Q 14 Parallel texts p 173
QUESTION FOURTEEN

Parallel texts: In II Sent., dist. 19, a. 1; In IV Sent., dist. 50 q. 1, a. 1; Quodl., X, q. 3, a. 2; Contra gent., II, 79-81; Summa theol., I, q. 75, a. 6; Compend. theol., cap. 84.

Q 14 Thes p 173
The fourteenth question that is asked about the human soul has to do with its immortality. And it seems that the human soul is corruptible.

Q 14 Obj 1 p 173
(1) For Ecclesiastes III ††1 says: "The death of a human being and of beasts is one, and the condition of both is equal." But when beasts die, their souls perish. Therefore, when a human being perishes, his soul is corrupted.

Q 14 Obj 2 p 173
(2) Furthermore, corruptible and incorruptible are generically different, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics.††2 But a human soul and an animal soul do not differ generically; because a human being does not differ in genus from an animal. Therefore a soul of a human being and a soul of an animal do not differ as the corruptible and the incorruptible do. But a soul of an animal is corruptible. Therefore a human soul is not incorruptible.

Q 14 Obj 3 p 173
(3) Furthermore, Damascene ††3 says that an angel receives immortality by grace and not by nature. But an angel is not inferior to a soul. Therefore a soul is not naturally immortal.

Q 14 Obj 4 p 173
(4) Furthermore, the Philosopher proves, in Book VIII of the Physics,††4 that the Prime Mover is of infinite power because he moves in infinite time. Therefore, if a soul has the power to endure for an infinite time, it follows that its power is infinite. But there is no infinite power in a finite essence. Therefore it follows that the essence of a soul be infinite if it be incorruptible. Now this is impossible, because only the divine essence is infinite. Therefore a human soul is not incorruptible.

Q 14 Obj 4 p 173
But an objector was arguing that a human soul in incorruptible, not by its own essence but through divine power.

Q 14 Obj 5 p 173
(5) On the contrary, whatever does not belong to something through the thing's own essence is not essential to it. But 'corruptible' and 'incorruptible' are predicated essentially of whatever they are predicated of, as the Philosopher says in Book X of the Metaphysics.††5 Consequently, if a soul is incorruptible, it must be incorruptible through its own essence.

Q 14 Obj 6 p 174
(6) Furthermore, whatever exists is either corruptible or incorruptible. Therefore, if a human soul is not incorruptible according to its own nature, it follows that according to its own nature it is corruptible.

Q 14 Obj 7 p 174
(7) Furthermore, whatever is incorruptible possesses the power to exist forever. Therefore, if a human soul is incorruptible, it follows that is possesses the power to exist forever. Consequently it does not possess being after non-being, and this is contrary to faith.

Q 14 Obj 8 p 174
(8) Furthermore, Augustine ††6 says that just as God is the life of a soul, so a soul is the life of its body. But death is the privation of life; hence by death a soul is deprived of life and destroyed.

Q 14 Obj 9 p 174
(9) Furthermore, a form does not exist except in that in which it is a form. Therefore, if a soul is the form of a body, it cannot exist except in a body. Therefore, when its body is taken away, it perishes.

Q 14 Obj 9 p 174
But an objector was arguing that this is true of a soul insofar as it is a form, not according to its essence.

Q 14 Obj 10 p 174
(10) On the contrary, a soul is not the form of a body in an accidental way; otherwise, since a soul constitutes a human being insofar as it is the form of its body, it would follow that a human being is an accidental being. Now whatever does not belong to a being by accident belongs to it according to its essence. Consequently a soul is a form according to its essence. Therefore, if a soul is corruptible insofar as it is a form, then it is also corruptible according to its essence.

Q 14 Obj 11 p 174
(11) When several elements come together to constitute a single existent, they are so related to one another that if one is corrupted, the other is corrupted. But soul and body come together to constitute a single existent, namely, an existing human being. Therefore, when the body is corrupted, the soul is corrupted.

Q 14 Obj 12 p 174
(12) Furthermore, in a human being the sensitive soul and the rational soul are one in substance. But the sensitive soul is corruptible; therefore so is the rational soul.

Q 14 Obj 13 p 174
(13) Furthermore, a form must be proportioned to its matter. But a human soul is in its body as form is in matter. Therefore, since the body is corruptible, a soul will also be corruptible.

Q 14 Obj 14 p 174
(14) Furthermore, if a soul can be separated from its body, there must be some operation belonging to it that is independent of a body, for no substance is functionless. But a soul can have no operation without its body, not even understanding, which seems the likeliest possibility, because there is no act of understanding apart from a phantasm, as the Philosopher says.††7 Now there is no phantasm apart from a body. Therefore a soul cannot be separated from its body, but is corrupted when its body is corrupted.

Q 14 Obj 15 p 175
(15) Furthermore, if a human soul be incorruptible, this will be only because it possesses intelligence. But it seems that to understand does not belong to a human soul; because whatever is highest in a lower nature imitates to some degree the action of a loftier nature, but does not quite attain this action; just as monkeys imitate to some degree the operation of a human being but do not quite attain this operation. In like fashion it seems that since a human being is the loftiest being in the realm of material things, a human being imitates in some degree the action of the separate intellectual substances, which is the action of understanding, but he does not quite reach this action. Therefore there does not seem to be any necessity for declaring that the soul of a human being is immortal.

Q 14 Obj 16 p 175
(16) Furthermore, either all or nearly all of those who belong to a species achieve the essential operation of that species. But only a few human beings become actually intelligent. Therefore to understand is not the essential operation of a human soul. And consequently there is no necessity for the human soul to be incorruptible simply because it is intellectual.

Q 14 Obj 17 p 175
(17) Furthermore, the Philosopher says, in Book I of the Physics,††8 that everything which is finite is finally reduced to nothing since something is always being taken away from it. But the natural good of a soul is a finite good. Therefore, since any sin whatsoever diminishes the natural good of a human soul, it seems that finally a soul will be entirely obliterated; and thus a human soul is corrupted at some time or other.

Q 14 Obj 18 p 175
(18) Furthermore, when its body weakens, the soul too becomes weak, a fact that is clear from its operations. Therefore also when its body is corrupted, the soul is corrupted.

Q 14 Obj 19 p 175
(19) Furthermore, whatever comes from nothing can return to nothingness. But a human soul is created from nothing. Hence it can return to nothingness. And thus it follows that a soul is corruptible.

Q 14 Obj 20 p 175
(20) Furthermore, so long as a cause remains, its effect remains. But a soul is the cause of the life of its body. Therefore, if a soul always continues to exist, it is clear that its body would live forever; and this is clearly false.

Q 14 Obj 21 p 175
(21) Furthermore, whatever subsists through itself is an entity, located in a genus or a species. But it seems that a human soul is not an entity and that it is not located in a species or a genus as an individual or species is, since a soul is a form. For to be in a genus or to be in a species belongs to a composite, not to matter or to form, except by reduction. Therefore a human soul is not self-subsistent, and consequently, when its body is corrupted, it cannot continue to be.

Q 14 OTC 1 p 176
On The Contrary,

Wisdom II says, "God made man to be inexterminable, and He made him in the image of His own likeness."††9 From this one can draw the conclusion that man is inexterminable, that is, incorruptible, insofar as he is made to the image of God. Now it is with respect to his soul that a human being is made to the image of God, as Augustine states in his book De Trinitate.††10 Therefore a human soul in incorruptible.

Q 14 OTC 2 p 176
(2) Whatever undergoes corruption has contraries or is composed of contraries. But a human soul wholly lacks contrariety; because even those things which are contraries in themselves are not contraries in a soul; for the notions of contraries which exist in a soul are not contrary. Therefore a human soul is incorruptible.

Q 14 OTC 3 p 176
(3) Furthermore, the celestial bodies are said to be incorruptible because they do not have the same kind of matter as things which are generable and corruptible. But a human soul is wholly immaterial; this is clear from the fact that it receives the species of things in an immaterial way. Therefore a soul is incorruptible.

Q 14 OTC 4 p 176
(4) Furthermore, the Philosopher ††11 says that an intellect exists in separation as that which is everlasting is separate from the corruptible. Now the intellect is a part of a soul, as he himself says. Therefore a human soul is incorruptible.

Q 14 Body p 176
The Response:

It must be stated that it is necessary that a human soul be totally incorruptible. To make this clear one must note carefully that whatever belongs to something essentially cannot be taken away from it; for example, one cannot separate animality from man, nor odd and even from number. Now it is obvious that being essentially follows upon form; for each thing has being in accordance with its proper form; hence being cannot in any way be separated from form. Therefore things which are composed of matter and form are corrupted because they lose the form upon which their being follows. However, a form itself cannot of itself be corrupted; but when the composite is corrupted, the form is corrupted accidentally because the being of the composite, which exists through the form ceases to exist. This is true with regard to a form of the kind that does not possess being, but is only that by which the composite exists.

Q 14 Body p 176
Therefore, if there be a form which is in such a way that it possesses existence, it is necessary that such a form be incorruptible. For existence is not separated from something which possesses existence unless its form is separated from it. Hence, if that which possesses existence is the form itself, it is impossible that existence be separated from it. Now it is clear that the principle by which a human being understands is a form that possesses existence and is not merely that by which something exists. For to understand, as the Philosopher proves in Book III of the De Anima,††12 is not an act that is completed through a bodily organ. For it is impossible that there should be found a bodily organ which is capable of receiving all sensible natures, especially because a recipient must be free of the nature received, just as the pupil of the eye lacks color. Now every bodily organ has a sensible nature. On the other hand, the intellect by which we understand is capable of knowing all sensible natures. Hence it is impossible that the intellect's operation, which is to understand, be carried out through anything that is corporeal. Hence it is clear that the intellect has an essential operation in which its body does not share. Now each thing operates in accordance with what it is. For things which exist through themselves operate through themselves, whereas things which do not have existence through themselves do not have an operation through themselves; for heat does not through itself produce warmth, but something which is hot does. Accordingly, therefore, it is clear that the intellective principle by which a human being understands possesses an existence that transcends its body and is not dependent upon its body.

Q 14 Body p 177
It is also evident that an intellective principle of this kind is not composed of matter and form, because species are received in it in a wholly immaterial way. This is made clear from the fact that the intellect is concerned with universals, which are considered in abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Therefore one can conclude that the intellective principle by which a human being understands is a form that possesses existence. Hence it necessarily follows that it is incorruptible, and this is what the Philosopher too says: that the intellect is something divine and everlasting.††13

Q 14 Body p 177
Now it has been pointed out in preceding questions that the intellective principle by which a human being understands is not a separate substance, but is something which formally belongs in a human being, which is the soul or a part of the soul. Hence we conclude from what has been said that a human soul is incorruptible.

Q 14 Body p 177
Now all those who taught that the human soul is corruptible denied some of the points already made. For some of them, declaring that a soul is a body, taught that it is not a form but rather something composed of matter and form. Others, however, declaring that the intellect does not differ from the sense powers, taught as a consequence that the intellect does not have an operation except through a bodily organ; and consequently that the intellect does not have an existence that transcends its body; hence it is not a form that possesses existence. However, others held that the intellect by which a human being understands is a separated substance. All these positions have been shown to be false in earlier questions. Hence it follows that a human soul is incorruptible.

Q 14 Body p 178
There are two sources of direct evidence in support of this assertion. First, from the side of the intellect: for things which of themselves are corruptible are incorruptible insofar as they are perceived by an intellect. For an intellect is able to grasp things in a universal way according to which they are not subject to corruption. Secondly, from the fact of natural appetite which cannot be in vain wherever it is found. For we observe that there exists in human beings a desire for everlastingness, and this is a reasonable desire; for since existence is of itself desirable, an intelligent being who grasps existence without qualification and not merely existence here and now must naturally desire to exist without qualification and for all time. Hence it seems that this appetite is not in vain, but that a human being is incorruptible with respect to his intellective soul.

Q 14 Rp 1 p 178
Replies to the Opposing Arguments:

(1) Solomon, in the book Ecclesiastes, speaks as a preacher, sometimes playing the role of wise men, sometimes the role of fools. The text cited represents the role of the foolish. Or one can say that the death of a human being and of animals is one and the same with respect to the composite's corruption, which takes place for both through the separation of soul from body, although after its separation a human soul continues to exist while a soul belonging to an animal does not.

Q 14 Rp 2 p 178
(2) If a human soul and the soul of an animal, considered merely in their essence, were located in a genus, they would as a result be in different genera, inasmuch as genus is here understood from the viewpoint of the philosophy of nature. For under this aspect, the corruptible and the incorruptible must necessarily be generically different, although they can be united under a common notion; and hence the human soul and the soul of an animal can also be in the same genus if genus is understood in its logical sense. In fact, however, a soul is not in a genus as a species is, but rather as a part of its species. Now each of these composites is corruptible, both that of which a human soul is a part as well as that of which the soul of a beast is a part. For this reason nothing prevents their belonging to a single genus.

Q 14 Rp 3 p 178
(3) As Augustine says,††14 true immortality is true immutability. Now both a soul and an angel possess by grace that immutability which results from the divine decision that they should be incapable of changing from good to evil.

Q 14 Rp 4 p 179
(4) Existence is related to form as essentially following form, but not as an effect follows upon the power of an agent, as, for example, movement is consequent upon the power of the one that causes movement. Therefore, although the fact that something can cause movement in infinite time demonstrates the infinite power of that which causes the movement, still the fact that something is able to exist for an infinite period of time does not demonstrate the infinity of the form through which it exists; just as the fact that the number two is always even does not prove its infinity. Rather the fact that something exists in infinite time demonstrates the infinite power of that which causes existence.

Q 14 Rp 5 p 179
(5) 'Corruptible' and 'incorruptible' are essential predicates because they belong to essence as a formal or as a material principle, but not as an active principle. Rather the active principle for the perpetuity of certain things is a principle which is extrinsic to them.

Q 14 Rp 6 p 179
(6) And from this the solution to the sixth argument is clear.

Q 14 Rp 7 p 179
(7) A soul possesses the power to exist always, but it did not always have this power; and therefore it is not necessary that a soul should always have existed, but rather that in the future it will never cease to be.

Q 14 Rp 8 p 179
(8) A soul is said to be the form of its body insofar as it is the cause of life, just as form is the principle of existing. For in beings which are alive, their 'to live' is their 'to be,' as the Philosopher says in Book II of the De Anima.††15

Q 14 Rp 9 p 179
(9) A soul is the kind of form whose existence does not depend upon that of which it is the form; its operation makes this clear, as we have already said.

Q 14 Rp 10 p 179
(10) Although a soul through its essence is a form, nevertheless something may belong to it insofar as it is the kind of form it is, namely, a subsistent form, which does not belong to it insofar as it is a form; just as to understand does not belong to a human being insofar as he is an animal, although a human being is an animal by his essence.

Q 14 Rp 11 p 179
(11) Although a soul and its body unite to achieve a single act of existence of a human being, still that act of existence accrues to the body from the soul, so that a human soul communicates to its body the soul's own existence by which it subsists, as we have shown in earlier questions. Consequently, when its body is taken away, a soul continues to exist.

Q 14 Rp 12 p 179
(12) The sensitive soul in beasts is corruptible; but in a human being, since the sensitive soul is the same substance as the rational soul, it is incorruptible.

Q 14 Rp 13 p 180
(13) A human body is matter that is proportioned to a human soul with respect to a soul's operations; but it is subject to corruption and other defects because of the exigencies of matter, as we explained earlier. Or one can say that corruption befalls the body because of sin, not because of the original constitution of nature.

Q 14 Rp 14 p 180
(14) When the Philosopher says that there is no understanding apart from a phantasm, the statement is to be understood in reference to the present state of life, in which a human being understands through his soul. There will be a different mode of understanding for a separated soul.

Q 14 Rp 15 p 180
(15) Although a human soul does not achieve that mode of understanding by which loftier substances understand, it still achieves understanding in some degree; and this is certainly enough to establish its incorruptibility.

Q 14 Rp 16 p 180
(16) Although only a few human beings achieve complete understanding, still all human beings achieve understanding to some degree. For it is clear that the first principles of demonstration are conceptions common to all, and these principles are grasped by the intellect.

Q 14 Rp 17 p 180
(17) Sin totally removes grace, but it does not take away anything belonging to a thing's essence. Sin does, however, diminish the inclination toward or aptitude for grace; and to the extent that every sin introduces a contrary disposition, every sin whatsoever is said to diminish that natural good which is aptitude for grace. However, sin never wholly removes the good of nature, because there always remains the potency, with its contrary dispositions, even though the potency is more and more remote from act.

Q 14 Rp 18 p 180
(18) A soul is not weakened when its body is weakened, not even the sensitive soul; this is clear from what the Philosopher says in Book I of the De Anima,††16 that if an old man were to receive the eye of a young man, he would see just as well as the young man does. From this it is obvious that inadequacy of action does not occur because of the weakness of the soul but that of the organ.

Q 14 Rp 19 p 180
(19) Whatever arises from nothing can return to nothingness unless it be kept in existence by the hand which rules it. But it is not for this reason that something is said to be corruptible, but from the fact that something possesses an intrinsic principle of corruption. It is in this latter sense that 'corruptible' and 'incorruptible' are essential predicates.

Q 14 Rp 20 p 180
(20) Although the soul, which is the cause of life, is incorruptible, still the body which receives its life from the soul is subject to change; and because of this the body loses that disposition by which it is suited to receive life. It is in this way that the corruption of a human being takes place.

Q 14 Rp 21 p 180
(21) A soul, although it can exist of itself, does not of itself possess a specific nature, since it is part of the specific nature.

Question 15

Q 15 Parallel texts p 182
QUESTION FIFTEEN

Parallel texts: In III Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, a. 4; In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 1; De Ver., q. 19, a. 1; Contra gent., II, 81, Summa theol., I, q. 89, a. 1; I-II, q. 67, a. 2; Quodl. III, q. 9, a. 1.

Q 15 Thes p 182
The fifteenth question that is asked about the soul is this: Whether a soul that is separated from its body is able to understand? And it seems that it cannot.

Q 15 Obj 1 p 182
(1) Because, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the De Anima,††1 to understand is either imagination or it does not occur apart from imagination. Now imagination does not exist apart from a body; therefore neither does understanding. Therefore a separated soul does not understand.