforementioned diversity in three ways. The first is that 'being itself' is not signified as the subject of being (essendi), just as 'running' is not signified as the subject of a run (cursus). Hence, just as we cannot say that running itself runs, so we cannot say that being itself is. But 'that which is' is signified as the subject of being, just as 'that which runs' is signified as the subject of running. And therefore, just as we can say about that which runs or about one running that it runs inasmuch as it is the subject of a run and participates in it, so we can say that a being or that which is, is inasmuch as it participates in the act of being (actum essendi). This is what For, being itself is not yet expresses, because being is not attributed to itself as to a subject of being, but that which is, once the form of being is received, that is, by receiving (suscipiendo) the very act of being, is and subsists (consistit), that is, subsists (subsistit) in itself. For, 'a being' is said properly and per se only of substance, to which subsisting belongs; for, accidents are not called beings as if they themselves are, but inasmuch as by them substance is something, as will be said later.

He sets forth a second difference at That which is can participate [2], etc. This difference is taken from the concept of participation. But participating is, as it were, taking part (partem capere). And therefore, when something receives in a particular way what pertains to another in a universal way, it is said to participate in the latter, just as human is said to participate in animal because it does not possess the intelligibility (ratio) 'animal' in its entire community (secundum totam communitatem).3 For the same reason, Socrates participates in human. Similarly, a subject also participates in an accident, and matter [participates in] form, because substantial or accidental form, which in its intelligibility is common, is determined to this or that subject. And similarly, an effect is also said to participate in its cause, and especially when it does not equal the power of its cause, such as if we say that air participates in the light of the sun because it does not receive it in the brightness with which it exists in the sun.

But setting aside this third way of participating, it is impossible that according to the other two ways being itself participate in something. For, it cannot participate in something in the way that matter or a subject participates in form or an accident, because 'being itself' is signified as something abstract, as was said. Similarly, moreover, it cannot participate in something in the way a particular participates in a universal. For, in this way those things that are said abstractly are also able to participate in something, just as whiteness in color. But being itself is most common (communissimum), hence it is actually participated in by others but it does not participate in anything else. But that which is or 'a being', although it is the most common, nevertheless is said concretely, and therefore it participates in being itself — not in the way that the more common is participated in by the less common, but it participates in being itself in the way that the concrete participates in the abstract. This, therefore, is what is expressed by 'That which is, that is, a being, can participate in something, but being itself in no way participates in anything' [2]. And, he proves this through what was said above, namely, that being itself is not yet. For, it is evident that that which is not, is not able to participate in anything. Hence, the consequence is that participation belongs to something when it already is. But something is from the fact that it receives (suscipit) being itself, as was said. Hence, it remains that that which is can participate in something, but being itself cannot participate in anything.

He sets forth a third difference at That which is can have [3], etc. And, this difference arises through mixture with something extraneous. As to this it should be considered that for anything signified abstractly it is true that it does not possess in itself anything extraneous, anything, that is, beyond its essence, as [is true of] humanity, whiteness, and anything else said in this way, whose concept (ratio) is that humanity is signified as 'that by which' something is a human being, and whiteness as that by which something is white. But something is a human being, speaking formally, only through that which pertains to the concept (ratio) of 'human being', and similarly something is only formally white through what pertains to the concept 'white'. Therefore, abstract things of this kind can have nothing foreign in them. But the situation is different in things signified concretely. For, 'a human being' is signified as that which has humanity, and 'white' as that which has whiteness. But from the fact that a human being has humanity or the white, whiteness, it is not prevented from having something else that does not pertain to the concept of these things — with the sole exception of what is opposite to these. Therefore, a human being and white can have something other than humanity or whiteness. And, this is the reason why whiteness and humanity are signified 'as a part' and are not predicated of concrete things, just as a part is not predicated of its whole. Therefore, because, as was said, 'being' itself is signified as something abstract, and 'that which is' as something concrete, it follows that what is here said is true, that That which is can have something beyond what it itself is [3], that is, beyond its own essence, But being itself has nothing else mixed [with it] beyond its essence.

Then when he says Nevertheless, being something and being something in that which is are diverse [4], etc., he sets forth conceptions that are grasped by comparing that which is being without qualification with that which is being something. And, first he sets forth the differences of each. Second, he assigns the differences at For, in the former accident [4], etc.

As for the first, it should be considered that from the fact that that which is can have something beyond its essence, it is necessary that a two-fold being be considered in it. For, since form is the principle of being, it is necessary that for whatever form is possessed, that which possesses it is in some way said 'to be'.4 Thus, if that form is not beyond the essence of that which possesses it but constitutes its essence, from the fact that it possesses such a form it is said to be the possessor of being (habens esse) without qualification, just as a human being from the fact that it possesses a rational soul [is said to be a possessor of being without qualification]. But if there be the sort of form that is extraneous to the essence of that which possesses it, with respect to this form it is not said to be the possessor of being without qualification, but of being something, just as with respect to whiteness a human being is said 'to be white'. And, this is expressed by 'there is a diversity between being something', which is not 'being without qualification', and 'something exists in that which is', which is the subject's own being (proprium esse).

Then when he says For, in the former accident [4], etc., he sets forth three differences among what has been established. The first of these is that in the former, that is, where it is said about a thing that it is something and not that it 'is' without qualification, accident is signified, because the form that 'makes' such being is beyond the essence of the thing. But in the latter, when something is said to be 'in that which is', substance is signified, that is, because the form that makes this being constitutes the essence of the thing.

He sets forth the second difference at Everything that is [5], etc. He says that for something to be without qualification, the subject participates being itself, but for it to be something it is necessary that it participate in something else, just as for a human being to be white it participates not only in substantial being (esse substantiale) but also in whiteness.

He sets forth the third difference at And thus [5], etc. This [difference] is understood through the order of each of the two [previous differences] and is concluded from what has been established. This difference is that it is first necessary that something be understood to be without qualification, and later that it be something — as is evident from what has been established. For, something 'is' without qualification through the fact that it participates in being itself. But when it already is, that is, through participation in being itself, it remains that it participates in some other thing so that, that is, it is something.

Then when he says For every composite [6], etc., he sets forth conceptions of the composite and the simple, which pertain to the concept of 'one'. And, it should be considered that what was said above regarding the diversity of being itself and of 'that which is' belongs to the order of intentions (est secundum ipsas intentiones). Here he shows how it is applied to things. First he shows this in composites, second in simple things, at Every simple thing [6], etc.

Therefore, it should be considered first that just as being and that which is differ as intentions, so in composites they differ really (differunt realiter). This, in fact, is evident from what was previously established. For, it was said above that being itself neither participates in anything so that its concept is constituted by many things, nor does it possess anything extrinsic mixed in with it so that there is in it an accidental composition. And, therefore, being itself is not composite. Therefore, a composed thing is not its own being. And, therefore, he says that in every composite <its> being is one thing and the composite itself that 'is' by participating in 'being itself' is another.5

Then when he says Every simple thing [6], etc., he shows the condition of simple things in which it is necessary that being and that which is are really one and the same. For, were that which is and being itself really different, already there would not be something simple but something composite. Nevertheless, it should be considered that in calling something simple because it lacks composition, nothing prevents a thing's being simple in a qualified sense — insofar as it lacks some composition — which nevertheless is not entirely simple. Hence, both fire and water are called simple bodies insofar as they lack the composition through contraries that is found in mixtures, although each is a composite of both quantitative parts and also of form and matter. Therefore, if some forms are found that are not in matter, each of these is simple insofar as it lacks matter and hence quantity that is the disposition of matter. Nevertheless, because any form is determinative of being itself, none of these forms is being itself but is that which possesses being (habens esse). According to Plato's opinion, for example, should we affirm that an immaterial form subsists that is an idea and the intelligibility (ratio) of material humans and another form that is an idea and the intelligibility of horses, it will be evident that the immaterial subsisting form, since it is a certain thing determined to a species, is not being itself in general (esse commune) but participates in the latter. And, it makes no difference in this regard if we posit other immaterial forms of a higher rank than are the intelligibilities of these sensible things, as Aristotle wished. For, each of these, insofar as it is distinguished from the other, is a certain 'specific' form participating in being itself, and so none of these will be truly simple. That alone, moreover, will be truly simple that does not participate in being, not actually inhering [in another] but subsisting. This, moreover, can only be one, because if being itself possesses nothing else mixed [with it] beyond that which is being, as has been said, it is impossible for that which is being itself to be multiplied through anything diversifying it. And, because it has nothing else beyond itself joined [to it], it follows that it is not receptive of any accident. This simple thing, one and sublime, is God himself.

AQUINAS, EXPOSITION OF BOETHIUS'S DE HEBDOMADIBUS 2

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

I. Aquinas's Division of Boethius's Text

II. Concerning conceptions pertaining to 'a being'

A. As determined on the side of the subject which has being: conceptions comparing being to 'that which is'

1. The difference between being and 'that which is' - l. 20

2. Three-fold manifestation of the difference

a. 'Being itself' is not signified as the subject of being - l. 26

- a subject is said 'to participate' in its predicates

b. Difference taken from the notion of participation - l. 39

i. Three kinds of participation:

a'. Matter or subject in form or accident

b'. Particular in a universal

c'. Effect in a cause, especially in a non-univocal cause

ii. Being cannot participate in another in the first two ways - l. 50

c. Difference taken from being mixed with something extraneous: abstract v. concrete modes of signifying - l. 69

B. As determined on the side of the predicate: conceptions comparing that which is being without quatification to that which is being something - l. 88

1. What the differences of each are: 'possessor of being' v. 'being something' - l. 92

2. Assignment of three differences - l. 104

a. Substance v. accident is signified

b. Participation in being v. in something else

c. The latter is ordered to the former

III. Concerning conceptions pertaining to 'the one': real diversity between being and that which is - l. 122

A. In composite things - l. 127

1. Being does not participate

2. Being possesses nothing extrinsic

B. In simple things - l. 134

1. Real identity in absolutely simple things

2. Real diversity in simple but determinate forms - l. 137

3. Properties of the absolutely simple: unique and without accidents - l. 152