Q 9 Parallel texts p 124
QUESTION NINE

Parallel texts: In II Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, a. 4, ad 3; Contra gent., II, 71; Summa theol., I, q. 76, a. 6, 7; De Spir. creat., a. 3; In II De An., lect. 1; In VIII Metaph., lect. 5; Quodl., XII, q. 6, a. 9.

Q 9 Thes p 124
The ninth question that is asked about the soul is this: Whether a soul is united to corporeal matter through an intermediary?

And it seems that a soul is united to corporeal matter in this way.

Q 9 Obj 1 p 124
(1) In the book De Spiritu et Anima 1 it is asserted that a soul has powers through which it is intermingled with its body. Now the powers of a soul are other than its existence. Therefore a soul is united to its body through an intermediary.

Q 9 Obj 1 p 124
But an objector was arguing that a soul is united to a body by means of powers insofar as a soul is a mover, but not insofar as it is a form.

Q 9 Obj 2 p 124
(2) On the contrary, a soul is the form of a body insofar as it is an act; but it is a mover insofar as it is a principle of operation. But a principle of operation is only such insofar as it is an act, because everything acts insofar as it is in act. Therefore a soul is both mover and form of its body under the same formality. Consequently one cannot draw a distinction between a soul as a mover of a body and a soul as its form.

Q 9 Obj 3 p 124
(3) Furthermore, a soul, as its body's mover, is not united to the body accidentally; because, if it were, a substantial unit would not arise from the union of soul and body. Therefore a soul is united to its body substantially. But whatever is united to another substantially is united to it without an intermediary. Therefore a soul, insofar as it is a mover, is not united to its body through an intermediary.

Q 9 Obj 4 p 124
(4) Furthermore, a soul is united to its body as a mover inasmuch as a soul is a principle of operation. Now the operations of a soul do not belong to the soul alone, but to the composite, as is said in Book I of the De Anima.