Q 6 Parallel texts p 91
QUESTION SIX

Parallel texts: In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 5, a. 2; In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1; dist. 17, q. 1, a. 2; De Ente et ess., 5; Quodl., IX, q. 4, a. 6; q. 4, a. 1; Super Boet. De Hebdom., lect. 2; In lib. Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad 4; Contra gent., II, 50, 51; De Pot., q. 6, a. 6, ad 4; Summa theol., I, q. 50, a. 2; q. 75, a. 5; De Spir. creat., a. 1; a. 9, ad 9; Quodl., III, q. 8, a unica; De Subst. sep., cap. 5, 7, 19.

Q 6 Thes p 91
The sixth question that is asked about the soul is this: Whether a soul is composed of matter and form. And it seems that it is.

Q 6 Obj 1 p 91
(1) For Boethius says in his book De Trinitate.††1 A simple form cannot be a subject. But a soul is a subject, namely, of sciences and of virtues. Therefore it is not a simple form. Therefore it is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 2 p 91
(2) Furthermore, Boethius states in his book De Hebdomadibus:††2 That which is can participate in something but esse itself participates in nothing. And for a like reason, subjects participate but not forms, as something white can participate in something besides whiteness, but whiteness cannot. Now a soul participates in something, namely, in those things from which it acquires form. Therefore, a soul is not form only. Consequently it is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 3 p 91
(3) Furthermore, if a soul is form alone and if it is in potency to something, it seems very likely that its very to-be would be its act; for a soul is not its own to-be. Now for a potency which is simple there can be only one act. Consequently a soul cannot be the subject of anything except its to-be. However, it is clear that a soul is the subject of other things. Consequently it is not a simple substance, but is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 4 p 91
(4) Furthermore, accidents which belong to the form can be attributed to the whole species; but accidents following upon matter belong to this or to that individual. For form is a principle of the species, whereas matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore, if a soul is form only, all of its accidents will pertain to the whole species. Now this is clearly false, for to be a musician or a grammarian and things of this sort do not pertain to the whole species. Consequently a soul is not a form only, but is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 5 p 92
(5) Furthermore, form is the principle of action; but matter is the principle by reason of which a thing is the recipient of an action. Therefore, wherever there is action and passion, there is composition of form and matter. But in a soul there is action and passion. For the operation of the possible intellect consists in being acted upon, and this is why the Philosopher says that to understand is to undergo something.††3 However, the operation of the agent intellect consists in acting, for it causes those things which are potentially intelligible to become actually intelligible, as is said in Book III of the De Anima.††4 Therefore in a soul there is composition of form and matter.

Q 6 Obj 6 p 92
(6) Furthermore, whatever contains the properties of matter must be composed of matter. But in a soul we find the properties of matter, namely, to be in potency, to receive, to be subject to, and other things of this kind. Therefore a soul is composed of matter.

Q 6 Obj 7 p 92
(7) Furthermore, things that act and things that are the recipient of that action must have a matter common to both, as is explained in Book I of the De Generatione.††5 Therefore whatever can be affected by something which is material itself possesses matter. Now a soul can be affected by something material, namely, the fire of hell, which is a corporeal fire, as Augustine proves in Book XXI of the De Civitate Dei.††6 Therefore a soul itself possesses matter.

Q 6 Obj 8 p 92
(8) Furthermore, the action of an agent does not terminate in the form alone, but rather in the composite of form and matter, as is proved in Book VII of the Metaphysics.††7 Now the action of that agent who is God terminates in the soul. Therefore a soul is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 9 p 92
(9) Furthermore, that which is solely form is at the same time a being and one and does not need anything to make it a being and one, as the Philosopher states in Book VIII of the Metaphysics.††8 Now a soul needs something which causes it to exist and to be one, namely, God as creating. Therefore a soul is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 10 p 92
(10) Furthermore, an agent is necessary if something is to be reduced from potency to act. Now to be reduced from potency to act belongs only to those beings in which there is matter and form. Consequently, if a soul is not composed of matter and form, it does not need an efficient cause, and this is clearly false.

Q 6 Obj 11 p 92
(11) Furthermore, in his book De Intellectu,††9 Alexander states that a soul has a material intellect. By material is meant prime matter. Therefore there is prime matter in a soul.

Q 6 Obj 12 p 92
(12) Furthermore, everything that exists is either pure act, or pure potency, or is composed of potency and act. Now a soul is not pure act since this is true of God alone. Nor is a soul pure potency because, if it were, it would not differ from prime matter. Therefore it is composed of potency and act. Consequently, since form is act, a soul is not form alone.

Q 6 Obj 13 p 93
(13) Furthermore, whatever is individuated is individuated by matter. Now a soul is not individuated by the matter in which it is, namely, its body; for if this were so, its individuation would be lost when it loses its body. Therefore it is individuated by the matter of which it is constituted. Consequently part of a soul is matter.

Q 6 Obj 14 p 93
(14) Furthermore, there must be something common to an agent and a patient, as is clear from Book I of the De Generatione.††10 Now a soul is affected by sensible things, which are material. Nor can one say that in a human being the substance of the sensible soul is other than the substance of the intellective soul. Therefore a soul possesses something in common with material things, and consequently it seems that a soul possesses matter.

Q 6 Obj 15 p 93
(15) Furthermore, since a soul is not simpler than an angel, it must belong to a genus as a species of the genus, for this is true of an angel. Now whatever is in a genus as a species of that genus would seem to be composed of matter and form. For genus corresponds to matter, while specific difference corresponds to form. Therefore a soul is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Obj 16 p 93
(16) Furthermore, a form that is common to many is diversified in the many by a division of matter. Now intellectuality is a form that is common, not only to souls, but also to angels. Therefore it is necessary that both in angels and in souls there be matter through whose division the form is multiplied in many individuals.

Q 6 Obj 17 p 93
(17) Furthermore, whatever is moved has matter. But a soul is moved. For this is the way that Augustine uses to show that the soul is not divine in nature, namely, that it is subject to change.††11 Therefore a soul is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 OTC 1 p 93
On The Contrary,

Everything that is composed of matter and form has a form. Consequently, if a soul is composed of matter and form, a soul has a form. But a soul is a form. Therefore a form has a form, and this seems impossible because it would lead to an infinite regress.

Q 6 Body p 93
The Response:

It must be said that on this question people hold diverse positions. Some say that the soul, and in fact every substance except God, is composed of matter and form. The first authority to hold this position seems to be Avicebron, the author of the book Fons Vitae.††12 The basis of this position, which has been mentioned in the objections, is that it is necessary that there be matter in any being in which the properties of matter are found. Accordingly, since in a soul are found the properties of matter, for example, to receive, to be a subject, to be in potency, and other similar properties, he thought that there is necessarily matter in a soul.

Q 6 Body p 94
Now this argument is worthless and his position is impossible. The weakness of the argument becomes clear from the fact that to receive, to be subject and other features of this kind do not belong to a soul and to prime matter in the same way; for prime matter receives actuation through transmutation and motion. Now since all transmutation and motion may be reduced to local motion as to that which is the first and most universal kind of motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics,††13 it follows that matter is found only in those beings which have potency to place. Now the only beings of this kind are bodies, which are located in a place. Hence matter is found only in corporeal beings, according to what the philosophers have said about matter, unless one wishes to use the term "matter" equivocally. Now a soul is not actuated through motion and transmutation; but rather through being separated from motion and things subject to motion, according to what is said in Book VII of the Physics,††14 namely, that a soul becomes knowing and prudent while at rest. Hence the Philosopher also says, in Book III of the De Anima,††15 that to understand is to undergo something, but to undergo something in this context has a meaning different from that which it has in corporeal things. Therefore, if anyone wishes to draw the conclusion that a soul is composed of matter because it receives something or undergoes something, he is clearly led into error because of an equivocation. Therefore it is obvious that the argument cited above is worthless.

Q 6 Body p 94
Furthermore, that this position is impossible can be made obvious is many ways: in the first place because a form accruing to matter constitutes a species. Therefore, if a soul is composed of form and matter, then from this union of the form to the matter of the soul a species would be constituted in reality. Now whatever possesses its species through itself does not enter into union with another in order to constitute a species unless the other one of the two is corrupted in some way, in the way that elements are united to produce the species of a mixture. Therefore, a soul is not united to its body in order to constitute the human species, but rather the whole human species would be located in the soul alone; now this is obviously false, because if the body did not belong to the human species, then the body would be united to the soul accidentally. Nor does this permit one to say that neither is the hand composed of matter and form because the hand does not possess a complete specific nature, but is a part of a species. For it is clear that the matter of the hand is not separately perfected by its own form, but rather there is one form which simultaneously perfects the matter of the entire body and of all its parts; and this could not be asserted of a soul if the soul were composed of matter and form. For then the order of nature would require that the matter of the soul should first be completed by its own form, and that thereafter the body should be brought to completion by the soul; unless perchance one were to say that the matter of the soul is a part of corporeal matter, and this would be totally absurd.

Q 6 Body p 95
Secondly, the aforesaid position is shown to be impossible from the fact that in everything that is composed of matter and form, matter is that which receives existence but it is not that by which something exists; for this latter characteristic belongs essentially to form. Therefore, if a soul is composed of matter and form, it is impossible that the entire soul be the formal principle of existence for its body. Consequently not the soul, but only a part of the soul, will be the form of its body. But the soul is that element, whatever it is, that is the form of the body. Hence the soul is not that composite of matter and form which they posit, but only the form of this composite.

Q 6 Body p 95
This position seems to be impossible for a third reason. For if a soul is composed of matter and form, and body likewise, each of them will have its unity through itself. And consequently it will be necessary to posit a third reality by which the soul will be united to its body, and in fact some of those who subscribe to the aforesaid position admit this. For they say that a soul is united to its body by means of light: the vegetative soul by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensitive soul by means of the light of the crystalline heaven; and the rational soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. All these explanations are fanciful. For it is necessary that a soul be directly united to its body as act is united to potency, as is clearly stated in Book VIII of the Metaphysics.††16 From this it is clear that a soul cannot be composed of matter and form. This does not preclude that there be act and potency in a soul, for potency and act exist not only in movable things but are found also in immutable things; for act and potency have a more universal meaning, as the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Metaphysics,††17 while matter exists only in movable things.

Q 6 Body p 95
Now the way in which act and potency exist in a soul is to be considered by advancing from material things to those that are immaterial. For in substances composed of matter and form we note three factors, namely, matter, form, and thirdly existence, of which form is in fact the principle; for matter participates in existence because it receives a form. Therefore existence follows upon the form, yet form is not identical with its own existence since form is the principle of existence. And although matter does not achieve existence except through its form, still the form, insofar as it is form, does not need matter for its own existence since existence follows upon the form itself; but it needs matter since it is the kind of form which is not essentially subsistent. Consequently there is no reason why a form that is separate from matter should not have its own existence; and in a form of this kind the very essence of the form is related to existence as to its proper act. And in this way potency and act are to be found in forms which subsist through themselves, inasmuch as the existence itself is the act of the subsisting form, which is not identical to its existence. Now if there be something which is its own existence (and this is proper to God), there will not be potency and act in it, but pure act. And it is because of this that Boethius says in his De Hebdomadibus††18 that in all things other than God the to-be (esse) and that which is differ. Or as some put it, that by which something is and what it is differ; for existence itself is that by which something is, as running is that by which someone runs. Consequently, since a soul is a form that is capable of subsisting of itself, there is in it the composition of act and potency, that is, of existence and essence, but there is not the composition of matter and form.

Q 6 Rp 1 p 96
Replies to the Opposing Objections:

(1) In the text cited, Boethius is speaking of the form which is unqualifiedly simple, namely, the divine essence, which is simply incapable of being a subject because it contains no potency, but is pure act. However, other simple forms, even though they be subsistent, as angels and souls are, can be subjects inasmuch as they possess potency as a result of which they are able to receive something.

Q 6 Rp 2 p 96
(2) The act of existing itself is the highest act, which can be participated in by everything, but does not itself participate in anything. Hence, if there be something which is a subsistent act of existing, as we say God is, we assert that it participates in nothing. But the same argument is not valid with respect to other subsistent forms, which of necessity participate in existence and are related to it as potency is related to act. And since these forms are somehow in potency, they are able to participate in something else.

Q 6 Rp 3 p 96
(3) Not only is a form related to its existence as potency to act, but there is also no reason why one form cannot be related to another form as potency to act, just as the transparent is related to light and the moist is related to heat. Thus, if transparency were separate and self-subsistent, not only would it be receptive of its own existence but also of light. In like fashion there is nothing to prevent subsistent forms, such as angels and souls, from being receptive, not only of their own existence, but also of other perfections. However, the higher in perfection these subsistent form are, the fewer are the forms in which they need to participate in order to achieve their own perfection, because they possess essentially and by nature a higher degree of perfection.

Q 6 Rp 4 p 97
(4) Although human souls are forms without matter, nevertheless they are forms that are individuated in bodies and are multiplied numerically along with the multiplication of bodies. Hence nothing prevents souls from having certain accidents which accrue to them because they are individuated, and which do not belong to the entire species.

Q 6 Rp 5 p 97
(5) Passion, as found in a soul and attributed to the possible intellect, does not belong to that genus of passions which is attributed to matter, but 'passion' is predicated of these two equivocally. This is clear from what the Philosopher says in Book III of the De Anima,††19 since the passion of the possible intellect consists in its reception of something in an immaterial way. Similarly, the action of the agent intellect is not of the same kind as the action of material forms; for the action of the agent intellect consists in abstracting forms from matter, while the action of material agents consists in impressing forms upon matter. Consequently, from the kind of action and passion which are found in a soul it does not follow that a soul is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Rp 6 p 97
(6) To receive, to be a subject of, and other characteristics of this kind belong to a soul in a way that is different from the way in which they belong to prime matter. Hence it does not follow that the properties of matter are found in the soul.

Q 6 Rp 7 p 97
(7) Although the fire of hell which afflicts the soul is material and corporeal, the soul is not affected by this fire in a material way, as bodies are. The soul experiences instead a spiritual suffering inasmuch as the fire is an instrument of the sentence imposed by divine justice.

Q 6 Rp 8 p 97
(8) The action of one who generates terminates in a composite of matter and form because a natural generator is a cause which produces its offspring out of matter. But the action of one who creates does not produce its effect out of matter. As a result it is not necessary that the action of creating terminate in a composite of matter and form.

Q 6 Rp 9 p 97
(9) Those beings which are subsistent forms do not require a formal cause to be one and to be a being since they are forms. They do, however, have an extrinsic cause which gives them existence.

Q 6 Rp 10 p 97
(10) An agent which acts through motion reduces something from potency to act. However, an agent which acts without motion does not reduce something from potency to act, but it causes something which of its nature is able to exist to exist actually, and this kind of agent is a creator.

Q 6 Rp 11 p 98
(11) The possible intellect is called the 'ylealis' or material intellect by some authorities, not because it is a material form, but because it possesses a likeness to matter, insofar as it is in potency to intelligible forms just as matter is to sensible forms.

Q 6 Rp 12 p 98
(12) Although a soul is neither pure act nor pure potency, still it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form, as is clear from what has already been said.

Q 6 Rp 13 p 98
(13) A soul is not individuated by matter out of which it is composed, but rather because of its relation to the matter in which it exists. How this is possible has been shown in earlier questions.

Q 6 Rp 14 p 98
(14) It is the composite being, not the sensitive soul, which is affected by sensible things; for to sense, which is a form of affectivity, does not belong to the soul alone but to the animated organ.

Q 6 Rp 15 p 98
(15) The soul is not in a genus in the proper sense, as if it were a species, but only as part of the species "man." Hence it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form.

Q 6 Rp 16 p 98
(16) Intellectuality does not belong to many individuals as if it were a single specific form given to many individuals because of the division of matter, since intellectuality is an immaterial form; but rather intellectuality is diversified because of a diversity of forms, whether these forms differ specifically, as human being and angel, or whether they differ only numerically, as the souls of diverse human beings.

Q 6 Rp 17 p 98
(17) A soul and angels are said to be changeable by nature because they can undergo change through choice, which is truly a change from one operation to another. Matter is not necessary for this kind of change but only for natural changes, as from one form to another form, or from one location to another.

Question 7

Q 7 Parallel texts p 100
QUESTION SEVEN

Parallel texts: In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, a. 6; Contra gent., II, 94; Summa theol., I, q. 75, a. 7.

Q 7 Thes p 100
The seventh question that is asked about the soul is this: Whether an angel and a soul differ specifically. And it seems that they do not.

Q 7 Obj 1 p 100
(1) Those beings which have the same essential and natural operation belong to the same species, for the nature of a thing is known through its operation. Now the essential and natural operation of a soul and of an angel, namely, to understand, is the same. Therefore soul and angel belong to the same species.

Q 7 Obj 1 p 100
But an objector was arguing that a soul's act of understanding is discursive while an angel's is not; and hence a soul and an angel do not have the same specific operation.††1

Q 7 Obj 2 p 100
(2) On the contrary, one and the same power is not the source of operations which are diverse specifically. Through one and the same power, the possible intellect, we understand certain truths, the first principles, without a reasoning process; while other truths, conclusions from the first principles, we understand by a process of reasoning. Therefore to understand through a reasoning process and to understand without reasoning do not diversify species.

Q 7 Obj 3 p 100
(3) Furthermore, to understand with or without a reasoning process seems to differ as to be in motion differs from to be at rest; for reasoning is a movement of the intellect from one thing to another. Now to be in motion and to be at rest do not diversify species; for motion ultimately belongs to the genus in which is found the terminus of the motion, as the Commentator says in Book III of the Physics.††2 And the Philosopher says in the same text ††3 that there are as many species of motion as there are species of being, that is, of things in which motion terminates. Therefore, to understand through a reasoning process and to understand without reasoning do not differ specifically.

Q 7 Obj 4 p 100
(4) Furthermore, just as angels understand things in the Word, so also do the souls of the blessed. Now the knowledge which is in the Word is not discursive; hence Augustine says in Book XIV of his De Trinitate††4 that in heaven thoughts will not be subject to change. Therefore a soul does not differ from an angel on the basis of understanding through a reasoning process or without reasoning.

Q 7 Obj 5 p 101
(5) Furthermore, not all angels are specifically alike, as many authorities assert, and yet all angels understand without reasoning. Consequently to understand through a reasoning process and to understand without a reasoning process do not cause a diversity of species in intellectual substances.

Q 7 Obj 5 p 101
However an objector was arguing that some angels understand more perfectly than other angels.

Q 7 Obj 6 p 101
(6) On the contrary, more and less do not bring about diversity of species. Now to understand more perfectly and to understand less perfectly do not differ except in terms of more and less. Therefore angels do not differ specifically because they understand more or less perfectly.

Q 7 Obj 7 p 101
(7) Furthermore, all human souls belong to the same species, and nevertheless they do not all understand in equal degree. Therefore a specific difference in intellectual substances does not come about because they understand more or less perfectly.

Q 7 Obj 8 p 101
(8) Furthermore, a human soul is said to understand discursively because it understands a cause through its effect and vice versa. But this also occurs in angels. For it is said in the Liber de Causis††5 that an intelligence understands the intelligence that is above itself because it is caused by it, and it understands the intelligence which is below itself because the intelligence is the cause of it. Consequently an angel does not differ from a soul on the basis of understand discursively or non-discursively.

Q 7 Obj 9 p 101
(9) Furthermore, things which are perfected by the same perfection seem to be specifically the same; for an act that belongs to them as a property proceeds from one of their essential powers. Now an angel and a soul are perfected by the same perfections, namely, grace, glory or charity. Therefore they belong to the same species.

Q 7 Obj 10 p 101
(10) Furthermore, things which have the same end seem to belong to the same species; for a thing is related to its end through that form which is the principle of its species. Now angels and souls have the same end, namely, eternal happiness, as is clear from what is said in the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 22,††6 namely, that the children of the resurrection will be like angels in heaven. And Gregory states that souls will be elevated to the ranks of the angels.††7 Therefore an angel and a soul belong to the same species.

Q 7 Obj 11 p 101
(11) Furthermore, if an angel and a soul differ specifically, it necessarily follows that in the order of nature an angel is higher than a soul, and as a result will occupy a rank midway between the soul and God. But, as Augustine holds,††8 there is no middle state between our mind and God. Consequently an angel and a soul do not differ in species.

Q 7 Obj 12 p 102
(12) Furthermore, the impression of the same image in diverse recipients does not make them diverse in species; for the image of Hercules in gold and in silver is specifically the same. Now the image of God is in a soul just as it is in an angel. Therefore an angel and a soul do not differ specifically.