

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: ON EVIL

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Question 1

Question I

On Evil

Article 1 †p

Whether Evil is Something?†1

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. Everything created is something. But evil is something created, as is said in Isaiah (5, 6-7), ". . . I am the Lord making peace and creating evil . . .". Therefore evil is something.

2. Since contraries belong to the same genus,†2 each of the contraries is something. But evil is contrary to good, according to Ecclesiasticus (33, 15), "Good is set against evil." Therefore evil is something.

3. But it was argued that evil considered abstractly is not a contrary but a privation, however an evil considered concretely †3 is a contrary and is something. But counter to this: nothing is contrary to another according to that in which it agrees with it: for black is not contrary to white according as it is a color. But according to that which underlies good, evil concurs with good; therefore according to this, evil is not opposed to good, but rather under the very aspect in which it is evil. Evil, then, precisely as evil is something.

4. Opposition of form and privation is also found in natural things. Yet it is not said that evil is contrary to good in natural things, but only in moral matters, because evil and good, as contraries, include by implication virtue and vice.†4 Therefore the contrariety of evil and good is not taken according to the opposition of privation and possession of a quality.†5

5. Dionysius †6 and Damascene †7 say that evil is like darkness. But darkness is contrary to light, as is said in Book II On the Soul.†8 Therefore evil is contrary to good and not merely the privation of good.

6. Furthermore,†9 Augustine says †10 that what once exists, never entirely falls into non-being. If then air is illuminated by the sun, that light caused in the air does not wholly cease to be; nor can it be said that it is gathered again into its source; consequently something of it, which is like an imperfect disposition, remains in the subject, and this is called darkness. Therefore darkness is something contrary to light and not merely a privation. And the same reasoning applies to evil and good. Consequently evil is not merely the privation of

good, but the contrary of good.

7. Between the privation and the possession of a quality there is no intermediate in a subject admitting of them.†11 But between good and evil there is something intermediate, nor are all things either good or evil, as is said in the Predicaments.†12 Therefore good and evil are not opposed as privative opposites, but as contraries,†13 between which there can be an intermediate. And so evil is something.

8. Moreover,†14 everything that corrupts, acts. But evil, precisely as evil, corrupts, as Dionysius says.†15 Therefore evil, precisely as evil, acts. But nothing acts except inasmuch as it is something.†16 Therefore evil, precisely as evil, is something.

9. But it was argued that to corrupt i.e. to deteriorate is not to act but the lack or want of action. But counter to this: corruption is a movement or change. Therefore corrupting is a movement. But movement is an action. Therefore corruption is an action.

10. Furthermore,†17 corruption is natural just as generation is, as the Philosopher says in Book V of the Physics.†18 But in any natural motion, something is per se intended by the mover's nature; therefore in corruption something is per se intended by the corruptor's nature. But to corrupt is proper to evil, as Dionysius says.†19 Therefore evil has a nature intending some end.

11. What is not something cannot be a genus: because there are no species of non-being, as the Philosopher says.†20 But evil is a genus: for it is said in the Predicaments that good and evil are not in a genus, but are themselves genera of other things.†21 Therefore evil is something.

12. That which is not something cannot be a constitutive difference:†22 because each of the differences of any genus must have being and be one, as is said in Book III of the Metaphysics.†23 But good and evil are differences constitutive of virtue and vice. Therefore evil is something.

13. Besides,†24 that which is not something cannot vary in degree. But evil varies in degree: for murder is a greater evil than adultery. Nor can it be said that the evil is greater inasmuch as it corrupts a greater good, since corruption of good is an effect of evil, and the cause does not vary in degree on account of the effect, but the reverse. Therefore evil is something.

14. Everything that has being by having its own place, is something. But evil is a thing of this kind: for Augustine says that "even evil, when regulated and put in its own place, serves to enhance our admiration of the good."†25 Nor can it be said that this is to be understood of evil on the part of the good in which the evil exists, since evil enhances our admiration of the good by opposition to it, according as "two opposites stand out more clearly when the two are put side by side."†26 Therefore evil, as evil, is something.

15. The Philosopher says †27 that every change is either from subject to subject or from subject to non-subject or from non-subject to subject, and he designates as 'subject' that which is affirmatively expressed. But when someone is changed from good to evil, he is not changed from subject to non-subject, nor from non-subject to subject, because these changes are generation and corruption; therefore he is changed from subject to subject, and so it appears that evil is something positively existing.

16. Moreover †28 the Philosopher says †29 the corruption of one thing is the generation of something else. But evil, as evil, is corruptive according to Dionysius;†30 therefore evil, as evil, is generative of something. And so evil must be something, because everything that is generated, is generated from something.

17. Good is characterized as desirable, because good is what all things desire, as is said in Book I of the Ethics;†31 and by the same reasoning evil is characterized as a thing to be avoided. But something negatively signified may be naturally desired, and something affirmatively signified may be naturally shunned, as the

sheep naturally flees from the presence of the wolf and desires its absence.†32 Therefore good is not something any more than evil is.

18. Punishment as such is just;†33 and what is just is good; therefore punishment as such is something good. Yet punishment as such is something evil; for evil is divided into punishment and fault.†34 Therefore something evil, as such, is good; but every good is something. Consequently evil as such is something.

19. If goodness were not something, nothing would be good; therefore similarly, if evil itself (malitia) is not something nothing is evil. But it is obvious that many evils exist. Therefore evil itself is something.

20. But it was argued that evil is not a being or a thing in nature nor in morals, but a conceptual being, i.e. something as known by the mind. But counter to this: the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Metaphysics†35 that good and evil are in things, but true and false in the intellect. Therefore evil is not merely a being of reason i.e. a conceptual being, but is something among the things of nature.

On the Contrary:

1. Augustine says †36 that evil has no positive nature, but the lack of good has received this name.

2. In the Gospel of John (1, 3) it is said "All things were made by Him." But evil, as Augustine says,†37 was not made by the Word. Therefore evil is not something.

3. In the same place (John 1, 3) it is added "without Him was made nothing," i.e., sin, "because sin is nothing and men becomes nothing when they sin," as the Gloss of Augustine †38 says in the same place; and by the same reasoning any other evil is nothing. Therefore evil is not something.

Response:

Just as the color white is spoken of in two ways, so also is evil. For in one way when white is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of whiteness; in another way to the whiteness itself, namely the accident or quality itself. And likewise when evil is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of evil, and this is something; in another way, it can refer to the evil itself, and this is not something but is the privation of some particular good.

In order to show this, we must consider that good properly is something inasmuch as it is desirable: for according to the Philosopher,†39 they have best defined good who say that good is that which all things desire. But that which is opposed to good is called evil; hence evil must be that which is opposed to the desirable as such. But it is impossible for this to be something, which is evident for three reasons.

First, because the desirable has the nature of an end, and the order of ends corresponds to the order of agents. For the higher and more universal the agent, the more is the end for the sake of which it acts a more universal good; for every agent acts for an end †40 and for the sake of some good. This is obvious in human affairs: for the ruler of a city intends a particular good which is the good of the city. but the king, who is his superior, intends a universal good, the peace of the whole kingdom. Since then in agent or efficient causes an infinite regression is not possible,†41 but one must arrive at a first cause which is the universal cause of being, there must also be some universal good to which all goods are reduced, i.e. referred; and this cannot be other than that very one that is the first and universal agent: because, since the desirable moves the appetite, and the first mover must be unmoved,†42 it follows necessarily that the first and universal agent is itself the first and universal desirable thing, that is, the first and universal desirable good, which effects all things on account of the desire of itself. Therefore just as whatever is numbered among the things that are, must have its origin from the first and universal cause of being. so whatever is among the things that are, must have its origin from the first and universal good. But what originates from the first and universal good cannot be other than a particular good,

just as what originates from the first and universal cause of being is a particular being. Everything then that is numbered among the things that are, must be a particular good. Hence it cannot according as it is a particular being, be opposed to good. Consequently it remains that evil according as it is evil is not numbered among the things that are, but is a privation of some particular good, inhering in a particular good.

Secondly, this likewise is evident from this, that whatever is numbered among the things that are, has an inclination and desire for something befitting itself. But whatever has the nature of desirable has the nature of good. Therefore whatever is numbered among the things that are, has an affinity with some good; but evil as such does not have an affinity with good but is opposed to it; evil then is not numbered among the things that are. But if evil were a thing, it would desire nothing nor would it be desired by anything, consequently it would not have any action nor any motion, because nothing acts or is moved except on account of a desire of an end.

Thirdly, the same point is evident from the fact that being itself especially has the nature of desirable; hence we see that each thing naturally desires to preserve its being, and not only flees from things destructive of its being but resists them with all its might;†43 so accordingly, being itself, inasmuch as it is desirable, is good. Therefore evil, which is universally opposed to good, must be opposed also to being itself. But what is opposed to being cannot be something.

Consequently I say that evil is not something; but that to which evil happens is something, inasmuch as evil deprives of only some particular good; thus for instance, blindness itself is not something, but that to which blindness happens is something.

Reply to 1. Something is said to be evil in two ways; in one way simply, in another way in some respect. And that is called evil simply, which is in itself evil; and this is inasmuch as a thing is deprived of some particular good that pertains to its due or proper perfection, as sickness in an animal is an evil because it deprives it of the equilibrium of humors †44 which is required for the well-being of the animal. But that is said to be evil in some respect, which is not evil in itself but to something else, because, namely, it is not deprived of some good that belongs to its own due perfection but that belongs to the due perfection of another: as in fire there is a privation of water's form which does not belong to the due perfection of fire but to the due perfection of water; hence fire is not of itself evil but is evil to water. And likewise the order of justice has as an adjunct the privation of a particular good of a transgressor, inasmuch as the order of justice requires that a transgressor be deprived of a good he desires. So accordingly, the punishment itself is good simply, but an evil to this person. And God is said to create this evil, and to make peace: because the appetite of the transgressor does not cooperate with the punishment, but the appetite of the recipient of peace does cooperate with peace; but to create is to make something with nothing presupposed. And therefore it is clear that evil is said to be created not inasmuch as it is evil but inasmuch as it is good simply and evil only in a certain respect.

Reply to 2. Good and evil are properly opposed as privation and possession of a quality, because as Simplicius says,†45 those things are properly called contraries, each of which is something in keeping with nature, for example hot and cold, white and black; but those of which one is keeping with to nature and the other a departure from nature are not opposed as contraries but as privation and possession of a quality. But privation is twofold: one of which consists an actual loss of being, like death or blindness; the other which consists of a gradual loss of being, like sickness which is a process leading to death or ophthalmia which is a process leading to blindness. And privations of this latter kind are sometimes called contraries, inasmuch as they still retain something of that which is being lost; and in this way evil is called a contrary, since it does not deprive of all good, but something of the good remains.

Reply to 3. If black were not to retain something of the nature of color it could not be contrary to white, because contraries must be in the same genus.†46 Therefore, although that in which white agrees with black may not suffice for the notion of contraries, nevertheless without it there could not be contrariety; and similarly, although that in which evil concurs with good may not suffice for the notion of contrariety, nevertheless without

it there could not be contrariety.

Reply to 4. The reason why evil is more properly called contrary in moral matters than in natural things is that moral acts depend on the will, and the object of the will is good and evil. But every act is denominated and receives its species from its object.†47 So accordingly, the act of the will, inasmuch as it turns to evil, receives the nature and name of evil; and this evil is properly contrary to good. And this contrariety passes on from acts to habits, inasmuch as acts and habits are akin to one another.

Reply to 5. Darkness is not the contrary of light but the privation. However Aristotle frequently uses the name 'contrary' for privation, because he himself says that privation is in a certain way a contrary,†48 and that the first contrariety is privation and form.†49

Reply to 6. With the arrival of darkness, nothing remains of light, but only the potentiality to light remains, which is not darkness but its subject. For thus even before the air was illuminated it was only in potentiality to light. And properly speaking it is not light that is, or comes to be, or ceases to be, but rather by virtue of the light, air is said to be illuminated or to become illuminated or to cease to be illuminated.

Reply to 7. As Simplicius says.†50 there is something intermediate between evil and good as it is taken in moral matters, for instance an indifferent act is midway between a virtuous act and a vicious act.

Reply to 8. Evil taken abstractly, i.e. evil itself, is said to corrupt, not indeed actively but formally, namely inasmuch as it is the corruption itself of good, as also blindness is said to corrupt sight, inasmuch as blindness is the corruption or privation itself of sight. But that which is evil, if it is evil simply, i.e. in itself, so corrupts or actively and effectively makes the thing corrupt not by acting but by dis-acting, i.e. by failing to act,†51 by reason of a deficiency of active power, as for example defective seed generates defectively and produces a monstrosity,†52 which is a corruption of the natural order. But that which is not simply and in itself evil, by its active power brings about complete corruption, not simply but of some one thing [e.g. as fire corrupts water].

Reply to 9. To corrupt after the manner of a formal cause is not to move or to act but to be corrupt; but to corrupt actively is to move and to act, in such a way however that whatever is there of action or motion pertains to the power of good, but what is there of defect pertains to evil in whatever way evil be taken; for example, whatever motion there is in lameness comes from the power of walking, but the motion's lack of straightness and uniformity comes from the crookedness of the leg †53 also fire generates fire inasmuch as it has such a form, but it corrupts water inasmuch as such a privation is an adjunct of this form.

Reply to 10. The corruption that comes about from that which is simply and in itself evil, cannot be natural, but rather is a lapse from nature; but the corruption that comes about from that which is evil with reference to something else, can be according to nature, for example that fire corrupts water. And then what it intends is good simply, namely the form of fire, but what is intended principally is the 'being' (esse) of generated fire, and secondarily the 'non-being' of water, inasmuch as this is required for the 'being' of fire.

Reply to 11. That statement of the Philosopher presents a difficulty because if good and evil are not in a genus but are themselves genera, the distinction of the ten categories comes to naught. And therefore, as Simplicius says,†54 some have offered the solution that this statement of the Philosopher is to be understood in such a way that good and evil are genera of contraries, i.e. of virtue and vice, but are not in a contrary genus but in quality. But this explanation does not seem proper, because this third member does not differ from the first member the Philosopher stated, namely that certain contraries are in one genus. Hence Porphyry †55 stated that certain contraries are univocal; -- and these are either in one proximate genus, as white and black in the genus of color, which is the first member of the division Aristotle makes,†56 or they are in contrary proximate genera, as chastity and lust which are under virtue and vice respectively, which is the second member †57 of the division --; but others are equivocal, such as 'good' which is found in all genera, as is 'being' and likewise 'evil'. And

therefore he said that good and evil are neither in one genus nor in many genera, but they themselves are genera, according as that which transcends genera can be called a genus, like 'being' and 'one'. However Iamblicus †58 gives two other solutions. One of which is that good and evil are called genera of contraries, inasmuch as one of the contraries is defective in respect to the other, as black in respect to white and bitter in respect to sweet; and thus all contraries are so to speak reduced to good and evil, inasmuch as every defect pertains to the notion of evil. Hence also in Book I of the Physics†59 it is said that contraries are always compared to each other as better and worse. The other solution Iamblicus gives is that Aristotle gave this [that good and evil are genera] as the opinion of Pythagoras,†60 who posited two orders of things, one comprehended under good and the other under evil. For often in arguing Aristotle uses examples which are not true according to his opinion but which are commonly accepted by others.†61 Clearly then, in view of the preceding statements, it is not necessary to hold that evil is something.

Reply to 12. Good and evil are differences only in moral matters, in which evil is something affirmed in a positive way, inasmuch as the very act of the will is denominated evil from what is willed, although the evil itself cannot be willed except under the aspect of good.

Reply to 13. One thing is called more evil than another not by approaching some maximum evil nor by diverse participation of some form, in the way a thing is called more or less white according to a diverse participation in whiteness; rather, a thing is called more or less evil inasmuch as it is more or less deprived of good, not indeed effectively but formally. For homicide is called a greater evil than adultery, not because it corrupts to a greater degree the natural good of the soul, but because to a greater degree it removes the goodness of the act itself; for homicide to a greater degree than adultery is contrary to the good of charity, by which the virtuous act ought to be informed.

Reply to 14. Nothing prevents evil from having its place according to that which is retained in it of good, and that evil enhance the good by its opposition inasmuch as it is evil.

Reply to 15. The subject which is designated by an affirmative term is not restricted to a contrary, but may also be a privation: for the Philosopher says in the same place †62 that a privation can be designated by an affirmative term, as for instance 'naked'. And moreover nothing prevents us from saying that a change from good to evil is a kind of corruption, so that in this way it can be called a change from a subject to a non-subject. However, when man is changed from the goodness of virtue to wickedness, it is a movement from one quality to another quality as is evident from the premises of the objection (in argument 15).

Reply to 16. As Dionysius explains,†63 evil is corruptive inasmuch as it is evil; but it is generative not inasmuch as it is evil, but inasmuch as it retains something of good.

Reply to 17. Non-being is never desired except inasmuch as by some non-being one's own being is preserved, as the sheep desires the absence of the wolf for the preservation of its own life, and flees the wolf's presence only as corruptive of its own life. From which it is evident that 'being' is desired of itself (per se) and is fled from by reason of something else (per accidens); but 'non-being' is fled from by reason of itself (per se) and desired by reason of something else. (per accidens). And therefore good as such is something, but evil as such is a privation.

Reply to 18. Punishment as such is an evil to someone; inasmuch as it is just is good simply. But nothing prevents that which is good simply from being an evil to something else, as for example the form of fire is good simply but it is an evil to water.

Reply to 19. 'Being' is used in two senses.†64 In one way as it signifies the nature of the ten genera, and in this sense neither evil nor any privation is a being or anything. In another way, as an answer to the question 'whether it, i.e. evil or anything else, is or exists'; and in this sense evil is or exists, just as blindness is or exists. Nevertheless evil is not something, because 'to be something' not only signifies what is answered to the

question 'whether it is' but what is answered to the question 'what is it'?†65

Reply to 20. Evil indeed is in things but as a privation, and not as something real, but in the intellect evil is understood as something; and therefore it can be said that evil is a being in reason and not in reality, because in the intellect it is something, but not in reality. And indeed to be understood, thanks to which something is called a being of reason, is good; for that something be understood is a good.

Question I, Article 2 †p

Whether Evil Exists in Good?†1

It seems it does not, for the following reasons.

1. Dionysius says that evil is neither an existing thing nor does it exist in things.†2 And he proves this from the fact that every existing thing is good, but evil does not exist in good, therefore evil is not in an existing thing. And so from this argument it seems obvious that evil does not exist in good.

2. But it was argued that evil is in an existing thing and in a good, not inasmuch as evil is an existing thing or a good but inasmuch as the existing thing is deficient. But counter to this: every defect pertains to the notion of evil. If then evil is in an existing thing inasmuch as it is deficient, evil is in the existing thing inasmuch as it is evil. Therefore some evil is presupposed in the existing thing in order that it can be the subject of evil, and then the question will arise again as to that evil's subject; and if the existing thing, inasmuch as it is deficient, is its subject, it will be necessary to presuppose some other evil, and so on endlessly. Therefore we must maintain the first position, namely that if evil is in an existing thing, it is in it not inasmuch as it is deficient but inasmuch as it is an existing thing, which is contrary to the position of Dionysius (in arg. 1).

3. Moreover,†3 evil and good are opposites. But one of the opposites is not in the other, as coldness is not in fire. Therefore evil is not in good.

4. But it was argued that evil is not in a good opposed to itself, but in some other good. But counter to this: everything that belongs to many, belongs to them according to one nature. But good, and similarly, evil, belongs to many. Therefore according to one common nature, good belongs to all goods and evil to all evils. But evil, taken in general, is opposed to good; therefore, any whatever evil is opposed to any whatever good. And so if some evil is in some good, it follows that an opposite is in its opposite.

5. Augustine says †4 that in view of the fact that evil exists in good, the rule of the logicians which says that contraries cannot be in the same thing at the same time, is in error. But the rule would not be in error if evil were not in the good opposed to it; therefore from the fact that evil is in good it follows that an opposite is in an opposite. Which is utterly impossible, because all opposites as such involve a contradiction, and contradictories cannot be simultaneously true.†5 Therefore evil is not in good.

6. Moreover,†6 anything that is in something, either is caused by the subject as is a natural accident, for example heat from fire, or by some external agent, as the heat of water by fire, which is a non-natural accident. If then evil is in good, either it is caused by good or by some other agent. But it is not caused by good, because good cannot be the cause of evil, according to Matthew (7, 18) "A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit." Nor on the other hand is it caused by some other agent, because this also either is evil or is a common principle of evil and good. But evil not caused by good cannot be the cause of evil that is in good, because thus it would follow that not every duality would have a unity prior to it as its origin. Nor again, can it be one common principle of good and evil, because one and the same thing does not produce diverse and contrary effects.†7 Therefore in no way can evil be in good.

7. No accident i.e. attribute, diminishes or corrupts the subject in which it is. But evil diminishes or corrupts good. Therefore evil is not in good.

8. Just as good relates to actuality, so evil on the contrary relates to potentiality; hence evil is found only in those things that have a potentiality for it, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics.†8 But evil is in potentiality, as is any privation. Therefore evil is not in good but in evil.

9. End and good are the same, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics†9 and in Book II of the Physics.†10 And form and end coincide in the same thing as is said in Book II of the Physics.†11 But privation of the substantial form excludes form from the matter, therefore no good remains. Since then privation is in the matter, and has the nature of evil, it seems that not every evil exists in good.

10. The more perfect the subject, the more is an accident i.e. an attribute, found in it, for example the more perfect the fire the hotter it is. If then evil exists in good as in a subject, it would follow that the more perfect the good, the more evil is in it, which is impossible.

11. Every subject tends to preserve an accident, i.e. an attribute. But evil is not preserved by good, but rather is destroyed. Therefore evil does not exist in good as in a subject.

12. Every accident i.e., attribute, denominates its subject. If then evil is in good, it will denominate good, and so it will follow that evil is good, which is contrary to what is said in Isaiah (5, 20), "Woe to you that call evil good."†12

13. What is not, is not in something. But evil is not a being. Therefore it is not in good.

14. Just as a defect or imperfection is of the nature of evil, so perfection is of the nature of good. But evil does not exist in any perfect thing, since evil is a corruption. Therefore evil does not exist in good.

15. Good is what all things desire.†13 But that which is subject to evil is not desirable, for no one desires to live in misery, as is said in Book IX of the Ethics.†14 Therefore that which is subject to evil is not a good.

16. Nothing does harm except to its opposite. If then evil is not in a good opposed to it but in some other good, it will not harm that good, and so it will not have the nature of evil, because it is evil only inasmuch as it harms a good, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion†15 and in the book On the Nature of Good.†16 But good cannot be in an evil opposed to itself. Therefore evil does not exist in any good.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says †17 that evil cannot exist except in good.

2. Evil is the privation of good, as Augustine says.†18 But privation determines its subject: for it is a negation in a substance, as is said in Book IV of the Metaphysics.†19 Therefore evil determines its subject. But every subject, since it is an existing thing, is good because being and good are convertible.†20 Therefore evil is in good.

Response:

Evil cannot exist except in good. To prove this we must consider that we may speak of good in two ways: in one way of good absolutely, in another way of 'a good this', for instance a good man or a good eye. Speaking then of good absolutely, good has the greatest extension, even greater than being, as was the opinion of the Platonists.†21 For since good is that which is desirable, what is in itself desirable is in itself good;†22 and this is the end, the object or goal of the appetite. But from this that we desire the end it follows that we desire

those things that are ordered to the end, consequently those things that are ordered to the end, from the very fact that they are ordered to the end or good, have the nature of good; hence useful things are contained under the division of good.†23 Moreover any thing that is in potentiality to good from the very fact that it is in potentiality to good, has an order to good, since to be in potentiality is nothing else but to be ordered to actuality. Clearly, then, that which is in potentiality from the very fact that it is in potentiality has the nature of good. Therefore every subject, even prime matter, inasmuch as it is in potentiality in regard to any perfection whatsoever, from the very fact that it is in potentiality has the nature of good. And since the Platonists †24 did not distinguish between matter and privation, ranking matter with non-being, they held that good extends to more things than being.

And Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*†25 seems to have followed this course, placing good prior to being. And although matter is distinguished from privation and is non-being only incidentally (per accidens),†26 nevertheless this consideration is to some extent true: because prime matter is called being only in potentiality, and has unqualified being through form, but in and of itself it has potentiality; and since potentiality pertains to the notion of good, as was said above, consequently good belongs to it in itself (per se ipsam).

But although any being whatsoever, whether actual or in potentiality, can be called good simply, i.e. in itself, nevertheless it does not follow from this alone that anything without distinction is 'a good this': for example if a man is good simply, it does not follow that he is a good flute player but only when he has attained skill in the art of flute playing. So accordingly, although man precisely as he is a man is a certain good, nevertheless it does not follow from this alone that he is a good man, rather that which makes each thing good is its proper virtue. For virtue is that which makes its possessor good, according to the Philosopher.†27 But virtue is the maximum of a thing's potentiality, as is said in *Book I On the Heavens*.†28 From which it is clear that something is called 'a good this' when it has the perfection proper to it, for example 'a good man' when he has the perfection proper to man, 'a good eye' when it has the perfection proper to the eye.

From the foregoing analysis then it is evident that good is taken in three ways. For in one way the very perfection of the thing is called its good, as sharpness of vision is called the good of the eye and virtue is called the good of man. Secondly, the thing that has its proper perfection is called good, for instance a virtuous man and a sharp eye. In the third way the subject itself is called good inasmuch as it is in potentiality to perfection, for example the soul to virtue, and the substance of the eye to acuteness of sight. But since evil, as we have said above (in article 1), is nothing else but the privation of a due perfection, and privation exists only in a being in potentiality, because we say a thing is deprived which is designed by nature to have something and does not have it,†29 it follows that evil exists in good inasmuch as being in potentiality is called good.

Now the good which is perfection is free from i.e. is without evil; consequently in such a good evil cannot exist. But the good which is a composite of subject and perfection is seriously damaged by evil, inasmuch as the perfection is removed and the subject remains, for instance blindness deprives of vision and leaves the eye without sight, and exists in the substance of the eye or even in the animal itself as in a subject

Hence if there is a good which is pure act having no admixture of potency, such as God is, in such a good evil in no way can exist.

Reply to 1. Dionysius does not mean that evil is not in an existing thing as a privation is in a subject but that it is not in an existing thing as something existing of itself (per se), therefore it is not something positive existing in a subject.

Reply to 2. When it is said that evil is in an existing thing inasmuch as it is deficient, this can be understood in two ways: in one way that 'the' ('li')†30 "inasmuch as" designates a kind of concomitance; and thus what is said in the objection is true in that manner of speaking in which we can say that white is in the body

inasmuch as the body is white; in another way that the "inasmuch as" designates a condition pre-existing in the subject, and the argument proceeds in this way.

Reply to 3. Evil is not opposed to the good in which it is. For it is in the good that is in potentiality; but evil is a privation; and potentiality is opposed neither to privation nor to perfection but underlies i.e. is subject to both. Dionysius †31 however uses this argument to show that evil is not in good as something existing.

Reply to 4. The argument in that objection has many flaws. For the first statement, that what belongs to many belongs to them according to one common nature, is true of those things which are predicated univocally. But 'good' is not predicated univocally of all goods just as neither is 'being' predicated univocally of all beings, since both are found in all genera. And in fact by this argument Aristotle shows in Book I of the Ethics †32 that there is not one common idea of good. Secondly, because granted that good were predicated univocally and even evil, nevertheless since evil is a privation it is not said of many according to one common nature. Thirdly, because granted that each were univocal and each signified some nature, it could be said that the common nature of evil would be opposed to the common nature of good; nevertheless it would not necessarily follow that any whatever evil would be opposed to any whatever good, since vice in general is opposed to virtue in general, yet not any vice whatsoever is opposed to any virtue whatsoever: for intemperance is not opposed to liberality.

Reply to 5. Inasmuch as evil exists in good the rule of the logicians is not in error according to the truth of the matter, because evil is not in a good opposed to it, as was said (in the Response). But it appears to be in error inasmuch as evil taken in general and good seem to involve opposition.

Reply to 6. Evil, since it is not in a subject as a natural accident, is not caused by the subject, just as neither is privation caused by potentiality; nor again does it have an external cause per se, but only incidentally (per accidens) as will be evident when we inquire about the cause of evil (below in article 3).

Reply to 7. Evil exists in good as in a subject which it diminishes or corrupts, according as being in potentiality is called good.

Reply to 8. Although actuality in itself is good, nevertheless it does not follow that potentiality in itself is evil but rather, the privation which is opposed to actuality. Indeed potentiality from the very fact that it is ordered to actuality, has the nature of good, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 9. There are many flaws in that argument. For first, although the end is in itself a good, yet not only is the end good, but also those things that are ordered to the end from the very fact that they are ordered to the end have the nature of good, as we have said (in the Response). Secondly because although some end is the same as the form, nevertheless it does not follow that every end is a form: for in certain things the operation itself or use is the end, as is said in Book I of the Ethics. †33 And again, since the thing made is so to speak the end of the maker, the disposition for the form is the end in the arts that prepare the matter; and the matter itself according as it is made by divine art, is for this reason a good and an end, inasmuch as the action of creator terminates at it.

Reply to 10. The argument in that objection is valid of the accidents i.e. attributes that follow upon the nature of the subject, as heat follows upon the nature of fire. However, it is different in the case of an accident that is a regression from nature, for example sickness. For it does not follow, if sickness is an accident of an animal, that the stronger the animal, the sicker it is, but rather the less sick; and the same argument holds in regard to any evil. Nevertheless it can be said that the more something is in potentiality and has a natural tendency to good, the worse it is that it be lacking in good; but the good which is the subject of evil is the potentiality. And so in some manner the greater the good which is the subject of evil, the greater is the evil.

Reply to 11. A subject preserves an accident that naturally inheres in it. But evil is not in good as

naturally inhering in good. And yet evil could not exist, if good were totally destroyed.

Reply to 12. As Augustine says,†34 the prophetic judgment [cited in the objection] is against those who say that good, precisely as good, is evil, but not against those who say that what is good under one aspect is evil under another aspect.

Reply to 13. Evil is not said to exist in good as something positive, but as a privation.

Reply to 14. Not only that which is perfect has the nature of good but also that which is in potentiality to perfection; and evil is in a good of this kind.

Reply to 15. That which is subject to privation, although it is not desirable inasmuch as it is subject to privation, nevertheless it is desirable inasmuch as it is in potentiality to perfection; and according to this consideration it is good.

Reply to 16. Evil harms a good composed of potentiality and actuality, inasmuch as evil takes away its perfection; it also harms the good itself which is in potentiality, not as taking away something of it, but inasmuch as evil is the very deprival or privation of the perfection to which the evil is opposed.

Question I, Article 3 †p

Whether Good Is the Cause of Evil?

It seems it is not, for the following reasons.

1. It is said †1 in Matthew (7, 18) "A good tree cannot bear bad fruit." But 'fruit' designates the effect of a cause. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

2. An effect bears a likeness to its cause, because every agent produces its like.†2 But a likeness of evil does not pre-exist in good. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

3. Those things which are effects of their causes pre-exist substantially in their causes. If then evil is caused by good, evil pre-exists substantially in good. Which is impossible.

4. One opposite is not the cause of the other. But evil is opposed to good. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

5. Dionysius says that "evil is not from good; and if it is from good, it is not evil."†3

6. But it was said that good inasmuch as it is deficient is the cause of evil.†4 But counter to this: every defect has the nature of evil. If then good inasmuch as it is deficient is the cause of evil, it follows that good is the cause of evil inasmuch as some evil pre-exists in it, and then the question will recur about that evil. Either then there will be an infinite regression, or we will have to admit some first evil which is the cause of evil, or we will have to say that good precisely as good is the cause of evil.

7. But it was argued that that defect which pre-exists in good according as it is the cause of evil, is not an actual evil but defectibility, i.e. a potentiality to be defective. But counter to this: the Philosopher says †5 that causes as potential are related to effects as potential, and causes as actual to effects as actual. Therefore from the fact that something is potentially defective, it is not the cause of an actual defect, which is an actual evil.

8. Given a sufficient cause the effect is given,†6 because it is of the nature of a cause that it is naturally ordered to producing its effect. But whenever defectibility is found in some creature it does not follow that actual evil is found in it. Thus let something defectible yet not defective exist in the instance A, but let something actually defective exist in instance B. Therefore either something came to B which was not in A, or nothing. If nothing, there will not be a defect in B, just as there was no defect in A; but if something was added, either it is good or evil. If evil, there will be an infinite regression as before (in arg. 6); if good, then good precisely as good is the cause of evil, and so it follows that a greater good is the cause of a greater evil, and the greatest good is the cause of the greatest evil. Therefore good inasmuch as it is deficient is not the cause of evil.

9. Every good inasmuch as it is created can be deficient. If then good inasmuch as it can be deficient is the cause of evil, it follows that good inasmuch as it is created is the cause of evil. But created good always remains created, therefore it will always be the cause of evil. Which is inadmissible.

10. If good inasmuch as it is actually or potentially deficient, is the cause of evil, it follows that, that which in no way can be deficient either actually or potentially cannot be the cause of evil, which is contrary to what is said in Isaiah (45, 7) "I, the Lord, create evil," and in Amos (3, 6) "Shall there be evil in a city which the Lord does not do?" (Vulgate: 'hath not done?'). Therefore good inasmuch as it is deficient is not the cause of evil.

11. Just as perfection is related to good, so a defect or imperfection is related to evil. Therefore commutatively [i.e. in a reverse way], just as a defect is related to good, so perfection is related to evil. But a defect as such is the cause of good, for example faith inasmuch as it is enigmatic, i.e. obscure vision,†7 which pertains to a defect of vision, is the cause of merit. Therefore good inasmuch as it is perfect, and not inasmuch as it is deficient, can be the cause of evil.

12. Three faculties are required for action: reason directing, the will commanding, and a power executing. But a defect in reason, which is ignorance, excuses from evil, i.e. from fault, and so it is not the cause of evil; and likewise, a defect in power, which is weakness, excuses. Therefore also a defect in the will excuses. The will then inasmuch as it is a deficient good is not the cause of evil.

13. If the will inasmuch as it is deficient is the cause of evil, then either inasmuch as it lacks a good which properly belongs to it, and this is a punishment, and thus punishment would precede fault;†8 or inasmuch as it lacks a good which does not properly belong to it, and from such a lack no evil follows: for no evil follows in a stone from the fact that it does not have sight. In no way then is good inasmuch as it is deficient the cause of evil.

14. But it was argued that good as such can be a cause of evil, but incidentally (per accidens). But counter to this: an agent's action accidentally attains an effect, for instance the action of a grave-digger uncovers a treasure.†9 If then good is accidentally the cause of evil, it follows that a good action extends to evil itself. Which seems unreasonable.

15. A person doing an unlawful act unintentionally does not sin, for example if someone intending to strike an enemy, strikes his father instead.†10 But the cause of a thing which is not intended is accidentally the cause of it. If then evil has only an accidental cause it follows that no one doing evil sins. Which is unreasonable.

16. Every accidental cause is reduced, i.e. is referred to a per se cause.†11 If then evil has an accidental cause, it seems to follow that evil would have a per se cause.

17. That which occurs accidentally occurs for the least part i.e. rarely.†12 But evil occurs for the most part, because as is said in Ecclesiastes (1, 15) "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore evil has a per se cause and not merely an accidental cause.

18. Nature is the per se cause of those things which come about naturally, as is said in Book II of the Physics.†13 But some evils come about naturally, such as death and old age, as is said in Book V of the Physics.†14 Therefore it cannot be said that good is the accidental cause of evil.

19. Moreover †15 the actuality and likewise the potentiality is good. But neither is the cause of evil: for form, which is the actuality, is removed by evil, and the good which is the potentiality is related to both, namely to good and to evil. Therefore no good is a cause of evil.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says †16 that evil can have its origin only from good.

2. Dionysius says †17 that the principle and end of all evils is good.

Response:

Good is the cause of evil in that way in which evil can have a cause. For it is evident that evil cannot have a per se cause. Which is obvious for three reasons. First because that which has a per se cause is intended by its cause: for what happens outside the agent's intention is not a per se effect but an accidental effect, for example the digging of a grave is accidentally the cause of finding a treasure when this happens outside the intention of the gravedigger.†18 But evil as such cannot be intended, nor in any way willed or desired, because the desirable has the nature of good, to which evil as such is opposed. Hence we see that no one does evil except intending some good as it appears to him,†19 for instance it seems good to the adulterer to enjoy sensual pleasure, and for that reason he commits adultery. Hence it remains that evil does not have a per se cause.

Secondly, the same point is evident from this that every per se effect in some way has a likeness to its cause, either as being of the same nature, as in univocal agents, or as being of a deficient nature, as in equivocal agents.†20 But every effective cause acts inasmuch as it is in act,†21 which pertains to the nature of good; hence evil as such does not have a likeness to its effective cause inasmuch as it is effective. It remains then that evil does not have a per se cause.

Thirdly, the same truth is evident from this that every per se cause has a fixed and determined order to its effect, and what is done in keeping with order is not evil, but evil occurs when order is neglected;†22 hence evil as such does not have a per se cause.

Nevertheless evil must have a cause in some way. For it is clear, that since evil is not something existing of itself but inheres in something as a privation, -- which is a lack of that which a thing is designed by nature to have but does not have †23-, that it is not of a thing's nature that it be evil: for if some lack is natural to a thing, it cannot be said to be evil for it, for example not to have wings is not evil for man, nor not to have sight for a stone, because it is in keeping with nature. But anything which does not belong naturally to a thing must have some cause: for water would not be hot except from some cause. Hence it remains that every evil has some cause, but accidentally,†24 since it cannot have a per se cause. Now everything which is accidental, is reduced, i.e. is traced back to that which is per se; but if evil does not have a per se cause, as has been shown, it remains that only good has a per se cause. Nor can the per se cause of good be other than good, since a per se cause produces its like. It remains then that good is the accidental cause of any evil. But evil, which is a defective good, may also be a cause of evil; nevertheless it always comes back to this that the first cause of evil is not evil, but good.

Accordingly, there is a twofold way in which evil is caused by good. In one way good is the cause of evil inasmuch as it is deficient, in another way inasmuch as good is accidentally the cause of evil. Which is obvious in natural things. For the cause of this evil, namely the corruption of water, is the active power of fire;

which does not principally and directly (per se) intend the non-being of water, but principally intends to induce the form of fire into the matter, with which the non-being of water is necessarily connected; and therefore it is accidental that fire causes the non-being of water. On the other hand, the cause of this evil, the birth of a monstrosity, is a lack power in the seed.†25 Now if we seek the cause of this defect, the evil of the seed, we will arrive at some good which is the cause of this evil accidentally and not inasmuch as it is deficient. For the cause of this defect in the seed is some altering principle which induces a quality contrary to the quality required for the good disposition of the seed; and the more perfect the power of this altering principle the more will it induce this contrary quality and consequently the ensuing defect of the seed; hence the evil of the seed is not caused by a good inasmuch as it is deficient, but by a good inasmuch as it is perfect [and is caused incidentally].

The case is somewhat similar in voluntary actions, but not in all respects. For clearly what is pleasurable according to the senses moves the will of the adulterer and influences it delight in such pleasure which excludes the order of reason and divine law; which is morally evil. If then it were true that the will of necessity would accept the impression or influence of the enticing pleasure, as a natural body of necessity accepts the impression of an agent, the case would be entirely the same in voluntary and in natural acts. But this is not so, because however much the external sensible object attracts, the will still has the power to accept or not to accept. Consequently the cause of the evil which occurs from the acceptance, is not the seductive pleasure itself, but rather the will.

Indeed the will is the cause of evil in each of the forementioned ways, namely both incidentally (per accidens) and inasmuch as it is a deficient good: incidentally inasmuch as the will is moved to something which is good in some respect, but joined with what is simply evil; but as a deficient good inasmuch as in the will we must consider beforehand some defect previous to the defective choice, by which it chooses a thing good in some respect but simply evil.

Which is evident as follows: for in all things of which one ought to be the rule and measure of the other, good in the thing ruled and measured results from this that it is ruled and conformed to the rule and measure, but evil from the fact that it is not ruled or measured. If then there is a craftsman who ought to cut a piece of wood straight according to some rule, if he does not cut it straight, which is to cut badly, this faulty cutting will be caused from this defect, that the craftsman was working without a rule and measure. Likewise, pleasure and everything else in human affairs ought to be measured and ruled according to the rule of reason and divine law; hence non-use of the rule of reason and divine law is presupposed in the will before its disordered choice.

And indeed there is no need to seek a cause of this non-use of the aforesaid rule, because the liberty of the will itself, thanks to which it can act or not act, suffices for this. And the very fact of not actually giving heed to such a rule considered in itself is not evil, neither a fault nor a penalty, because the soul is not bound nor is it always possible to actually give heed to a rule of this kind; but it first takes on the nature of fault from this that without actual consideration of the rule it proceeds to such a choice, just as the carpenter does no wrong in not always having in hand a measure but in proceeding to cut without using the measure. And likewise the fault of the will does not consist in not actually give heed to the rule of reason or divine law but in proceeding to choose without employing the rule or measure. And hence Augustine says †26 that the will is the cause of sin inasmuch as it is deficient; but he compares that defect to silence or darkness because that defect is solely a negation.

Reply to 1. As Augustine explains this,†27 by 'tree' is signified the will and by 'fruit' the external work. So accordingly it is to be understood that a good tree cannot bear bad fruit, because an evil work does not proceed from a good will, just as a good work does not proceed from a bad will. But nevertheless even the bad will itself is from some good, just as the bad tree is produced from good earth. For as was said above (in the Response), if an evil effect proceeds from an evil cause which is a deficient good, nevertheless it always comes back to this that evil is caused accidentally by a good that is not deficient.

Reply to 2. That argument is valid in regard to a per se cause: for in such a cause a likeness of the effect pre-exists. But good is not the cause of evil in this way, but accidentally, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 3. That argument too is valid in regard to a per se cause and effect: for a cause which furnishes substantially what is in the effect is a per se cause.

Reply to 4. An opposite is not the per se cause of its opposite, but nothing prevents it from being an accidental cause of it. For cold if it changes direction "in some manner and departs" is the cause of heat, as is said in Book VIII of the Physics.†28

Reply to 5. Dionysius there establishes that evil is not from good as from a per se cause, but afterwards †29 in the same chapter he shows that evil is accidentally from good.

Reply to 6. Some good is the cause of evil inasmuch as it is deficient; yet not only is good the cause of evil in this way, but even in a certain manner good inasmuch as it is not deficient is accidentally the cause of evil. But in voluntary actions the cause of evil i.e. sin, is the defective will, but that defect, according as it is presupposed to sin, does not have the nature either of fault or punishment, as we have said (in the Response). Nor do we need to seek a further cause of such a defect, hence there is no need to admit an infinite regression. When then it is said that good inasmuch as it is deficient is the cause of evil, if 'the' ('li')†30 "inasmuch as" designates something pre-existing, it is not universally true; but if designates concomitance, it is universally true, because anything that causes evil is deficient, i.e. a thing bringing about evil, just as if we were to say that anything that heats, heats inasmuch as it gives off heat.

Reply to 7. A good inasmuch as it has an tendency (aptitudinem) to be deficient is not a sufficient cause for it to be actually evil, but inasmuch as it has some actual defect, as was explained in regard to the will (in the Response). Although it is not necessary that a thing have some sort of defect in order to be the cause of evil, because even if it is not deficient it can be the cause of evil accidentally.

Reply to 8. The answer to the eighth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 9. A good from the fact that it is created can in some manner be deficient in virtue of that defect from which voluntary evil proceeds, because from the very fact that a thing is created it follows that it is subject to another as to a rule and measure. But if it were its own rule and measure, it could not proceed to work without the rule. For that reason God, Who is His own rule, cannot sin, just as a craftsman could not err in cutting wood if his own hand were the rule for cutting.

Reply to 10. As we have already said (in the Reply to 6), it is not necessary that a good which is the accidental cause of evil, be a deficient good. And in this way God is the cause of the evil of punishment: for in punishing He does not intend evil to the one punished but the imprinting of the order of His justice on human affairs, on which follows the evil of the one punished, just as the privation of the form of water follows on the form of fire.

Reply to 11. Faith is not meritorious because it is enigmatic, i.e. obscure cognition, but because the will uses such knowledge rightly, namely by assenting on account of God revealing them to those things that it does not see. But nothing prevents someone from meriting by properly using evil, just as on the contrary someone would demerit by improperly using good.

Reply to 12. The defect of the will itself is a fault, just as the defect of the intellect is ignorance and the defect of the executing power is weakness. So accordingly, the defect of the will does not excuse from fault, just as neither does the defect of the intellect exclude ignorance nor the defect of the power exclude weakness.

Reply to 13. The defect which is presupposed in the will before sin is neither a fault nor a punishment,

but a pure negation; but it takes on the nature of fault from the fact that with such a negation it applies itself to a work: for by reason of the very application to a work it incurs responsibility for that good which it lacks, namely actually heeding the rule of reason and divine law.

Reply to 14. Something is called an accidental cause of a thing in two ways: so far as concerns the cause, for example the per se cause of a house is the builder, to whom being-a-musician is accidental, and so we say the accidental cause of the house is a musician, inasmuch as being-a-musician is accidental to the per se cause; in another way so far as concerns the effect, as if we say that the builder is the per se cause of the house but the accidental cause of something that is attributed to the house, for instance that the house is lucky or unlucky,†31 i.e. that good or evil befalls someone living in the house. Consequently, when we say that good is the accidental cause of evil, it is to be understood as an accident which is attributed to the effect, namely inasmuch as good is the cause of some good to which a certain privation, which is called evil, is accidental. But although sometimes the action of the cause extends to the effect itself which is accidental, as the gravedigger by his digging finds a treasure, nevertheless this is not always true: for the operation of the builder does not extend to this that good or evil befalls a person living in the house. And in this way I say that a good action does not extend to the evil effect. For which reason Dionysius says †32 that evil is not only contrary to the intention but also contrary to the means (viam), because motion of itself (per se) does not have evil as its end.

Reply to 15. Sometimes an accident of some effect is joined to it in a few cases and rarely, and then it is reasonable to presume that the agent in intending the per se effect, in no way intends the accidental effect. But sometimes an accident of this kind always or in most cases accompanies the effect principally intended, and then the accidental effect is not separated from the agent's intention. If then in a few cases some evil is joined to the good that the will intends, the sin is excusable, for example if someone cutting timber in a woods through which people rarely pass, in felling a tree should kill a man. But if always or for the most part evil is connected with the good that is per se intended, it does not excuse from sin, even if that evil is not per se intended. Now an evil is always joined to the pleasure that is connected with adultery, namely a privation of the order of justice; hence there is no excuse from sin, because from the very fact that a person chooses a good to which evil is always joined, even if he does not will the evil in itself, nevertheless he is more willing to fall into this evil than to be without such a good.

Reply to 16. Just as what is accidental on the part of the cause is reduced to, i.e. is referred to the per se cause, so what is accidental on the part of the effect is referred to the per se effect. But evil, since it is an accidental effect, is referred to the good, which is a per se effect, to which evil is joined.

Reply to 17. That which is accidental does not always occur for the least part but sometimes occurs always or for the most part, for instance someone going to a market to shop always or for the most part encounters crowd of people, though he does not intend this;†33 likewise an adulterer intending a good to which evil is joined, always falls into evil. And indeed that good happens for the least part among men and evil for the most part is because it is possible to depart in more ways from the mean than to observe it, as is said in Book II of the Ethics,†34 and because sensed goods are better known to the majority of men than the goods of reason.

Reply to 18. Corruption is called a natural change, not according to the particular nature of that which is corrupted, but according to universal nature †35 which moves purposively to generation or corruption: to generation for its own sake but to corruption inasmuch as generation cannot take place without corruption.†36 And so corruption is not per se and principally intended, but only generation.

Reply to 19. The accidental cause of evil is not the good that is removed by evil, nor the good that underlies evil, but the good that is the effective cause which, by inducing one form, removes another.

Whether Evil Is Properly Divided into Punishment †1 and Fault?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Every good division is by opposites.†2 But punishment or penalty and fault are not opposites, for some sin is the penalty of sin, as Gregory says.†3 Therefore evil is not properly divided into penalty and fault.

2. But it was argued that sin is not a punishment precisely as it is a sin, but by a kind of concomitance.†4 But counter to this: an act inasmuch as it is disordered, is evil. But inasmuch as it is disordered it is a punishment, for Augustine says †5 "You have ordained, O Lord, and so it is that every disorder of the soul is its own punishment." Therefore sin precisely as it is a sin is a punishment.

3. The second perfection, which is operation, is better than the first perfection,†6 which is form or habit: hence the Philosopher proves in Book I of the Ethics†7 that the ultimate human good, namely happiness, is not a habit but an operation or activity. If then to be deprived of the first perfection is a punishment, much more is sin which deprives of the second perfection, namely right operation, a punishment.

4. Every passion that causes anxiety †8 seems to involve a punishment. But many sins are connected with passions that cause anxiety, for example envy, acedia, anger, and the like; and many of them also have difficulty in operating, as the Book of Wisdom (5, 7) says in the person of the wicked: "We . . . have walked through hard ways." Therefore it seems that sin precisely as such is a punishment.

5. If sin is concomitantly a punishment, every sin which is concomitantly a punishment, will be a punishment. But the first sin is concomitantly a punishment. Therefore it will follow that the first sin is a punishment. Which is contrary to what Augustine says,†9 namely that only those sins are punishments which are midway between the first sin of apostasy and the final punishment of hell.

6. Evil is a corruption of mode, species, and natural order, as Augustine says,†10 and he is speaking of evil in general. But afterwards †11 he says that it pertains to the notion of punishment to be opposed to nature; therefore it seems that every evil is a punishment. Consequently evil should not be divided into punishment and fault.

7. A person who is without grace may sin. But every fault, since it is evil, deprives of some good; but it does not deprive of grace, since the supposition is that grace is not had; therefore it deprives of a natural good. Consequently it is a punishment, because it is of the nature of punishment to be opposed to a natural good, as Augustine says.†12

8. The very act of sin, inasmuch as it an act, is good and is from God.†13 According to this, then, the evil of fault is in the act inasmuch as there is some corruption in it. But every corruption has the nature of punishment;†14 therefore the evil of fault, precisely as evil, is a punishment. And so fault ought not to be divided in opposition to punishment.

9. That which is in itself good ought not to be assigned as one of the dividing members of evil. But punishment as such is good, because it is just:†15 hence those making reparation are even praised for their willingness to undergo punishment for their sins. Therefore punishment ought not to be assigned as one of the dividing members of evil.

10. There is an evil, namely, of nature, which is neither a punishment nor fault. Therefore evil is not adequately divided into punishment and fault.

11. Punishment is of its nature contrary to the will, and fault is of its nature voluntary.†16 But man suffers some evils which are neither according to his will nor contrary to his will, for instance if someone

unwittingly is robbed of his goods in his absence. Therefore evil is not adequately divided into punishment and fault.

12. If one (contradictory) opposite is used in more than one way the opposite of it will be used in more than one way, as the Philosopher says.†17 But 'good' is used in three ways,†18 namely, of the praiseworthy (honestum), the useful, and the pleasurable. Therefore evil ought to be divided into three kinds, not just two.

13. According to the Philosopher evil is possible in many more ways than good.†19 But good is threefold, namely the good of nature, of grace, and of glory. Therefore it seems that evil ought to be divided in many more ways; and so it seems that evil is inadequately divided into only two.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says "There are two evils of the rational creature: one by which it is voluntarily alienated from the supreme good, the other by which it is punished against its will."†20 Punishment and fault are expressly stated by these two. Therefore evil is divided into punishment and fault.

Response:

A rational or intellectual nature in comparison with other creatures is related in a special way to good and evil: because every other creature is naturally ordered to some particular good, but only an intellectual nature, by means of the intellect, grasps the universal nature of good and is moved to good universally by the appetite of the will. And therefore evil in the rational creature is divided by a special division into fault and punishment: for this is a division of evil only as it is found in a rational nature, as is clear on the authority of Augustine cited above (in On the contrary). From which such an argument can be inferred, namely that it is of the nature of fault to be according to the will, but of the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will, and the will is found only in an intellectual nature.

The distinction of these two (fault and punishment) can be understood in this way. For since evil is opposed to good, evil must needs be divided according to the division of good. Now good designates a certain perfection. And perfection is twofold:†21 namely, the first, which is form or habit, and the second, which is operation. But everything we use in operating can be referred to the first perfection, the use of which is operation. Consequently, and conversely, a twofold evil is found: one in the agent himself, according as he is deprived either of form or of habit or of whatever else is necessary for operation, thus blindness or crookedness of the leg is an evil; but the other evil is in the defective act itself, for instance if we should say that limping is an evil. And just as these two evils may be found in other creatures, so also in an intellectual nature, which operates by the agency of the will. In which it is clear that a disordered act of the will has the nature of fault: for a person is blamed and rendered culpable inasmuch as he voluntarily does a disordered act. But evil is also found in an intellectual creature according to a privation of form or habit or of any other thing whatsoever that may be necessary to operate rightly, whether it pertains to the soul, or to the body, or to exterior things; and according to the judgment of the Catholic Faith †22 it is incontrovertible that such evil is a punishment.

For three characteristics belong to the nature of punishment. One of which is that it has regard to fault: for someone is properly said to be punished when he suffers evil for some act he has committed. Indeed, the tradition of faith †23 holds it as certain that the rational creature could have incurred no evil either so far as concerns the soul or as concerns the body or as concerns external goods except from preceding sin, either of the person, or at least of the nature. And so it follows that every such privation of good which man can use to operate rightly is called a punishment, and this applies with equal reason to the angels. And thus every evil of the rational creature is contained under either fault or punishment. The second characteristic of the nature of punishment is that it is contrary to the will. For every one's will is inclined to his own good; hence to be deprived of one's own good is contrary to the will. However it must be noted that punishment is contrary to the will in three ways: sometimes to the actual will, as when a person knowingly undergoes some punishment;

sometimes it is contrary only to the habitual will, as when a person not knowing of it is robbed of some good which he would grieve over if he knew; sometimes it is contrary only to the natural inclination of the will, as when a person is deprived of the habit of virtue who does not want to have virtue although the natural inclination of the will is to the good of virtue. The third characteristic seems to belong to the nature of punishment as it consists in a kind of passion or undergoing: for those things which happen contrary to the will are not from an intrinsic principle, i.e. the will, but from an extrinsic principle, the effect of which is called passion or undergoing.†24

So accordingly, punishment and fault differ in three ways. First, because fault is the evil of the action itself, but punishment is the evil of the agent. But these two evils are ordered differently in natural operations and in voluntary operations. For in natural operations the evil of the action follows from the evil of the effective cause, for example limping follows from a crippled leg;†25 but in voluntary operations the reverse is true, the evil of the agent i.e. punishment, divine providence regulating fault by punishment, follows from the evil of the action i.e. the fault. In the second way punishment differs from fault as determined by that which is according to the will and that which is contrary to the will, as is clear on the authority of Augustine cited above (in *On the contrary*). And thirdly inasmuch as fault consists in doing or acting, but punishment in suffering, as is clear from Augustine in the book *On Free Choice*,†26 where he calls fault the evil we do, but punishment the evil we suffer.

Reply to 1. Since it is of the nature of fault to be voluntary, but of the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will, as was said (in the Response), it is impossible that the same thing in the same respect should be punishment and fault: because the same thing in the same respect cannot be voluntary and contrary to the will. But nothing prevents this in different respects: for what we will can have something conjoined to it which is contrary to our will, and in seeking what we will, we incur that which we do not will. And this happens to sinners: for while they are inordinately drawn to some created good they incur separation from the uncreated good and other such things which they would not will. And in this way the same thing in different respects can be both fault and punishment, but not in the same respect.

Reply to 2. The act itself is not willed according as it is disordered, but according to something else, which while the will is seeking it, it incurs the foresaid deordination which it would not will. And so from that which is willed it has the nature of fault, but from the fact that a person suffers a deordination to some extent unwillingly, the nature of punishment is implicated in the fault.

Reply to 3. The disordered action itself inasmuch as it proceeds from the will has the nature of fault, but inasmuch as the agent incurs from this an impediment to proper operation, it pertains to the nature of punishment. Hence the same thing can be fault and punishment, but not in the same respect.

Reply to 4. Such anxieties of the passions follow in the sinner apart from his will: for the angry man would choose to so rise up in punishment of another that he himself would suffer no anxiety or pain from this; hence when he incurs these apart from his will, this pertains to the nature of punishment.

Reply to 5. A thing is denominated from that on which it depends rather than from that which depends on it. But sin has a concomitant punishment in two ways: in one way as on that on which in a certain manner it depends, for example when someone is left without grace on account of a preceding fault, from which it follows that he sins; hence the sin itself is called a punishment by reason of his being without grace, on which in a certain manner it is dependent; and so the first sin cannot be called a punishment, but the following sins can. In another way sin has a concomitant punishment which follows from it, such as separation from God or privation of grace or deordination of the agent or anxiety of passion or pain. And from punishment concomitant in this way, sin is not so properly called a punishment; although even too in this way sin can be called a punishment causally, as in the statement of Augustine †27 that a disordered soul is its own punishment.

Reply to 6. Evil taken generally is a natural corruption of mode, species, and order in general, but evil of punishment in the agent himself, and evil of fault as such in the action itself.

Reply to 7. Fault deprives him who does not have grace of the aptitude for grace not by completely taking away the aptitude but by diminishing it. But this privation is not the evil of fault formally, but its effect which is a punishment. The evil of fault formally is the privation of mode, species, and order in the very act of the will.

Reply to 8. Corruption of good in an action, as such, is not a punishment of the agent (per se) strictly speaking, but it would be a punishment of the action, if the punishment coincided with the action. But in fact from this corruption or privation in the action a corruption or privation in the agent follows which has the nature of punishment.

Reply to 9. Punishment as it is compared to the subject, is evil inasmuch as it deprives the subject in some way; but according as it is compared to the agent who inflicts the punishment, it sometimes has the nature of good, when the one who inflicts the punishment does so for the sake of justice.

Reply to 10. This division (into fault and punishment), as was said (in the Response), is not of evil taken generally, but of evil as it is found in the rational creature; in whom there cannot be any evil which is neither fault nor punishment, as was said (in the Response). Nevertheless we must realize that not every defect (or privation or lack) in the rational creature has the nature of evil, but only the defect or lack of a good it is intended by nature to have.^{†28} Hence it is not a defect in man that he cannot fly, and consequently it is neither a fault nor a punishment.

Reply to 11. Although the inconveniences and damages which a person suffers unknowingly are not contrary to his actual will, nevertheless they are contrary to his natural or habitual will, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 12. The useful good is ordered to the pleasurable and the praiseworthy good as to an end. And so there are two principal goods, namely, the praiseworthy and the pleasurable, to which two evils are opposed: fault to the praiseworthy and punishment to the pleasurable.

Reply to 13. In each of these three goods, namely, of nature, of grace, and of glory, we have to consider the form and the act, according to which difference fault is distinguished from punishment, as we have said (in the Response).

Question I, Article 5 [†]p

Whether Punishment or Fault Has More of the Nature of Evil?

It seems that punishment does, for the following reasons.

1. As merit is related to reward, so fault is related to punishment. But reward is a greater good than merit. Therefore punishment is greater evil than fault.

2. That is a greater evil which is opposed to a greater good. But punishment is opposed to the good of the agent, and fault to the good of the action. Since then the agent is greater good than the action, it seems that punishment is worse than fault.

3. But it was argued that fault is a greater evil than punishment inasmuch as fault severs from the supreme good. But counter to this: nothing severs more from the supreme good than the very separation from

the supreme good. But the very separation from the supreme good is a punishment. Therefore punishment is even a greater evil than fault.

4. The end is a greater good than the order to the end. But the very privation of the end is a punishment which is called the deprival of the vision of God,†1 but the evil of fault is due to privation of the order to the end. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

5. It is a greater evil to be deprived of the possibility to act than only of the act, for instance blindness by which the possibility of seeing is removed is a greater evil than darkness by which vision itself is impeded. But fault is opposed to merit itself, and the privation of grace by which there is the possibility to merit, is a punishment. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

6. But it was argued that fault is a greater evil than punishment, because fault is even the cause of this punishment. But counter to this: although in per se causes the cause is a greater good than the effect, nevertheless this is not necessarily the case in accidental causes: for an accidental cause may be less good than the effect, as for instance the digging of a grave is the accidental cause of finding a treasure,†2 and likewise an accidental cause may be less evil than its effect, for instance to trip over a stone is less evil than to fall into the hands of a pursuing enemy, which accidentally follows from it. But punishment is an accidental effect of fault: for he who sins does not intend to incur punishment. Therefore the fact that the fault is the cause of punishment is not a sufficient reason for fault to be a greater evil than punishment.

7. If fault has the nature of evil because it is the cause of punishment, then the evil of fault is the cause of the evil of punishment. But 'whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is that still more'.†3 Therefore punishment will be a greater evil than fault.

8. What is said of a thing formally belongs to it more properly than what is said of it causally i.e., after the manner of an effective cause, for example 'healthy' is more properly said of animal than of medicine. If then the evil of fault is considered as being the cause of punishment it follows that punishment is a greater evil than fault: because evil is said of fault after the manner of an effective cause but of punishment formally.

9. But it was argued that evil is also said of fault formally. But counter to this: a thing is said to be evil formally i.e. after the manner of form, inasmuch as it is deprived of some good. But the good, namely the end itself, which is deprived of by the very privation that is a punishment, is greater than the good deprived of by the evil of fault, which is the order to the end. Therefore punishment will still be a greater evil than fault.

10. As Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names,†4 no one looks to evil to guide it in its actions; and again in the same place †5 he says that evil is contrary to the will. Therefore what is more contrary to the will is more evil. But punishment is more contrary to the will than fault, because it is of the nature of punishment that is contrary to the will, as was said above (in q. 1, a. 4 in the Response). Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

11. Just as it is of the nature of good to be desirable so it is of the nature of evil to be avoided. Therefore the greater the evil the more it is to be avoided. But fault is avoided because of the punishment, and so punishment is more to be avoided, because 'whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is that still more'.†6 Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

12. A subsequent privation harms more than the first one, just as a subsequent wound hurts more than the first one. But punishment is subsequent to fault; therefore it harms more than fault. Consequently it is a greater evil because a thing is said to be evil inasmuch as it harms, according to Augustine.†7

13. Punishment destroys the subject, since death a kind of punishment,†8 fault however does not, but only defiles it. Therefore punishment harms more than fault; consequently punishment is a greater evil.

14. That which a just man prefers is presumed to be less evil. But Lot since he was a just man, preferred fault to punishment, offering his daughters to the lustful Sodomites, which was a fault, so that he would not undergo an injustice in his home by the infliction of violence on his guests, which is a punishment.†9 Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

15. God inflicts eternal punishment for temporal sin: because, as Gregory says,†10 what torments is eternal, what delights is temporal. But eternal evil is worse than temporal evil, just as eternal good is better than temporal good. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

16. Evil occurs more often than good according to the Philosopher in Book II of the Topics.†11 But punishment occurs more often than fault because many people are punished who are without fault, and every fault has at least its connected punishment. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

17. Just as among goods the end is better than that which is for the sake of the end,†12 so among evils the end is worse. But punishment is the end i.e. outcome of fault. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

18. Man can be freed from any sin: hence Cain is rebuked who says (in Genesis 4, 13) "Too great is my sin that I should deserve pardon." But there is a punishment from which man cannot be freed, namely the punishment of hell. Therefore punishment is a greater evil than fault.

19. When something is said analogously of many it seems to be said primarily of that which is more often said to be such. But punishment is more often said to be evil than fault, because the majority think of punishment as evil rather than fault. Therefore evil is primarily said of punishment rather than of fault

20. The "fomes" i.e. inordinate and habitual concupiscence,†13 is the source of all sins and so it is worse than any sin. But the "fomes" is a kind of penalty. Therefore penalty is a greater evil than fault.

On the contrary:

1. That which the virtuous hate more is a greater evil than that which the wicked hate more. But as Augustine says,†14 the wicked hate more the evils of punishment, but the virtuous hate more the evils of fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than punishment.

2. Evil is the privation of order, according to Augustine.†15 But fault is farther removed from order than punishment: because fault of itself is without order, but is set in order by punishment. Therefore fault is a greater evil than punishment.

3. The evil of fault is opposed to the praiseworthy good, but the evil of punishment to the pleasurable good. Therefore the evil of fault is worse than the evil of punishment.

Response:

Superficially this question seems easy to answer because most people understand only punishments that are corporal or painful to sense, which undoubtedly have less of the nature of evil than fault, which is opposed to grace and glory. But since the privation of grace and glory are also kinds of punishment, they seem equally to have the nature of evil if the good to which each is opposed be considered: for certainly the privation of the ultimate end itself, which is the greatest good, has the nature of punishment.

But it can be shown for evident reasons that absolutely speaking fault has more of the nature of evil. First because anything that causes a subject to be such is more such than that which cannot cause the subject to

be such;†16 for example, if white is so present in a thing that the subject cannot be called white by reason of it, it has less of the nature of white than if the subject be made white by it: for what is in a thing in such a way that it does not affect and denominate its subject, seems to be in it in a qualified manner (*secundum quid*), but what affects and denominates its subject is in it simply, that is, in an unqualified sense. But clearly on account of the evil of fault that person in whom the evil of fault is present is called evil, but not on account of the evil of punishment as such; hence Dionysius says †17 that "to be punished is not evil, but to become deserving of punishment is evil." Hence it follows that the evil of fault has more of the nature of evil than the evil of punishment. Now the reason why someone is called evil on account of the evil of fault and not on account of evil of punishment is inferred from this: for good and evil are predicated in an absolute manner according to act, but in a qualified manner according to potentiality; for the potentiality to be good or bad, is not good or bad simply but in a qualified manner good or bad. But act is twofold, namely first act, which is habit or form, and second act, which is operation, corresponding respectively to knowledge and the exercise of knowledge.†18 But when first act i.e. knowledge is inherent there is still the potentiality to second act, as when the knower is not yet actually considering his knowledge but can consider it. Therefore what is according to second act, which is operation, is considered good or evil simply; but what is according to first act is considered good or evil so to speak in a qualified manner.

Now it is evident that in beings having a will any power and habit is moved to a good act by the act of the will: because the will has as its object good universally, under which are contained all particular goods on account of which all of the powers and habits operate. And the power that intends the principal end always moves by its command the power that intends the secondary end, for example the art of navigation gives orders to the shipbuilding art, and the military to the equestrian art. Now a person does not speak or at least speak correctly from the very fact that he has the habit of grammar: for someone having a habit may not use the habit or may act contrary to the habit, as when a grammarian intentionally utters a solecism,†19 but then operates correctly according to his art, when he wishes. And therefore a man who has a good will is called a good man simply, inasmuch as by an act of good will he uses all that he possesses rightly, but from the fact that he has the habit of grammar, he is not called a good man but a good grammarian; and the case is similar in regard to evil. Since then the evil of fault is an evil in the act of the will, but the evil of punishment is a privation of that which the will can use in any circumstances for good operation, therefore the evil of fault makes a man evil simply, but not the evil of punishment.

The second reason is that since God is the very essence of goodness, the more alien a thing is to God the more it has the nature of evil. But fault is more alien to God than punishment: for God is the author of punishment, but not the author of fault.†20 From this then it is apparent that fault is a greater evil than punishment. And the reason why God is the author of punishment but not of fault is taken from this. For the evil of fault, which is in the act of the will, is directly opposed to the act of charity, which is the first and principal perfection of the will. Now charity directs the act of the will to God; not only so that man may enjoy the divine good, for this pertains to the love which is called concupiscence, but according as the divine good is found in God Himself, which pertains to the love which is friendship.†21 But it cannot be from God, that someone would not desire the divine good as it is in itself, since on the contrary God inclines every will to will what He wills,†22 and He wills His good according as it is in itself. Hence the evil of fault cannot be from God. But God can will that the divine good itself or any other good under it, be withdrawn from someone who does not have the suitableness for it: for the good of order requires this, that nothing should have that of which it is undeserving. But the very withdrawal of the uncreated good or of any other good whatsoever from one who is undeserving has the nature of punishment. Therefore God is the author of punishment, but He cannot be the author of fault.

The third reason is, that the evil which a skilled artisan brings about in order to avoid another evil, has less of the nature of evil than that evil for the avoidance of which it was brought about; for example, if a skilled surgeon amputates a hand lest the whole body perish, obviously the amputation of the hand is less evil than the destruction of the body. But it is evident that the wisdom of God inflicts punishment to prevent fault, either by him who is punished or at least by others, according to that text of Job (19, 29) "Flee from the face of iniquity,

for the sword is the avenger of iniquity." Clearly then fault for the avoidance of which punishment is inflicted is a greater evil than the punishment itself.

The fourth reason is that the evil of fault consists in operating or acting, but the evil of punishment in suffering or undergoing as was said above (in q. 1, a. 4). But what has an evil action is already shown to be evil, but what suffers or undergoes some evil is not thereby shown to be evil but to be as it were on the way to evil, because what undergoes something, shows signs of that; for example, from the very lameness the leg is shown to be already subject to evil, but from the fact that the leg suffers pain, it is not yet defective but is on the way to being defective. For just as the action or operation which is of a thing actually existing is better than movement towards actuality and perfection, so too an evil action, considered in itself, has more of the nature of evil than the evil of suffering. Therefore fault has more of the nature of evil than punishment.

Reply to 1. If reward is compared to merit and punishment to fault in regard to termination, a like comparison is found in both, because just as merit terminates in reward, so fault terminates in punishment. But if they are compared in regard to intention, there is not a like comparison in both, but rather the reverse: for just as a person performs a meritorious work to gain a reward, so a person inflicts punishment to prevent fault. Hence just as reward is better than merit, so fault is worse than punishment.

Reply to 2. The good of the agent is not only the first perfection, the privation of which is a punishment, but also the second perfection, i.e. operation, to which fault is opposed; and this second perfection is a greater good than the first. And therefore fault which is opposed to the second perfection has more of the nature of evil than punishment which is opposed to the first perfection.

Reply to 3. Fault severs from God by a separation that is opposed to the union of charity according to which a person wills the good of God Himself as He is in Himself, but punishment severs from God by a separation that is opposed to fruition by which a person enjoys the divine good. And therefore the separation deriving from fault is worse than the separation deriving from punishment.

Reply to 4. Separation of the order to the end can be taken in two ways: in one way in man himself, and thus the privation of order to the end is a punishment as also is the privation of the end; in the other way in an action, and thus the privation of order to the end is a fault; for man is culpable from this, that he performs an action not ordered to the proper end. Hence there is no comparison of the evil of fault and the evil of punishment as of the end and order to the end, because each in some fashion deprives of both the end and the order to the end.

Reply to 5. Privation of habitual grace is a punishment, but a corrupting of the act which ought to proceed from grace is the evil of fault. And so it is evident that the evil of fault is opposed to a more perfect good, because operation is the perfection of habit.

Reply to 6. Although fault is an accidental cause of punishment on the part of the person suffering the punishment, nevertheless it is the per se cause on the part of the one imposing the punishment: for the one punishing intends to inflict the punishment on account of the fault.

Reply to 7. Fault is not evil because punishment is inflicted for fault, but rather the reverse, the evil of punishment is inflicted to restrain and control the evil of fault. And so it is evident that evil is said of fault not only after the manner of an effective cause, causally, but also after the manner of form, more principally of fault than of punishment, as is clear from what we have said (in the Response).

Replies to 8 and 9. The answer to the eighth and ninth arguments is clear from the foregoing.

Reply to 10. We should not judge of things according to the estimation of the wicked but according to

the estimation of the virtuous, just as we should not judge of the taste of things according to the estimation of a sick man but according to the estimation of a healthy man.†23 And therefore punishment should not be judged a greater evil because the wicked flee from it more, but rather fault should be judged a greater evil because the virtuous flee from it more.

Reply to 11. The virtuous flee from fault on account of itself and not on account of the punishment, but the wicked flee from fault on account of the punishment, according to that saying of Horace "The wicked hate to sin from the fear of punishment, the virtuous hate to sin from the love of virtue."†24 But what is more, God inflicts punishment only on account of fault, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 12. A subsequent privation is worse than a preceding privation when the subsequent privation includes the preceding privation, and so apparently it can be said that punishment together with fault is a greater evil than fault alone. And this certainly is true as far as he who is punished is concerned; but as regards the one punishing, punishment has as its purpose justice and order, and so by being linked with a good the fault becomes less evil, as Boethius shows in the book *On the Consolation of Philosophy*.†25

Reply to 13. Fault and punishment pertain to the rational nature, which precisely as such is incorruptible; hence punishment does not destroy its subject even if the life of the body be taken away by the punishment. Hence we grant that, absolutely speaking, for the body punishment is worse than fault.

Reply to 14. Lot did not prefer the fault to punishment, but showed the order to be preserved in fleeing from faults: that it is more tolerable if a man commits a lesser fault than a graver one.

Reply to 15. Although fault is temporal so far as concerns the act, nevertheless it is eternal, unless deleted by repentance, so far as concerns the guilt and stain; and the eternity of fault is the cause of the eternity of punishment.

Reply to 16. Some evil, namely that in man's moral actions occurs in the majority of cases, because most men follow their sentient nature rather than reason. And therefore it is not necessarily true that the more a thing is found in the majority of cases the more evil it is: because according to this, venial sins which most men commit, would be worse than mortal sins.

Reply to 17. Punishment is the end or outcome of fault in regard to termination, but not in regard to intention, as was said above (in Reply to 1).

Reply to 18. A person cannot return to life from the punishment of hell, because the fault of those who are in hell cannot be expiated. Hence that punishment is a greater evil than fault is not proved by this.

Reply to 19. A name is said primarily of one thing rather than another in two ways; in one way so far as concerns the imposition of the name, in another way as concerns the nature of the thing: for example, as regards the imposition of the name, names said of God and creatures are primarily said of creatures, but as regards the nature of the thing they are primarily said of God, from Whom every perfection in creatures is derived. And in like manner nothing prevents evil from being said primarily of punishment according to the imposition of the name, but subsequently of punishment according to the nature of the thing.

Reply to 20. The "fomes" is potentially the source of faults; but in the case of evil things, actual evil is worse than potential evil, as the Philosopher says.†26 Hence the "fomes" is not a greater evil than fault.

Question 2

Question II

On Sins

Article 1 ¶p

Whether Every Sin Involves An Act?

It seems that it does, for the following reasons

1. Augustine says that "sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the law of God."†1 But in each of these three an act is implied. Therefore every sin involves an act.
2. Augustine says †2 so true is it that sin is voluntary that if it is not voluntary it is not a sin. But nothing can be voluntary except by an act of the will. Therefore in any sin there must be at least an act of the will.
3. Contraries are in the same genus.†3 But merit and demerit are contraries. Since then merit is in the genus of action, because we merit by acts, it seems that with equal reason demerit or sin is in the genus of action.
4. Sin is a kind of privation because, as Augustine says,†4 sin is nothing. But privation is grounded in something. Therefore there must be some act in which sin is sustained.
5. Augustine says †5 that evil cannot exist except in good. But that good in which the evil of sin is based is an act. Therefore in any sin there must be an act.
6. Augustine says †6 that neither sin nor a good deed can be justly imputed to anyone who has done nothing by his own will. But one cannot do something by one's own will without an act. Therefore nothing can be imputed to a person as a sin if there is there no act.
7. Damascene says †7 that praise and blame are incurred for acts. But blame is incurred for any sin. Therefore every sin consists in an act.
8. On Romans 7, 21 ". . . the sin that dwelleth in me" the Gloss†8 says that every sin derives from concupiscence. But what derives from concupiscence is not without an act. Therefore no sin is without an act.
9. If any sin is without an act, this seems especially true of a sin of omission. But omission is not without an act, because omission is a kind of negation: for every negation is based on an affirmation.†9 And so a sin of omission must be based on some act. Therefore much more so any other sin.
10. Omission is a sin only inasmuch as it is contrary to the law of God. But this is not without contempt, and contempt implies an act. Therefore a sin of omission is based on some act, and much more so any other sin.
11. If a sin of omission consists solely in a negation of an act it would follow that as long as a person does not act, he sins, and so a sin of omission would be more dangerous than a sin of transgression, which passes away as soon as is committed but remains as to its guilt.†10 But this is not true, because a sin of transgression, other things being equal, is a greater sin: for to steal is a greater sin than not to give an alms. Therefore a sin of omission does not consist solely in a negation.
12. Sin is found in those things that are ordered to an end, according to the Philosopher.†11 But a thing is ordered to an end by operation. Therefore every sin consists in an act.

On the contrary:

1. As is said in James 4, 17, "To him who knows of a good to be done, and does it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the very not-doing is a sin.

2. Punishment is justly inflicted only for sin.†12 But punishment is inflicted for only the omission of an act, without any consideration of an act connected with it. Therefore sin consists in only the omission of an act.

3. According to the Philosopher in Book II of the Physics,†13 fault occurs in those things that come about according to art and in those that come about according to nature. Therefore just as in those things that are according to nature, to be contrary to nature is a sin, so in those that are according to art, to be contrary to art is a sin; and similarly in moral matters, to be contrary to reason is a sin. But not only are there motions but also states of rest that are contrary to nature, as is said in Book V of the Physics.†14 Therefore in moral matters too, not only acts, but also cessations from action are sins if the cessations are contrary to reason.

4. The will may be moved to neither side of a contradiction: for it is not true to say that God wills evils to be done, because thus He would be their author,†15 nor even that He wills evils not to be done, because thus His will would not be efficacious in fulfilling all that He wills. Suppose then that someone is obligated at the present moment to give an alms and yet he neither wills to give it nor not to give it, because he does not think about it; nevertheless he sins and is justly punished for this. Therefore there can be a sin even without an act of the will.

5. But it was argued that although the act of the will is moved neither to give an alms nor not to give it, nevertheless it is moved to something else by which it is prevented from giving it. But counter to this: that other to which the will is moved is incidental (per accidens) in regard to the sin of omission: for it is not opposed to an affirmative precept of the law by reason of which opposition the sin of omission follows. But a judgment about the nature of a thing should not be made according to that which is incidental, but according to that which is proper to it. Therefore it ought not to be said that a sin of omission consists in an act on account of a connected act.

6. Even in a sin of transgression some act may be connected with it which nevertheless does not pertain to the sin of transgression because it is related to it accidentally: for instance a thief may accidentally say something or see something. Therefore neither does the act connected with omission pertain to the sin of omission.

7. Just as there are some acts which cannot be rightly done, such as fornicating and lying, so there are some acts that cannot be badly done, such as loving God and praising Him. But someone while occupied in praising God may be omitting something; for example if someone at a time when he should be honoring his parents devotes himself to praising God not to honoring his parents, obviously he sins by omission, and yet the act of praising God cannot pertain to this sin, since it cannot become evil; therefore the whole sin consists solely in the omission of an act that ought to be done. Therefore an act is not required for a sin.

8. In original sin there is not an act. Therefore not every sin consists in an act.

9. Augustine says "Some sins are sins of weakness, others are sins of ignorance, others sins of malice."†16 Weakness and ignorance are contrary to virtue and wisdom, malice is contrary to goodness, moreover contraries are in the same genus.†17 Since then virtue, wisdom, and goodness are habits, it seems that sins are habits. But a habit can be present without an act. Therefore sin can be present without an act.

Response:

There are two opinions about this. For some †18 have asserted that in any sin even a sin of omission there is an act: either an interior act of the will, as when someone sins in not giving an alms he wills not to give

the alms, or even a connected exterior act by which a person is kept from doing an act he ought to do; whether that act be done simultaneously with the omission, as when someone desiring to play foregoes going to church, or it be a preceding act, as when a person is prevented from getting up for morning prayer because he stayed up too late the night before engrossed in something. And this opinion is based on the statement of Augustine who defines sin as "a word or deed or desire contrary to the law of God."†19

Others,†20 however, asserted that the sin of omission does not involve an act but that the sin of omission is the very desistance from an act, and they explain the Augustine's statement that sin is a word or deed or desire as implying that desiring and not desiring, saying and not saying, doing and not doing are taken as the same so far as the nature of sin is concerned. Hence in the Gloss †21 on Romans 7, 15 "For that which I do I understand not . . ." etc. , it is said that 'I do' and 'I do not' are parts of 'I do'. And this seems to be reasonably said since affirmation and negation are referred to the same genus.†22 Hence too, Augustine says in the book On the Trinity†23 that 'unbegotten' belongs to the genus of relation just as 'begotten' does.

And in fact each opinion is true in a certain respect. For if we consider what is required for sin as being of the essence of sin, thus for a sin of omission an act is not required; and indeed (per se) absolutely speaking the sin of omission consists in the very cessation or desistance from an act. i.e. not-doing an act. And this is obvious if we consider the nature of sin: for as the Philosopher says,†24 fault occurs both in those things which are according to nature and in those according to art when nature or art does not attain the end for which it acts. And that an agent operating by art or by nature does not attain the end occurs from this that it deviates from the measure or rule of proper operation; which in natural things is the natural inclination itself that follows on the form, but in works of art it is the very rule of art. So accordingly, in fault two things can be considered: departure from the rule or measure, and departure from the end.

But sometimes a departure from the end occurs and not a departure from the rule or measure by which an agent operates for an end both in nature and in art. In nature, for example, if something indigestible like a piece of metal or a stone is ingested, a failure of digestion occurs without any fault of nature; likewise if a doctor in conformity with his art prescribes some medicine and the patient is not cured, either because he has an incurable disease or because he does something contrary to his health, clearly the doctor is not at fault although the end is not attained; but if, conversely, he attained the end but nevertheless deviated from the rule of art, nonetheless he would be said to be at fault. From which it is evident that it pertains more to the nature of fault to disregard the rule of action than to fail to attain the end of the action. It is therefore intrinsically (per se) of the nature of fault, whether in nature or in art or in morals, that it is opposed to a rule of action.

But since a rule of action establishes a mean between too much and too little, it is necessary that one rule forbid and another prescribe. Hence certain negative and certain affirmative precepts are contained both in natural reason †25 and in divine law,†26 according to which our actions ought to be regulated. And just as affirmation is opposed to negation, so negation is opposed to affirmation;†27 hence just as the doing is imputed to a person as a sin because it is opposed to a negative precept of the law, so too the very not-doing is imputed as a sin because it is opposed to an affirmative precept. So then per se i.e. absolutely speaking there can be a sin for which an act, which is of the essence of sin, is not required and according to this the second opinion is true.

But if we consider what is required for sin as being the cause of sin, thus an act is required for any sin even a sin of omission. Which is evident as follows. For as the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Physics,†28 if a thing is sometimes in motion, sometimes not in motion, it is necessary to assign a cause for its being at rest; for we see that the movable and mover being disposed in the same manner, a thing is moved or is not moved in like manner; and for the same reason if someone does not do what he ought to do, there must be a cause of this. But if the cause is wholly extrinsic, an omission of this kind does not have the nature of sin, for example if someone injured by a falling rock is prevented from going to church, or being robbed by someone is prevented from giving an alms. Therefore only at that time is the omission imputed as a sin when it has an intrinsic cause not just of any kind whatsoever but a voluntary one; because if a person were impeded by an intrinsic cause which was not voluntary, say a fever, the same reasoning would hold as in the case of an extrinsic cause.

Therefore for an omission to be a sin the omission must be caused by a voluntary act.

But the will is the cause of a thing sometimes directly (per se) and sometimes indirectly (per accidens); directly, as when it acts intentionally to attain such an effect, for example if someone seeking to find a treasure, finds it while digging; but indirectly, as when it is apart from his intention, for example if someone intending to dig a grave while digging uncovers a treasure.†29 So then the voluntary act sometimes is the direct cause of an omission, not however in such a way that the will directly intends the omission, since non-being and evil are contrary to the intention and the will, as Dionysius says,†30 and the object of the will is being and good; but indirectly the will is moved to something positive with foresight of the consequent omission, as when a person wills to play knowing that this is concomitant with not going to church; just as likewise in transgressions we say that a thief wills (to have) the gold in not avoiding the deformity of injustice. On the other hand sometimes the voluntary act is indirectly the cause of an omission, as when to someone engrossed in some activity, does not think about what he is bound to do. And it makes no difference in regard to this whether the voluntary act, which is directly or indirectly the cause of the omission, is simultaneous with the omission itself or even precedes it; as we said (in the beginning of the Response) of him who getting to sleep too late because of being too engrossed in something, is prevented from getting up at the time of morning prayer. So therefore in regard to this the first opinion is true, that for omission a voluntary act is required as a cause.

Since then each opinion is in some respect true, we need to reply to the arguments on both sides of this question.

Reply to 1. In that definition of sin, a word said and not said, a deed done and not done, are to be taken as the same thing, as was said above (in the Response).

Reply to 2. A thing is said to be voluntary not only because it falls under the act of the will, but also because it falls under the power of the will. For in this way even the very not-willing is called voluntary because the will has the power to will and not to will, and likewise to do and not to do.†31

Reply to 3. More things are required for good than for evil: because, as Dionysius says,†32 good results from a cause that is one and integral but evil from any single defect. Therefore for merit an act of the will is required; but for demerit this alone is sufficient, that the will not will good when it ought, it need not always will evil.

Reply to 4. In a sin of transgression, it is not true that sin is a privation but that sin is an act deprived of due order, as for instance theft or adultery is a certain disordered act. For sin is nothing in that way in which men become nothing when they sin:†33 not indeed in such a way that they are actually nothing, but because inasmuch as they sin, they are deprived of some good, and the privation itself is the non-being in the subject; and likewise sin is an act deprived of due order, and according to this privation the act is called nothing. But in a sin of omission it is true, absolutely speaking, that the sin is a privation only; and the subject of the privation is not a habit but a power, just as the subject of blindness is not vision but that which is designed by nature to see. Therefore the subject of omission is not an act but the power of the will.

Reply to 5. The answer to fifth argument concerning evil is clear from the foregoing.

Reply to 6. In that passage from Augustine 'not doing' is included under 'doing', as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 7. Praise and blame are incurred not only for voluntary acts but also for failures to act.

Reply to 8. That argument concludes that an act is required as a cause for omission; although it can be said that the "fomes" spoken of there in the Gloss †34 is not actual concupiscence but habitual concupiscence.

Reply to 9. Not every negation is based on a real affirmation: because as the Philosopher says,†35`not sitting' can truthfully be said both of that which exists and of that which does not exist; but, nevertheless, every negation is based on some affirmation either understood or in the imagination: for that about which something is denied must be apprehended. So accordingly, it is not necessary that an omission be founded on some real existing act. If however every negation were founded on some real affirmation, so that negation would in this way be regarded as a privation, it would not be necessary for omission, which is the negation of an act, to be founded on an act but to be founded on the power of the will.

Reply to 10. It is not always necessary in omission or even in transgression that there be actual contempt but only habitual or even inferrable contempt, for we infer that a person who does not do what is commanded or does what is forbidden regards those precepts with contempt.

Reply to 11. Omission is opposed to an affirmative precept, which although it is always binding, is not binding at all times: for a person is not obliged to be always engaged in honoring his parents, but nevertheless he is always obliged to honor his parents at the time he ought to. For as long a time then as the obligation to observe the affirmative precept lasts, the actual sin of omission lasts. When this is past the sin passes as to the act and remains as to guilt, and again when such a time recurs the sin of omission is repeated.

Reply to 12. Just as a person departs from the end by doing an evil act, so also by desisting from an act he ought to do.

Replies to the arguments On the contrary:

Reply to 1. On that authority it is accepted that the very not-doing of good is a sin, but this does not deny that the cause of such not-doing of good is an act.

Reply to 2. Punishment is inflicted for the omission of an act just as for fault, but nevertheless the fault may be caused by some act, which sometimes is a fault, as when sin is the cause of sin, but sometimes is not a fault.

Reply to 3. Even a state of rest contrary to nature is caused by some preceding action.

Reply to 4. God neither wills evils to be done, nor wills evils not to be done, but nevertheless He wills precisely this i.e. that He not will that evils be done and that He not will that evils not be done.

Reply to 5. The act which is required for omission is not always related to it indirectly (per accidens) but sometimes is a direct (per se) cause, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 6. A similar answer is to given to the sixth argument concerning transgression.

Reply to 7. Every act ought to regulated by reason; hence any act can be done badly if it is not properly regulated so that it be done when it ought to be done, and for the right motive, and similarly in regard to the other circumstances to be observed in actions. Consequently, even the very act of loving God can be done badly, for example, if someone loves God for temporal goods; and the very act of praising God in words can be done badly if this be done when it ought not to be done, i.e. when one is obligated to do other things. But if a regulated act be understood as it is meant when we say `acting temperately' or `acting justly', in this way it cannot be done badly. Nevertheless even granted that some act could not be done badly, it would not be inadmissible for the act to be an incidental cause of the omission, because good can be the cause of evil accidentally.

Reply to 8. Even the cause of original sin is an act, namely the actual sin of our first parent.

Reply to 9. Just as on the part of the virtues there are acts and habits, so on the part of the vices; habits, however, can be called virtues or vices, but only acts are called merits or sins.

Question II, Article 2 †p

Whether Sin Consists Solely in the Act of the Will?

It seems that it does, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says †1 that we sin only by the will. Therefore sin consists solely in the act of the will.

2. Augustine says in the book *On Two Souls* "Sin is the will to retain or acquire what justice forbids." †2 But 'will' is taken here for the act of the will. †3 Therefore sin consists only in the act of the will.

3. Augustine says †4 that continence is a habit of the soul, but it is manifested by an exterior act. Therefore and conversely, incontinence and every sin consists in the will alone, and the exterior acts merely manifest the sins.

4. Chrysostom says †5 "It is the will that is either rewarded for good or condemned for evil. But works are manifestations of the will; therefore God does not require works for His sake that He may know how to judge, but for others so that all may know that He is a just God." But that alone for which God punishes is sin. Therefore sin consists in the act of the will alone.

5. That which when provided or removed nonetheless sin remains, is accidentally related to sin. But despite the provision or removal of the exterior act, sin still remains in the will. Therefore exterior acts are accidentally related to sin; sin then does not consist in them but only in the interior act of the will.

6. No act is imputed to anyone as a sin which in no way is in his power; hence if a person takes hold of some man's hand against his will and with it kills a man, the sin of homicide is not imputed to the man whose hand struck the blow, but to him who uses the other's hand. But the external members of the body in no way can resist the command of the will. Therefore sin does not consist in the exterior acts of the members but in the act of the will which uses the members.

7. Augustine says †6 that if someone sees an oar bent in the water, this is not the fault of vision, which delivers what it receives to deliver, but the fault of the power that ought to judge. But the external members of the body have received from God this ordination to do what the will commands. Therefore fault or sin is not in their acts, but in the act of the will.

8. If sin consists in the act of the will and again in the exterior act, to sin simultaneously by the will and by the exterior act will be a greater sin than to sin by the interior act of the will alone: because just as a quantity added to a quantity makes a greater quantity, so a sin added to a sin seems to make a greater sin. But this is not true: for it is said in the Gloss on Matthew 12, 35, †7 "As much as you intend, so much do you do." And thus the sin of the interior will and the exterior act is not a greater sin than the interior act alone. Therefore sin does not consist in the exterior act but only in the interior act.

9. Supposing there are two persons equally intending to commit the same sin, say fornication, and one has the opportunity and accomplishes his will while the other does not have the opportunity but wishes he had; obviously there is no difference between these two in regard to what is in their power. But sin is not considered, nor consequently an increase of sin, according to what is not in a person's power. Therefore one of them does not sin more than the other, and so sin seems to consist only in the act of the will.

10. Sin corrupts the good of grace, which is not in any of the inferior powers as in a subject, but in the will. But opposites are concerned with the same thing.†8 Therefore sin consists in the will alone.

11. The interior act is the cause of the exterior act. But one and the same thing is not the cause of itself.†9 Since then sin is one and the same thing, it seems that if it consists in the act of the will, it cannot consist in the exterior act.

12. The same accident i.e. attribute cannot be in two subjects. But deformity is related to a disordered act as an accident to a subject. Since then there is one deformity of one sin, one sin cannot consist in two acts, namely in an interior act and an exterior act. But clearly sin is in the interior act of the will. Therefore in no way is sin in the exterior act.

13. Anselm says in the treatise On the Virgin Conception, speaking of exterior acts, "Justice does not consist in any species of these."†10 Therefore for the same reason neither does injustice, and so sin does not consist in the exterior act.

14. Augustine says †11 that sin passes away as soon as it is committed, yet the guilt remains. But this would not be the case if the exterior act itself was a sin. Therefore the exterior act itself is not a sin.

On the contrary:

Everything that is forbidden by the law of God is a sin, because "sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the law of God."†12 But the exterior act is forbidden by the law of God, Exodus 20, 13-15 when it is said "Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal." And the interior act is forbidden separately when it is said "Thou shalt not covet."†13 Therefore, not only is the act of the will a sin, but also the exterior act.

Response:

There was a threefold opinion concerning this question: for some †14 said that no act either interior or exterior in itself is a sin, but only privation has the nature of sin on account of what Augustine says †15 that sin is nothing; but others †16 asserted that sin consists in the interior act of the will alone; still others †17 maintained that sin consists in both the interior act of the will and the exterior act. And although the latter opinion contains more truth, nevertheless all the opinions are in some measure true.

But it must be noted that these three: evil, sin, and fault are related to each other as more general and less general. For evil is more general: indeed any privation whatever of form or of order or of due measure either in the subject or in the act, has the nature of evil.†18 But any act lacking due order or form or measure is called a sin (or defect). Hence it can be said that a crooked leg is an evil or bad leg, but it cannot be said that it is a sin except perhaps in that manner of speaking in which the effect of sin is called a sin; but the limping itself is called a sin or defect †19 indeed any disordered act either in nature or in art or in morals can be called a sin. But sin has the nature of fault only from the fact that as it is voluntary: for no disordered act is imputed to anyone as a fault except in consequence of the fact that it is within his power. And so it is clear that sin is more general than fault, although according to the common usage among theologians, sin and fault are taken for the same thing.†20

Consequently those who considered in sin only the nature of evil, said that the substance of the act is not a sin, but the deformity of the act is; but those who considered in sin only that from which it has the nature of fault said that sin consists in the will alone. But in sin it is necessary to consider not only the deformity itself but also the act underlying the deformity, since sin is not the deformity but a deformed act. Now the deformity of the act is owing to this that it is discordant with the due rule of reason or of the law of God. Which deformity is

found not only in the interior act, but also in the exterior act; but nevertheless the very fact that the exterior deformed act is imputed to man as a fault is on account of the will. And so clearly if we wish to consider all that is in sin, sin consists not only in the privation (of the due rule of reason or the divine law) nor only in the interior act, but also in the exterior act. And what we say about the act in a sin of transgression is also to be understood about the privation of the act in a sin of omission, as it was treated in the previous question (q. 2, a. 1).

Reply to 1. Not only the interior act which the will elicits, but also the exterior act which the will commands is caused by the will; and therefore even the sin itself that is committed by the exterior act is committed by the will.

Reply to 2. Sin is said to be 'the will', not that the whole essence of sin consists in the act of the will, but because the whole sin is in the will as in its root.

Reply to 3. It is on account of the will that an act is praiseworthy i.e. meritorious and virtuous, or is blameworthy and demeritorious or vicious. And therefore any virtue and vice is said to be a habit of the mind and will, not that the exterior acts do not likewise pertain to the acts of virtue and vice, but because the exterior acts are acts of virtue and vice only according as they are commanded by the mind's will.

Reply to 4. Only the will is said to be rewarded or condemned, because nothing is condemned or rewarded save insofar as it is from the will.

Reply to 5. In the acts of the soul when one thing remains despite the placing or removal of another thing, this other thing is not always related accidentally to that one thing, but sometimes materially. For that which is the reason for the other is always related to it as formal to material: for instance in the act of sense, color is seen by means of light and is related as material to that light, which can be seen even without color, although color cannot be seen without light.^{†21} And similarly in the act of the will the end is the reason for willing that which is for the sake of the end: hence the end is desirable even without that which is for the end, and nevertheless that which is for the end is not accidentally related to the desirable end, but materially. And this is likewise the case in the understanding of a principle and a conclusion: because a principle can be understood without the conclusion but not conversely. Since then the act of the will is the reason why the exterior act is blameworthy, in regard to the sin being culpable the act of the will is related as the formal element to the exterior act, and the exterior act is not related accidentally but materially to such a sin.

Reply to 6. The act of that person whose hand someone used to kill, would indeed be a disordered act but would not have the nature of fault except in relation to him who uses the other person's hand. And similarly the exterior act of the member [of the body] has deformity, but it does not have the nature of fault unless it is from the will. Hence if the will and the hand belong to two persons, the hand would not sin but the will would sin not only by its own act which is to will, but also by the act of the hand that it uses; but in the case presented here there is one man to whom both acts belong and he is punished for both.

Reply to 7. The answer to argument seven is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 8. If it be asked whether a person who sins by the will only, sins as much as a person who sins by the will and by the act, it should be said that this can occur in two ways: in one way, insofar as there is equality on the part of the will, in another way insofar as there is not equality. But inequality of the will can occur in three ways. In one way according to number, for example if someone by one movement of the will wills to sin, and when he does not have the opportunity the movement of the will ceases; but by another movement of the will when he has the opportunity, the act of the will is repeated; and thus in him there is a twofold evil will, one without the act, the other with the act. In a second way inequality can be considered as regards the movement, for example if one man having the will to sin, desists from this movement of the will

when he is aware that he lacks the opportunity, but another man knowing he has the opportunity of sinning, continues the movement of the will until he completes the act. Inequality of the will may occur in a third way as regards intensity: for there are some pleasurable acts of sin in which the will increases in intensity as if the restraint of reason were removed, which before the act so to speak repeatedly murmured against it. In whatsoever manner, then, there may be inequality of the will there is inequality of sin.

But if there is complete equality on the part of the will, it seems we must distinguish in sin as we do in merit. For a person who has the will to give an alms and does not give it because he does not have the means, merits just as much as if he gave it, in comparison with to the essential reward which is joy in God: for this reward corresponds to charity which pertains to the will; but in relation to the accidental reward,†22 which is joy over any whatsoever created good, a person merits more who not only wills to give but actually gives: for he will rejoice not only because he willed to give but because he gave and by reason of all the good things that resulted from that act of giving. And similarly if we consider the quantity of demerit in relation to the essential punishment, which consists in separation from God and in the suffering resulting from it, he does not demerit less who sins by the will alone than he who sins by the will and the act because this is a punishment for contempt of God, Who considers the will; but as regards the secondary punishment, which is suffering on account of any other evil done, a person who sins by the act and the will demerits more: for he will suffer not only for what he wrongly willed but also for what he wrongly did and for all the evils resulting from his wrongdoing; hence too the penitent who forestalls future punishment by repenting, is sorry for all such wrongdoing.

The statement then that a quantity added to a quantity makes a greater quantity, is to be understood where both are called quantities for the same reason, but where one is the reason for the quantity of the other this is not necessarily the case. For example, if a stick is long, there will be a long line: and it is not reasonable that the stick with the line be longer than the line, which line is the reason for the stick's length; so too we said (in the Response) that the exterior act has the nature of fault on account of the act of the will. As to the statement "as much as you intend, so much do you do," it has a place in evil deeds: because if someone intends to sin mortally, even if he commits an act which is venial according to its genus or no sin at all, he sins mortally, because an erroneous conscience binds. However if a person intends to do a meritorious work, committing an act which according to its genus is a mortal sin, he does not merit, because an erroneous conscience does not excuse.†23 Nevertheless if under intention is included not only the intention of the end but the willing of the work, thus it is true in good and in evil that as much as someone intends so much does he do: for he who wills to kill the saints to render a service to God †24 or who wills to steal to give an alms, seems to have a good intention, but a bad will. And on account of this, if under intention the will is also included so that the whole is designated as intention, the intention will also be evil.

Reply to 9. No one merits or demerits on account of a habit, but on account of an act. Hence someone may be so weak that if he were tempted, he would sin, who however if he is not tempted does not actually sin: and yet he does not demerit on account of this because, as Augustine says,†25 a man is not punished by God for what he would do, but for what he does. Although, then, to have or not to have the opportunity may not be in the sinner's power, nevertheless to use or not to use the opportunity at hand is in his power, and on account of this he sins and his sin is increased.

Reply to 10. Because sin is not in any other acts except inasmuch as they are from the will, therefore that which is in the will [in the present case, grace] is principally removed by sin.

Reply to 11. Anything that is compared to another as its cause is related to it as form to matter; hence from two things one comes about as from matter and form. And therefore color and light are one visible object because color is visible on account of light;†26 and similarly, since the exterior act has the nature of sin from the act of the will, the act of the will and the conjoined exterior act is the same sin; but if someone should first only will, and afterwards will and do the act, he commits two sins because he repeats the act of the will. But when one thing comes about from two things, nothing prevents one of these two from being the cause of the

other; and in this way the act of the will is the cause of the exterior act, just as likewise the act of a higher power is the cause of an act of a lower power and is always formally related to it.

Reply to 12. The deformity of sin consists in both acts, namely in the interior and in the exterior act, but nevertheless one deformity belongs to both; the reason for which is that the deformity in one of them is caused by the other.

Reply to 13. Justice is said not to consist in the essence of any exterior acts because exterior acts do not pertain to the genus of moral acts except according as they are voluntary.

Reply to 14. Guilt, which makes a person subject to punishment, is a certain effect following upon sin. Hence when it is said that sin passes away as soon as it is committed and remains as to its guilt, it is the same as if it were said that sin passes in its essence and remains in its effect.

Question II, Article 3 †p

Whether Sin Consists Principally in the Act of the Will?

It seems not, for the following reasons.

1. Things are denominated from what is principal in them, as is said in Book II of On the Soul.†1 But sin is denominated from the exterior act, as when we call an act 'theft' or 'homicide'. Therefore sin does not consist principally in the act of the will.

2. The act of the will cannot be evil because the very potency i.e. power of the will is good, and a good tree cannot bear bad fruit, as is said in Matthew 7, 18. Therefore sin does not consist principally in the act of the will.

3. Anselm says in The Fall of the Devil "The movement of the will is not evil, but the will or the mover of the will."†2 But the movement of the will is its act. Therefore sin does not consist principally in the act of the will.

4. Those acts done of necessity are not done by the will. But Augustine says †3 that some acts done of necessity are to be censured, and therefore are sins. Consequently sin does not consist principally in the will.

5. On that passage in Romans (7, 20) "The sin that dwells in me . . . ," etc. , the Gloss says †4 that every sin is from concupiscence. Which certainly is not in the will but in the concupiscible power. Therefore sin does not consist principally in the will.

6. The infection of the powers of the soul is only through sin. But it is said that of all the powers of the soul, the concupiscible power is most infected.†5 Therefore sin is principally in it, not then in the will.

7. The appetitive powers follow the apprehending powers. But the apprehending powers of the intellectual part of the soul receive sense impressions from the apprehending powers of the sensory part, therefore the superior appetitive powers also receive impressions from the lower appetitive powers. And so sin seems to consist in the act of one of the lower appetitive powers, which are the irascible and concupiscible powers, rather than in the act of the will.

8. 'That on account of which something is such is that still more', as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics.†6 But the act of the will is evil because the exterior act is evil: for it is because stealing is evil that willing to steal is evil. Therefore sin is not primarily in the act of the will.

9. The will tends to good as to its object; hence it always wills either a real good, and then there is no sin, or an apparent good that is not really good, and then there is a sin. But that something not really good appears good, is from a fault of the intellect or of some other apprehending power. Therefore sin does not consist principally in the will.

On the contrary:

Augustine says, "It is certain that inordinate desire is dominant in every kind of evil-doing."†7 But inordinate desire pertains to the will. Therefore sin is principally in the will.

Response:

There are some sins in which the exterior acts are not in themselves evil, but only according as they proceed from a perverted intention or will, for instance when a person wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory; and in sins of this kind it is clear that in every case the sin consists principally in the will. But there are other sins in which the exterior acts are in themselves evil, as clearly is the case in theft, adultery, murder, and the like; and in these it seems a twofold distinction needs to be made. Of which the first is that 'principally' is taken in two ways, namely originally and completely. The other distinction is that the exterior act can be considered in two ways: in one way as it is grasped by the mind according to its nature, in another way as it is in the execution of the work. If then we consider an act evil in itself, theft or homicide for instance, as it is apprehended according to its nature, thus the nature of evil is found in it originally, because the act is not vested with due circumstances; and from the very fact that it is an evil act, i.e. deprived of due measure, species, and order,†8 it has the nature of sin: for in this way considered in itself it is compared to the will as its object according as it is willed. But just as acts are prior to potencies, so also objects are prior to acts; consequently the nature of evil and sin is found originally in the exterior act so considered rather than in the act of the will, but the nature of fault and moral evil is completed according as the act of the will accedes to it, and thus the evil of fault is found in a complete manner in the act of the will. However if the act of sin be taken according as it is in the execution of the work, thus originally and more fundamentally fault is in the will. And the reason we have said evil is more fundamentally in the exterior act rather than in the will if the exterior act is considered according as it is apprehended, but the reverse if it be considered in the execution of the work, is that the exterior act is compared to the act of the will as its object which has the nature of an end or goal; and the end is posterior in being i.e. in existence but prior in intention.

Reply to 1. An act has its species from its object,†9 and consequently sin is denominated from the exterior act, which is compared to it as its object.

Reply to 2. The will according to its nature is good; hence also its natural act is always good. And I say 'the natural act of the will', inasmuch as man naturally wills to be, to live, and happiness.†10 But if we speak of moral good, in this way the will considered in itself is neither good nor evil, but is potentially good or evil.

Reply to 3. Anselm is speaking of when the exterior act is evil in itself: for then the movement of the will receives the nature of evil from the what moves it, i.e. from the act itself inasmuch as it is the object.

Reply to 4. The necessity deriving from coercion is absolutely contrary to the voluntary,†11 and such necessity entirely excludes fault. However there is a kind of necessity mixed with the voluntary, for example when a sailor is forced to throw merchandise overboard to prevent the sinking of the ship; and acts done as a result of such necessity can have the nature of fault inasmuch as they partake of the voluntary. For acts of this kind are more voluntary than involuntary, as the Philosopher says in Book III of the Ethics.†12

Reply to 5. Sometimes even the will is included under inordinate concupiscence. But if concupiscence is

taken according as it pertains to the concupiscible power, sin is said to arise from concupiscence, not that sin consists principally in the concupiscence itself, but because concupiscence tends to incite to sin. But sin is principally in the will inasmuch as it wrongfully consents to concupiscence.

Reply to 6. The concupiscible power is said to be most infected in regard to the transmission of original sin from parents to their offspring, but this very infection has proceeded from the disordered will of our first parent.

Reply to 7. The act of apprehending in us who receive knowledge from things, is according to a movement from things to the soul. But the senses are nearer to things perceptible by the senses than the intellect, and therefore it follows that just as the senses receive [impressions] from perceptible things, so the intellect [receives impressions] from the senses. But the act of an appetitive power is according to a movement from the soul to things, and so conversely the movement proceeds from the higher appetite to the lower, as is said in Book III On the Soul.†14

Reply to 8. The interior act is said to be evil on account of the exterior act as on account of the object; nevertheless the nature of fault is completed in the interior act.

Reply to 9. What is not really good appears good for two reasons: sometimes because of a defect of the intellect, as when a person has an erroneous opinion about doing an act, as is obvious in him who thinks fornication is not a sin, or in a person who lacks the use of reason; and such a defect on the part of the intellect lessens the fault or excuses it entirely. But sometimes the defect is not on the part of the intellect but rather on the part of the will, for according to the character of a man so does the end appear to him, as is said in Book III of the Ethics;†14 for we know by experience that in respect to those things that we love or those we hate so does something seem good or bad to us. And therefore when a person is inordinately disposed toward something, the judgment of his intellect in regard to a particular eligible object is impeded as a result of inordinate affection. And thus the fault is not principally in the cognition but in the affection. And therefore he who sins in this way is not said to sin on account of ignorance, but in ignorance, as is said in Book III of the Ethics.†15

Question II, Article 4 †p

Whether Every Act Is Indifferent?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. Anselm says: "No justice is found in the essence of these, i.e. acts, and for the same reason no injustice."†1 But that act is called indifferent in which there is neither justice nor injustice. Therefore all acts are indifferent.

2. What is in itself good cannot be evil, because what inherently (per se) belongs to a thing belongs to it necessarily. But there is no act which cannot be wrongfully done, even the act of loving God, as is obvious in a person who loves God on account of temporal goods. Therefore no act is good in itself, and with equal reason, none is evil in itself. Therefore every act is in itself indifferent.

3. Since good and being are convertible,†2 a thing will have from the same source its goodness and its being. But an act has moral being from the will: for if it is not voluntary it is not a moral act. Therefore an act has its moral goodness or moral evil from the will. So in itself the act is neither good nor evil but indifferent.

4. But it was argued that although the act is moral inasmuch as it is voluntary which is something common or general, nevertheless to be in itself good or evil is something special. But counter to this: good and

evil are differences of moral acts. But differences of themselves (per se) divide the genus;†3 and so the differences must not be referred to other than genus. If then the act has from the will this general characteristic, which is to be moral, it will also have from the same will that it is good or evil, and so in itself it is indifferent.

5. A moral act is called good inasmuch as it is vested with the proper circumstances and evil inasmuch as it is not vested with the proper circumstances. But circumstances since they are accidents of an act are outside the species of the act. Since then that is said to belong to a thing in itself which belongs to it according to its species, it seems that an act in itself is neither good nor evil, but indifferent.

6. Just as white and black are found in the same species of man so good and evil are found in the same species of act. For approaching one's own wife and approaching a wife not one's own for sexual intercourse do not differ in species, as is apparent from the effect: for in both cases a human being is begotten; yet one act is good and the other evil. But white and black do not intrinsically (per se) belong to man, therefore neither do good and evil intrinsically belong to an act; and so every act considered in itself is indifferent.

7. Those things which inherently (per se) belong to something do not vary in the same numerical subject, for example the same number is not even and odd. But one and the same numerical act may be good and evil: for an act which is continuous is one in number, and in a continuous act first good may be found and afterwards evil or the reverse, as for instance if a person starts out for church with a bad intention and on the way his intention is changed to a good one. Therefore good and evil do not of themselves (per se) belong to the act; and so every act of itself is indifferent.

8. Evil precisely as evil is not a being. But non-being cannot be of the substance of any being. Therefore since an act is a kind of being, no act of itself can be evil, nor consequently good: because a good act is contrary to an evil act, and contraries are in the same genus.†4 Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

9. An act is called good or evil from the order to the end. But an act does not receive its species from the end: because if such were the case any acts whatever would turn out to be of the same species since diverse acts may be ordered to one end. Therefore evil and good do not pertain to the species of the act; and so acts considered in themselves are neither good nor evil but indifferent.

10. Good and evil are found not only in acts but also in other things. But in other things they do not diversify species. Therefore neither do good and evil diversify acts; and so acts in themselves are neither good nor evil.

11. Good moral acts are called virtuous acts, and evil acts vicious acts. But virtue and vice are in the genus 'habit'. Therefore it is from another genus that an act is good or evil and not in itself.

12. A prior thing does not depend on the properties of a posterior thing. But an act is by nature prior to a moral act, because every moral act is an act, but not the reverse. Since then good and evil are moral properties, they do not of themselves belong to an act precisely as an act.

13. What is by nature such is always and everywhere such. But just and good deeds are not always and everywhere such: for at one place and time it is just to do certain things which at another it is not just to do. Nothing then is by nature just or good, nor consequently, unjust or evil. Therefore every act in itself is indifferent.

On the contrary:

Augustine says that there are some acts "which cannot be done with a good intention, such as illicit sexual intercourse in any form, blasphemy, and the like, about which we are permitted to judge."†5 Therefore not all acts are indifferent.

Response:

There was a diversity of opinion on this question among the ancient Doctors of the Church. For some said that all acts of themselves are indifferent; which others denied †6 saying that some acts are of themselves (per se) good and others of themselves evil.

To investigate the truth in regard to this we must consider that good implies a certain perfection, the privation of which is evil, in that manner in which we use the name 'perfection' in a broad sense according as it includes the proper measure and form and order. Hence Augustine in the book *On the Nature of Good* †7 based the nature of good on measure, species, and order, and the nature of evil on the privation of these. But clearly the same perfection is not proper to all things, but diverse perfections to diverse things, whether we take the diversity between different species, as between horse and ox, whose perfection is diverse, or between genus and species, as between animal and man: for something pertains to the perfection of man which does not pertain to the perfection of animal. Hence the good of the animal and the good of man, and of the horse and of the ox must be taken differently; and the same is to be said of evil. For it is obvious that in man not to have hands is an evil, but not in a horse or an ox, or even in animal as such. And in a similar way we must speak of good and evil in acts. For the consideration of good and evil in an act inasmuch as it is an act and in diverse particular acts is diverse: for if we consider an act inasmuch as it is an act, its goodness consists in a kind of emanation in keeping with what is appropriate to the kind of agent, and so according to the diversity of agents good and evil in acts is taken in diverse ways. Now in natural things an act is good which is in keeping with the nature of the agent, but evil which is not in keeping with the nature of the agent. And so one and same act is judged differently in relation to different agents. For example, upward movement if referred to fire, is a good action because it is natural to fire; but if it be referred to earth, it is an evil action because it is contrary to the nature of earth; †8 if however upward movement be referred to movable body in general, it has neither the nature of good nor of evil. But we are speaking now of human acts. Hence good and evil in the acts we are now discussing is to be understood according to that which is proper to man as such; and this is reason. Therefore good and evil in human acts is considered according as the act is in agreement with reason informed by divine law, either naturally, or by teaching or by infusion: hence Dionysius says †9 it is evil for the soul to be contrary to reason, for the body it is evil to be contrary to nature.

So accordingly, if to be in conformity with reason or to be contrary to reason pertains to the species of human act, it must be said that some human acts are in themselves good and others are in themselves evil. For not only what belongs to a thing by reason of its genus, but also what belongs to it by reason of its species is said to belong to it of itself (per se): for example, rational and irrational per se belong to animals by reason of their species, although not by reason of this genus 'animal'; for animal as such is not rational or irrational. However, if to be contrary to reason or in conformity with reason does not pertain to the species of human act, it follows that human acts of themselves (per se) are neither good nor evil but indifferent; just as men of themselves (per se) are neither white nor black. This then is the principle on which the truth of this question depends.

For evidence of this we must consider that since an act receives its species from its object, †10 the act compared to one active principle will be specified according to a formality of the object, according to which formality it will not be specified compared to another active principle. For to see color and to hear sound are acts that are diverse in species if they are referred to the sense, because these [color and sound] are of themselves (per se) their respective objects, but not if they are referred to the intellect, because they are comprehended by the intellect under one common formality of 'object', i.e. being or true. And similarly to perceive white and to perceive black differ in species if referred to sight, but not if referred to taste. From which we can conclude that the act of any power is specified according to that which essentially (per se) pertains to that power, and not according to that which pertains to it only accidentally. If then we consider the objects of human acts that have differences according to something essentially (per se) pertaining to reason, the acts will be different in species according as they are acts pertaining reason, although they are not different species according as they are acts of some other power: for example, to know one's own wife [i.e. sexually] and to

know a wife not one's own are acts having objects differing according to something pertaining to reason: for 'one's own' and 'not one's own' are determined according to the rule of reason; which differences however are accidental if they are referred to the generative power or even to the concupiscible power. And therefore to know one's own and not one's own differ in species according as they are rational acts, but not according as they are generative or concupiscible acts. But acts are human insofar as they are rational: so accordingly, it is clear that they differ in species inasmuch as they are human acts. Obviously then human acts are good or evil on account of their species.

And therefore it must be said simply that some human acts are good or evil in themselves, and that not all are indifferent, except perhaps as they are considered according to their genus only. For just as it is said that animal as such is neither rational nor irrational, so it can be said that a human act inasmuch as it is an act does not yet have the nature of moral good or evil unless something is added contracting it to a species; although even from the very fact that it is a human act, and more remotely from the fact that it is an act, and even more remotely from the fact that it is a being, it has some nature of good, but not of this moral good which is conformity with reason, of which we are now treating.

Reply to 1. Anselm is speaking of acts according to their generic nature i.e. as acts not according to their specific nature i.e. as moral acts.

Reply to 2. That which follows on the species of a thing always belongs to it. Since then a human act obtains its species from nature of its object, according to which the act is good or evil, an act so specified as good can never be evil, nor can an act specified as evil ever be good. Nevertheless there may be joined to an act good in itself some other act evil according to some ordination (*ordinem*), and in virtue of that evil act a good act is said to become evil,^{†11} not that it is evil in itself: for example, to give an alms to the poor man or to love God is an act good in itself, but to refer an act of this kind to some disordered end, like cupidity or vainglory, is a certain other evil act; which two acts however are reduced to one by a certain ordering of one act to the other. But good, as Dionysius says,^{†12} results from a whole and integral cause, and evil from any single defect. And so whichever one of these is evil, whether the act or the ordination of the act to the end, the whole is judged evil, but the whole is not judged good unless both are good, just as a man is not judged handsome unless all his members are comely, and is judged ugly if even one is unsightly. And hence it is that an evil act cannot become good: for from whichever [of these] the act is evil, it cannot be an integral good; but a good act can become evil, because it is not required that it be an integral evil but it is sufficient that it be evil in some particular respect.

Reply to 3. To be voluntary pertains to the nature of a human act as such. Hence what belongs to the act inasmuch as it is voluntary, either according to its genus or according to its difference, belongs to it not accidentally but by reason of its nature (*per se*).

Reply to 4. The answer is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 5. Circumstances are related to moral acts as accidents which are outside the definition of the species pertaining to natural things. But a moral act, as we have said (in the Response), receives its species from the object as it is compared to reason; and therefore in general it is said ^{†13} that some acts are good or evil generically, and that an act good generically is a act bearing on due matter, for instance feeding the hungry, but an act evil generically is one bearing on undue matter, for instance taking what belongs to another: for the matter of an act is called its object. But to this goodness or badness can be added another goodness or badness from something extrinsic called a circumstance, such as the place or the time or the condition of the agent and so on, for example if someone takes what does not belong to him from a sacred place or apart from need and the like. And although such goodness or badness does not intrinsically (*per se*) pertain to the moral act as it is considered in its species, nevertheless some goodness or badness does pertain to it according to its species, because as was said above (in the Response), the account of goodness differs according to the difference of perfections.

Reply to 6. A moral act in the same species can be good and evil as a result of a circumstance, just as in the same species of man there can be black and white. But nevertheless acts which are good in themselves differ in species from acts which are evil in themselves precisely as moral acts, although they may not differ in species according as they are natural acts, as is evident in the two acts of knowing one's own wife and knowing a wife not one's own.

Reply to 7. Nothing prevents a thing from being the same in number according to one genus which nevertheless according to another genus differs not only in number but in species; for example, if a continuous body is white in one part and black in another, it is one in number inasmuch as it is continuous, but inasmuch as it is colored it is different not only in number but in species. And similarly, if in a continuous action at first the intention is ordered to good and afterwards to evil, it follows that it is one act in number according to its nature as an action, but nevertheless it is different in species according as it is in the genus of moral acts; however it can also be said that that act always retains either the goodness or badness which it has from its species, although the act of intention in one and the same act may vary according to different ends.

Reply to 8. Just as in natural things privation follows on a form, for example, the privation of the form of fire follows on the form of water,†14 so also in moral matters the privation of due measure or species or order follows on the imposing of some mode or species or order. And therefore from that which is found in a positive manner in an act, the act receives its species; but from the consequent privation it is called evil; and just as it belongs of its nature (per se) to water not to be fire, so of its nature it belongs to such an act even according to its species to be evil.

Reply to 9. End is twofold, proximate and remote. The proximate end of an act is the same as its object and from this the act receives its species; but it does not have species from the remote end, but rather the ordination to such an end is a circumstance of the act.

Reply to 10. Good has the nature of an end;†15 hence the end inasmuch as it such is the object of the will. And because moral acts depend on the will, it follows that good and evil in moral acts differ in species. But this is not the case in other matters.

Reply to 11. Some acts are called virtuous or vicious not only because they proceed from a habit of virtue or of vice but because they are similar to those acts that proceed from such habits. Hence even before a person has the virtue he may perform a virtuous act, yet in a different way than after he has the virtue. For before a person has the virtue he may do just acts, but not as the just man does them, and chaste acts but not as the chaste man does them; but after he has the virtue he does just acts as a just man would do them and chaste acts as a chaste man would do them, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Book II of the Ethics.†16 So accordingly, it is evident that there is a threefold grade of goodness and badness in moral acts: first according to their genus or species as determined by comparison to the object or matter, secondly from the circumstances, and thirdly from the informing habit.

Reply to 12. That argument is true of an act according to its generic nature as an act, from which it does not have moral goodness or badness; however it does have moral goodness or badness according to the species, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 13. Just and good acts can be considered in two ways: in one way formally, and thus they are the same always and everywhere, because the principles of what is good and just which are in natural reason do not change; in another way materially, and thus just and good acts are not the same everywhere and among all men, but must be determined by law. And this happens because of the changeability of human nature and the diverse conditions of men and things according to the difference of places and times; for example, it is always just that an equivalent exchange be made in buying and selling, but it is just that at such a place or time so much be given for a measure of grain, and at another place or time not that amount but a greater or lesser amount.

Question II, Article 5 †p

Whether Some Acts Are Indifferent?

It seems not, for the following reasons.

1. Being as such is good;†1 and non-being is opposed to being, but evil to good.†2 But there is nothing intermediate between being and non-being.†3 Therefore neither is there between good and evil. All acts then are necessarily good or evil and none is indifferent.

2. But it was argued that being and good are not convertible in the moral order but in the natural order, and so it does not necessarily follow that good and evil in the moral order are without an intermediate. But counter to this: the moral good is a greater good than the natural good, therefore the moral good has a greater opposition to evil. If then the natural good is opposed to evil without an intermediate, much more so is the moral good.

3. Evil is not opposed to good as a contrary, because evil confers nothing, but it is opposed as a privation. But privative opposites do not have an intermediate in regard to their proper subject, and the proper subject of moral good and evil is a human act. Therefore every human act is good or evil, and none is indifferent.

4. A human act proceeds from a deliberate will, but a deliberate will always acts for an end, therefore every human act is for the sake of an end. But every end is either good or evil; and an act that is ordered to a good end is good and an act that is ordered to an evil end is evil. Therefore every human act is either good or evil and none is indifferent.

5. Every human operation is either the use of a thing or the enjoyment of it. But whoever uses, uses either rightly or wrongly, i.e. abuses.†4 And similarly whoever enjoys, enjoys God which is good, or a creature which is evil. Therefore every human act is either good or evil.

6. Augustine says,†5 that no action happens in nature by chance: for every action has hidden causes which are unknown to us. But just as chance is in nature, so it seems is the indifferent act in moral matters, i.e. outside the intention of good or evil. Therefore no moral act is indifferent.

7. Every act proceeding from a will informed by charity is meritorious, but every act proceeding from a will not informed by charity is demeritorious, because everyone is bound to conform his will to the divine will,†6 especially in regard to the manner of willing, so as to will what he wills out of charity, as God does; which a person cannot observe who does not have charity. Therefore every act is meritorious or demeritorious, and none is indifferent.

8. No one is condemned except for fault. But a person is condemned for not having charity, as is clear in Matthew (22, 11-14) of him who was excluded from the wedding feast because he did not have on a wedding garment, by which charity is signified.†7 Therefore not to have charity is a sin, and whatever is done by a person not having charity is demeritorious. And so the same conclusion follows as before.

9. The Philosopher says †8 that actions in moral matters are like conclusions in syllogistic matters, in which there is the true and the false, just as in moral matters there is good and evil. But every conclusion is either true or false. Therefore every moral act is either good or evil and none is indifferent.

10. Gregory says †9 that the wicked are accomplishing the will of God whilst they are striving to the

contrary. Much more then do they accomplish the will of God who do not strive to the contrary. But to accomplish the will of God is good. Therefore it follows that every act is good, and no act is indifferent.

11. For an act to be meritorious in a person having charity the act need not actually be referred to God, but it is sufficient that it be actually referred to some good end that is habitually referred to God, for example, if someone intending to go on a pilgrimage in honor of God buys a horse, not actually thinking of God but only of the journey which he has already ordained to God: for this indeed is meritorious. But it is evident he who possesses charity has ordered himself and all that is his to God, Whom he cleaves to as his ultimate end; therefore whatever he ordains either as pertains to himself or as pertains to anything else of his, he does meritoriously even if he does not actually think of God, unless he is prevented by some inordinateness of an act that is not referable to God. But this cannot happen without at least a venial sin. Therefore every act of a person having charity either is meritorious or is sinful, and none is indifferent, and the same reasoning seems to apply in regard to other acts.

12. But it was argued that an act cannot be meritorious nor ordered from this alone that a person negligently and taken unawares does not promptly order it to a proper end. But counter to this: negligence itself is a sin either mortal or venial; even some venial sins are committed when we are taken unawares, as is evident especially in the first movements of concupiscence. Therefore on that account venial sin is not excluded.

13. The Gloss of Augustine †10 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (3, 12) says that he builds on wood, hay, and straw who cleaves more than he ought to things that are permitted; but he who builds on wood, hay, and straw, sins: otherwise he would not be punished by fire; therefore he who clings to permissible things more than he ought, sins. But whoever acts, either clings to things permitted or not permitted; if to things not permitted, he sins; if to things permitted more than he ought, he likewise sins, if as he ought he does a good act. Therefore every human act is either good or evil and none is indifferent.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says that "there are some intermediate acts which can be done with a good or bad intention, of which it is rash to judge." †11

2. The Philosopher says †12 that good and evil are contraries admitting of intermediates. Therefore there is something intermediate between good and evil, which is the indifferent.

Response:

As we said above (in the preceding article), over and above the goodness and badness a moral act has from its species, it can have another goodness or badness from the circumstances, which are related to the moral act as certain accidents. Now just as a genus is considered in its own nature apart from the differences, without which there can be no species, so a species is considered according to its nature apart from the accidents, which no individual can be without. For to be white or to be black or something of this kind is not of the nature of man, yet it is impossible for any individual man to be without being white or black or some color. So accordingly, speaking of moral acts as they are considered in their species, they can be called good or bad from their genus. But the goodness or badness which derives from the circumstances of the act does not belong to the act according to its genus or species, but such goodness or badness can belong to individual acts.

If then we speak of the moral act according to its species, thus not every moral act is good or evil but some act is indifferent: because the moral act has its species from the object according to its relation to reason, as we said above (in the preceding article). Now there is an object that implies something in accord with reason and makes the act good by reason of its genus, for example clothing the naked; and an object that implies something discordant with reason, for example taking what belongs to another, and this makes it evil in its genus; but there is a kind of object which implies neither something in accord with reason nor something

discordant with reason, for instance picking up a straw from the ground, or the like, and such an act is called indifferent. And they have spoken rightly about this who have divided acts in a threefold way, affirming that some are good, some evil, some indifferent.†13 But if we speak about the moral act as an individual act, in this way every particular moral act is necessarily good or bad by reason of some circumstance. For no singular act can be performed without circumstances which make it right or wrong: for if any act whatsoever be done when it ought and where it ought and as it ought, and so on in respect to the other circumstances,†14 such an act is well-ordered and good; but if any of these circumstances not be as it ought, the act is disordered and evil. And this can be noticed especially in the circumstance of the end:†15 for what is done on account of just need or on account of pious usefulness, is done laudably and is a good act; but what is done without just need or pious usefulness, is considered idle as Gregory says.†16 And even an idle word is a sin and much more so an idle deed: for it is said in Matthew (12, 36) ". . . of every idle word men speak, they shall give an account." So accordingly, a good act and an evil act by reason of their genus [i.e. moral act], are opposites that admit of an intermediate, and there is an act which considered in its species is indifferent; but good and evil from the circumstances do not admit of an intermediate, because they are distinguished according to the opposition of affirmation and negation,†17 namely from this that the act is as it ought to be and it is not as it ought to be according to all the circumstances. But this good and evil is proper to the singular act; and therefore no singular human act is indifferent. And I call a human act one which proceeds from a deliberate will: for if it be an act without deliberation proceeding merely from imagination, for instance scratching one's beard or something of the kind, such an act is outside the genus of moral acts; hence it does not participate in moral goodness or badness.

Reply to 1. Although being as such is good, nevertheless not every non-being is evil; for not having eyes is not evil for a stone. Hence it does not necessarily follow that if being and non-being are without an intermediate that good and evil are without an intermediate.

Reply to 2. Being and good are convertible simply and in every genus; hence the Philosopher distinguishes good according to the genera of beings or things.†18 But it is true that being is not absolutely convertible with the moral good just as neither is it absolutely convertible with the natural good. But the moral good is in certain manner a greater good than the natural good, namely inasmuch as it is an act and perfection of a natural good, although also in a certain manner the natural good is better, as a substance is better than an accident i.e. an attribute. But it is evident that not even the natural good and evil, are opposed without and intermediary, because not every non-being is evil as indeed every being is good. Hence the reasoning does not follow.

Reply to 3. Good and evil in moral matters are opposed as contraries and not as the privation and possession of a quality.†19 For evil confers something inasmuch as it attains a kind of order or measure or species, as was said (in the preceding article); hence nothing prevents good and evil in moral matters from being opposed mediately i.e. admitting of an intermediary, as the Philosopher maintains.†20 But evil in nature follows on privation simply; hence good and evil in nature although they are not without an intermediate absolutely, as we have said (in the Response), nevertheless they are without an intermediate in regard to the subject susceptible of them, as the privation and possession of a quality.

Replies to 4 and 5. We concede the fourth and fifth arguments for they are concerned not with an act considered in its species, but with the singular act as it proceeds from the will.

Reply to 6. In nature nothing is at random i.e. by chance in relation to the first cause, because all things are foreseen by God. But there are random events in relation to proximate causes: for having a cause does not exclude chance, but having a direct (per se) cause; for chance events are those which arise incidentally (per accidens) from causes. But among human acts there are some that are done for an imagined end, not a deliberate end, for instance scratching one's beard or the like, which in the genus of moral acts are so to speak like chance events in nature, because they do not proceed from reason, which is the direct (per se) cause of moral acts.

Reply to 7. Not every act proceeding from a will informed by charity is meritorious, if the will is taken as the power, otherwise venial sins, which sometimes are committed even by persons having charity, would be meritorious; but it is true that every act that proceeds from charity is meritorious. However it is absolutely false that every act which is not from a will informed by charity is demeritorious: otherwise those in mortal sin would sin in their every act, nor would they be counseled to do whatever good they could in the meantime, nor would works done by them which are good in kind dispose them for grace; all of which are false. But everyone is bound to conform his will to the divine will in regard to this that he will whatever God wills him to will according as the will of God becomes known through prohibitions and precepts, but not in regard to this that he will out of charity, except according to those who say that the mode of charity falls under the precept.^{†21} Which opinion is true in some respect: otherwise a person could fulfill the law without having charity, which pertains to the impiety of the Pelgians;^{†23} nevertheless the opinion is not altogether true because if it were, a person not having charity who honors his parents would sin mortally because of the omission of the mode of charity; which is false. Hence the mode [i.e. of charity] is included under the necessity of precept according as the precept is ordered to the attainment of beatitude, not however according as it is ordered to avoidance of the debt of punishment: hence a person not having charity who honors his parents does not merit eternal life, but neither does he demerit. From which it is evident that not every human act, even considered in the singular, is meritorious or demeritorious, although every act is good or evil. And I say this out of consideration for those who do not have charity, who cannot merit. But for those having charity every act is meritorious or demeritorious, as is proved in the objection.

Reply to 8. Not to have charity does not merit punishment: for just as we do not merit by habits but by acts, so neither do we demerit by the very absence of habits; but a person demerits by placing an obstacle to charity, either by omission or commission. And likewise the man in the Gospel not said to be punished because he did not have on a wedding garment, but because not having on a wedding garment he entered the sacred banquet: for it was said to him (in Matth. 22, 12) "How didst thou come in here without a wedding garment?"

Reply to 9. True and false are opposed according to being and non-being: for when what is, is said to be or what is not, is said not to be, it is true, but when what is not, is said to be or what is, is said not to be, it is false.^{†23} Hence just as there is no intermediate between being and non-being, so there no intermediate between true and false. But the reasoning is different in regard good and evil, as is clear from what has been said above (in the Response).

Reply to 10. Those who strive contrarily to the will of God fulfill it beyond their intention, thus the Jews in killing Christ fulfilled the will of God concerning the redemption of the human race beyond their intention; and this is one of the examples that Gregory gives.^{†24} But to fulfill the will of God in this way is neither good nor praiseworthy.

Replies to 11, 12, and 13. We concede the those last three arguments: for they are concerned with the performance of individual acts.

We also concede the arguments cited On the contrary: for they are concerned with the act good or evil from its genus.

Question II, Article 6 ^{†p}

Whether a Circumstance Gives Species to a Sin or Changes the Species by Transferring It into Another Genus of Sin?^{†1}

It seems it does not, for the following reasons.

1. The principle of species is intrinsic, but the circumstances are extrinsic, as the name implies. Therefore a circumstance does not give species to a sin.

2. But it was argued that that which is a circumstance of an act considered in its natural species gives species to the act inasmuch as it is moral. But counter to this: as in general an object is to an act so the moral object is to the moral act. But the object gives species to an act.^{†2} Therefore the moral object gives species to the moral act, not then a circumstance.

3. The same sinful act has many circumstances. If then a circumstance gives species to a sin, it follows that the same sin is in different species, which is impossible.

4. That which is already constituted in a species does not receive species from something else unless the prior species has corrupted. But stealing is already constituted in a species of sin, and by this added circumstance of stealing from a sacred place or stealing a sacred object, the first species is not eliminated, for it is still theft. Therefore this circumstance does not give any species to the sin, and for a like reason neither does any other circumstance.

5. Sins seem to be differentiated from one another according to excess and defect: for in this way illiberality is opposed to extravagance.^{†3} But excess and defect seem to pertain to only one circumstance, namely quantity. Therefore other circumstances do not diversify species of sins.

6. Every sin is voluntary, as Augustine says.^{†4} But the will does not bear upon a circumstance: for instance when someone steals a consecrated gold vessel, he is not concerned about the consecration but only about the gold. Therefore this circumstance does not give species to the sin, and for a like reason neither do the others.

7. That which does not remain but immediately passes away, cannot be changed from the species it previously had. But the act of sin does not remain but immediately passes away. Therefore a circumstance cannot change the species of sin.

8. Just as a defect may occur in moral matters under certain circumstances, so also in natural things: for monstrosities sometimes occur in nature on account of local pressure,^{†5} but sometimes on account of an abundance or even an insufficiency of matter, and from other such causes, and yet what is begotten is always the same in species. Therefore neither in moral matters is the species of sin diversified on account of the disorder of various circumstances.

9. The end confers the species in moral acts, because a moral act is judged good or bad from the intention. But the end is not a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance does not give species to a sin.

10. Sin is opposed to virtue. But a circumstance does not change the species of virtue: for it belongs to the same virtue, e.g. to liberality or mercy, to do a good deed for a cleric or a lay person. Therefore a circumstance does not change the species of sin.

11. If a circumstance changes the species of sin, it must make the sin worse. But sometimes it does not, e.g., that circumstance which seems to change the species, for instance if it be unknown; for example if a man approaches for sexual intercourse a married woman whom he does not know is married, he commits adultery, nevertheless the sin does not seem to be made worse, because that which is minimally voluntary has a minimum of the nature of sin. Therefore such a circumstance does not change the species of sin.

12. If this circumstance, that a thing is holy gives species to the sin, though it remains theft, it follows that there is in that case both sacrilege and theft, and so in one act two sins are committed which seems unreasonable.

13. According to the Philosopher,^{†6} action in moral matters is like a conclusion in theoretical matters. But a circumstance does not change the species of a conclusion, therefore neither does it change the species of the moral act. And so it does not give species to the sin.

14. Just as there are certain moral actions, so also there are certain actions pertaining to an art. But circumstances do not change the species of the craftsman's action, because it makes no difference in whatever place or at whatever time or for whatever motive a craftsman makes a knife. Therefore neither do the circumstances change the species of a moral act.

15. Evil according to genus is usually divided against evil according to circumstances.^{†7} But evil according to genus pertains to the very species of sin, therefore evil according to circumstances does not pertain to the species of sin. consequently circumstances do not give species to a sin.

16. A circumstance inasmuch as it worsens a sin causes a greater evil. But more and less do not diversify species. Therefore a circumstance making a sin worse does not change the species of sin.

On the contrary:

1. The place in which a sin is committed is a circumstance. But the place gives species to a sin: for it is said to be a sacrilege if someone steals from a sacred place.^{†8} Therefore a circumstance gives species to a sin.

2. If a man sexually knows a married woman, he commits adultery; which is a species of sin. But that a woman is single or married, is a circumstance of the act. Therefore a circumstance gives species to a sin.

Response:

To resolve this question three things have to be considered: first, from what does sin have its species, secondly, what is a circumstance, and then thirdly it can be shown in what way circumstances give species to a sin.

As to the first point, it must be noted that since a moral act is a voluntary act proceeding from reason, the moral act must have its species according to something considered in the object which has a relation to reason; and so it was said in a preceding question (q. 2, a. 4) that if this is in accord with reason, the act will be good according to its species, but if it is discordant with reason, it will be evil according to its species. Now that which is not in accord with reason in the object considered, can diversify species of sin in two ways: in one way materially, in another way formally. Materially, by opposition to virtue: for virtues differ in species according as reason arrives at a mean in different matters, for example, justice according as reason establishes a mean in exchanges and distributions and the like, temperance according as reason establishes a mean in matters of concupiscence, fortitude according as reason establishes a mean in matters of fear and daring, and so on in other matters. Nor should anyone deem it to be inconsistent if the species of virtues are differentiated according to the diverse matters, though a difference of matter usually is the cause of a difference not of species but of individuals: because even in natural things a difference in matter causes a difference in species when the difference in matter requires a difference in form. Hence too in moral matters, it must surely be the case that virtues diverse in species are concerned with different matters in which reason arrives at a mean in diverse ways: for example, in concupiscible matters reason arrives at a mean by restraining, hence virtue established in these matters is nearer to deficiency than to excess, as the very name 'temperance' denotes; but in matters of daring and fear reason arrives at a mean not by restraining but rather by attacking, hence virtue in these matters is nearer to excess than deficiency, as the very name 'fortitude' denotes; and we see the same in other matters relating to the virtues. So then too by their opposition to the virtues, sins differ in species according to their diverse matters, for example homicide, adultery, and theft. Nor should it be said that they differ in species according to a difference of precepts but rather the reverse, precepts are distinguished according to the

difference of virtues and vices, because the purpose of the precepts is that we act according to virtue and avoid sins. However if there should be some acts that would be sins only because prohibited, in these it would be reasonable that sins would differ in species according to the difference of precepts.

But since concerning one matter there is one virtue, but many sins diverse in species, it is necessary next to consider formally the difference of species in sins, namely according as sin is committed either according to excess or according to defect, as for instance timidity differs from presumption and stinginess from extravagance, or according to diverse circumstances, as the species of gluttony are distinguished according to those comprised in the following verse †9

'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, finically.'

So having shown in what way sins differ in species, we must consider what a circumstance is. Now that is called a circumstance which surrounds an act as it were, outside of not within the substance of the act being considered. Now this is in one way on the part of the cause, either the final cause when we consider why a person did the act, or the principal agent when we consider who did the act, or as regards to the instrumental cause when we consider with what instrument or what aids he did the act. In another way that which surrounds the act as regards the measure, i.e. when we consider where and when the person acted. In a third way as regards the act itself, whether we consider the manner of acting, for instance, did the person strike lightly or forcefully, many times or once, or we consider the object or matter of the action, for instance did he strike his father or a stranger, or even the effect he caused by acting, e.g., by striking did he wound or actually kill. Which are all contained in the following verse:†10

'Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when'.

In such a way however that not only the effect but also the object is included in 'what', so that both 'what' and 'about what' are understood.

So having investigated these points, we must consider that just as in other matters something is extrinsic to a higher thing which is intrinsic to a lower, for instance, rational is outside the nature of animal but it is of the nature of man, so something is a circumstance in respect to an act more generally considered which cannot be called a circumstance in respect to an act considered more in particular; for example if we consider the act of taking money, it is not of the nature of the act that it belong to another, hence 'to belong to another' is related to the act so considered as a circumstance; but that it belongs to another is of the nature of theft, hence it is not merely a circumstance of theft. However it does not necessarily follow that everything which is outside the nature of a higher thing belongs to the nature of the lower; for just as white does not belong to the nature of animal, so it does not belong to the nature of man: hence it is related to both as an accident, or attribute. And likewise it does not necessarily follow that anything whatever which is a circumstance of a more general act would constitute a species of act, but only that which intrinsically (per se) pertains to the act; and we have already pointed out (above in q. 2, a. 5) that something intrinsically (per se) pertains to a moral act according as it is related to reason as accordant or discordant with reason. If then an added circumstance implies no special discordance with reason, it does not give species to the act, for example, to use a white article adds nothing pertaining to reason: hence white does not constitute a species of moral act; but to use a thing belonging to another does add something pertaining to reason: hence it constitutes a species of moral act.

But we must consider further that an added circumstance pertaining to reason can constitute a new species of sin in two ways. In one way according as the species constituted by the circumstance is a certain species of that sin which was previously considered under the more general act, whether the species of sin be

constituted formally, or materially: materially, for instance, if to this which I call 'using what belongs to another' be added 'wife', from which adultery is constituted; formally, for instance, if I take a thing belonging to another from a sacred place: for it becomes a sacrilege, which is a species of theft. But sometimes by reason of the circumstance another entirely disparate species †11 is constituted, not pertaining to the former genus of sin: for instance if I steal another's property so I can commit homicide or simony, the sin is assigned to a species of sin entirely different. And we find a likeness of this sort in other matters. For if over and above 'colored' we consider 'white', it becomes a species of the quality first considered; but if over and above colored 'sweet' be understood, it becomes another species of quality entirely different. The reason for this diversity is that when that which is added is of itself (per se) divisive of that to which it is added, it produces a species of that; but when the addition is incidentally (per accidens) related to that to which it is added, it has its own species, which nevertheless is not a species of that to which it is added: because that which is added incidentally does not become per se (intrinsically) one with that to which it added. So accordingly it is evident in what way a circumstance can constitute a species of sin.

Reply to 1. That which is regarded as a circumstance and extrinsic in respect to the act considered in one way, can also be regarded as intrinsic in respect to the act considered in another way and can give it species.

Reply to 2. Just as an act considered in general receives species from the object, so the moral act receives species from the moral object, yet it is not on that account prevented from receiving species from the circumstances: because by reason of a circumstance a new condition can be considered in the object by which it (the circumstance) gives species to the act; for example if I say 'taking another's property that is in a sacred place', here the condition of the object is considered from the circumstance of place, and so it is a species of theft which is sacrilege from the circumstance of place, more precisely however on account of the new condition of the object. And similarly this is necessarily the case whenever a species of sin which is constituted by a circumstance, is related to the previously understood sin as a species to a genus, like sacrilege to theft or adultery to fornication. However when the species of sin resulting from a circumstance is not a species of the sin previously understood but is a certain other disparate species, then it can be understood that the circumstance gives species not inasmuch as some condition about the object results from the circumstance, but inasmuch as that circumstance is regarded as an object of a further surrounding act: for example, if a man commits adultery in order to steal, there is added a certain other species of sin on account of the act of intention aiming an evil end which is the object of the intention; and likewise if someone should perform an indecent act during a sacred time, the sacred time which is considered as a circumstance in respect to the indecent act performed during it, can be considered as an object in respect to a further surrounding act, i.e. contempt of the sacred time. And the same can be said in other cases.

Reply to 3. When a circumstance constitutes a species which is compared to the previously understood sin as a species to a subalternate genus, it does not follow that the same thing is in diverse species: for to fall under 'man' and under 'animal' is not to fall under diverse species: because man really is that which is animal; and it is the same in regard to sacrilege and theft. But if a circumstance should constitute another disparate species of sin, it follows that the same act falls under different species of sin. Nor is this unreasonable: because a species of act is not a species of sin according to its nature as an act, as was said above (in the preceding article), but according to its moral being, which is related to the nature of the act as a quality to a substance or rather as a deformity of a quality to a subject. Therefore just as it is not inconsistent that the same concrete object be white and sweet, which are diverse species of quality, and that the same man be blind and deaf, which are defects diverse in species, so it is not inconsistent that the same act be in diverse species of sin.

Reply to 4. The response to the fourth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 5. Not every difference of sins is according to excess and defect, but according to the diverse matter, and according to defect or excess in the diverse circumstances. Nor is excess and defect taken only according to quantity, but according to any circumstances whatever: because if a person acts where he ought not

or when he ought not, and similarly in respect to the other circumstances, there will be excess, and defect if any of the circumstances be defective.

Reply to 6. Although the will of the thief does not bear principally on the sacred vessel but on the gold, nonetheless his will bears on the sacred vessel by implication: because he wills to take the sacred vessel rather than forego the gold.

Reply to 7. When we say that a circumstance changes the species of a sin or transfers it to another genus, we do not mean that an act that is first in one species is again resumed and becomes of another species; but that the act, which without a circumstance is considered not to be in such a species of sin, has that species of sin when the circumstance is added.

Reply to 8. A defect of a circumstance in nature does not change a substantial species of nature but it does change the species of deformity: for a different species of monstrosity is caused from local pressure than from a the mass of matter. And the case in question is similar, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 9. The moral act does not have species from the remote end but from the proximate end which is the object. And it was said (in the Response) that a circumstance gives species inasmuch as it is the object of the act or inasmuch as some condition about the object results from the circumstance.

Reply to 10. Even in the virtues a circumstance transfers an act to another species, though not every circumstance does this: for to make great expenditures is an act of magnificence, but to make great expenditures in building a church consecrated to God is an act of religion.

Reply to 11. Every circumstance constituting a species of sin necessarily makes the sin worse: because if without this circumstance there was no sin, the circumstance makes a sin of what was not a sin; and if there was a sin, the circumstance introduces further deformities of the sin. But if such a circumstance is utterly unknown, by reason of ignorance of the kind that does not involve fault, it will not constitute a species of sin formally speaking, but only materially; for example, if a man sexually approaches a married woman whom he does not know is married, he indeed commits an act of adultery, not as an adulterer however, because the form of a moral act is from the reason and will. And what is unknown is not voluntary. Hence if he were to approach another's wife whom he thought to be his own he would be without sin, as when Lia was brought in to Jacob in place of Rachel.†12

Reply to 12. If a circumstance constitutes a species which is related to the previously understood sin as a species of it, like adultery to fornication, there are not two sins but one, just as Socrates is not two substances because he is a man and an animal. But if the circumstance constitutes a disparate species of sin there will be one sin because of the substance of the act being one, but multiple sins because of the many different deformities, just as an apple is one of such a kind because of the unity of the subject but many by reason of the diversity of color and taste.

Reply to 13. The likeness between a conclusion and moral action is noticed in this respect that just as the syllogistic act terminates in a conclusion, so the process of reasoning in moral matters terminates in an action, but there is not a likeness in all respects. For moral actions concern singulars †13 in which diverse circumstances are considered, but conclusions in theoretical matters are reached by way of abstraction from singulars. Yet even conclusions are varied in respect to some circumstances pertaining to the nature of a syllogism: for conclusions in necessary matter differ from those in contingent matter,†14 and in different sciences there are different modes of reasoning.

Reply to 14. Even the actions of an art are varied according to diverse circumstances pertaining to the nature of the art: for a builder constructs a house in one way from stone, in another way from clay, and even differently in one region than another. But it must be noted that some circumstances pertain to the nature of a

moral act which do not pertain to the nature of art, and vice versa.

Reply to 15. When evil according to circumstance is distinguished against evil according to genus, we are speaking of that evil according to circumstance which makes the sin worse but does not transfer it to another genus of sin.

Reply to 16. More and less sometimes follow on diverse forms and then they diversify species, as for instance if we say that red is more colored than yellow. But sometimes they follow from a different participation of one and the same form, and then they do not diversify species, as for example if one thing be called whiter than another.

Question II, Article 7 †p

Whether a Circumstance Makes a Sin Worse without Giving Species to the Sin?

It seems not, for the following reasons.

1. The malice of sin derives from its aversion (from God).†1 But circumstances are taken on the part of conversion (to a creature). Therefore circumstances do not increase the malice of a sin.

2. If a circumstance has in itself any malice it constitutes a species of sin; but if it has not in itself any malice there is no reason why the sin should be made worse by it. Therefore there cannot be any circumstance that makes a sin worse that does not give species to the sin.

3. Dionysius says †2 that good results from a cause that is one and integral, but evil from any single defect. But a single defect is considered according to any circumstance. Therefore according to any aggravating circumstance there is some species of evil and sin.

4. Every circumstance making a sin worse causes a difference of malice, which is so to speak the substance of sin inasmuch as it is a sin. But that which causes a difference in substance changes the species of sin. Therefore every circumstance making a sin worse changes the species of sin.

5. We grow and are constituted from the same things: for we grow as a result of those things by which we are nourished, and we are nourished by those things from which we are constituted, as is said in Book II On Generation and Corruption.†3 If then the malice of sin is increased by some aggravating circumstance, it seems that some species of sin would be constituted by that same circumstance.

6. Virtue and vice are opposed. But every virtue is constituted in species by the circumstances: for to confront frightening things as one ought, where one ought, when one ought, and in like manner in respect to the other circumstances, belongs to fortitude.†4 Therefore sin also receives species according to any circumstance whatever.

7. Sin has its species from the object. But the object is changed in goodness or badness according to any circumstance, at least any aggravating circumstance. Therefore any aggravating circumstance gives species to a sin.

8. Of similar things the judgment is the same.†5 But some circumstances always give species to a sin, e.g. the object called 'what' and the end which is signified by 'why' in the verse previously cited (in q. 2, a. 6 in the Response). Therefore for a like reason all the other circumstances when they aggravate the sin give the sin species.

On the Contrary:

To steal a large amount is graver than to steal a small amount, yet it is not a different species of sin. Therefore not every circumstance that makes a sin worse changes the species of sin.

Response:

A circumstance is related to a sinful action in a threefold way. Sometimes it neither changes the species nor makes the sin worse, for example to strike a man wearing a white or red coat. But sometimes it does constitute a species of sin, whether the act to which the circumstance is added is indifferent by reason of its genus, as when someone picks up a straw from the ground in contempt of another, or the act is good by reason of its genus, as when someone gives an alms for the sake of human praise, or the act is bad by reason of its genus and another species of malice is added from the circumstance, as when someone steals a sacred object. Yet sometimes a circumstance increases the gravity of the sin, but does not constitute a species of sin, as when someone steals a large amount.

The reason for this diversity is that if a circumstance accompanying an act is related indifferently to reason, such a circumstance neither gives species to the sin nor makes it worse: for it is of no concern to reason whether he who struck the blow is clothed in this or that fashion. However if a circumstance does have some difference in relation to reason, either it implies something primarily and of itself contrary to reason and then it gives species to the sin, for example taking another's property; or it does not imply something primarily and of itself contrary to reason, but by comparison to that which is primarily and of itself contrary to reason it does have some opposition to reason, for taking something in great quantity does not affirm something contrary to reason, but taking another's property in great quantity does affirm a greater opposition to reason; hence this circumstance makes the sin worse inasmuch as it is a determination of that circumstance which gave species to the sin. A fourth member of this division is not possible, i.e. that a circumstance give species to the sin and not make it worse, as was said above (in q. 2, a. 6 Reply to 11).

Reply to 1. Inordinate conversion to a mutable good is a cause of aversion from God, and therefore circumstances which are taken on the part of conversion to a mutable good can add to the malice on the part of aversion from God.

Reply to 2. A circumstance that makes a sin worse and does not give species to the sin, has not of itself any malice but is a determination of another circumstance having malice.

Reply to 3. A defect in any circumstance whatever it be, can cause a species of sin, but a defect is not always found in any circumstance in itself but sometimes in one by reason of a relation to another.

Reply to 4. A circumstance making a sin worse does not always change the species of malice but sometimes only the quantity.

Reply to 5. Just as those things by which we are nourished and grow do not always constitute a new substance but sometimes preserve or increase an already existing substance, so it is not necessarily the case that circumstances always cause a new species of sin, but sometimes they increase the preexisting one.

Reply to 6. Just as virtue in some measure has its species from due circumstances, so also sin from the defect of some due circumstance. But nevertheless not any circumstance whatsoever it be, causes the defect of sin, since some circumstances are indifferent and some are determinations of other circumstances.

Reply to 7. An aggravating circumstance indeed causes some change of the malice in the object of one's action, but it does not always cause a change of the species but sometimes only of the quantity.

Reply to 8. Many conditions are found in an object and nothing prevents that which is considered as the object according to one condition from being considered as a circumstance according to another condition, which sometimes gives species to the sin, sometimes not. For example, another's property is the proper object of theft giving it species; another's property can also be of great quantity, and this circumstance does not give species but only increases the gravity; another's property can also be sacred and this circumstance will constitute a new species of sin; another's property can also be white or black, and this circumstance will be indifferent so far as concerns the object, neither making the sin worse nor constituting a species. And similarly it must be said of the end, inasmuch as the proximate end is the same as the object, and in like manner it is to be said of it as of the object; but the remote end is taken as a circumstance.

Question II, Article 8 †p

Whether a Circumstance Aggravates a Sin Infinitely So As to Make a Venial Sin Mortal?

It seems that it does, for the following reasons.

1. Adam in the state of innocence could not sin venially,†1 therefore every sin was a mortal sin for him. But afterwards not every sin was a mortal sin for him; and this difference is due only to the circumstance 'who' or the person. Therefore a circumstance infinitely aggravates a sin.
2. To make of what is not a sin a sin is worse than to make a venial sin mortal. But a circumstance makes what is not a sin a sin: for engaging in business is not a sin in itself but nevertheless for a priest it is a sin because of the circumstance of the person.†2 Therefore far more does a circumstance make a venial sin mortal.
3. To get drunk once is a venial sin. But to get drunk often is said to be a mortal sin.†3 Therefore this circumstance 'how often' makes a venial sin mortal.
4. A sin that is committed from malice aforethought is said to be unpardonable †4 and not venial. Therefore a circumstance infinitely aggravates a sin.
5. Jerome says †5 that trifles on the lips of a lay person are trifles, but on the lips of a priest, blasphemies. But blasphemy is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. Therefore the circumstance of the person makes a venial sin mortal.

On the contrary:

A circumstance is related to sin as an accident to a subject. But an infinite accident cannot be in a finite subject. Therefore a circumstance cannot give to a sin infinite gravity, i.e., the gravity of mortal sin.

Response:

As was pointed out (in the preceding article), a circumstance aggravating a sin sometimes constitutes a new species of sin, and sometimes not. But clearly mortal sin and venial sin are not of the same species: for just as some acts are good according to their genus and others are evil according to their genus, so some sins are venial according to their genus and others are mortal according to their genus. Therefore a circumstance, which makes a sin worse in such a way that it constitutes a new species of sin, can constitute a species of mortal sin and so make the sin infinitely worse, for example if a man utters a facetious word to provoke someone to lust or hatred. But if a circumstance makes the sin worse in such a way that it does not constitute a new species of sin, it cannot increase the gravity infinitely by making a venial sin mortal, because the gravity which derives from the species of the sin is always greater than the gravity which derives from a circumstance that does not

constitute a species.

Reply to 1. The reason it is said that Adam could not sin venially is not because the things which are venial for us would have been mortal for him, but because before he sinned mortally he could not commit the sins which are venial for us; for in him no defect was possible either of soul or of body unless he turned away from God by mortal sin.

Reply to 2. A circumstance which makes what is not a sin a sin constitutes a species of sin; and such a circumstance can also make a venial sin mortal.

Reply to 3. To get drunk often, is not a circumstance constituting a species of sin. And therefore just as getting drunk once, is a venial sin, so too, strictly (per se) speaking, is getting drunk often; but accidentally (per accidens) and dispositively, getting drunk often, can be a mortal sin, for example if as a result of habit a person should be led to such complacency in drunkenness that he would purposely get drunk even in contempt of a divine precept.

Reply to 4. To sin from malice aforethought is to sin from choice, i.e. voluntarily and knowingly. And this occurs in two ways: in one way owing to this, that a person rejects those things by which he can be withdrawn from sin, for instance hope of pardon or fear of divine justice, and such a circumstance constitutes a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, which is called unpardonable. In another way it can occur from merely the inclination of habit, and such a circumstance does not constitute a species nor does it make a venial sin mortal: for not everyone who voluntarily and knowingly says an idle word sins mortally.

Reply to 5. The circumstance of the person even if it makes the sin worse does not nevertheless make a venial sin mortal unless it constitutes a species of sin, as for example if a priest should do something contrary to a precept prescribed for priests by a superior or contrary to a vow. And the statement of Jerome is to be understood as said by way of exaggeration or at a favorable opportunity, because trifles on the lips of a priest can be an occasion of blasphemy to others.

Question II, Article 9 †p

Whether All Sins Are Equal?

It seems that they are, for the following reasons.

1. It is said in James 2, 10 "Whoever keeps the whole law, but has offended in one point, has become guilty of all."†1 And Jerome commenting on that passage in Ecclesiastes (9, 18) "He that shall offend in one, shall lose many good things," says that "he who is subject to one vice, is subject to all."†2 But there is nothing beyond all. Therefore no one can sin more than that man who subjects himself to one sin, and so all sins are equal.

2. Sin is the death of the soul.†3 But in respect to the body one death is no greater than another, because everyone dead is equally dead. Therefore neither is one sin greater than another.

3. Punishment corresponds to fault. But in hell there will be one punishment for all sins, according to that passage of Isaias (24, 22) "They shall be herded together as in the gathering together of one bundle and they shall be shut up in a dungeon." Therefore all sins have the same gravity.

4. To sin is nothing else than a transgression of the rectitude of reason or of the divine law. But if someone is forbidden by a judge to pass beyond a specified limit, it does not matter in regard to the

transgression whether he oversteps the fixed limit much or little. Therefore as regards the sin of transgression it is of no importance whatever a man does, if in doing it he does not observe the rectitude of reason and divine law.

5. Infinite is not greater than infinite. But any mortal sin is infinite, because it is against the infinite good, i.e. God: hence it deserves infinite punishment. Therefore one mortal sin is not greater than another.

6. Evil is so-called from the privation of a good But every mortal sin equally deprives a person of grace, leaving nothing of it. Therefore all mortal sins are equal.

7. If something is said to be more or less, this is by comparison with that which is absolutely such,†4 for instance something is said to be more or less white by comparison with that which is absolutely white. But nothing is absolutely evil such that it lacks all good;†5 therefore one thing is not more or less evil than another. And so all sins are equal.

8. Sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal:†6 hence it is said in the Apocalypse (21, 16) that the length and the height and the breadth thereof are equal. Therefore likewise all sins are equal.

9. If one sin is graver than another it will follow that a sin committed in a greater matter will be graver than a sin committed in a smaller matter, for example if we should say that to steal a great amount is a graver sin than to steal a small amount. But this is not true: because it would follow that he who commits a minor sin would commit a major sin, for it is said in Luke 26 †7"He who is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater." Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

10. Sin consists in aversion from an immutable good and conversion to a mutable good.†8 But conversion and aversion of this kind do not admit of more or less: because the soul, since it is simple, totally turns to what it turns, and totally turns away from what it turns from. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

11. Augustine says †9 that the magnitude of man's sin is shown by the magnitude of the remedy, namely that the death of Christ was needed to blot it out. But this same remedy is directed against all sins. Therefore all sins are equally grave.

12. As Dionysius says,†10 good results from a cause that is one and integral, but evil from any single defect. But any defect takes away integrity, therefore any defect whatever it be, takes away the whole nature of good. Consequently one sin is not graver than another.

13. Virtue is simple, since it is a kind of form, therefore if it is taken away it is totally taken away. But sin is evil from this that it takes away virtue. Therefore all sins are equally evil because each sin equally takes away virtue.

14. It is from the same principle that a thing is such and that it is more such: if then what is white expands vision, what is whiter expands vision to a greater degree.†11 But an act has the nature of sin by reason of aversion from God.†12 Since then all sins agree in aversion from God, all sins will be equal.

15. The greater the person offended the graver the sin, for example he who strikes a king sins more gravely than he who strikes a soldier. But in every sin one and the same person is regarded with contempt, namely God. Therefore all sins are equal.

16. A genus is equally shared by its species.†13 But sin is the genus of all sins. Therefore all sins are equal and everyone who sins equally sins.

17. Evil is so-called from the privation of good,†14 and the magnitude of the privation can be known from that which is left after the privation. But what is left of good after any sin is the same: for the very nature of the soul and the liberty of choice by which man can choose good and evil remains. Therefore one sin is not more evil than another.

18. Circumstances are related to virtue as substantial differences. But if one substantial difference is removed, all are removed: because the subject has corrupted. Since then any sin deprives of some circumstance of virtue, any sin will deprive of all circumstances, and therefore one sin will not be graver than other.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in John 19, 11 "Therefore, he who betrayed me to thee has the greater sin."

2. According to Augustine,†15 inordinate desire is the cause of sin. But not all inordinate desire is equal. Therefore not all sins are equal.

Response:

The opinion of the Stoics †16 was that all sins are equal. From which has arisen the opinion of certain modern heretics,†17 who maintain there is no inequality either among sins or among merits, and likewise neither among rewards nor punishments.

The Stoics †18 were led to this conclusion because they thought an act has the nature of sin from this alone that it is contrary to the rectitude of reason, for example it is obvious that adultery is a sin not because sexual intercourse in itself is evil, but because it is done contrary to the rectitude of reason; and this is likewise evident in other cases. It is the same also if the act be designated as contrary to divine law so far as the question at issue is concerned: for both imply a certain privation. But privation does not seem to be susceptible of more and less. Hence if a thing is evil by reason of a privation of something, it does not seem to matter in whatsoever manner it be, provided that the privation is present, for instance if a judge sets a certain limit for someone, if he has gone past that limit it makes no difference whether he has gone past it much or little. And in like manner the Stoics said that so long as a person disregards the rectitude of reason by sinning, it does not matter in whatsoever way or for whatsoever reason he does this, as if sinning were nothing else than crossing certain designated lines. Therefore the whole basis for resolving this question must be taken up here in order to investigate how more or less can or cannot be found in those things which are said by way of privation.

We must consider then that privation is twofold:†19 one which is a pure privation, like darkness which leaves nothing of light, and death, which leaves no life; the other privation is not a pure privation but leaves something remaining: hence it is not only a privation but also the contrary, for instance sickness which does not remove the whole balance of humors proper to health †20 but something of it; and it is similar in regard to the dishonorable and the dissimilar and the unequal and the false, and others like these. And privations of this kind seem to differ from the preceding one in this that the first privations consist so to speak in being already corrupted, but the second signify as more or less on the way to corruption. Since then in the first privations the whole thing it is taken away, and since that which is said of it in a positive way does not pertain to the nature of privation, it makes no difference in such privations from whatever cause or in whatever manner a person is deprived to say that because of this he is more or less deprived. For one person is not less dead who died from a single wound than another who died from two or three wounds; nor is a house darker if a candle be entirely covered by one shade rather than by two or three. But in the second privations the whole thing is not taken away, and what is said of it in a positive way pertains to the nature of that which is said of it in a privative way: and therefore such things admit of more or less according to the difference of that which is said of it in a positive manner, as for example an illness is said to be worse if the cause taking away health is greater or more manifold; and it is the same in the case of the dishonorable, the dissimilar, and the like.

Therefore a certain difference in sins must be considered. For sins of omission, strictly speaking, consist only in a privation pertaining to the precept that is disregarded, as was shown above (in q. 2, a. 1); hence in a sin of omission the condition of the connected act, since it is incidental to the sin, does not make the sin of omission strictly speaking more or less; for example, if a precept is given to a person to go to church, no attention is given in the sin of omission to whether the person lives near or far from the church, but only to the fact that he does not go to church, except perhaps incidentally inasmuch as the difference of that circumstance would pertain to greater or less contempt. But nevertheless all sins of omission are not on that account equal, since precepts are unequal either because of the different authority of the one commanding or because of the different importance or necessity of the precepts. On the other hand, the sin of transgression consists in the deformity of an act which does not take away the whole order of reason but something of it, for instance if a person eats when he ought not, yet it remains that he eats where he ought and for the reason he ought. Nor while the action remains can the proportion, i.e. the order of reason, be totally taken away; hence the Philosopher says,^{†21} that evil, if it is complete, becomes unbearable and destroys even itself. Therefore just as not every deformity of the body is equal but one is greater than another according as more of the characteristics of beauty are lacking or a more predominant one, so not every deformity or inordinateness of action is equal but one is greater than another. Consequently not all sins are equal.

Reply to 1. That passage of James is not to be understood in the sense that he who offends against one precept of the law incurs as much guilt as if he transgressed all, but that in some measure he incurs guilt for contempt of all the precepts not in all but in one. For a person who regards one precept with contempt regards all precepts with contempt inasmuch as he regards God with contempt, from whom all precepts have their authority. Hence James immediately adds:^{†22} "For He who said 'Thou shalt not kill' said also, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery.' " And the passage from Jerome is to be understood in like manner.

Reply to 2. The death of the soul is the privation of grace, by which the soul was united to God. But the privation of grace is not essentially the fault itself but the effect of fault and its punishment, as was stated above (in q. 1, a. 4 and 5). Hence sin is called the death of the soul not essentially but effectively; but essentially sin is a deformed or inordinate act.

Reply to 3. In the punishment of the damned there is something common to all, which corresponds to the contempt of God, namely loss of the vision of God and an eternity of pain. And in regard to this they are said to be herded together as in the gathering together of one bundle; and there is also something in which they differ, according as some are subject to more torture than others, and in regard to this it is said in Matthew 23,^{†23} they are collected like bundles of weeds to burn.

Reply to 4. A person who goes beyond a line prescribed for him as a limit by a judge sins only because he does not confine himself within the boundary prescribed for him; and so his sin is directly a sin of omission. But if he were directly commanded not to walk, clearly the more he proceeded to walk the more gravely he would be punished. Or in another way it may be said that in those things that are evil only because forbidden, he who does not observe the precept, totally departs from that which he is bound to observe; but in those things which are evil in themselves (per se) and not only because forbidden, the good to which the evil is opposed is not totally taken away, and therefore the more gravely sins, the more of the good is taken away.

Reply to 5. A person turns away from an infinite good by a finite act; and so the sin is essentially finite, although it has some relationship to an infinite good.

Reply to 6. Sin is not essentially the privation of grace but causally, as was said above (in Reply to 2).

Reply to 7. In privations something is not called more or less in accordance with approach to a term, but rather in accordance with departure from it. Hence in the same place the Philosopher also shows ^{†24} that due to the fact that there is something more or less false there is something absolutely true. Therefore, for this that

there are things that are more or less evil it is not required that there be something absolutely evil, but that there be something absolutely good.

Reply to 8. All virtues are equal, not in quantity, since the Apostle says †25 that charity is greater, but proportionally, inasmuch as each virtue is equally related to its act; just as if a person were to say that all the fingers of his hand are equal proportionally, not in length. Sins, however, are not even equal proportionally, because they do not depend on one cause like the virtues, all of which depend on prudence or charity, but the roots of sins are diverse.

Reply to 9. A sin committed in greater matter is greater; hence theft of a more valuable object is a graver sin, because it is more opposed to the equality proper to justice. But the Lord's word is not to be understood in such a way that he who commits a lesser sin would commit a greater one: for many persons speak an idle word who would not blaspheme; but it is to be understood in the sense that it is easier to preserve justice in minor matters than in major ones, hence he who does not preserve it in minor matters would not preserve it in major ones.

Reply to 10. Although the soul is simple in essence, nevertheless it is multiple in power, not only inasmuch as it has many powers, but because as one and the same power it is related to many things and can be moved to those things in various ways. Hence it is not necessarily the case that every aversion or conversion of the soul is equal.

Reply to 11. It was necessary that all mortal sins be remedied by the death of Christ because of the gravity which they have from contempt of the infinite good, but nevertheless nothing prevents one sin from being more contemptuous of God than another.

Reply to 12. In any sin the integrity of good is taken away, but not the whole good; rather in one sin more, in another less, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 13. Sin is directly opposed to the act of virtue, for which many circumstances are required; moreover virtues are diverse and one is greater than another. Hence it is not reasonable to infer that all sins are equal.

Reply to 14. That argument would be valid if sin were only a privation; but because sin has in its nature a positive aspect, it admits of more or less, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 15. The degree of contempt is measured not only in reference to the person offended but also in reference to the act by which that person is treated with contempt, which can be more intense or less intense.

Reply to 16. All animals are equally animals, not however equal animals, but one animal is greater in size and more perfect than another; and similarly, it does not follow on that account that all sins are equal.

Reply to 17. After sin there remains both the nature of the soul and the liberty of the will, however the aptitude for good is diminished, and by one sin more and by another less.

Reply to 18. Circumstances are not related to virtue or to sin as substantial differences, otherwise every circumstance would constitute a genus or species of virtue or of sin; but rather they are related after the manner of accidents as we have said (in q. 2, a. 6 and 7). And besides, it is not true that when one essential difference is removed all are removed, for when 'rational' is removed, 'living' remains, as is said in the book On Causes, †26 not indeed the same numerical living thing, because of the destruction of the subject, but the same nature of 'living'.

Whether a Sin Is Graver Because It Is Contrary to a Greater Good?

It seems not, for the following reasons.

1. According to Augustine,†1 a thing is called evil because it deprives of good; therefore that which deprives of more good is more evil. But the first sin, even if it be contrary to a lesser virtue deprives of more good than the second sin, because the first sin deprives man of grace and eternal life. Therefore a sin is not graver because is contrary to a greater virtue.
2. According to the Apostle in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (13, 13) charity is greater than faith and hope. But hatred, which is contrary to charity, is not a graver sin than unbelief and despair, which are contrary to faith and hope. Therefore a sin is not graver because it is contrary to a greater good.
3. That a person sins knowingly or in ignorance is incidental (per accidens) to the good to which the sin is contrary. If then one sin would be graver than another because contrary to a greater good, it would follow that he who sins knowingly would not sin more gravely than he who sins in ignorance. Which is obviously false.
4. The magnitude of punishment corresponds to the magnitude of fault. But we read that some sins committed against our neighbor are punished more severely than sins committed against God: for example, the sin of blasphemy, which is a sin against God, is punished by simple stoning, as is stated in Leviticus 24, 16, but the sin of schism is punished by the unwonted death of many, as is stated in Number 26, 10. Therefore a sin that is committed against our neighbor is graver than a sin committed against God, even though a sin committed against God is contrary to a greater good.

On the contrary:

The Philosopher says †2 that just as evil is contrary to good, so the worst is contrary to the best.

Response:

The gravity of sin can be considered in two ways: in one way as regards the act itself, in another way as regards the agent. As regards the act there are two things to consider, namely the species of the act and its accident which we above called a circumstance (in q. 2, a. 5 and a. 8 On the contrary). Now the act has its species from the object, as we have already said above (in q. 2, a. 4).

Therefore the gravity that a sin has from its species is considered on the part of the object or matter, and according to this consideration a sin is called graver according to its genus which is contrary to a greater good of virtue. Hence since the good of virtue consists in rightly ordered love, as Augustine says,†3 and God ought to be loved above all else, the sins that are against God, like idolatry, blasphemy, and other such sins, are considered the gravest according to their genus. But among the sins against our neighbor some are graver than others inasmuch as they are opposed to a greater good of our neighbor. And the greatest good of our neighbor is the person himself, to which is opposed the sin of homicide, which takes away the actual life of man, and the sin of lust, which is opposed to the potential life of man, because it is a deordination concerning the act of human generation. Hence among all the sins against our neighbor the graver according to its genus is homicide, but adultery and fornication and carnal sins of this kind, hold second place, and theft and robbery and the like by which our neighbor suffers injustice in regard to his external goods hold third place. But in each of these genera there are different degrees in which the measure of the sin must be taken according to its genus, inasmuch as the contrary good ought to be more or less loved out of charity.

But there is also a gravity in sin on the part of the circumstances which is not by reason of its species but

is accidental. Likewise the gravity of sin is considered on the part of the agent according as he sins more or less voluntarily: for the will is the cause of sin, as we said above (in q. 2, a. 2 and 3). But this gravity does not belong to the sin according to its species.

And therefore if the gravity of sin is considered according to its species, the greater the good to which a sin is opposed the graver the sin will be.

Reply to 1. A twofold deprivation of good is found in sin: one formal, by which the order of virtue is taken away; and in regard to this it is not of importance whether the sin is the first or second one committed, because the second sin can take away more of the order of actual virtue than the first. The other deprivation of good is the effect of sin, namely the privation of grace and glory; and in regard to this the first sin deprives of more than the second; but this is incidental (per accidens) because the second sin does not find there what the first found. But a judgment about things should not be taken from what is incidental.

Reply to 2. Faith and hope are preambles to charity. Hence unbelief, which is opposed to faith, and despair which is opposed to hope, are especially contrary to charity because they tear it out by its roots.

Reply to 3. Although to commit some sin knowingly or in ignorance is incidental to some particular sin - for instance, theft - so far as concerns its species, nevertheless so far as concerns the nature of the genus, i.e. inasmuch as it is a sin, it is not incidental, because it is of the nature of sin to be voluntary. Hence ignorance which diminishes the voluntariness also diminishes the nature of sin.

Reply to 4. Punishments that are inflicted by God in a future life correspond to the gravity of fault: hence the Apostle says in Roman 2, 2 that "the judgment of God is according to truth against those who do such things." But punishments that are inflicted in the present life either by God or by man do not always correspond to the gravity of fault: for sometimes a lesser fault is punished with a graver punishment temporarily in order that a greater danger be avoided; for punishments in the present life are used as medicines.†4 But the sin of schism is most pernicious in human affairs because it destroys all governance of human society.

Question II, Article 11 †p

Whether Sin Diminishes the Good of a Nature?†1

It seems not, for the following reasons.

1. No diminished thing is integral i.e. unimpaired. But the natural goods of the demons remain unimpaired after sin, as Dionysius says.†2 Therefore the good of their nature is not diminished by sin.

2. An accident does not take away its subject. But the evil of fault is in the good of the nature as in a subject. Therefore the evil of fault does not take away anything from the good of the nature; and so it does not diminish it.

3. But it was argued that the good of the nature is diminished by the evil of fault not so far as concerns the substance of the subject but as concerns the suitability or aptitude. But counter to this: privation takes away nothing from that which is common to itself and the opposite form. But just as the substance of the subject is common to the privation and the form, so also is the suitability or aptitude: for privation in a subject requires suitability for the opposite form. Therefore privation takes away nothing of the aptitude of the subject.

4. To be diminished is a kind of passion, i.e. undergoing or being acted upon;†3 and undergoing consists in receiving, but acting in emitting; nothing then is diminished by its own act. But sin consists in an act.

Therefore the natural good of the sinner is not diminished by sin.

5. But it was said that sin is an act of a power, which is not itself diminished but only its aptitude. But counter to this: a thing is said to be acted upon not only if something of its substance is taken away from it, but also if its proper accident is taken away from it: for water is said to be acted upon not only when it loses its substantial form but also when being heated it loses its coldness. But aptitude is an attribute of a power; therefore if the aptitude is diminished, the power itself will be acted upon by its own act. Which seems impossible according to previous arguments (arg. 2 and 3 above).

6. In natural things an agent is passive, i.e. is acted upon. Nevertheless it is not passive inasmuch as it acts, for it acts inasmuch as it is in act, but it is acted upon inasmuch as it is in potency: for example, air that is actually warm is cooled by water inasmuch as air is potentially cold, and the air heats water inasmuch as the air is actually hot. But this is generally true in all things, because nothing is in the same respect in a state of actuality and in a state of potentiality. Nothing then is passive inasmuch as it acts; therefore neither is a sinner diminished in his natural good by his own sinful action.

7. Diminution is a kind of action. But an action does not act: for there would be an infinite process, since everything that acts would cause action. Therefore although sin is an action, it seems that sin does not diminish the good of the nature.

8. To diminish is to move since diminution is a kind of motion. But nothing moves itself; and something would move itself if it were moved by its own action. Therefore a sinner is not diminished in his natural good as a result of his sinful action.

9. Dionysius says †4 that evil does not act except in virtue of good. But a sin committed in virtue of good, i.e. having good as its object, does not corrupt the good of a thing's nature because the effective power of good is not corruptive but rather preservative.†5 Therefore sin does not diminish the good of the nature.

10. Augustine says †6 that in the case of good and evil the rule of the logicians which states that opposites cannot exist at the same time in the same thing, fails; but it would not fail if evil was in the good opposed to it as in a subject; consequently sin is in the good of nature opposed to it as in a subject. But no accident i.e. attribute diminishes its subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature even according as it is opposed to it.

11. If sin diminished the good of the nature, the liberty of choice in which sin principally consists, would be diminished. But Bernard says †7 that free choice does not undergo diminution in the damned. Therefore the good of nature is not diminished by sin.

12. If sin diminishes the natural aptitude for good, either on the part of the subject or on the part of the good for which the subject has an aptitude, clearly the aptitude is considered as a sort of mean between these two. But sin does not diminish the aptitude on the part of the subject, just as neither does it diminish the subject itself; but according as this aptitude is associated with the good of virtue or of grace, it seems to pertain to the genus of moral acts. Therefore the good of the nature is in no way diminished as a result of sin.

13. Augustine says †8 that the infusion of grace is like an illumination, and consequently sin is like a darkness of the mind. But darkness does not take away from the air the aptitude for light. Therefore neither does sin take away anything of the aptitude for grace.

14. The natural aptitude for good seems to be the same as natural justice; but justice is a kind of rectitude of the will, as Anselm says.†9 But rectitude cannot be diminished, because anything upright is uniformly upright. Therefore neither is the good of the nature which is a natural aptitude diminished by sin.

15. Augustine says in the book *On the Immortality of the Soul*†10 that when a thing is changed, that which is in it is changed; but diminution is a species of motion;†11 therefore when the subject is diminished the accident that is in it is diminished. But fault is in the good of the nature as in a subject. If then fault diminishes the good of the nature, it diminishes itself; which is unreasonable.

16. According to the Philosopher,†12 there are three principles in the soul: potency, habit, and passion. But passion is not diminished by sin: rather the passions are augmented by sins, hence in Romans 7, 5 they are even called the 'passions of sins'; but the habit of virtue is totally taken away by sin, but the potency remains. Therefore no good of the nature found in the soul is diminished by sin.

On the contrary:

1. On the passage "Having beaten him they went their way . . . ," etc. (Luke 10, 30) the Gloss †13 says that the integrity of human nature is wounded by sins. But integrity is not wounded except by diminution. Therefore sin diminishes the good of the nature.

2. Augustine says in Book XI *On the City of God*†14 that vice is evil because it harms a nature that is good. Which would not be the case unless it took away something. Therefore it diminishes the good of the nature.

3. Augustine says in Book VI *On Music*†15 that the soul is made weaker as a consequence of sin. Therefore the natural good in it is diminished by sin.

4. The rational creature is related to grace as the eye is to light; but the eye remaining for long in darkness becomes less adapted to see light; therefore the soul remaining for a long time in sin becomes less adapted to receive grace. And therefore the good of the nature which is aptitude is diminished as a result of sin.

Response:

Because diminution is a kind of action, we need to investigate in how many ways a thing may be said to act, in order to know in what way sin diminishes the good of the nature. Now the agent itself that produces the act is said to act in the proper sense, but in an improper sense, that by means of which the agent acts: for example, in the proper sense a painter makes a wall white; but because he makes it white by means of whiteness, it is usually said that whiteness makes it white.†16 Therefore in whatever number of ways an agent is that which is properly said to act, that by means of which the agent acts is said to act in an improper sense. Now an agent is principally said to do a thing both of itself (per se) and incidentally (per accidens); per se, or directly, inasmuch as it acts in accordance with its own form; incidentally, or indirectly, inasmuch as it acts by removing an impediment:†17 for example, of itself (per se) the sun lights up a house, but incidentally the person who opens the shutter which was an obstacle to the light.†18 Again, the principal agent is said to effect something in the first place, and to effect something as a consequence: for example, the generator, i.e. the agent that brings the thing into existence, gives the form in the first place, but it gives motion and everything that follows upon the form as a consequence; hence the generator is said to be the mover of heavy and light bodies, as is said in Book VIII of the *Physics*.†19 Now what has been said about positive effects likewise should be understood in regard to privative effects: for in like manner the corrupting and diminishing principle is a mover as also is the generating and augmenting principle. Hence clearly it can be inferred that just as the one removing the obstacle to light is said to give light accidentally, and even the very removal of the obstacle, though in an improper sense, so also the one setting up an obstacle to light, and even the obstacle itself, is said to darken.

Now just as light is imparted to the air by the sun, so grace is imparted to the soul by God; which (grace) indeed is over and above the nature of the soul, but nevertheless in the nature of the soul or of any rational creature there is a certain suitability for the reception of grace and through the grace received it is strengthened in its proper actions. But sin is a kind of obstacle interposed between the soul and God, according to that

passage of Isaias 59, 2 †20 "Your iniquities have made a division between you and your God." The reason for this is that just as the air inside a house is not lighted up by the sun unless it directly faces the sun, and that is called an impediment to illumination which impedes the directness of this relation, so the soul cannot be enlightened by God through the reception of grace unless the soul is directly turned to Him. But this conversion is impeded by sin which turns the soul to the opposite, namely what is contrary to the law of God. Hence it is evident that sin is a kind of obstacle impeding the reception of grace.

Now every impediment to a perfection or form at the same time along with this that it excludes any form or perfection whatsoever, makes the subject less apt or suitable for the reception of the form; and moreover as a consequence it impedes the effects of the form or perfection in the subject, and especially if that obstruction should be something inhering in the subject habitually or actually. For obviously, that which is moved by one motion is not simultaneously moved by a contrary motion, and it is also less apt or suited to be moved by a contrary motion: just as also what is hot is less apt to become cold, for it receives the incursion of cold with greater difficulty. So accordingly sin, which an impediment to grace, not only excludes grace but also makes the soul less apt or suitable for the reception of grace: and thus it diminishes the suitability or aptitude for grace.

Hence, since such an aptitude is a certain good of the nature, sin diminishes the good of the nature. And because grace perfects the nature both as regards the intellect and as regards the will, and even as regards the lower powers of the soul obedient to reason, †21 namely the irascible and the concupiscible powers, sin by excluding grace and such aids to the nature is said to wound the nature. Hence ignorance, malice, and the like are called certain wounds of the nature †22 following from sin.

Reply to 1. The good of the nature remains unimpaired so far as concerns the substance of natural good, but the suitability for grace is diminished by sin, as we have said (in the Response); which suitability is a kind of natural good.

Reply to 2. An accident, i.e. an attribute, even if does not take away the substance of its subject, nevertheless it can diminish the aptitude for another attribute, as for instance heat diminishes the aptitude for cold; and such is the point of what we have said [in the Response).

Reply to 3. According to the Philosopher †23 the potentiality to be healthy and the potentiality to be ill are the same in subject by reason of the one substance of the subject which is in potentiality to either, yet they differ in notion i.e. as mentally conceived, because the notion of potentiality is taken from actuality. So accordingly, sin does not diminish the aptitude for grace according as the aptitude is rooted in the substance of the soul, -- for in this way one and the same subject is equally related to both contraries, -- but according as it is ordered to the opposite as discordant with it .

Reply to 4. For a moral act the acts of many powers of the soul concur, some of which move others, as the intellect moves the will, and the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. But the mover imprints something on the thing moved. Hence it is clear that in a moral act there is not only emanation but also reception: and as a consequence of this something can be caused in the agent by moral acts, such as a habit or disposition or also something opposed to these.

Reply to 5. We concede the fifth argument.

Reply to 6. A natural action consists in emanation only: hence a natural action causes nothing in the agent, especially in simple agents which are not composed of agent and patient or mover and moved; for in these that are composed in this way there seems to be the same explanation as there is in moral acts.

Reply to 7. Action is not said to act in the proper sense but in an improper sense, because it is that by which the agent acts.

Reply to 8. Nothing in the same respect moves itself, but there is nothing to prevent this according to different parts, as is evident in Book VIII of the Physics;†24 and such is the case in moral acts as we have said above (in Reply to 4). Reply to 9. A particular good is corruptive of another particular good on account of contrariety to it, and so nothing prevents evil, according as it acts in virtue of a particular good, from being corruptive of another good, as for instance cold is corruptive of heat; and in this way sin corrupts the good of justice by turning to some good without measure and order, and consequently diminishes the suitability for justice.

Reply to 10. Good and evil can be considered in two ways: in one way according to the general nature of good and evil, and in this way any evil whatever is opposed to any good whatever; and accordingly, Augustine says that the rule of the logicians fails given that evil cannot exist except in good. In another way they can be considered according to the special nature of this or that good or evil, and in this way not any whatever evil is opposed any whatever good, but this evil to that good, as blindness to sight and intemperance to temperance; and considered in this way evil is never in the good opposed to it, nor considered in this way does the rule of logic fail.

Reply to 11. Free choice does not undergo injury in the damned as regards liberty, which is neither increased nor diminished, but it undergoes injury as regards freedom from fault and misery.†25

Reply to 12. Aptitude for grace is understood entirely on the part of the nature, even according as it is ordered to the good in moral actions.

Reply to 13. Sin is not a pure privation like darkness, but is something positive and therefore it is constitutes an obstacle to grace, however the very privation of grace is regarded as a darkness; but the obstacle diminishes the aptitude, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 14. Aptitude for grace is not the same as natural justice but is the order of a natural good to grace. Nor is it true that natural justice cannot be diminished: for uprightness, i.e. rectitude can be diminished in this way, that what was upright as a whole is bent in some part: and in this way natural justice is diminished according as it deviates in someone: for example in a fornicator, natural justice deviates from moral rectitude in regard to the direction of concupiscent powers, and likewise in other cases. However in no one is natural justice totally corrupted.

Reply to 15. That which is in something is moved according to the motion of that in which it is, so far as concerns that on which it depends on it, not so far as concerns anything else: for the soul existing in the body depends on the body so far as concerns place, but not so far as concerns being, nor as concerns magnitude i.e. as concerns that to which it extends; and therefore indirectly (per accidens) the soul is moved locally when the body moves, nevertheless the soul is not diminished when the body diminishes, nor corrupted when the body corrupts. But the evil of fault does not have magnitude from the good of nature, but rather by reason of a departure from the good of nature, just as sickness has magnitude, or extent, by reason of a departure from the natural disposition of the body; hence the evil of fault is not diminished when the good of nature is diminished, just as neither is a disease diminished when nature is weakened but rather is increased.

Reply to 16. Under potency is included aptitude or suitability for the good of grace; which aptitude indeed is diminished, as we have said (in the Response), although the potency itself is not diminished.

Question II, Article 12 †p

Whether Sin Can Corrupt the Whole Good of the Nature?

It seems that it can, for the following reasons.

1. Any finite thing by continual diminution can be completely taken away.†1 But the good of the nature, which is aptitude, is something finite, since it is created. Therefore if it is diminished by sin, as was said (in the preceding article), it can be totally taken away.

2. The good of the nature which is an aptitude for grace seems to be diminished or taken away by aversion i.e. turning away from grace. But such aversion has a determinate limit, and is not infinite, because conversion which is opposed to aversion has a determinate limit: for charity in man is not infinite. Therefore diminution of the good of the nature has a determinate limit; which would not be the case if some of the good of the nature always remained, because the good of the nature is always naturally diminished by sin. Therefore it seems that the good of nature can be totally taken away by sin.

3. Privation totally takes away an aptitude: for a blind man in no way is capable of seeing. But fault is a kind of privation. Apparently then fault totally takes away the good of the nature which is aptitude.

4. Sin is a spiritual darkness, as Damascene says.†2 But darkness can totally exclude light. Therefore fault can totally exclude good.

5. As the good of grace is to the evil of nature so the evil of fault is to the good of the nature. But grace can exclude the whole evil of the nature, i.e. the 'fomes',†3 which is the tendency to fault, as is evident in the blessed. Therefore the evil of fault can take away the whole good of the nature which is the aptitude for grace.

6. The aptitude for grace cannot remain where there is no possibility of obtaining grace. But the state of damnation which we arrive at by sin, brings us to that state in which it is impossible to obtain grace. Therefore fault can take away the whole good of the nature which is the aptitude for grace.

7. Dionysius says †4 that evil is a weakness and impotence of a natural aptitude, i.e. the natural inclination to virtue. Which seems to pertain especially to the evil of fault. Therefore it seems that the good the nature which is an aptitude totally ceases as a result of sin.

8. Whatever places something outside the state of nature seems to take away the good of the nature. But sin places the sinner outside the state of nature: for Damascene says †5 that the angel sinning (by his free choice) fell from what is according to nature to what is outside of nature. Therefore sin takes away the good of the nature.

9. Privation takes away only what a thing has. But before they sinned the angels did not have grace.†6 Therefore the sin of the angel did not take away the good of grace; it remains then that it took away a good of its nature i.e. the aptitude for grace.

10. Diminution is a kind of motion.†7 But the motion of the whole and the part, for example of a clod of earth and of the whole earth, is the same, as is said in Book IV of the Physics.†8 If then any good of the nature is diminished by sin, the whole good of the nature can be taken away by sin.

On the contrary:

So long as the will remains, the aptitude for good remains. But sin does not take away the will, but rather it consists in the will.†9 Therefore it seems that sin cannot take away the whole good of the nature which is aptitude.

Response:

It is impossible that the good of the nature which is suitability or aptitude for grace be totally taken away by sin. But a difficulty seems to arise from this, for since that aptitude is finite, it seems that by continual diminution it can be totally taken away. Some sought to avoid this difficulty †10 by construing this continual diminution in the likeness of a finite continuum which is infinitely divisible if the division is made according to the same proportion: for instance, if from a finite line a third of it is taken away, and again a third of the remainder, and so on, the division will never end but can go on indefinitely. But this not applicable to the question at issue: because since the division of the line proceeds according to the same proportion, the part subtracted the second time is always less than the part subtracted the first time; as in this case a third of the whole is greater than a third of the two remaining parts, and so on; however it cannot be said †11 that the foresaid aptitude is less diminished by the second sin than by the first, but rather equally perhaps, or even more if the second sin was graver.

And therefore on this matter another sort of explanation must be given, namely that an aptitude can be diminished in two ways, in one way by subtraction, in another way, by application or addition of the opposite: by subtraction, as for instance a body is apt to be warmed by means of the heat it possesses, hence when the heat is diminished the aptitude to be warm is diminished; and by application of the contrary, as heated water has a natural aptitude or tendency to become cold, but the more heat is added, the more the aptitude to be cold is diminished. For this reason the second mode of diminution which results from addition of the contrary, applies more to passive and receptive powers, but the first mode to active powers, although each mode can be found in some measure in both kinds of powers. Therefore when there is a diminution of the aptitude by subtraction, then the aptitude can be taken away entirely if that which caused the aptitude is removed; but when the aptitude is diminished by addition of the contrary, then we must consider whether or not an increasing addition of the contrary can corrupt the subject. For if it can corrupt the subject, the aptitude can be taken away entirely; for instance the heat in water can be increased to such a degree that the water evaporates; and in this way the aptitude that follows on the species of water is totally taken away. However if the addition of the contrary, howsoever much it be increased, cannot corrupt the subject, the aptitude will always be diminished by increased application of the contrary, yet it will never be entirely destroyed because of the permanence of the subject in which such an aptitude is rooted; just as howsoever much heat would be increased, the aptitude of primary matter, which is incorruptible, for the form of water would not be destroyed.

Now it is obvious that the aptitude of the rational nature for grace is like the aptitude of a receptive power, and that an aptitude of this kind follows on the rational nature as such. But it was said above (in the Response) that the diminution of this aptitude results from addition of the contrary, namely while the rational creature is turned away from God by turning to the contrary. Hence since the rational nature is incorruptible and does not cease to exist howsoever much sin is multiplied, it follows that the aptitude for the good of grace is always diminished by the increase of sin, in such a way, nevertheless, that the aptitude is never totally destroyed. And so in our exposition the diminution proceeds endlessly by the opposite to addition, just as in continua, on the contrary, addition becomes endless by the opposite to division, as long as what is subtracted from one line is added to another.

Reply to 1. That argument would be valid if the good of the nature was diminished by subtraction, as we have already said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. Conversion and aversion have a determinate limit at which they actually arrive because conversion or aversion is not actually infinite; nevertheless they do not have a set limit so far as concerns that which is in potentiality, because both merit and demerit can be multiplied without limit.

Reply to 3. The privation that takes away the power, totally deprives of the aptitude, as blindness deprives of the power to see, except perhaps according as the aptitude or suitability remains in the root of the power, i.e. in the essence of the soul. But the privation that precludes the act does not take away the aptitude; and such a privation is the privation of grace, as also is darkness which is the privation of light from the air. But

sin is not the very privation of grace, but an obstacle to grace by which grace is precluded, as we have said above (in q. 2, a. 11).

Reply to 4. Darkness excludes the light opposed to it but not the suitability for light which belongs to the air; and in a similar manner sin excludes grace, but not the suitability for grace.

Reply to 5. The propensity to evil, which is called the 'fomes', does not follow on the nature as does the aptitude for good, but follows on the corruption of the nature which derives from fault; and therefore the 'fomes' can be totally eliminated by grace, but the good of the nature cannot be totally eliminated by fault.

Reply to 6. The impossibility of obtaining grace which is in the damned is not from the total removal of the natural aptitude for good, but from the obstinacy of the will in evil and from the immutability of the divine judgment that grace be forever withheld from them.

Reply to 7. The weakness and impotence of the natural aptitude, i.e. the natural inclination to virtue, is not to be taken to mean that the whole natural aptitude weakens and ceases but that it falls short of its perfection.

Reply to 8. A similar answer is to given to the eighth argument, namely that sin does not place a person outside the natural state but outside its perfection.

Reply to 9. Privation not only takes away what a thing has, but also what it is naturally designed to have; for a person can be deprived of something that he never had, provided that he was intended by nature to have it. However it is not true that the angels did not have grace from the beginning of their creation, for God simultaneously fashioned their nature and bestowed grace on them, as Augustine says.†12

Reply to 10. That argument would be valid if that diminution were to take place by the subtraction of a part.

Question 3

Question III

On the Cause of Sin

Article 1 †p

Whether God is the Cause of Sin?

It seems that He is, for the following reasons.

1. The Apostle says †1 in Romans (1, 28) "God has delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not proper," on which the Gloss †2 of Augustine taken from the book On Grace and Free Will says "It is clear that God works in the hearts of men by inclining their wills to whatsoever He wills, whether to good or to evil." But the inclination of the will to evil is a sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

2. But it was argued that the inclination of the will to evil is said to be from God inasmuch as it is a punishment; hence in the same place †3 Augustine speaks of the judgment of God. But counter to this: The same thing under the same aspect cannot be punishment and fault, as was said above (q. 1, a. 4 and 5), because punishment according to its nature is contrary to the will, but fault according to its nature is voluntary.†4 But the inclination of the will pertains to the nature of the voluntary. If then God inclines the will to evil, it seems that He is the cause of fault as such.

3. As fault is opposed to the good of grace, so punishment is opposed to the good of the nature. But God is not prevented from being the cause of punishment by the fact that He is the cause of the nature. Therefore neither is He prevented from being the cause of fault by the fact that He is the cause of grace.

4. Furthermore,†5 whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of its effect.†6 But free will, of which God is the cause, is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

5. That to which a power, given by God, inclines is caused by God. But some powers given by God incline to sin, for instance the irascible to homicide and the concupiscible to adultery. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

6. Whoever turns his own or another's will to evil, is the cause of sin; for instance if a man in giving an alms turns his will to vainglory. But God inclines the will of man to evil, as was already said (above in arg. 1). Therefore He is the cause of sin.

7. Dionysius says †7 that the causes of evils are in God. But they are not idly in God. Therefore God is the cause of evils, among which are reckoned sins.

8. Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace†8 that grace in the soul is like an (eternal) light by which man does good, and without which he cannot do good. Therefore grace is the cause of merit; so conversely the withholding of grace is the cause of sin. But it is God who withholds grace. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

9. Augustine says in the Confessions†9 "To Thy grace I ascribe whatever evils I have avoided." But it would not be imputed to grace that a man did not do evils, if without grace he was capable of not sinning. Sin then is not the reason that a person is deprived of grace, but rather the privation of grace is the cause of sin; and so it follows as before that God is the cause of sin.

10. Besides,†10 any praise of a creature should be attributed above all to God. But in praise of the just man it is said in Ecclesiasticus (31, 10) that "He could have transgressed and hath not transgressed"; much more then is this applicable to God. Therefore it is possible for God to sin and consequently to be the cause of sin.

11. The Philosopher says †11 "(Even) God and the good man are capable of doing bad things." But this is to sin. Therefore God can sin.

12. This logically follows 'Socrates can run if he wishes, so simply he can run.' But this is true 'God can sin if He wishes', because the very wish to sin is to sin. Therefore, simply, He can sin. And so the same conclusion follows as before.

13. He who furnishes the occasion of wrong-doing seems to have caused the wrong-doing. But God has given man the occasion of sinning by the commandment He gave, as is said in Romans 7, 7-8. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

14. Since evil is caused by good, it seems that the greatest evil is caused by greatest good. But the greatest evil is fault which makes a good man or a good angel evil. Therefore it is caused by the greatest good which is God.

15. The same person has the right to give dominion and to take it away; but God has the right to give the soul dominion over the body, therefore He also has the right to take it away. But subjection of the flesh to the spirit is taken away only by sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

16. The cause of a nature is the cause of the proper and natural motion of that nature. But God is the cause of the will's nature: and the proper and natural motion of the will is to turn away, just as the proper and natural motion of a stone is go downward, as Augustine says;†12 therefore God is the cause of turning away. And so, since the nature of fault consists in turning away,†13 it seems that God is the cause of fault.

17. He who commands sin is the cause of sin. But God is found to have commanded sin. For as is said in Book III of Kings (22, 22) when the lying spirit had said "I will go forth and be a lying spirit in the mouth of the prophets," the Lord answered "Go forth and do so"; and in Osee (1, 2) it is said that the Lord commanded Osee to take a wife of fornications and have of her children of fornications. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

18. It belongs to the same thing to act and to have the power to act: because as the Philosopher says,†14 action belongs to that to which the power belongs. But God is the cause of that which has the power to sin. Therefore He is the cause of that which is to sin.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says †15 that man's perversity is not attributable to God, his author. But man becomes perverse by sin. Therefore God is not the author of sin.

2. Fulgentius says †16 that God is not the author of that thing of which He is the punisher. But God is the punisher of sin. Therefore He is not the author of sin.

3. God is the cause only of what He loves, because it is said in the book of Wisdom (11, 25): "Thou lovest all the things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made." But He hates sin according to that passage of Wisdom (14, 9) "To God the wicked and his wickedness are alike hateful." Therefore God is not the cause of sin.

Response:

Someone is the cause of sin in two ways: in one way because he himself sins, in another way because he causes another to sin. Neither of which can belong to God.

That God cannot sin is evident both from the general nature of sin and from the particular nature of moral sin which is called fault. For sin commonly so called †17 as it is found in the things of nature and of art, results from this that someone in acting does not attain the end for which he acts. Which occurs from a defect of the active principle; for example, if a grammarian writes incorrectly, it happens from a deficiency of the art, at least if he intended to write correctly; and that nature sins i.e. fails in the formation of an animal, as occurs in the birth of monstrosities, happens from a defect in the active power of the seed.†18 But sin as it is properly so called in moral matters and has the nature of fault, arises from this that the will fails to attain its proper end by reason of the fact that it aims at an improper end. But in God the active principle cannot be deficient, because His power is infinite, nor can His will fail to attain its proper end, because His very will which is identical with His nature, is the supreme goodness which is the ultimate end and first rule of all wills; hence His will naturally adheres to the supreme good and cannot depart from it, just as the natural appetite of a thing cannot fail to desire its own natural good. So accordingly He cannot be the cause of sin in that He Himself sins.

Likewise He cannot be the cause of sin in that He causes others to sin. For sin as we are now speaking of it, consists in a turning away of the created will from the ultimate end.†19 But it is impossible that God should cause the will of anyone to be turned away from the ultimate end, since He Himself is the ultimate end. For whatever is commonly found in all created agents, is necessarily had after the manner of an imitation of the first agent, Who bestows His likeness on all things according to their capacity to partake thereof, as Dionysius says.†20 Now every created agent as a result of its own action is found to draw other things to itself in a certain manner by making them similar to itself, either by a likeness of form, as when heat makes something warm, or

by conversion of others to its own end, as man moves others by his command to the end he intends. This then is proper to God that He turns all things to Himself and consequently that He turns nothing away from Himself. But He Himself is the greatest good. Hence He cannot be the cause of turning the will away from the greatest, i.e. the ultimate good, in which the nature of fault consists, according as we are now speaking of fault.

It is therefore impossible for God to be the cause of sin.

Reply to 1. God is said to give some up to a reprobate sense or to incline their wills to evil, not by acting or moving them but rather by withdrawing His support or not impeding them: just as a person who does not give his hand to someone falling would be said to be the cause of that fall. But it is by reason of a just judgment that God does not extend help to some so they will not fall.

Reply to 2. The answer to the second argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 3. Punishment is opposed to some particular good. But it is not contrary to the nature of the highest good to take away some particular good, since a particular good may be taken away by the provision of another good which sometimes is better: for example, the form of water is taken away by provision of the form of fire;^{†21} and similarly a good of a particular nature is taken away by punishment, by the provision of a better good, namely as a result of the fact that God has established an order of justice in things. But the evil of fault occurs as a consequence of turning away from the highest good, from which the highest good cannot turn away. Hence God can be the cause of punishment but not the cause of fault.

Reply to 4. The effect of an effect, inasmuch as it is such, is reduced [i.e. is referred] to the cause. But if something proceeds from an effect not inasmuch as it is such, this ought not to be referred to the cause: for example the movement of the leg is caused by the motive power of the animal that moves the leg, but the limp does not come from the leg according as it is moved by the motive power but according as it is defective in receiving the influx of the motive power by reason of its own defect; and therefore the limp is not caused by the motive power.^{†22} Similarly, then, sin is caused by the free will according as it withdraws from God. Hence it does not follow that God is the cause of sin, although He is the cause of free will.

Reply to 5. Sins do not arise from the inclination of the irascible or concupiscible powers according as they were instituted by God, but according as they depart from the order of His institution: for they were so instituted in man that they would be subject to reason. Hence when contrary to the order of reason they incline to sin, this is not from God.

Reply to 6. That argument is not valid: because God does not incline the will to evil by acting or moving, but by not providing grace, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 7. The causes of evils are particular goods, which can be defective. But particular goods of this kind are in God, as effects in a cause, inasmuch as they are good. And to this extent the causes of evils are said to be in God, not that He is the cause of the evils.

Reply to 8. God communicates Himself to all things for their partaking thereof so far as is possible for them; hence that a thing is deficient in the participation of that goodness is owing to this that some obstacle to the divine participation is found in it. Therefore the cause is not on the part of God that grace is not given to someone, but from the fact that he, to whom grace is offered, presents an impediment to the grace inasmuch as he turns away from the light that does not turn Itself away, as Dionysius says.^{†23}

Reply to 9. In speaking of man it is one thing to speak of him according to the state of nature as it was instituted and another thing to speak of him according to the state of fallen nature: because according to the state of nature as it was instituted man had nothing inciting him to evil, although the good of his nature did not

suffice for the attainment of glory; and therefore he needed the help of grace to merit, but not to avoid sins, because by reason of what he had received in accordance with his nature he could remain steadfast. However in the state of fallen nature, he has an incitement to evil, and therefore he needs the help of grace not to fall. And it was in regard to this state that Augustine attributed to divine grace whatever evils he did not commit. But this state, i.e. of fallen nature had its origin from a preceding fault.

Reply to 10. Something can be praiseworthy in a lower being which does not pertain to the praise of a higher being, as fierceness is praiseworthy in a dog but not in a man, as Dionysius says.†24 And similarly not to transgress when he could transgress pertains to the praise of man, but not to the praise of God.

Reply to 11. That statement of the Philosopher is understood not of Him Who is God by nature but of those who are called gods either according to conjecture like the pagan gods, or according to participation, as for instance men virtuous beyond the human mode to whom the Philosopher attributes heroic or divine virtue.†25 Or according to some †26 it is possible to maintain that God may be said to do evil things because He can if He wishes.

Reply to 12. The antecedent of this conditional 'Socrates can run, if he wills ', is possible, and therefore the possibility of the consequent follows; but in this conditional, 'God can sin, if He wishes', the antecedent is impossible, for God cannot wish evil, and hence there is no similarity.

Reply to 13. Occasion is twofold, namely, given and taken. But the commandment is an occasion of sin, not given by the one commanding, but taken by him to whom the commandment is given. Hence the Apostle significantly says (in Romans 7, 8) "But sin, having thus found an occasion (occasione accepta), worked in me by means of the commandment all manner of lust." For an occasion of sinning is said to be given when something less just is done by reason of which example others are provoked to sin. But if a person does a just work and another is provoked to sin by it, the occasion will not be given but taken, as when the Pharisees were scandalized by Christ's teaching.†27 But the commandment was holy and just, as is said in Romans 7, 12. Hence, by commanding, God did not give the occasion for sinning, but man took it.

Reply to 14. If good as such were the cause of evil, it would follow that the greatest good is the cause of the greatest evil. But good inasmuch as it is defective is the cause of evil;†28 hence the greater the good, the less it is the cause of evil.

Reply to 15. To take away from the spirit dominion over the flesh is contrary to the natural order of justice, and therefore this cannot be attributed to God, Who is justice itself.

Reply to 16. The motion of turning away is called proper and natural to the will according to the state of fallen nature, but not according to the state of nature as it was instituted.

Reply to 17. That answer "Go forth and do so" is not to be understood after the manner of a command but of a permission, as is also what is said to Judas (in John 13, 27) "What thou doest, do quickly", in that manner of speaking in which God's permission is called His will.†29 However what is said to Osee "Take thee a wife of fornications" etc. is to be understood after the manner of a command. But the divine command causes that which otherwise would be a sin not to be a sin. For as Bernard says,†30 God can dispense in regard to the precepts of the second tablet, by which man is directly regulated in regard to his neighbor: for the good of our neighbor is a certain particular good. But God cannot dispense in regard to the precepts of the first tablet,†31 by which man is ordered to God, Who cannot turn away others from Himself; for He cannot deny Himself, as is said in the Second Epistle to Timothy 2, 13. However some hold †32 that those things that are said concerning Osee are to be understood to having occurred in a prophetic vision.

Reply to 18. From that statement of the Philosopher we take it that it is the same thing that can act and does act, and not that whatever is the cause of the power is also the cause of its act.

Question III, Article 2 †p

Whether the Action of Sin is from God?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Man is said to be the cause of sin only because he is the cause of the action of sin: for no one makes evil his definite object when performing an action, as Dionysius says.†1 But God is not the cause (actor) of sin, as was said above (in q. 3, a. 1).

2. Whatever is the cause of a thing is the cause of that which pertains to it according to the nature of its species; for instance if someone is the cause of Socrates it follows that he is the cause of man. But there are some acts which are sins by reason of their species.†2 If then the action of sin is from God, it follows that sin is from God.

3. Whatever is from God is a thing. But the act of sin is not a thing, as Augustine says.†3 Therefore the act of sin is not from God.

4. The act of sin is an act of the free will, which is called free because it moves itself to act. But anything whose act is caused by another is moved by that other; and so it is not moved by itself nor is it free. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.

On the contrary:

Augustine says †4 that the will of God is the cause of all the species and movements (of incorporeal and corporeal things). But the act of sin is a movement of the free will. Therefore the act of sin is from God.

Response:

Among the earlier authorities there was a twofold opinion on this question †5 for some in ancient times, having in mind the very deformity of sin, which is not from God, maintained that the act of sin is not from God; but others having in mind the very essence of the act, maintained that the act of sin is from God. Which must be held to be from God, for two reasons: first for a general reason: that since God Himself is being by His essence, because His essence is His being, every being whatever the mode of its being, is necessarily derived from Him.†6 For there is nothing else that is its own being, but all of them are called beings by a kind of participation. And everything which is called such by participation, is derived from that which is such essentially, just as all ignited things are derived from that which is fire essentially. But clearly the act of sin is a kind of being and is put in a category of being,†7 i.e. under 'action': hence it must be said to be from God.

Secondly the same thing is evident for a special reason. For all the movements of secondary causes are necessarily caused by the first mover, just as all the movements of the lower bodies are caused by the motion of the heavens. But God is the first mover in respect to all movements both spiritual and corporeal,†8 just as the heavenly body is the principle of all movements of the lower bodies.†9 Hence since the act of sin is a movement of the free will, it must be affirmed that the act of sin inasmuch as it is an act, is from God.

But nevertheless it must be noted that the movement of the first mover is not uniformly received in all movable things, but in each according to its own mode. For in one way the movement of inanimate bodies, which do not move themselves, is caused by the movement of the heavens, and in another way the movement of animals, which move themselves. And again, the sprouting of a plant in which the reproductive power is not deficient but productive of a perfect shoot, results in one way from the movement of the heavens; in another

way the sprouting of a plant whose reproductive power is deficient and productive of a useless shoot, results from that movement. For when a thing is properly disposed to receive the movement of the first mover, a perfect action in accord with the intention of the first mover follows; but if a thing is not properly disposed and suited to receive the motion of the first mover, an imperfect action follows. And then whatever action is present is referred to the first mover as the cause, but whatever defect is present is not referred to the first mover as the cause, since such a defect in the action results from the fact that the agent departs from the order of the first mover, as we have said above (in q. 3, art. 1); just as in limping whatever movement is there is from the motive power of the animal, but whatever defect there is in the movement is not from the motive power but from the leg,^{†10} inasmuch as it is not properly disposed to being moved by the motive power.

Therefore it must be said that since God is the first principle of the motion of all things, some are so moved by Him that they also move themselves, as in those that have free will. For if these are properly disposed and rightly ordered to receiving the motion by which they are moved by God, good actions will follow, which are totally reduced [i.e. referred] to God as the cause; but if these lack the proper order, inordinate action i.e. the act of sin will follow: and thus whatever action is present will be referred to God as the cause, but whatever deordination or deformity is present does not have God as its cause but the free will alone. And for this reason we maintain that the action pertaining to the sin is from God, but the sin is not from God.

Reply to 1. The man who sins although he does not directly (per se) will the deformity of sin, nevertheless the deformity of sin in a certain manner falls under the will of the sinner, namely since he chooses rather to incur the deformity of sin than to desist from the act. However the deformity of sin in no way falls under the divine will, but results from this that the free will departs or deviates from the order of the divine will.

Reply to 2. The deformity of sin does not follow on the species of the act according as it is in the genus of nature: and in this way it is caused by God; but it follows on the species of the act according as it is moral, inasmuch as it is caused by the free will, as we have said in another question (above in q. 3, a. 1 and q. 2, a. 2 and 3).

Reply to 3. 'Being' and 'thing' are said simply i.e. absolutely of substance but only in a qualified way of accidents. And in accordance with this Augustine says that an act is not a thing.

Reply to 4. When we say that a thing moves itself, we are stating that the same thing is mover and moved; but when we say that something is moved by another, we are stating that the mover is one thing and the moved is another. Now clearly when something moves another, it does not follow from the fact that it is the mover that it is the first mover: hence it is not precluded that it is moved by another and from that other has the very ability to move. Similarly when something moves itself, it is not precluded that it is moved by another from whom it has this very ability by which it moves itself. And therefore it is not contrary to liberty that God is the cause of the act of free will.

Question III, Article 3 ^{†p}

Whether the Devil is the Cause of Sin?

It seems that he is, for the following reasons.

1. It is said in the Book of Wisdom (2, 24) "By the envy of the devil death came into the world." But death is the consequence of sin. Therefore the devil is the cause of sin.

2. Sin consists in affection. But Augustine says in Book IV On the Trinity^{†1} that the devil inspires his followers with malignant affections; and Bede on that passage in The Acts of the Apostles "Why has Satan

tempted us?" says †2 that the devil entices the soul into malicious affections. Therefore the devil is the cause of sin.

3. The lower is designed by nature to be moved by the higher. But just as the human intellect is below the angelic intellect in the order of nature, so the human will is below the angelic will: for the appetitive power is always proportionate to the apprehending power. Therefore by his evil will a bad angel can move the human will to evil; and so an evil angel can be the cause of sin.

4. Isidore says †3 that the devil inflames the hearts of men with hidden desires (cupiditatibus). But cupidity is the root of all evils, as is said in the First Epistle to Timothy (6, 10). Therefore it seems that the devil can be the cause of sin.

5. Whatever is indeterminately related to either of two alternatives, needs something determining it to proceed to act; but the free will of man is indeterminately related to either of two alternatives, namely to good and evil. Therefore in order to proceed to the act of sin, the will needs to be determined to evil by something; but this seems to be done especially by the devil, whose will is determined to evil. Therefore it seems that the devil is the cause of sin.

6. Augustine says †4 that the cause of sin is a changeable will, first of the angel, and afterwards of man. But the first in any genus is the cause of the others that follow in that genus.†5 Therefore it seems that the evil will of the devil is the cause of the evil will of man.

7. Sin consists in cogitation; hence it is said in Isaiah (1, 16) "Take away the evil of your devisings (cogitationum) from my eyes." But the devil it seems can cause cogitations in us because the cogitative power is a power bound to a bodily organ,†6 and the devil can change bodies. Therefore it seems that the devil can be directly the cause of sin.

8. Augustine says in Book XIX On the City of God†7 that (we must not fancy) that there is no vice in us when the flesh lusts against the spirit. But the devil it seems can cause this lust, because the concupiscible urge is an act of a bodily organ. Therefore it seems that the devil can be directly the cause of sin.

9. Augustine says †8 that when likenesses or images of things are presented to man in such a way that they are not distinguished from the things themselves, deordination in the flesh follows; and this he says can be brought about by the spiritual power of a good or bad angel. But deordination in the flesh is not without sin. Therefore it seems that the devil can be directly the cause of sin.

10. The Commentator quotes Themistius †9 as saying that a lower nature acts as though reminded by higher causes; but higher causes are properly and directly the cause of that which is done by lower causes; whatever then can recall something to the mind of a lower agent seems to be the cause of its act. But the devil can recall something to the mind of man by which man is moved to sin. Therefore it seems that the devil can be directly the cause of sin.

11. In . . . of the Eudemian Ethics the Philosopher asks †10 what is the principle of operation in the soul, and he shows that it must be something extrinsic. For everything that begins anew has some cause: for man begins to operate because he wills, and he begins to will because he took counsel beforehand. Now if he took counsel beforehand by reason of some preceding counsel, either this leads to an endless regression or we must postulate some extrinsic principle which first moves man to take counsel; unless perhaps someone should say this happens by chance, from which it would follow that all human acts are fortuitous. But in good acts, he says, this principle is God, Who is not the cause of sin, as we have already shown above (in q. 3, art. 1). Since then man begins to act, to will, and to take counsel in order to commit sin, it seems that there must be some extrinsic cause of this, which cannot be other than the devil: the devil then is the cause of sin.

12. To whatsoever's power a moving principle subject, to that power is subject also the motion caused by the moving principle. But the moving principle of the will is something apprehended by the senses or the intellect;†11 both of which are subject to the power of the devil. For Augustine says †12 "This evil," namely which is from the devil "creeps in through all the avenues of the senses, gives itself shapes, puts on colors, adheres to sounds, lies concealed in anger and fallacious speech, affixes itself to odors, infuses with flavors, and clouds all the channels of understanding." Therefore it is within the power of the devil to move the will; and consequently he is directly the cause of sin.

13. The devil bought man for sin according to that passage of Isaiah (50, 1) "Behold you are sold for your iniquities."†13 But the buyer delivers the price to the seller. Therefore sin is caused in man by the devil.

14. Jerome says †14 that just as in good works it is God who brings them to perfection, so in evil deeds, though there are in us certain impulses to vices, it is the devil who fully develops them. But God is the direct (per se) cause of our good works. Therefore it seems that the devil is the direct cause of our sins.

15. Just as the good angel intends good, so the bad angel intends evil. But the good angel leads men to good, for as Dionysius says.†15 it is the law of the divinity to lead to the highest things by intermediaries. Therefore it seems that a bad angel can lead man to evil, and so the devil apparently is the cause of sin.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says †16 that the cause of man's perversion comes back to his own will, whether he was perverted by the persuasion of someone or no one. But it is through sin that man is perverted. Therefore the cause of man's sin is not the devil but the human will.

2. Augustine says †17 that no one else is the cause of human sin, but each one is the cause of his own evil-doing.

3. The sin of man proceeds from free will. But the devil cannot move the free will of man: for this would be contrary to liberty. Therefore the devil is not the cause of sin.

Response:

That which moves a thing in various ways is called a cause. For sometimes that which disposes is called a cause or that which counsels or that which commands; but sometimes that which is the effecter (perficiens) is called a cause.†18 And this is a cause in the real and proper sense, since the cause is that from which an effect follows.†19 Now the effect follows immediately from the action of the one causing the effect, but not from the action of the one disposing or counseling or commanding: "for persuasion does not compel against one's will," as Augustine says.†20 So accordingly it must be said that the devil can be the cause of human sin in the manner of one disposing or of one persuading internally or externally, or even in the manner of one commanding, as is apparent in those who evidently have put themselves under the power of the devil. But the devil cannot be the cause of sin in the manner of an effective cause. For just as in the production of forms the effective cause is that from whose action the form directly results, so in the eliciting of acts the effective cause is that from whose action the agent directly is inclined to act. But sin is not a form but an act. Therefore that can be the direct (per se) cause of sin which can move the will directly to the act of sin.

But it must be noted that the will is said to be inclined to something in two ways: in one way from without, in another way from within. From without as by the object apprehended, for the good apprehended is said to move the will,†21 and in this manner the one counseling or persuading is said to move the will, namely inasmuch as the one counseling or persuading makes something appear to be good; but the will is moved from within as by that which produces the very act of the will. Now the object proposed to the will does not necessarily move the will, although the intellect sometimes necessarily assents to a proposed truth. The reason

for this difference is that both the intellect and the will necessarily tend to that to which they are ordained by nature: for to be determined to one is characteristic of nature.†22 Hence the intellect necessarily assents to the first principles naturally known,†23 and cannot assent to their contraries; and likewise the will naturally and necessarily wills happiness, nor can anyone will misery.†24 Consequently, in regard to the intellect, those things which have a necessary coherence with the first principles naturally known, necessarily move the intellect, as in the case of demonstrated conclusions when it is evident that if they be denied it is necessary to deny the first principles from which they necessarily follow. But if any conclusions are such as to have no necessary coherence with the first principles naturally known, as in contingent and opinionable matters, the intellect is not compelled to assent to them. Similarly neither does the intellect necessarily assent even to necessary conclusions that are necessarily connected with first principles, before it ascertains that there is such a necessary connection. So too in regard to the will it will be found that the will is not necessarily moved to anything which does not at least appear to have a necessary connection with happiness which is naturally willed. But it is evident that such particular goods do not have a necessary connection with happiness, because man can be happy without any of them; hence, however much any of them is proposed to man as good, the will is not necessarily moved to it. But the perfect good which is God has a necessary connection with the happiness of man, because without it man cannot be happy; however the necessity of this connection is not clearly evident to man in this life because he does not see God in His essence. And therefore even the will of man does not of necessity adhere to God in this life, but the will of those who seeing God in His essence clearly know Him to be the essence of goodness and the happiness of man, cannot not adhere to God, just as neither can our will in this life not will happiness. It is evident then that the object does not move the will of necessity, and therefore no persuasion necessarily moves man to act.

It remains then that the effective and proper cause of a voluntary act is solely that which operates internally; but this can be nothing other than the will itself as the secondary cause and God as the first cause. The reason for this is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination of the will to the thing willed, just as the natural appetite is nothing other than an inclination of the nature to a thing. But the inclination of the nature is both from the natural form and from that which gave the form: hence it is said that the motion of fire upward is from its lightness and from the generator that produced such a form.†25 So accordingly, the movement of the will directly proceeds from the will and from God, Who is the cause of the will, Who alone works in the will and can incline the will to whatever He wishes.†26 But God is not the cause of sin, as we have shown above (in q. 3, a. 1). It remains then that nothing else is directly the cause of human sin but the will. Therefore it is evident that the devil is not properly the cause of sin, but only in the manner of one persuading.

Reply to 1. Death came into the world through the envy of the devil inasmuch as he persuaded the first man to sin.

Reply to 2. The devil is said to inspire malignant affections in man or even to entice the soul to malicious affections after the manner of one persuading.

Reply to 3. It is natural for the lower to be moved by the higher, just as it is natural for the passive to be moved by the active in external change, for example, air by fire; but external change does not impose necessity on the will, as we have shown (in the Response). Hence, although the devil is superior to the human soul in the order of nature, nevertheless he cannot compel man's will to move. And so he is not properly the cause of sin; for that from which something necessarily follows is properly called the cause.†27

Reply to 4. The devil is said to inflame men's hearts with cupidity by persuasion.

Reply to 5. The will, since it is related to either of two alternatives, is determined to one of them by something, namely by the counsel of reason; and it is not necessary that this be done by some external agent.

Reply to 6. The sin of the angel and the sin of man do not have a natural, i.e. an intrinsic order to one

another but only an order of time: for it happened that the devil sinned before man, but it could have happened the other way around. Hence it does not necessarily follow that the sin of the devil is the cause of man's sin.

Reply to 7. Sin occurs in cogitations only inasmuch as a person is inclined to evil by them or is withdrawn from good. Which remains in the free choice of the will, whatever the cogitations that arise; hence if something is the cause of cogitation, it does not necessarily follow that it is the cause of sin.

Reply to 8. The lust of the flesh against the spirit is an act of sensuality in which there can be sin since its movement can be impeded or restrained by reason; hence if the movement of sensuality should arise from some bodily change and the reason actually resists, which is within the choice of the will, there is in that case no sin. Hence it is evident that every sin depends upon the choice of the will.

Reply to 9. The fact that the appearances or likenesses of things are not distinguished from the things themselves, comes about from this that the higher power which can judge and discern, is fettered: as for instance when the fingers are crossed, one object placed between them is felt by touch as two unless another power, sight for instance, contradicts this.†28 In like manner, then, when likenesses are presented to the imagination, it adheres to them as to the things themselves unless there is some other power, namely sense or reason, which contradicts this; but if reason is fettered and the senses lulled, the likenesses are adhered to as the things themselves, as occurs in dreams and also in delirium. So accordingly demons can cause men not to discern appearances from the things themselves inasmuch as, God permitting, they disturb the internal sense powers, from which disturbances the use of human reason is fettered, which needs these internal sense powers for its activity, as for instance is apparent in persons possessed.†29 But when the use of reason is fettered nothing is imputed to man as a sin, just as it is not imputed to the brute; hence according to this the devil will not be the cause of sin even if he is the cause of an act which would otherwise be a sin.

Reply to 10. A lower nature is moved of necessity by higher causes: and therefore the higher causes, by which the lower nature is said to be made mindful, are properly and directly the cause of natural effects. But recalling to mind by the devil does not move the will of necessity, and so there is no parallel.

Reply to 11. God is the universal principle of all counsel and willing and human action, as was said (in the Response). But the error and sin and deformity that take place in counsel, in willing, and in human action comes from man's defect, nor is it necessary to assign an extrinsic cause of this.

Reply to 12. The apprehended object does not move the will of necessity, as we have shown (in the Response). And therefore however much the object apprehended by the sense or the intellect may be subject to the power of the devil, nevertheless it cannot be sufficient to move the will to commit sin.

Reply to 13. The devil offers sin to man in the manner of one persuading.

Reply to 14. That similarity is not intended to extend to everything, for God is the author of our good works, both as persuading from without and as moving from within; but the devil is the cause of sin only as persuading from without, as was shown (in the Response).

Reply to 15. The good angel leads man to God not by directly moving his will but as one persuading. And in this way too the devil inclines man to sin.

Question III, Article 4 †p

Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin by Internal Persuasion?

It seems that he cannot, for the following reasons.

1. Every agent setting before one an inducement knows its effect. But the devil cannot perceive internal cogitations as is stated in the book *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmaticis*.†1 Therefore he cannot interiorly persuade by causing internal cogitations.

2. Forms are in the internal powers in a more excellent way than in corporeal matter. But the devil cannot impress forms in corporeal matter except perhaps by the use of certain natural seeds: because corporeal matter does not obey the fallen angels at their bidding, as Augustine says.†2 Therefore the devil cannot impress forms in the internal powers.

3. The Philosopher proves †3 that the forms that are in matter are not caused by forms that are outside of matter but by the forms that are in matter, for example the form of flesh and bone is caused by forms that are in this flesh and in this bone. But the forms of the sense powers are received in a corporeal organ. Therefore they cannot be caused by the devil, who is an immaterial substance.

4. To operate outside the order of nature belongs to Him alone, namely God, Who instituted the order of nature. But there is a certain natural order of the acts of the soul's internal powers: for "imagining is a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a sense power," as is said in Book III *On the Soul*,†4 and hence proceeding further one potency is moved by another. Therefore the devil cannot cause internal movements or acts of the powers of the soul unless this starts from the sense powers.

5. Vital operations proceed from an internal principle. But all the acts of the internal powers are vital operations. Therefore they cannot be caused by the devil, but only by an internal principle.

6. The effect is of the same species as the cause. But the acts of the internal powers are caused by the senses. Therefore they cannot be caused by the devil by an act of the same species.

7. The sense power is more excellent than the nutritive power. But the devil cannot cause the act of the nutritive power to form flesh or bone. Therefore the devil cannot cause the act of any of the internal powers of the soul.

On the contrary:

The devil is said to tempt man not only visibly but even invisibly. Which would not be the case unless something internally persuaded man. Therefore the devil internally entices man to sin.

Response:

As was said above (in the preceding article) the devil cannot be the cause of human sin as directly moving man's will, but only after the manner of one persuading. But he persuades man to a thing in a twofold way: visibly and invisibly. Visibly, as when he appears perceptibly to man in some form, and speaks to him in a way apprehensible by the senses and persuades him to sin, as he tempted the first man in paradise in the likeness of a serpent,†5 and Christ in the desert,†6 appearing in some form to Him visibly. But we must not think that he persuades man only in this manner: because it would follow that no other sins would be committed at the devil's instigation except those to which the devil persuades when appearing visibly. And therefore we have to say that he also invisibly induces man to sin.

This he does both after the manner of one persuading and after the manner of one disposing. After the manner of one persuading, as when something is proposed as good to a cognitive power. And this can be done in three ways: since the proposal is made either as it concerns the intellect or as it concerns the internal sense or even as it concerns the external sense. As it concerns the intellect, inasmuch as the human intellect can be helped by an angelic intellect to know something after the manner of an illumination, as Dionysius says.†7 For

although an angel cannot directly cause an act of the will, because the will's act is nothing else than a certain inclination proceeding from within, nevertheless the angel can make an impression on the intellect, whose act consists in receiving from outside: hence it is said that to understand is a kind of undergoing, i.e. being acted upon.†8 And, although the devil according to the order of his nature could persuade man of something by enlightening his intellect as does a good angel, nevertheless he does not do this: because the more the intellect is enlightened, the more it can guard itself against deception which the devil intends. Hence it remains that the internal persuasion of the devil and any revelation of his is not by illumination of the intellect but only by a kind of impression made on the internal or external sense powers.

But in order to see in what manner the devil can make an impression on the internal powers, we need to bear in mind that a corporeal nature is naturally moved locally by a spiritual nature, but it is not naturally formed by it directly, but by some corporeal agent, as is shown in Book VII of the *Metaphysics*.†9 And therefore corporeal matter naturally obeys a good or bad angel in regard to local motion, and in this way demons can assemble seeds which they use to produce certain startling effects, as Augustine says in Book III *On the Trinity*.†10 But as to the formation, corporeal matter does not obey a spiritual creature at its bidding; hence demons cannot form corporeal matter except in virtue of corporeal seeds, as Augustine says in the place cited.†11 Therefore nothing prevents the demons from doing whatever can occur from the local movement of corporeal matter, unless they are divinely impeded. Now the apparition or representation of the sensible species retained in the internal organs can come about from the local movement of corporeal matter, in the way the Philosopher says when assigning the cause of the apparition in dreams,†12 that when an animal sleeps, in proportion as most of the blood sinks inward to the sensory principle, the sensory movements accompanying it, namely the impressions left by the action of sense objects which are retained in the sensory spirits, move the apprehending principle so that they appear just as though the sensory principle was at that time being affected by the external things themselves.

What occurs then in those asleep in the apparitions of dreams by reason of the natural local motion of spirits and humors, can occur by a similar local motion brought about by the demons, sometimes in persons asleep and sometimes in persons awake, in whom the demons can move the internal spirits and humors: at times even to the point that the use of reason is completely fettered, as is apparent in people possessed -- for it is evident that the act of reason is impeded by the undue disturbance of spirits and humors, as we see in the insane and in those asleep and in drunkards --; but at times without the fettering of reason, as even men awake and having the use of reason, by a voluntary rousing of the spirits and humors bring to the sensory principle as it were from a kind of treasury, the species interiorly retained,†13 in order to mentally picture certain things. Since then the demons do this in persons awake and having the use of reason, the more complaisantly a person perceives some species restored to its principle and tarries in the cogitation of it, the more he is detained by some passion, because as the Philosopher says,†14 a person excited by amorous desire is moved by a slight likeness, as a lover is moved by a slight likeness of the beloved. And therefore demons are called tempters,†15 because from men's acts they learn to which passions they are more subject, so that accordingly they may more effectively impress on men's imagination what they intend.

Similarly by rousing the sensory spirits the demons can make an impression on the external senses which, according to a withdrawal or an increase of the sensory spirits, perceive a thing either more acutely or more obtusely: but a person sees or hears acutely when the sensory spirits are abundant and pure, more obtusely when the opposite is the case. And in this way Augustine says †16 that this evil caused by the demons creeps stealthily through all the senses. So accordingly it is evident in what way the devil internally persuades to sin, by impressions on the internal or external sense powers.

And after the manner of one disposing the devil can be the cause of sin inasmuch as by a similar stirring up of the spirits and humors he makes some men more disposed to anger or to concupiscence or some such passion. For clearly when the body is in some measure disposed, man is more prone to concupiscence and anger and such passions, to which being aroused man is disposed to consent.

Therefore it is evident that the devil internally incites to sin by persuading and by disposing, but not by directly causing man to sin.

Reply to 1. The devil cannot see our interior cogitations in themselves but in their effects.

Reply to 2. The devil does not produce an impression on the imagination by causing the form anew; hence the devil could not make someone blind from birth imagine colors. But he causes an impression by means of local motion, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 3. The third argument is to be answered in a similar way.

Reply to 4. The devil does not cause this apart from the order of nature but by locally moving the intrinsic principles from which such things naturally arise.

Replies to 5 and 6. The answer to the fifth and to the sixth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 7. In the same manner the devil by an assembling of spirits and humors, could bring it about that something would be digested more quickly or more slowly; but this is not really related to his purpose.

Question III, Article 5 †p

Whether All Sins Are Suggested by the Devil?

It seems that they are, for the following reasons.

1. Damascene says †1 that all wickedness and all impure passions have been devised by the devil.
2. Dionysius says †2 that the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils both to themselves and to others.
3. What the Lord said to the Jews (John 8, 44) can be said of every sinner: "The father from whom you are is the devil." But this would not be the case unless all sin were caused in some way by the devil. Therefore every sin is due to the instigation of the devil.
4. Isidore says †3 "Men are deceived now by the same blandishments by which our first parents were deceived in paradise." But they were deceived by the suggestion of the devil. Therefore even now all sin is committed at the suggestion of the devil.

On the contrary:

It is said in De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus †4 "Not all our evil cogitations are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our own free will."

Response: †5

Something can be called the cause of a thing in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. Indirectly, as when an agent causes a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the provider of the occasion and the indirect cause of that effect: for example if we say that he who dries out logs of wood provides the occasion of their burning. And in this way it must be said that the devil is the cause of all our sins because he

instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a certain proneness to all sins in the whole human race; and the statements of Damascene and Dionysius (in arg. 1 and 2) are to be understood in this way.

But someone is said to be directly the cause of a thing inasmuch as he acts directly for that thing; and in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin. For not all sins are committed at the instigation of the devil but some are due to the liberty of the will and the corruption of the flesh: for as Origin says in the book *On First Principles*†7 even if the devil did not exist, men would have an appetite for food and sex, and other such pleasures, in regard to which many disorders come about unless this appetite is restrained by reason, and especially given the corruption of our nature; but it is within the power of free will to restrain and direct such an appetite. So accordingly all sins need not originate from the instigation of the devil.

However if any sins do originate from the instigation of the devil, men are ensnared into committing them now by the same blandishments by which our first parents were ensnared, as Isidore says.†7 And even if any sins are committed without the instigation of the devil, nevertheless by committing them men become children of the devil, inasmuch as they imitate him who was the first to sin.†8 However there is no kind of sin that is not at times due to the instigation of the devil.

From this the answer to the objections is evident.

Question III, Article 6 †p

Whether Ignorance Can Be the Cause of Sin?

It seems that it cannot, for the following reasons.

1. Ignorance is the cause of the involuntary, as Damascene says.†1 But the involuntary is the opposite of sin: for so true is it that sin is voluntary, that if it is not voluntary it is not a sin, as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*.†2 Therefore ignorance cannot be the cause of sin.

2. Cause and effect are conjoined. But ignorance and sin are not conjoined, because ignorance is in the intellect, but sin in the will, as Augustine says.†3 Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.

3. When the cause is augmented the effect is augmented, for instance when fire becomes hotter it gives off more heat. But when ignorance is augmented, sin is not augmented; on the contrary, ignorance may be so great that sin is entirely excluded. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.

4. Since in sin there are two aspects, namely turning-from and turning-to, the cause of sin ought to be taken in regard to turning-to: because in regard to turning-from, sin has the nature of evil,†4 and evil does not have a cause, as Dionysius says.†5 But ignorance does not seem to have regard to sin on the part of turning-to but rather on the part of turning-from. Therefore ignorance is not the cause of sin.

5. If any ignorance is the cause of sin, this seems especially to be sinful ignorance, which is called intentional ignorance.†6 But when a person falls into some sin by reason of being voluntarily ignorant, it seems that the cause of that sin is the will to be ignorant rather than the ignorance itself. Therefore we ought not to say that ignorance is the cause of sin.

6. Ignorance seems to be the cause of innocence or mercy, for the Apostle in the First Epistle to Timothy (1, 13) says "I obtained the mercy of God because I acted in ignorance." But mercy is opposed to sin: because the more a person sins, the less he deserves mercy. Therefore ignorance is not the cause of sin.

7. There are four kinds of causes, and ignorance cannot be the cause of sin according to any of them. For ignorance is not the final cause since it is not intended by sin; nor is ignorance the material cause, since the matter of sin is that about which the act of sin is concerned, for instance the matter of intemperance is concupiscence; nor is ignorance the formal cause or the efficient cause, because ignorance is a certain privation, and privation does not have the nature of a form or a mover. Therefore in no way can ignorance be the cause of sin.

8. As Bede says,†7 ignorance is a kind of wound resulting from sin. Therefore it seems rather that sin is the cause of ignorance than that ignorance is the cause of sin.

On the contrary:

1. Isidore says "Sin is committed in three ways, that is, from ignorance, from weakness, and deliberately. "†8 Therefore there are some sins that are committed out of ignorance. Ignorance then is the cause of some sin.

2. Augustine says †9 that many deeds done through ignorance are rightly condemned. But deeds that are condemned, are sins in the proper sense. Therefore some sins are committed through ignorance, and so ignorance is the cause of some sins.

Response:

Ignorance can be the cause of sin, and is reducible, i.e. is assigned to the genus of efficient or moving cause. But it should be noted that a mover is twofold, as is said in Book VIII of the Physics,†10 namely the direct (per se) mover and the indirect (per accidens) mover i.e. the remover of an impediment: for example, in the movement of heavy and light bodies the direct (per se) mover is the generator, which gives to the heavy or light body the form from which such movement follows; and the indirect (per accidens) mover is one who removes that which impeded the movement, as he who removes a pillar is said to move the stone on top of the pillar. But we must know that, since a practical science is directive of human actions, we are not only led to good acts by such a science, but we are also withheld from evil acts; and so the science itself is preventative of evils. Ignorance then which deprives of such knowledge, is rightly said to be the cause of sin as removing what is preventative of evils, as is clearly evident in works of the arts. For the science of grammar provides directions for speaking correctly †11 and prevents incongruities in speech; hence ignorance of grammar can be called a cause of incorrect speech as a remover of an impediment or rather as the very removal of the impediment [to correct speech]. And in a similar way practical science directs moral actions; and therefore ignorance of such a science in the way just designated is a cause of moral fault.

But we must realize that in directing moral actions there is a twofold knowledge which can prevent sin: one universal, by which we judge that an action is right or wrong; and by such knowledge a person is sometimes prevented from sin, for instance someone considering that fornication is a sin abstains from it; and if such knowledge were removed through ignorance, the ignorance would be the cause of fornication; but if this were ignorance of the kind which would not entirely excuse from sin, as sometimes happens as will be pointed out below (in Article 8), such ignorance would be the cause of sin. The other knowledge that directs moral acts and can prevent sin is particular knowledge, namely of the circumstances of the act itself; for universal knowledge does not give rise to movement without particular knowledge, as is said in Book III On the Soul.†12

Now in one way a person may be absolutely (simpliciter) withheld from sin by the knowledge of some circumstance, in another way a person may not be absolutely prevented from sin by the knowledge of a circumstance, but from such a kind of sin. For instance, if a hunter knew that a man was passing by he would not shoot at all, but because he does not know it is a man but thinks it is a deer he shoots and kills a man: thus the ignorance of a circumstance causes homicide, which is a sin, unless it is ignorance of the kind that excuses entirely, as will be pointed out below (in Article 8). But if some hunter wishes to kill a man but not his father, he would never shoot if he knew that the person passing by was his father, but because he does not know that the

man is his father he shoots and kills him; hence this ignorance clearly causes the sin of homicide, since in any event this hunter is guilty of homicide, although he is not guilty of patricide in this case. Consequently it is evident that ignorance is the cause of sin in diverse ways.

Reply to 1. There are two ways in which ignorance may not so entirely exclude the voluntary that the nature of sin is altogether eliminated: in one way when the ignorance itself is voluntary, because then that which follows from ignorance is judged to be voluntary; in another way when, even though one thing is not known, nevertheless another thing that suffices for the nature of sin is known, as was said of the hunter who shoots and kills him whom he does not know to be his father but does know to be a man, and so, although he involuntarily commits patricide, nevertheless he voluntarily commits homicide.

Reply to 2. Although the intellect and the will are diverse powers, nevertheless they are joined together, inasmuch as the intellect so to speak moves the will according as the good apprehended is the object of the will. And consequently ignorance can be joined to the sin.

Reply to 3. The saying 'when the cause is augmented the effect is augmented' is valid in regard to per se causes, but not in regard to accidental causes of the kind that is the remover of an impediment.

Reply to 4. Ignorance even as concerns turning-to is the cause of sin, inasmuch as it removes that which impedes turning to sin.

Reply to 5. Just as the remover of the pillar and the very removal of the pillar are called the cause of the fall of the stone, so also both the very will to be without knowledge and the very privation of knowledge can be called the cause of sin. However we ought not to say that only that ignorance which is a sin is the cause of sin: for ignorance of a circumstance is not a sin but nevertheless it can be a cause of sin, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 6. Ignorance from different points of view can be the cause of opposites. For inasmuch as it excludes the knowledge that prevented sin, it is said to be the cause of sin; but inasmuch as it removes or diminishes the voluntariness it excuses from sin and it is said to be the cause of mercy and innocence.

Reply to 7. Ignorance is reducible to the genus of an efficient cause which is not a direct (per se) but an indirect (per accidens) cause of sin, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 8. Nothing prevents ignorance from being an effect of one sin and the cause of another, as indeed inordinate concupiscence (concupiscentia fomis)^{†13} is caused in us by the sin of our first parent, and nevertheless is the cause of many actual sins.

Question III, Article 7 ^{†p}

Whether Ignorance is a Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Opposites belong to the same genus;^{†1} hence Augustine says ^{†2} that 'man' and 'non-man' both refer to substance. But ignorance is the opposite of knowledge, and knowledge is in the genus of habit,^{†3} therefore also ignorance. But sin is not in the genus of habit but rather in the genus of act, because "sin is a deed or word or desire contrary to the law of God." ^{†4} Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

2. Grace is more opposed to sin than knowledge: because knowledge can be present together with sin, but grace cannot. But the privation of grace is not a sin but a punishment. Therefore neither is ignorance, which is the privation of knowledge, a sin but rather a punishment.

3. In the book *De Regulis Theologiae*†5 it is said that no privation is worthy of reward or punishment. But every sin is worthy of punishment. Therefore no privation is a sin, but ignorance is a privation, therefore ignorance is not a sin.

4. We differ from the brutes by the possession of reason; when then that which pertains to reason is removed there remains only that which is common to us and the brutes. But there is no sin in the brutes. Therefore ignorance in us, by which that which pertains to reason is removed, is not a sin.

5. If any ignorance is a sin, that ignorance must be voluntary, and so it involves a preceding will. But when the will precedes ignorance, sin consists in the very will to be ignorant. Therefore not ignorance, but the will to be ignorant is a sin.

6. Augustine says in the *Retractations* †6 "He who has sinned through ignorance, not incongruously can be said to have sinned unwillingly; although, indeed, ignorant of what he did, all the same he did it willingly, since he willed the act of sin." So the act of sin consists in the will alone. Therefore ignorance itself is not a sin.

7. Augustine says †7 "Fault is not imputed to you if you are involuntarily ignorant, but if you have failed to seek the knowledge you lack. Therefore the very failure to seek the knowledge is a sin, and not the ignorance.

8. Every sin is either an act elicited by the will or an act commanded by the will. But ignorance is not elicited by the will, because ignorance is not in the will but in the intellect; likewise it is not commanded by the will: for ignorance cannot be willed, because all men naturally desire to know.†8

9. Moreover,†9 every sin is voluntary.†10 But the voluntary is that of which the moving principle is in the knower himself, as is said in Book III of the *Ethics*.†11 Therefore ignorance, which excludes cognition, cannot be a sin.

10. Besides,†12 every sin is absolved by repentance. But ignorance remains after repentance.

11. No sin remains in its effect yet passes away as to its guilt except original sin.†13 But ignorance remains in its effect even when it passes away as to its guilt. Since then ignorance is not original sin, because in that case it would follow that it would be in all men, it seems that ignorance is not a sin.

12. Moreover,†14 ignorance is continuous in one who is ignorant. If then ignorance were a sin, it would follow that one who is ignorant would sin an infinite number of times in successive moments

On the contrary:

1. It is said in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (14, 38) "If any man know not, he shall not be known", namely by rejection.†15 But such rejection is due to sin. Therefore ignorance is a sin.

2. Augustine says that "folly is not just any kind ignorance, but an ignorance of the things to be desired and to be avoided born of vice. But everything born of vice is a sin."†16 Therefore some ignorance is a sin.

Response:

We must affirm that nescience, ignorance, and error differ. For nescience denotes a simple negation or absence of knowledge. Ignorance, however, sometimes signifies a privation of knowledge, and then ignorance is

nothing else but a lack of knowledge which a person is designed by nature to have, for this is characteristic of any privation.†17 But sometimes ignorance is to some extent opposed to knowledge and this is said to be ignorance resulting from a perverse frame of mind: for instance, when a person has a habit of false principles and false opinions by which he is impeded from knowledge of the truth. On the other hand, error is approval of the false as true;†18 hence it adds a certain act over and above ignorance: for a person can be ignorant without making a judgment about things he does not know, and then he is in ignorance and not in error; but when at this stage he makes a false judgment about those things he does not know, then he is properly said to be in error.

And so since sin consists in an act, error clearly has the nature of sin. For it is not without presumption that a person makes a judgment about things he does not know, and especially in matters that are manifestly dangerous. But nescience of itself has neither the nature of fault nor of punishment: for that someone does not know those things which it does not pertain to him to know or which he is not designed by nature to know, is neither a fault nor a punishment. Hence there is nescience in the good angels, as Dionysius says in chapter six *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*.†19 However, ignorance considered in itself signifies the nature of punishment, but not all ignorance has the nature of fault: for ignorance of those things a person is not obliged to know is without fault; however that ignorance by which someone is ignorant of those things which he is bound to know is not without sin. But every one is obliged to know those things by which he is directed in his own acts. Consequently all men are obliged to know the truths of faith, because faith directs intention,†20 and they are obliged to know the ten commandments, which enable them to avoid sin and to do good: hence The Commandments were divinely promulgated before all the people, as is related in Exodus (20, 22ff.), but the more obscure i.e. recondite precepts of the law were learned by Moses and Aaron from the Lord. And besides these, anyone in a position of authority is bound to know those things which pertain to his office, for instance, bishops those things which pertain to the episcopal office and priests the things that pertain to the sacerdotal office, and so on. And ignorance of these matters is not without fault.

Such ignorance, therefore, can be considered in three ways: in one way in itself, and thus it does not have the nature of fault but of a punishment. For it was said above (in q. 2, a. 2 and 3) that the evil of fault is a privation of order in an act, and the evil of punishment is the privation of a perfection in the subject acting; hence the privation of grace or of knowledge has the nature of a punishment if considered in itself. In the second way such ignorance can be considered in comparison with its cause. For just as the cause of knowledge is the application of the mind to knowing, so the cause of ignorance is the failure to apply the mind to knowing, and this very failure to apply the mind to knowing what one is obliged to know is a sin of omission; hence if a privation of this sort is taken together with the preceding cause, it will be an actual sin in that manner in which omission is called a sin. In the third way this ignorance can be considered in comparison with that which follows from it, and thus sometimes it is the cause of sin, as was said above (in q. 3, a. 6).

Ignorance can also pertain to original sin, as Hugh of St. Victor says.†21 Which should be considered as follows: in original sin there is a formal element, namely the absence of original justice,†22 which pertains to the will; and just as from original justice, by which the will was united in friendship with God, there arose an overflowing of perfection into the other powers -- namely in such a way that the intellect was illuminated by the knowledge of truth and the irascible and concupiscible powers obtained rectitude from reason --, so when original justice was withdrawn from the will, knowledge of truth in the intellect and right ordering in the irascible and concupiscible powers was lost. And thus ignorance and the 'fomes' i.e. inordinate concupiscence †23 are the material elements in original sin, just as turning to a transitory good †24 is the material element in actual sin.

Reply to 1. The privation of knowledge and grace has the nature of fault according as they are taken together with their cause, which pertains to the genus of act: for not-to-act and to-act are considered to be in the same genus, according to the rule stated by Augustine.

The answer to the second and third arguments is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 4. Although ignorance takes away some perfection of reason, nevertheless it does not take away reason itself by which we differ from the brutes. Hence the argument is not valid.

Reply to 5. The root of any sin lies in the will, as we have said above (in q. 2, a. 2 and 3); nevertheless it does not follow on account of this that the act willed is not a sin. Hence too neither does it follow that ignorance is not a sin, although the root of sin consists in the will to be ignorant.

Reply to 6. Augustine in the passage cited is speaking of sin that is committed through ignorance. And this sin sometimes consists only in the willing of the act, and not in the ignorance itself; for we said above (in q. 3, a. 6) that not all ignorance which is a cause of sin, is a sin.

Reply to 7. Ignorance which is entirely involuntary is not a sin; and this is what Augustine says "Fault is not imputed to you if you are involuntarily ignorant." And by this which he adds "but if you have failed to seek the knowledge you lack," he gives us to understand that ignorance has its sinfulness from the preceding negligence, which is nothing other than the failure to apply the mind to know those things which one is obliged to know.

Reply to 8. Nothing prevents a thing from being willed in itself and indeed naturally willed which however we do not will on account of an added factor. For example, a person naturally wills to preserve the integrity of his body, and nevertheless in the meantime he wills to have his infected hand amputated, if he fears danger to the whole body from it. And similarly man naturally wills to know, but nevertheless, on account of the hardship of learning, or for fear that it be an impediment to sin which he loves, he rejects knowledge; and thus ignorance is in a way commanded by the will.

Reply to 9. Although a person who is ignorant does not know that of which he is ignorant, nevertheless he discerns either the ignorance itself, or that on account of which he does not flee from the ignorance; and therefore ignorance can be a voluntary sin.

Reply to 10. Although ignorance remains after repentance, nevertheless the guilt of ignorance is taken away.

Reply to 11. The sin of ignorance does not consist only in the privation of knowledge, but in the privation together with the preceding cause, which is the neglect to learn; which negligence if it remains in effect, the guilt would not pass away. There is however an ignorance with which all of us are born pertaining in a measure to original sin, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 12. Just as in other sins of omission a person does not continue to sin when he does not act, but only during the time in which he is obliged to act, so in like manner also it should be said of ignorance.

Question III, Article 8 †p

Whether Ignorance Excuses Sin or Diminishes It?

It seems it does not, for the following reasons.

1. That which increases a sin does not excuse it either wholly or in part. But ignorance increases a sin: for Ambrose †1 commenting on that passage of The Epistle to the Romans (2, 4) "Do you not know that the goodness of God . . ." etc., says "You sin most gravely if you do not know." Therefore ignorance does not excuse sin either wholly or by much.†2

2. As is said in the Decretis†3 he who has communion with heretics has sinned more by the very fact that he did not know they were in error. Therefore ignorance increases sin and does not excuse it.

3. Ignorance follows on drunkenness. But the drunkard who by reason of his drunkenness commits homicide or any other sin, deserves double the penalty as is said in Book III of the Ethics.†4 Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin but increases it.

4. A sin added to a sin becomes greater. But ignorance itself is a certain sin as was said (in the preceding article). Therefore ignorance does not diminish but increases the sin.

5. That which is commonly found in every sin, does not diminish sin. But ignorance is commonly found in every sin: because as is said in Book III of the Ethics†5 every wicked man is ignorant, which agrees with what is said in Proverbs (14, 22) "They err that work evil." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin nor excuse it.

On the contrary:

Sin consists especially in contempt of God. But ignorance diminishes contempt or takes it away entirely. Therefore ignorance excuses sin either wholly or in part.

Response:

Since it is of the nature of sin that it is voluntary,†6 to whatever extent ignorance excuses sin either wholly or in part, to that extent it takes away the voluntariness. But we must take into consideration that ignorance can take away the subsequent but not the preceding voluntariness.

Now since ignorance is in the intellect, the order of ignorance in relation to the voluntary can be considered from the order of the intellect to the will: for the act of the intellect necessarily precedes the act of the will, since the good apprehended is the object of the will;†7 and therefore when the cognition of the intellect is excluded through ignorance, the act of the will is excluded and so the voluntariness is excluded so far as concerns what is unknown. Hence if in the same act something is unknown and something known, there can be voluntariness so far as concerns that which is known; nevertheless there is always involuntariness so far as concerns that which is unknown; whether the deformity of the act is unknown, for example, when someone does not know fornication is a sin, he voluntarily commits fornication but does not voluntarily commit sin; or a circumstance of the act is unknown, as when a man approaches for sexual intercourse a woman whom he believes to be his wife, he voluntarily approaches a woman for intercourse, but he does not voluntarily approach one who is not his wife. And, although ignorance always causes the non-voluntary, nevertheless it does not always cause the involuntary. For 'non-voluntary' signifies the mere privation of the act of the will, but 'involuntary' signifies that the will is opposed to what is done; hence the involuntary is followed by sorrow, which does not always follow on the non-voluntary. For sometimes it happens that a man approaching for intercourse a woman not his wife whom he believes to be his wife, although he does not actually will to approach one not his wife, for he does not know that she is not his wife, nevertheless habitually wishes and actually would wish this if he knew; hence afterwards when he perceives her not to have been his wife, he is not sorry but glad, unless he has changed his will.

But on the other hand the act of the will can precede the act of the intellect, as when someone wills to have knowledge, and for the same reason ignorance falls under the will and becomes voluntary.

And this occurs in three ways: in the first way, when a person directly wills to be ignorant of the knowledge of salvation so as not to be withdrawn from sin which he loves; hence it is stated in Job (21, 14) of certain ones that they said to God "Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways." Secondly, ignorance is called indirectly voluntary because a person does not make an effort to know, and this is ignorance

from negligence. But because a person is said to be negligent only when he omits what is he obliged to do, it does not seem to pertain to negligence that he fails to apply his mind to know anything whatsoever but only if he fails to apply his mind to know those things he ought to know, either simply and at any time -- hence ignorance of the law †8 is rightly regarded as negligence --, or in a particular case: as he who shoots an arrow in some place where men are accustomed to pass, is considered guilty of negligence if he makes no effort to know whether anyone is passing at that time. And such ignorance which occurs by reason of negligence is considered voluntary.

Thirdly, some ignorance is called incidentally (per accidens) voluntary, namely from the fact that a person directly or indirectly wills something on which ignorance itself follows: directly, as is apparent in a drunkard who wills to drink too much wine, as a result of which he is deprived of the use of reason, and indirectly, when someone neglects to resist the rising movements of passion which intensifying, bind the use of reason in a particular choice, according to which every wicked man is said to be ignorant.†9

Since then whatever is caused voluntarily is considered voluntary in moral matters, ignorance itself is voluntary insofar as it lacks that which would cause it to be non-voluntary and consequently that which excuses sin. When then a person directly wills to be ignorant so that he not be restrained from sin by knowledge, such ignorance does not excuse sin either wholly or in part, but rather increases it: for a person seems to be afflicted with a great love of sinning that he would will to suffer the loss of knowledge for the sake of freely engaging in sin. But when a person indirectly wills to be ignorant, because he neglects to learn, or even when he wills ignorance incidentally by willing directly or indirectly something on which ignorance follows, such ignorance does not totally cause involuntariness in the following act, because the following act from the very fact that it proceeds from ignorance which is voluntary, is in some measure voluntary. But nevertheless the preceding ignorance lessens the voluntary nature of the act: for that act is less voluntary which proceeds from ignorance of this sort than if a person knowingly would choose such an act without any ignorance; and so such ignorance does not excuse the following act altogether but only to some degree. But nevertheless it must be noted that sometimes both the act itself that follows and the preceding ignorance are one sin just as the will (to do a thing) and the external act are called one sin; hence it can happen that the sin is no less increased by the voluntariness of ignorance than is excused by the diminished voluntariness of the act.

But if ignorance is not voluntary in any of the preceding ways, for instance when it is invincible †10 and when it is without any disorder of the will, then it makes the following act totally involuntary.

Reply to 1. The saying of Ambrose is customarily explained as follows:†11 "You sin most gravely", i.e. most dangerously "if you do not know", because as long as you do not know that you sin, you do not seek a remedy. Or he is speaking of intentional ignorance by which a person wills to be ignorant so as not to be restrained from sin. Or he is speaking of ignorance of benefits received: because it is the utmost degree of ingratitude for a person to fail to recognize the benefits he has received. Or he is speaking of the ignorance of unbelief which in itself is the gravest sin; although even sin committed from such ignorance is diminished, according to that passage of the Apostle (I Timothy 1, 13) "I obtained the mercy of God because I acted ignorantly in my unbelief".†12

Reply to 2. That authority is speaking of the ignorance of infidelity.

Reply to 3. The drunkard who commits homicide deserves double the penalty because he commits two sins; and nevertheless he sins less in the homicide than if he were to kill a man when sober.

Reply to 4. Even ignorance which is a sin insofar as it is voluntary, diminishes the voluntariness of the following act, and by reason of this diminishes the following sin; and it is possible that such ignorance makes the following sin less grave than is its own gravity.

Reply to 5. In him who sins through habit and from choice, such ignorance is purely intentional,†13 hence it does not diminish the sin. But the ignorance of him who sins through passion, is incidentally (per accidens) voluntary, as was said (in the Response), and diminishes the sin: for this is to sin from weakness,†14 by reason of which sin is diminished.

Question III, Article 9 †p

Whether It Is Possible for Someone Having Knowledge To Sin from Weakness?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. No one is said to do a thing from weakness whose will has the power to keep him from it. But the will of anyone having knowledge has the power to keep him from sin, for it is said in Ecclesiasticus (15, 16) "If thou wilt keep the commandments . . . they shall preserve thee." Therefore no one having knowledge sins from weakness.

2. No one who possesses the most effective help against sin, sins out of weakness. But a person who possesses knowledge has the most effective help against sin, i.e. the certitude of knowledge. Therefore no one having knowledge sins out of weakness.

3. No power can be activated except by its formal object, as sight can see only colored objects; but the object of the will, in whose act sin principally consists, is the good apprehended, as is said in Book III On the Soul;†1 therefore there cannot be sin in the act of the will unless there is some defect in the apprehension of the good. But knowledge excludes such a defect. Therefore it is not possible for anyone having knowledge to sin from weakness.

4. The object of the will is only the good or the apparent good: for evil is not the direct object of the will, as Dionysius says;†2 but inasmuch as the object of the will is the real good, sin is not found in it; therefore every sin is in the will according as its object is an apparent and not a real good. Which is not without ignorance. Therefore it is not possible for someone having knowledge to sin from weakness.

5. But it was argued that a person having knowledge in general can be ignorant in respect to the particular thing to be done, and thus will sin: for example, if a person knows universally that no fornication is to be committed, but judges that here and now it is to be committed. But counter to this: as the Philosopher shows in Book II On Interpretation†3 opinions about contradictories are contraries. But a universal negative and a particular affirmative are contradictory.†4 Since then no one at the same time can hold contrary opinions, because contraries cannot be at the same time in the same subject,†5 it seems that it is not possible for someone holding the opinion universally that no fornication is to be committed could simultaneously have the opinion in a particular case that fornication is to be committed.

6. But it was said that opinions that are about contradictories are contraries, but knowledge and opinion are not contrary, since they do not belong to one genus. But counter to this: knowledge differs more from a false opinion than a true opinion, because opinion is accompanied by fear of the contrary,†6 but knowledge is not. If then at the same time with a false opinion a person cannot have a true contrary opinion, much less could he have knowledge [simultaneously with a false opinion].

7. Whoever knows the universal and knows that the singular is contained under the universal, at the same time virtually knows the singular, as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics,†7 for example, he who knows that every mule is sterile at the same time -- provided he knows this animal is a mule -- knows that it is sterile. But he who knows that no fornication is to be committed, unless he also knew that this act is fornication, would not be considered to sin knowingly but in ignorance. Therefore if he does not sin through ignorance, not

only does he know universally, but he also knows in particular.

8. Spoken words are signs of the things understood as the Philosopher says.†8 But he who actually chooses to commit fornication if he were asked, would answer: this is a sin and is not to be done. Therefore it is not true that he is in ignorance about the particular but knows universally, as was argued (above in arg. 5).

9. Augustine says †9 that shame extinguishes concupiscence. But shame arises from knowledge, therefore knowledge extinguishes concupiscence. But weakness of soul pertains especially to concupiscence, therefore knowledge prevents sin that arises from weakness. It is impossible then for a person having knowledge to sin from weakness.

10. That person is said to sin knowingly who knows that what he does is a sin. But the nature of sin consists in an offense against God, and the thought of offending God restrains concupiscence, according to that passage of Psalm 118, 120 "Pierce thou my flesh with thy fear; for I am afraid of thy judgments." Therefore knowledge prevents sin that arises from the weakness pertaining to concupiscence. And so the same conclusion follows as before.

11. Bede cites weakness among the four wounds following from sin,†10 and so it has the nature of a penalty or punishment. But punishment is not the cause of sin, but rather is ordered to the correction of sins. Therefore the sin of one having knowledge cannot be from weakness.

12. Weakness of soul is associated with the passions which are in the sensory part of the soul, but sin consists in the consent of the will, which is in the intellective part. But the cause must be connected with the effect, because every action occurs through contact.†11 Therefore weakness cannot be the cause of sin.

13. Something passive is changed more by an active principle that is nearer than by one more remote. But knowledge since it is in the intellect, is nearer to the will than weakness or passion, which pertains to the lower principle associated with the flesh, according to Matthew 26, 41 "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." Therefore it does not seem possible for anyone to sin from weakness acting contrary to his conscience.

14. The higher part of the soul which includes the intellect and will, commands the lower part of the soul which includes the passions, namely the irascible and concupiscible passions, and even the members of the body. But a defect in the members of the body does not change the command of the will but only the execution of the act. Therefore neither does a defect in the irascible and concupiscible part from the weakness pertaining to the passions, change the command of the will. But sin consists in the command of the will. Therefore no sin is from weakness.

15. We neither merit nor demerit by the passions. But demerit itself is a sin. Therefore no sin is from passion, which is a weakness of the soul.

On the contrary:

1. Isidore says †12 that some sins are committed from weakness.

2. The Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans (7, 5) ". . . the passions of sins, which were aroused by the Law were at work in my ('our' in the Vulgate) members so that they brought forth fruit unto death." But that which brings forth fruit unto death is sin according to Romans 6, 23 "The wages of sin is death." Therefore some sins are committed owing to the passions, which are the weakness of the soul.

Response:

It is generally accepted by all †13 that some sins are committed from weakness. Which would not be

distinguished from sins of ignorance unless it were possible for a person having knowledge to sin from weakness. Therefore we must grant that it is possible for someone having knowledge to sin from weakness.

For evidence of this we must first consider what is understood by the name 'weakness'; and this is taken from a comparison to bodily weakness. Now the body is weak when some bodily humor †14 is not subject to the regulative power of the whole body, for example when some humor exceeds a certain limit of hotness or coldness or something of the sort. And just as there is a certain regulative power of the body, so reason is the regulative power of all the internal affections: hence when some affection is not regulated according to the rule of reason, but is excessive or deficient, it is said to be a weakness of the soul. And this occurs especially in regard to the affections of the sense appetite, which are called passions, for instance fear, anger, concupiscence and the like; hence the ancient authors called such passions of the soul sicknesses of the soul, as Augustine says in the book *On the City of God*.†15 Therefore a person is said to do that from weakness, which he does from some passion, for instance from anger or fear or concupiscence or some such passion.

But Socrates, as Aristotle says in Book VII of the *Ethics*,†16 considering the firmness and certitude of knowledge, held that knowledge cannot be overcome by passion, namely that no one by reason of passion can do anything contrary to his knowledge; hence he called †17 all virtues forms of scientific knowledge and he called †18 all vices or sins forms of ignorance. From which it follows that no one having knowledge sins from weakness; which clearly is contrary to our daily experience. And therefore we must consider that one may have knowledge in many ways: in one way in general, in another way in particular, and in one way habitually, in another way actually. In the first place it can happen by reason of passion that what is known habitually is not actually considered. For it is obvious that whenever one power is intent on its act,†19 another power is either impeded or totally diverted from its act: for instance, when a person concentrates on hearing someone, he does not notice a man passing by. And the reason for this is that all the soul's powers are rooted in one soul, whose intention applies each power to its act; and therefore, when a person is resolutely intent on the act of one power, his attention to the act of another power is reduced. In this way, then, when concupiscence, or anger, or something of this kind, is intense, man is impeded from the consideration of knowledge.

Secondly, we must consider that the passions of the soul since they are in the sense appetite, are concerned with particulars: for a person desires this pleasure, as for instance he tastes this sweet thing. But knowledge (*scientia*) concerns the universal; and nevertheless universal knowledge is not a principle of any act except as it is applied to a particular: because acts are about particulars.†20 When, then, passion is vehement concerning some particular, it repulses the contrary movement of knowledge about the same particular, not only by distracting from a consideration of knowledge, as we said above (in the Response), but by perverting it by way of contrariety. And so he who is in a vehement passion, even if in some way he should consider the universal, nevertheless his deliberation about the particular is impeded.

Thirdly we must consider that by reason of some bodily change the use of reason may be fettered, so that either it considers nothing at all or cannot freely consider, as is apparent in those asleep and those delirious. And indeed by reason of the passions,†21 a change takes place in the body in such a way that sometimes people have fallen into madness on account of anger or concupiscence or some such passion. And therefore, when such passions are intense, by reason of the bodily change itself, such passions so to speak fetter the reason so that it does not exercise free judgment about particular acts to be done. And so nothing prevents someone who has knowledge according to habit and of general applicability, from sinning out of weakness.

Reply to 1. The will of man has the power to keep him from sin; but in this he is weakened by passion, so that he does not will perfectly when the use of reason is fettered, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. Although knowledge in itself is most certain, nevertheless, as was said (in the Response), it is impeded in particular cases by passion so that it cannot be of assistance against sin.

Reply to 3. The will is moved according to the pressing demand of the apprehended good; but this particular appetible object is sometimes impeded by passion from being apprehended as good according to the judgment of reason as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 4. The will always tends to something under the aspect of good. But a thing may sometimes appear good which in fact is not good, because the judgment of reason is perverse even in general, and then the sin is from ignorance, but sometimes because the judgment of reason is impeded in a particular case on account of passion, and then the sin is from weakness.

Reply to 5. It is not possible for anyone to actually have at the same time knowledge or a true opinion about a universal affirmative and a false opinion about a particular negative or vice versa. But it is quite possible for someone to have habitual knowledge or a true opinion about one of the contradictories and actually a false opinion about the other: for an act is not contrary to a habit but to an act.

Reply to 6. The answer to the sixth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 7. Since an act of sin and of virtue is done by choice, and choice is the desire of what has been decided on by previous deliberation,^{†22} and deliberation is a kind of inquiry,^{†23} it follows that in every act of virtue or of sin there must be a quasi-syllogistic deduction. But nevertheless the temperate man syllogizes in one way, the intemperate man in another, the continent man in one way, the incontinent man in another. For the temperate man is moved only according to the judgment of reason; hence he uses a syllogism containing three propositions, making a deduction such as this: No fornication is to be committed, this act is fornication, therefore, this act is not to be done. But the intemperate man yields entirely to the movement of concupiscence, and so he too uses a syllogism containing three propositions, making a deduction such as this: everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed, this act is pleasurable, therefore this act is to be done. However both the continent and the incontinent man are moved in two directions: according to reason to avoid sin, and according to concupiscence to commit sin; but in the continent man the judgment of reason prevails, in the incontinent man the movement of concupiscence prevails. Consequently each uses a syllogism having four propositions,^{†24} but for contrary conclusions. For the continent man syllogizes in this manner: No sin is to be committed. And this he proposes in accordance with the judgment of reason, yet according to the movement of concupiscence he turns over and over in his mind that everything pleasurable is to be pursued; but because in him the judgment of reason prevails he adopts the first proposition and concludes under it: this act is a sin, therefore, it is not to be done. However the incontinent man, in whom the movement of concupiscence prevails, adopts the second proposition and concludes under it: this is pleasurable, therefore it is to be pursued. And such is properly the man who sins from weakness. And therefore it is evident that although he may know universally, nevertheless he does not know in particular, because he does not adopt the premise in keeping with reason but in keeping with concupiscence.

Reply to 8. As the Philosopher says in book VIII of the Ethics,^{†25} just as the drunkard gives voice to certain opinions which nevertheless he does not interiorly understand, so he who is overcome by passion, even though he says externally with his lips that this act is to be avoided, nevertheless in his heart he judges that it is to be done: hence he says one thing externally and thinks another thing internally.

Reply to 9. Knowledge indeed sometimes overcomes concupiscence, either by rousing shame, or dread of offending God; but nothing prevents knowledge itself from sometimes being overcome in particular cases by passion.

Reply to 10. The answer to the tenth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 11. Every punishment when reflected upon deters from sin, but not every punishment, insofar as it has already been inflicted, deters from sin. For the privation of grace is a kind of punishment, nevertheless a person is not deterred from sin by the fact that he is deprived of grace but by the fact that he reflects on his

being deprived of grace if he sins. And a similar response should be made about ignorance.

Reply to 12. Consent to an act pertains to the intellectual appetite, i.e. to the will, but nevertheless it is not given without application to a particular, in which the passions of the soul are most powerful. And therefore consent sometimes is changed by the passions.

Reply to 13. Reason is nearer to the will than passion, but passion is nearer to the particular appetible object than reason which pertains to the universal.

Reply to 14. The soul rules the body as a slave who cannot resist the power of his master; but reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers, as the Philosopher says,†26 with a royal or constitutional rule, which is proper to free men. And therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers can even resist the command of reason, just as likewise free citizens sometimes may resist the command of the ruler.

Reply to 15. We neither merit nor demerit by the passions as though merit or demerit principally consists in them, but nevertheless the passions can be a help or a hindrance to merit or demerit.

Question III, Article 10 †p

Whether Sins Committed from Weakness Are Imputed to Man as a Mortal Fault?

It seems they are not, for the following reasons.

1. Nothing is imputed to a person as a mortal fault which he does not do voluntarily. But a person does not voluntarily commit sins of the kind that are done from weakness: for concerning them the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Galatians (5, 17) "For the flesh lusts against the spirit . . . so that you do not what you would." Therefore such sins are not imputed to man as a mortal fault.

2. No passive power can operate except insofar as it is moved by its active principle. But reason is specially designed by nature to move the will; if then the judgment of reason is impeded by passion, it seems that it is not within the power of the will to avoid sin. Therefore the sin is not imputed to the will as a mortal fault.

3. A passion i.e. an affection of the soul on account of its proximity impedes the reason and will more than an affection of the body.†1 But an affection of the body entirely excuses inordinate acts from fault, as is clear in the case of things done by those asleep or delirious. Therefore much more does an affection of the soul excuse from fault.

4. But it was argued that an affection of the soul is voluntary, but an affection of the body is not voluntary. But counter to this: an effect is not more powerful than its cause. But an affection of the soul from the fact that it is voluntary does not have the nature of a mortal fault, but only of a venial fault. Therefore it cannot be the cause of mortal sin.

5. A sin is not increased infinitely on account of its consequence,†2 namely in such a way that what was in itself venial becomes mortal on account of its consequence. But passion itself, if an evil choice did not follow, would not be a mortal sin; therefore on account of this that an evil choice follows, a man does not incur the guilt of mortal sin. And so sins that are committed from weakness are not mortal.

On the contrary:

The Apostle says (Romans 7, 5) "Sinful passions . . . were at work in our members so that they brought

forth fruit unto death." But nothing except mortal sin brings forth fruit unto death. Therefore sins that are committed from passion or from weakness can be mortal.

Response:

Since from weakness or from passion a person sometimes commits adultery and many shameful or criminal acts,†3 as did Peter †4 when he denied Christ out of fear, no one ought to doubt that sins committed from weakness are sometimes mortal

In proof of which it must be noted that the necessity that derives from the supposition of something that is subject to the will does not eliminate the imputation of mortal sin. For example if a sword is thrust into a man's vital organs, he will necessarily die, but the thrusting of the blade is voluntary: hence the death of the one who is struck by the blade is imputed to the wielder as a mortal sin. We must speak to the question at hand in a similar way: for granted that reason is fettered by passion, an evil choice necessarily follows, still it is within the power of the will to repulse this fettering of reason. For it was said (in the preceding article) that reason is fettered owing to the fact that the attention of the soul is vehemently applied to an act of the sense appetite, hence it is diverted from considering in particular what it knows universally and habitually. But the will has the power to apply or not to apply its attention to something, hence it is within the power of the will to exclude the fettering of reason. Therefore the act committed, which proceeds from this fettering, is voluntary, hence it is not excused even from mortal fault. But if the fettering of reason by passion advanced to such a point that it would not be within the power of the will to exclude this fettering, for example, if from some passion of the soul someone were to become insane, whatever he committed would not be imputed to him as a sin, just as it would not be imputed to another insane person, except perhaps so far as concerns the beginning of such a passion, that it was voluntary: for the will was able in the beginning to prevent passion from advancing so far, just as homicide committed by reason of drunkenness is imputed to a man as a sin, because the beginning of drunkenness was voluntary.

Reply to 1. That which a man does when fettered by passion a man does not will to do when free from passion, but after his reason is fettered by passion, he is led to will that by passion.

Reply to 2. The will is not only moved by the perception of reason fettered by passion but also has the power to remove the fettering of reason, as was said (in the Response). And to that extent what the will does is imputed to it as a sin.

Reply to 3. The will does not have the power to remove a affection of the body as it is to remove an affection (passionem) of the soul, because corporeal nature does not obey the rational will as the sense appetite does. And therefore there is no similarity.

Reply to 4. Nothing prevents something that is not a mortal sin simply i.e. absolutely, from being a mortal sin in a particular case, for instance not to give an alms to a poor man dying of hunger is a mortal sin, which however in other circumstances would not be a mortal sin. And similarly in the question at hand, not to will to repulse some passion, even though it is not mortal sin simply, nevertheless in this case, when it inclines a man to consent to a mortal sin, it is a mortal sin.

Reply to 5. A future and unforeseen consequence does not make a sin infinitely worse, but a conjoined and foreseen consequence can make a sin infinitely worse, so that what otherwise would not be a mortal sin is a mortal sin: for example, to shoot an arrow is not a mortal sin, but to shoot an arrow in connection with killing a man is a mortal sin. Likewise, not to repulse a passion inclining one to mortal sin is not without mortal sin.

Whether Weakness Alleviates or Aggravates sin?

It seems that it aggravates sin, for following reasons.

1. Just as a good or virtuous passion is related to merit, so an evil passion is related to sin; but a good passion increases merit: for it is more praiseworthy and meritorious for a person to give an alms with a fellow-feeling of compassion than to give it without such compassion, as is clear from Augustine;†1 therefore also to commit sin with passion is more shameful and a greater sin. But to sin from passion is to sin from weakness, as was said (in q. 3, a. 9). Therefore weakness aggravates sin.

2. Since every sin results from inordinate desire, as Augustine says,†2 the greater the inordinate desire from which a person sins, the more gravely he seems to sin. But inordinate desire is a certain passion of the soul and a weakness. Therefore weakness makes a sin worse.

3. When the cause is increased the effect is increased, for example, greater heating results from greater heat. If then weakness is the cause of sin, it follows that a greater weakness is the cause of a greater sin. And therefore weakness makes a sin worse.

On the contrary:

That on account of which a sin becomes pardonable does not aggravate but diminishes sin.†3 But a sin is said to be more pardonable on account of weakness. Therefore weakness does not aggravate but lessens sin.

Response:

To sin from weakness is to sin from passion, as we have said (in q. 3, a. 9). But a passion of the sense appetite is related to the movement of the will in two ways: in one way as preceding, in another way as consequent. As preceding, for example, when the will is inclined to will a thing on account of passion: and in this way passion diminishes the reason for merit and the reason for demerit, because merit and demerit consist in the choice resulting from the preceding deliberation, but passion clouds or even fetters the judgment of reason. Now the purer the judgment of reason, the more discerning is the choice for meriting or demeriting. Hence he who is induced to do a good work by the judgment of reason acts in a more praiseworthy manner than someone who is induced to do the same work solely from passion or emotion: for the latter can sometimes err by being unduly compassionate. And similarly, one who is induced to sin from the deliberation of reason sins more gravely than one who is induced to sin solely from a passion or emotion of the soul.

But passion is considered as consequent when from a vehement movement of the will the lower appetite is moved with passion. And in such a manner passion adds to merit or demerit, because passion is a sign that the movement of the will is more intense. And in this way it is true that a person who gives an alms with greater compassion merits more, and a person who commits sin with more inordinate desire sins more, because this is a sign that the movement of the will is more intense. But in fact this is not to do a good work or to sin from passion but rather to be fervent or ardent by reason of the choice of good or of evil.

Replies to 1 and 2. The answer to the first and second arguments is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 3. It is of the nature of sin to be voluntary. But that is called voluntary of which the principle is in the agent himself.†4 And therefore, the more intense the internal principle, the graver is the sin; but the more intense the external principle, the less grave is the sin. But passion is an extrinsic principle of the will, and the movement of the will is an intrinsic principle. And therefore the more intense the movement of the will to sin, the graver is the sin; but the more intense the passion impelling to sin, the less grave the sin becomes.

Question III, Article 12 †p

Whether Anyone Can Sin from Malice i.e. with Malice Aforethought?†1

It seems not, for the following reasons.

1. A man intends to do that which he does with malice aforethought, but as Dionysius says,†2 no one makes evil his object when performing an action. Therefore no one does evil with malice aforethought.

2. No power can be moved except by its proper object. But the object of the will is the apprehended good.†3 Therefore no one can will that which he knows is evil, and so no one can sin with malice aforethought.

3. But it was argued that the will tends to some good to which evil is joined, and to that extent it is said to intend evil. But counter to this: those things that are not separated in reality can be separated by an act of the soul, in one way in keeping with the intellect and in another in keeping with desire: for we can understand 'spherical' without sensible matter, and someone can wish to be an abbot without wishing to be a monk. Therefore although evil may be joined to some good, nevertheless it is not necessary as is supposed that someone intends evil because he tends to a good to which an evil is joined.

4. A thing is not denominated from that which is accidental (secundum accidens), but from that which properly (per se) belongs to the thing, because we judge a thing according to this. But from the fact that a person wills a thing in itself he is not said to will that which is joined to it, except incidentally (per accidens): for example, a person who loves wine on account of the sweetness, loves wine only incidentally.†4 And therefore he who wills some good to which an evil is joined, wills that evil only incidentally. Consequently it ought not to be said that he sins from malice, as though willing the evil.

5. Whoever sins from weakness is favorably disposed to the evil which is joined to some good. If then on account of this a person is said to sin from malice, it also follows that he who sins from weakness sins from malice. Which is clearly false.

6. But it was argued that the will of him who sins from malice, of itself is moved to evil in the foresaid way, but not the will of the person who sins from weakness, rather his will is moved so to speak by passion. But counter to this: to be moved of itself to a thing is to be inclined according to its own form and nature to that thing, just as of itself what is heavy moves downwards.†5 But the will according to its own form and nature does not have a tendency to evil, but rather to good. Therefore the will cannot of itself tend to evil, and so no one will sin from malice.

7. The will of itself tends towards good according to the general notion of good; therefore it must tend to different goods as inclined by something else determining it. But the differences of good are the real good and the apparent good; and the will tends to the real good as determined by the judgment of reason; therefore the will does not tend of itself but as inclined by something else to the apparent good to which evil is joined. Therefore no one sins from malice.

8. Malice sometimes is taken for fault according as it is opposed to virtue, but sometimes it is taken as a punishment, according as Bede says †6 that four wounds are contracted from sin: ignorance, weakness, malice, and concupiscence. But no one can be said to sin from malice if malice is taken for fault, because thus the same thing would be the cause of itself,†7 i.e. malice of malice; nor again if malice is taken as a punishment, because every punishment pertains to the notion of a weakness, and thus to sin from malice would be to sin from weakness; which is inconsistent. Therefore no one sins from malice.

9. It happens sometimes that someone commits a very slight sin intentionally, for instance by speaking an idle word or telling a jocose lie. But a sin from malice is said to be the gravest sin.†8 Therefore to sin intentionally is not to sin from malice.

10. Dionysius says †9 that good is the principle and end of every action. But that from which someone sins is either an internal principle inclining to sin, such as a habit or passion or something of the sort, or the intended end. Therefore no one sins from malice.

11. If a person sins from malice, this seems to be especially true of him who chooses to sin. But according to Damascene,†10 every sin is from choice. Therefore every sin would be from malice.

12. Malice is opposed to virtue: and so since virtue is a habit, malice too is a habit, because contraries are in the same genus.†11 But some habits of virtue are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, as the Philosopher says in regard to temperance and fortitude,†12 that they belong to the irrational parts; but it does not pertain to these powers of the soul to choose, but to the free will. Therefore a sin committed from choice ought not to be said to proceed from malice.

13. He who sins from malice seems to actually will this, i.e. to sin and to do evil. But this cannot be the case, because synderesis, which always murmurs against evil, is never extinguished.†13 Therefore no one sins from malice.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in Job (34, 27) "Who as it were on purpose have revolted from God, and would not understand His ways" (Vulgate '. . . revolted from Him and all His ways . . .'). But to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some people sin on purpose, which is to sin from malice.

2. Augustine says †14 that when he was stealing the pears, he loved not the pears themselves, but his own iniquity, namely, the very theft itself. But to love evil itself is to sin from malice. Therefore someone sins from malice.

3. Envy is a kind of malice. But some people sin from envy. Therefore some people sin from malice.

Response:

As the Philosopher says in Book III of the Ethics,†15 some authors have held that no one is voluntarily evil; against whom the Philosopher says in the same place †16 that it is irrational to say that a man wills to commit adultery and does not will to be unjust.

The reason for this is that a thing is called voluntary not only if the will is moved to it principally and of itself (per se) as an end, but also if the will is moved to it for the sake of the end: for example, a sick person not only wills to attain health but also to take the bitter medicine which otherwise he would not, in order to recover health; and similarly a merchant voluntarily throws merchandise overboard so the ship will not be lost.†17 If then a person should wish so much to enjoy some pleasure, say, adultery or some desirable thing of this kind, that he does not shrink from incurring the deformity of sin which he perceives to be conjoined to what he wills, not only will he be said to will that good he principally wills, but even that very deformity, which he chooses to incur, to avoid being deprived of the desired good. Hence the adulterer both wills principally the pleasure and wills secondarily the deformity, as in the example Augustine gives,†18 that a man on account of love of a maid servant, voluntarily submits to the hard servitude of her master.

But that someone desire some transitory good so much that he does not flee from being alienated from the unchangeable good, can occur in two ways: in one way, from this that he does not know that such an

alienation is joined to that transitory good, and then he is said to sin from ignorance; in another way, from something internally inclining the will to that transitory good. Now a thing is found to be inclined to another in two ways: in one way as being subject to or acted on by another, as when a stone is thrown upward; in another way in virtue of its own form, and then it is of itself inclined to that, as when a stone falls downward. And in a similar manner the will is inclined to a transitory good to which the deformity of sin is joined, sometimes from some passion, and then the will is said to sin from weakness, as was said above (in a. 10 and 11); but sometimes from a habit, when by custom the inclination to such a good has already been turned as it were into a habit and [second] nature: and then the will by its own movement without any passion is inclined to that good. And this is to sin from choice either purposely or knowingly or even from malice.

Reply to 1. No agent intends evil as principally willed, but nevertheless the evil itself subsequently becomes voluntary for him if for the sake of enjoying the desired good he does not avoid incurring the evil.

Reply to 2. The will is always moved principally to some good; and it comes to pass by reason of a vehement movement to some good that it submits to the evil joined to that good.

Reply to 3. Sometimes it happens that the will is inclined to some good to which an evil is joined, and nevertheless is not inclined to that evil: for example if someone were to desire the pleasure connected with adultery, yet shrink from the deformity of adultery and therefore even reject the pleasure. But sometimes it happens that a person even voluntarily incurs the deformity of fault for the sake of the pleasure.

Reply to 4. That which is joined to a good principally desired, if it is unforeseen and unknown, is willed only accidentally, as when a person sinning from ignorance wills something that he does not know is a sin but in reality is a sin: for such a person does not will evil except accidentally. But if he knows it is evil, he now wills that evil as a consequence, as we have said (in the Response), and not merely incidentally.

Reply to 5. When it is said that a person sins 'from something', we are given to understand that that is the first principle of the sin. But in him who sins from weakness, the willing of evil is not the first principle of sin but is caused from passion; but in him who sins from malice, the willing of evil is the first principle of sin: because of itself and by reason of his own habit his will is inclined to the willing of evil, not by some external principle.

Reply to 6. The form in keeping with which the sinner acts is not only the very potency or power of the will, but the habit which internally inclines the will after the manner of a certain nature.

Reply to 7. The answer to the seventh argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 8. When it is said that someone sins from malice, 'malice' in that context can be taken either for a habit which is opposed to virtue, or for a fault, according as the internal act of the will i.e. choice is called a sin and is the cause of the external act; hence it does not follow that the same thing is the cause of itself.

Reply to 9. Malice is opposed to virtue which is a good quality of the mind,^{†19} but venial sin is not opposed to virtue: hence if someone intentionally commits a venial sin, it is not from malice.

Reply to 10. Good is the principle and end of action primarily and principally, but secondarily and consequently even evil can be willed, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 11. Even in a sin of weakness there can be choice, which however is not the first principle of sinning, since the sin of weakness is caused from passion. And therefore a person sinning in this a way is not said to sin from choice although he sins while choosing.

Reply to 12. Just as a passion present in the irascible or concupiscible power is the cause of choice inasmuch as it fetters the reason for the moment, so a habit established in these powers is the cause of choice inasmuch as it fetters the reason, not now after the manner of a transient passion, but after the manner of an immanent form.

Reply to 13. The universal principles of natural law about which no one errs pertain to synderesis;†20 but in him who sins in regard to particular things to be chosen, reason is fettered by passion or habit.

Replies to the arguments On the contrary:

Replies to 1 and 2. Although the arguments offered on the contrary arrive at true conclusions, nevertheless in the second argument it must be noted that when Augustine says he loved the iniquity itself and not the pears he was stealing, this is not to be understood as if the iniquity itself or the deformity of fault can be willed primarily and of itself (per se); but rather the thing willed primarily and of itself was either to act in accordance with the wishes of others, or to have experience of something, or to act in an uninhibited way or something of the sort.

Reply to 3. In the third argument it should be noted that not every sin which is caused by another sin can be said to be committed from malice: because it may be the case that the first sin which is the cause of the other sin, is committed from weakness or passion, but for someone to sin from malice, malice must be the first principle of sinning, as we have said (in the Response).

Question III, Article 13 †p

Whether He Who Sins from Malice Sins More Gravely Than He Who Sins from Weakness?†1

It seems that he does not, for the following reasons.

1. It is said in the Apocalypse (3, 15-16) "I would that thou wert cold or hot; but because thou art lukewarm . . . I am about to vomit thee out of my mouth." Now "hot" seems to be one who does good deeds, the "lukewarm" one who sins from weakness, for instance the incontinent man, but the utterly "cold", one who sins from malice, for instance the intemperate man. Therefore it is more dangerous to sin from weakness than from malice.

2. In Ecclesiasticus (42, 14) it is said "Better is the iniquity of a man than a woman doing a good turn," which is understood by some †2 in this way, that by "man" is meant one who energetically engages in a strenuous task, and by "woman" one who is lax and half-hearted in action. But the first seems to be applicable to the intemperate man, who acts from malice, as was said (in arg. 1); and the second to the incontinent man who sins from weakness. Therefore it is worse to sin from weakness than from malice.

3. In the Collationibus Patrum,†3 it is said that it is easier for a sinner to attain to the fervor of perfection than a lax and lukewarm monk. But a sinner is especially one who acts from malice, and a lax person is he who is ineffective in action. Therefore it is worse to sin from weakness than from malice.

4. He is most dangerously weak who cannot benefit either from the food or the medicine which benefits others. But neither knowledge nor good intention benefit the incontinent person who sins from weakness, because he is diverted by passion. Therefore he sins most dangerously.

5. The greater the passion that impels someone to sin, the less gravely he sins. But the impulse from habit is greater than the impulse from passion. Therefore he who is inclined to sin from habit, who is said to sin from malice, as was said (in the preceding article), sins less than he who is inclined to sin from passion, who is

said to sin from weakness.

6. He who sins from malice is moved to evil from a form inhering in him, which moves [him] after the manner of nature. But that which is naturally moved to something is moved to it necessarily and not voluntarily. Therefore he who sins from malice does not sin voluntarily; so he sins either not at all or very little.

On the contrary:

That which disposes to compassion diminishes sin. But weakness disposes to compassion according to that passage in Psalm 102, 13-14 "The Lord has compassion on them that fear him, for he knoweth our frame." Therefore a sin committed from weakness is less grave than a sin committed from malice.

Response:

A sin committed from malice other things being equal, is graver than a sin committed from weakness.

The reason for which is apparent from the following three arguments: first because, since that is called voluntary of which the moving principle is in the agent himself,†4 the more the principle of the act is in the agent himself the more voluntary it is, and consequently the more it is a sin if the act is evil. Now it is clear from what has been said previously (in q. 3, a. 9 and 10) that when someone sins from passion, the principle of the sin is the passion, which is in the sense appetite, and so such a principle is extrinsic to the will; but when someone sins from habit, which is to sin from malice, then the will of itself proceeds to the act of sin as it were already totally inclined from habit after the manner of a natural inclination to the act of sin, hence the sin is more voluntary and consequently graver.

Secondly because in him who sins from weakness, i.e. from passion, the will is inclined to the act of sin as long as the passion lasts, but immediately upon the cessation of the passion, which passes quickly,†5 the will recedes from that inclination and returns to its good intention, repenting of the sin committed. But in him who sins from malice, the will is inclined to the act of sin from an enduring habit, which does not pass away but persists as a kind of form now become immanent and connatural; hence he who sins in this way persists in the will to sin and does not easily repent. And therefore the Philosopher in Book VII of the Ethics†6 compares the intemperate man to one who suffers from a chronic disease, for instance a consumptive or a victim of dropsy, and the incontinent man to one who suffers from an intermittent sickness, for instance an epileptic. And so it is evident that he who sins from malice sins more gravely and more dangerously than he who sins from weakness.

Thirdly because he who sins from weakness has a will ordered to a good end: for he intends and seeks the good but in some instances diverges from his intention on account of passion; but he who sins from malice has a will ordered to an evil end: for he has a fixed intention of sinning. But it is evident that the end in things to be desired or to be done is like a principle in theoretical matters, as the Philosopher says.†7 Now he who errs about principles is ignorant in a most grave and dangerous way because such a person cannot be led back by means of any prior principles. But he who errs only about conclusions, can be led back by means of principles in which he is not in error. Therefore he who sins from malice sins most gravely and dangerously and cannot easily be induced to refrain from sin as can the one who sins from weakness in whom at least a good intention remains.

Reply to 1. In that passage "cold" designates the infidel i.e. the unbeliever who has some excuse because he sins through ignorance, according to the Apostle (in the First Epistle to Timothy 1, 13) "I obtained the mercy of God because I acted ignorantly in my unbelief." But "lukewarm" designates the sinful Christian who in the same genus of sin, sins more gravely, according to the Apostle (in Hebrews 10, 29) "How much more punishment do you think he deserves who . . . has esteemed the blood of the covenant unclean . . .," etc. Hence the passage cited is not to the point.

Reply to 2. According to the Gloss,†8"man" there is taken for a discrete and strong-minded person who although he sins at times, nevertheless from the sin itself derives the occasion of good, for instance, of humility and greater precaution; but "woman" there is taken for an indiscrete person who from the good that he does, derives the occasion of his own danger, inasmuch as from it he is caused to fall through pride. Or it can be said, according to the literal sense, that better is the iniquity of a man i.e. better is a bad man for companionship than a woman doing a good turn: for a man would more easily be plunged headlong into sin from familiar association with a good woman than with a bad man. And this is clear from what precedes in the text "Tarry not among women" (Ecclesiasticus 42, 12) and from what follows ". . . a woman bringing shame and reproach" (Ecclesiasticus 42, 14). Hence that argument is not to the point.

Reply to 3. He who is lax in doing good works is incomparably better than he who does evil. And from this very fact it comes about that the sinner considering his evil sometimes is so vehemently moved against that evil, that he advances to the fervor of perfection; but he who does good albeit remissly is not conscious of anything which he ought to be much afraid of, and hence is more satisfied with his state and is not so easily moved to worthier things.

Reply to 4. He who sins from weakness, although while committing the sin is not helped by knowledge and good intention, nevertheless he can easily be helped afterwards, to gradually form a habit of resisting passion. But it is difficult to lead a person back who sins from malice, just as it is to lead a person back who errs about principles, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 5. The impulse which is from passion diminishes the sin because it is so to speak from without. But the impulse which is from the will increases the sin: for the more vehement the movement of the will to sin, the more gravely a person sins; but habit makes the movement of the will more vehement, and therefore he who sins from habit sins more gravely.

Reply to 6. The habit of virtue or vice is a form in the rational soul, and every form is in a thing according to the mode of the recipient. But it is of the nature of the rational creature that it is free in its judgment and choice, and therefore the habit of virtue or vice does not incline the will of necessity, in such a way that a person cannot act contrary to the nature of the habit; but it is difficult to act contrary to that to which the habit inclines.

Question III, Article 14 †p

Whether Every Sin from Malice Is a Sin Against the Holy Spirit?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. A sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin in word, as is evident from that passage in Matthew 12, 32: "Whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the world to come." But a sin from malice can also be in the heart and in deed.†1 Therefore not every sin from malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

2. A sin against the Holy Spirit is a special genus of sin: for it has designated species, as is clear from the Master,†2 namely, obstinacy, despair and the like. But a sin from malice is not a special genus of sin: for it is possible to sin from malice in any genus of sin just as it is from weakness and from ignorance. Therefore not every sin from malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

3. A sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin of blasphemy, as is clear from that passage of Luke 12, 10 "But to him who has blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven." But blasphemy is a special sin. Since

then a sin from malice aforethought is not a special sin, because it is found in every genus of sin, it seems that not every sin from malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

4. A sin from malice is attributed to him to whom malice is pleasing for its own sake, just as to holy persons goodness is pleasing for its own sake, as the Master says.†3 But the fact that virtue is pleasing to someone for its own sake does not constitute a determinate species of virtue, therefore neither does the fact that malice is pleasing to someone for its own sake constitute a determinate species of malice. And so, since a sin against the Holy Spirit is a determinate species of sin, it seems that not every sin which is from malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit.

5. Augustine says in a letter to Boniface †4 that any sin in whatsoever way a man has estranged himself from God unto the end of his life, is a sin against the Holy Spirit. But this is possible even of a sin committed from weakness or from ignorance. Therefore to sin against the Holy Spirit is not the same as to sin from malice.

6. The Master says †5 that they sin against the Holy Spirit who think their malice is greater than the divine goodness. But they who think in this fashion err, and all who err are in ignorance. Therefore it seems that a sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin of ignorance rather than of weakness.

7. A person is said to sin 'from something' in two ways: in one way as a person is said to sin from a power, a habit or a disposition eliciting the act, in another way as from an end as the moving principle. But it cannot be said that someone sinning against the Holy Spirit sins from malice as from a habit or a disposition eliciting the act, because thus every sin would be against the Holy Spirit; nor again, as from an end as the moving principle, because malice, as such, cannot be an end as a moving principle: for no acts with evil as his goal, as Dionysius says;†6 but if malice is called a moving principle on account of an apparent good to which it is joined, every sin would be from malice, because in every sin the moving principle is an apparent good that is joined to an evil. Therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit is not the same as a sin from malice.

8. Malice is twofold:†7 namely, contracted malice, according as Bede cites it as one of the four effects following from the sin of our first parent;†8 and committed malice, which is an actual sin. But a sin against the Holy Spirit cannot be called a sin from contracted malice, because contracted malice pertains to a defect and weakness of man's nature, and thus a sin against the Holy Spirit would be a sin from weakness; nor can it be called a sin from committed malice, because thus a sin against the Holy Spirit would always have to be preceded by an actual sin, which is not the case in every species of sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit is not a sin from malice.

9. A sin against the Holy Spirit is called by the Masters [of theology]†9 a sin that is not easily forgiven. But this applies to any sin which proceeds from a habit. For Augustine says †10 that from a perverse will follows inordinate desire, from inordinate desire a custom of sinning, and from custom (not resisted) necessity. Therefore every sin that is from habit, even if it is not from malice but from weakness or ignorance, is a sin against the Holy Spirit, for a vicious habit is caused from custom. Therefore to sin against the Holy Spirit and to sin from malice are not the same.

On the contrary:

1. The Master says †11 that he to whom malice is pleasing for its own sake, sins against the Holy Spirit. But such a one is said to sin from malice. Therefore to sin from malice is the same as to sin against the Holy Spirit.

2. Moreover,†12 just as power is appropriated to the Father and wisdom to the Son, so goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But he who sins from weakness, which is opposed to power, is said to sin against the Father, and he who sins from ignorance, which is opposed to wisdom, is said to sin against the Son. Therefore he who sins from malice, which is opposed to goodness, is said to sin against the Holy Spirit.

Response:

Theologians have spoken in various ways about a sin against the Holy Spirit. The Holy Doctors before Augustine, namely Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, and Chrysostom †13 maintained that a sin is said to be against the Holy Spirit when someone blasphemes the Holy Spirit, whether the Holy Spirit is taken essentially according as the whole Trinity can be designated as both Spirit and Holy, †14 or is taken personally according as He is the Third Person in the Trinity. And this view seems to be in sufficient agreement with the text of the Gospel, from which this question has its origin. For when the Pharisees †15 said that Christ cast out devils by Beelzebub, they were blaspheming both the divinity of Christ, and the Holy Spirit through Whom Christ worked, ascribing to the prince of devils what Christ wrought by the power of His divinity or through the Holy Spirit. Hence even in the Gospel †16 the sin against the Holy Spirit is contraposed to the sin that is against the Son, i.e. against the humanity of Christ. But because it is stated that a sin against the Holy Spirit is not forgiven either in this world or in the world to come, †17 it would seem to follow that whoever blasphemes the Holy Spirit or the divinity of Christ can never have his sin forgiven, as Augustine objects in the book *On the Words of the Lord*, †18 though nevertheless baptism which confers the remission of sins is not denied to Jews and pagans and heretics who blaspheme the divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit.

And therefore Augustine in his book *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* †19 seems to restrict a sin against the Holy Spirit to those who after they know the truth and receive the sacraments, blaspheme the Holy Spirit not only in word, as unbelievers do by blaspheming the very Person of the Holy Spirit, but also either in their heart, envying the truth and grace which come from the Holy Spirit, or even in deed repudiating them. Nor is it an obstacle to this that the Pharisees to whom the Lord said these things, were unbelievers not yet initiated into the sacraments of faith: because the Lord did not intend to say that they already had committed an unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit, since He adds (Matthew 12, 33) "Either make the tree good and its fruit good . . . ," etc., but he intended to warn them lest by blaspheming as they were doing they would arrive in time at a degree of unpardonable sin. But against this Augustine again objects in the book *On the Words of the Lord*, †20 that the Lord does not say that he who has sinned against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven in baptism, but that he will not be forgiven in this world or the world to come in any way whatsoever. Therefore this sin does not seem to pertain more to the baptized than to others since, notwithstanding, in the Church repentance is never denied to any sinner if he is sorry for having sinned.

And so Augustine retracts this opinion in the *Retractions*, †21 adding that then only is the impugner of the known truth and the person envious of his brother's grace said to sin against the Holy Spirit when he perseveres in this until death. And for proof of this we should consider what Augustine has to say on this point in his book *On the Words of the Lord*. †22 For there he says, that we must bear in mind that not everything which is proposed in Scripture in an indefinite manner is to be taken universally; for example what is said in John (15, 22) "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin" is not to be understood in the sense that they would have as it were no sin, but that they would not have some one sin, which they committed in contemning the preaching and miracles of Christ. So then when it is said definitely in Matthew (12, 32) "Whoever speaks a word against the Holy Spirit . . . ," and likewise in Mark (3, 29) and Luke (12, 10) "Whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit . . . ," etc., we must understand one who blasphemes in some determinate manner.

Moreover we should note that the 'word' (verbum) against the Holy Spirit is manifested not only in speech but also in the heart and in deed, and also that many words on the same subject are called one word, †23 as for instance we frequently read in the Prophets †24 'the word which the Lord spoke' to Isaiah and Jeremiah.

But it is obvious that the Holy Spirit is charity, and in the Church forgiveness of sins takes place through charity: †25 and therefore the forgiveness of sins is an effect appropriated to the Holy Spirit, according to that passage in John (20, 22-23) "Receive ye the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven." That person then is said to speak an unpardonable word against the Holy Spirit who in heart, in word and deed so

resists the forgiveness of sins, that he perseveres in sin even unto death. And therefore according to Augustine †26 impenitence persisting until death is the sin against the Holy Spirit

And just as forgiveness of sins is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, so also is goodness: hence the Masters in theology †27 following in the wake of Augustine said that that person speaks a word or a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit who sins from malice, which is contrary to the goodness of the Holy Spirit.

So accordingly, if we speak of the sin against the Holy Spirit according to the opinion of the early saints or even according to the opinion of Augustine, not every sin from malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit, as can be clearly seen from what has been said.

But if we speak according to the words of the Masters, which are not to be esteemed lightly, thus it can be stated that, properly speaking of the sin against the Holy Spirit, not every sin from malice is a sin against the Holy Spirit. For he is said to sin from malice, as was said above (in q. 3, a. 12 and 13), whose will of itself (per se) is inclined to some good which has an annexed malice. Which can happen in a twofold manner. For even in natural things something is moved in two ways: either on account of an inclination, as a heavy object moves downward, †28 or on account of the removal of an impediment, †29 as water pours out of a broken vase. So then the will sometimes is inclined of itself to a good of this kind from its own inclination as a result of acquired habit, but sometimes from the removal of that which was restraining it from sin, for instance hope, fear of God, and other such gifts of the Holy Spirit by which man is kept from sin. Hence properly speaking he sins against the Holy Spirit whose will tends to sin from this that he casts aside such restraints of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore despair and presumption and obstinacy and the like are posited as species of sins against the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the Master. †30

However, broadly speaking he who sins from the inclination of habit can also be said to sin against the Holy Spirit, because even he as a consequence of habit resists the goodness of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to 1. According to the opinion of the early Holy Fathers a sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin in word by which a person blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, but according to other opinions †31 it must be said that there also is a word both in the heart and in deed, because we say something both in the heart and in deed, according to that passage in The First Epistle to the Corinthians (12, 3) "No one can say 'The Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit, i.e. in the heart, in word and in deed, as the Gloss explains there. †32

Reply to 2. According to the interpretation of the early saints, and also according to that of the Masters, †33 a sin against the Holy Spirit can be called a special genus of sin, provided however that 'a sin from malice' is taken in the proper sense according as a person sins from casting aside the benefits of the Holy Spirit by which he is restrained from sin. But if a sin from malice is taken according as it comes from an inclination of habit, it is not a special genus of sin but a kind of circumstance of sin which can be found in every genus of sin. And also in like manner it is to be answered if the sin against the Holy Spirit is final impenitence, according to Augustine's interpretation (in the Response).

Reply to 3. Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, according to the early saints, is taken as a special sin in word, but according to Augustine and the Masters †34 any resistance to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, either in heart or in word or in deed, is contained under blasphemy.

Reply to 4. If virtue for its own sake were pleasing to someone on account of the consideration of some higher mover a special kind of virtue would follow from this, for example if someone were to delight in chastity on account of the love of God, this would pertain to the virtue of chastity. And in like manner also if malice is pleasing to someone on account of contempt of divine hope or fear, this pertains to special kinds of sin, namely despair and presumption which are species of sins against the Holy Spirit.

Reply to 5. The argument given there proceeds according to the intention of Augustine: and hence a sin against the Holy Spirit is not a special genus of sin.

Reply to 6. The person in despair, i.e. without hope, who is said to sin against the Holy Spirit thinks his malice exceeds the divine goodness, not as an opinion, for thus he would commit a sin of unbelief, but because in the manner of one so thinking, he despairs of the divine goodness from a consideration of his evil deeds.

Reply to 7. As was said above (in q. 3 a. 12 and 13), in one way a person can be said to sin from malice as from an inclining habit, according to which malice is called a habit opposed to virtue. However it is not true that whoever sins in this manner sins from malice: for not everyone who does unjust deeds already has the habit of injustice, though a person by unjust actions arrives at the habit of injustice, as is said in Book II of the Ethics.^{†35} In another way it can be understood that a person sins from malice because he wills a good to which an evil is joined, and is not inclined to it from any passion or ignorance; and thus it is also evident that not every sinner sins from malice.

Reply to 8. Contracted malice is said to be a kind of proneness to do evil which is in us from the corruption of man as a result of inordinate concupiscence (fornice), and malice is not taken in this sense when someone is said to sin from malice, but is taken for committed malice according as the internal choice itself is called malice: and therefore it is to be understood that always when a person sins from malice, it is the internal act of sin that is called malice, from which the external act proceeds.

Reply to 9. A sin that is committed from the inclination of habit has some general characteristics in accordance with which it can be called a sin against the Holy Spirit; but a sin against the Holy Spirit can be taken in other ways as well, as we have said (in the Response).

Question III, Article 15 [†]p

Whether a Sin against the Holy Spirit Can Be Forgiven?

It seems that it cannot, for the following reasons.

1. It is said in Matthew (12, 32) "Whoever speaks a word against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the world to come." Therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit is never forgiven.

2. But it was argued that this sin is said not to be forgiven because it is forgiven with difficulty. But counter to this: it is said in Mark (3, 29) "Whoever has blasphemed against the Holy Spirit never has (Vulgate '... never will have') forgiveness but will be guilty of an everlasting sin." But he is not guilty of an everlasting sin whose sin is forgiven. Therefore in no way is a sin against the Holy Spirit forgiven.

3. We should pray for the forgiveness of any sin. But we are not to pray as to the sin against the Holy Spirit: for it is said in the First Epistle of John (5, 16) "There is a sin unto death; I do not mean that anyone should ask as to that." Therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit can never be forgiven.

4. Augustine says that "so great is the infamy of this sin that a person cannot submit to the humiliation of beseeching forgiveness." ^{†1} But since the beginning of (all) sin is pride as is said in Ecclesiasticus (10, 15), no sin can be healed except by humility, because contraries are healed by contraries.^{†2} Therefore a sin against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven.

5. Augustine says ^{†3} that sins of weakness and ignorance are venial, but not the sin of malice. But sins are called venial because they can be pardoned. Therefore a sin from malice, which is a sin against the Holy Spirit, cannot be pardoned.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in John XII †4 "Every kind of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven men."

2. No one commits a sin without the prospect of being able to achieve the impossible. If then it were impossible for some sin to be forgiven, the person despairing of its forgiveness would not sin. Which is obviously false.

3. Augustine says †5 that we should not despair of anyone so long as he is in this life. But no sin allures a man except in the state of this life. Therefore we should not despair of anyone, and so every sin can be forgiven.

Response:

The truth concerning this question can be shown from what has been said previously (in q. 3, a. 14). For if a sin against the Holy spirit is taken according to Augustine's interpretation, †6 obviously in this sense a sin against the Holy Spirit can never be forgiven. For inasmuch as a person persists in sin even unto death without repentance, in no way is sin forgiven him, if we are speaking of mortal sins among which is reckoned impenitence which Augustine holds to be a sin against the Holy Spirit. †7 There are however some light and venial sins which are forgiven in the world to come, as Gregory says. †8

But according to other interpretations †9 of a sin against the Holy Spirit, it is not said to be unpardonable because in no way is it forgiven, but for two reasons. First, so far as concerns the punishment, according as a sin is called remissible which has some excuse that it ought to be punished less, just as heat is said to be moderated (remitti) when it is diminished; and in this way a sin which is committed from ignorance or from weakness is said to be remissible, because ignorance and weakness lessen the sin, but not malice. In like manner even they were thought to have some excuse who were blaspheming against the humanity of Christ, calling him a wine-bibber and a glutton, †10 because they were moved to blaspheme by the weakness of his flesh. But those who blaspheme the divinity of Christ or the power of the Holy Spirit have no excuse that might diminish their sin.

In another way a sin can be called irremissible so far as concerns fault. For evidence of which we must consider that in the lower beings something is said to be impossible by reason of a privation of active power in the lower being, although divine power is not excluded: for example if we should say that it is impossible for Lazarus to rise when the created principle of life is removed, but by this we do not exclude the possibility of God raising him. But in him who sins against the Holy Spirit, the remedies for the remission of sin are cast aside, inasmuch as a person contemns the Holy Spirit and His gifts by which the remission of sins is accomplished in the Church. †11 And similarly he who sins from malice through the inclination of habit is ignorant of the proper end by means of which he could be brought back to good, as we have said above (in q. 3, a. 12 and 13).

And therefore according to these interpretations a sin against the Holy Spirit is called irremissible because those remedies by which a person is provided with help towards the remission of sin have been removed; nevertheless it is not irremissible if we consider the power of divine grace as the active principle, and the condition of free will not yet confirmed in evil as the material principle.

Reply to 1. The text 'It will not be forgiven either in this world or in the world to come' was understood in diverse ways according to the opinion of Augustine and that of others as was said (in the Response). However Chrysostom †12 more expediently settles the problem, by referring to the fact that the Jews for their blasphemies against Christ were about to suffer punishment both in this world from the Romans, and in the world to come in the damnation of hell.

Reply to 2. A sin against the Holy Spirit is called an everlasting sin, because considered in itself it is everlasting, but on account of the mercy of God it can be terminated; just as also charity considered in itself is said never to fall away,†13 although sometimes it falls away on account of the vice of the sinner.

Reply to 3. 'A sin unto death' can be understood as that in which a person persists until death, and so for such a one we are not to pray because prayers are of no benefit to the condemned who die without repentance. But if 'sin unto death' is understood as that which is committed from malice, it is not forbidden that one pray for him; but not everyone is of such great merit that by praying he can succeed in gaining grace for him, because the healing of such persons is so to speak miraculous: just as if it were said 'for the resuscitation of the dead I do not say that anyone should pray' i.e., anyone whatsoever, but someone of great merit in the sight of God.

Reply to 4. The words there are to be understood in the sense that such persons cannot easily become humble, not that it is altogether impossible.

Reply to 5. 'Venial' is said of sin in three ways: in one way by reason of its genus, as for instance an idle word is called a venial sin, in another way from the outcome, as the movement of concupiscence without consent is called a venial sin; in the third way it is called venial by reason of the cause,†14 namely in that it has an extenuating factor which lessens the sin. And in this way we are to understand that the sins of weakness and ignorance are venial, but not the sins from premeditation or malice.

Question 4

Question IV

On Original Sin

Article 1 †p

Whether Any Sin Is Contracted by Way of Origin?†1

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. It is said in Ecclesiasticus (15, 18) "Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him," from which it can be understood that sin, which is the spiritual death of the soul,†2 depends upon the will. But nothing that man contracts by way of his origin depends upon his will. Therefore man contracts no sin by way of origin.

2. An accident is not transmitted unless its subject is transmitted, but the subject of sin is the rational soul. Since then the rational soul is not transmitted by way of origin, as is said in the book *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*,†3 it seems that neither is any sin transmitted by way of origin.

3. But it was argued that although the subject of sin is not transmitted nevertheless the flesh, which is the cause of sin,†4 is transmitted. But counter to this: the transmission of an insufficient cause does not suffice for the transmission of an accident, because if the cause is insufficient the effect does not follow; but the flesh is an insufficient cause of sin, because however much the flesh entices to sin it is still within the power of the will to assent or not to assent, and thus the will itself is the sufficient cause of sin. But the will is not transmitted. Therefore the transmission of the flesh does not suffice for the transmission of any sin.

4. Sin as it is taken here, is that for which punishment and blame is incurred. But punishment and blame are not incurred for any defect contracted by way of origin: for as the Philosopher says,†5 if someone is blind owing to a disease he is not blamed, but he is blamed if he is blind from drunkenness. Therefore no defect

contracted by way of origin has the nature of sin.

5. At the beginning of the book *On the Free Choice of the will*†6 Augustine distinguishes a twofold evil: one that we do, which is the evil of fault, and the other that we suffer, which pertains to the evil of punishment. But every defect which is from another has the nature of suffering, i.e. of undergoing, or being acted upon, for suffering is an effect of being acted upon.†7 Therefore nothing which is contracted from another by way of origin has the nature of sin but only of punishment.

6. It is said in the book *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*†8 "Our flesh is good, namely as being created by a good God." But good is not the cause of evil according to that passage of Matthew (7, 18) "A good tree cannot bear bad fruit." Therefore original sin is not contracted by way of the flesh's origin.

7. The soul depends more on the flesh after being united to it than in its being united to it. But after the soul has already been united to the flesh, the soul cannot be infected by the flesh without its consent, therefore neither can the soul be infected in its being united to the flesh. Original sin then cannot be contracted by way of the flesh's origin.

8. If the vitiated origin of the flesh causes sin in the soul, the more the origin is vitiated the greater the sin it will cause. But in those who are begotten of fornication the origin is more vitiated than in those begotten of lawful marriage; it would follow then that those who are begotten of fornication contract greater sin at their begetting. Which is clearly false, because they do not warrant greater punishment.

9. If original sin is contracted by way of the flesh's origin, this is only inasmuch as the flesh is corrupted. That corruption then is either moral or it is natural. But it cannot be moral because the subject of moral corruption is not the flesh, but the soul: and likewise it cannot be natural, because it would follow that the flesh would infect the soul by a natural action, namely through the agency of active and passive qualities.†9 Which is clearly false. Therefore in no way is sin contracted by way of the flesh's origin.

10. The defect that followed from the sin of our first parent is the absence of original justice, as Anselm says;†10 and so since original justice is something spiritual, it follows that this defect is also spiritual. But corruption of the flesh is something bodily or physical, and spiritual and bodily things belong to different genera, and so what is spiritual cannot cause a bodily effect. Therefore the sin of our first parent could not cause corruption in our flesh, through which sin would be transmitted to us by way of origin.

11. According to Anselm †11 original sin is the absence of original justice: either then original justice belonged naturally to the soul of the first man at his creation or it was a gift superadded out of divine liberality. But if it was natural to the soul, the soul would never have lost it by sinning: because, as Dionysius says,†12 natural gifts remained even in the demons; and so also all men would have original justice, because what is natural to one soul is natural to all souls, and therefore no one would be born with original sin, i.e. with the absence of original justice. But if that justice was a gift superadded out of divine liberality, then either God gives that gift to the soul of man at the moment of his formation, or He does not: if He gives it, man is not born with the absence of original justice, nor can his soul be infected by the flesh; but if it is not given to him by God, this does not seem to be imputed to the soul, but to God Who did not give it. In no way then can man contract sin by way of origin.

12. The rational soul does not supervene upon some pre-existing form, because then it would not come to matter as a substantial form but as an accidental form, which comes to a subject already actually existing. Therefore at the advent of the rational soul all pre-existing forms must be lacking and consequently all accidents; so even the seed's corruption ceases, if it was in any way present from the generator. Therefore the arriving soul cannot be defiled by the flesh.

13. Movement results from the nature of the predominant element in mixed bodies, and consequently all

properties result from that which is predominant in the composite.†13 But the soul is predominant over the body in man, who is composed of both, and the soul by reason of its origin is untainted. Although then the flesh contracts some impurity from its origin, nevertheless it seems that the man beginning to be formed ought not to be said to be infected with sin, but untainted.

14. Sin is that for which some punishment is warranted. But no punishment is warranted for sin contracted by way of origin. For deprivation of the vision of God which is commonly †14 assigned to it as a punishment does not seem to be a punishment: because if a man were to die without any sin and did not have grace he could not attain to the vision of God, in which eternal life consists according to that passage in John 17, 3 "This is everlasting life, that they may know Thee, the only true God," and the Apostle says in Romans 6, 23 "The gift of God is life everlasting." Therefore there is not any sin contracted by way of origin.

15. Just as the first cause is more noble than the second, so the second cause is more noble than the effect. But if sin is transmitted from our first parent, corruption has followed in the flesh from the soul of the first man sinning, and from the flesh is conveyed to the soul of the man who is born from Adam; and thus the soul of the first man is as it were the first cause, the flesh as it were the second cause, and the soul of the man generated the final effect. In that case, then, the soul of the first man will be more noble, and the flesh more noble than the soul of the man generated. Which is unreasonable. Therefore sin cannot be transmitted by way of origin.

16. Nothing acts except inasmuch as it is actual.†15 But sin is not actual in the seed. Therefore the soul cannot be infected with any sin by means of the detached seed.†16

17. The same thing cannot be the cause of the infection of sin and of merit. But the act of generation sometimes can be meritorious, for example when a man in a state of grace approaches his wife for the sake of begetting offspring or of rendering the marital debt. Therefore the infection of sin in the offspring could not be caused by this.

18. A particular cause does not induce a universal effect. But the sin of Adam was a particular occurrence. Therefore it could not infect all human nature with some sin.

19. The Lord says to Ezechiel (18, 4 and 20) "All souls are mine; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear it if for the sin of the first man those who are begotten from him were condemned for his sin. Therefore sin is not transmitted to the descendants of Adam on account of his sin.

On the contrary:†17

1. It is said in Romans 5, 12 "Through one man sin entered into the world." But not through imitation, because in this manner sin entered into the world through the devil, according to that passage in Wisdom I †18 "By the envy of the devil death came into the world. And they imitate him who are on his side." Therefore the sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants by way of vitiated origin.

2. Augustine says in Book XIV On the City of God†19 that the first man, being of his own will corrupted, begot corrupted offspring. But corruption comes about only through sin. Therefore the descendants of Adam contract sin by way of their origin.

Response:

The Pelagians †20 denied that any sin could be transmitted by way of origin. But this excludes in large part the necessity of the redemption wrought by Christ, which seems to have been especially necessary to eradicate the infection of sin that is transmitted from the first parent to all his descendants, as the Apostle says in Romans 5, 18 "As from the offense of the one man the result was unto condemnation to all men, so from the

justice of the one the result is unto justification of life to all men." It also excludes the necessity of baptizing infants, which however the common custom of the Church shows to be derived from the Apostles, as Dionysius says.†21 And therefore it must be held simply i.e. without qualification, that sin is transmitted by way of origin from the first parent to his descendants.

To manifest this we must consider that an individual man can be regarded in two ways: in one way as he is a particular person, in another way as he is part of a community (collegium). And in either way an act is attributable to him: for that act which a man does by his own choice and of himself (per se) is attributed to him insofar as he is a particular person, but an act is attributable to him insofar as he is a part of a community, which act he does not do of himself (per se) nor by his own choice, but which is done by the whole community or the majority of the community or by the head of the community, just as that which the ruler of the state does the state is said to do, as the Philosopher says.†22 For such a community of men is regarded as one man, such that different individuals appointed to different offices are as it were different members of one natural body, as the Apostle manifests in regard to the Church in I Corinthians 12, 12. In this manner then the whole multitude of men receiving human nature from the first parent, is to be considered as one community, or rather as one body of one man. In which multitude each man, even Adam himself, can be considered either as a single person, or as a particular member of this multitude which is derived from one man by way of natural origin.

We must also consider that at his creation God had endowed man with a supernatural gift, namely, original justice, by which his reason was subject to God, his lower powers to reason, and his body to his soul. But this gift was not given to the first man as to a single person only, but as to a principle of all human nature, namely so that from him by way of origin it would be transmitted to his descendants. Now the first man sinning by free judgment and choice, lost this gift he had received in that same tenor, i.e. in the precise sense, in which it was given to him, namely for himself and for all his descendants. The lack then of this gift accompanies the whole of his posterity, and so this defect is transmitted to his descendants in that manner in which human nature is transmitted. Which is transmitted not according to the whole but according to a part of it, namely according to the flesh, into which God infuses the soul. And therefore, just as the soul infused by God pertains to human nature derived from Adam on account of the flesh to which it is joined, so also the forementioned defect pertains to the soul on account of the flesh which is propagated from Adam, not only according to bodily substance but also according to seminal power,†23 i.e. not only materially but as from an active principle: for in this manner a son receives human nature from the father.

If then this defect transmitted thus by way of origin to this man be considered according as this man is an individual person, then such a defect cannot have the nature of fault, for to have the nature of fault it must be voluntary. But if this man generated be considered as a member of the whole of human nature propagated by the first parent as if all men were one man, the defect does have the nature of fault, on account of its voluntary principle which is the actual sin of the first parent. Just as if we should say that the motion of the hand to perpetrate homicide, inasmuch as the hand is considered by itself (per se), does not have the nature of fault because the hand is necessarily moved by something else; but if we consider the hand as a part of the whole man who operates by the will, in this way the motion has the nature of fault, because thus it is voluntary. Therefore just as homicide is not said to be the fault of the hand but of the whole man, so this defect, i.e. original sin] is not said to be a personal sin but a sin of the whole nature, nor does it pertain to the person except inasmuch as the nature infects the person. And just as for the commission of one sin different parts of man are employed, namely the will, the reason, the hand and the eye and so on, and nevertheless there is only one sin because of the unity of the principle, namely the will, from which the nature of sin is transmitted to all the acts of the parts, so also by reason of the principle in all human nature there is considered to be as it were one original sin. For which reason the Apostle says in Romans 5, 12 "In whom (in quo) all have sinned." Which "in quo", according to Augustine,†24 can be taken to mean: 'in whom', i.e. the first man, or 'in which', i.e. the sin of the first man, so that the sin of the first man is as it were the common sin of all.

Reply to 1. The sin that is contracted by way of origin is called voluntary by reason of its principle,

namely, the will of the first parent, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. This sin accompanies all human nature; consequently the subject of this sin is the soul according as it is a part of human nature. And therefore, just as human nature is transmitted although the soul is not transmitted, so also original sin is transmitted although the soul is not transmitted.

Reply to 3. The flesh is not a sufficient cause of actual sin, but it is a sufficient cause of original sin, just as also the transmission of the flesh is a sufficient cause, though in a material way, of human nature.

Reply to 4. Punishment and blame is not warranted for that which is contracted by way of origin if we are referring to the person, because in this way it (i.e. original sin) is not held to be voluntary; but if we are referring to the nature, in this way it is held to be voluntary, as we have said (in the Response). And in this way reproach and punishment is warranted for it.

Reply to 5. The defect contracted by way of origin has the distinctive note of being from another if it be referred to the person, but not if it be referred to the nature: for in this way it is so to speak from an intrinsic principle.

Reply to 6. Our flesh in its nature is good, but according as it is deprived of original justice on account of the sin of our first parent, it is the cause of original sin.

Reply to 7. As we said (in the Response), original sin strictly (per se) speaking is a sin of the nature and not of the person except by reason of the infected nature. And the act of generation properly serves the nature, because it is ordained to the preservation of the species, but that the flesh be already united to the soul, pertains to the constitution of the person. And therefore the flesh causes original sin rather as it is considered in the act of generation than as it is already united [to the soul].

Reply to 8. In those born of fornication their origin is vitiated in two ways, namely by the sin of the nature, which is transmitted from Adam, and by a sin of the person, i.e. of the father generating, from which sin no infection is left in the offspring. For every man who begets transmits original sin inasmuch as he generates as Adam, not inasmuch as he generates as Peter or Martin, i.e. in virtue of what he has from Adam, not in virtue of what is proper to himself.

Reply to 9. The corruption which is in the flesh is natural in its effect but moral in intention and power. For by reason of the sin of our first parent his flesh was deprived of that power whereby from it could be detached seed by which original justice would be propagated in others; and so in the seed the defect of this power is a defect pertaining to moral corruption and a certain intention of it, just as we say that color is in the air after the manner of an intention †25 of it and the soul is in the seed after the manner of an intention of it.†26 And by reason of this there is also there (in the seed) the power to produce a similar infection, just as there is there the power for the production of human nature in the offspring generated.

Reply to 10. Nothing prevents a spiritual cause from producing a bodily effect. For Boethius too says †27 that the forms which are in matter come from forms which are without matter; and even in ourselves the lower appetite, as a result of whose movement corporeal change follows, is moved by the will.

Reply to 11. Original justice was superadded to the first man out of divine liberality. But that it is not given to this soul by God is not on His part, but on the part of human nature in which there is an impediment incompatible with it.

Reply to 12. The corruption of original sin is not actually but virtually present in the semen in that manner in which human nature is there virtually. Which active power is the spiritus [i.e. vital heat] included in the semen and the fume-like, as the Philosopher says in the book On the Generation of Animals,†28 but not in

the matter which loses one form and acquires another.

Reply to 13. As Dionysius says,†29 good results from a whole and integral cause, but evil from any single defects. And therefore a defect on the part of the body is sufficient to deprive human nature of its integrity.

Reply to 14. The absence of the vision of God is attributable to a person in two ways: in one way insofar as a person does not have in himself that whereby he can attain to the vision of God. And in this way the absence of the vision of God would be attributable to him who having only natural powers would live even without sin: for thus the absence of the vision of God is not a punishment but an ineffectiveness accompanying all created nature, because no creature in virtue of its natural powers can attain to the vision of God. In another way the absence of the vision of God is attributable to a person inasmuch as he has in himself something owing to which he ought to be without the vision of God, and in this way the absence of the vision of God is a punishment of both original and actual sin.

Reply to 15. Cause is twofold: one, principal, which acts in virtue of its own form; and this cause is more noble than the effect, inasmuch as it is the cause. The other is the instrumental cause, which does not act in virtue of its own form, but inasmuch as it is moved by another; and this need not be more noble than the effect, as a saw is not more noble than a house. And in this way carnal seed is the cause of human nature in the offspring, and also of original fault in the offspring's soul.

Reply to 16. A thing is in act in many ways: in one way according to its own form, which either contains the form of the effect according to a likeness of species, as fire generates fire, or according to power only, as the sun generates fire. In another way as moved by another: and in this way an instrument acts like a being in act. And in this way too the seed is in act inasmuch as the motion and intention of the generating soul is in it, according to the Philosopher;†30 and by reason of this it has the power to cause both human nature and original sin.

Reply to 17. A just man approaching his wife for sexual intercourse merits in accordance with that which is proper to himself as a person. And in this way he does not transmit original sin, but in accordance with that which he has from Adam, as we have said above (in Reply to 8).

Reply to 18. Adam inasmuch as he was the principle of all human nature, fulfilled the function of a universal cause, and so by virtue of his act all human nature propagated from him is corrupted.

Reply to 19. The sin of the first man is so to speak a common sin of all human nature, as was said (in the Response). And for this reason when a person is punished for the sin of the first parent, he is not punished for the sin of another but for his own sin.

Question IV, Article 2 †p

What is Original Sin?

I. - It seems that it is concupiscence.

1. For Augustine says †1 "Adam besides being an example for imitation has made infectious in him all who were to come from his stock by the hidden corruption of his carnal concupiscence": hence the Apostle rightly says in Romans 5, 12 ". . . in whom all have sinned." But original sin is that in which all sinned, as was said (in q. 4 a. 1). Therefore original sin is concupiscence.

2. Anselm says in the book *On the Virgin Conception* †2 "He (Adam) was so made that he ought not to experience inordinate concupiscence." But as he says in the same book †3 "sin is present not only when man does not have what he ought to have, but also when he has what he ought not to have." Therefore original sin is contracted concupiscence.

3. Augustine says †4 that the guilt of concupiscence is blotted out in baptism. But the guilt of original sin is properly blotted out in baptism. Therefore concupiscence is original sin.

On the contrary:

1. Damascene says †5 that sin is due to this that a person turns from that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature; hence the saying that sin is contrary to nature. But concupiscence is natural: for nature has taught all animals this. †6 Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.

2. But it was argued that concupiscence is natural according to corrupted i.e. fallen nature, but not according to nature as it was instituted. But counter to this: concupiscence is the proper act of the concupiscible power. But the concupiscible power is natural even according to nature as instituted. Therefore also concupiscence.

3. No sin is related to good and to evil. But concupiscence i.e. desire is both of good, for example wisdom, and of evil, for example thievery. Therefore concupiscence of itself is not original sin.

4. Concupiscence designates either a habit or an act. But as it designates an act it is an actual sin, not original sin, and as it designates a habit it cannot be original sin, because habit in a man acquired from his own evil acts is not a sin, otherwise he would continually sin and continually demerit: and so much less does habitual concupiscence, caused in this man from an act of the first parent, have the name of sin. Therefore in no way is concupiscence original sin.

5. Every habit is either natural or acquired or infused. But original sin is not a natural habit because, according to Dionysius, †7 nothing which belongs to a thing by nature is evil for it; likewise neither is it an acquired habit because acquired habits are caused by acts, as is clear from the Philosopher, †8 and original sin is not acquired by acts but is transmitted by way of origin; likewise it is not an infused habit, because only God working within the soul is the cause of such habits and He cannot be the cause of sin. Therefore in no way is original sin habitual concupiscence.

6. According to the common opinion of theologians, †9 in good acts, habit precedes act because the habit is infused by God and the act is done by us, but in evil acts, act precedes habit. If then original sin is habitual concupiscence it will follow that evil acts that are actual sins would precede original sin. Which is unreasonable.

7. Original sin is said to be the fuel (the fomes) of every sin. †10 But sins are caused not only from concupiscence but also from malice or from ignorance, as was shown above (in q. 3, a. 7 and 12). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence.

8. If concupiscence is original sin, either it is original sin essentially and so since concupiscence remains after baptism original sin would not be blotted out (by baptism); which is not reasonable. Or concupiscence is called original sin on account of something else connected with it, and thus that other is more properly original sin. Therefore original sin is not concupiscence.

9. An accident i.e. an attribute is caused by the principles of the subject. But the subject of original sin is the soul, and the cause of concupiscence is not the soul but the flesh. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.

10. Concupiscence seems to be original sin especially according as it implies the necessity of concupiscence itself. But this necessity can be taken in two ways: in one way that it is a necessity of assenting to the movements of concupiscence; which necessity cannot be called original sin, because it does not remain after baptism, and original sin remains in its effect but passes as to its guilt.†11 And in the other way it is a necessity of experiencing the movements of concupiscence, but neither can this be original sin. For either it would be original sin of itself or on account of something else. If of itself, it would follow that original sin remained after baptism, since such a necessity remains after baptism; but if on account of something else, namely on account of the absence of original justice, neither does this seem to be possible, because the necessity of experiencing such movements is related to original sin as actually experiencing is to actual sin, but to actually experience movements of concupiscence is not an actual sin because of this that the absence of grace is connected with it, otherwise in those who are without grace every movement of concupiscence would be a sin. Which is clearly false, since sometimes by natural reason they resist the movements of concupiscence. Therefore neither is the necessity of experiencing such movements original sin on account of the associated absence of original justice: and so in no way is concupiscence original sin.

11. If concupiscence is original sin, either it is original sin essentially or causally. But it is not original sin essentially, because concupiscence is the cause of original sin according to Augustine,†12 and the cause is outside the essence of a thing; and likewise concupiscence is not original sin causally, since the cause precedes the effect, and concupiscence does not precede the absence of original justice, in which the nature of original sin principally consists, but rather follows from it. Therefore in no way is concupiscence original sin.

12. Just as in the state of corrupted nature the concupiscible power resists reason, so also does the irascible power. Therefore no more ought concupiscence to be called original sin than anger.

II. - Also it was said that original sin is ignorance.

1. For Anselm says in the book On Predestination†13 that the inability of human nature to have justice and to understand it is imputed to original sin. But the inability to understand pertains to ignorance. Therefore original sin is ignorance.

2. In the same book †14 Anselm says the fact that human nature was diminished in relation to the original beauty of the human condition is imputed to it as a sin But the beauty of human nature consists especially in the splendor of knowledge. Therefore it seems that original sin which is imputed to human nature is the abasement of knowledge, i.e. ignorance.

3. Hugh of St. Victor †15 says that the vice we contracted at our begetting consists in ignorance in the mind and concupiscence in the flesh. But such a vice is original sin. Therefore original sin is just as much ignorance as concupiscence.

On the contrary:

1. Ignorance differs from concupiscence, and is not in the same subject. But the same thing is not in diverse genera nor in diverse subjects. Therefore original sin since it is concupiscence cannot be ignorance.

2. Just as the intellect incurs a defect on account of original sin so also do the lower powers, such as the procreative power, and even the body itself. If then ignorance, which is a defect of the intellect, is taken to be original sin, also with equal reason all the defects of the lower powers and even of the body itself. Which seems implausible.

III. - Also it was said that original sin is the absence of original justice.

1. For Anselm †16 argues thus in the book *On the Virgin Conception*: Every sin is an injustice and consequently excludes any justice; but original sin excludes no other justice than original justice: Therefore original sin is the absence of original justice.

On the contrary:

1. Fault is said to be due to the privation of sanctifying grace. But original justice does not include sanctifying grace, because the first man was established in original justice and not in sanctifying grace, as is evident from the Master.†17 Therefore the absence of original justice does not constitute the nature of sin.

2. Original justice is not restored by baptism since the lower powers still resist reason. If then original sin were the absence of original justice, it would follow that original sin was not absolved by baptism. Which is heretical.†18

3. The subject ought to be put in the definition of an accident.†19 But when it is said that original sin is the absence of original justice, no mention is made of the subject. Therefore the definition is inadequate.

4. Just as original justice is taken away as a result of original sin, so grace is taken away as a result of actual sin. But the absence of grace is not itself an actual sin, but the effect of it. Therefore neither is the absence of original justice original sin itself.

IV. - Also it was said †20 that original sin is a penalty and fault.

1. For on Psalm 84, 2 "Lord, thou has blessed thy land," the Gloss says †21 that that which we contract from Adam is a penalty and fault. But this, i.e. what we contract from Adam, is original sin. Therefore original sin is a penalty and fault.

2. Moreover,†22 Ambrose says †23 that vice or penalty corrupts nature, fault offends God. But original sin does both. Therefore original sin is both a fault and a penalty.

On the contrary:

1. Hugh of St. Victor says †24 that original sin is a mortal weakness from which the necessity of experiencing concupiscence ensues. But weakness designates a penalty. Therefore original sin is a penalty only.

2. Furthermore †25 Anselm speaking of original sin †26 compares it to the slavery that certain ones suffer for the sin of their father who committed the crime of treason. But such slavery is a penalty only. Therefore original sin is a penalty only.

3. Augustine says in Book XV *On the City of God*†27 that original sin is a sickness of human nature (induced by sin). But sickness designates a penalty. Therefore original sin is a penalty only.

Response:

The truth in regard to this question can be inferred from what has been said above. For it was stated above (in q. 4, a. 1) that original sin is attributed to this or that person according as he is considered a part of a multitude of people descended from Adam, as if he were a particular member or limb of one man. It was also

stated (in q. 4, a. 1) that original sin is one sin of one sinner according as it is referred to the whole and the first principle of sinning, although the execution of the sin is done by diverse members. Therefore original sin in this or that man is nothing other than that which comes to him by way of origin from the sin of the first parent, just as sin in the hand or in the eye is nothing other than that which comes to the hand or to the eye from the movement of the first principle of sinning, which is the will, although in one case the movement takes place by way of natural origin, but in the other case from the command of the will. Now that which comes to the hand from the sin of one particular man is a certain effect and impression of the first inordinate movement which was in the will, hence it must bear a likeness to it. But the inordinate movement of the will is a turning to some temporal good without a proper order to the due end; which inordinateness is a turning away from an immutable good, and the latter is the quasi formal element, and the former the quasi material element: for the formal nature of a moral act is taken from its relation to the end. Hence that which pertains to the hand from the sin of one man is nothing other than the application of it to some effect without any order of justice. Now admittedly if the movement of the will extends to something which is not susceptible of sin, for example, a spear or a sword, we do not say that sin is in it except virtually and after the manner an effect, namely inasmuch as the spear or sword is moved in virtue of the act of sin and achieves the sin's effect, not that the spear or the sword itself commits sin, since they are not a part of the man sinning like the hand or the eye.

So accordingly in the sin of the first parent there was a formal element, namely turning away from an immutable good, and a material element, namely turning to a mutable good.†28 But from this that he turned away from an immutable good, he lost the gift of original justice, and from this that he turned inordinately to a mutable good, his lower powers which ought to be lifted up to reason were drawn downwards to lower activities. Therefore also in those who descend from him as their source, the higher part of the soul lacks the proper order to God, which it had by virtue of original justice, and the lower powers are not subject to reason but are turned to lower activities according to their own impulse, and even the body itself tends to corruption according to the tendency of the contraries of which it is composed.†29 However the higher part of the soul, and even certain of the lower powers which are subject to the will and naturally designed to obey it, contract this consequence of the first sin after the manner of fault: for such parts are susceptible of fault. But the lower powers that are not subject to the will, namely the powers of the vegetative soul and even the body itself, receive this consequence after the manner of a penalty, not after the manner of fault except perhaps virtually, namely inasmuch as such a penalty following sin is productive of sin according as the procreative power through the detachment of bodily seed †30 serves for the transmission of original sin together with human nature.

However among the higher powers which receive the defect transmitted by way of origin after the manner of fault, there is one which moves all the others, namely the will,†31 and all the others are moved by it to their acts. Now what is on the part of the agent and mover is always as it were formal and what is on the part of the movable and recipient is as it were material. And therefore, since the absence of original justice is on the part of the will, but the proneness to inordinate concupiscence, which may be called by the general name of concupiscence, is on the part of the lower powers moved by the will, it follows that original sin in this or in that man is nothing other than concupiscence together with the absence of original justice, in such a way however that the absence of original justice is the quasi formal element in original sin and concupiscence is the quasi material element; just as also in actual sin, turning away from an immutable good is the quasi formal element, and turning to a mutable good is the quasi material element: so that in like manner in original sin the soul may be understood as turned from i.e. averted and turned to i.e. converted, just as in actual sin the act is as it were averted and converted.

I. -- Arguments 1, 2, and 3, then, which prove that original sin is concupiscence are to be conceded.

Replies to On the contrary:

Reply to 1. Something can be natural to man in two ways: in one way inasmuch as he is an animal, and

in this way it is natural to him that generally speaking the concupiscible power is moved to what is enjoyable according to the senses; in the other way inasmuch as he is a man, i.e. a rational animal, and in this way it is natural to him that the concupiscible power be moved to what is sensually enjoyable according to the order of reason. The concupiscence, then, by which the concupiscible power is prone to move to what is sensually enjoyable contrary the order of reason, is contrary to the nature of man inasmuch as he is a man; and therefore it pertains to original sin.

Reply to 2. Just as the concupiscible appetite is natural to man according to his nature as instituted, so also it is natural to the concupiscible appetite to be subject to reason, according to what the Philosopher says in Book III On the Soul,†32 that the sense appetite obeys the rational appetite just as one sphere imparts its movement to another sphere.

Reply to 3. Concupiscence i.e. desire is indeed of good according as concupiscence follows the order of reason, but it is of evil according as it is contrary to reason: because as Dionysius says,†33 for man it is evil to be contrary to reason; and hence it is that to be furious beyond reason is evil in a man although it is good in a dog.†34

Reply to 4. Concupiscence according as it pertains to original sin is not actual but habitual concupiscence. But it must be noted that we become apt to do something from habit. Now an agent can be apt to do something in two ways: in one way on account of a form inclining to this, as a heavy body moves downward account of its form which it has from the generator,†35 in another way from the removal of that which was impeding it, as wine spills out when the cask's hoops burst apart which prevented the spilling, and a spurred horse rushes headlong when the bridle breaks that was holding it in check. Similarly then concupiscence can be called habitual in two ways: in one way as a disposition or habit inclining to concupiscence, for example if a habit of concupiscence was caused in a person from frequent actual concupiscence, and in this way concupiscence is not said to be original sin; in another way habitual concupiscence can be understood as the very proneness or aptitude to be concupiscent, which results from the fact that the concupiscible power is not perfectly subject to reason after the curb of original justice is removed: and in this way original sin materially speaking is habitual concupiscence.

But notwithstanding it does not follow, if habitual concupiscence in the sense affirmed has not the nature of actual sin according as it is caused from personal acts, that for this reason habitual concupiscence taken after the manner of the removal of an impediment does not have the nature of original sin as it is caused by the act of the first parent, on the grounds that original sin is not called sin for the same reason as actual sin is: since actual sin consists in the voluntary act of a person, and therefore what does not belong to such an act does not have the nature of actual sin; but in fact original sin pertains to the person according to the nature it received from another by way of origin, and so every defect in the nature of the offspring found to be derived from the sin of the first parent has the nature of original sin, provided it is in a subject that is susceptible of fault. For as Augustine says †36 concupiscence is called a sin because it was produced by sin.

Reply to 5. Just as a vicious habit which is proper to this person is acquired from the acts of this person, so too habitual concupiscence which pertains to a sin of the nature, is acquired from a voluntary act of the first parent; however it is not natural properly speaking nor is it infused.

Reply to 6. The argument in that objection proceeds from habit called personal in a positive way; but such a habit is not original sin.

Reply to 7. Both malice and ignorance are comprehended under original sin. For just as concupiscence contracted by way of origin is nothing other than an abandoning by the lower powers of the curb of original justice, so contracted malice is nothing other than an abandoning by the will itself of original justice: and hence it becomes subject to every proclivity to choose evil. And in this way according to what was said (in the Response) malice belongs to original sin as formal, and concupiscence as material. But we shall speak about

ignorance later (in the Replies about ignorance).

Reply to 8. Something is called such and such on account of another, not only as it is such on account of an accident or attribute but also as it is such on account of a formal principle; for example, a body is called living on account of the soul; nevertheless it does not follow that the body is not a part of the living being. Likewise concupiscence is called original sin on account of the absence of original justice, which as we have stated (in the Response), is to concupiscence as the formal is to the material. Hence it does not follow that concupiscence is not something belonging to original sin.

Reply to 9. A natural accident i.e. attribute is caused by the principles of its subject, but not an accident that is not natural, of which kind is original sin. And yet even original sin is caused by the will of the first parent.

Reply to 10. Concupiscence according as it is something belonging to original sin does not designate the necessity of assenting to inordinate movements of concupiscence but designates the necessity of experiencing them, which indeed remains after baptism, but it does not remain simultaneous with the absence of original justice, from which there is the guilt i.e. debt of punishment. Therefore we say that the absence of original justice] remains in its effect but passes as to its guilt. Nevertheless it is unreasonable that the necessity of experiencing the movements of concupiscence does not have the nature of original sin on account of fact that experiencing such movements does not have the nature of actual sin because of the absence of grace: since actual sin consists in an act, for it is an inordinate act. And for that reason the defect constituting actual sin is the very inordinateness of the act but not the absence of grace, which is a defect in the subject of sin. But original sin is a sin of the nature; and therefore the inordinateness of the nature in virtue of the removal of original justice is taken as the nature of original sin.

Reply to 11. Concupiscence can be considered in two ways: in one way as it is in another man: and thus concupiscence in the father is regarded as the cause of original sin in the son, and does not belong to its essence but precedes it. In another way concupiscence can be considered as it is in the same man, and thus it is a cause by way of the matter, which is of the essence of a thing, and precedes it so to speak after the manner of matter, as the body precedes the soul in the order of material cause. For it was said above (in q. 4, a. 1) that from the flesh, to which concupiscence pertains, the soul is infected to which the absence of original justice pertains.

Reply to 12. Even the corruption of the irascible power is included in a material way in original sin as also is the corruption of the concupiscible power. However original sin is denominated rather from the concupiscible power for two reasons: first because all the passions of the irascible power originate from love, which is in the concupiscible power, and terminate in joy or sorrow, which are also in the concupiscible power: hence the movement of both the concupiscible and the irascible power can be called concupiscence in a general way; secondly because original sin is transmitted through the act of generation, wherein there is a maximum degree of pleasure, in which the inordinateness of the concupiscible power is apparent: hence the concupiscible power is said to be not only corrupted but also infected, inasmuch as through such an act original sin is transmitted.

II. - Replies to 1, 2, and 3 in regard to whether original sin is ignorance.

Among the other powers even the intellect is moved by the will; and so the defect of the intellect also is contained in a material way under original sin, which defect is the absence of that natural knowledge which man would have had in his first state. And in this way ignorance is contained materially under original sin.

Replies to On the contrary:

1. Since original sin is a sin of the nature, just as human nature is composed of many parts, so many elements belong to original sin, namely defects of the diverse parts of human nature.

2. Those parts which are not designed by nature to obey reason are not susceptible of fault, and so in them the defect transmitted does not have the nature of fault but of penalty only. But the intellect is subject to fault: for a person can merit and also demerit by an act of the intellect inasmuch as it is voluntary. And therefore there is no similarity.

III. - Reply to 1 in regard to whether original sin is the absence of original justice.

The absence of original justice is the formal element in original sin, as was said (in the Response).

Replies to On the contrary:

1. Original justice includes sanctifying grace, nor do I believe it to be true that man was created with purely natural endowments.†37 However if original justice does not include sanctifying grace, nevertheless it is not on that account excluded that the absence of original justice has the nature of fault; because from the very fact that a person sins against the dictate of natural reason, he incurs fault: for the rectitude deriving from grace is not without the rectitude of nature.

2. Original justice is restored in baptism so far as concerns this, that the higher part of the soul is united to God, by the privation of which [union] the guilt of fault had entered the soul, but not as concerns this that the lower powers are submissive to reason: for from this defect follows the concupiscence that remains after baptism.

3. 'Will' is stated in the definition of justice. For justice is rectitude of the will, as Anselm says;†38 and therefore, since justice is stated in the definition of original sin, a subject is not lacking in it; just as if 'snub-nosed' is put in the definition a thing, there is no need to add 'nose' which is included in the definition of snub-nosed.†39

4. The privation of grace is not in the act itself but in the subject of the act, and therefore it does not pertain to the actual sin. But the absence of original justice is in the nature, and therefore it can pertain to original sin, which is a sin of the nature.

IV. - Replies to arguments 1 and 2 as to whether original sin is penalty only or penalty and fault.

As was said above (in q. 4, a. 1) if original sin be compared to this man as he is a particular person without regard to the nature, in this sense it is a penalty; but if original sin be compared to the principle in whom all sinned, in this sense it has the nature of fault

The answer to arguments 1, 2, and 3 On the contrary are readily evident from this.

Question IV, Article 3 †p

Whether Original Sin Is in the Flesh or in the Soul as in a Subject?

It seems that it is in the flesh and not in the soul, for the following reasons.

1. The soul is created by God. But the soul does not have the uncleanness of sin from God; nor even from itself, because thus it would be an actual sin. Therefore in no way is original sin in the soul.

2. In whomever there is original sin, he has sinned in Adam, according to the words of the Apostle in Romans (5, 12): "In whom all have sinned." But the soul of this particular man has not sinned in Adam, because he was not there. Therefore original sin is not in the soul.

3. Augustine says †1 that the rays of the sun filter through dregs and are not defiled. But the soul is a kind of immaterial light, and thus is more powerful than physical light. Therefore the soul is not defiled by the uncleanness of the flesh.

4. Punishment corresponds to fault. But the punishment of original sin is death,†2 which affects not the soul alone but the composite of body and soul. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the composite.

5. A thing is more truly in the cause than in the effect. If then the infection of the soul is caused by the flesh, it seems that original sin is more truly in the flesh than in the soul.

On the contrary:

1. Ambrose says †3 that the same thing is the subject of virtue and of fault. But the flesh is not the subject of virtue. Therefore neither is it the subject of fault.

Response:

To answer this question two distinctions must be noted. The first is that something is said to be in a thing in two ways: in one way as in its proper subject, in another way as in its cause. Now the proper subject of any accident proportionate to the accident itself, for example if we wish to consider the proper subject of happiness and virtue, since happiness and virtue are qualities proper to man, the proper subject of each will be that which is proper to man, namely the rational part of the soul, as the Philosopher shows in Book I of the Ethics.†4 On the other hand, cause is of two kinds, namely instrumental and principal. Now a thing is in its principal cause according to a likeness of form, as being either of the same species if it be a univocal cause, for example when man begets man, and fire generates fire; or according to some higher form, if it be a non-univocal agent,†5 as for example the sun generates man.†6 But an effect is in its instrumental cause in virtue of the power that the instrument receives from the principal cause inasmuch as it is moved by it; for the form of the house in one way is in the stones and wood as in the proper subject, and in another way in the soul of the builder as in its principal cause, and in still another way in the saw and axe as in the instrumental cause.

Now it is evident that to be subject to sin is proper to man, hence the proper subject of any whatever sin must be that which is proper to man, namely the rational soul, according to which man is man. And thus original sin is in the rational soul as in a proper subject. And the carnal semen, just as it is the instrumental cause of the transmission of human nature, so also it is the instrumental cause of the transmission of original sin. And therefore original sin is in the flesh, i.e. in the carnal semen, virtually, as in an instrumental cause.

Secondly we must consider that there is a twofold order, namely the order of nature and of time. In the order of nature the perfect is prior to the imperfect and act to potency, but in the order of generation and of time, on the contrary, the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act.†7 So accordingly, in the order of nature original sin is first in the soul, in which it is as in a proper subject, rather than in the flesh, in which it is as in an instrumental cause, but in the order of generation and of time it is first in the flesh.

Reply to 1. The rational soul does not have the uncleanness of original sin either from itself or from God, but from union with the flesh: for in this way it becomes a part of human nature transmitted from Adam.

Reply to 2. Since original sin is a sin of the nature, it belongs to the soul only inasmuch as the soul is a part of human nature, and human nature was originally in Adam according to a part of it, namely according to

the flesh and according to a disposition to the soul; and therefore man is said to have sinned in the original sin of Adam.

Reply to 3. Augustine introduces this example to show that the Word of God was not defiled from union with flesh, for the Word of God is not united to the flesh as a form, and therefore it is as it were a light not intermixed with a body, like the rays not defiled by the dregs. But the soul is united to the body as a form, and so it is compared to light received in a body, which is contaminated from admixture with the body, as is evident of a ray of the sun which, as it passes through a cloudy region of the air, is darkened.

Reply to 4. Death inasmuch as it is a punishment of original sin is caused from this that the soul has lost the power by which it could preserve its body from corruption; and thus even this punishment pertains principally to the soul.

Reply to 5. A thing is in the principal cause in a more excellent way than in the effect, but not in the instrumental cause: and in this way, as in an instrumental cause both human nature and original sin is in the carnal semen. Hence just as human nature is not more truly in the semen than in the body already furnished with organs, so neither is original sin more truly in the flesh than in the soul.

Question IV, Article 4 ¶p

Whether Original Sin First Is in the Powers of the Soul Rather Than in the Essence?†1

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. According to Anselm,†2 as was said above, original sin is the absence of original justice. But original justice is in the will, as he himself says.†3 Therefore original sin is first in the will, which is a power of the soul.

2. According to Augustine,†4 as was said above, original sin is concupiscence. But concupiscence pertains to the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin first is in the powers of the soul.

3. Original sin is said to be the fuel (fomes)†5 of sin inasmuch as it disposes to acts of sin. But a disposition to act pertains to a power. Therefore original sin is in the powers of the soul.

4. Original sin is a disorder opposed to the order of original justice. But disorder cannot be in the essence of the soul in which there is no distinction, which order and disorder presuppose, but the powers of the soul are distinct. Therefore original sin is not first in the essence of the soul but in the powers.

5. The original sin of this person who is begotten is derived from the sin of Adam, which first corrupts the powers of the soul rather than the essence. But an effect is similar to its cause. Therefore original sin first infects the powers of the soul rather than the essence.

6. The soul according to its essence is the form of the body, giving it being and life. Therefore the defect pertaining to the essence of the soul is a passing away of life, which is death or the necessity of dying. But such a defect does not have the nature of fault but of punishment.†6 Therefore original fault is not in the essence of the soul.

7. The soul is not the subject of sin except inasmuch as it is rational. But the soul is called rational in keeping with certain powers that are rational. Therefore sin is first in the powers of the soul rather than in the essence.

On the contrary:

1. The soul contracts original sin from its union with the flesh. But the soul by its essence is united to the flesh as its form. Therefore original sin is first in the essence of the soul.

2. Original sin is not first a sin of the person but of the nature, as was said (in q. 4, a. 1). But the soul by its essence constitutes human nature inasmuch as it is the form of the body, and by its powers is the principle of actions, which pertain to persons: for actions are concerned with individuals, according to the Philosopher.^{†7} Therefore original sin first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers.

3. Original sin in one man is one, but the powers are many, which nevertheless are united in the one essence of the soul. But one accident is not in many subjects except inasmuch as they are united. Therefore original sin first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers.

4. Original sin is contracted by way of origin. But origin terminates at the essence of the soul because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated.^{†8} Therefore original sin directly pertains to the essence of the soul.

5. Original sin, according to Anselm,^{†9} is the absence of original justice. But original justice was a gift bestowed on human nature, not on the person, otherwise it would not have been transmitted to future generations; and so it pertained to the essence of the soul, which is the nature and form of the body. With equal reason, then, original sin first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers.

6. Anything of the kind that first is in the powers of the soul rather than in the essence, is in the soul according as it is related to an object; but what is in the soul through a relation to the subject, first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. But original sin is not in the soul through a relation to objects but through a relation to the subject, which is the flesh, from which the soul contracts infection. Therefore original sin first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers.

Response:

Original sin in some fashion is both in the essence of the soul and in the powers because the defect from the fault of our first parent extends to the whole soul. But we need to consider whether it first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. At first sight it may seem that it is first in the essence on the grounds that original sin is one, and the powers of the soul are united in the essence of the soul as in a common root. However this argument is not compelling:^{†10} because the powers of the soul are also united in another way, namely by a unity of order, and even by the unity of some first moving and directing power.

But we must undertake the search for the truth about this elsewhere. And indeed, since original sin is transmitted from the flesh to the soul there can be no doubt that in some manner, at least in the order of generation and time, original sin first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers, since the soul by its essence is immediately united to the body as its form, but not by its powers, as we have shown elsewhere.^{†11} However if someone should say that original sin first is in the essence of the soul in the order of generation and time rather than in the powers but first in the powers in the order of nature, as was said previously (in q. 4, a. 3) in regard to the soul and the flesh, this cannot be maintained. For the essence of the soul is not related to the powers in the same way as the body is related to the soul; for the body is related to the soul as matter to form, and matter precedes form in the way of generation and time but form precedes matter in the way of perfection and nature; but the essence of the soul is related to the powers as the substantial form to the consequent natural properties, and substance is prior to accident in time, in nature, and according to definition, as is shown in Book VII of the Metaphysics.^{†12}

Hence in every way original sin first is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers, and is transmitted to the powers from the essence of the soul; just as also the process of nature is from the essence of

the soul to the powers. And indeed original sin relates to the nature, as we have said (in q. 4,a. 1).

Reply to 1. Original justice was not thus in the will without first being in the essence of the soul, for it was a gift bestowed on the nature.

Reply to 2. Concupiscence is original sin materially and as it were by way of derivation from something preceding it, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 2).

Reply to 3. The essence of the soul is compared to the powers as the substantial form to the consequent properties, as for instance the form of fire to heat; but heat acts only in virtue of the essential form of fire, otherwise it would not act with a view to bringing about the substantial form. Hence the substantial form is the first principle of action. And so too the essence of the soul is the first principle of action rather than the power.

Reply to 4. The disorder in the powers of the soul is from a defect of the nature which first and principally pertains to the essence of the soul.

Reply to 5. In Adam the person corrupts the nature; and therefore in him corruption was first in the powers of the soul rather than in the essence. But in the man who has his origin from Adam the nature corrupts the person, and therefore in him corruption first pertains to the essence rather than the powers.

Reply to 6. The essence of the soul is not only the form of the body giving it life, but it is also the principle of the powers; and hence original sin first is in the essence of the soul.

Reply to 7. The rational powers themselves are derived from the essence of the soul inasmuch as it is the effective principle of the nature; and therefore to be subject to sin is transmitted from the essence of the soul to the powers.

Question IV, Article 5 †p

Whether Original Sin First Is in the Will Rather Than in the Other Powers?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Original sin is a kind of infection. But among the powers of the soul the procreative power is said to be more infected.†1 Therefore original sin first is in the procreative power and not in the will.

2. The absence of original justice, which Anselm says is original sin,†2 is noticed in regard to this that the lower powers rebel against reason. But such rebellion is in the lower powers. Therefore original sin first is in the lower powers.

3. In actual sin turning from an unchangeable good follows turning to a transitory good.†3 But in original sin concupiscence is regarded as turning-to is in actual sin, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 2). Therefore since concupiscence is in the lower powers, original sin first is in the lower powers.

4. Original sin, as was said (above in arg. 2), is the absence of original justice. But justice is a moral virtue, and all moral virtues are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Commentator says.†4 Therefore original sin too is first in the irrational parts of the soul

5. Original sin is a certain perversion of the governance of the soul. But the governance of the soul pertains to reason. Therefore original sin first is in the reason rather than in the will.

6. The punishment of original sin is the deprivation of the vision of God,†5 which pertains to the intellect. But punishment corresponds to fault. Therefore original sin first is in the intellect rather than in the will.

On the contrary:

1. Anselm says †6 that justice is rectitude of the will. But original sin is the privation of original justice. Therefore original sin is first in the will.

Response:

The subject of virtue or vice is found to be some part of the soul according as it participates in something from a higher power, as for instance the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul are the subject of certain virtues inasmuch as they participate in reason. Hence it is reasonable to say that rational part of the soul is the first and per se subject of virtue. In order then to discover the primary subject of original sin among the powers of the soul, we must consider which is that power from which all the others are subject to sin: for original sin must of necessity be transmitted first to that power from the essence of the soul. Now clearly sin, as we are now speaking of sin, is that for which punishment is deserved. But punishment and blame †7 is deserved for our acts because they are voluntary. Hence the other powers of the soul derive from the will their susceptibility to sin; from which it is evident that among all the powers of the soul original sin first is in the will.

Reply to 1. As we said above (in q. 4, a. 3), the infection of sin is said to be in something either actually as in its proper subject, or virtually as in its cause. But the cause of original sin is the act of procreation; which pertains to the procreative power as to the producing principle, to the concupiscible power as to the appetitive and commanding principle, and to the sense of touch as to the principle experiencing and conveying pleasure. Hence the infection of original sin is said to be first in these powers virtually as in its cause, but not as in its proper subject.

Reply to 2. The rebellion of the lower powers against the higher is due to the deprivation of virtue that was present in the higher powers, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 2); and therefore original sin is in the higher powers rather than in the lower.

Reply to 3. Turning-from follows turning-to in the way of generation, but the nature of actual sin is achieved in the turning-from; and likewise the nature of original sin in the privation of justice. And therefore original sin is first in the will.

Reply to 4. The statement of the Commentator is not true of all the moral virtues but only of those which concern the passions, which are in the irrational parts. But justice is not concerned with the passions but with external operations or transactions, as is said in Book V of the Ethics.†8 Hence justice is not in the irascible and concupiscible power, but in the will. And thus the four principal virtues are in the four powers which are susceptible of virtue: prudence in the reason, justice in the will, temperance in the concupiscible power, fortitude in the irascible power.

Reply to 5. The perverse governance of reason has the nature of fault only inasmuch as it is voluntary; and therefore even reason has from the will its susceptibility to sin.

Reply to 6. The deprivation of the vision of God is a punishment inasmuch as it is contrary to the will, for this is of the nature of punishment, as was said above (in q. 1, a. 4). And therefore, inasmuch as it is a punishment, it pertains to the will.

Question IV, Article 6 †p

Whether Original Sin Is Transmitted from Adam to All Who Seminally Derive from Him?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Death is the punishment of original sin.†1 But at the end of the world some people who will still be alive when the Lord comes to render judgment will not die, as Jerome says in a letter to Marcella.†2 Therefore they will not be born with original sin.

2. But it was said that on this matter the opinion of Jerome was not held by all,†3 and so the argument is not necessarily conclusive. But counter to this: that which necessarily follows from what rests on opinion †4 is not erroneous nor contrary to faith, just as the impossible does not follow from what is contingent though false.†5 But that some men begotten from Adam by way of origin are not to die rests on opinion. Therefore what follows from this, that some men are born without original sin, is not erroneous but rests on opinion.

3. As Augustine says in the Enchiridion,†6 in the first three petitions of the Lord's prayer eternal things are asked for, and in the remaining four, temporal things. But among the other four is the request for remission of debts or sins, one of which is the necessity of begetting with original sin. Since then it is unreasonable to say that the prayer of the whole Church is not heard, it seems that some men in this temporal life could beget children without original sin.

4. No one can receive from a person what that person does not have. But original sin is not in a baptized person: for it is washed away by baptism. Therefore no one begotten from a baptized father contracts original sin.

5. Moreover,†7 the Apostle says in Romans 11, 16 "If the root is holy so also are the branches" and the Lord says in Matthew 7, 17 "A good tree bears good fruit." If then a father is both holy and good, he does not beget a son infected with original sin.

6. Furthermore,†8 "If the opposite species be found in the opposite genus, then also the species in question would be found in the genus in question."†9 But a sinner begets a sinner. Therefore also a just man begets a just man; consequently he does not beget a son infected with original sin.

7. Besides,†10 the Apostle says in Romans 5, 15 †11 "not like the offense (of Adam) is the gift (of Christ)" for the gift of Christ is far more efficacious. But the sin transmitted from Adam to a man is propagated by him in his son. Therefore also the gift of Christ bestowed on man through baptism is transferred by him to his son; and so the children of those baptized are begotten without original sin.

8. Augustine says †12 "the transgression of the first sinner did not injure man more than the incarnation i.e. the redemption of the Savior profited him." But the redemption of the Savior does not profit all men. Therefore neither does the transgression of Adam corrupt all men, and so not all who are seminally begotten from Adam contract original sin from him.

9. The superior is not corrupted when the inferior has corrupted: for it does not follow, if man is not, that animal is not, but the other way around.†13 But human nature is superior to any person whatsoever of human nature. Therefore the personal infection of Adam himself could not corrupt all human nature with original sin.

10. By baptism the corruption of the nature either is removed or it is not. If it is removed, then original sin is not transmitted to the offspring by an act of the nature; and if it is not removed, then that corruption is related equally to the soul of the begetter and to the soul of the begotten. If therefore it does not infect the soul

of the begetter with original fault, neither will the soul of the begotten be infected with original fault.

11. Anselm says †14 that sin is no more in the semen than in the spittle. But nothing can give to another what it does not have. Therefore generation which comes about seminally from Adam does not cause original sin in the offspring.

12. Augustine says "What comes about from natural necessity is without fault." †15 But whatever is caused in the offspring from the semen is caused in it from natural necessity, therefore it is without fault. Those then who are seminally begotten from Adam by way of origin do not contract original sin.

13. The semen is a particular sort of body. But the action of a body is not instantaneous but in time, †16 yet the soul is infected instantaneously by fault. Therefore such infection is not caused by the semen.

14. The Philosopher says †17 that the semen is a secretion of excess nutriment, and so the semen from which this man is generated was not in Adam. But original sin is contracted by others inasmuch as they sinned in Adam, as the Apostle says in Romans 5, 12. Therefore original sin is not transmitted from Adam to all men by way of seminal generation.

15. The proximate agent is more effective than the remote agent. A sign of which is that the proximate agent generates one like itself in species, but not the remote agent; for instance the man begotten is alike in species to the man begetting, but not to the sun. †18 But just as the infection of the nature was in Adam, so also it is in the proximate parent. Therefore it should not be said that those who are now begotten contract original sin from Adam, but rather from their proximate parents.

16. Augustine says †19 that not propagation but libido, i.e. inordinate concupiscence, transmits sin to the progeny, and thus it seems that if procreation were without inordinate concupiscence, sin would not be transmitted to the progeny. But procreation without inordinate concupiscence or with inordinate concupiscence does not cause a different disposition in the semen except according to greater or less intensity of heat: for since the semen is a kind of body composed of the elements, †20 a different disposition of it in acting is referred to the active qualities of the elements; †21 but an effect diverse in species is not produced by a cause differing only in greater or less intensity of heat. Therefore just as propagation without inordinate concupiscence would not transmit original sin, so neither would propagation with inordinate concupiscence.

17. Charity diminishes inordinate concupiscence. But charity can be increased infinitely; since then inordinate concupiscence is not infinite, it seems that inordinate concupiscence can be entirely eliminated by charity. And so it is not necessarily the case that all are born with original sin.

18. Inordinate concupiscence pertains either to the disorder of sensuality or to a bad will. †22 But neither of these is found in the just men who procreate. Therefore those who are begotten from them do not contract original sin.

19. Just as good is diffusive, as Dionysius says, †23 so evil is constrictive. But a good of Adam, for instance his penitence, is not diffused to all. Therefore much less his evil.

20. Sin is transmitted from Adam to others inasmuch as they sinned in Adam. But Adam sinned by eating the forbidden fruit, †24 and it cannot be said that all ate the forbidden fruit when Adam ate it, therefore neither that they sinned when he sinned. And so original sin does not pass from Adam to all men.

On the contrary:

1. The Apostle says in Romans 5, 12 "As by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death, so also death passed to all men, from him in whom all have sinned."

2. Augustine says †25 that just as in men there cannot be copulation without inordinate concupiscence, so there cannot be conception without sin.

Response:

It is erroneous to say that some men descended seminally from Adam are without original sin: for if such were the case there would be some who would not need the redemption wrought by Christ. Hence it must be granted without qualification that all who are seminally propagated from Adam contract original sin immediately at the moment of their animation.

This can be shown from what was said above (in q. 4, a. 1). For it was said above that original sin is compared to all human nature generated from Adam as actual sin is compared to one particular human person, as if all men inasmuch as they are descended from Adam, are one man whose different members are different persons. Now it is evident that actual sin is first found in a principle, namely in the will, which is the first subject of sin, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 5), and is transmitted from it to the other powers of the soul, and even to the members of the body, according as they are moved by the will: for in this way they are voluntary acts; which is required for the nature of sin. So too then original sin must first be considered in Adam, as in a certain principle, from which it is transmitted to all who are moved by that principle. But just as the parts of one man are moved by the command of the will, so a son is moved by the father in virtue of the procreative power. Hence the Philosopher says in Book II of the Physics†26 that the father is the cause of the child as mover, and in the book On the Generation of Animals†27 he says that in the semen there is a movement from the soul of the father which moves the matter to the form of the offspring conceived. So accordingly such movement, which is by way of origin from the first parent, is transmitted to all who seminally proceed from him; hence all who seminally proceed from him protract (i.e. contract and transmit) original sin from him.

Reply to 1. Jerome does not present this as an assertion but gives it as the opinion of some, as is clear in his letter †28 concerning the resurrection of the flesh, in which he gives many opinions on this subject. Among which he recounts that some thought those who will be alive at the coming of the Lord will never die because of what the Apostle says in the First Epistle to the Thessalonians (4, 17) speaking in their person "Then we who are alive, who survive, shall be taken up together with them in the clouds to meet Christ in the air." Which others †29 explain, not that they do not die but that they will scarcely be dead, rising immediately afterward. And this is the opinion more commonly held.†30

Reply to 2. Granted that those who will be found to be live at the coming of the Lord may never die, it does not necessarily follow that they have not contracted original sin. For the proper punishment of original sin is the necessity of dying, according to the words of the Apostle in Romans 8, 10 "The body, it is true, is dead by reason of sin," that is, sentenced to the necessity of death, as Augustine explains.†31 Now it is possible for some to have the necessity of dying who nevertheless will never die, their death being prevented by divine power, just as it is possible for a body heavy by nature not to move downward on account of some impediment.

Reply to 3. This debt of begetting with original sin is remitted in this life not as to this that a man may beget without original sin, but as to this that some begotten with sin are cleansed from sin by the power of Christ. For by 'debts' are understood sins, as Augustine explains.†32

Reply to 4. Original sin is opposed to original justice, by which the higher part of the soul was both united (by ties of friendship) with God and commanded the lower powers, and was even able to preserve the body from corruption. By baptism, then, original sin is taken away so far as concerns this, that grace is given by which the higher part of the soul is united (by ties of friendship) with God, but the power is not given to the soul by which it can preserve the body without corruption nor by which the higher part of the soul can keep the lower powers from all rebellion; hence after baptism both the necessity of dying and concupiscence which is the

material element in original sin remain.†33 And thus as regards the higher part of the soul it participates in the newness of Christ, but as regards the lower powers of the soul and the body itself, there still remains the oldness that is from Adam.†34 Now it is evident that a baptized man does not beget in virtue of the higher part of the soul but in virtue of the lower powers and the body; and therefore, a baptized man does not transmit to his offspring the newness of Christ but the oldness of Adam. And for this reason, although he himself does not have original sin inasmuch as it is a fault, nevertheless he transmits original sin to the offspring.

Reply to 5. The answer to the fifth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 6. That manner of arguing is valid in regard to that which belongs to the opposite inasmuch as it is the opposite, but not in regard to that which is common to both opposites. For it follows, if black contracts (congregat) vision, that white expands (disgregat) it,†35 but it does not follow that white is invisible if black is visible, because being visible belongs to it according to color, which is the genus of both. But the oldness of Adam so far as concerns the lower powers and the body itself, is common to both the just man and the sinner, and according to this a sinner begets a sinner. Hence it does not follow that the just man begets offspring without [original] sin.

Reply to 7. The gift of Christ is more efficacious than the offense of Adam because it restores men to a higher state than Adam had before sin, namely the state of glory, which is free from the danger of sinning; but it is necessary that this be done through conformity to Christ, so that the effect may be like its cause. For just as Christ assumed the oldness of punishment that by death he might redeem us from death and thus by His resurrection has renewed life,†36 so too men through Christ are first conformed to Christ through grace, while the oldness of punishment remains, and finally rising are transferred to glory. And from this punishment which remains in the baptized so far as concerns the lower powers, they transmit original sin. Nor is it inconsistent that punishment is the cause of fault: because the lower powers are not subject to fault except inasmuch as they can be moved by the higher powers, and therefore when fault is removed from the higher part of the soul the nature of fault does not remain in the lower powers actually but virtually, inasmuch as they are the principle of human procreation.

Reply to 8. Just as the sin of Adam injures all who are begotten from him according to the flesh, so the redemption of Christ profits all who are spiritually begotten from Him.

Reply to 9. The nature taken absolutely is predicably more common than person, but the nature considered in a person is confined within the limits of the person, and in this way the person can infect the nature. And because all persons who are seminally propagated from the person of the first parent receive human nature from him, therefore such corruption of the nature is transmitted to all; just as, if water were contaminated at its source the contamination would extend to the whole stream coming from the source.

Reply to 10. In the soul of the baptized parent there is something resisting the corruption of original sin, namely Christ's sacrament, which impediment to the corruption of original sin is not in the soul of the offspring begotten. Or it can be said that the infection of the nature does not pass to the soul except by the act of procreating, which is an act of the nature, and therefore it does not pass into the soul of the begetter but into the soul of the one begotten, who is the terminus of procreation.

Reply to 11. Sin is not in the semen actually but virtually inasmuch as it is the principle of human generation, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 1).

Reply to 12. The original defect does not have the nature of fault from this that it is of necessity transmitted by way of seminal generation, but from this that the nature is tainted by an infection which is considered voluntary on account of its principle, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 1).

Reply to 13. The semen brings about infection of the soul in like manner as it brings about the

completion of human nature. Therefore just as the action of the semen takes place in time but the completion of human nature is instantaneous at the arrival of the ultimate form, so also the infection of original sin is caused instantaneously although the action of the semen is not instantaneous.

Reply to 14. Some †37 believed that original sin could not be transmitted from the first parent to posterity unless all men were in Adam in a material way; and therefore they hold that the semen is not a superfluity of nutriment but is transmitted from Adam himself. But this is not possible: because in this way the semen would be something unloosed or separated from the substance of the begetter. But that which is unloosed or separated from the substance of a thing recedes from the nature of it and is on its way to corruption, hence it cannot be the principle of generation of the same nature. And for this reason the Philosopher (in the place cited) concludes that the semen is not something unloosed from the substance but is a superfluity of nutriment. But by this it is not excluded that original sin is contracted from the first parent. For the condition of the begotten depends more on the agent or effective cause that disposes the matter and gives the form than on the matter, which receding from its previous disposition and losing its previous form, receives from the agent a new disposition and form. Hence it is of no importance so far as concerns the contraction of original sin, from wherever the matter of the human body has come, but by what agent it is changed into the species of human nature.

Reply to 15. Proximate and remote causes can be distinguished in two ways: in one way in themselves (per se), in another way by reason of something else (per accidens). By reason of something else, for example when remotion and distance are considered only according to place or according to time, or some such thing accidental to a cause inasmuch as it is a cause. And in this way it is true that a proximate cause produces a greater effect than the remote cause, as the fire that is near heats more than a fire that is distant, and an immanent evil moves the soul more than a distant evil. But in themselves (per se) the proximate and remote causes are distinguished according to the natural order of causes in causing; and in this way, the remote cause has a greater influence on the effect than the proximate cause. For it is said in the book *On Causes*†38 that every primary cause exercises more influence on its effect than a secondary cause, since the secondary cause acts only in virtue of the primary cause. But that the effect sometimes receives the species of the proximate cause and not of the remote cause, is not on account of a defect of the influx coming from the remote cause, but on account of the defectiveness of the matter which cannot receive so excellent a form; hence if the matter be susceptible of the form of the principal cause, it will receive that form rather than the form of the proximate cause, for example the house receives the form of the art rather than the form of the tool or instrument. Since then the oldness of original sin is found in all men according as they are moved by the first parent, as we said above (in q. 4, a. 1), therefore no one transmits original sin except inasmuch as he begets in virtue of the first cause. And for this reason original sin is said to be contracted from Adam rather than from the proximate parent.

Reply to 16. Libido i.e. inordinate concupiscence designates actual inordinate concupiscence. But we said above (in Reply to 4) that the material element in original sin is habitual concupiscence, which arises from this that reason does not have the power to completely restrain the lower powers. Consequently actual inordinate concupiscence, which occurs in copulation, is a sign of habitual concupiscence which is related to original sin after the manner of matter. But the reason that a man transmits original sin to the offspring is that which remains in him of original sin even after baptism (as was said in Reply to 7), namely concupiscence or the fuel (fomes) of sin. So accordingly it is clear that actual inordinate concupiscence is not the reason that man transmits original sin but a sign of the cause: hence if miraculously it happened that actual inordinate concupiscence was entirely removed during copulation, since the cause remains, the offspring would nonetheless contract original sin. Hence when Augustine said that inordinate concupiscence transmits sin, he posited the sign for the thing signified. But the objection argued from this actual inordinate concupiscence, operating with a more intense heat; however the whole cause is not from the heat, but the more basic (principalior) cause is from the power of this soul that operates as the principal cause in the semen, as the Philosopher says.†39

Reply to 17. Charity diminishes actual inordinate concupiscence inasmuch as the concupiscible power

obeys reason. But it is not so obedient in the state of fallen nature that it does not retain something of its own movement even contrary to the order of reason. And therefore inordinate concupiscence is not entirely removed, however much charity is increased in this life.

Reply to 18. In the act of procreating, even in just men, there is actual inordinate concupiscence, when the concupiscible appetite immoderately inclines to carnal enjoyment, and even the will although it does or wills nothing contrary to reason, nevertheless does not heed the order of actual, i.e. practical, reason on account of the intensity of passion.

Reply to 19. The principle of sin is from us, but the principle of meritorious good is from God. Hence in Adam there was a good which could be imparted to all, namely the good of original justice, which however he had from God; but the evil that he transmitted to others he had from himself: so that it can rather be said that God was the transmitter of good but man the transmitter of evil. But Adam's good of repentance was not transmitted to others because the principle of it was a grace given personally to that man.

Reply to 20. Eating signifies a personal act but sinning can pertain both to the person and to the nature. And therefore those who receive human nature from Adam are said to have sinned in Adam, but are not said to have eaten in Adam.

Question IV, Article 7 †p

Whether Those Who Originate from Adam Only by Way of Matter Contract Original Sin?†1

It seems that they do, for the following reasons.

1. The soul is infected with original sin on account of the infection of the flesh to which the soul is united. But the flesh of a man sinning, is actually infected with the infection of sin, but the semen only virtually, for since the semen lacks a rational soul, it cannot be infected with the infection of sin. The infection of original sin, then, would be contracted more by a man who was miraculously formed from the flesh of someone having original sin, say from the rib or the hand or the foot, than if he was generated from the semen.

2. On Genesis 3 †2 a certain Gloss says †3 that in Adam's loins all posterity was corrupted, because it (all posterity) was not separate [from him] previously in the place of life, but afterwards in the place of exile. But if some man were formed from the body of another man, for instance from the hand or the foot, his flesh would be separated in the place of exile. Therefore he would contract the corruption of original sin.

3. Original sin is a sin of all of human nature, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 1 and 2, and in a. 6 Reply to 9). But that man who was formed from the flesh of another man would belong to human nature. Therefore he would contract original sin.

4. In the generation of man and of any animal, the matter of the body is provided by the female.†4 But the soul is infected with the infection of sin because it is united to bodily matter. Therefore even if Adam had not sinned, though Eve did, the offspring begotten from both would contract original sin, not on account of the infection of the man's semen but on account of the matter alone.

5. Death and any corruption results from the necessity of matter, but matter is provided by the mother,†5 therefore if Eve had become subject to death and suffering by sinning and Adam had not sinned, the children who were begotten would have been subject to suffering and death. But punishment is not without fault. Therefore they would have contracted original sin.

6. Damascene says †6 that the Holy Spirit coming upon the Virgin purified her. But it cannot be said that

that purifying was superfluous, because if created nature does nothing superfluous,†7 much less does the Holy Spirit. If then the body of Christ had been derived from the Virgin without the preceding purification, it would nonetheless have contracted original sin. And so it seems that this itself suffices for contracting original sin, that someone materially receive flesh from Adam.

On the contrary:

Augustine says †8 that Christ did not sin in Adam nor did he pay tithes [i.e. contract the stain of sin] in the loins of Abraham because He was not there [i.e. in the loins of Abraham] according to seminal power but only according to His bodily substance.

Response:

The truth in regard to this question can be inferred from what we have already said. For it was said above (in q. 4, a. 6) that original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his descendants inasmuch as the descendants are moved by the first parent by way of origin. But it is evident that it is of the nature of matter not to move but to be moved;†9 hence howsoever someone proceeds by way of matter from Adam or from his descendants, in no way would he contract original sin unless he was seminally propagated from Adam, just as a man would not contract original sin if he were formed anew from the earth. For it does not make any difference so far as concerns the formation of man from what matter he is formed, but by what agent, i.e. effective cause, he is formed; because he receives his form and dispositions from the effective cause, as was said (in q. 4, a. 6 Reply to 14), indeed the matter does not retain its previous form and disposition but acquires a new form in generation.

Reply to 1. If a man were formed from the finger or flesh of another man, this could be only if that flesh had corrupted and receded from its particular disposition, because the generation of one thing is the corruption of another thing.†10 Hence the infection which preceded in the flesh would not remain to infect the soul.

Reply to 2. That Gloss is not to be understood as if the place of exile is the cause of contracting original sin, because even if man after sin had remained in the earthly paradise he would have transmitted original sin to his posterity. But the cause of the transmission of original sin is the corruption of human nature in the first parent, and the place of exile is concomitant with the corruption; hence in that Gloss the place is regarded as accompanying the cause and not as the cause.

Reply to 3. Original sin does not pertain to human nature absolutely, but according as it (human nature) is derived from Adam by way of the semen, as was said (in q. 4, a. 6).

Reply to 4. The children who were begotten from Adam, if Adam had not sinned and Eve had, would not contract original sin because original sin is contracted by the power moving towards human nature which is in the semen of the male, according to the Philosopher.†11 And therefore even though Eve sinned first,†12 nevertheless the Apostle in Romans 5, 12 expressly says that through one man sin entered the world.

Reply to 5. It was thought by some †13 that those who were begotten from Adam if Adam had not sinned and Eve had sinned would be subject to death and suffering because such effects follow from the matter, which the mother provides, and in that case mortality and suffering would not be penal defects but natural defects. But it would be more accurate to say they would be neither subject to suffering nor death. For if Adam had not sinned he would have transmitted to posterity original justice, to which it pertains not only that the soul is subject to God but also the body is subject to the soul. By reason of which, suffering and mortality is excluded.

Reply to 6. From the very fact that Christ was conceived by the Virgin without the semen of man, it was

held that He would not contract original sin. And the purification preceded, not as though necessary for this that He would be conceived without original sin, but because complete purity was befitting for the flesh that received the Word of God.

Question IV, Article 8 ¶p

Whether Sins of Near Ancestors Are Transmitted by Way of Origin to Their Descendants?

It seems that they are, for the following reasons.

1. David born of lawful marriage says in Psalm 50, 7 "For behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me," from which it seems that there are many original sins in one man. But this would not be possible if the sins of near ancestors were not transmitted by way of origin to their descendants, but only the sin of the first man. Therefore the sins of near ancestors are transmitted by way of origin to their descendants.

2. Just as human nature was in Adam, so it is in each man. But Adam by his actual sin corrupted human nature and transmitted it corrupted to his descendants, because he communicated the kind of nature he had. Therefore any other person by his actual sin corrupts human nature in himself and transmits such corruption to his descendants, and so the actual sins of near ancestors are transmitted by way of origin to their descendants, just as is the sin of our first parent.

3. But it was argued that in Adam human nature was integral, and therefore he could corrupt it by his actual sin, but in other men human nature is already corrupted, and therefore it cannot be corrupted by their actual sins. But counter to this: at the end of the Apocalypse (22, 11) it is said "He who is just, let him be justified still, and he who is filthy, let him be filthier still." But to be in the filths of sin is to be already corrupted. Therefore the nature that is already corrupted in someone can be corrupted still further.

4. But it was argued that the corruption of the nature which came about through the sin of the first parent, made of an integral nature a corrupted nature, and therefore it could cause the transmission of original sin, but other corruptions of the nature which come about by actual sins, cannot do this, and therefore do not cause the transmission of original sin. But counter to this: the mean compared to one extreme has the nature of the other extreme; for instance grey is compared to white as black, and to black as white. But the less corrupt is a mean between the integral and the more corrupt. Therefore the corruption of the nature by which it is changed from integral to corrupt, and the corruption by which it is changed from less corrupt to more corrupt, produce the same effect.

5. But it was argued that human nature was in the first man as in a first principle, and therefore it could be corrupted in him, but not in other men. But counter to this: if the first man had not sinned and a descendant of his had sinned, human nature would have been corrupted in the latter and he would have transmitted such a nature to his posterity; but nevertheless human nature would not have been in the latter as in a first principle. Therefore it is not necessary for the transmission of original sin that human nature be corrupted by the first principle of the nature.

6. In Exodus 20, 5 it is said "For I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the father upon the sons unto the third and fourth generation," which can refer only to the actual sins of near ancestors. Therefore the actual sins of near ancestors are transmitted to their descendants by way of origin.

7. But it was said that the foregoing is understood of the transmission of sins in regard to punishment and not in regard to fault. But counter to this: an effect cannot occur without a cause. But punishment is an effect of fault. Therefore if the punishment is transmitted, the fault too must be transmitted.

8. But it was said that the punishment which presupposes a fault is not always in the same person but sometimes in another. But counter to this: Punishment is from God and is just,†1 and justice is a certain equality, therefore it is necessary that punishment reduce, i.e. restore, the inequality of fault to equality. But this could not take place unless equality by means of punishment be brought about in the same person in whom the inequality resulting from fault precedes, in such a way that something according to the will of God be suffered contrary to the will of him who by sinning acted according to his own will contrary to the will of God. It is necessary then that punishment be transmitted to the same person to whom fault is transmitted.

9. According to Matthew 20,†2 the Jews said "His blood be on us and on our children." Augustine explaining this in a sermon on the passion says,†3 "Behold what goods they transmit to their heirs by such testimony of their sacrilege; they steep themselves with the stain of blood and ruin their descendants." Therefore the actual sin of other men than Adam is transmitted to their descendants even in regard to stain, i.e. guilt.

10. When Adam sinned we all sinned in him as the Apostle says (in Romans 5, 12); and this is because we were in him according to seminal power, as Augustine says.†4 But just as we were in Adam according to seminal power so also were we in our near ancestors. Therefore also in their sins we have sinned, and consequently they transmit their sins to us by way of origin.

11. Death, which is the privation of life, is the punishment of original sin.†5 But the life of men is always being shortened more and more: for in the beginning of the world men lived longer than they do now.†6 Therefore since the punishment increases it seems it is increased by fault, and so by the actual sins of our near ancestors something is added to original sin which is transmitted from our first parent.

12. Before the institution of circumcision, children were saved solely through the faith of their parents, as Gregory says,†7 therefore through their parents' unbelief they were also condemned. But unbelief is an actual sin. Therefore the actual sin of near ancestors is transmitted to their descendants.

13. That is more efficacious in producing an effect which is present according to species and in reality than that which is present only according to species. But an imagined uncleanness of the body that is present in the parent according to species alone, is transmitted to descendants: hence Jerome relates †8 that a certain woman gave birth to a black child from the sight of an Ethiopian depicted on the wall. Much more then is the uncleanness of sin, which is in the soul of the father both in reality and according to species, transmitted to descendants.

14. A person can better communicate to another what he has by his own actions than what he has from another. But near ancestors transmit to their descendants the corruption of original sin, which is transmitted to them from Adam. Therefore much more do they transmit the corruption of actual sins.

15. According to canon and civil law, children are made liable for the sins of their parents. For sons of pagan priests, although born of a free mother, are bound over to slavery;†9 and the heirs of a thief are made liable for their father's theft according to canon law, even if none of the stolen goods passed into their hands and even if no lawsuit was brought against the father;†10 also the sons of those who commit the crime of treason bear the burden of their parents' dishonor.†11 Therefore the sins of parents are transmitted to their children.

16. Children have a greater affinity with their near ancestors than with their first ancestor, and are more closely related to them. If then the sin of the first parent is transmitted to all his descendants, much more are the sins of near ancestors.

17. Those things that pertain to the body are transmitted when the body is transmitted. But certain actual sins pertain to the body, for the Apostle in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 6, 18 says "Every sin that a man commits is outside the body, but he who commits fornication sins against his own body." Therefore actual sins

of this kind are transmitted by way of origin from near ancestors to their descendants.

On the contrary:

1. Sin is opposed to merit. But the merits of ancestors are not transmitted to descendants, otherwise not all would be born children of wrath.†12 Therefore actual sins of near ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants.

2. In Ezechiel 18, 20 it is said "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear it if it were transmitted from the father to him. Therefore the sins of near ancestors are not transmitted to their children.

Response:

Augustine takes up this question in the *Enchiridion*†13 and leaves it unresolved. But a careful consideration of the matter shows it is impossible that actual sins of near ancestors are transmitted by way of origin to their descendants.

In proof of this it should be noted that a univocal begetter †14 communicates the nature of his species to the begotten and consequently all the accidents following on the species; for just as man begets man, so a risible man begets a risible man. And if the virility of the begetter is vigorous, he transmits his likeness to the begotten even in regard to accidents of the individual. However this is true of accidents which in some measure pertain to the body, but not of accidents which pertain only to the soul, especially the intellective soul, which is not a power in an organ of the body; for a blond man often begets a blond son, and a big man a big son, but a grammarian does not beget a grammarian, nor a physicist a physicist.

But because the gift of grace is withdrawn through sin, the same thing must be considered in sin that is considered in the gift of grace which is withdrawn through sin. Now at man's creation a certain gratuitous gift was divinely given to the first man, not in relation to his person alone, but in relation to all human nature to be derived from him; which gift was original justice. Moreover the power of this gift not only resided in the higher part of the soul, which is intellective part, but was diffused throughout the lower parts of the soul, which in virtue of the foresaid gift were completely subject to reason, and further, even to the body, in which nothing could take place while the foresaid gift remained that was contrary to its union with the soul. And therefore it is reasonable to assume that this gift would have been transmitted to his descendants for two reasons: first because it accompanied the nature according to the gift of God, though not according to the order of nature; secondly because it extended even to the body, which is transmitted by generation. But this gift was withdrawn by reason of the first sin of the first parent; hence it is reasonable also that that sin for the same reasons is transmitted to his descendants by way of origin.

However other actual sins, either of the first parent himself, or even of other ancestors, are interposed as an obstacle to the gift of grace which is divinely bestowed on a man by reason of his person alone; and again the power of this gift resides only in the intellective soul, but it is not transmitted to the body so that the corruptibility of the body is eliminated by grace of this kind. And therefore neither is the grace itself transmitted nor are the actual sins of any ancestors whatsoever even of Adam himself, except his first sin, transmitted to posterity by way of origin. But actual sins of near ancestors can be transmitted to children by way of imitation, because of the children's constant association with them.

Reply to 1. Original sin in one man is one only, but it is used in the plural in the passage "In sins did my mother conceive me" (Psalm 50, 7) for four reasons: first, according to the custom of Scripture in which the plural is used for the singular, as is evident in Matthew 2, 20,†15 "Those who sought the child's life are dead," which is said in reference to Herod alone; secondly because original sin is so to speak the cause of subsequent

sins, and so virtually it contains in itself many sins; thirdly because in the actual sin of the first parent, from which original sin is caused, there was a manifold deformity of sin: for in that sin there was pride, disobedience, gluttony, and theft.†16 Fourthly because the corruption of original sin pertains to the diverse parts of man. But nevertheless on that account original sin in one man cannot be called many except in a qualified way.

Reply to 2. Adam by his actual sin corrupted human nature by causing the withdrawal of the gratuitous gift that could be transmitted to his descendants. Which is not done by the actual sins of near ancestors, as is clear from what has been said (in the Response); although they add to this corruption by withdrawal of grace or of the suitability for grace itself, which is a personal gift.

Replies to 3, 4, and 5. The answers to those arguments are evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 6. This [i.e. the passage from Exodus] affirms that sin is transmitted from ancestors to descendants in regard to punishment. However it must be noted that punishment is twofold: one, spiritual, which pertains to the soul, and a child is never punished with such a punishment on account of the father. And this for the reason that the soul of the child is not derived from the soul of the father but is immediately created by God. And this reason is given in Ezechiel 18, 4, "As the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine," and verse 20 "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." The other punishment is of the body, or of those things pertaining to the body; and in regard to this punishment children sometimes are punished for the parents, especially when they conform to their parents in fault: for as regards the body which is transmitted from the parents, the child is as it were a part of the father †17

Reply to 7. Temporal punishment by which a child is sometimes punished has as its cause a preceding fault in the father.

Reply to 8. Inasmuch as the child is a part of the father, the father too is thus punished in the punishment of the child.

Reply to 9. The children of the Jews are guilty of the blood of Christ insofar as they are imitators of their fathers' malice by approving it.

Reply to 10. We were in our first parent and in our near ancestors according to a communication of the nature, not however according to a communication in the person. And therefore after the deprival caused by sin we participate in the gift of the nature, but not after that deprival, in the personal gift.

Reply to 11. That men now live a shorter time than in the beginning of the world, is not owing to the aggravation of original sin nor to a continual debilitation of man's nature, as some have said,†18 otherwise in the process of time the life of man would become ever shorter and shorter. Which is clearly false, since now men live as long as in the time of David †19 who said "The days of our years in them are three score and ten." Therefore that long duration of life was due to divine power, in order that the human race would be increased.

Reply to 12. From the beginning of the human race the remedy against original sin could not be applied except in virtue of the mediator between God and man, Jesus Christ.†20 Therefore the faith of the ancients with some protestation of faith profited children unto salvation, not inasmuch as it was a meritorious act on the part of the believers -- hence it was not required that it be an act of formed [i.e. living] faith --, but on the part of that which they had faith in or relied on, i.e. the mediator Himself: for in this way also the sacraments that were afterwards instituted have their efficacy inasmuch as they are certain protestations of faith. Hence it does not follow that the unbelief of the parents would harm their children, except incidentally (per accidens), as removing the remedy of sin.

Reply to 13. Imagination is a power in an organ of the body.†21 Hence in accordance with the imagined species there is a change in the corporeal spirit on which the formative power that operates in the semen is

based,†22 and therefore now and then some change takes place in the form of the offspring in the imagination of the parent in coitus itself, if it is intense. But the infection of sin, especially of actual sin, remains entirely in the soul and does not pertain to the body. Hence there is no similarity.

Reply to 14. That argument holds, other things being equal.

Reply to 15. That argument is valid concerning the transmission of sin in regard to corporal punishment.

Reply to 16. A man would contract sin from his near ancestor rather than from his first ancestor if in virtue of the sin of the near ancestor a gift of the nature were taken away as was taken away by the sin of the first parent.

Reply to 17. He who commits fornication is said to sin against his own body, not because the stain of this sin is in the body, rather it is in the soul as also is grace to which it is opposed, but because this sin abounds in physical pleasure and in a certain physical release, which does not happen in any other sin: for in the sin of gluttony there is no physical release, and in spiritual sins there is no physical pleasure.

Question 5

Question V

On the Punishment of Original Sin

Article 1 †p

Whether Deprival of the Vision of God Is a Fitting Punishment for Original Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. As is said in Book II of the Physics, what is ordered to an end that is not attained is in vain;†1 but man is ordained by nature to happiness as to an ultimate end,†2 which happiness consists in the vision of God; therefore man exists in vain if he does not attain to the vision of God. But God does not cease to cause human propagation because of original sin, as Damascene says.†3 Since then nothing in the works of God is in vain, it seems that man does not incur guilt for the loss of the vision of God because of the sin he contracts by way of his origin.

2. In Ezechiel 19 †4 it is said "All souls are mine; as the soul of the father is mine, so also is the soul of the son", from which it can be inferred that all souls are immediately created by God, and that one is not transmitted from another,†5 therefore a person ought not to be punished by a punishment pertaining only to the soul for original sin which is transmitted from our first parent. But deprival of the vision of God is a punishment pertaining only to the soul, just as the divine vision itself pertains only to the soul. Therefore deprival of the vision of God is not a fitting punishment for original sin.

3. Augustine says †6 that the punishment of those who are punished for original sin alone is the mildest. But Chrysostom says †7 that deprival of the vision of God is the severest of punishments and more unbearable than hell. Therefore deprival of the vision of God is not a fitting punishment for original sin.

4. But it was argued that deprival only of the vision of God is less of a punishment than deprival of the divine vision together with the punishment of sense incurred for actual sin. But counter to this: punishment since it is a kind of evil consists in the privation of some good. But the proportion of privations to one another is like the proportion of those things that are deprived of: for thus deafness is to blindness as hearing is to sight. But by deprival of the divine vision man is deprived of God, and by the punishment of sense he is deprived of

some created good, namely sense pleasure or something of this kind; but a created good added to the uncreated good does not make a man happier: for Augustine in the Confessions speaking to God says: "He who knows Thee and them," i.e. creatures, "is not happier because of them but is happy because of Thee alone." †8 Therefore he who is deprived of the uncreated good alone by deprivation of the vision of God, is not less unhappy than he who suffers the punishment of sense together with this.

5. But it was said that although a person may not be less happy so far as concerns the essential reward, nevertheless he is less happy so far as concerns the accidental reward.†9 But counter to this: the accidental reward is accidentally related to happiness. But an increase of an accident does not increase that of which it is the accident: for if a man is more white he is not on that account more a man. Therefore happiness, which consists essentially in the enjoyment of the highest good, is not increased by the addition of any created good whatsoever.

6. Since an uncreated good infinitely exceeds a created good, a created good is compared to an uncreated good as a point to a line. But a line does not become greater by the addition of a point.†10 Therefore happiness which consists in the enjoyment of the uncreated good does not become greater by the addition of a created good.

7. But it was argued that although God is an infinite good, nevertheless the vision of God is not an infinite good, because God is seen by the created intellect in a finite manner, and therefore he who is deprived of the vision of God is not deprived of an infinite good. But counter to this: he whose perfection is taken away, is deprived of his perfection. But vision is a perfection of the beholder. Therefore he whose vision is taken away is deprived of the thing seen; and so when the thing seen is an infinite good, he who is deprived of the vision of God is deprived of an infinite good.

8. God Himself is the reward of man, Who said to Abraham in Genesis 17 †11 "I the Lord am thy reward exceeding great." Therefore he who is deprived of the ultimate reward, which consists in the vision of God is deprived of God Himself, Who is the infinite good.

9. A milder punishment is incurred for original sin than for venial sin, otherwise the punishment of original sin would not be the mildest, as Augustine says.†12 But only the punishment of sense is incurred for venial sin, not the deprivation of the vision of God. Since then deprivation of the vision of God without the punishment of sense is undoubtedly greater than the punishment of sense without the deprivation of the vision of God, it seems that deprivation of the vision of God ought not to be a punishment for original sin.

10. But it was argued that even for venial sin deprivation of vision of God is incurred for a time, as a punishment of sense. But counter to this: the added eternity makes the punishment of the deprivation of the vision of God more unbearable than the temporary punishment of sense: for no well-disposed person would not will to undergo any temporary punishment whatsoever rather than to be without the vision of God forever. If then original sin is punished by the perpetual deprivation of the vision of God, original sin is punished more than venial sin, and therefore it is not the mildest of punishments.

11. According to the laws †13 he deserves mercy who suffers for another's evil. But he who is punished for only original sin suffers for another's evil, namely of our first parent. Therefore he deserves mercy; he ought not then to incur the severest punishment, i.e. deprivation of the vision of God.

12. Augustine says †14 "To hold anyone guilty because he did not do what he was unable to do is the greatest injustice and folly." But nothing of this kind is imputable to God. Since then the child who is born could not avoid original sin, it seems that the child does not incur the debt of any punishment for this.

13. Original sin is the privation of original justice, as Anselm says.†15 But the vision of God is not owed to a person having original justice, since he may be found to be without grace. Neither then does deprivation of the

divine vision correspond to original sin as a punishment.

14. As we read in Genesis 3, 12 †16 Adam excused himself saying "The woman whom thou gavest me . . . gave to me . . . and I did eat," and the excuse would have been sufficient not to merit punishment, if he had not been able to resist the suggestion of the woman. But God gave the soul flesh whose infection it cannot resist. Therefore it does not seem that on account of this he should be liable to any punishment.

15. Man endowed with natural powers even if he had never sinned, would have been without the vision of God, to which he cannot attain except through grace. But punishment is rightly owed for sin. Therefore deprival of the vision of God cannot be called a punishment for original sin.

On the contrary:

1. Gregory says "The mind while yet on this pilgrimage, cannot see the light as It is, because the bondage of its condemnation hides this from it." †17

2. Pope Innocent II says in the Decretales †18 that deprival of the vision of God is warranted as a punishment for original sin.

Response:

The fitting punishment for original sin is deprival of the vision of God. For evidence of this we must consider that since two conditions seem to pertain to the perfection of a thing, one that it be capable of a great good or actually have it, the other that it be in need of none or of little exterior help, the first condition is more important than the second: for that which is capable of a great good although it needs much help to obtain it, is much better than that which is capable of only a little good which nevertheless can be attained without any or with only a little exterior help. For example, we say that a man's body is better disposed if it can attain perfect health although with the help of much medicine, than if it can attain only a kind of imperfect health without the help of medicine. †19 The rational creature then excels every other creature in this that he is capable of the highest good in virtue of having as his ultimate end the vision and enjoyment of God, although the principles of his own nature are not sufficient to attain this but he needs the help of divine grace.

On this point we must note that in general some divine help is necessary for every rational creature, namely the help of sanctifying grace, which every rational creature needs to enable him to arrive at complete happiness, according to the words of the Apostle (in Romans 6, 23) "The grace of God is eternal life." But over and above this help, another supernatural help was necessary for man because of his composite nature. For man is made up of soul and body and of an intellectual and sense nature: which compositions so to speak if left to their own nature, burden and impede the intellect so that it cannot freely arrive at the heights of contemplation. Now this help was original justice, by which the mind of man would be subject to God in such a way that the lower powers and even the body itself would be totally subject to it, and reason would not be impeded from tending to God. And just as the body is for the sake of the soul and the sense powers for the sake of the intellect, so this help by which the body remains under the control of the soul and the sense powers under the control of the intellectual mind, is as it were a certain disposition for that help (i.e. grace) by which the human mind is ordered to seeing God and to enjoying Him. But this help of original justice is taken away by original sin, as was said above (in q. 4, a. 8).

Now when a person by sinning casts away from himself that by which he was disposed to acquire some good, he deserves to be deprived of that good for the obtaining of which he was disposed, and the very deprival of that good is a fitting punishment for this. And therefore the fitting punishment for original sin is the deprival of grace and consequently of the vision of God, to which man is ordained through grace.

Reply to 1. Man would have been made to no purpose and in vain if he could not attain happiness, as is anything that cannot attain its ultimate end. Hence, so that man would not have been made to no purpose and in vain, being born with original sin, God proposed from the very beginning of the human race a remedy for man by which he would be freed from this purposelessness, namely the Mediator Himself of God and men, Jesus Christ,†20 by faith in Whom the impediment of original sin could be taken away. Hence in Psalm 88, 48 it is said "Remember what my substance is; for hast thou made all the children of men in vain?"; which the Gloss of Augustine †21 explains saying that David begged for the incarnation of the Son Who was to take flesh from his (i.e. David's) substance, and through Him men were to be freed from being made in vain.

Reply to 2. The soul of that child who dies without baptism is not punished by deprival of the vision of God because of the sin of Adam according as it was his personal sin, but is punished for the infection of original fault which it incurs from union with the body that is transmitted from the first parent according to its seminal cause. For it would be unjust for the debt of punishment be transmitted unless the infection of fault were also transmitted: hence the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans (5, 12) explicitly puts the transmission of fault before the transmission of punishment when he says "Through one man sin entered into the world and through sin death."

Reply to 3. The gravity of a punishment can be considered in two ways: in one way as regards the good itself of which one is deprived by the evil of punishment, and thus deprival of the vision and enjoyment of God is the severest of punishments; in another way in comparison with him who is punished, and thus the punishment is graver inasmuch as that of which he is deprived of possessing and enjoying is more his own and connatural to him who is deprived of it, for example, we would say a man is punished more if his own inheritance were taken away from him than if he were prevented from coming into possession of a kingdom to which he has no natural right. And in this way deprival of the divine vision alone is said to be the mildest of all punishments, inasmuch as the vision of the divine essence is a good altogether supernatural.

Reply to 4. A created good added to an uncreated good does not make it a good greater nor cause greater happiness. The reason for this is that if two participants are conjoined, that of which they are participants, can be augmented in them; but if a participant is added to that which is such essentially, it does not cause it to be greater, for example, two hot things joined to one another can result in greater heat, but if there were such a thing as essentially subsistent heat, it would not become hotter by the addition of any hot object. Since then God is the very essence of goodness, as Dionysius says,†22 and all other things are good by participation, God does not become a greater good by the addition of any good: because the goodness of every other thing is contained in Him. Hence since happiness is nothing other than the attainment of the perfect good, any other good whatsoever added to the divine vision or enjoyment, will not cause greater happiness, otherwise God would have become happier by making creatures. However the reasoning is not the same with regard to happiness and unhappiness: because just as happiness consists in union with God, so unhappiness consists in a departure from God, from whose likeness and participation a person recedes by the privation of any good; hence any withdrawal of good makes a person unhappier although not any added good makes a person happier, because by reason of an added good, a man does not adhere to God more than if he is immediately united to Him, but by reason of a withdrawal of good he departs farther from Him.

Reply to 5. The addition of an accidental reward does not make a person happier: because the accidental reward depends on some created good, but the true happiness of man depends only on the uncreated good. But just as a created good is a kind of likeness and a participation of the uncreated good, so the attainment of a created good is a kind of happiness by way of similitude, by which however true happiness is not increased.

Reply to 6. Just as a point does not increase a line, so a created good does not increase happiness.

Replies to 7 and 8. We concede the seventh and eighth arguments. For a person who is deprived of the vision and enjoyment of God, is deprived of God Himself.

Reply to 9. Venial sin compared to original sin is in some way greater and in some way less. For venial sin in relation to this or that person has more of the nature of sin than original sin, because venial sin is a voluntary act by the will of this person, but original sin is not. But original sin in relation to the nature is graver, because it deprives the nature of a greater good, namely the good of grace, than that of which venial sin deprives a person; and on account of this, deprivation of the vision of God is incurred for original sin, because we attain to the vision of God only through grace, which venial sin does not exclude.

Reply to 10. The perpetuity of punishment is a consequence of the perpetuity of fault, which arises from the absence of grace: because fault can be forgiven only through grace. And since grace is excluded as a result of original sin but not as a result of venial sin, therefore perpetual punishment is incurred for original sin, but not for venial sin.

Reply to 11. This child dying without baptism was burdened with another's sin as to the cause, namely because he contracted sin from another, nevertheless he was burdened with his own sin inasmuch as he contracted fault from his first parent. And therefore he deserves mercy that lessens, but not entirely releases from punishment.

Reply to 12. This child dying without baptism is not guilty on account of this that he did not do something, for this would be a sin of omission, but he is guilty on account of this that he contracted the infection of original sin.

Reply to 13. That is a valid argument according the opinion of those who hold that sanctifying grace is not included in the nature of original justice.†23 Which however I believe is false because, since in the beginning original justice consisted in subjection of the human mind to God, which cannot be steadfast except through grace, original justice could not exist without grace; and for that reason the vision of God was owed to a person having original justice. But even if the foresaid opinion be accepted, still the argument is not convincing, because although original justice would not include grace, nevertheless it was a certain disposition prerequired for grace. And for that reason what is contrary to original justice is also contrary to grace, just as what is contrary to natural justice, for example theft, homicide, and the like, is contrary to grace.

Reply to 14. If the man had not been able to resist the woman's persuasion, it would have been sufficient to excuse him from actual sin, which is committed by one's own will; and in this way too the soul of this child is excused from the guilt of actual sin, but not from the guilt of original sin, the infection of which he contracts by reason of union with the flesh.

Reply to 15. Man endowed with only natural powers would be without the divine vision if he were to die in this state, but nevertheless the debt of not having it would not be applicable to him. For it is one thing not to be bound to have, which does not have the nature of punishment but of defect only, and it is another thing to be bound not to have, which does have the nature of punishment.

Question V, Article 2 †p

Whether the Punishment of Sense Is Incurred for Original Sin?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says †1 that children dying without baptism will experience hell. But 'hell' designates the punishment of sense. Therefore the punishment of sense is incurred for original sin.

2. Augustine says †2 "Hold firmly and in no way doubt that children who have departed from this world without the sacrament of baptism are to be punished with eternal torment." But 'torment' designates the

punishment of sense. Therefore punishment of sense is incurred for original sin.

3. In Book VIII of the Moralia on that passage of Job (9, 17) "He has multiplied my wounds without cause" Gregory says †3 that "the sacraments do not liberate from original sin, and though here they (children) have done nothing by their own will, there they are brought to torment." But 'torment' designates the punishment of sense. Therefore punishment of sense is incurred for original sin.

4. The original sin of this child seems to be of the same species as the actual sin of our first parent, since it proceeds from it as an effect from its cause. But the punishment of sense is attributed to the actual sin of the first parent. Therefore also to the original sin of this child.

5. An active cause joined to something passible i.e. capable of suffering, induces the punishment of sense. But the souls of children are passible, and also their bodies after the resurrection, since they do not have the gift of impassibility. Therefore they will suffer the punishment of sense in the presence of fire.

6. The punishment of sinners will be consummated after the judgment. But the punishment of children dying without baptism, who are punished for original sin alone, could not be consummated after the judgment unless some punishment of sense were added to the loss of the vision of God, which they now suffer. Therefore the punishment of sense is incurred for original sin.

7. Punishment is due to fault. But the cause of original sin is the flesh. Since then no punishment except the punishment of sense befits the flesh, it seems that the punishment of sense is incurred especially for original sin.

8. If a person dies with original sin together with venial sin, he will suffer perpetual punishment of sense. But perpetual punishment is not deserved for venial sin. Therefore the perpetual punishment of sense is incurred for original sin.

On the contrary:

1. Bernard says that "Only one's will burns in hell." †4 But original sin is not a sin of one's own will, rather it results from the will of another. Therefore the punishment of sense is not incurred for original sin.

2. Pope Innocent III says in the Decretales †5 that the punishment of sense is warranted for actual sin. But original sin is not actual sin. Therefore the punishment of sense is not incurred for original sin.

Response:

As is commonly said, †6 the punishment of sense is not incurred for original sin but only the punishment of loss, i.e. deprivation of the vision of God. And this seems valid for three reasons: first because each person is an individual substance (suppositum) of a certain nature; and therefore of itself (per se) it is directly ordered to those things that pertain to the nature, but by means of the nature to those things that are above the nature. Therefore that a person suffer some loss in the things that are above the nature can occur either from a fault of the nature or even from a fault of the person; but that a person suffer some loss in those things pertaining to the nature can occur, it seems, only on account of one's own fault. Now as is clear from what has already been said (in q. 5, a. 1 Reply to 9), original sin is a fault of the nature, but actual sin is a fault of the person. But grace and the vision of God are above human nature, and therefore the privation of grace and the loss of the vision of God are imputed to a person not only on account of actual sin but also on account of original sin. Now the punishment of sense is opposed to the integrity of the nature and its good condition, and therefore the punishment of sense is not imputed to a person except on account of actual sin.

Secondly, because punishment is proportioned to fault; and therefore to actual mortal sin, in which there

is a turning away from an unchangeable good and a turning towards a transitory good,†7 is attributed both the punishment of loss, i.e. deprival of the vision of God corresponding to turning away, and the punishment of sense corresponding to turning towards. But in original sin there is not a turning-to, but only a turning-away, or something corresponding to turning-away, namely the soul's abandonment of original justice; and therefore the punishment of sense is not attributed to original sin but only the punishment of loss, namely deprival of the vision of God.

Thirdly because the punishment of sense is never attributable to an habitual disposition; for a person is not punished because he is disposed to steal but because he actually steals; nevertheless some loss [or, privation] is warranted for an habitual disposition devoid of any act: for instance, from the very fact that a man does not have the knowledge of letters he is unworthy of promotion to the dignity of episcopal office.†8 But in original sin there is also concupiscence after the manner of an habitual disposition which makes a child readily disposed to inordinate concupiscence as Augustine says,†9 and an adult actually concupiscent. And therefore for a child who has died with original sin the punishment of sense is not warranted but only the punishment of loss, namely because he is not worthy i.e. he is not blameless enough to be brought into the presence of God, on account of the privation of original justice.

Reply to 1. The names "torment", "suffering" and "hell" and "torture", or other like expressions found in the sayings of the saints,†10 are to be taken in a broad sense for 'punishment', in the way in which the species is taken for the genus. And the reason the saints used this mode of speaking was to render abhorrent the error of the Pelagians †11 who asserted that children were without sin and that they deserved no punishment.

Replies to 2 and 3. The answers to the second and the third and to all similar difficulties is clear from the foregoing.

Reply to 4. As the Apostle says in Romans 5, 12, all sinned in the one sin of our first parent. But not all are affected in the same way by that one sin: for that sin pertains to Adam by reason of his own will and is his actual sin, and therefore actual punishment was deserved for such a sin; but original sin pertains to others by way of origin and not by reason of their actual will, and therefore for others the punishment of sense is not warranted for such a sin.

Reply to 5. In the state of the future life, fire and other active causes of this kind do not act on the souls or bodies of men according to the necessity of nature but rather according to the order of divine justice, because that is a state of receiving according to one's merits. Hence since divine justice does not require that for children who die with only original sin the punishment of sense is called for, they will not suffer at all from such active causes.

Reply to 6. The punishment of children dying with original sin will be consummated after the judgment inasmuch as they who are to be punished with this punishment, will be consummated at the resumption of their bodies.

Reply to 7. Although original sin is transmitted to the soul by way of the flesh, nevertheless it has the nature of fault only according as it infects the soul. And therefore punishment is not incurred for the disposition of the flesh; and if sometimes the flesh is punished, this is on account of the fault of the soul.

Reply to 8. This position does not seem to many to be possible,†12 that a person would die with original and venial sin only: because inasmuch as the lack of age excuses from mortal sin far more does it excuse from venial sin, on account of lack of the use of reason; but after they have attained the use of reason they are under obligation to attend to their salvation. Which if they have done, they will be free from original sin, when grace supervenes; but if they have not, such an omission is for them a mortal sin. However supposing that it were possible that a person died with original and venial sin, I say that he would be punished by eternal punishment

of sense. For eternity of punishment, as we have said (in q. 5, a. 1 Reply to 10), accompanies the loss of grace, from which the eternity of fault arises; and hence it is that venial sin in him who dies with mortal sin, because the latter is never remitted after death, is punished with eternal punishment on account of the loss of grace. And the reasoning would be similar if someone were to die with original and venial sin.

Question V, Article 3 †p

Whether Those Who Die with Only Original Sin Suffer the Affliction of Interior Pain?

It seems that they do, for the following reasons.

1. Anything †1 that is naturally desired, if it is not had at the time for it to be had, causes affliction and pain, as is evident when someone does not have food when nature requires it. But man naturally desires happiness,†2 and the time of its being had is after this life. Since then those who die with original sin do not attain happiness, since they are deprived of the vision of God, it seems that they suffer affliction.

2. Just as baptized children are affected [i.e. react] in regard to the merit of Christ, so also the unbaptized react in regard to the demerit of Adam. But baptized children are joyful on account of the merit of Christ. Therefore unbaptized children are grieved on account of demerit of Adam.

3. It is of the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will.†3 But anything that is contrary to the will is painful, as the Philosopher says.†4 Therefore if they suffer any punishment they must be grieved on account of it.

4. To be perpetually separated from one we love, is especially distressing. But children naturally love God. Therefore since they know that they are forever separated from Him, it seems that this state cannot be without affliction.

On the contrary:

Pain i.e. the affliction of the punishment is incurred for the pleasure of the fault, according to the words of the Apocalypse (18, 7) "As much as she glorified and gave herself up to wantonness, so much torment and mourning give to her." But there was no pleasure in original sin. Therefore there will be no pain or affliction in the punishment of it.

Response:

Some theologians †5 held that children experience some pain or interior affliction because they are without of the vision of God, although that pain in them does not involve the note of the worm of conscience,†6 since they are not conscious that it was within their power to avoid original sin. But there seems to be no reason why we should withhold from them the exterior punishment of sense, if we attribute to them interior affliction, which is far more of a punishment and more opposed to the mildest of punishment, which Augustine ascribes to them.†7 Therefore it seemed to others, and more reasonably, that they do not experience even interior affliction.

And different reasons are assigned for this by the theologians. For some say †8 that the souls of children dying with original sin are in such darkness of ignorance that they do not know they were created for happiness, nor do they think about it at all, and therefore they suffer no affliction on account of this. But it does not seem reasonable to say this. First because, since in children there is no actual sin, which is strictly personal sin, it is not reasonable that they would suffer any loss in natural goods, according to the reason assigned above (in q. 5, a. 2). Moreover it is natural for the separated soul to abound not less but more in knowledge than souls that are here, and therefore it is improbable they are afflicted with such great ignorance. Secondly because according to

this, those who are condemned to hell would be in a better condition so far as concerns their nobler part, i.e. the intellect, being in less darkness of ignorance; and there is no one, as Augustine says,^{†9} who would not prefer to suffer grief with a sound mind than to be joyful but of unsound mind.

And therefore others ^{†10} assign the reason for this, that they [children] are not afflicted, as being due to the disposition of their will. For the disposition of the will either to good or to evil is not changed in the soul after death. Hence since children before they have the use of reason do not have a disordered act of the will, neither will they have it after death. But it is not without disorder of the will that a person would be grieved that he does not have what he could never obtain, as for instance it would be inordinate if a peasant were to grieve over the fact that he would not inherit a kingdom. Since, then, children after death know they never could have attained that heavenly glory they will not grieve over its absence.

However joining together these two opinions we can take a position midway between, for in reference to this we say that the souls of children are not without natural knowledge such as is proper to a separated soul according to its nature, but they are without supernatural knowledge, which is here implanted in us by faith, because in this life they neither actually had faith nor received the sacrament of faith.^{†11} Now it pertains to natural knowledge that the soul knows it was created for happiness and that happiness consists in the attainment of the perfect good. But that that perfect good for which man was made is that glory which the saints possess is beyond natural knowledge. Hence the Apostle says in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 2, 9 ^{†12} that "Eye has not seen nor ear heard neither has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him," and afterwards in verse 10, he adds "But to us God has revealed them through His Spirit." Which revelation pertains to faith. And therefore the souls of children do not know that they are deprived of such a good, and do not grieve on account of this; but this knowledge which they have by nature, they possess without grief.

Reply to 1. The souls of children dying with original sin know happiness in general according to its common notion but not in particular. And therefore they do not grieve over its loss.

Reply to 2. As the Apostle says, in Romans 5, 15, greater is the gift of Christ than the sin of Adam.^{†13} And therefore it does not necessarily follow if children are joyful on account of the merit of Christ, that those not baptized are grieved on account of the sin of Adam.

Reply to 3. Punishment does not always correspond to one's actual will: for example, when a person is defamed in his absence, or even despoiled of his possessions without knowing of it. But punishment must always be either against the actual will or even against the habitual will, or at least against one's natural inclination, as we have said above (in q. 1, aa. 4 and 5) when we treated of the evil of punishment.

Reply to 4. Children dying with original sin are separated from God forever so far concerns the loss of glory which they have no knowledge of, not however so far as concerns their participation in natural goods which they do have knowledge of.

Question V, Article 4 ^{†p}

Whether Death and Other Ills in This Life Are a Punishment for Original Sin?

It seems that they are not, for the following reasons.

1. Seneca says ^{†1} "Death belongs to man by nature and is not a punishment." For the same reason, then, neither are other ills that lead to death.

2. Whatever is commonly found in many, pertains to them by reason of something commonly found in them; but death and other ills leading to it are common to man and to other animals; therefore these ills are found in them according to something common. But these ills do not belong to the other animals by reason of fault, which cannot be attributed to them. Therefore neither do they belong to men, and so they are not a punishment of original sin.

3. Punishment ought to be proportional to sin. For in Deuteronomy 26,†2 it is said "According to the measure of sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But original fault is equal in all who are begotten from Adam, but the foresaid ills are not equal: for some children are born sickly, some crippled in various ways, some well-formed. Therefore ills of this kind are not a punishment for original sin.

4. Such ills are a certain punishment of sense. But the punishment of sense is incurred for sin on account of an undue turning to a transitory good; which turning-to is not found in original sin. Therefore ills of this kind do not correspond to original sin as a punishment.

5. Men are punished more severely after this life than during this life. But after this life, the punishment of sense is not incurred for original sin, as was said (above in q. 5, a. 2). Therefore neither in this life: and so the same conclusion follows as before.

6. Punishment corresponds to fault. But fault pertains to man inasmuch as he is a man. Since then death and other ills of this kind do not belong to man inasmuch as he is a man, because they belong to other animals as well, it seems that such ills are not punishments.

7. Original sin is the privation of original justice,†3 which belonged to man according to the soul. But ills of this kind pertain to the body. Therefore they do not correspond to original sin as a punishment.

8. If Adam had not sinned, his children could have sinned; and if they had sinned they would die, but not on account of original sin, which they would not have had. Therefore death is not a punishment of original sin.

On the contrary:

1. In Romans 6, 23 it is said "For the wages of sin is death," and in Romans 8, 10 "The body . . . is dead by reason of sin," and in Genesis 2, 17 †4 it is said "For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death."

2. Augustine says in Book XII On the Trinity†5 and Book XV On the City of God†6 and in Against the Epistle Called Fundamental,†7 that ills of this kind come from the condemnation of sin. And Isidore †8 even says in the book De Summo Bono that if man had not sinned, water would not drown him, nor fire burn him, nor other such adversities come to pass. Therefore all such ills are a punishment of original sin.

Response:

According to the Catholic Faith †9 we must hold without any doubt whatever that death and all such ills of the present life are a punishment of original sin.

But it must be noted that punishment is twofold: one as it were appointed for sin, but the other concomitant. For instance we see that a judge sentences a man to blindness for some crime,†10 but many misfortunes, such as beggary and other such things, result from his blindness. But the blindness itself is the punishment appointed for the crime, for the judge intends that the criminal be deprived of sight for his sin; but in fact he is not weighing the ensuing misfortunes: hence if many persons are deprived of sight for the same sin, more misfortunes may ensue in one person than in another. Nevertheless this does not redound to injustice in the judge, because such evils were not inflicted by him for the sin, but followed incidentally (per accidens) so

far as concerns his intention. And the same can be said in regard to the present question. For when man was first created God had given to him the help of original justice by virtue of which he was preserved from all ills of this kind. Of which help all human nature was deprived on account of the sin of our first parent, as is clear from what was said above (in q. 5, a 1); from the privation of which help diverse evils follow, which are found to be of diverse kinds in diverse persons, although they share equally the fault of original sin.

However there seems to be this difference between God punishing and man judging, that the human judge cannot foresee future events, wherefore he cannot weigh them at the time he inflicts the punishment for fault: because of which it is reasonable that the inequalities of such evils do not detract from his justice; but God foreknows all future events, wherefore it would seem to point to injustice in God if misfortunes of this kind would occur unequally in persons to whom fault is equally attributable.

Therefore to resolve doubt on this matter, Origen maintained †11 that souls before they were united to bodies earned different merits, according to the diversity of which merits they incurred greater or lesser afflictions in the bodies to which they united. Hence it is, as Origen himself says, †12 that some children just born are afflicted by an evil spirit, or are born blind, or suffer other disadvantages of this kind. But this is contrary to apostolic teaching. For the Apostle in Romans 9, 11 speaking of Jacob and Esau says, †13 "For before the children had yet been born or had done aught of good or evil . . .," etc. And the same teaching applies to all; hence it must not be said that souls had good or bad merits before they were united to their bodies. It is also contrary to reason. For since the soul is naturally a part of human nature, it is imperfect when it is without the body, as is any part separated from the whole. But it would have been incongruous for God to begin His work with imperfect things; †14 hence it is not reasonable that God would have created the soul before the body, just as it would be unreasonable to have formed the hand without the man.

And therefore we must state otherwise, that such diversity in these ills which occur among men, is foreseen and ordained by God: not indeed on account of any merits gained in another life, but sometimes on account of some sins of the parents. For since the child is a part of the father †15 according to the body, which is derived from him, but not according to the soul, which is immediately created by God, it is not unreasonable that the child should be punished corporally for the sin of the father, although not by spiritual punishment, which pertains to the soul, just as man is punished in other affairs of his. Sometimes indeed such ills are ordained not as a punishment of some sin, but as a help against future sin, or for progress in virtue, either of him who suffers it, or of another. For as the Lord says in John 9, 3 of the man born blind "Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents, but the works of God were to be made manifest in him," which served to promote human salvation. But the very fact that man is in such a condition that he must be helped, either to avoid sin, or to advance in virtue, by means of these misfortunes or defects, pertains to the weakness of human nature, which derives from the sin of our first parent; just as the fact that the body of man is so disposed that it needs surgery to cure it, pertains to its weakness. And therefore all these ills correspond to original sin as a concomitant punishment.

Reply to 1. That help given to man by God, namely original justice, was gratuitous; hence reason could not take it into account. And therefore Seneca and other pagan philosophers did not consider such ills under the aspect of punishment.

Reply to 2. Such help was not conferred on other animals, nor did they lose anything previously through fault, from which such evils would result, as in the case of men. And therefore the reasoning is not parallel. Just as in him who stumbles on account of the blindness with which he was born, such blindness does not have the nature of punishment as far as human justice is concerned, but of a natural defect; but in him who was deprived of sight on account of a crime it does have the nature of punishment.

Reply to 3. Such ills are not a punishment appointed for sin, but a concomitant punishment, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 4. The appointed punishment of sense is incurred only for an actual turning-to a transitory good, but concomitant punishment is of a different kind.

Reply to 5. The state of persons after death is not one of progress in virtue or of failure through sin, but of receiving in proportion to merits. Hence all the evils after death are decreed for fault, and are not ordained either for advance in virtue or for avoidance of sin. And hence it is that punishment of sense is not warranted for children after death.

Reply to 6. Something that in man has the nature of fault, for instance killing a man, can indeed be found in other animals, but without the nature of fault, which consists in this that it is according to the will which cannot be the case in brutes. And similarly, ills which are common to men and to other animals have in man the nature of punishment which consists in this that they are contrary to the will, but not in other animals: for the consideration of fault and punishment pertains to man inasmuch as he is a man.

Reply to 7. By reason of original justice the proper relationship of the body under the control of the soul was preserved, although original justice itself was in the soul. And therefore bodily ills or defects properly follow on original sin, by which original justice is lost.

Reply to 8. According to some theologians,†16 if Adam had not sinned when tempted, he would have been immediately confirmed in justice, and all his descendants would have been born confirmed in justice; and according to this view the objection is not relevant. But I believe that this is false: because the condition of the body in its first state corresponded to the condition of the soul; hence as long as body was animal-like the soul too, not yet being fully spiritual, was mutable. But to generate pertains to animal life: hence it follows that the children of Adam would not be born confirmed in justice. If then some one of Adam's descendants had sinned though Adam had not sinned, he would die on account of his own actual sin just as Adam died, but his descendants would die on account of original sin.

Question V, Article 5 †p

Whether Death and Other Such Defects Are Natural to Man?

It seems that they are, for the following reasons.

1. Man's body is composed of contraries. But every thing composed of contraries is naturally corruptible.†1 Therefore man is naturally mortal, and consequently subject to other defects.

2. But it was argued that the dissolution of the human body on account of the contrariety existing in it results from the withdrawal of original justice; hence it is not natural but penal. But counter to this: if death and dissolution follow in man from the withdrawal of original justice which prevented these defects, it follows that such defects are caused from sin as from the removal of an impediment to sin. But the movement that follows from the removal of an impediment is natural †2 even if the remover of the impediment is a voluntary agent, for instance when a man removes a pillar and a stone on top of it falls, the stone's movement is natural. So nonetheless death and dissolution are natural to man.

3. Man in the first state was immortal as it were capable of not dying, and in his final state he will be immortal as it were not capable of dying, but in the intermediate state he is in every way mortal as it were under the necessity of dying.†3 But the immortality of the final state, which is glory, will not be natural but consummated through grace. Therefore neither was the immortality of the first state natural. Consequently dying was natural.

4. Man according to the condition of his nature, if left to himself, dies; but that he was preserved from death in his first state, was owing to a gift divinely given. But if something be done in a thing by God beyond its nature, nonetheless the contrary disposition is natural to it: for instance, if God were to cause water to be boiling hot, nonetheless it would be cold by nature. Notwithstanding then man in his first state was naturally mortal.

5. Just as it was supernaturally given to man that he could not die, so it is supernaturally given to man that he is able to see God. But that man be without the divine vision is not contrary to nature, therefore neither is it contrary to nature that he be without immortality. Death then is not contrary to nature.

6. Even before sin man's body was composed of the four elements, and therefore there were active and passive qualities in it.†4 But corruption naturally follows on these: for the active principle naturally assimilates the passive principle to itself;†5 which when done, the passive principle is corrupted and as a consequence the composite itself. Therefore the man's body even before sin was naturally corruptible.

7. The life of man is preserved by the action of natural heat, which is a natural agent;†6 but every natural agent in acting undergoes some diminution, for when it acts it is itself also acted upon, according to the Philosopher;†7 but any finite thing is necessarily depleted entirely if something is continually being dispelled from it. Since then the natural heat in man's body was finite, natural heat according to its nature would of necessity finally be depleted: and therefore man would naturally have died even before sin.

8. The body of man was finite. And in it a depletion was occurring, otherwise it would not have needed food. Since then by continuous depletion any finite thing is at some time severely weakened, it seems that man's body would have naturally and necessarily corrupted even before sin.

9. Augustine says †8 the capability of not dying belonged to man thanks to the tree of life. But this seems to be impossible: because if the tree of life was corruptible it could not have given incorruptibility; and if it was incorruptible it could not have been used by man as food. Therefore man did not have the capability of not dying, but would naturally and necessarily have died.

10. That which is of itself possible, is never made necessary by another; hence what is of itself perishable can never be made imperishable by another: for the perishable and the imperishable differ according to genus, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics,†9 and of those things that differ in genus a change of one into the other is not possible. But man's body was of itself perishable, inasmuch as it is composed of contraries, therefore in no way could it be made imperishable by another. Consequently man would have naturally died even if he had not sinned.

11. If man before he sinned was capable of not dying, either the capability of not dying pertained to grace or to nature. If to grace, then he could merit it, which is contrary to the Master in distinction XXIV, Book II of the Sententiae.†10 But if it pertained to nature, he could be wounded but not totally destroyed: for through sin man was stripped of gratuitous things and wounded so far as concerns natural things, as is said in the Gloss on Luke X.†11 Therefore before sin man in no way had the capability of not dying.

12. In anything composed of contraries there is necessarily inequality, according to the philosophers †12 for if contraries belonged equally to the constitution of a composed thing, one would not partake more of the form than another but all would be equally actual; but one thing does not come to be from many unless one is related to another as potential to actual. Moreover inequality is necessarily a principle of corruption, because that which is stronger corrupts that which is weaker. Therefore of natural necessity the body of man was corruptible, even if man had not sinned.

13. Man has the same substantial nature before and after sin: otherwise he would not be of the same species. But after sin the necessity of dying belongs to man according to the nature of his substance, namely inasmuch as matter is in potency to another form. Therefore even before sin he would have necessarily died.

14. But it was argued that before sin man was preserved by God from dying. But counter to this: that from which it follows that contradictories are simultaneously true is never done by God.†13 But from this, that a being in potency be subject to an agent's action and not be corrupted, it follows that contradictories are simultaneously true, namely to be in potency and not to be in potency, for it is of the nature of a being in potency that it be actualized by an agent. Therefore before sin the body of man would not have been incorruptible thanks to God preventing the corruption.

15. Augustine says in Book VIII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis†14 that God so administers things that He allows them to (perform and) exercise their proper motions. But the proper and natural motion of a body composed of contraries is to tend to dissolution. This then was not prevented by God.

16. That which is beyond the natural order cannot be done by any created power, because every created power operates according to the seminal principles implanted in the nature, as Augustine says.†15 But original justice was a created gift. Therefore man could not be preserved from corruption by its power.

17. What is in all or most is not contrary to nature. But death is found in all men after sin. Therefore it is not contrary to nature.

On the contrary:

1. Anything that is for an end is proportioned to the end. But man was created for perpetual happiness as his end. Therefore according to his nature he has perpetual duration; consequently death and corruption are contrary to his nature.

2. Matter is proportioned to the form according to nature. But the intellectual soul, which is the form of the human body, is incorruptible. Therefore also the human body is naturally incorruptible, and so death and dissolution are contrary to the nature of the human body.

Response:

According to the Philosopher in Book II of the Physics,†16 'natural' is spoken of in two ways: either of that which has a nature, as we call bodies natural, or of that which follows on the nature as being according to the nature, as we say tending upward is natural to fire. And in this way we are speaking here of the natural which is according to nature. Hence since 'nature' may refer to two things, namely 'form' and 'matter', something is called natural in two ways, either according to the form or according to the matter. According to the form, as it is natural to fire to give off heat, for action follows upon the form; and according to the matter, as it is natural to water that it can be heated by fire. And since the form is more properly 'nature' than the matter,†17 what is natural according to the form is more natural than what is natural according to the matter.

But that which follows on the matter can be taken in two ways: in one way according as it is suited to the form, and this is what an agent chooses in matter; in another way not according as it is suited to the form, -- rather it may be even contrary to the form and the end or purpose --, but what follows from the necessity of matter,†18 and such a condition is not chosen or intended by the agent. For example, the artisan who makes a saw for cutting looks for iron because it is a material suitable for the form of a saw and for its intended end on account of its hardness. However there is found in iron a condition according to which it is not suitable either for the form or its intended end, for instance that it is breakable or subject to rust or something of the kind, which is an impediment to the end or purpose; hence such conditions are not chosen by the agent, but rather would be rejected by him if it were possible. Hence the Philosopher says in Chapter XIX On the Animals,†19 that the final cause is not to be sought, but only the material cause, in the accidents of or attributes of the individual: for they arise from the disposition or composition of the matter, not from the intention of the agent. So then something is natural to man according to his form, as for instance to understand, to will, and the like;

but some things are natural to man according to his matter, i.e. his body.

But the condition of the human body can be considered in two ways: in one way according to its aptitude for the form, in another way according to that which follows in it solely from the necessity of the matter. According to its aptitude for the form, it is necessary that the human body be composed of the elements and of a proportionate or balanced combination (*medie complexionatum*) of these.†20 For since the human soul is intellective in potency it is united to the body in order that through the senses it may acquire intelligible species, by which the soul actually understands. For the union of the soul with the body is not for the sake of the body but for the sake of the soul: because form is not for the sake of matter, but matter for the sake of the form.†21 Now the first or principal sense is touch which is so to speak the foundation of the other senses,†22 and the organ of touch has to be a mean between contraries, as is proved in Book II On the Soul.†23 Hence the body suited to such a soul was a body composed of contraries; wherefore it follows from the necessity of matter that the body is corruptible.

But according to this condition it (the body) does not have an aptitude for the form but rather opposition to the form. And indeed any corruption of any natural thing whatsoever is not consistent with the form. For since form is the principle of being, corruption which is the way to non-being, is opposed to it; hence the Philosopher says in Book II On the Heavens,†24 that the corruption of old age, and all defects are contrary to the particular nature of this thing determined by the form, although it may be in keeping with universal nature, by virtue of which matter is reduced, i.e. is subject to the act of any form to which the matter is in potency, and when one thing is generated another thing is necessarily corrupted. But in a special way the corruption arising from the necessity of matter is not suited to this form which is the intellective soul. For other forms are corruptible at least accidentally, i.e. by reason of something else, but the intellective soul is not corruptible either of itself (*per se*) or by reason of anything else. Hence if in nature there could have been found a body composed of elements that were incorruptible, undoubtedly such a body would be naturally suited to the soul. Just as if iron that was unbreakable and not subject to rust could be found, it would be the most suitable matter for a saw, and an artisan would seek matter of this kind; but because matter of this kind cannot be found he takes such as he can, namely hard but breakable. And similarly, because in nature there cannot be found a body composed of elements which according to the nature of matter is incorruptible, an organic though corruptible body is naturally accommodated to the incorruptible soul.

But since God, Who is the creator of man, could by His omnipotence prevent this necessity of matter [i.e. its corrupting] from actually coming about, by His power it was given to man before sin to be preserved from death, until man showed himself unworthy of such beneficence by sinning; just as an artisan, if he could, would give to the iron with which he works the attribute of unbreakability.

So death and dissolution then, is natural to man according to the necessity of matter, but according the nature of his form immortality, i.e. exemption from death would befit him. However natural principles are incapable of providing this; but a certain natural aptitude for it belongs to man by reason of his soul, and its fulfillment comes from a power above nature. Just as the Philosopher says †25 that we have an aptitude for the moral virtues by nature, but they are developed in us by habitually practising them. And so too inasmuch as immortality is natural to us, death and corruption is contrary to our nature.

Reply to 1. That argument is valid so far as concerns the necessity of matter.

Reply to 2. A similar answer is to be given to the second argument.

Reply to 3. That argument is valid in regard to immortality, not so far as concerns aptitude but so far as concerns consummation.

Reply to 4. Boiling is contrary to water by reason of water's form, but not immortality to man, as was

said (in the Response): hence the case is not similar. However it must be said that those things done by God in things are indeed beyond nature, but not contrary to nature: because a natural subjection to the Creator belongs to every created thing; much more even than subjection to the heavenly bodies belongs to the lower bodies: and nevertheless those things that occur in the lower bodies in accordance with the influence of the heavenly bodies, such as the ebb and flow of the tide are not contrary to nature, as the Commentator says.†26

Reply to 5. The divine vision is beyond the capacity of human nature not only so far as concerns the matter but also so far as concerns the form: for it exceeds the nature of the human intellect.

Reply to 6. Contrary qualities are in a mixed i.e. composed body in the way that contrary elements are in the world; and just as the contrary elements do not corrupt one another, because they are preserved by the power of the heavenly body, by which their actions are regulated, so contrary qualities in a composed body are regulated and preserved so as not to corrupt one another, by the substantial form which is a certain imprint of the heavenly body; for nothing in these lower bodies acts for the attainment of the species except by the power of the heavenly body.†27 Hence as long as the form has its active power from the influence of the heavenly body, the composed body is preserved in being; and hence it is that the heavenly body by approach and withdrawal causes generation and corruption in these lower bodies, and that the durations of all lower bodies are measured by the periodicity of the heavenly bodies.†28 Hence if there were some form whose active power always remained by reason of the influence of its cause, corruption would never result from the action of active and passive qualities.

Reply to 7. Although the power of a physical agent is diminished by being acted upon, nevertheless it can be restored. Hence we see renewal of active power taking place in parts of the universe owing to this that the warm elements whose power is diminished in winter because of the absence of the sun, is restored in summer by the presence of the sun. And this takes place in any composed body as long as the power of the form preserving the mixture of the elements endures.

Reply to 8. The loss of moisture which occurred in the body of Adam as a result of the action of natural heat, was repaired by the taking of food; and in this way it was able to be preserved from being totally consumed.

Reply to 9. That which is produced by the taking of food is as it were extraneous in respect of that on which the power of the human species was first founded. Hence just as the strength of wine is gradually diluted by the admixture of water and finally gives out, so the power of the species by the admixture of nutrimental moisture †29 is gradually weakened and finally gives out. Hence an animal inevitably becomes weak and finally dies, as is said in Book I On Generation and Corruption.†30 And it was against this loss of strength that the tree of life provided assistance, by restoring the power of the species to its pristine vigor by its power; not however in such a way that once taken as nourishment it would give the power of lasting forever: for it was perishable, hence unable of itself (per se) to be the cause of perpetual duration. But it strengthened the natural power to endure longer according to a fixed time, at which point it could be taken again to live longer, and so on until man would be transferred to a state of glory, in which he would no longer need nourishment. Thus then the tree of life was a help towards immortality, but the principle cause of immortality was the power conferred on the soul by God.

Reply to 10. That which is of its nature possible never is made necessary according to its nature by another, namely in such a way that it has the nature of necessity. Nevertheless what is possible by reason of itself is made necessary by another than itself, although not naturally, as happens in all compulsory things that are said to be necessary owing to something other than themselves, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics.†31

Reply to 11. The capability of not dying was due to grace, but not sanctifying grace, according to some †32 hence man could not merit in that state. But according to others †33 this gift of immortality was due to sanctifying grace, and man could merit in that state.

Reply to 12. The inequality of the elements is preserved in a composed body by the power of the form as long as the form is preserved by its cause.

Reply to 13. Matter is in potency to another form; but nevertheless that other form cannot be reduced to act i.e. actualized by an external agent unless that agent is stronger than the active power the form has from the influence of its cause. But the cause of this form i.e. the human soul, is God alone, Whose power infinitely exceeds the power of any other agent. And therefore, so long as He willed to preserve man in existence by His power, man could not be corrupted by any external or internal agent. Just as also we clearly see that by the power of the heavenly body material forms are preserved in existence despite the action of a corrupting agent.

Reply to 14. It is of the nature of potency to be reduced to act [i.e. actualized] by an agent; but one act already in potency impedes the reduction of a potency to another act. Hence, unless the agent is stronger than the power that the form in the matter has either of itself, or from the one preserving it, the potency will not be reduced to act by an external agent: for a small fire cannot cause the dissolution of a vast amount of water. Hence it is not surprising that by divine influence the human soul in the state of innocence was able to resist every contrary agent.

Reply to 15. By His governance God does not impede the proper movements of things which pertain to their perfection, but the movements of things that pertain to their defects are sometimes prevented by God out of the abundance of His goodness.

Reply to 16. The form itself is an effect of the agent. Hence what the agent does effectively and what the form does formally are the same: for instance the painter is said to color a wall, and so too does the color.†34 In this manner then God alone effectively causes the immortality of man; but the soul causes this formally by a gift divinely bestowed on it, either in the state of innocence or in the state of glory.

Reply to 17. That argument is valid concerning that which is contrary to nature simply [i.e. absolutely]: for this in no way is in all or in most. But death in a certain manner is according to nature and in a certain manner contrary to nature, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to the arguments On the contrary.

The answer to those arguments is readily evident from what has been said. For that eternal happiness to which man is ordered is beyond his nature; hence immortality [i.e. the capability of not dying] does not necessarily belong to man by nature. And similarly even the body although it is corruptible, as was explained (in the Response), is proportionate to the human soul.

Question 6

Question VI †p

On Human Choice

Whether Man Has a Free Choice of His Acts or Chooses of Necessity?

It seems that he chooses necessarily, not freely,†1 for the following reasons.

1. It is said in Jeremiah (10, 23) "The way of man is not his, neither is it in a man to walk, and to direct his steps." But that in respect of which a man has liberty, is his, as if placed in his power. Therefore it seems that man does not have a free choice of his ways and his acts.

2. But it was said that that text refers to the execution of choices, which sometimes are not in a man's power. But counter to this: The Apostle says in Romans (9, 16) "So then it is not of him that wills" i.e. to will, "nor of him that runs" i.e. to run,†2 "but of God that showeth mercy." But just as 'to run' pertains to the exterior execution of acts, so 'to will' pertains to interior choice. Therefore not even interior choices are in man's power but come to man from God.

3. But it was argued that man is moved to choose by a certain inner impulse,†3 i.e. by God Himself, and in an unchangeable manner, yet this is not opposed to liberty. But counter to this: although every animal moves itself in accordance with its appetite, nevertheless animals other than man do not have free choice, because their appetite is moved by an external mover, namely by the power of a heavenly body or by the action of some other body. If then man's will is moved in an unchangeable manner by God, it follows that man does not have a free choice of his acts.

4. A coerced act is one whose principle is external, to which the one undergoing coercion contributes nothing.†4 If then the principle of voluntary choice is from outside, namely God, it seems that the will is moved perforce and necessarily. Therefore man does not have a free choice of his acts.

5. It is impossible for the will of man to be discordant with the will of God; because as Augustine says,†5 either man does what God wills or God fulfills His will concerning him. But the will of God is unchangeable, therefore also the will of man. Consequently all human choices proceed from an unchangeable choice.

6. The act of any power can be only in regard to its object, as the act of seeing can only be in regard to the visible. But the object of the will is the good, therefore the will can will only the good. The will, then, necessarily wills the good and does not have a free choice of good or evil.

7. Every power, whose object is compared to it as mover to movable, is a passive power, and its operation is an undergoing; for instance a perceptible object moves the sense, therefore sense is a passive power, and sensing is a kind of undergoing or being acted upon.†6 But the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable: for the Philosopher says in Book III On the Soul†7 and in Book IX of the Metaphysics†8 that the object of the appetite is a mover not moved but the appetite is a mover moved. Therefore the will is a passive power †9 and to will is to be acted upon i.e. be affected. But every passive power is necessarily moved by its active principle if that principle is sufficient. Therefore it seems that the will is moved necessarily by the appetible object.†10 Consequently man is not free to will or not to will.

8. But it was argued that the will has necessity in regard to the ultimate end, because every man necessarily wills to be happy,†11 but not in regard to those things that are for the sake of the end. But counter to this: just as the end is the object of the will, so also is that which is for the sake of the end; because each has the nature of good. If then the will is necessarily moved to the end, it seems that it is also necessarily moved to that which is for the end.

9. Where the moving principle is the same and the movable is the same, the manner of moving is the same. But when a person wills the end and those things that are for the end, what is moved, namely the will, is the same and what moves it is the same; because a person wills those things that are for that end only inasmuch as he wills the end. Therefore the manner of moving is the same, i.e., just as a person necessarily wills the ultimate end, so he necessarily wills those things that are for the end.

10. Just as the intellect is a power separated from matter, so too is the will. But the intellect is moved necessarily by its object: for man is compelled of necessity to assent to a truth by the force of the reasoning.†12 Therefore for the same reason the will too is necessarily moved by its object.

11. The disposition of the first mover remains in all the succeeding movers, because all the secondary movers move inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. But in the order of voluntary movements, the first mover is the apprehended desirable object. Since then the apprehension of a desirable object imposes necessity if a thing is demonstrably proved to be good, it seems that necessity is transmitted to all the succeeding movements; and therefore the will is not moved to will freely but necessarily.

12. The thing is a more effective mover than the intention, i.e. the conception of the thing. But according to the Philosopher,†13 the good is in things, but the true is in the mind; and so the good is the thing itself and the true is the conception; therefore the good more than the true has the nature of a mover. But the true moves the intellect necessarily, as was said (in arg. 10). Therefore the good moves the will necessarily.

13. Love, which pertains to the will, is a more vehement movement than cognition, which pertains to the intellect, because cognition assimilates but love transforms, as we learn from Dionysius;†14 therefore the will is more movable than the intellect. If then the intellect is moved necessarily, much more it seems is the will.

14. But it was argued that the action of the intellect is in accordance with movement towards the soul but the act of the will in accordance with movement away from the soul; and therefore the intellect has more the nature of a passive principle and the will more the nature of an active principle; hence the will is not necessarily passive in regard to its object. But counter to this: to assent pertains to the intellect just as to consent pertains to the will. But to assent signifies movement to the thing assented to, just as to consent signifies movement to the thing consented to. Therefore the movement of the will is no more away from the soul than the movement of the intellect.

15. If the will is not moved of necessity in regard to some things willed, it is true to say that it is open to opposites: because anything that is not necessarily so, can be or not be; but anything that is in potency to opposites is not reduced to the actuality to either of them except by an actual being that makes what was in potency actual, and we call that which makes something actual, its cause. If then the will determinately wills something, there will have to be some cause that makes it will this. But given the cause the effect is given, as Avicenna proves,†15 because if the cause be given yet it is possible that the effect not occur, it will need yet another cause to move it from potentiality to actuality, and so the first one was not a sufficient cause. Therefore the will is necessarily moved to will something.

16. No power relating to contraries is an active power, because any active power can do that in respect to which it is active; but 'to be possible' or 'the possible' being assumed, nothing impossible follows,†16 for it would follow that two opposites exist simultaneously, which is impossible.†17 But the will is an active power. Therefore it is not related to opposites but is necessarily determined to one.

17. The will at some time begins to choose when previously it was not choosing; either then it is changed from its previous disposition or it is not. If not, it follows that just as previously it was not choosing, so neither is it now; and thus the will not choosing would be choosing, which is impossible. And if its disposition is changed, it must be changed by another, because anything that is moved is moved by another.†18 But the mover imposes necessity on the movable thing, otherwise the mover would not effectively move it. Therefore the will is moved necessarily.

18. But it was said that these arguments draw a conclusion about a natural power, which is in matter, but not about an immaterial power, which is the will. But counter to this: the beginning of all human knowledge is sensation, i.e. sense-perception;†19 therefore only inasmuch as either the thing itself or the effect of it falls under the senses can it be known by man. But that power itself relating to opposites does not fall under the senses, and in the effects of it which do fall under the senses, two contrary acts are not found to occur at the same time, rather we always see that in fact one determinately occurs. Therefore we cannot conclude that there is in man some active power relating to opposites.

19. Since potency is related to act, just as one act is related to another act, so one potency is related to another potency. But two opposite acts cannot occur simultaneously. Therefore neither can one potency be related to two opposites.

20. According to Augustine in Book I On the Trinity, nothing is the cause of its own existence,†20 therefore for a like reason nothing is the cause of its own movement; the will then does not move itself. But it must be moved by something, because it begins to act after it was not acting, and anything of such a kind is moved in some way; hence even of God we say that on account of His immutability He does not begin to will after He had not willed. Therefore it is necessary that the will be moved by another. But what is moved by another receives necessity from that other. Therefore the will wills necessarily, and not freely.

21. Everything multiform is reducible to some uniform principle.†21 But human movements are various and multiform, therefore they are reducible to a uniform motion as to their cause, which is the motion of the heaven.†22 But what is caused by the motion of the heaven comes about necessarily, because a natural cause necessarily produces its effect unless there be something impeding it, and nothing can impede the movement of the heavenly body from attaining its effect, because even the act of the thing impeding it would have to be referred to some principle of the heaven as to its cause. Therefore it seems that human movements occur necessarily and not from free choice.

22. He who does what he does not will, does not have free choice. But man does what he does not will, as we read in Romans 7, 15 "The evil which I hate, that I do." Therefore man does not have a free choice of his actions.

23. Augustine says that "the man who misuses free will destroys both himself and it."†23 But freely choosing belongs only to one who has free choice. Therefore man does not have free choice.

24. Augustine says in the Confessions that "custom not resisted becomes necessity."†24 Therefore it seems that at least in those accustomed to doing something, the will moves of necessity.

On the contrary:

1. In Ecclesiasticus (15, 14) it is said "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." But this would not be the case unless man had free choice, which is the desire of what is counselled, as is said in Book III of the Ethics.†25 Therefore man has a free choice of his acts.

2. Rational powers are capable of contrary effects, according to the Philosopher.†26 But the will is a rational power: for it is in the rational part of the soul, as is said in Book III On the Soul.†27 Therefore the will is open to opposites and is not necessarily moved to one thing.

3. According to the Philosopher in Book III †28 and Book VI †29 of the Ethics, man is the master of his acts, and it is in his power to act or not to act. But this would not be the case if he did not have free choice. Therefore man has a free choice of his acts.

Response:

Some philosophers maintained that man's will is necessarily moved to choose a thing. Nevertheless they did not say that the will was coerced; for not every necessary act is coerced, but only that act of which the principle is outside.†30 Hence some necessary movements are natural, but coerced acts are not: for a coerced act is contrary to a natural act as well as to a voluntary act, since the principle of each is within, but the principle of a coerced act is outside.

But that opinion is heretical,†31 for it destroys the reason for merit and demerit in human acts: for it

does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious for someone of necessity to do what he cannot avoid.

It is even counted among extraneous opinions in philosophy, because not only is it contrary to faith, but it subverts all the principles of moral philosophy.†32 For if nothing is within our power, but we are necessarily moved to will, then deliberation, exhortation, precept, and punishment and praise and blame, with which moral philosophy is concerned, is nullified. Opinions of this kind that destroy the principles of some part of philosophy are called extraneous positions;†33 as for instance the opinion that nothing is in motion, which destroys the principles of natural science. And some men were led to hold such positions partly owing to perversity, partly owing to some sophistic arguments which they were unable to refute, as is said in Book IV of the Metaphysics.†34

In order then to arrive at the truth in regard to this question, we must first consider that just as in other things there is some principle of their own acts, so also in men. And this principle of activity or motion in men is properly the intellect and the will, as is said in Book III On the Soul.†35 Which principle in part corresponds to the principle of motion in natural things and in part differs from it. It corresponds to it because, just as in natural things there is found a form, which is a principle of action, and an inclination following on the form, which is called the natural appetite, from which two action follows, so in man there is found an intellective form and an inclination of the will following on the apprehended form, from which two action results. But there is this difference, that the form of the natural thing is a form individualized by matter, and therefore the inclination following it is determined to one, but the form intellectually grasped is universal, under which many can be comprehended. Hence since acts are concerned with singulars,†36 among which there is none that is equal to the potentiality of the universal, the inclination of the will remains indeterminately related to many; for example, if an architect conceives the form of a house universally, under which houses of different shapes are comprised, his will can be inclined to build a house that is square or circular or of some other shape.

But the active principle in brute animals is midway between these two. For the form apprehended by the senses is individual, like the form of the natural thing, and therefore from it an inclination to one act follows, as in natural things. But nevertheless the same form is not always received in the sense, as is the case in natural things, for fire is always hot, but now one, now another: for instance, now a pleasing form, now a displeasing form. Hence at one time the animal flees, at another time pursues. In which respect it is like the human active principle.

Secondly we must consider that a power is moved in two ways: in one way on the part of the subject, in another way on the part of the object. On the part of the subject, as sight by a change in the condition of the organ is moved to see more clearly or less clearly; on the part of the object, as sight now sees white, now sees black. And the first change pertains to the very exercise of the act, namely that the act be done or not be done or be more effectively or less effectively done; but the second change pertains to the specification of the act, for an act is specified by its object.†37

We must consider, then, that in natural things the specification of the act is from the form, but the exercise itself is by the agent that causes the very motion; but a mover acts for the sake of an end; hence it remains that the first principle of motion so far as concerns the exercise of the act is from the end. But if we consider the object of the will and the intellect, we find that the object of the intellect is the first and primary principle in the genus of formal cause, for its object is being and truth; but the object of the will is the first and primary principle in the genus of final cause, for its object is the good, under which are comprehended all ends just as under the truth are comprehended all apprehended forms. Hence even good itself inasmuch as it is an apprehensible form, is contained under the truth as a particular truth, and truth itself, inasmuch as it is the end of the intellectual operation, is contained under the good as a particular good.

If then we consider the movement of the potencies or powers of the soul on the part of the object specifying the act, the first principle of motion is from the intellect, for in this way the good intellectually grasped moves even the will itself. But if we consider the movement of the powers of the soul on the part of the

exercise of the act, in this way the principle of motion is from the will. For the power to which the principal end pertains always moves to act the power to which it pertains that which is for the end, for example the military art moves the bridle-maker to operate. And in this way the will moves itself and all the other powers: for I understand because I will to, and likewise I use all the other powers and habits because I will to. Hence too the Commentator †38 defines habit as that which a person uses at will. Therefore, in order to show that the will is not necessarily moved we must consider the movement of the will both as regards the exercise of the act and as regards the determination of the act, which comes from the object.

As to the exercise of the act, first it is clear that the will is moved by itself: for just as it moves the other powers so also does it move itself. Nor does it follow from this that the will is in potency and in act in respect to the same thing; for just as man in virtue of his intellect moves himself to knowledge by way of discovery, inasmuch as from one thing actually known he arrives at something not known that was only potentially known, so from this that man actually wills something he moves himself to actually will something else. For example, from the fact that he wills health, he moves himself to will to take a dose of medicine: for from the fact that he wills health he begins to deliberate about those things that conduce to health, and finally when deliberation is ended he wills to take the dose of medicine; so accordingly the will to take the medicine is preceded by counsel which proceeds from the will of the person who wills to take counsel. Since therefore the will moves itself by counsel, and counsel is a kind of investigation †39 not demonstrative but involving opposites, the will does not move itself of necessity. However, since the will does not always will to deliberate, it is necessary that it be moved by something to will to deliberate; and if by itself, it is again necessary that counsel precede the movement of the will, and the act of the will precede counsel; and since an infinite regression is not possible, it is necessary to maintain that, so far as concerns the first movement of the will, the will of anyone not always actually willing must be moved by something external, by whose impulse the will begins to will.

Therefore some †40 held that this impulse is from a heavenly body. But this is impossible. For since the will is in the rational part of the soul according to the Philosopher †41 and the reason or intellect is not a bodily power, it is impossible for the power of a heavenly body to move the will directly. And indeed to hold that the will of man is moved by the influence of a heavenly body, as the appetites of the brutes are moved, is in keeping with the opinion of those who hold that the intellect does not differ from the senses. For to those the Philosopher in book III On the Soul †42 attributes the words of certain persons who say that the will in men is "such as daily the father of men and of gods induce," i.e. the heaven or the sun.

It remains, therefore, as Aristotle concludes in the chapter On Good Fortune †43 that what first moves the will and the intellect is something above the will and the intellect, namely God, Who since He moves all things according to the nature of the movable things, e.g. light things upwards and heavy things downwards, also moves the will according to its condition, i.e. its nature, not as of necessity but as indeterminately relating to many. Clearly then if we consider the movement of the will on the part of the exercise of the act, it is not moved of necessity.

But if we consider the movement of the will on the part of the object determining the act of the will to will this or that, we must take into consideration that the object moving the will is a good apprehended as befitting. Hence if some good is proposed that is apprehended as having the aspect of good but not as having the aspect of befitting, it will not move the will. But since deliberations and choices are about particular things, in regard to which we act, it is required that what is apprehended as good and befitting be apprehended as good and befitting in particular and not merely in general. If then something is apprehended as a befitting good according to all the particular aspects that can be considered, it will move the will necessarily, and for this reason man of necessity desires happiness, †44 which according to Boethius †45 is "a state made perfect by the simultaneous possession of all good things." And I say "of necessity" so far as concerns the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite, but not so far as concerns the exercise of the act, because a person at that time may not will to think of happiness, since even the very acts of the intellect and the will are particular acts.

However if a good be of such a nature that it is not found to be good according to all the particular aspects that can be considered, the will will not move of necessity even in regard to the determination of the act: for a person will be able to will its opposite, even while cogitating about it since perhaps it is good or fitting according to some other particular consideration; as for instance what is not good so far as enjoyment is concerned, is good for health, and so on in regard to others.

And that the will is inclined to that which is presented to it more according to this particular condition rather than another, can occur in three ways. In one way inasmuch as one condition is of greater weight, and then the will is moved in keeping with reason: as say, when a person prefers that which is useful for health rather than what is useful for pleasure. In another way inasmuch as a person cogitates about one particular circumstance and not about another, and this often happens by reason of some inducement offered either from within or from without, in such a way that such cogitation engrosses him. In a third way this occurs on account of a person's disposition: because as the Philosopher says "according to the character of a man so does the end appear to him."^{†46} Hence the will of an angered man and the will of a calm man are moved differently in regard to something, because the same thing is not agreeable to each, just as food is regarded differently by a healthy man and a sick man.

If then the disposition by which a thing seems good and befitting to a person is natural and not subject to the will, the will chooses it naturally and necessarily, as all men naturally desire to be, to live, and to know.^{†47} But if the disposition be such as is not natural, but subject to the will, as when someone is so disposed by habit or passion that something seems either good or bad to him under this particular aspect, the will is not moved of necessity: because it has the power to remove this disposition so that the thing does not seem so to him; for example, when a man calms his wrath so as not to judge something in anger. Passion however is more easily removed than habit.

Therefore in regard to some things the will is moved of necessity on the part of the object, but not in regard to all things; but on the part of the exercise of the act the will is not moved of necessity.

Reply to 1. That authority can be understood in two ways: in one way that the Prophet is speaking of the execution of choice: for it is not within man's power to actually accomplish what he deliberates about in his mind. In another way it can be understood as referring to the fact that even the interior will is moved by a higher principle, namely God; and in keeping with this the Apostle says that it is not of him that wills, i.e. to will, nor of him that runs, i.e. to run, as of a first principle, but of God instigating.

Reply to 2. The answer to the second argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 3. Brute animals are moved by the impulse of a higher agent to something determined or according to mode of the particular form, the perception of which the sense appetite follows. But God moves the will in an unchangeable manner on account of the efficacy of His moving power which cannot fail; but because of the nature of the will moved, which is related indifferently to diverse things, necessity is not induced but liberty remains. Thus too divine providence works infallibly in all things, and nevertheless the effects of contingent causes come about contingently, inasmuch as God moves all things proportionately, each thing according to its mode.

Reply to 4. The will contributes something when it is moved by God: for it itself is what operates, but moved by God. And therefore although the movement of the will is from outside as from a first principle, nevertheless it is not coerced.

Reply to 5. In a certain way the will of man does not conform to the will of God, namely inasmuch as man wills something that God does not will him to will, as when he wills to sin; although God does not will that man not will this, because if God willed this, that he not will to sin it would be done, i.e. he would not will to

sin. For whatsoever the Lord willed He has done.†48 And although in this way the will of man does not conform to the will of God so far as concerns the movement of the will, still man's will can never be discordant so far as concerns the outcome or result, because the will of man always obtains this result, that God fulfills His will concerning man.†49 But so far as concerns the manner of willing it is not reasonably to be expected that the will of man conform to the will of God, because God wills whatsoever He wills eternally an infinitely, but not man. For which reason it is said in Isaiah (55, 9) "As the heavens are exalted above the earth so are my ways exalted above your ways."

Reply to 6. From the fact that good is the object of the will it can be concluded that the will wills nothing except under the aspect of good. But because many and diverse things are contained under the notion of good, it cannot be concluded from this that the will is necessarily moved to this or to that.

Reply to 7. An active principle moves necessarily only when it overcomes the power of the passive principle. But since the will is in potency to the good universally, no good overcomes the power of the will as necessarily moving it, except that which is good according to every consideration, and this is the perfect or complete good alone, i.e. happiness, which the will cannot not will, that is, in such a way that it will the opposite; nevertheless the will can actually not will happiness, because the will can turn away i.e. repel the thought of happiness inasmuch as the will moves the intellect to its act, and to this extent neither does the will necessarily will happiness itself. Just as a person would not necessarily become warm, if he could repel heat from himself when he willed.

Reply to 8. The end is the reason for willing those things that are for the end; hence the will is not related to each in like manner.

Reply to 9. If we could reach the end only in one way, then the reason for willing the end and those things that are for the end would be the same. But this is not so in the present case, for we can attain happiness in many ways. And therefore, although man necessarily wills happiness, nevertheless he does not necessarily will any of those things that lead to happiness.

Reply to 10. In regard to the intellect and the will there is a certain similarity and a certain dissimilarity. There is dissimilarity so far as concerns the exercise of the act, for the intellect is moved by the will to act, but the will is not moved by another power but by itself. However so far as concerns the object there is a similarity on the part of both. For just as the will is moved necessarily by an object that is in every way good, but not by an object that can be seen to be evil in some respect, so also the intellect is moved necessarily by what is necessarily true, which cannot be taken to be false, but not by what is contingently true, which can be taken to be false.

Reply to 11. The disposition of the first mover remains in those things moved by it inasmuch as they are moved by it: for in this way they acquire a likeness to it. However it does not necessarily follow that they acquire a total likeness to it: since the first moving principle is immovable but not the others.

Reply to 12. From the fact that the true is a particular intention, i.e. conception, existing in the mind as it were, it has more fully the nature of form than the good, and more fully the nature of mover under the aspect of object; but the good has more fully the nature of mover under the aspect of end, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 13. Love is said to transform the lover into the beloved inasmuch as the lover is moved by love to the very thing loved, but cognition assimilates inasmuch as a likeness of the thing known is impressed in the knower. The first of which pertains to a change which is on the part of the agent that seeks the end, but the second pertains to a change which is according to the form.

Reply to 14. To assent does not signify a movement of the intellect to the thing, but rather to the conception of the thing that is had in the mind; to which the intellect assents in judging it to be true.

Reply to 15. Not every cause produces its effect of necessity even if it is a sufficient cause, inasmuch as the cause can sometimes be impeded from attaining its effect, as for instance natural causes, which do not produce their effects necessarily, but only for the most part, since they are impeded for the least part, i.e. rarely. Therefore it does not follow that that cause which causes the will to will a thing does this necessarily, because an obstacle can be introduced by the will itself, either by removing that consideration which induces it to will or by considering the opposite, namely that what is proposed as good in some respect is not good.

Reply to 16. The Philosopher in Book VIII of the Metaphysics†50 shows by that means, not that a potency or power relating to opposites is not active, but that an active power relating to opposites does not necessarily produce its effect. For if this were supposed it would obviously follow that contradictories would exist at the same time. But if it be granted that some active power is related to opposites it does not follow that opposites exist at the same time: because even if each opposite to which the power is related be possible, they are not compossible.

Reply to 17. When the will begins to choose anew it is changed from its previous disposition so far as concerns this that previously it was potentially choosing but afterwards is actually choosing; and this change is effected by some mover inasmuch as the will itself moves itself to act and inasmuch as it is moved by an external agent, namely God. Nevertheless the will is not necessarily moved, as was said (in the Response and Reply to 15).

Reply to 18. The beginning of human knowledge is sensation, i.e. sense perception, nevertheless it does not necessarily follow that whatever is known by man is subject to the senses or known immediately from a sensible effect. For even the intellect itself knows itself by its own act which is not subject to the senses; and likewise it also knows the interior act of the will inasmuch as the will is moved so to speak by the act of the intellect, and in another way inasmuch as the act of the intellect is caused by the will (as was said in the Response) as an effect is known from its cause and the cause from its effect. However, granted that the power of the will relating to opposites †51 cannot be known except from a sensible effect, still the argument in the objection does not follow. For just as the universal which is the term we apply to what is everywhere and always,†52 is known by us from the singulars which are here and now, and prime matter which is in potency to diverse forms is known by us from a succession of forms which nevertheless are not simultaneously in matter, so also the power of the will relating to opposites is known by us, not from this that opposite acts exist at the same time, but because they successively follow one another from the same principle.

Reply to 19. This proposition 'As one act is related to another act so one potency is related to another potency' is in a certain manner true and in one certain manner false. For if we take the act commensurate with the potency or power as its universal object, the proposition is true: for thus hearing is to sight as sound is to color. But if we take that which is contained under a universal object as a particular act, then the proposition is not true: for the seeing power is one and nevertheless black and white are not the same. Therefore although there is in man a power of the will relating simultaneously to opposites, nevertheless those opposites to which the will is related are not simultaneous.

Reply to 20. The same thing in respect to the same thing does not move itself but in respect to another thing it can move itself. For thus the intellect, inasmuch as it actually understands the premises, reduces i.e. moves itself from potency to act so far as concerns the conclusions, and the will inasmuch as it wills the end, moves itself to act so far as concerns those things that are for the end.

Reply to 21. Since the movements of the will are multiform, they are reduced i.e. are referred to some uniform principle. Which principle however is not the heavenly body but God, as was said (in the Response), if we mean the principle that directly moves the will. But if we are speaking of the movement of the will as it is moved by an extrinsic sensed object at a favorable opportunity, then the movement of the will is referred to the heavenly body. But nevertheless the will is not moved of necessity: for when pleasurable things are presented to

it the will is not necessarily attracted by them. Nor is it true that those things that are directly caused by the heavenly bodies necessarily occur. For as the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Metaphysics,†53 if every effect would proceed from a cause and every cause would necessarily produce its effect, it would follow that everything would be necessary. But both of these conditions are false, since some causes even when they are sufficient, do not necessarily produce their effects, because they can be impeded, as is evident in all natural causes. Nor again is it true that everything that occurs has a natural cause: for those things which occur incidentally (per accidens) do not come about from an active natural cause, because what is incidental (per accidens) is not a being and one.†54 Therefore the meeting of an obstacle, since it is accidental, is not reduced to the heavenly body as to its cause: for the heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural agent.

Reply to 22. He who does what he does not will does not have free action, but he can have free will.

Reply to 23. The sinner has lost free will so far as concerns freedom from fault and misery, but not so far as concerns freedom from compulsion.†55

Reply to 24. Custom becomes necessity not simply but especially in sudden or indeliberate actions. For however much a person is habituated he can nonetheless by deliberation act contrary to custom.

Question 7

Question VII

On Venial Sin

Article 1 †p

Whether Venial Sin Is Properly Divided Against Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says in Book XXVII of Reply to Faustus that "sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law."†1 But every sin that is contrary to the eternal law is mortal. Therefore every sin is mortal. Sin then is not properly divided into mortal and venial.

2. Sin according to its nature deserves punishment. But pardon, which takes away sin, is contrary to punishment; therefore to be pardonable or venial is contrary to the nature of sin. But no difference that divides a genus †2 is contrary to the genus. Therefore sin cannot be properly divided into mortal and venial.

3. Whoever †3 turns towards something inordinately, turns towards some transitory good, but he who turns towards some transitory good turns away from an unchangeable good,†4 because in any motion he who approaches one terminus recedes from the other;†5 therefore whoever sins turns away from an unchangeable good. But this is to sin mortally; consequently one sin is not mortal and another venial.

4. Every sin †6 consists in some inordinate love of a creature. But whoever loves, either loves as using a means or as enjoying an end. Now he who loves a creature as using a means does not sin, because he refers it to the end which constitutes our happiness, which is properly speaking to use, as Augustine says.†7 But if he loves a creature as enjoying it as an end, he sins mortally, because he constitutes a creature as his ultimate end. Therefore a person who loves a creature either does not sin or sins mortally: and so the same conclusion follows as before.

5. Of those things which are opposed members of a division, one does not change into the other: for whiteness never becomes blackness nor conversely. But venial sin becomes mortal: for on 'Blessed are they

whose iniquities are forgiven' (Psalm 31, 1), a certain Gloss says †8 "Nothing is so venial that it cannot become mortal when it is actually willed." Therefore venial sin ought not to be divided against mortal sin.

6. If something is not willed, it is not a sin, because it is not voluntary; but if it is willed, it is a mortal sin, as is clear from the Gloss cited above (in arg. 5). Therefore either it is not a sin or it is a mortal sin.

7. What disposes to a thing is not divided against it, because one opposite does not dispose to the other. But venial sin disposes to mortal sin. Therefore venial sin ought not to be divided against mortal sin.

8. Anselm says †9 that the will of the rational creature is obliged to be subject to the divine will: he who does not render this honor which is due to God, deprives God of the honor owed to Him and dishonors Him. But to dishonor God is to sin mortally; and whoever sins dishonors God in this way, because he does not subject his will to the divine will. Therefore whoever sins, sins mortally.

9. Man is bound by a precept to order everything that he does to God as to an end. For it is said in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (10, 31) "Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all for the glory of God," But venial sin is not referable to God. Consequently whoever sins venially, acts contrary to a precept, therefore he sins mortally.

10. Augustine says "This is the total and sole evil of man that he uses as a means what ought to be enjoyed as an end and enjoys as an end what ought to be used as a means." †10 But each of these is a mortal sin: because he who uses as a means things to be enjoyed as ends does not constitute his ultimate end in God, Who alone is to be enjoyed as an end; and he who enjoys as ends things to be used as a means, constitutes his ultimate end in a creature; each of which constitutes a mortal sin; therefore every evil of fault is a mortal sin.

11. Since punishment corresponds to fault, where the punishment is the same, the nature of fault seems to be the same. But the same punishment is ascribed to venial sin as to mortal sin, for Augustine says in a sermon On Purgatory that to fawn on a person of higher dignity is a venial sin, †11 and yet a cleric is degraded for servile flattery, as is said in distinction LXVII. †12 Therefore the nature of venial and mortal fault is the same; consequently venial sin is not properly divided against mortal sin.

12. But it was argued that venial sin differs from mortal sin in subject: for venial sin is in the sense appetite, but mortal sin in the reason. But counter to this: consent to an act pertains to the higher reason, according to Augustine. †13 But some consent to an act is a venial sin, for example to consent to an idle word. †14 Therefore the difference assigned is not a proper one.

13. The first movements of spiritual sins †15 are venial sins. But they are not in the sense appetite as in a subject, but rather in the reason. Therefore venial sin is not solely in the sense appetite.

14. That which we have in common with the irrational animals does not seem to be the subject of sin, since in the irrational animals it is not a sin. But we have sensuality in common with the irrational animals. †16 Therefore there cannot be a sin either venial or mortal in sensuality.

15. Necessity excludes the notion of sin, because in those acts done out of necessity there is neither praise nor blame. But sensuality is subject to necessity, because it is tied to a bodily organ. Therefore there cannot be sin in sensuality.

16. Anselm says †17 that the will alone is punished. But punishment is incurred for sin. Therefore only in the will is there sin; not then in sensuality.

17. If mortal sin is in the higher reason, it will be in it either directly or indirectly. But mortal sin cannot be in the higher reason directly and in itself: because the higher reason cannot err, since according to Augustine

†18 its role is to contemplate the eternal reasons of things in which there is no error. But "they err that work evil", as we read in Proverbs (14, 22). Likewise neither can mortal sin be in the higher reason indirectly because it does not restrain the lower powers: for this is not within its power, for because of original sin it lost the power to restrain the lower powers, as Augustine says.†19 Therefore mortal sin cannot be in the higher reason.

18. Again it was argued that venial and mortal sin differ in that a person sinning mortally loves a creature more than God, but a person sinning venially loves a creature under i.e. less than he loves God. But counter to this: supposing that a person thinks simple fornication †20 is not a mortal sin and commits fornication while holding such an opinion, but would forego fornication if he knew that this is against the law of God. It is evident that this person sins mortally, because ignorance of the law †21 does not excuse him, and yet he loves God more than fornication: for that is loved more for the sake of which something else is foregone. Therefore not everyone who sins mortally loves a creature more than God.

19. More and less do not diversify species. But mortal and venial differ in species. Therefore they do not differ by reason of loving a creature more or less than God.

20. Wherever more and less is found, the equal is found: because when that which is in excess is removed from the greater the equal remains. But a person may love a creature more than God and even less than God, therefore also he may love a creature equally with God. Consequently there will be a sin midway between mortal and venial, and thus the division will be inadequate.

21. Again it was argued that mortal and venial sin differ so far as concerns the effect, inasmuch as mortal sin deprives of grace, but venial sin does not. But counter to this: grace cannot be present without virtue. But venial sin takes away virtue, which consists in well-ordered love according to Augustine,†22 and venial sin takes away well-ordered love, otherwise it would not be a sin. Therefore even venial sin deprives of grace.

22. It pertains to grace to order man to God as to his end. But venial sin takes away this ordering to God as an end; for venial sin cannot be ordered to God as to an end. Therefore venial sin takes away grace.

23. Whoever offends God does not have God's grace. But a person offends God by venial sin, since God punishes him. Therefore venial sin takes away grace.

24. Again it was argued that venial sin differs from mortal sin in regard to guilt: for mortal sin makes a person guilty of eternal punishment but venial sin of temporal punishment.†23 But counter to this: Augustine says †24 that unbelief is a sin by whose retention all sins are retained; and thus apparently the venial sins of unbelievers are not forgiven. But as long as the fault remains the debt of punishment is not removed. Therefore venial sins of unbelievers are punished by eternal punishment. Venial sin, then, does not differ from mortal sin in such a way that it can be divided against mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in the First Epistle of St. John (1, 8) "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves."†25 But this cannot be taken to mean mortal sin, as Augustine says,†26 because mortal sin is not in the saints. Therefore there is some venial sin that can be divided against mortal sin.

2. Augustine says in Homily VII on the Gospel of St. John†27 that a crime is a grievous sin deserving damnation; but venial sin is not something that deserves damnation. Therefore venial sin is rightly distinguished from mortal sin.

Response:

Venial is so called from "venia", that is, from "pardon".†28 And in regard to pardon a sin is called venial

in three ways: first because the sin has already obtained pardon, as Ambrose says †29 because mortal sin becomes venial, i.e. pardonable, by confession, and this according to some, is called venial from the outcome; but clearly 'venial' in this sense is not divided against mortal. Secondly a sin is called venial because it has in itself some reason for pardon, not that it go unpunished but that it be punished less; and in this way a sin is called venial which is committed from weakness or from ignorance, because weakness excuses sin either wholly or in part. And this according to some is called venial on account of its cause. Nevertheless neither is 'venial' even in this sense divided against mortal: since a person sinning from ignorance or weakness may sin mortally, as was said in previous questions (q. 3, a. 8 and 10). In a third way a sin is called venial because considered in itself it does not exclude pardon, i.e. the termination of punishment, and in this way venial sin is divided against mortal which, considered in itself, deserves eternal punishment and therefore excludes pardon, that is, the termination of punishment. And this according to some is called venial generically.†30

Now in order to investigate the difference that distinguishes venial from mortal sin, we must take into account that they differ according to guilt: for mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, but venial sin temporal punishment. However this difference follows on the nature of mortal and venial sin, but does not constitute it: for sin is not of such a kind because such a punishment is deserved for it but rather conversely, because the sin is of such a kind therefore such a punishment is deserved for it. Likewise they differ as regards the effect: for mortal sin deprives of grace, but venial sin does not. But neither is this the difference we are looking for, because this difference follows as a necessary effect of the nature of sin: for from the fact that sin is of such a kind it has such an effect, and not the other way around.

But the difference which is on the part of the subject would constitute a diverse kind of sin, if venial sin always were in the sense appetite and mortal sin always in the reason. For in this way intellectual virtue is distinguished from moral virtue, according to its substance, i.e. its subject, according to the Philosopher,†31 because moral virtue is in a subject rational by participation, i.e. in the appetite, but intellectual virtue is in reason itself. But this is not true, because venial sin can also be in reason itself, as is shown in the objection above (in arg. 13). Hence even according to this difference a diverse notion of the two sins cannot be maintained.

Certainly a fourth difference which is according to the mode of loving constitutes a diverse kind of sin, but only so far as concerns the act of the will, which is on the part of the agent. But venial sin consists not only in an interior act of the will but also in an exterior act. For there are certain exterior acts which are venial sins by reason of their genus, such as speaking an idle word or telling a jocose lie and the like;†32 and there are certain exterior acts which are mortal sins by reason of their genus, such as homicide, adultery, blasphemy, and the like. But the diversity which is on the part of the act of the will does not diversify the genera of exterior acts: for something that is good generically can become evil by reason of the perverse will of the doer i.e. the agent, for instance if a person gives an alms for the sake of vainglory; likewise something that is venial generically can become mortal on account of the will of the agent, for example if someone speaks an idle word in contempt of God. But in fact exterior acts differ generically by reason of their objects. Hence it is commonly said †33 that an act bearing on due or proper matter is good generically and an act bearing on undue matter is evil generically. It must be the case then, that a sin is called venial by reason of its genus and mortal by reason of its genus from this that it bears on some undue matter. Accordingly, to investigate this point we must consider that sin consists in a certain disorder of the soul, just as a sickness consists in a certain disorder of the body; hence sin is so to speak a sickness of the soul,†34 and pardon for sin is the cure for this sickness. Consequently just as some sicknesses are curable and some incurable, which are called mortal, so some sins are so to speak curable, which are called venial, and some sins considered in themselves are incurable which are called mortal, although they can be cured by God.

Now a sickness is called incurable and mortal by which a principle of life is destroyed, for if this is destroyed nothing remains by which it can be restored and therefore such a sickness cannot be cured but brings about death. On the other hand, there is a kind of sickness which does not destroy any of the principles of life but something consequent on the principles of life, which can be restored by the principles of life: for instance, the tertian fever,†35 which consists of an excess of bile, which the power of nature can overcome. Now the

principle in practical matters i.e. in actions is the end, according to the Philosopher;†36 therefore the principle of spiritual life, which consists in rectitude of action, is the end or goal in human actions. Which is love of God and neighbor: "For the purpose of this precept is charity" as is said in the First Epistle to Timothy (1, 5). For through charity the soul is united to God Who is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body.†37 And therefore, if charity is excluded, the sin is mortal: for there remains no principle of life by which this lack can be repaired, but it can be repaired only by the Holy Spirit, because as is said in Romans VI,†38 "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who has been given to us." But if the lack of rectitude be such as not to exclude charity the sin will be venial, because through the charity remaining as it were by a principle of life all defects can be repaired: for "charity covereth all sins", as is said in Proverbs (10, 12).

Now that a sin exclude or not exclude charity can occur in two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner, in another way from the very genus of the work.

On the part of the sinner in two ways: in one way because the act of sin is of the kind of power to which it does not belong to order to the end, and therefore neither can it turn away from the end: and for this reason the movement of sensuality cannot be a mortal sin, but only venial: for to order something to an end pertains to reason alone. In the other way because the power that can order to the end and turn away from the end, can order to the contrary of the end an act that of itself is not contrary to the end. For example if someone speaks an idle word in contempt of God, which is contrary to charity, it will be a mortal sin, but not by reason of the genus of the act but by reason of the perverse will of the doer of the act.

In a second way a sin may be contrary or not contrary to charity by reason of the very genus of the work, i.e. from of the object or matter which is contrary to charity or is not contrary. For just as a particular food is of itself contrary to life, for instance poisonous food, and a particular food is not contrary to life although it offers some impediment to proper condition of life, for example, food that is coarse and not easily digestible, or even if it be easily digestible, because it is not taken in moderation; so also in human acts something is found that of itself is contrary to the love of God and neighbor, namely those acts which destroy the subjection and reverence of man towards God, such as blasphemy, idolatry, and the like; and also those acts which destroy the fellowship of human society, for example, theft, homicide, and the like; for men would not be able to live together where those acts would be perpetrated habitually and indiscriminately. And these are mortal sins by reason of their genus no matter with what intention or will they are committed. But there are certain sins which although they have some deordination, nevertheless they do not directly exclude either of the foresaid goods: for example, if a man should lie not in a matter of faith nor to injure his neighbor, but to please or even to give help, or if someone be excessive in eating or drinking and the like. Hence these sins are venial by reason of their genus.

Reply to 1. Division is twofold: one in which a univocal genus is divided into its species, which equally participate in the genus, as animal into bovine and equine; the other is a division of that which is analogously common into those things of which the common notion is said according to the prior and the posterior, as 'being' is divided into substance and accident, and into potency and act; and in such things the common notion is saved fully (perfecte) in one alone, but in the others in some respect (secundum quid) and posteriorly. And such is the division of sin into venial and mortal. Hence the definition given of sin in the objection corresponds perfectly to mortal sin, but imperfectly and in some respect to venial sin. Hence it is rightly said †39 that venial sin is not contrary to the law but falls short of the law, because clearly it recedes somewhat from the order of the law, yet it does not violate (corrumpit) the law since it does not exclude love, which is the fulfillment of the law, as is said in Romans XII.†40

Reply to 2. 'Venial' is a difference lessening the notion of sin, and such a difference is found in all those things that participate in something common in an imperfect and restricted manner.

Reply to 3. The end has the nature of a terminus, but not that which is for the sake of the end. But venial sin is not turned towards a transitory good as to an end; and therefore it is not turned towards a transitory good

as to a terminus other than God to such an extent that on that account it is necessarily turned away from God.

Reply to 4. He who sins venially does not enjoy a created thing as an end but uses it as a means: for he refers it to God habitually though not actually. Nor does he act contrary to a precept in this, because he is not bound to be always actually referring to God.

Reply to 5. Venial sin precisely as venial never becomes mortal, just as whiteness does not become blackness; but an act that is venial by reason of its genus can become a mortal sin by reason of the will of a person constituting a creature as his end, because even that which is of its nature cold can become hot, for instance water.

Reply to 6. Venial sin may become mortal when it is willed, not in any way whatsoever but as an end.

Reply to 7. Sometimes a thing is divided in opposition to another because they are opposed according to their essence, as white and black, hot and cold: and one of these does not dispose to the other. But sometimes things are divided in relation to one another because they are opposed according to the notion of perfect and imperfect, one of which is ordered to the other as an accident to substance, and potency to act: and in this way too venial sin is divided against mortal sin, and disposes to it.

Reply to 8. The will of the rational creature is obliged to be subject to God, but this is done through positive and negative precepts, of which the negative precepts oblige always and at all times, and the positive precepts oblige always but not at all times. When therefore a person sins venially, at that time certainly he does not render due honor to God by observing the positive precept, but this is not to sin mortally as he sins mortally who dishonors God by transgressing a negative precept or by not fulfilling a positive precept at the time it is obligatory.

Reply to 9. Since that precept of the Apostle is positive, its observance is not always obligatory at the present moment; but it is always observed after the manner of a habit as long as man is habitually ordered to God as his ultimate end. Which is not excluded by venial sin.

Reply to 10. Augustine is speaking there of the perfect i.e. the absolute evil of fault, which is mortal sin.

Reply to 11. To flatter only to be pleasing or be liked is a venial sin by reason of its genus, since it is a kind of vanity; but to flatter in order to deceive is a mortal sin, according the words of Isaias 10 †41 "O my people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee." And of such flattery the canon Clericus qui (dist. 46) speaks; wherefore it is said there †42 that a cleric who spends his time in flatteries and deceits ought to be degraded.

Reply to 12. That difference on the part of the subject of sin does not constitute the species of mortal and of venial sin, but is concomitant; and therefore nothing prevents a venial sin from being in the higher reason.

Reply to 13. The same answer is to be given to the thirteenth argument.

Reply to 14. Sensuality in the irrational animals does not share in any way in reason as it does in us, as is said in Book I of the Ethics;†43 and according to this, sensuality in us can be a subject of sin.

Reply to 15. Even the bodily organ itself obeys reason in some measure; and according to this there can be sin in its act, and in like manner in the act of sensuality.

Reply to 16. Sin is in the will alone as in a first mover; but in the other powers as commanded and moved by the will.

Reply to 17. Mortal sin can be in the higher reason both directly and indirectly. For even if the higher reason does not err inasmuch as it considers the eternal reasons of things, nevertheless it can err inasmuch as it can be turned away from them. Likewise it must be said that it does not follow that by reason of original sin the lower powers in no way obey reason, but only that they are not Completely obedient to reason, as in the state of innocence.

Reply to 18. That difference [in the first part of the argument] is acceptable according as the difference between mortal and venial sin is taken on the part of the will, but there are certain acts that are mortal by reason of their genus which are always mortal sins no matter with what will they are done; and it is to these that the counter argument refers. But in these the work itself by reason of its genus is contrary to the love of God, just as if a person harms someone, by that very deed he acts contrary to charity.

Reply to 19. When more and less result from diverse motives, they diversify a species, and so it is in the case at hand. For to love something as an end and to love it for the sake of the end do not have the same motive of love.

Reply to 20. It may well happen that a person who is without charity loves some creature more than God, and some creature equally with God, and some creature even less than God; but it is not possible for a person to love any creature equally with God in such a way that he loves no creature more than God, because man necessarily constitutes the ultimate end of his will in some one thing.

Reply to 21. That difference is a consequence and not constitutive of mortal and venial sin. But he who sins venially lacks a well-ordered love in some act concerned with those things that are for the end, but not absolutely in regard to the end itself; and therefore the sin he commits does not deprive of virtue or grace.

Reply to 22. It is one thing not to be ordered to God, which pertains to venial sin, and another thing to exclude the order to God, which pertains to mortal sin.

Reply to 23. God punishes him who sins venially not as hating him, but as purifying and correcting a son whom He loves.

Reply to 24. The venial sins of those who die in unbelief i.e. without faith or in any mortal sin whatsoever, are punished eternally, not on account of them [i.e. the sins] alone, for they do not deprive of grace, but on account of the conjoined sin of unbelief which deprives of grace.

Question VII, Article 2 †p

Whether Venial Sin Diminishes Charity?

It seems that it does, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says "He loves Thee less who loves anything besides Thee which he does not love for Thy sake."†1 But he who sins venially loves something else besides God which he does not love for His sake, otherwise he would not sin in loving it. Therefore he who sins venially loves God less.

2. Contrary attributes by nature belong to the same thing,†2 and increase and diminution are contraries; but charity increases according to the Epistle to the Philippians (1, 9): "I pray that your charity may more and more abound"; therefore it is also diminished. But it is not diminished by mortal sin, rather it is totally taken away. Therefore charity is diminished by venial sin.

3. But it was argued that charity so far as concerns its acquisition is diminished by venial sin, because

venial sin is the cause of a person receiving less charity, but after charity has already been infused it cannot be diminished by venial sin. But counter to this: the Philosopher says †3 it is from the same causes and by the same means that virtue is produced, destroyed, and diminished. If then venial sin is the cause of less charity being acquired by infusion, it will also be the cause of the charity already possessed being diminished.

4. Whatever diminishes the difference that constitutes †4 a species, diminishes its essence. But 'difficult to change' is the difference that constitutes a habit, †5 which venial sin diminishes, because by venial sin man becomes more disposed to fall into mortal sin, by which charity is lost. Therefore venial sin diminishes the habit of charity.

5. All love is either that of cupidity or that of charity, as we learn from Augustine. †6 But he who sins venially loves a creature but not with the love that is charity, because "charity dealeth not perversely" as is said in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (13, 4); therefore with the love that is cupidity. But an increase of cupidity seems to be equivalent to a diminution of charity: because as Augustine says, †7 the diminution of cupidity is the very nourishment of charity. Therefore it seems that venial sin diminishes charity.

6. Augustine says †8 that charity or grace is compared to the soul as light to the air. But light in the air is diminished if some hindrance to light occurs, for instance when air becomes denser because of vapor. Therefore also charity or grace is diminished by venial sin which is a hindrance to charity and a beclouding of the mind.

7. Anything that is successively corrupted can be diminished. But charity is successively corrupted. Therefore charity can be diminished. The minor premise is proved in two ways: first, because anything which is being corrupted is the subject of corruption. But charity is being corrupted. Therefore it is the subject of corruption; something of it then is corrupted and something of it still remains, and so it is successively corrupted. Secondly in this way: charity is not corrupted when it exists; nor likewise when it does not exist at all, since it has now been corrupted. Therefore it is being corrupted when it partly exists and partly does not; consequently it is successively corrupted. Hence it can be diminished; but not by mortal sin, therefore by venial sin.

8. Just as in mortal sin there is deordination simply, so in venial sin there is deordination in some respect. But deordination simply, which is the deordination of mortal sin, completely eliminates the ordination of charity. Therefore deordination in some respect, eliminates the ordination of charity in respect to something; consequently it diminishes the charity itself.

9. From numerous acts of venial sins a habit is formed. But the act of venial sin impedes the act of charity. Therefore likewise the habit of venial sin impedes the habit of charity; consequently it diminishes charity.

10. Every offense diminishes love. But venial sin is a sort of offense, since it has the nature of fault. Therefore venial sin diminishes the love that proceeds from charity.

11. Bernard says in a certain sermon On the Purification †9 that not to advance in the way of God is to recede. But he who sins venially does not advance in the way of God, therefore he recedes. Which would not be the case unless venial sin diminishes charity.

12. Any virtue is stronger when unified †10 than when extended to many; hence love when had for one person is stronger than when dispersed among many. Wherefore the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Ethics †11 that it is impossible to love many persons intensely. But he who sins venially disperses his love to others than God. Therefore the virtue of charity is diminished in him.

13. It is said in Proverbs (24, 16) "A just man falls seven times a day and rises again," †12 which the Gloss †13 interprets as the fall that occurs through venial sin. But a man does not fall away from charity

through venial sin. Therefore he falls away from a perfect degree of charity; charity then is diminished by venial sin.

14. Through charity man merits the glory of eternal life. But his attainment of eternal life is delayed through venial sin. Therefore charity is diminished by venial sin.

15. Those things which impede bodily life or health diminish it. But venial sin is an impediment to the spiritual life which derives from charity, as was said above (in q. 7 a. 1). Therefore charity is diminished by venial sin.

16. Operation follows upon form; therefore what impedes the activity, diminishes the form. But venial sin impedes the activity i.e. the exercise of charity. Therefore it diminishes charity itself.

17. Fervor is a proper accident, i.e. a property, of charity; hence it is said in Romans (12, 11) "Be fervent in spirit." But venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity, as is commonly said.^{†14} Therefore venial sin diminishes charity.

On the contrary:

1. What is infinitely distant from a thing, does not diminish or increase it when it is added or subtracted, as is evident in the case of a point and a line.^{†15} But venial sin is infinitely distant from charity, because charity loves God as an infinite good, and venial sin loves a creature as a finite good.

2. The reward of eternal life, which is commensurate with the quantity of charity, is diminished when charity is diminished. But venial sin does not diminish the reward of eternal life, otherwise its punishment would be eternal, namely the eternal diminution of glory. Therefore venial sin does not diminish charity.

3. Any finite thing by continual diminution is completely taken away. But charity is a finite habit in the soul. Therefore if venial sin diminishes charity, when multiplied it would completely eliminate charity; which is unreasonable.

Response:

Because increase and diminution are considered in terms of quantity, in order to resolve this question we must consider what the quantity of charity is. And since charity is a certain form and also a habit or virtue, its quantity must be considered in two ways: in one way as it is a form, in another way as it is a form of such a kind, i.e. a habit or virtue.

Now a certain quantity of form is had indirectly (per accidens) and a certain quantity directly (per se). Indirectly, for example, as the quantity of form is said to be of a certain magnitude by reason of the subject, as whiteness by reason of the surface in which it is; but this quantity has no place in the question at issue, because the mind, which is the subject of charity, is not a quantitative. The quantity of form had directly (per se) is considered in two ways. In one way on the part of the agent cause: for the stronger the active power of the agent cause, the more perfect the form it induces, more completely reducing i.e. bringing the subject from potentiality to actuality, as a large fire heats better than a small one. In another way on as regards the subject which, the better disposed it is, the more perfectly it receives the form from the action of the agent, as dry wood heats better than green wood, and air than water from the same fire.

In the third way the quantity of a form is considered inasmuch as it is a virtue or habit, on the part of the object. For a virtue is called great that can do something great, and every habit has both its species and its quantity from the object. If then we consider the quantity of charity on the part of the object, in no way can charity be increased or diminished: for those things whose nature consists in something indivisible do not admit

of degree. And in fact this is the reason why any species of number is lacking in degree, because any number is made complete by oneness. for when one is added it always produces a species.†16 Now the object of charity has an indivisible nature and consists in an end or goal: for the object of charity is God inasmuch as He is the supreme good and the ultimate end.

However on the part of the agent cause and on the part of the subject, charity can be greater or less. On the part of the agent, not because of His greater or less power, but because of His wisdom and will, in keeping with which He distributes diverse measures of grace and charity to men, as is said in Ephesians (4, 7): "To each one of us grace was given according to the measure of Christ's bestowal." Also on the part of the subject, charity can be greater or less inasmuch as a person is disposed more or less to grace and charity through good works. Nevertheless it should be noted that a person's good works are related in one way to the quantity of charity so far as concerns the very coming into being of charity and in another way so far as concerns the charity already actually possessed: for the works of man before he possesses charity are related to charity and to its quantity not after the manner of meritorious acts, since charity is the principle of meriting, but only after the manner of a material disposition; but when charity is already possessed, by its works it merits being increased and having increased, merits being perfected, as Augustine says.†17 Now venial sin cannot be the reason that the charity already possessed is diminished either on the part of the agent cause, i.e. God, or on the part of the recipient cause, i.e. man. Indeed the cause of the diminution cannot be on the part of the agent, because venial sin cannot merit a diminution of charity, as an act done out of charity merits its increase: for a person merits that towards which his will is disposed. But a person who sins venially, is not so disposed to a creature that he is turned away from God in any way: for he is not turned to a creature as to an end, but as to that which is for the sake of the end; and if a person is inordinately disposed in regard to that which is for the end, his affection for the end is not on that account lessened, for instance if a person is irregular in taking medicine, his desire for health is not on that account lessened. Hence it is clear that venial sin does not merit a diminution of the charity already possessed.

Likewise on the part of the subject venial sin cannot diminish charity. Which is evident for two reasons: first, because venial sin is not in the soul in the same way as charity is in the soul; for charity is in the soul according to its higher part, inasmuch as it is ordered to something as to its greatest good and ultimate end, but venial sin has some deordination, not however concerning the order to the ultimate end. Hence even if venial sin were contrary to charity, it would not diminish charity, just as neither does blackness of the foot diminish whiteness of the head. Secondly, because the form in the subject is diminished by some admixture of its contrary, according as the Philosopher says "that is whiter the less it has of an admixture of black."†18 But venial sin does not have contrariety to charity, because they do not have regard to the same object according to reason: for venial sin is not a deordination about the ultimate end, which is the object of charity.

And therefore venial sin in no way diminishes the charity already possessed. Nevertheless venial sin can be a reason for less charity being infused from the beginning, namely inasmuch as venial sin impedes the act of free choice by which a person is disposed to the reception grace. And in this way it can even impede the charity already possessed from increasing, namely by impeding a meritorious act by which a person merits an increase of charity.

Reply to 1. The person who sins venially loves something else together with God, which he loves habitually, though not actually, for the sake of God.

Reply to 2. Charity can have the cause of its increase meritorious on the part of man and effective on the part of the divine goodness to which it always pertains to move to the good, but it cannot have the cause of the diminution either meritorious on the part of man, as was said (in the Response), or effective on the part of God, because it is not by reason of Him that man becomes perverse, as Augustine says.†19

Reply to 3. That argument would be valid if venial sin were directly the cause of little charity being

given at its coming into being. However it is not directly, but as it were indirectly (per accidens) the cause, namely inasmuch as it impedes the act of free choice by which a person is disposed to charity. Moreover the act of free choice is required in adults for the infusion of grace or charity, but it is not required for the preservation of the habit already received. Hence the charity already possessed is not diminished when the act is impeded.

Reply to 4. 'Difficult to change' is not the difference constitutive of a habit. For disposition and habit are not diverse species, otherwise one and the same quality which previously was a disposition could not become a habit. Rather 'easy to change' and 'difficult to change' are related as perfect and imperfect in respect to the same matter. But granted that 'difficult to change' were the constitutive difference, still the argument would not follow. The reason is that a habit may become easily changeable in two ways: In one way of itself (per se), namely because the habit is not so firmly established in the subject that it is difficult to change: and thus whatever would diminish this disposition of being difficult to change in the habit, would diminish the habit itself; in another way by reason of something else (per accidens), namely because a disposition to the contrary is induced, as if we say the form of water becomes less difficult to change by the reception of heat, and nevertheless it is clear that the substantial form is not diminished. And in this way venial sin diminishes the disposition of being difficult to change in the case of charity. And in this way also should be understood what some say,^{†20} that venial sin diminishes charity so far as concerns its rootedness in the subject: not certainly of itself (per se) but by reason of something else (accidentally), as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 5. The decrease of cupidity is said to be the nourishment or preservation of charity, but not its increase: namely because the diminution of cupidity diminishes venial sins which dispose to the loss of charity.

Reply to 6. Dense vapor is received in the same part of the air in which light is received, and therefore diminishes light; but venial sin does not affect the highest part of the soul so far as concerns its relation to the supreme good, and therefore venial sin cannot diminish the charity already possessed, although it can impede the soul's magnanimity in acquiring it, just as the darkness of the air outside of the house would not diminish the brightness that is in the house from a cause inside, but it would diminish the intensity of a ray's brightness coming from outside the house. Now the perfection of the higher part of the soul so far as concerns the acquisition of charity depends on the good disposition of the lower parts of the soul, not however so far as concerns its preservation: for man by nature attains the internal intelligible objects by means of the lower and sentient parts of the soul; hence even a defect of sight and hearing can impede the acquisition of knowledge, yet not diminish the knowledge already acquired.

Reply to 7. It is not universally true that anything which is successively corrupted is diminished: because the substantial form successively is lost if we consider the preceding alteration, according as the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Physics,^{†21} that that which is being corrupted was being corrupted and will be corrupted, and nevertheless the substantial form is not diminished. And in this way charity sometimes successively is lost, if we consider the preceding disposition to the loss; but if we consider the loss in itself, it is not successively lost. And the statement that charity, because it is being corrupted, is the subject of corruption, is completely false. For whiteness or any form is not said to be corrupted because it is the subject of corruption, rather the subject of whiteness is the subject of corruption inasmuch as it ceases to be white. Likewise it must also be noted that if we take the very corruption of the form in itself according as it is at the terminus of movement, 'being corrupted' and the first instant of 'having been corrupted' is the same, just as being illuminated and having been illuminated is the same. Now at the moment when something has been corrupted, then it no longer exists as is said in Book VIII of the Physics.^{†22} And therefore when charity is corrupted, it does not exist.

Reply to 8. Deordination simply, completely removes the ordination of charity because it affects the soul according to its higher part; and deordination in some respect, removes the ordination of charity in some act, according as the order of charity is transmitted from the higher part of the soul to the lower parts. But it diminishes nothing of charity itself as it is in the highest part, just as blackness in the foot diminishes nothing of the whiteness in the head.

Reply to 9. A habit can be caused from numerous venial sins, but that habit neither destroys nor diminishes charity: because it is neither in the same subject nor concerned with the same matter.

Reply to 10. Venial sin does not have the nature of an offense strictly speaking since it does not involve a turning away (from God).

Reply to 11. A person advances in the way of God not only when charity is actually increased, but when he is disposed to an increase of charity: just as a child does not actually grow all during the time of his development but sometimes he actually grows, sometimes he is disposed to the growth. And similarly a person regresses in the way of God not only from the diminution of charity, but also by being impeded from advancing, or even from this that he is disposed to fall, each of which come about from venial sin.

Reply to 12. Love which is extended to many according to the same formality, is diminished; but the diffusion of love according to one formality does not diminish the love which is according to a different formality: for example if a person has many friends, he does not on that account love his son or his wife less, but if he were to love many wives, his love for one would be diminished, and if he had many sons, his love for an only son would be diminished. Now by venial sin a person's love is extended to creatures not according to the formality of an end, as God Himself is loved; and therefore a person's love for God is not diminished as to habit, but perhaps in its exercise.

Reply to 13. Through venial sin a person does not fall away from charity itself or from a perfect degree of charity, but falls away from charity in some act.

Reply to 14. Venial sin diminishes nothing of glory but only delays the obtaining of glory; and in like manner it diminishes nothing of charity but only impedes its act and increase.

Reply to 15. Some things impede the perfection of health or its functioning which nevertheless do not diminish health, just as is the case with some foods not easily digestible, inasmuch as they impede ready digestion.

Reply to 16. Operation or action can be diminished in two ways: In one way so far as concerns the facility of acting, namely inasmuch as a man cannot do as much, and in this way what diminishes the action, diminishes the principle of the action which is the form; in another way, so far as concerns the execution of the act: and in this way what diminishes the action does not necessarily diminish the form: for the column which keeps a stone from falling does not diminish its weight, nor does he who ties up a man diminish his power of walking. And in this way venial sin diminishes the exercise of charity, but not in the first way.

Reply to 17. Fervor can be taken in two ways: in one way as it denotes the intensity of the inclination of the lover to the one loved, and such fervor is essential to charity and is not diminished by venial sin; in the other way fervor is taken according as the movement of love overflows even into the lower powers, in such a way that not only the heart but also the flesh so to speak exults in God.^{†23} And such fervor is diminished through venial sin without diminishing the charity itself.

Question VII, Article 3 †p

Whether Venial Sin Can Become Mortal?

It seems that it can, for the following reasons.

1. In explaining the text "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life" (John 3, 36), Augustine says

"Many small sins if they are made light of bring about death."†1 But a sin is called mortal from this that it brings about spiritual death. Therefore many small or venial sins, make a mortal sin.

2. Moreover,†2 on that Psalm 39, 13 "They are multiplied above the hairs of my head" the Gloss of Augustine says "You have avoided the rocks, beware lest you be crushed by the grains of sand."†3 But by 'grains of sand', small or venial sins are meant. Therefore many venial sins crush or cause the death of man; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

3. But it was said that many venial sins are said to cause death or crush a man inasmuch as they dispose to mortal sin. But counter to this: Augustine says in the Rule that "Pride creeps stealthily into good works to destroy then,"†4 and so it seems that even good works are a disposition to mortal sin. But yet they are not said to cause death or crush a man; therefore neither can venial sins be said to crush or bring about death for the reason just assigned. Therefore It seems that venial sin of itself (per se) becomes mortal.

4. Venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. But a disposition becomes a habit, according to the Philosopher.†5 Therefore venial sin becomes mortal.

5. The movement of sensuality is a venial sin. But at the arrival of the consent of reason it becomes mortal, as is clear from Augustine.†6 Therefore a venial sin can become mortal .

6. Moreover †7 a movement of disbelief, which is a venial sin, may arise surreptitiously †8 in the higher reason itself. But the supervening consent does not destroy the essence of the prior movement which was a venial sin, and yet it makes the sin mortal. Therefore venial sin can become mortal.

7. Venial and mortal sin sometimes differ according to the diverse status of the persons. For it is said in the Decretis,†9 distinctio 25 that not to bring persons in discord into agreement is a venial sin for a lay person, but for a bishop it seems to be a mortal sin, since on account of this he is lowered in rank, as is said in Distinctio 53.†10 But a person of lower rank can be transferred to a higher rank. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

8. According to Chrysostom †11 laughter and jesting are venial sins. But laughter becomes a mortal sin: for it is said in Proverbs 13 †12"Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow, and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy"; according to the Gloss†13"perpetual" mourning. Which is incurred only for mortal sin. Therefore venial sin can become mortal.

9. [Of things that are distinguished only accidentally (per accidens) one can become the other: but venial and mortal sin are distinguished only accidentally. For those things that are distinguished essentially (per se) are not transformed into one another: but venial and mortal sin are transformed into one another, because nothing is so venial that it cannot become mortal when willed; and similarly every mortal fault becomes venial through confession. Therefore venial sin can become mortal.]†14

10. A minimum good by access to God becomes a maximum good, for example, the movement of free choice informed by grace becomes meritorious; therefore a minimum evil can become a maximum evil by withdrawal from God. But the minimum evil in the genus of sins is venial sin, and the maximum evil is mortal. Therefore venial sin can become mortal.

11. Boethius says †15 that sins are related to the soul as sicknesses to the body. But a slight sickness by increasing in degree can become very grave. Therefore a slight sin i.e. venial, can become a very grave sin i.e. mortal.

12. The angelic orders are formally constituted by the gifts of grace;†16 but the angelic orders differ in species; therefore the gifts of grace also differ in species. But by an increase of merit a person who first merited to be taken up into a lower order of angels, afterwards merits to be taken up into a higher order;†17 therefore a

lesser grace becomes a greater grace, even though they differ in species. For a like reason then venial sin can become mortal.

13. The state of innocence does not infinitely exceed the state of corrupted i.e. fallen nature. But any venial movement in the state of innocence would have been mortal.†18 Therefore also in the state of fallen nature venial sin can become mortal.

14. Good and evil differ more than two evils, namely venial and mortal evil: because good and evil differ in genus, but two evils agree in genus: for good and evil are genera of the other things, as is said in the Predicaments.†19 But the same numerical action can be good and evil, for instance, when a servant murmuring the while gives an alms after his master's command bidding it to be done out of charity. Therefore much more can the same numerical action be a venial and a mortal sin.

15. Sin is a weight upon the soul, according to that Psalm 37, 5 "My iniquities are gone over my head and as a heavy burden are become heavy upon me." But the slightest weight by addition can become so heavy that it exceeds the strength of the bearer. Therefore venial sin by addition can become mortal and exclude virtue.

16. According to Augustine in Book XII On the Trinity †20 such is the progression in any sin as in the sin of our first parents, namely that sensuality takes the place of the serpent, reason the place of the woman, the higher reason the place of the man. But it was not possible that man would eat of the forbidden tree without sinning mortally. Therefore in the higher reason there can be only mortal sin. Consequently what is venial in the lower part, when it comes in turn to higher part will become mortal.

17. If a habit is condemnable, the act proceeding from that habit is also condemnable. But in an unbaptized infidel whose original sin has not been remitted, there remains the habit of the original condemnation, to which pertains the corruption of the "fomes", i.e. inordinate concupiscence of the sense appetite; therefore even the first movements arising from such corruption are condemnable and are mortal sins; which first movements however in themselves are certainly venial sins. Therefore venial sin can become mortal.

On the contrary:

1. Those things that differ infinitely do not change into one another. But mortal and venial sin differ infinitely: for to one, temporal punishment is due and to the other eternal punishment. Therefore venial sin cannot become mortal.

2. Those things that differ in genus or in species do not change into one another. But venial and mortal sin differ in genus or even in species. Therefore venial sin can never become mortal.

3. One privation does not become another: for blindness never becomes deafness. But mortal sin includes the privation of the end, and venial sin the privation of the order to the end. Therefore venial sin can never become mortal.

Response:

This question can be understood in three ways. For in one way it can be taken to mean whether one and the same numerical sin which was first venial could afterwards become mortal. In the second way, whether a sin that is venial by reason of its genus can somehow become mortal. In the third way, whether many venial sins can become one mortal sin.

If the question is understood in the first way, in reply to it, it must be said that venial sin cannot become mortal. For since sin as we are now speaking of it, denotes a morally evil act, for it to be one and the same numerical sin, it must be one act morally. Now an act is moral from this that it is voluntary, hence the unity of

the moral act must be considered according to the will. For it sometimes happens that an act is one numerically according as it is in the genus of nature, which nevertheless is not one according as it is in the genus of moral acts, on account of the diversity of will: for example, if someone in the course of going to church should intend vainglory in the first part of the journey but in the second part intend to serve God. Thus, then, in an act that is one according to natural species there may be a venial sin in the first part and a mortal sin in the second part, if the will should increase so much in wantonness that it does a venially sinful act even in contempt of God, for instance speaking an idle word or something of the kind. But in this case there is not one sin, but two, because there is not one act according to the genus of moral acts.

However if the question is understood in the second way, it must be said that what is a venial sin by reason of the genus can become a mortal sin, not indeed by reason of the genus but by reason of the end. In order to manifest this we must consider that since an external act belongs to the genus of moral acts inasmuch as it is voluntary, two objects can be considered in the moral act, namely the object of the external act, and the object of the internal act. Which sometimes are one, namely when a person wills to go to a particular place, and goes there; but sometimes they are diverse, and one may be good and the other evil, for instance when person gives an alms wishing to please men, the object of external act is good but the object of the internal act is evil. And because the external act is constituted in the genus of moral acts inasmuch as it is voluntary, the moral species of the act must be considered formally according to the object of the internal act: for the species of an act is considered according to the object. Hence the Philosopher says in Book V of the Ethics†21 that a person who commits adultery in order to steal is an avaricious man rather than an adulterer. So accordingly, an external act which, according to the species it has from the external object, is a venial sin, passes over into the species of mortal sin because of the object of the internal act, for example when a person speaks an idle word with the intention of inciting to evil desire. It may also happen that an act is in itself a venial sin, not on account of the object but on account of its imperfection, as say the movement of concupiscence at the thought of adultery, which is in the sensual part, is so far as concerns its object [i.e. adultery] in the genus of mortal sin, but because it does not completely attain moral evilness, since it is without the deliberation of reason, therefore it cannot be a mortal sin, which in the genus of moral acts is completely evil. But such a sin may become mortal, if it obtains completion, namely when the deliberate consent of reason supervenes.

If the question is understood in the third way, in reply to this it must be said that many venial sins do not directly and effectively constitute one mortal sin, namely in such a way that many venial sins incur the guilt of one mortal sin. Which is evident for two reasons. First, because whenever some one thing comes to be out of many accumulated things, there must be the same kind of quantity on both sides: for in this way, one line is made out of many small lines; but where there is a different kind of quantity, one is not made out of many: for one line is not made from many numbers, nor conversely. Now venial sin does not have the same kind of magnitude as mortal sin: for the quantity of mortal sin is from turning away from the ultimate end; but the quantity of venial sin is from a deordination concerning those things that are for the end. Secondly, because venial sin does not diminish charity, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 2), which mortal sin eliminates. However in a dispositive way many venial sins induce a person to commit mortal sin, because from the multiplication of acts a habit is formed, and the eagerness and pleasure in the sin increase and can increase so much that a person is more easily inclined to sin mortally. However this disposition is not necessarily prerequisite for mortal sin, because even when venial sins do not precede, a man can commit mortal sin, and when the foresaid disposition to venial sins does precede, through charity a man can resist mortal sin.

Reply to 1. Many small sins in a dispositive way cause death, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. A similar answer is to be given to the second argument.

Reply to 3. Good works do not dispose to the commission of mortal sin as do venial sins, but good works can be an occasion indirectly (per accidens) of sinning mortally.

Reply to 4. A disposition is compared to a habit as imperfect to perfect. But this may occur in two ways: in one way according as the perfect and the imperfect are in the same species, and in this way the disposition becomes a habit; in the other way according as the perfect and the imperfect are in different species, and in this way a disposition never becomes that to which it disposes: for heat does not become the form of fire. And in like manner neither does venial sin become mortal.

Reply to 5. That movement which was a venial sin in sensuality never will become a mortal sin; but the supervening consent of itself (per se) will be a mortal sin.

Reply to 6. An indeliberate movement of disbelief is not always in the higher reason, but sometimes it can be in the imagination, as when a person imagines the three persons in God as three men, and is moved suddenly to believe it; and sometimes in the lower reason, for instance when a person considers certain things in respect to creatures to be contrary to faith in the Trinity; and sometimes in the higher reason, for instance when a person suddenly in a disorderly manner begins to cogitate about the Trinity of persons in God, such a sudden movement is in the higher reason and is a venial sin, but the supervening consent is another movement: and therefore it does not follow that the same sin is venial and mortal.

Reply to 7. A person is permanent, i.e. continues to exist, and therefore a person can be moved to a higher rank; but sin is an act that immediately passes. Therefore there is no similarity.

Reply to 8. Extreme mourning takes hold of the end of joy not of any joy but of that joy by which someone enjoys a creature as an end.

Reply to 9. A sin that is mortal by reason of its genus is always mortal and never becomes venial, if venial by reason of its genus is meant. And the statement that penitence (i.e. confession) makes a mortal sin venial, takes 'venial' in an equivocal sense, as is clear from the distinction of 'venial' made above (in q. 7, a. 1).

Reply to 10. A minimum good in the genus of human acts can mean an act that is good by reason of its genus but is not meritorious because it is not informed by grace; but this same numerical act never becomes a meritorious act that can be called a maximum good in the genus of human acts, just as neither does a venial sin ever become mortal.

Reply to 11. Sickness, like health, is not an act but a disposition or habit, hence while remaining numerically the same it can be changed from a less perfect to a more perfect state. But sin is an act that quickly passes, and therefore so far as concerns this there is no similarity, but a likeness is perceived only in regard to this that just as sickness is a deordination of nature, so sin is a deordination of an act.

Reply to 12. Since among the angels an order is regarded as a part of a hierarchy which is a sacred principality,†22 it is evident that an order essentially consists in the gift of grace and the orders are distinguished according to the distinction of gratuitous gifts, although a distinction of natural goods is presupposed materially and dispositively. But it must be noted that the gift of grace can be considered in two ways: in one way so far as concerns this that it brings about a union with God, and in this regard the angelic orders are not distinguished but all agree, hence Dionysius says †23 that the whole hierarchy of angels has a likeness and oneness with God so far as is possible; in another way the gift of grace can be considered inasmuch as it ordains to operation, and in accordance with this, grace is diversified in the different orders inasmuch as they are ordained to different offices.†24 And men are said to be taken up into the orders of angels †25 not by reason of offices but on account of the measure of glory and divine enjoyment; hence it does not follow that in men grace differs in species according to their diverse state of perfection.

Reply to 13. In the state of innocence man could not sin venially, not that he was not able to do those acts that are venial by reason of their genus which for him would be mortal, but because he was not able to do any of those acts that are venial by reason of their genus; for there could not be in him a deordination in the

lower parts (of the soul) about those things that are for the sake of the end unless there preceded in him a deordination in the higher part (of the soul) in regard to the end.

Reply to 14. The action of the servant and the action of the master proceed from a different will; hence there is not one action morally.

Reply to 15. In all physical weights there is one kind of quantity, but not in mortal and venial sin; hence the argument does not follow.

Reply to 16. Man acted contrary to the divine command in tasting of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,†26 and therefore sinned mortally; and in like manner the higher reason whenever it sins by acting contrary to the divine command, sins mortally; but it does not always sin against the divine command, and therefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to 17. What was proposed in the objection is false, namely, that if a habit deserves to be condemned, so does the act: for mortal sin does not consist in a habit but in an act; hence if a habit is produced from many acts of mortal sins, every movement resulting from the inclination of that habit need not be a mortal sin: for no one has so confirmed a habit of lust or of some other vice that he may not sometimes in keeping with reason resist its movements, and yet it would be absurd to say that such a movement would be imputed as a mortal sin to him who resists. Hence although habitual concupiscence in an unbeliever not yet baptized deserves to be condemned, surely not every movement of concupiscence deserves to be condemned after the manner of a mortal sin. Nor on the other hand is the "fomes" called habitual concupiscence in a positive manner, but in a privative manner, as was said above (in q. 5, a. 1, and 2), namely by reason of the withdrawal of original justice; hence the movement that follows from the natural power itself need not always be a sin, still less a mortal sin. Therefore it should not be said that the first movements of sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins, because far more would they be mortal sins for believers: since in one and the same act a believer sins more than an unbeliever other things being equal, as is clear from the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10, 29): "How much worse punishment do you think he deserves who . . . has regarded as unclean the blood of the covenant?" and from the Second Epistle of St. Peter (2, 21): "For it were better for them not to have known the way of justice than, having known it, to turn back from the holy commandment delivered to them."†27

The answers to the arguments On the contrary are clear from what has been said above (in the Response).

Question VII, Article 4 †p

Whether a Circumstance Makes a Venial Sin Mortal?

It seems that it does, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says in a Sermon on Purgatory,†1 that if anger is retained for a long time, and if drunkenness is a continual, they are included among mortal sins. But these are venial sins by reason of their genus, otherwise they would always be mortal sins. Therefore from the circumstance of continual or of duration a venial sin becomes mortal.

2. Prolonged enjoyment is a mortal sin, as the Master says.†2 But if it is not prolonged it is a venial sin. Therefore the circumstance of prolongation makes a venial sin mortal.

3. Good and evil in human acts differ more than venial and mortal sin, since good and evil differ in genus: for they are genera of other things as is said in the Predicaments.†3 On the other hand venial and mortal

sin agree in genus, since both are evil. But a circumstance makes a good act evil. Therefore much more does a circumstance make a venial sin mortal.

4. Among the other circumstances is listed 'on account of which' (propter quid), which circumstance pertains to the end. But a venial sin becomes mortal on account of the end, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 3). Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin mortal.

On the contrary:

A circumstance is an accident of a moral act, as the name itself indicates. But to be a mortal sin pertains to the species of sin. Since then no accident constitutes the species of that of which it is an accident, it seems that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin mortal.

Response:

A moral act is called good or evil by reason of its genus according to its object. But besides this goodness or badness, the moral act can have an additional twofold goodness or badness: one from the end, the other from a circumstance. And because the end is the first object of the will, the internal act obtains its species from the end, and if the internal act has the nature of a mortal sin by reason of the end, the external act will be pass over into the species of the internal act and will become a mortal sin, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 3). But a circumstance does not always give a species to the moral act but only when it adds a new deformity pertaining to another species of sin: for example, when a man approaches for sexual intercourse not only a woman who is not his wife, but who is the wife of another, there occurs in this case the deformity of injustice as well; hence this circumstance confers a new species and, properly speaking, it is not now a circumstance but becomes a specific difference of the moral act.

If then the additional circumstance adds a deformity of the kind that is contrary to the command of God, then it will make that which is venial by reason of its genus a mortal sin. Therefore that which is venial by reason of its genus cannot become mortal from a circumstance which continues to have the nature of a circumstance, but only from a circumstance that transfers the sin to another species. However it sometimes happens that some act is venial not by reason of its genus, namely on the part of the object, but rather on account the imperfection of the act, because it does not attain to the deliberate consent of reason, which fulfills the nature of a moral act: and when that occurs such a circumstance which completes what is required for a moral act, namely the supervening deliberate consent, it makes a venial sin mortal.

Reply to 1. Anger implies a movement to harm one's neighbor. But to do harm to one's neighbor is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, because it is contrary to charity as regards love of neighbor; but when the movement remains in the lower appetite and reason does not consent to do serious harm to one's neighbor, it is a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act; but if the anger is retained for a long time it is impossible for the deliberation of reason not to supervene. Now anger is understood to be retained for a long time not whenever it lasts a long time, but because a person can resist it by the use of reason, and then the movement of anger is not retained even if it lasts a long time. In like manner we must reply in regard to drunkenness, because drunkenness considered in itself turns away reason actually from God, in such a way that reason cannot turn towards God during drunkenness. And because man is not always bound to actually turn his reason towards God therefore drunkenness is not always a mortal sin; but when a man is continually drunk it seems that he is not solicitous about his reason being turned towards God, and in a condition of this kind drunkenness is a mortal sin: for in this way it seems that he regards turning his reason towards God with contempt on account of the pleasure in wine.

Reply to 2. The same is to be said about prolonged pleasure as about anger that is persisted in for a long time.

Reply to 3. When a circumstance changes a good act into an evil act it constitutes a new species of sin, and thus transfers the act into a different genus of moral acts, and in such a case it (a circumstance) can also make a venial sin mortal.

Reply to 4. The end, inasmuch as it is the object of the act, gives species to the moral act, and for this reason it can make a venial sin mortal.

Question VII, Article 5 †p

Whether There Can Be Venial Sin in the Higher Reason?

It seems that there cannot, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says in Book XII On the Trinity †1 that the higher reason cleaves to the eternal truths; from which it seems there is sin in the higher reason only by turning away from the eternal truths. But every such sin is a mortal sin. Therefore in the higher reason there can be only mortal sin.

2. There cannot be sin in any power except by some deordination of the act in relation to its object, for instance an error in the act of the seeing power can occur only in relation to color. But the object of the higher reason is the ultimate end, which is an eternal good. Therefore there cannot be sin in the higher reason except by some deordination in regard to the ultimate end. But every such sin is a mortal sin: for venial sin is concerned with those things that are for the end, but mortal sin with the end, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 1). Therefore in the higher reason there can be only mortal sin.

3. The higher reason is that which participates in the light of grace. But the light of grace is more powerful than physical light; and physical light is not defective in its action, unless it loses its power or is diminished, hence much less spiritual light. Therefore there cannot be any defective act in the higher reason unless grace is lost or diminished. But grace is neither lost nor diminished by venial sin as was said above (in q. 7, a. 1). Therefore the defect of venial sin cannot be in the higher reason.

4. The object of the higher reason is a good to be enjoyed which is an eternal good. But as Augustine says, †2 every human perversity consists in enjoying things to be used and in using things to be enjoyed. Therefore sin cannot be in the higher reason save insofar as it uses that which is to be enjoyed, which is God. But this is to love something more than God, which constitutes a mortal sin: for to use is to refer a thing to something else as to an end. Therefore in the higher reason there can be only mortal sin.

5. The higher and lower reason are not diverse powers, but they differ in this that the higher reason proceeds according to the eternal norms, but the lower reason according to temporal norms, as Augustine says. †3 But when we proceed according to the eternal norms there cannot be sin unless we err about the eternal norms, which is always a mortal sin. Therefore in the higher reason there cannot be venial sin but only mortal sin.

6. According to the Philosopher in the book On the Soul, †4 reason is always right. But sin is opposed to rectitude. Therefore there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason.

7. The Philosopher says in Book I of the Ethics †5 that we praise the reason of the continent and of the incontinent man, and thus reason is praised in both good men and bad. But we do not praise that in which there is sin. Therefore there is neither mortal nor venial sin in the higher reason.

8. Reason implies deliberation: if then there is some sin in the reason it must be there as a result of

deliberation, because anything which is in another is in it according to the mode of that in which it is i.e. its subject.†6 But a sin committed as a result of deliberation is committed intentionally or from pure malice,†7 which is mortal in the highest degree since it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore in the higher reason there can be only mortal sin.

9. It pertains to the higher reason to consult the eternal norms. But counsel is a kind of deliberation. Therefore the higher reason never sins except by deliberate consent; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

10. Venial sin becomes mortal on account of contempt, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 3). But that a person sin deliberately does not seem to be without contempt. Apparently then, since sin in the higher reason results from deliberation, it never is venial but is always mortal.

11. Venial sin from a movement that takes us unawares i.e. an indeliberate movement,†8 is found in the lower powers of the soul. But sin according as it takes place in the higher reason from an indeliberate movement apparently cannot be venial. Therefore in no way can venial sin be in the higher reason. -- Proof of the minor premise: a sin according as it takes place from an indeliberate] movement, from being venial becomes mortal when deliberate consent supervenes, because of the fact that reason in deliberating has recourse to some other greater good, to act against which is a more grievous sin: for example, when concupiscence arises as a result of an indeliberate movement, only the aspect of pleasure is considered in the object desired; but when reason deliberates it considers something higher, namely the law of God incompatible with concupiscence, by contempt of which owing to concupiscence a man sins mortally. But nothing higher can be resorted to than the object of the higher reason which is the eternal good. Therefore if a sin from an indeliberate movement regarding the higher reason's proper object would be venial, it could not become mortal in the higher reason through deliberate consent; but it certainly is mortal by reason of deliberate consent; therefore even if it arises from a sudden movement it is mortal. In no way then can there be venial sin in the higher reason.

12. The higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life just as the heart in the animal is the principle of bodily life; hence it is also compared to the heart according to Proverbs (4, 23) "With all watchfulness keep thy heart, because life issueth out of it." But there cannot be any malady in the bodily heart that is not mortal. Therefore neither in the higher reason is there any venial sin but only mortal.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says †9 that any consent to an act pertains to the higher reason. But some consent to an act is a venial sin, as when a person consents to speak an idle word: for consent to a venial sin is venial, just as consent to a mortal sin is mortal. Therefore there can be venial sin in the higher reason.

2. Just as the will delights in good so the reason delights in truth. But the will can sin venially if it loves a created good that is inferior to the uncreated good. Therefore the higher reason can sin venially if it loves a created truth that is inferior to the uncreated truth.

Response:

Since reason directs the appetite, sin can be in the reason in two ways: in one way in regard to reason's proper act, as when reason errs in some matter by embracing what is false after rejecting what is true; in another way from this that the appetite is inordinately inclined to something following the deliberation of reason. And if the deliberation of reason resorts to some or other temporal norms, as say, that a thing is useful or useless, befitting or unbecoming according to the opinion of men, it will be said that the sin is in the lower reason; but if the deliberation has recourse to the eternal norms, for example that it is accordant or discordant with the divine command, it will be said that the sin is in the higher reason: for reason is called higher that is intent on the eternal norms, as Augustine says.†10 But reason is intent on them in two ways: namely both in considering

them and in consulting them: it is intent on considering them as its proper object and it is intent on consulting them as a mean that it applies to direct the appetite or action.

And in each of these ways both venial and mortal can be in the higher reason. For inasmuch as it is intent on considering the eternal norms, which are its proper object, it can have both a deliberate act and an indeliberate act, which is called a sudden movement. For although it is the function of reason to deliberate, nevertheless it is necessary that an absolute consideration be included in any deliberation: for deliberation is nothing else than a kind of discourse and a mobile i.e. dialectical consideration so to speak, but in every movement there is found something indivisible, as in time the instant,^{†11} and in a line the point.^{†12} If then in the higher reason there should be a sin from an indeliberate movement concerning its proper object, it will be a venial sin; as when a person suddenly thinks it impossible that God be triune and one. For this is not a mortal sin before reason adverts to the fact that this is contrary to the command of God: for it is of the nature of mortal sin to be contrary to God's command; when therefore reason has perceived by deliberation that not to believe is contrary to the command of God, the sin will become mortal if it does not believe.

However inasmuch as reason is intent on the eternal norms in consulting them as a mean, there cannot be a sin from a sudden or indeliberate movement because counsel itself implies deliberation; yet nonetheless even in this way there can be venial and mortal sin in the higher reason. For in consulting we seek both by which means something can be done, and by which means it can be done better. Therefore in consulting the eternal norms there can be a sin in two ways: in one way inasmuch as following on such deliberation something is approved which is altogether contrary to the end, such that this being accepted it is not possible to attain the end, and then the sin is mortal: for example, when a person considering that fornication is contrary to the law of God, nonetheless chooses it, he sins mortally. However when something is approved which does not exclude the end but still the end can be more readily attained without it because it retards somewhat from the end or disposes to the contrary of the end, then the sin is venial: for instance when a person speaks an idle word, even considering that it is a venial sin disposing to mortal sin, and falling short somewhat of the rectitude of justice that leads to God.

Reply to 1. Whenever the higher reason sins, it need not be by turning away from the eternal norms: because sometimes it sins by approving something that is not contrary to the eternal norms, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. There can be a deordination about the end in two ways: either because there is a departure from the end, and this is a mortal sin; or because something is approved that retards from the end, and this is a venial sin.

Reply to 3. Physical light acts from natural necessity: and therefore as long as it remains integral i.e. intact, it always acts and its activity is never diminished. But the use of charity and grace is subject to the choice of the will; hence a man having charity does not always use his perfection but sometimes settles on some less perfect act.

Reply to 4. Augustine is speaking there of mortal sin, which is a perversity and evil simply; but venial sin cannot strictly be called a perversity nor is it evil except in a qualified sense, as we have said above (in q. 7, a. 1 Reply to 1).

Reply to 5. When reason proceeding according to the eternal norms accepts something contrary to those norms, it sins mortally; however sometimes it sins, not because that which it accepts is contrary (to the eternal norms), but because it disposes to the contrary and retards (from the end).

Reply to 6. Reason is always said to be right, either according as it is related to first principles about which it does not err, or because error comes about not as a result of a property of reason but rather as a result of

its defect. However error follows from a special property of the imagination inasmuch as the imagination perceives likenesses of absent things.

Reply to 7. Both the continent and the incontinent man possess right reason at least in regard to the universal, because even the incontinent man judges by right reason that it is evil to engage in shameful pleasure although he abandons this universal consideration because of passion. Yet it does not follow on that account that the reason of every sinner in regard to the universal is praised, because the intemperate man even when free from passion, resorting as it were to perverse reasoning, judges it good to enjoy shameful pleasure.

Reply to 8. Even though reason deliberates, nevertheless it must needs have some absolute consideration that is included in the deliberation itself, as was said (in the Response). Nevertheless does not necessarily follow that whenever sin is committed deliberately it is from pure malice, but only then when reason consents to something contrary to virtue, as is said in Book VII of the Ethics;†13 but venial sin is not contrary to virtue: consequently when a person deliberately consents to venial sin, he does not on that account sin from malice.

Reply to 9. The answer to the ninth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 10. Deliberate consent does not cause contempt of God unless that to which consent is given is approved as contrary to God.

Reply to 11. The object of the higher reason, which is the noblest object, can be considered both according to a superior cognition and according to an inferior cognition. For the cognition God has of the eternal good, which is Himself, is beyond the cognition man has of it by human reason, and therefore man is rectified in his cognition by divine knowledge inasmuch as he believes divine revelation: when then a person suddenly apprehends God not to be triune and one, he apprehends this according to human reason and it is a venial sin, but when he deliberates he applies divine knowledge to this, considering that it is contrary to what God has revealed that anyone should not believe in the trinity of the one God, and therefore the sin becomes mortal inasmuch as it is reduced to contrariety through a higher means of knowledge.

Reply to 12. A malady that changes the natural circulation in the heart or ejects something from it, is always mortal, but a malady that induces some irregularity in its beat is not always mortal: and in like manner a sin that ejects charity from the higher reason is mortal, but not a sin that causes a deordination in some act.

Question VII, Article 6 †p

Whether in Sensuality There Can Be Venial Sin?

It seems that there cannot, for the following reasons.

1. Ambrose says †1 that alone is susceptible of virtue which is susceptible of vice. But sensuality is not susceptible of virtue: for sensuality is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says.†2 Therefore sensuality cannot be the cause of vice.

2. According to Augustine,†3 every sin is in the will "because sin is committed only by the will." But sensuality is different than the will. Therefore sensuality is not a venial sin.

3. Sin is not found in the brutes. But sensuality is common to us and the brutes.†4 Therefore there cannot be sin in sensuality.

4. But it was argued that sensuality in the brutes is not obedient to reason as it is in us, and therefore in us it can be the subject of sin but not in the brutes. But counter to this: sensuality, according to this, will be the

subject of venial sin only inasmuch as it is obedient to reason. But that on account of which a thing is such, is that more so and first.^{†5} Therefore reason rather than sensuality must be assigned as the subject of venial sin: for according to the Philosopher,^{†6} they err who do not assign the first subject of an accident i.e. an attribute.

5. A disposition and the habit are in the same subject. But venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Since then there cannot be mortal sin in sensuality, neither will venial sin be possible in sensuality.

6. Augustine says ^{†7} that if a person does not consent to the movement of sensuality, he is not endangered but is rewarded. But no one who sins venially is rewarded on account of it. Therefore the movement of sensuality is not a venial sin.

7. Augustine says in a sermon On the Works of Mercy^{†8} "Every sin is contempt of God, because His commands are contemned." Therefore there can be sin in that part of the soul that can know God's command. But this cannot be sensuality but only reason. Therefore there cannot be venial sin in sensuality.

8. No man sins in that which it is not in the power of his will to avoid.^{†9} But man by his will cannot avoid the rising movements of concupiscence, according to Romans 7, 15: "For I do not that good which I will," namely not to be concupiscent, as the Gloss explains.^{†10} Therefore the movement of sensuality is not a sin.

On the contrary:

The Master says ^{†11} that if the movement of concupiscence be only in sensuality it will be a venial sin; and this is taken from Book XII of Augustine's book On the Trinity.^{†12}

Response:

Sin strictly speaking refers to an act, as is clear from what was said previously (in q. 2, a. 1 and 2). And since we are now speaking of sin in moral matters, sin can be in the act of that power whose act can be moral; and an act is moral from this that it is directed and commanded by the reason and the will, hence sin can be in the act of any part of man that obeys reason; but not only does the bodily member obey the reason and the will in regard to an external act, but even the sense appetite in regard to certain interior movements: hence there can be sin both in the external acts and in the movements of the sense appetite which is called sensuality.

However it must be noted that, since action is attributed to the principal and primary cause rather than to the instrument, when the internal sense appetite or outward member acts in accordance with the command of reason, sin is attributed not to sensuality or to the bodily member but to the reason. Now it is never possible for the external member to operate i.e. to act. unless it is moved either by the reason or at least by the imagination or memory and by the sense appetite, hence sin is never said to be in the external members, for instance in the hand or the foot; however sensuality sometimes is moved without the command of the reason and will, and then sin is said to be in the sense appetite. But still this sin cannot be mortal but only venial. For mortal sin is due to turning away from the ultimate end to which reason orders or directs; but sensuality cannot extend to that, i.e. the ultimate end. Hence in sensuality there cannot be mortal sin but only venial. For when the movement of sensuality is commanded by reason, as is evident in him whose will conceives a strong desire for something mortal, such a movement is a mortal sin but it is not attributed to sensuality, but to the reason commanding.

Reply to 1. Ambrose is speaking of the vice of mortal sin that is opposed to virtue; but venial sin is not contrary to virtue although there are certain virtues of the irrational parts of the soul, according to the Philosopher in Book II of the Ethics,^{†13} not inasmuch as they are sensitive i.e. connected with the reception and transmission of sense impressions, but inasmuch as they are rational by participation.

Reply to 2. Augustine takes every sin to be in the will as in the first mover or effective power: for from this it follows that the movement of sensuality is a venial sin, since the will can impede it.

Reply to 3. Sensuality is the subject of sin inasmuch as it is obedient i.e. subject to reason; and in this way it is not common to us and the brutes.

Reply to 4. When the act of the will or reason is found in a sin, then the sin can be attributed directly to the reason or will as to the first mover and first subject of sin; but when no act of the will or reason is there but only the act of sensuality, which is called a sin because it can be kept in check by the reason and will, then the sin is attributed to sensuality.

Reply to 5. When disposition and habit differ as perfect and imperfect in the same species, then they are in the same subject; otherwise they need not be in the same subject †14 for excellence of imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect, and in like manner the movement of sensuality can be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.

Reply to 6. When an unlawful movement occurs in sensuality, reason can be related to it in three ways: in one way as resisting it, and then there is no sin but rather the merit of reward; but sometimes reason is related to such a movement as commanding it, as when it intentionally rouses the movement of unlawful concupiscence; and then if the object of the unlawful movement is in the genus of mortal sin, there will be a mortal sin; but sometimes reason is related to the unlawful movement neither as prohibiting nor as commanding but as consenting; and then the sin is venial.

Reply to 7. Augustine there is speaking of mortal sin which is sin simply i.e. without qualification: for venial sin is sin in a qualified sense, as was said above (in a. 5 Reply to 4).

Reply to 8. Since the sense appetite is moved by some perception and yet is a power in a bodily organ, its movement can arise in two ways: in one way from the disposition of the body, in another way from some perception. But the bodily disposition is not subject to the command of reason; but every perception is subject to the command of reason: for the reason can prevent the use of any perceptive power, especially in the absence of an object sensed according to touch, which sometimes cannot be removed. Since then sin is in sensuality according as it can obey reason, the first movement of sensuality which arises from the bodily disposition is not a sin, and some †15 call this movement 'involuntary' (primo primum); but the second movement of sensuality which is aroused by some perception is a sin: for reason can in no way avoid the first movement but it can avoid the second so far as concerns single (or separate) movements, but not so far as concerns all movements, because in turning away its thoughts from one object it meets with another, from which an unlawful movement can arise.†16

Question VII, Article 7 †p

Whether Man in the State of Innocence Could Sin Venially?

It seems that he could, for the following reasons.

1. In the First Epistle to Timothy (2, 14), on that passage "Adam was not deceived", the Gloss says: "Having as yet no experience of the God's severity, it was possible that Adam was so deceived that he thought what he did was venial."†1 From which it seems that Adam in the state of innocence presumably thought he could sin venially before he sinned mortally. But Adam knew the condition of his state better than we do. Therefore we should not say that he could not sin venially.

2. But it was argued that 'venial' is not taken there for venial by reason of its genus,†2 as an idle word is called a venial sin, but is called venial because it is easily pardonable.†3 But counter to this is Gregory's statement in Book IX of the Moralia†4 on that passage of Job (10, 9) "Remember, I beseech thee, that thou hast

made me as the clay ", that "sin is venial in man, while it is irremedial in an angel." If then Adam had thought his sin to be venial, i.e. pardonable, he would not have been deceived. Therefore the Gloss is not to be explained in such a way that 'venial' is taken as 'pardonable'.

3. Venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. But a disposition precedes a habit. Therefore in man venial sin preceded mortal sin.

4. Since we can sin venially, if Adam could not sin venially, this was only on account of the integrity of his state. But venial sin is less opposed to the integrity of the first state than mortal sin, which nevertheless he committed. Therefore much more could he commit venial sin.

5. Sins are opposed to virtuous acts. But virtuous acts were not of a different kind in the state of innocence than they are now; therefore neither were sinful acts. If then certain sins are now venial, they were also venial in the state of innocence.

6. We reach the less distant before the more distant. But mortal sin is more distant from the rectitude of the first state than venial sin. Therefore Adam first fell into venial sin before he fell into mortal sin.

7. Adam could sin and could do good. But he could do a greater good or a lesser good. Therefore he could do a greater evil or a lesser evil by sinning mortally or venially.

8. A state of the rational creature is found in which a person can sin mortally and venially, as happens in us. We also find another state in which a person cannot sin either venially or mortally, as in the state of glory. And we find yet another state in which it is not possible to sin venially but only mortally; therefore there is some state in which it is possible to sin venially and not mortally while that state lasts. But this latter state cannot be other than the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence it was possible to sin venially while that state lasted.

9. In the state of innocence the governance (regimen) of the soul was well-ordered, wherefore it is said in Ecclesiastes (7, 30) that God made man right. But well-ordered government can first be weakened before it is totally corrupted. Therefore also the governance of the soul could first be weakened by venial sin before being totally corrupted by mortal sin.

10. Grace does not destroy nature. But man's free choice has by nature the power to do good and to sin mortally and venially. Therefore the gratuitous gift of original justice did not preclude the possibility of sinning venially.

11. Nothing prevents a defect from occurring in the act of the secondary agent though there is no defect in the act of the higher agent, for instance a defect may be present in the germinative power of a plant though there is no defect in the action of the sun. But in the soul reason and sensuality are related as higher and lower. Therefore there could be venial sin in the act of sensuality though there is no mortal sin in the act of reason even in the state of innocence.

12. Augustine says in Book XI of the Literal Commentary on Genesis, that "Adam was tempted by a desire to experience when he saw that the woman did not die after eating that fruit; yet I do not think that Adam if he was endowed with a spiritual mind, could have possibly believed that God had forbidden them to eat of the fruit of that tree out of envy."^{†5} But Adam did not have a spiritual mind after he sinned; therefore before sin the desire of experiencing tempted him. But the desire of experiencing is a venial sin. Therefore in Adam venial sin preceded mortal sin.

13. A sudden movement of disbelief is a venial sin. But there was a sudden movement of disbelief in Eve before she sinned, which is evident from the fact that she said as if in doubt, "Lest perhaps we die" (Genesis 3,

3). Therefore she sinned venially before she sinned mortally.

14. According to Augustine,†6 sins in the soul are like sicknesses in the body. But Adam first incurred a sickness weakening his strength before he incurred death. Therefore in like manner he first incurred a weakness from venial sin before spiritual death from mortal sin.

15. Augustine says in Book XI of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, "We must not think that the tempter would have caused man to fall unless a certain pride that should have been checked had first arisen in man's soul."†7 But pride could not be checked after he consented to it, therefore it had arisen in him even before it should have been checked by dissent; but a movement of the kind that should be checked is a venial sin. Therefore there was venial sin in Adam before consent.

16. Man was caused to fall by the tempter through mortal sin. But pride that should have been checked preceded the downfall, as the very words of Augustine (in the argument above) imply. Therefore venial sin was in him before mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. The first sin of man was the cause of death, according to the Apostle in Romans 5, 12, "Through one man sin entered into the world and through sin death." But sin is called mortal from this that it is the cause of death. Therefore the first sin of man must have been mortal.

2. Anselm says "Just as the order of the irrational animal is to act without reason, so the order of human nature is to act with reason."†8 But he who sins venially does not act with reason, otherwise it would not be evil, since Dionysius says †9 the evil of man lies in acting without reason. Therefore man could not sin venially in the state of innocence in which the order of nature was integral.

3. Every movement is from the predominant principle.†10 But justice predominated in man during the time of innocence. Therefore every movement in that state was in accordance with justice: man then could not sin venially during that state.

Response:

It is generally held †11 that in the first state Adam did not sin venially before he sinned mortally. But someone could judge this to be so because sins that are venial for us would have been mortal for man in the state of innocence on account of the excellence of his state.

However we cannot say this. It is of course possible that one and the same sin is graver on account of the excellence of the person; but the circumstance of the person does not aggravate infinitely so as to make a venial sin mortal unless it transfers the sin to another species: for only a circumstance of this kind makes a venial sin mortal, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 4). But this happens when a thing becomes contrary to a precept for some person on account of the condition of his state, which in a person of lower status does not have the nature of something contrary to a precept: for example, for a priest to marry is contrary to the precept of fulfilling the vow of continence, but not for a layman who has taken no vow, and therefore that which is either venial or no sin at all for a layman is a mortal sin in a priest. However if the act of the person of higher status is not opposed to a precept especially appointed for him, the act is not a mortal sin, because every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the divine law, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 1 arg. 1); except perhaps accidentally (per accidens) by reason of the scandal ensuing; since even by word or deed to provide the occasion of one's brother's downfall †12 is contrary to a precept. But it cannot be said that acts of venial sins were contrary to a precept in a different way for the first man in the state of innocence than for us; therefore we cannot say that those sins which are venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed them, on account of the excellence of his state.

But rather it must be said that the condition of his state was such that during that state in no way could he commit venial sin. The reason for this is that man was so constituted in the state of innocence, as Augustine says,†13 that as long as the higher part of man adhered firmly to God, all the lower parts were subject to the higher part, not only the lower parts of the soul but even the body itself and the various external members. Now the higher part of man, namely the mind, could not be removed from its rectitude by which it was subject to God except by mortal sin, which is a turning away from God; consequently no deordination in the lower parts of the soul was possible before man sinned mortally. Hence it is evident that venial sin, which occurs in sensuality before the deliberation of reason, could not occur in the state of innocence, since every movement of the lower parts was in conformity with the order of the higher part.

However since venial sin may occur even in the higher reason according to what was said before (in q. 7, a. 5), someone might think that at least venial sin of that kind was possible in Adam in the state of innocence. But even in regard to this the same explanation is found if we consider the matter carefully. For since powers are distinguished according to their objects,†14 the order of powers is also in keeping with the order of objects; but even among the objects of reason there is an order of higher and lower, both in theoretical and in practical matters: for just as an indemonstrable i.e. a non-gainsayable principle is the highest in theoretical matters, so also is the end in practical matters.†15 Hence as long as the higher reason of man would have been rightly ordered in regard to the end, in no way could there have been any deordination in regard to those things that are for the sake of the end, on account of the indefectible order of the lower powers in relation to the higher according to the condition of that state: just as likewise in theoretical matters as long as man has a right judgment regarding the principles, unless there be a defect in the connection of principles to conclusions, no defect can occur in regard to the conclusions. Now it is evident from what was said previously (in q. 7, a. 1) that mortal sin is owing to turning away from the end, but venial sin is a deordination concerning those things that are for the end: hence it was impossible for man in the state of innocence to sin venially before he sinned mortally.

Reply to 1. In that Gloss 'venial' is not taken for venial generically as we are now speaking of venial, but by venial is meant easily pardonable.

Reply to 2. The sin of the first man was indeed venial as Gregory says, because it could have been pardoned, yet not so easily as he himself thought, namely, that it would be pardoned without the loss of his state.

Reply to 3. A thing disposes to another in two ways: in one way according to a necessary and natural order as heat disposes to the form of fire, and such a disposition always precedes that to which it disposes; in another way contingently and so to speak incidentally (per accidens) as anger disposes to a fever, yet it need not always precede a fever, and in this way venial sin disposes to mortal sin, yet does not always precede it.

Reply to 4. Both venial and mortal sin are contrary to the integrity of the first state to such an extent that that integrity is compatible with neither of them, but mortal sin is so much more opposed to it that it could corrupt the integrity of the first state, but not venial sin.

Reply to 5. That argument is based on the supposition that those things which are venial sins for us could have been committed by Adam, and yet would be mortal sins for him: which is clearly false from what we have said above (in the Response).

Reply to 6. That argument is valid when the more distant cannot be reached except by one determinate less distant way; but when the more distant can be reached by diverse less distant ways, it is not necessary that some one of those be reached beforehand: for example, if we can go to some place by different routes it is not necessary that before we reach some more distant point that we arrive at a particular less distant point on one of

those ways. And likewise it is not necessary that man first sin venially before he sins mortally.

Reply to 7. From the beginning, Adam could commit either a graver or a less grave mortal sin; nevertheless it does not follow that he could sin venially: for not every less grave sin is venial.

Reply to 8. Arguments of that kind are not conclusive in all cases: for one thing can be found without the other, as substance without accident or form without matter, and yet the other cannot be found without it. And likewise it can be said that even if we should find that there is a state in which there can be only mortal sin, it does not follow on that account that there must be a state in which there would be only venial sin, although we can say that there is a state in which there could not be mortal but only venial sin, as in persons sanctified in the womb,^{†16} namely, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the Apostles, of whom it is said in Psalm 74, 4 "I have established the pillars thereof", who are considered to have been confirmed in grace so that they could not sin mortally but only venially.

Reply to 9. The fact that a government may be weakened before it is totally corrupted can happen either from the defectiveness of the ruler who is lacking in wisdom or justice, or from the disaffection of the subjects who are not completely obedient. But in the state of innocence man's mind was perfect in wisdom and justice, and his lower powers were completely obedient to him: hence the governance of the soul could not be weakened by venial sin before it was corrupted by mortal sin.

Reply to 10. The perfection of nature is not taken away by grace, but the deficiency of nature is taken away by grace. But to be capable of sinning pertains to a deficiency, hence even it can be taken away from man through grace so that he cannot sin, as is evident especially in the blessed.

Reply to 11. The fact that a defect occurs in the act of a lower agent when there is no defect in the higher agent, can happen inasmuch as the lower agent is not completely subject to the higher agent; but this was not the case in the state of innocence, hence the argument does not follow.

Reply to 12. That desire of experiencing was subsequent to the pride which the man conceived directly after the woman's words, and this is shown by the words of Augustine who says ^{†17} that the desire of experiencing allured the man because of a pride of mind; and that pride was the first sin of man, and it was a mortal sin because he took pride in a thing against God. And yet the desire of experiencing what is forbidden can be a mortal sin. And the statement about man being endowed with a spiritual mind must be referred to the time before the rising of pride; although it can be said that even after sin man had a spiritual mind, not indeed owing to the spiritual power of grace, but owing to the spiritual power of a keen intelligence.

Reply to 13. That cannot be called a sudden movement of disbelief or doubt which even bursts forth into words; and yet even before that doubt of the woman which burst forth into words a kind of pride preceded in her mind from the words of the serpent by which he tempted her regarding that which was contained in the command of a superior: for immediately pride arose in the woman's mind by which she shrunk from being restrained by the commands of God, and from this, doubt immediately followed.

Reply to 14. The very necessity of dying, to which man was immediately subject, is called a kind of death of man, according to that passage in Romans (8, 10) "The body, it is true, is dead by reason of sin," just as likewise mortal sin is called the death of the soul.^{†18} But actual death corresponds proportionately to future condemnation.

Reply to 15. 'Pride rising up that should be checked' is said to warn against letting it arise: for when the proposal of the tempter was made, man should have been so prepared that he would not permit pride to stealthily enter.

Reply to 16. That downfall is understood by inference from the act of external sin, or even from to the

loss of state, which pride preceded as the cause precedes the effect.

Question VII, Article 8 ¶p

Whether the First Movements of Sensuality in Unbelievers Are Venial Sins?¶1

It seems that they are not, for the following reasons.

1. Anselm says "Those who are not in Christ who feel the sting of the flesh are following the path of condemnation even if they do not walk according to the flesh."¶2 But to feel the sting of the flesh and not to walk according to the flesh is the first movement of concupiscence. Since then only mortal sin merits condemnation, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers who are not in Christ Jesus, are not venial sins but mortal.

2. The Apostle says in Romans 7, 15 "For I do not that good which I will," namely not to be concupiscent;¶3 and for this reason he concludes that this it is not condemnable in him if he does not walk according to the flesh because he was in Christ Jesus, when he says (Romans 8, 1) "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus who do not walk according to the flesh." But when the cause is removed the effect is removed.¶4 Therefore concupiscence is condemnable in those who are not in Christ Jesus.

3. As Anselm says in the same book,¶5 man was so made that he ought not to experience concupiscence. But this liability to experience concupiscence seems to have been remitted by baptismal grace which unbelievers do not possess. Therefore whenever an unbeliever experiences concupiscence, even if he does not consent, he acts contrary to the manner in which he ought to act, and consequently sins mortally.

On the contrary:

Other things being equal a Christian sins more than an unbeliever in the act of sin, as is evident from what the Apostle says in Hebrews 10, 29 "How much worse punishment do you think he deserves who has trodden under foot the Son of God, and has regarded as unclean the blood of the covenant . . . ," etc. But a Christian experiencing concupiscent desire if he does not consent does not sin mortally. Therefore much less the unbeliever.

Response:

Some ¶6 have held that the first movements of concupiscence in an unbeliever are mortal sins, But this cannot be the case. For the movement of sensuality can be considered in two ways: in one way in itself; and thus clearly it cannot be a mortal sin, because mortal sin consists in turning away from the ultimate end and in contempt for the command of God, but sensuality is not susceptible of a divine command nor can it attain to the ultimate end, hence its movement considered in itself in no way can be a mortal sin. In the other way it can be considered according to its principle or source, which is original sin; and in this way it cannot have more of the nature of sin than original sin has, because an effect as such cannot be more powerful than its cause; but original sin is present in the unbeliever both according to fault and according to penalty; but in the believer the fault is taken away but the penalty remains, as was said above when we discussed original sin (in q. 4, a. 6 Reply to 4).

And therefore the movement of sensuality in the believer is in fact a venial sin according as it is a personal act, but according as it derives from original sin it does not pertain to culpable condemnation but only to a certain punishableness; and in the unbeliever according as it is a personal act it is likewise a venial sin, but inasmuch as it derives from original sin it has some degree of culpable condemnation, not indeed of the condemnation pertaining to actual mortal sin but of the condemnation pertaining to original sin.

Reply to 1. Those feeling the sting of the flesh who are not in Christ incur the condemnation attributable to original sin but not the condemnation attributable to mortal sin.

Reply to 2. When the Apostle says "There is therefore now no condemnation . . . ," etc., he intends to draw the conclusion that the rebellion of the "fomes" i.e. inordinate concupiscence, is without the condemnation of original sin in those who are in Christ Jesus; from which it can be inferred that in those who have not obtained the grace of Christ Jesus there is the "fomes" of sin together with original sin.

Reply to 3. That freedom from the liability to feel the sting of the flesh is owing to having original justice; from which it follows that a person not having original justice or something in place of it, such as baptismal grace, has original sin, but it does not follow that every movement whatsoever of concupiscence in him who does not have original justice or baptismal grace is a mortal sin.

Question VII, Article 9 †p

Whether a Good or a Bad Angel Can Sin Venially?

It seems that he can, for the following reasons.

1. As Gregory says †1 "Man has something in common with the angel inasmuch man is an intelligent being." But there can be venial sin in man even according to the intellectual part of the soul, namely according to the higher reason and the lower reason as was said above (in q. 7, a. 5 and 6). Therefore likewise there can be venial sin in an angel.

2. Mortal sin consists in this that a person loves a creature more than God, but in venial sin something is loved less than God. But an angel could love a creature more than God, since he sinned mortally. Therefore he also could sin venially by loving a creature less than God: because he who can love more can also love less.

3. Mortal sin is infinitely different from venial sin; which is evident from the difference of punishments, for temporal punishment is incurred for one, eternal punishment for the other. But an angel is not infinitely different from man. Since then bad angels who are called devils sometimes do deeds that are venial sins for men, as when they themselves engage in idle speech or incite others to idle speech, it seems that in angels there are not mortal but venial sins.

4. A sin that is venial by reason of its genus does not become mortal except from some contempt. But devils sometimes incite to certain acts which are venial by reason of their genus, and as they themselves sometimes say, they do not do this out of contempt of God, nor to incite men to mortal sin. Therefore they sin venially.

On the Contrary:

Venial sin occurs especially by reason of a sudden or indeliberate movement. But indeliberate movement has no place in the angels, good or bad, because they have a godlike intellect as Dionysius says.†2 Therefore venial sin cannot be in the angels, good or bad.

Response:

There cannot be venial sin in a good or a bad angel. The reason for this is that an angel does not have a discursive intellect as we do; and it pertains to the nature of a discursive intellect that it sometimes considers the principles separately and the conclusions separately, and thus it may go from one to the other, considering now

this now that. But this cannot happen in a godlike intellect that is not discursive, i.e. that does not draw conclusions, but always considers the conclusions in the principles themselves without any passage from one to the other. Now it was said above (in q. 7, a. 7 in the Response) that the end is related to those things that are for the end in matters of appetite and action, as an indemonstrable principle is related to conclusions in demonstrative matters; hence sometimes we may cogitate or be concerned about only those things that are for the end and sometimes only about the end; which is not possible in the angels, for the movement of the angel's mind is always directed to the end and those things that are for the end simultaneously, hence in the angels there can never be a deordination about those things that are for the end unless there is at the same time a deordination about the end itself. But in us there can be a deordination about those things that are for the end owing to venial sin though our mind is habitually fixed on the end, and therefore in man there can be venial sin without mortal sin, not however in the angels, but rather every deordination in them is by reason of turning away from the ultimate end, which constitutes a mortal sin; for an angel sins from this that he cleaves to some created good by turning away from the uncreated good.

Reply to 1. We have something in common with the angels as to intellect, but in a general way; however according to species there is a great difference, because the intellect of the angel is godlike, but our intellect is discursive, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. The angel does not have a composite nature as does man, who on account of his sentient and corporeal nature is induced to love something that he ought not or to the extent he ought not. But an angel can sin solely from this that he loves a good pleasing to him without referring it to God, which is to turn away from God and sin mortally: consequently he cannot love something inordinately without turning away from God.

Reply to 3. In all of his voluntary acts the devil sins mortally, because the acts of free choice in him always proceed from the intention of a perverse end.

Reply to 4. By the very fact that the devil induces men to wanton speech he has the perverse intention of inducing them to mortal sin. Even to be familiar with him is imputed to man as a sin, to such an extent that we ought not even to look for the truth from him, as Chrysostom says;†3 wherefore the Lord even forbade him to reveal the truth about His divinity, as is said in Mark 1, 24-25 and in Luke 4, 34-35. Neither should the word of the devil be believed, because he is a liar and the father of lies as is said in John 8, 44.

Question VII, Article 10 †p

Whether Venial Sin in a Person Not Having Charity Is Punished by Eternal Punishment?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. When the cause is removed the effect is removed.†1 But the reason why mortal sin is punished by eternal death is that it destroys an eternal good: for Augustine says that "man who destroyed within himself the good that could have been eternal became deserving of eternal evil"†2 but venial sin does not do this. Therefore venial sin together with mortal sin is not punished with eternal punishment.

2. As is said in Deuteronomy (25, 12) "According to the measure of sin shall the measure also of the stripes be"; but venial sin does not become worse from the fact that it is joined to mortal sin; therefore it is not punished with a more severe punishment. But when venial sin is present without mortal sin in a person possessing charity it is not punished with eternal punishment. Therefore neither will it be punished with eternal punishment when joined to mortal sin.

3. But it was argued that venial sin in him who dies without charity is made worse by being joined to

mortal sin on account of the circumstance of final impenitence. But counter to this: final impenitence according to Augustine in the book *On the Words of the Lord*†3 is a sin against the Holy Spirit. If then venial sin is made worse by reason of final impenitence it will become a sin against the Holy Spirit, and so, then, it will not be venial but mortal.

4. It can happen even in him who possesses charity that he does not repent before death of some venial sin he has committed but he is not punished for venial sin with eternal punishment. Therefore final impenitence does not so greatly aggravate venial sin united to mortal sin that it makes venial sin deserving of eternal punishment.

5. The higher a person's state the graver for him one and the same sin seems to be. But he who possesses charity is in a higher state than he who is in a state of mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is graver in him.

6. It sometimes happens that a person dying in a state of mortal sin repents of a venial sin he has committed, changing the will he had in this life of sinning venially. But the soul persists with the same will in which it leaves this body. Therefore after death venial sin will not be present in him who dies in this state, consequently he will not be punished eternally for it.

7. God always punishes less than is deserved †4 wherefore likewise in Psalm 76, 10 it is said that in His anger He does not withhold His mercies. But God does not mitigate the punishment of venial sin in the future life so far as concerns severity, because as Augustine says,†5 the punishment of purgatory is more severe than any present punishment, and much more is this true of the punishment of hell; therefore He mitigates the punishment so far as concerns duration. Consequently venial sin joined to mortal sin is not punished eternally.

8. As mortal sin is present in a person without grace, so too is original sin. But venial sin joined to original sin is not punished eternally: for it is not punished in the limbo of children,†6 since there is no pain of sense there; nor in the hell of the damned, because only mortal sin is punished there; and no one is punished eternally in purgatory. Therefore neither will venial sin joined to mortal sin be punished eternally.

9. But it was argued that it is not possible for venial sin to be joined to original sin unless mortal sin is simultaneously present, since before the use of reason man cannot sin venially, but after he has the use of reason he is in the state of mortal sin unless he turns towards God, and if he turns towards God he will already have the grace that deletes original sin. But counter to this: that a person actually turns towards God falls under an affirmative precept, but affirmative precepts even if always binding nevertheless are not binding at all times; therefore he does not immediately commit a mortal sin if he does not actually turn towards God immediately after he has the use of reason, but he can at that time commit a venial sin. Consequently venial sin can be present with original sin, without mortal sin.

10. The punishment of mortal sin is proportionate to the punishment of venial sin as regards severity because the severity of each is finite, and any finite thing is proportional to any other finite thing. If then eternal punishment is incurred for venial sin joined to mortal sin just as it is for mortal sin, there will be no difference of punishments except according to severity; in some proportion then the punishment of mortal sin exceeds the punishment of venial sin. Therefore it will be possible for venial sins to increase to so great a number that they will merit a punishment equal to one mortal sin. But this is false: because many venial sins do not constitute one mortal sin, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 3). Therefore also the original point from which that follows is false, namely that venial sin joined to mortal sin is punished with eternal punishment.

On the contrary:

That the punishment of venial sins comes to an end is owing to the merit of its foundation,†7 as is clear from the Apostle in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 3, 11-12; which foundation is formed, i.e. living faith, as Augustine says in the book *On the City of God*†8 and the book *On Faith and Works*†9 But this foundation is not

present in him who dies with mortal sin. Therefore in him the punishment of venial sins will not come to an end.

Response:

The reason punishment is incurred for fault is that fault is corrected by punishment: for man by sinning disregards the order of divine justice in favor of his own will. Which order is only repaired inasmuch as justice is done in regard to man when, contrary to his will, he is punished according to the will of God.

Now perpetual punishment corresponds to mortal sin according to the order of divine justice both by reason of the kind of sin and by reason of its inherence in the subject. By reason of the kind of sin because mortal sin is directly contrary to the love of God and neighbor, through which the punishment of sin is remitted; but he who sins against someone by that very fact deserves to be deprived of that person's benevolence, just as in human affairs those who sin against the state are, because of this very fact, forever deprived of the society of the state either by perpetual exile or even by death, in which, as Augustine says,^{†10} consideration is not given to the brief time required to inflict death but rather that by death the offender is forever deprived of the benefit of the state, although the fault committed may perhaps have been perpetrated in a moment or in a very brief space of time. Hence too he who sins mortally inasmuch as he sins against charity, deserves to be deprived of forgiveness which is an effect of charity; and if the Lord grants forgiveness it is not owing to man's merit but to the Lord's mercy.

But as regards the inherence in the subject, mortal sin entails perpetual punishment because mortal sin deprives man of grace by which sin can be forgiven; and as long as sin remains, the punishment is not remitted, because in the works of God nothing can be without order. And so just as a man who would jump into a well from which he cannot escape by himself, would so far as is in his power bring it to pass that he would remain there perpetually, so too he who sins mortally, so far as is in his power brings himself to eternal punishment.

But venial sin, since it is not contrary to charity, does not deserve eternal punishment by reason of the kind of sin, nor properly speaking by reason of inherence in the subject, because it does not deprive of grace; however, joined to mortal sin it becomes irremissible indirectly (per accidens), inasmuch as it is in a subject deprived of grace; and so indirectly it is punished with eternal punishment.

Reply to 1. That argument is valid in regard to the cause of eternal punishment as determined by the species of the act: but venial sin does not merit eternal punishment in this way but in another way, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. The severity of punishment ^{†11} directly corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, but the eternity of the punishment corresponds to its indelibility, which indeed at times belongs to venial sin indirectly (per accidens), as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 3. That impenitence which is opposed to charity, which is a special gift of the Holy Spirit, constitutes a sin against the Holy Spirit; hence not to repent of venial sin, since it (venial sin) is not contrary to charity, does not constitute a sin against the Holy Spirit; but nevertheless indirectly it (venial sin) has indelibility inasmuch as it is joined to mortal sin together with final impenitence, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 4. A person who does not repent of venial sin, but does repent of mortal sin, does not have an impenitence which is opposed to the remission of sin: hence it is not a cause of eternal punishment.

Reply to 5. Venial sin joined to mortal sin is punished longer not because of the gravity of venial fault itself, but because of the indelibility that derives from its adjunct, as was said (in the Response). And yet it is not always true that venial sins are less serious joined mortal sin than joined to charity, rather they are very often graver as proceeding from greater inordinate desire that is not restrained by charity. But in persons who possess

perfect charity, venial sins for the most part occur from some sudden or indeliberate movement and are quickly forgiven in virtue of charity, according to that passage in II Paralipomenon (30, 18-19) "The Lord Who is good, will show mercy to all who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified."

Reply to 6. Sin after it passes as to its act can remain as to its guilt, which is not taken away by just any change of will but only by that which charity works.

Reply to 7. The punishment of venial sin, even when it is punished in hell, is mitigated so far as concerns severity although it is punished more severely than it would be by man, because venial sin has greater gravity according as it is compared to God, inasmuch as it is punished by God, than as it is compared to man, inasmuch as it is punished by man.

Reply to 8. It is not possible for anyone to die with original sin and venial sin without mortal sin: because before the use of reason a child is excused from mortal sin to such an extent that even if he should commit an act that is a mortal sin by reason of its genus he does not incur the guilt of mortal sin, because he does not yet have the use of reason; hence much more is he excused from the guilt of venial sin, since what excuses from a greater sin even much more excuses from a lesser sin; but after he has the use of reason he sins mortally if he does not do what is within his power to procure his salvation, and if he does what is within his power, he will obtain the grace by which he will be free from original sin.

Reply to 9. Although affirmative precepts generally speaking do not oblige at all times, nevertheless man is obliged by natural law to this, that he first be solicitous about his salvation, according to passage of Matthew (6, 23) "Seek first the kingdom of God"; for the ultimate end naturally falls under the appetite first, just as first principles naturally fall under the apprehension first; for in like manner all desires presuppose desire of the ultimate end just as all theoretical knowledge presupposes knowledge of the first theoretical principles.

Reply to 10.†12[To the final argument it should be said that although in those things which are of diverse natures there is a finite proportion, nevertheless that which is more imperfect, howsoever much it be perfected, cannot be made equal to that which is more perfect. For blackness howsoever much intensified is always less perfect than whiteness. Now the punishment properly owed for mortal sin is the privation of the vision of God, which punishment does not correspond to venial sin. And therefore it is impossible that the punishment owed for venial sin to be made equal to the punishment that is owed for mortal sin. Or it can be said that the pain of sense inflicted in hell for mortal sin and for venial sin do not differ infinitely, since both are finite, and correspond to a turning towards a transitory good which even in the case of mortal sin is finite; although perhaps the remorse of conscience which is called the worm of conscience is incomparably greater in one than in the other. But the infinite difference of mortal sin from venial sin is due to a turning away from God: which occurs only in mortal sin, by reason of which a person is forever deprived of the vision of God: but not by reason of venial sin, except indirectly (per accidens), as was said. Nor nevertheless does it follow that by the multiplication of venial sins the punishment becomes equal in intensity to the punishment of mortal sin, but only in extension, since it will be punished in many ways: and so the argument does not follow.]

Question VII, Article 11 †p

Whether Any Venial Sins Are Remitted in Purgatory After This Life?

It seems that they are not, for the following reasons.

1. It is said in Ecclesiastes: "If the tree falls to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be."†1 But the felling of man occurs by death. Therefore after death he will remain forever in that state in which he dies, consequently no sin of man is remitted after death.

2. Sin is not changed unless the will to sin is changed, which was the cause of the sin itself: for the effect is not removed as long as the cause remains. But after death the will cannot be changed, just as neither can the angel be changed after his fall: for death is to men what the fall was to the angels, as Damascene says.†2 Therefore venial sin cannot be remitted after this life.

3. But it was argued that mortal sin, because it is simply voluntary, requires for its remission an actual change of will, but not original sin which is not a voluntary sin by the will of the person, nor venial sin which is not simply voluntary since man cannot avoid sinning venially, although he can avoid this or that venial sin. But counter to this: Augustine says in the book *De Paenitentia*†3 that man cannot begin a new life unless he repents of his old life. But the remission of sin pertains to the beginning of a new life, and every sin, even original sin and venial sin, pertains to the oldness of life. Since then repentance signifies an actual change of the will, it seems that neither original sin nor venial sin can be remitted without an actual change of the will.

4. From the same habit one of the opposites is pleasing and the other displeasing: for instance from the habit of liberality, giving generously is pleasing to us and niggardliness is displeasing. But the good of grace is pleasing to us by reason of the habit of charity, therefore the evil of fault is displeasing to us by reason of the habit of charity. If then habitual displeasure would suffice for the remission of venial sin, venial sin would never be present at the same time with charity.

5. The remission of venial sin pertains to progress in the spiritual life. But progress in the spiritual life since it is proper to the state of a wayfarer,†3 cannot occur after death, which ends the state of a wayfarer. Therefore venial sin cannot be remitted after this life.

6. It seems to amount to the same thing that a person merits an essential or an accidental reward and that his sin is remitted,†5 because from the very fact that he advances towards one opposite he recedes from the other. But after death man cannot merit a reward either essential or accidental. Therefore for a like reason he cannot obtain the remission of sin either venial or mortal.

7. It is easier for man to fall into sin than to have his sin forgiven, because man is a spiritual being who of himself (per se) proceeds to sin, but not of himself returns (from it).†6 But after death man cannot commit venial sin. Therefore neither can his venial sin be remitted.

8. No sin that merits eternal punishment is remitted after this life. But venial sin seems to merit eternal punishment: for if a man can merit eternal life for the avoidance of venial sin, conversely he can merit eternal punishment for the commission of venial sin. Therefore after this life venial sin cannot be remitted.

9. Both grace and punishment are present in purgatory. But venial sin is not remitted there by reason of the punishment, both because punishment since it is an effect of fault, does not eliminate the fault, and because for a like reason any punishment whatsoever would eliminate the fault, which is clearly false concerning the punishment of hell; similarly neither by reason of grace, because grace is not opposed to venial sin but is compatible with it. Therefore venial sin is not remitted in purgatory.

10. But it was said that venial sin is remitted in purgatory because man merited in this life that venial sin would be forgiven him. But counter to this: the merit of Christ is more efficacious than the merit of any man. But no one can be absolved from future sin through the sacraments which have their efficacy from the merit of Christ. Therefore much less can anyone merit to have a future sin remitted.

11. Just as mortal sin is opposed to charity, so venial sin is opposed to the fervor of charity. But the fervor of charity that removes venial sin cannot occur in the future life, because there will be no new movement of the will there. Therefore it will not be possible for venial sin to be remitted just as neither can mortal sin be remitted except by charity supervening anew.

12. Whatever can co-exist with the antecedent can co-exist with the consequent: for instance if white can co-exist with man it can also co-exist with animal, otherwise it would follow that opposites exist simultaneously. But glory, with which venial sin cannot co-exist, necessarily follows upon final grace, therefore neither can venial sin co-exist with final grace. Consequently venial sin cannot be remitted after this life.

13. Purgatory is a state midway between the state of the present life and the state of future glory; but in the present life both fault and punishment are found, and in the state of glory neither fault nor punishment, midway between which there is either fault without punishment or punishment without fault. But fault cannot be without punishment because this would be contrary to the order of divine justice. Therefore in purgatory there will be punishment without fault. Consequently no fault can be remitted in purgatory after this life.

14. No sacrament of the Church is instituted in vain. But extreme unction, since it is instituted for the remission of venial sins, would seem to have been instituted in vain if after this life venial sins could be remitted in purgatory. Therefore they cannot be remitted after this life.

15. The disposition that follows on the form does not remain in the matter when the form recedes: for heat does not persist in the matter of fire when the fire is extinguished; therefore neither does the disposition of the matter remain in the form separated from the matter. But venial sin is a disposition of man on the part of the matter: for venial sins are committed as a result of the corruption of the body which oppresses the soul,†7 for in the state of integral nature venial sins could not occur as was said above (in q. 7, a. 7). Therefore venial sin does not remain in the soul separated from the body, and so venial sin cannot be remitted after this life.

16. When some great good is deferred and some great evil threatens, an intense desire is aroused to obtain the good and avoid the evil. But the separated soul which is subject to punishment in purgatory is threatened with a great evil, namely the severe pain of purgatory, and is kept from attaining the principal good hoped for, namely eternal life; therefore a fervent desire is immediately aroused in the separated soul. But the fervor of charity does not permit venial sin with it. Therefore a separated soul in purgatory cannot have venial sin; consequently venial sin cannot be remitted in purgatory.

17. The fire of purgatory punishes the soul inasmuch as it is an instrument of divine justice. But it (fire) is not said to be an instrument of divine mercy to which it pertains to remit sins. Therefore venial sin is not remitted in purgatory after this life.

On the contrary:

1. Gregory says in the Dialogues: "We are given to understand that certain light faults are remitted after this life."†8

2. On that passage of Matthew (3, 11) "He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire," the Gloss says "At present He cleanses (the soul of moral stain) with the Spirit; afterwards if any stain has arisen He purifies it with purgatorial fire."†9 Which is to be believed concerning lighter sins.

3. Augustine says that "not capital but minor sins are purged by that passage through fire."†10

4. Ambrose says "Just as bodily eyes cannot see the physical sun if there is any blemish in them, so neither can spiritual eyes see the spiritual sun when blemished."†11 But venial sin is a blemish of the soul; therefore the soul cannot attain to the vision of God as long as it has the stain of venial sin. Consequently such a stain must be purged from it in purgatory.

Response:

To establish the truth in regard to this question we must first know what 'sin is remitted' is, which is nothing else but 'sin is not imputed': wherefore in Psalm 31, after stating (in verse 1), "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven," it adds (in verse 2) as if explaining, "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." But sin is imputed to someone inasmuch as through it man is prevented from attaining his ultimate end, that is, eternal happiness, from the attainment of which man is prevented through sin both by reason of fault and by reason of the debt of punishment. By reason of fault, because eternal happiness since it is the perfect good of man, is incompatible with any diminution of goodness; but from the very fact that a person has committed an act of sin he incurs a certain diminution of goodness, namely inasmuch as he has become blameworthy and has a certain unbefittingness for so great a good. But from the fact that he incurs the debt of punishment, he is also impeded from perfect happiness, which excludes all sorrow and pain: ". . . for there sorrow and mourning shall flee away," as is said in Isaiah 35, 10.

However, each of these impedes (perfect happiness): mortal sin in one way sin, venial sin in another way. For by mortal sin man suffers a diminution of goodness through privation of the principle leading to the end, namely through the privation of charity, but by venial sin man suffers a diminution and an impediment because of a certain unfittingness of the act, as it were by an impediment present in the very act by which he was proceeding towards the end, yet without loss of the directing principle, i.e. charity; just as likewise a heavy object can be impeded from going downward either on account of the deterioration of its heaviness or on account of an impediment occurring, by which its movement is prevented from attaining its natural end. Even as regards the debt of punishment there is a difference: for on account of mortal sin man merits an exterminating punishment as one who has become an enemy, but on account of venial sin, a corrective punishment.†12

Therefore venial sin is remitted in one way and mortal sin in another. For so far as concerns fault, in order that mortal sin not be imputed, the impediment which came from the privation of the principle must needs be removed by a new infusion of charity and grace. But this is not required in the case of venial sin, because charity remains, but rather the impediment must be removed by some powerful impulse contrary to the impediment which was imposed after the manner of a venial obstacle: just as the impediment that occurs from the deterioration of heaviness in the stone cannot be removed except by generating anew the heaviness, but the impediment which arose from an obstacle occurring, is taken away by a violent movement removing the obstacle itself. So accordingly, venial sin even as regards fault is remitted by the fervor of charity, but mortal sin by the infusion of grace. But so far as concerns punishment, mortal sin is not remitted, because it involves an endless and eternal punishment; but venial sin is remitted by the payment of the finite temporal punishment. And how each can be remitted in this life appears sufficiently evident from this.

But in the future life mortal sin can never be remitted so far as concerns fault: for after this life the soul is not transformed by an essential change through a new infusion of grace and charity; and since the fault has not been forgiven neither is the punishment remitted, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 10).

Now as regards venial sin some †13 have held that in those having charity venial sin is always remitted in this life so far as concerns fault; but after this life it is remitted so far as concerns punishment, namely through payment of the punishment. And this seems probable enough in those who leave this life with the use of reason: for it is not likely that a person actually in a state of charity and knowing his death is imminent, would not be moved by an impulse of charity towards God and against all the sins he has committed, even venial sins; and this is sufficient for the remission of venial sin so far as concerns fault and perhaps even so far as concerns punishment, if the love be intense. But it sometimes happens that some persons in the very acts of venial sins are completely occupied either in their intent of sinning venially or with some passion depriving them of the use of reason and are forestalled by death before they can recover the use of reason; for whom, manifestly, venial sins are not remitted in this life, and yet on account of this they are not perpetually prevented from attaining eternal life, which they do not attain at all unless they are completely freed from every fault they have committed.

And therefore it should be said that venial sins are remitted after this life even so far as concerns fault in

the way in which they are remitted in this life, namely through an act of love for God which is contrary to the venial sins committed in this life. However because after this life there is no state of meriting, that movement of love in them though it takes away the impediment of venial fault, nevertheless does not merit absolution, nor the diminution of punishment, as it does in this life.

Reply to 1. Venial sin does not change the state or place of man, but it is a certain impediment by which man is delayed in obtaining the ultimate end.

Reply to 2. In the future life there is no essential change of the will, namely in regard to the end or in regard to charity or grace; nevertheless there can be an accidental change owing to the removal of an impediment, for that which removes an impediment is an accidental mover, as is said in Book VIII of the Physics.† 14

Reply to 3. The will is moved to the desire of one contrary and the detestation of the other for the same reason; but no one having the use of free choice can begin a new life which results from the infusion of grace, unless he desires and loves the good of grace; and therefore it is necessary that he detest every contrary evil. In such a way however that he detests in particular the mortal sins which he committed by his own will and which are directly contrary to grace, in order that thus after having removed the cause depriving of grace, by displeasure at mortal sin, the effect is taken away, namely the privation of grace by its infusion; but original sin is not contracted by the proper will of this person, and venial sin although it is indeed committed by the proper will of this person, nevertheless is not the cause of the privation of grace: hence displeasure in particular is not required but only in general, inasmuch as venial sin has some measure of resistance to grace.

Reply to 4. Habitual displeasure does not suffice for the remission of venial sin, but actual displeasure is required; nevertheless general displeasure suffices.

Reply to 5. The remission of venial fault does not cause spiritual progress directly (per se), i.e. so far as concerns an increase of spiritual good, but only indirectly (per accidens), i.e. so far as concerns the removal of an impediment.

Reply to 6. The meriting of essential or accidental glory pertains directly (per se) to spiritual progress which results from an increase of spiritual good; hence the reason is not similar (to that for the remission of sin).

Reply to 7. After death the soul passes into another state similar to that of the angels: hence it cannot sin venially just as neither can the angel; nevertheless because the use of charity remains in the soul, which is the cause of the remission of venial sin, venial sin can be remitted to it even after death.

Reply to 8. To avoid venial sin can be understood in two ways: in one way as a pure negation, and thus it does not merit eternal life, because even a sleeping person does not commit venial sin and yet he does not merit; in another way as an affirmation, according as he is said to avoid venial sin who wills not to commit venial sin. And because this will can originate from charity, therefore to avoid venial sin can merit eternal life; but to sin venially is not contrary to charity, hence it does not merit eternal punishment.

Reply to 9. The remission of venial sin in purgatory so far as concerns punishment is effected by purgatory, which man by suffering pays what he owes and thus the debt ceases. But so far as concerns fault venial sin is not remitted by the punishment, either according as it is actually borne, since it is not meritorious, or according as it is reflected upon: for it would not be a movement of charity for a person to detest venial sin because of the punishment, but rather it would be a movement of servile or natural fear. Therefore venial sin so far as concerns fault is remitted in purgatory in virtue of grace not only according as it (grace) is a habit, because thus grace is compatible with venial sin, but according as it issues in an act of charity detesting venial sin.

Reply to 10. No one can merit the remission of future fault, nevertheless he can merit the state of purgatory in which his fault can be remitted.

Reply to 11. After death there will be no new movement of the will which did not have some root in this life either owing to nature or to grace; nevertheless after this life there will be many actual movements of the will which do not occur now, because there will be movements of the soul in keeping with those things that they (souls) then know and experience.

Reply to 12. When the antecedent and the consequent of some conditional are simultaneous, whatever can co-exist with the antecedent can co-exist with the consequent, but when they are not simultaneous this is not necessarily the case: for it follows if an animal lives, that it will die, but not whatever can co-exist with life can co-exist with death; and similarly not whatever can co-exist with final grace can co-exist with glory.

Reply to 13. It does not necessarily follow that what is midway in regard to some thing is midway in regard to all things: consequently the state of purgatory is midway so far as concerns some things between the state of the present life and the state of glory, not however so far as concerns the presence in that state of fault without punishment or punishment without fault.

Reply to 14. All the sacraments of the new law were instituted to confer grace. But an infusion of new grace is not required for the remission of venial sins, as was said (in the Response); and therefore neither extreme unction nor any sacrament of the new law was instituted principally against venial sins although venial sins are remitted through them, but extreme unction was instituted to take away the remnants of sins.

Reply to 15. Although the corruption of the body may be a cause of venial sins, nevertheless venial sins are not in the body as in a subject but in the soul; hence venial sins are not dispositions of the matter but of the form.

Reply to 16. That argument does not prove that in purgatory venial sin is not remitted but that it is immediately remitted there, and this seems quite probable.

Reply to 17. As we have already said (in the Response), the remission of fault is not brought about through the punishment but through the use of grace, which is an effect of divine mercy.

Question VII, Article 12 †p

Whether Venial Sins Are Remitted in This Life by the Aspersions of Holy Water, Anointing of the Body, and the Like?†1

It seems that they are not, for the following reasons.

1. It is proper to the sacraments of the new law to confer grace. But the aspersion of holy water and the like are not said to be sacraments. Therefore they do not confer grace: consequently no remission of fault is brought about by them.

2. Mortal sin cannot co-exist with grace, with which however venial sin can co-exist; and consequently an infusion of grace suffices for the remission of mortal sin, but not for the remission of venial sin; therefore it seems that more is required for the remission of venial sin than for the remission of mortal sin. But mortal sin cannot be remitted by the aspersion of holy water and the like, therefore much less can venial sin.

3. Venial sin is remitted by an act of charity. But an act of charity cannot be caused by the aspersion of holy water and the like but arises from within. Therefore venial sin cannot be remitted by the aspersion of holy water and the like.

4. Aspersion of holy water and other such actions are related equally to all venial sins. If then one venial sin is remitted by them, with equal reason all are remitted; and therefore if they are remitted so far as concerns fault, those who are without mortal sin can repeatedly say 'we have no sin,' which is contrary to what we read in the First Epistle of John (1, 8); and if by such actions sin is also remitted so far as concerns punishment, most people will go straight to heaven immediately after death without suffering the punishment of purgatory, which does not seem reasonable. Therefore venial sins are not remitted by the aspersion of holy water and the like.

On the contrary:

Nothing in the observances of the Church is done in vain. But in the blessing of water mention is made of the remission of fault.^{†2} Therefore some sin is remitted by the aspersion of holy water; but not mortal sin, therefore venial sin.

Response:

As was said above (in q. 7 a. 11) venial sins are remitted by the fervor of charity: and therefore whatever is naturally suited to arouse the fervor of charity can cause the remission of venial sins. Now an act of charity pertains to the will, which is inclined to a thing in a threefold way: sometimes by reason alone presenting the thing, but sometimes by the reason together with an interior impulse, which is from a higher cause, namely God, and sometimes even along with this by the inclination of an inherent habit. There are then some things that cause the remission of venial sin inasmuch as they incline the will to a fervent act of charity in the three foresaid ways, and thus venial sins are remitted through the sacraments of the new law: because even reason regards them as certain salutary remedies and not only does the divine power in them in a hidden way work salvation but even the gift of habitual grace is conferred by them. Yet there are other things that cause the remission of venial sin in two of the foresaid ways: for they do not cause grace but they stimulate the mind to consider something which stirs up the fervor of charity; and also it is piously believed that divine power works inwardly by stirring up the fervor of love, and in this way holy water, the bishop's blessing, and other sacramentals of this kind cause the remission of venial sin. There are still other things that cause the remission of venial sin by stirring up the fervor of charity solely by way of reflection, for example, the Lord's prayer, striking the breast and the like.

Reply to 1. For the remission of venial sin it is not necessary that new grace be conferred, and therefore venial sin can be remitted by something that is not a sacrament.

Reply to 2. Without the fervor of charity new grace is not infused in a person having the use of free choice; hence more is required for the remission of mortal sin than for venial sin.

Reply to 3. The aspersion of holy water and the like cause the fervor of charity by inclining the will itself, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 4. Although the aspersion of holy water and the like are related equally to all venial sins, nevertheless the fervor aroused by them is not always equally related to all venial sins, but sometimes it (the fervor aroused) relates to some venial sins in particular and works against them more efficaciously; and if the fervor of charity relates to them in general, it may not have the same effect in all, because sometimes man's affection is habitually disposed to commit certain venial sins, so that if they were remembered they would not be displeasing, or perhaps if the opportunity were present they would be committed; and indeed it rarely happens that men living in this mortal life are free from affections of this kind: hence we cannot confidently say

'we are without sin'. And if by these remedies man obtained even for one hour immunity from all venial sins so far as concerns guilt, nevertheless it does not follow that he is freed so far as concerns all punishment, unless perhaps the fervor of his love is so great that it suffices for the remission of all punishment.

Question 8

Question VIII

On the Capital Vices

Article 1 ¶p

How Many Capital Vices Are There and What Are They?

It seems that there are seven.

1. For Gregory says ¶1 "There are seven principal vices, namely vainglory, envy, anger, acedia, ¶2 avarice, gluttony, and lust." ¶3 But counter to this: those vices seem to be called capital from which other vices arise. ¶4 But all vices arise from one or two vices: for it is said in the First Epistle to Timothy (6, 10): "Cupidity is the root of all evil" and in Ecclesiasticus (10, 15): "The beginning of all sin is pride." Therefore there are not seven capital vices.

2. But it was argued that the Apostle in that text is speaking of cupidity not as it is a special sin but as it signifies a certain general inordinacy of concupiscence. But counter to this: cupidity as it is a special sin is the inordinate desire of riches which is called avarice. ¶5 And it is of such cupidity that the Apostle is speaking there: which is evident from the fact that he says in the same place (I Timothy 6, 9) "They that will to become rich fall into the temptation and snare of the devil." Therefore the cupidity which is the root of all evils is a special sin.

3. Vices are opposed to virtues. ¶6 But there are only four cardinal virtues, as Ambrose says ¶7 commenting on that text of Luke 6, 20 'Blessed are the poor'. Therefore there are only four capital vices.

4. Another sin seems to arise from that sin to whose end the other sin is ordered: for example, if a person lies in order to gain money, the lying arises from avarice. But any vices can be ordered to the end of any vice. Therefore one vice is not more capital than another.

5. Those things of which one naturally rises from the other cannot be designated as equally principal. But envy naturally rises from pride. Therefore envy ought not to be designated as a capital vice distinct from pride.

6. Those vices seem to be principal or capital which have principal ends. ¶8 But if the proximate ends of the vices are considered, there are many more than seven; and if the remote ends are considered, gluttony will not be distinguished from lust, both of which are ordered to pleasures of the flesh as to a remote end. Therefore the seven capital vices are not properly assigned.

7. Heresy is a special vice. But heresy in one who is guilty of it from sheer ignorance is not caused by any of the foresaid vices. Therefore there is a vice that does not originate from the vices previously enumerated, and so it is not sufficient to assign seven capital vices.

8. A sin may originate from a good intention, as is evident in the case of a person who steals in order to give an alms. But such a sin does not proceed from any of the vices previously enumerated. Therefore all sins do not originate from the foresaid vices.

9. Gluttony seems to be ordered to the pleasure of taste, and lust to the pleasure of touch. But also certain things are pleasurable to the other senses. Therefore principal vices ought to be assigned in regard to the other senses.

10. All sins seem to pertain to the appetitive power, since it is by the will that we commit sin and live rightly, as Augustine says.†9 But the movement of the appetitive power is from the soul to things. And in things only good and evil is found, as is said in Book VI of the Metaphysics.†10 Therefore only two vices ought to be capital, one in regard to good and the other in regard to evil.

11. The will, to which sin pertains, is an intellectual appetite, which seems to concern things in general, inasmuch as it follows the apprehension of the intellect which is concerned with universals. But the universals in the genus of appetite are good and evil, which are not in a genus but are genera of other things, as is said in the Predicaments.†11 Therefore capital vices ought not to be distinguished according to any particular goods or evils, but only in general so there would be at most two capital vices, corresponding to the difference of good and evil.

12. Evil occurs in many more ways than good, because good results from a cause that is one and integral, but evil from single defects, as Dionysius says.†12 But four capital sins seem to be taken according to a relation to good: for example, gluttony and lust to the pleasurable good, avarice to the useful good, and pride to the honorable good, since "it (pride) creeps stealthily into good works to destroy them," as Augustine says.†13 Therefore there ought to be more than three other capital vices.

13. The principles of diverse genera are diverse, as is said in Book XI of the Metaphysics.†14 But in matters of action and appetite the end is like the principle in theoretical matters, as is said in Book VIII of the Ethics.†15 Therefore diverse genera of vices cannot be reduced to the end of one vice, and consequently many vices cannot originate from one vice.

14. If one vice arises from another vice as ordered to its end, it will follow that the end of both vices is the same; either then it will be according to the same formality or according to different formalities. If according to different formalities, not one end but many will have to be stated: because the multitude and diversity of objects corresponding to the powers, habits, and acts of the soul is considered according to their formality as objects rather than materially according to the things themselves; and thus one vice will not be ordered to the end of another, but each of the vices of itself (per se) will equally have its own end. On the other hand, if the end of both vices is the same according to the same formality, it will follow that both vices are one according to species, just as in natural things those having one form belong to one species, for the end confers the species in moral acts just as the form does in natural things; and thus there will not be an origin of vice from vice but rather a kind of uniformity of the vices. Therefore the previously enumerated vices should not be designated as capital.

15. The Philosopher says in Book V of the Ethics†16 that if a man commits adultery in order to steal he is not an adulterer but a thief; and so it seems that when one vice is ordered to the end of another vice it passes over into the species of that other vice. According to this then a vice will not originate from a vice.

16. On that Psalm 18, 14 "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin," the Gloss says †17 that "the greatest sin is pride, without which a person is free of all sin", from which it seems that pride is a general vice. But general is not divided against particular. Therefore pride ought not to be designated a capital vice as one capital vice among others as has been maintained by some.†18

17. On that text of Romans (7, 7) "For I should not have known myself guilty of concupiscence unless the Law had said: 'Thou shalt not covet,'" the Gloss says †19 "The law is good which by forbidding concupiscence forbids all evil"; and so it seems that concupiscence also is a general vice. Therefore cupidity i.e.

avarice, ought not to be designated as one of the seven special capital vices.

18. The vices which have principal ends are called capital, as was said (above in arg. 6). But riches which are the end or aim of avarice do not have the nature of a principal end: because riches are sought only as useful and related to a further end; from which the Philosopher proves †20 that happiness cannot consist in riches. Therefore avarice ought not to be designated as a capital vice.

19. The passions of the soul dispose to sins, wherefore they are also called 'the passions of sins' in Romans 7, 5. But the first of the passions is love from which all the affections of the soul arise, as Augustine says in Book XIV On the City of God.†21 Therefore inordinate love ought to be designated as a capital vice; especially since Augustine in the same book says †22 that love of self even unto contempt of God builds the city of Babylon.

20. Four passions of the soul are regarded as principal, namely joy and sadness, hope and fear, as is clear from Augustine.†23 But among the seven capital vices are found some pertaining to joy or pleasure, as gluttony and lust, some even pertaining to sadness, as do acedia and envy. Therefore some capital vices ought to be designated pertaining to hope and fear; especially since some vices arise from hope: for it is said that hope alone gives rise to a usurer;†24 and similarly some vices arise from fear, because on that Psalm 79, 17 "Things set on fire and dug down" Augustine says †25 that every sin arises from love inflaming with evil desires and from fear dug up to induce us to sin.

21. Anger is not considered a principal passion, therefore it seems that neither should it be considered a capital vice.

22. A principal vice is opposed to a principal virtue. But charity is a principal virtue which is called the mother and root of the virtues,†26 to which hatred is opposed. Therefore hatred ought to be designated as a capital vice.

23. In the First Epistle of John (2, 16) it is said "All that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh or the concupiscence of the eyes or the pride of life." But a person is said to be worldly or worldly-minded because of sin. Therefore only these three ought to be counted as capital vices.

24. Augustine in the homily De Igne Purgatorii†27 says that there are many capital sins, which are sacrileges, homicides, adulteries, fornication, false testimony, rape, thefts, pride, envy, avarice, and anger if persisted in for a long time, and drunkenness if continual; and this is found also in Decretis dist. XXVI, ch. 'Si quis'.†28 Therefore it seems that the seven capital vices previously enumerated are not properly assigned.

Response:

A vice is called capital from the word "capite" i.e. "head"; but 'head' is taken in three ways.

For first, a particular member of the animal is called the head, and it is taken in this way in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (11, 4): "Every man praying or prophesying with his head covered, disgraces his head." And since the head is a kind of principle of the animal, from this the name 'head' has been extended to signify secondly, any principle, according to that passage of Lamentations (4, 1) "The stones of the sanctuary are scattered in the top (capite) of every street" and of Ezechiel (16, 25) "At every head of the way thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution." In a third way 'head' signifies a prince or ruler of the people: for the other members of the body are ruled so to speak by the head; and 'head' is taken in this way in the First Book of Kings (15, 17) "When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made head of the tribes of Israel?" and in Amos (6, 1) "Heads of the people that go in with state into the House of Israel."

And indeed a vice can be called capital according to these three meanings of 'head'. For sometimes a sin

is called capital from 'head' according as it is a member of the body, and in keeping with this a sin is called capital which is punished with capital punishment;†29 but we are not speaking here of capital vices in this sense, but in the sense in which capital is derived from 'head' as it signifies 'principal'; hence Gregory †30 calls the capital vices principal vices.

Now we must note that one sin can arise from another in four ways: in the first way from the withdrawal of grace by which man is kept from sin, according to the First Epistle of John (3, 9) "Whoever is born of God committeth not sin; for God's seed abideth in him"; and in keeping with this the first sin which deprives a person of grace is the cause of sins following upon the privation of grace, and thus any sin can be caused by any other sin. But this manner of causing is by the removal of an impediment to sin; and the remover of an impediment is an accidental (per accidens) mover, as is said in Book VIII of the Physics;†31 but no art or science considers accidental causes, as is said in Book VI of the Metaphysics.†32 Consequently capital vices are not assigned according to this mode of cause or principle. In the second way one sin is the cause of another after the manner of inclination, namely inasmuch as a disposition or habit inclining to sin is caused by a preceding sin; and according to this mode of origin every sin is the cause of another similar to it in species; and therefore neither are sins called capital according to this mode of origin. In a third way one sin is the cause of another on the part of the matter, namely inasmuch as one sin furnishes the matter for another, as gluttony furnishes the matter for lust, and avarice for dissension; but neither are vices called capital according to this mode of origin because what furnishes the matter for a sin is not the cause of sin actually but potentially and as providing an occasion of sin. In the fourth way one sin is the cause of another on the part of the end, namely inasmuch as for the end or goal of one sin a man commits another, for instance avarice is the cause of fraud because a man commits fraud to gain money; and in this way sin is the cause of sin actually and formally. And therefore vices are called capital according to this mode of origin, in such a way that the third meaning of 'head' corresponds to it: for it is evident that a ruler directs his subjects to the end he has in view just as an army is directed to the end the commander has in view, as is said in Book XI of the Metaphysics;†33 hence according to Gregory †34 the capital vices are as it were heads or leaders, and the vices that arise from them are as it were an army.

Now that one sin be directed to the end of another can occur in a two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more inclined to the end or objective of one sin than of another; but this is accidental to the sins themselves, hence no vices are called capital according to this; in another way from the very relationship of ends, one of which has a certain affinity with another, in such a way that for the most part it is ordered to that other, for example, deception which is the end or aim of fraud is ordered to amassing money which is the end of avarice; and in this way the capital vices are to be taken. Therefore those vices are called capital which have ends principally desirable in themselves in such a way that other vices are ordered to these ends.

But we must take into consideration that a person pursues the good and flees from the opposite evil for the same reason, for example the glutton seeks pleasure in food and flees from the pain arising from the absence of food, and similarly in the other vices; hence capital vices can be properly distinguished according to the difference of good and evil, namely in such a way that wherever a special reason for a thing to be desired or to be avoided occurs, there one capital vice is distinct from others. Consequently we must consider that good according to its own nature attracts the appetite to itself, but that the appetite flees from some good is according to some special formality grasped in such a good. Hence following considerations of this kind, we need to consider other capital sins than those which are ordered to the pursuit of some good.

Now the good of man is threefold: namely the good of the soul, the good of the body, and the good of external things.†35 Therefore to the good of the soul which is a good imaginatively grasped,†36 namely the excellence of honor and renown, pride or vainglory is referred; to the good of the body pertaining to the preservation of the individual i.e. food, gluttony is referred; but to the good of the body pertaining to the preservation of the species as in sexual intercourse, lust pertains; and to the good of exterior things avarice pertains. But that some good is fled from is inasmuch as is impeditive of another good that is inordinately

desired; in regard to which good as it is impeditive, the appetite has two movements, namely the movement of aversion and the movement of recrimination against it. As regards the movement of aversion, two capital vices are derived according as the good impeditive of the desired good is considered in itself or in another person: in itself, inasmuch as a spiritual good impedes repose or bodily pleasure, and such is acedia, which is nothing else but sadness or antipathy in regard to some spiritual good †37 inasmuch as it is impeditive of repose or bodily pleasure; but in another, according as the good of another impedes one's own excellence, and such is envy which is sorrow over another's good.†38 Anger, however, implies recrimination against the good.

Reply to 1. Just as in the virtues a twofold end is considered, namely the ultimate and common or general end which is happiness, and the particular end which is the particular good of each virtue, so too in the vices the particular ends of the vices can be considered according to which the capital vices are assigned, as was said (in the Response); also the ultimate and general end can be considered which is a particular good: for to this all the specified ends of the capital vices are ordered. But the particular good is the end or aim of the vices only inasmuch as it is inordinately desired, and it is inordinately desired according as it is desired contrary to the order of divine law; hence also in every sin there are said to be two factors, namely a turning towards a transitory good and a turning away from an unchangeable good.†39 So accordingly, on the part of the turning-towards, a certain general cupidity which is an inordinate desire of one's own good, is designated as a source of all sins; but on the part of the turning-away, a certain general pride according to which man does not subject himself to God, is designated as a source of all sins: hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus (10, 14) "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy from God." In this way then cupidity and pride inasmuch as they are taken according to a certain generality, are not called capital vices, since they are not special vices, but are called certain roots or sources (initia) of the vices, just as if we were to say that the desire for happiness is the root of all virtues. Nevertheless it can be said that even cupidity and pride according as they are special sins, have a certain general causality in regard to all sins according to the nature of their ends. For the end of cupidity i.e. avarice, is related to the ends of all the other vices as a kind of principle inasmuch as by riches a man can acquire all the things that the other vices desire, for money virtually contains all such desirable things according to that text of Ecclesiastes (10, 19) "All things obey money"; and the particular end of pride, namely the excellence of honor and renown,†40 is as it were the end or goal of all these ends, for by reason of great riches and the enjoyment derived from the fulfillment of his desires, a man can acquire honor and renown. And although in the way of execution one of these ends is as it were a principle and the other as it were a goal of the other ends, nevertheless these two vices ought not to be enumerated as capital vices on account of this alone, since the intention of the appetite is not ordered principally to these ends alone i.e. to riches and the excellence of honor and renown.

Reply to 2. The answer to the second argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 3. Virtue is constituted from this that the order of reason is established in the appetitive power, but vice arises from the fact that the movement of the appetitive power departs from the order of reason; but the establishing of the order of reason in the appetite and the departure of the appetite from the order of reason is not according to the same thing; so although vice is opposed to virtue, yet it is not necessary that a principal vice be opposed to a principal virtue, because the reason for the origin of virtue and vice is not the same.

Reply to 4. Any vice can be ordered to the end of any vice by reason of the disposition of the sinner, but according to the affinity which the objects or ends of the vices have with one another, certain vices arise in a determinate manner from certain other vices from which they also for the most part proceed; and as in the study of nature so also in the study of morals we attend to what occurs for the most part.

Reply to 5. It is evident from what has been said (in the Response) that for the most part envy arises from pride: for the reason a man is especially sad about another's good is that it is impeditive of his own excellence. But because envy has a special end in its movement, namely to flee from good, therefore it is designated as a capital vice separate from pride.

Reply to 6. Capital vices are taken according to the proximate ends, not indeed of all the special sins, but of certain ones from which for the most part other sins naturally arise; and therefore gluttony is distinguished from lust, because the pleasure that is the object of gluttony and the pleasure that is the object of lust are of a different nature.

Reply to 7. These four, namely nescience, ignorance, error, and heresy seem to pertain to the lack of knowledge. Among which nescience is more common because it implies a simple absence of knowledge: hence Dionysius attributes a certain nescience even to the angels, as is evident in chapter six of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.†41 Ignorance certainly is a kind of nescience, namely of those things which a man is naturally capable of knowing and ought to know; but error adds over and above ignorance an attachment of the mind to the contrary of the truth: for it pertains to error to approve the false as true;†42 heresy however adds over and above error something both on the part of the matter, since it is an error concerning the truths pertaining to faith, and on the part of the person erring, because heresy implies obstinacy which alone gives rise to a heretic †43 which obstinacy arises from pride, for it is a sign of great pride that a person prefer his own opinion to divinely revealed truth. Therefore heresy arising from mere ignorance if it be a sin originates from one of the foresaid vices: for it is imputed to man as a sin if he does not take the trouble to learn the truths he is obliged to know; and this seems to arise from acedia to which it pertains to flee from a spiritual good inasmuch as it is impeditive of some bodily good.

Reply to 8. Those vices (Gregory enumerates) are called capital because other vices arise from them for the most part although sometimes a vice may also arise from good. And yet it can be said that even when a person steals in order to give an alms, this sin in a certain manner also originates from one of the capital vices: for to do evil for the sake of good arises from some ignorance or error; and ignorance or error is reduced to acedia, as was said (in Reply to 7).

Reply to 9. Lust and gluttony relate to the pleasure of touch: for a person is not called a glutton from this, that he takes pleasure in the taste of food but in the taking of it as though delighted by the touch or contact of it, as is said in Book III of the Ethics.†44 But the pleasures of the other senses are not principal ends: for they are referred either to the cognition of truth, as in man, or the pleasures of touch, as in the other animals: for the hound scenting a rabbit does not take pleasure in the odor but in the food it expects.†45 And therefore no capital vices are taken according to the pleasures of the other senses.

Reply to 10. Good and evil is found in things according to diverse conditions; hence it is not reasonable that only one capital vice be ordered to good.

Reply to 11. Many more special i.e. specific universals can be taken under one common universal just as under one most general genus subalternate genera are taken †46 which subalternate genera also fall under the intellect: in this way the intellective appetite, too, can be inclined diversely to diverse species of goods.

Reply to 12. Sins are not distinguished according to the difference of good and evil, because the same sin can be concerned with a good and the opposite evil, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 13. Of those things which belong to diverse genera i.e. of those belonging to the most general genera, the principles are diverse in reality although the same according to analogy, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics.†47 But those that are contained under one most general genus, although they are in diverse subalternate genera, can have the same principles according to the generality of that genus; and in this way some vices of diverse genera can be reduced to the same principle which is the end that affords some common explanation of their origin.

Reply to 14. When one sin is ordered to the end of another sin, the end of both sins is the same even according to the same formality but not in the same order, because of one sin it is the proximate end, of the

other the remote end. Hence it does not follow that both vices belong to one species, because moral acts do not receive their species from the remote end but from the proximate end.

Reply to 15. A person is not denominated a thief or an adulterer by reason of the act or the passion but by reason of the habit, as the Philosopher says of the just and unjust man;†48 but the intention of a person arises from the habit, and therefore when someone steals in order to commit adultery he indeed actually commits a sin of theft but nevertheless his intention proceeds from the habit of adultery, and so he is not denominated a thief but an adulterer.

Reply to 16. As we have said (in the Response), pride can be taken in two ways: in one way as it implies a certain rebellion against the law of God, and thus it is a common root of all sins, as Gregory says;†49 hence he does not enumerate it among the capital vices but rather vainglory. But in another way pride can be taken according as it is an inordinate desire for a certain excellence, and in this way it is designated as one capital vice among the other capital vices; and since human glory i.e. human honor and renown especially seems to pertain to such excellence, therefore Gregory puts vainglory in place of this special pride.

Reply to 17. A similar answer is to be given to the seventeenth argument, because concupiscence i.e. cupidity in that text also is taken as a common root of all sins.

Reply to 18. Riches from the fact that they have the nature of a useful good fail to satisfy the condition of a principal end, but this deficiency is made up for by the general utility of riches, which so to speak virtually contain all the desirable things of this world.

Reply to 19. As the Philosopher says,†50 to love someone is to wish him good. Inasmuch then as a man desires every good for himself he seems to love himself; and therefore love of oneself is not designated separately either as a root of sin or even as a capital vice, because all the roots and sources (capita) of the vices include an ordinate love of self.

Reply to 20. Fear and hope are passions of the irascible appetite; but all the passions of the irascible appetite are derived from the passions of the concupiscible appetite, and therefore the first or primary sources (capita) of the vices are not taken according to fear and hope but rather according to pleasure and sorrow. For although some vices do arise from fear and hope, nevertheless fear itself and hope also arise from others, namely from love or inordinate desire of some good.

Reply to 21. Anger implies a special kind of movement of the appetite, namely recrimination against something; and therefore although this movement also arises from other movements, nevertheless because it has another special formality besides the other movements it is enumerated separately as a capital vice.

Reply to 22. A vice is not called principal by reason of opposition to a principal virtue; and therefore hatred need not be a principal vice even though charity is a principal virtue.

Reply to 23. Certain primary origins and roots of sins, namely pride and cupidity, are signified by those three things what John enumerates; for both concupiscence of the flesh and concupiscence of the eyes are included under general cupidity.

Reply to 24. Augustine designates there †51 the capital vices which are punishable by capital punishment i.e. by death; for thus a capital vice is the same as a mortal sin.

Question VIII, Article 2 †p

Whether Pride Is a Special Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Every special sin corrupts a special virtue and power of the soul. But pride corrupts all the virtues and all the powers of the soul: for Gregory says †1 "Pride never content with the destruction of one virtue sets itself against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and deadly disease corrupts the whole body," and Isidore says †2 that pride is the ruin of all the virtues. Therefore pride is not a special sin.

2. To prefer one's own will to the will of a superior is to be proud. But whoever sins mortally prefers his own will to the will of a superior, namely God's; therefore he is guilty of pride. Consequently every sin is a sin of pride, and so pride is not a special sin.

3. But it was argued that pride inasmuch as it is a love of one's own excellence is a special sin, but inasmuch as it implies contempt of God it is a general sin. But counter to this: every special sin has its own special matter, for instance gluttony food, lust sex, avarice riches. But pride inasmuch as it is love of one's own excellence does not have its own special matter: because as Gregory says "One person prides himself on wealth, another on eloquence, one on base and earthly things, another on exalted and heavenly virtues." †3 Therefore pride according as it is the love of one's own excellence is not a special sin.

4. Likewise apparently neither is pride is a general sin according as it implies contempt of God: for whoever sins from weakness or ignorance †4 does not sin from contempt. But many who sin from ignorance or weakness sin mortally. Therefore not every mortal sin is committed out of contempt, and consequently pride as it implies contempt of God is not a general sin.

5. Not a special good but a general good is opposed to a general evil. But a special good, reverence for God, which pertains especially to the gift of fear, is opposed to contempt of God. Therefore contempt of God is not a general sin and consequently neither is pride according as it implies contempt of God, and so the foresaid distinction comes to naught.

6. That which invests all sins with the note of malice is a general sin. But pride is of this kind, as Gregory comments on Ezechiel. †5 Therefore pride is a general sin.

7. Sins, like the virtues, are distinguished according to their objects. But pride has the same object as other sins, for instance, as envy which in seeking one's own excellence is grieved about another's good, †6 and vainglory which seeks excellence in the approbation of men, †7 and anger that seeks revenge which pertains to a kind of excellence belonging to victory. †8 Therefore pride is not a special sin distinct from others.

8. That without which no sin is possible is common to all sins. But pride is of this kind: for Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace †9 that you will not find any sin that is without the designation of pride, and Prosper says †10 that no sin is or was or ever will be possible without pride. Therefore pride is a general sin.

9. That which is convertible with every sin is a general sin. But such is pride; for Augustine says "just as to be proud is to sin so to sin is to be proud." †11 Therefore pride is a general sin.

10. On that text of Ecclesiasticus (10, 14) "The beginning of the sin of man is apostasy from God" the Gloss says †12 "There is no greater apostasy than to withdraw from God, which is rightly called pride." But whoever sins mortally withdraws from God. Therefore he is guilty of pride, and so pride is a general sin.

11. On the same chapter (Ecclesiasticus 10, 14) another Gloss says †13 "Let us beware of cupidity and pride: which are not two evils but one." Therefore pride is not a special sin distinct from others.

12. On that passage of Job 33, 17 †14 "That he may withdraw a man . . . and deliver him from pride" the Gloss says †15 "To be proud against the Creator is to transgress His commandments by sinning." But whoever sins transgresses the commands of God: for Augustine says in Book XX in the Reply to Faustus †16 that sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law. Therefore whoever sins is proud, and every sin is pride.

13. Anselm says †17 that the soul of necessity desires its own good. But what is done out of necessity is not a sin. Therefore pride is not a sin, and so it is not a special sin.

14. If pride were a special sin it would be one of the seven principal vices. But Isidore †18 does not list pride among the seven principal vices but in its place puts vainglory. Therefore pride is not a special sin.

15. Augustine says †19 that pride is the love of one's own good. But this is common to every sin. Therefore pride is a general sin.

16. That which is formal in all sins is not a special sin. But pride is of this kind: for Augustine says †20 that to sin is to spurn the unchangeable good and to embrace transitory goods; the first of which, namely spurning the unchangeable good, pertains to turning away which is the formal element in every sin, †21 just as turning towards God which takes place through charity is the formal element in the virtues. But to spurn God pertains to pride. Therefore it seems that pride is a general sin.

17. Nothing which is of divine ordination is a sin. But pride is of divine ordination: for it is said in Isaiah (60, 15) "I will make thee to be an everlasting glory (superbia)" on which the Gloss of Jerome says †22 that there is good and bad pride; and in Proverbs (8, 18) Wisdom says "With me are riches and glory, glorious riches (opes superbae) and justice." Therefore pride is not a special sin.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace †23 "Let him seek diligently and he will find in the law of God that pride is a sin clearly distinguished from the other vices."

2. In the same place †24 it is said that many things are wrongly done which are not done from pride. Therefore pride is not a general sin.

3. No general sin has another sin prior to it. But pride has another sin prior to it: for it is said in Ecclesiasticus (10, 14) "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy from God." Therefore pride is not a general sin.

4. Every sin which is a co-equal member in a division of sins is a special sin. But such is pride, as is evident in the First Epistle of John (2, 16) "All that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." Therefore pride is a special sin.

5. Whatsoever sin has a special act is a special sin. But such is pride: because as Augustine says, †25 in good works pride alone is to be guarded against, and Gregory says †26 that pride is the first sin in those who withdraw from God and the last in those who return to God. Therefore pride is a special sin.

6. What is predicated in the superlative belongs to only one. †27 But pride is the greatest sin, as the Gloss says †28 on Psalm 18, 14 "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin." Therefore pride is a special sin.

Response:

To resolve this question it is necessary to determine what the sin of pride is, so that subsequently we can determine whether it is a special sin.

It should be noted then that every sin has its foundation in some natural appetite; and since in every natural desire man is seeking a likeness of the divine inasmuch as every good naturally desired is a kind of similitude of the divine goodness, therefore Augustine says in Book II of the Confessions when speaking to God †29 "The soul is guilty of fornication," namely by sinning, "when it turns away from Thee and seeks apart from Thee what it cannot find pure and untainted till it returns to Thee." But because it pertains to reason to direct the appetite, and especially according as it is informed by the law of God, therefore if the appetite is moved to some good naturally desired according to the rule of reason, the appetite will be morally right and virtuous, but if it exceeds the rule of reason or falls short of it, in either case there will be sin; for example, the desire to know is natural to man; †30 hence if man strives after knowledge as right reason dictates, it will be virtuous and praiseworthy, but if he exceeds the rule of reason it will be a sin of curiosity, and if he falls short it will be a sin of negligence.

Now one of the things man desires among others, is excellence: for it is natural not only to man but also to anything whatsoever to want in the desired good the perfection which consists in a certain excellence. If then the appetite strives after excellence according to the rule of reason informed by the law of God, the appetite will be morally right and referable to magnanimity, according to the Apostle in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (10, 13) "But we will not glory beyond our measure", as if against the measure of another's glory, "but according to the measure of the rule which God has measured to us." But if someone falls short of this rule he will incur the vice of pusillanimity; and if he exceeds it, it will be the vice of pride, as the very name 'superbia' indicates, for to be proud is nothing else but to exceed the proper measure in the desire for excellence; hence Augustinus says †31 that pride is "the craving for undue exaltation." And because the measure is not the same for all, therefore it turns out that a thing is not imputed to one as pride which would be imputed to another as pride, for example if a bishop exercises the functions proper to the eminence of his state it is not imputed to him as pride, but if a simple priest attempted to exercise the functions of a bishop this would be imputed to him as pride. If then excellence has the proper aspect of a determinate desirable object, although materially it may be found in many things, it is evident that pride is a special sin. For acts and habits are distinguished in species according to their formal aspects as objects; hence Augustine in assigning singly to particular sins their proper objects in the desire of which they (the objects) represent a faint shadow of the divine likeness, speaks thus of pride when addressing God "For thus does pride mimic loftiness, whereas Thou alone are God exalted above all things." †32

Yet pride in a certain manner is found to be a general sin in two ways: in one way by a kind of diffusion or extension, in another way according to its effect.

So far as concerns the first way, we must consider that, as Augustine says in Book XIV On the City of God, †33 just as the love of God builds the city of God, so the inordinate love of self builds the city of Babylon, and just as in the love of God, God Himself is the ultimate end to which all things are ordered which are loved with a right love, so in the love of one's own excellence an ultimate end is found to which all other things are ordered; for he who seeks to abound in riches or in knowledge or in honors or in any other things whatsoever, in all such things intends a certain excellence. But it must be noted that in all the arts and operative habits, that art or habit to which the end pertains, by its command moves the arts or habits concerned with those things which are for the sake of the end, for example the art of navigation to which belongs the ship's use which is its end, gives orders to the art of shipbuilding; and the same thing is seen in all the arts. Hence too charity which is the love of God, governs all the other virtues: and so although charity is a special virtue if its proper object be considered, yet according to a certain extension of its dominion it is common to all the virtues, hence charity is called the form and mother of all the virtues; †34 and in like manner, pride although it is a special sin according to the nature of its proper object, nevertheless according to a certain extension of its dominion it is a sin common to all sins, hence also it is called the root and queen of all sins, as is clear from Gregory. †35

As concerns the second way, it must be noted that every sin can be considered both according to the intention and according to the effect: for it sometimes happens that an action is a sin according to the effect, yet

not according to intention: for example if a person kills his father under the impression he is killing an enemy,†36 he in fact commits the sin of patricide according to the effect but not according to intention; just as in another example, it was said of certain Milesians †37 that "the Milesians certainly are not without sense but they do things that senseless people do." If then the sin of pride be taken according to the effect, it is commonly found every sin: for it is an effect of pride to refuse to be subject a higher rule, which whoever sins does inasmuch as he does not submit to the law of God; but if it be considered according to the intention, the sin of pride is not always found in every sin, because this or that particular act is not always done out of actual contempt of God or His law, but sometimes from ignorance, sometimes from weakness or from some passion; hence Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace†38 that the sin of pride is distinguished from other sins.

Reply to 1. Pride wipes out all the virtues and corrupts all the powers of the soul by a certain diffusion or extension of its power, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. To prefer one's own will to the will of a superior is indeed an act of pride, but it does not always proceed from an intention of pride, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 3. Pride has its own proper matter if the formal aspect of its object is considered, as was said (in the Response); although that formal aspect can be found in any matter whatsoever, just as likewise magnanimity is a special virtue and yet it aims at greatness in every virtue, as the Philosopher says in Book IV of the Ethics.†39

Reply to 4. Pride as it signifies contempt of God according to intention cannot be a general sin; rather it is even a more special sin than pride according as it signifies a desire of undue exaltation: for a desire of undue exaltation can occur not only if God is regarded with contempt but also if man is regarded with contempt. But if contempt of God be taken according to effect, in this way it is retained in all sins, even those committed from weakness or ignorance, as is clear from what has been said (in the Response).

Reply to 5. Just as pride by extension and effect is found in all sins although pride is a special sin, so also in the same ways fear can be found in all the acts of the virtues although it is a special gift.

Reply to 6. Pride invests all the aforesaid sins with the note of malice, not that pride is in essence wholly malice, but in the two ways mentioned (in the Response).

Reply to 7. Envy, vainglory, and anger do not have the same object as pride, but their objects are directed to the object of pride as to an end: for the reason envy is grieved over a neighbor's good and vainglory strives after praise and anger vengeance,†40 is that through these a certain excellence is retained. From which it cannot be concluded that pride is the same as these but that it governs them, as is clear from what has been said (in the Response).

Reply to 8. Those authorities are speaking of pride so far as concerns its effect pride without which no sin is possible, but not as concerns the intention of pride.

Reply to 9. A similar answer is to be given to the ninth argument: for pride in that sense according to effect is convertible with sin. Although in regard to both the eighth and ninth arguments it can be said that Augustine in the book On Nature and Grace†41 presents these opinions not as his own but as those of another with whom he is disputing; hence afterwards he rejects them, saying that sin is not always committed through pride.

Reply to 10. To withdraw from God is pride according to effect.

Reply to 11. A similar answer is to be given to eleventh argument, since to transgress the precepts of

God by sinning is to be proud according to effect, not always however according to intention.

Reply to 12. If pride be taken insofar as it is in every sin according to effect, pride is nothing other than a turning away from an unchangeable good, and cupidity a turning towards a transitory good; from which two, one sin is constituted as from the formal and material element in sin,^{†42} inasmuch as every sin is a turning away from an unchangeable good and a turning towards a transitory good.

Reply to 13. Sin occurs in the desire of one's own good if there is a departure from the rule of reason, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 14. Gregory ^{†43} likewise does not enumerate pride as one of the principal vices but as the queen and root of all vices, inasmuch as its dominion extends to all sins; but pride is not excluded from being a special sin by reason of this.

Reply to 15. An inordinate love of one's own good belongs in a general way to every sin, and in this way inordinate love of one's own good belongs to pride in the way in which that which belongs to the genus belongs to the species; nevertheless it can be said that pride is love of one's own good in the strict sense, if what is called 'one's own' is taken with a certain precision, namely that a person loves his good not as a good coming from a superior, which strictly pertains to pride, namely that a person does not acknowledge his good as coming from another.

Reply to 16. That argument is valid of pride so far as concerns its effect, for in this way an unchangeable good is spurned in every sin, but not always so far as concerns the intention.

Reply to 17. Pride can be taken in one way of that which exceeds the rule of reason, and in this way pride is always a sin; and it is so accepted generally. In another way pride can be taken of that which exceeds something else, and in this way pride can be good, as Jerome says (on the text of Isaiah 61, 6 "You shall pride yourself in their glory"). For example, when someone wills to do the works of the counsels, which surpass the common works of the precepts. Or it may be replied that when it is said "I will make thee to be an everlasting glory" (superbia), pride is taken in a material sense, i.e., 'I will give you great excellence of which worldly men are proud'. And what is called 'glorious riches' (opes superbae) can be understood in like manner, i.e. of those things which men are usually proud of.

Question VIII, Article 3 ^{†p}

Whether Pride Is in the Irascible Power?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Since the irascible power is a part of the sense appetite, any movement of the irascible power must be a passion because the passions of the soul are movements of the sense appetite. But pride does not seem to consist in any passion pertaining to the irascible power, not in fear nor in daring nor in hope or despair nor in anger. Therefore pride is not in the irascible power.

2. Since the irascible power is in the sentient part of the soul, the object of the irascible power can be only some good perceptible to the senses. But pride seeks to excel not only in perceptible goods but also in spiritual and intelligible goods, as Gregory says.^{†1} Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible power as in a subject.

3. In the demons there is no sentient part of the soul, since they are incorporeal. If then pride were in the irascible power, it would follow that pride cannot be in the demons, which is clearly false.

4. Strictly speaking, pride is contempt of God. But the irascible power, since it is a faculty of the sentient part of the soul, cannot even attain to that object which is God. Therefore the irascible power is not the subject of pride.

5. Avicenna †2 defines the irascible power as that power that moves purposefully to repel what is harmful or destructive with the desire of overcoming it. But this does not pertain to pride: for pride does not intend to repel what is harmful but rather to excel in what is good. Therefore pride is not in the irascible power.

6. Pride is the cause of envy. But envy is in the concupiscible power, since it is "hatred of another's prosperity."†3 Therefore pride is not in the irascible power.

7. It seems that pride is not in the irascible power but rather in the rational power: for Gregory in assigning the four species of pride says †4 "There are four marks by which all the pride of the arrogant betrays itself, either when they judge the good they have is from their own efforts, or if they believe it is given to them from above, they think it is due to their own merits that they have received it, or when they boast of having what they do not have, or despising others they seek to appear as possessing what they have in a singular way." But all of these, namely judging, thinking, believing, boasting, comparing oneself with others, pertain to reason. Therefore reason is the subject of pride.

8. In the book of Proverbs (11, 2) it is said "Where humility is, there also is wisdom." But wisdom is in the reason, therefore also humility. Consequently pride too, which is contrary to humility: for contraries are by nature in the same subject.†5

9. Bernard says in the book On the Steps of Humility†6 that the perfection of humility is knowledge of the truth. But knowledge of the truth pertains to reason, therefore humility is in the reason. So too then is pride.

10. The Philosopher says †7 the proud man is a pretender to courage. But pretence pertains to reason: for to pretend is to feign or simulate, which belongs only to reason, as the Philosopher says in his Poetria.†8 Therefore pride is in the reason.

11. On that text of Habacuc (2, 5) "As wine deceiveth him that drinketh it . . . ," etc., the Gloss says †9 that pride first causes a man to believe exalted things about himself. But to believe is an act of reason. Therefore the first act of pride is in the reason. Consequently pride itself is in the reason.

12. On that text "Blessed are the undefiled" (Psalm 118, 1) Ambrose says †10 that only the law of God can repulse the movements of pride. But the law of God is in the reason, therefore also pride which is repulsed by it.

13. Gregory says †11 that pride is the queen of all the vices. But to rule pertains to reason. Therefore pride is in the reason.

14. On Jeremiah 49, 16 "Thy arrogancy . . . and the pride of thy heart . . . ," etc., the Gloss says "Not error but pride gives rise to the heretic."†12 But heresy is in the reason, therefore also pride.

15. Augustine says in Book XII On the Trinity†13 that sin is in the lower reason inasmuch as it is not restrained by the higher reason or even inasmuch as the higher reason consents; and so it seems that the first sin is in the higher reason; but pride is the first sin. Therefore pride is in the higher reason.

16. Augustine says †14 and it is stated in Decretum XV, q. 1,†15 that pride is a movement to obtain what justice forbids. But justice pertains to the reason, because by it man renders to another what is his due. Therefore pride is in the reason.

17. Augustine says †16 and it is stated in Decretum XXIII, q. 4, †17 "God would never destroy vessels of wrath unless He found spontaneous sin in them." But a thing is called spontaneous which is subject to the command of reason. Since then destruction is especially appointed for vessels of wrath on account of pride, it seems that pride pertains to reason.

18. Seneca says in a certain epistle †18 that the highest good of man consists in his being rational. But this is a power which pride corrupts, as was said above (in q. 8, a. 2). Therefore pride too is in the reason and not in the irascible power.

19. It seems that pride is in the will and not in the irascible power: because on that text of Matthew (3, 15) "So it becomes us to fulfill all justice," the Gloss says †19 "That is perfect humility." But justice is in the will, therefore also humility.

20. The desire for honor seems to pertain especially to pride. But to desire honors pertains to the will. Therefore pride is in the will.

21. To be proud is to exceed i.e. to surmount, so it seems that pride pertains in a special way to a higher power that surpasses the other powers. But this power is the will, which moves all the other powers. Therefore pride seems to pertain to the will and not to the irascible power.

22. It seems that pride is in the concupiscible power: for it is said in the Sententiae of Prosper †21 that "Pride is the love of one's own excellence." But love is in the concupiscible power. Therefore also pride.

23. According to Augustine †22 it pertains to pride to seek pleasurable things and flee from saddening things. But this pertains to the concupiscible power. Therefore pride is in the concupiscible power.

24. It pertains to pride to delight in one's own good. But this pertains to the concupiscible power. Therefore pride seems to be in the concupiscible power and not in the irascible power.

On the Contrary:

1. Gregory †23 cites the gift of fear as contrary to pride.

2. Augustine says †24 that pride is "the craving for undue exaltation." But the arduous or difficult to achieve is the object of the irascible power. Therefore pride is in the irascible power.

3. Pusillanimity i.e. timidity seems to be the vice opposed to pride. But pusillanimity is in the irascible power, as is magnanimity. Therefore pride too is in the irascible power.

Response:

To resolve this question we must first consider which power of the soul can be the subject of vice or virtue, so that in keeping with this we can determine which power of the soul is the subject of pride.

We must take into account, then, that every act of virtue or of sin is voluntary. But in us there are two principles of a voluntary act, namely the reason or intellect, and the appetite: for these two are capable of originating movement, as is said in Book III On the Soul, †25 and especially in regard to the acts proper to man. But reason, since it is apprehending power, differs from the appetitive power in that the operation of reason and of any apprehending power is achieved inasmuch as the thing apprehended is in the one apprehending, for the intellect actually understanding is the thing actually understood, and the sense actually sensing is the thing actually sensed; but the operation of an appetitive power consists in a movement of the one desiring to the object desired. Now clearly it pertains particularly to pride that a person tends to his own excellence

inordinately, as it were magnifying himself, according to that Psalm 9, 18 "To judge for the fatherless and for the humble, that man may no more presume to magnify himself upon earth." Hence it is evident that pride pertains to the appetitive power.

But since the appetitive power in a manner of speaking is moved by the apprehending power, inasmuch as the good apprehended moves the appetite, the appetitive power must be distinguished according to the diverse mode of apprehending, because passive principles are proportionate to their active and moving principles and the powers are distinguished according to their objects. Now there is a certain power that apprehends universals, namely the intellect or reason, and there is a certain power that apprehends singulars, namely the sense or the imagination; from which it follows that there is a twofold appetitive power: one in the rational part of the soul, which is called the will, and the other in the sentient part, which is called sensuality or the sense appetite.

Therefore the rational appetite which is the will has the good universally as its proper formal object, and consequently it is not divided into many powers; but the sense appetite does not attain to the universal nature of good, but to certain particular aspects of the sensed or imagined good; hence the sense appetite must be distinguished according to the diverse particular aspects of such a good. For one thing has the aspect of desirable from the fact it is pleasurable to the senses, and according to this aspect of the sensed good it is the object of the concupiscible power; another thing has a desirable aspect from the fact that it has a certain excellence imagined i.e. pictured by the animal, that emboldens it to repel whatever is harmful and to use its own good aggressively; which arduous good is without any sensory pleasure, sometimes even with physical pain, as when the animal fights to vanquish, and the object of the irascible power is taken according to this aspect of the imagined good. Now clearly every particular (good) is contained under the universal (good), but not conversely. Consequently, to whatever the irascible or the concupiscible power can be moved, the will also can be moved and to many other things as well, but the will is moved to its object without passion, since it does not use a bodily organ, but the irascible and the concupiscible powers with passion; and therefore all the movements that are in the irascible and the concupiscible power with passion, such as love, joy, hope, and the like, can be in the will, but without passion.

Now it is clear from what was said above (in q. 8, a. 2) that the object of pride is excellence. If then only excellence perceptible to the senses or presented to the imagination pertains to pride, pride would have to be assigned solely to the irascible power. But because pride also concerns intelligible excellence, which is counted among spiritual goods, as Gregory says in Book XXXIII of the *Moralia*†26 and what is more, is found even in spiritual substances in whom there is no sense appetite, therefore it must be said that on the one hand pride is in the irascible power, inasmuch as it has regard to perceptible or imaginable excellence, and on the other hand is in the will inasmuch as it has regard to intelligible excellence and according as it is found in the demons.

Reply to 1. Pride is an inordinate desire for excellence. But just as desire is related to the good taken absolutely, so hope is related to a future good difficult to attain. Hence clearly pride is principally related to hope, which is a passion of the irascible power, for also presumption, which is inordinate hope, seems especially to pertain to pride.

Reply to 2. As was said (in the Response), the pride that relates to intelligible excellence is not in the irascible power but in the will; nevertheless sometimes an effect represented in the imagination ensues from intelligible excellence, in regard to which, pride can be in the irascible power, as when someone is commended for excellence in knowledge or is afforded some perceptible honor.

Reply to 3. The pride of the demons although it is not in the irascible power, is nevertheless in the will, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 4. An object is twofold: one, after the manner of a terminus to which (*ad quem*), and God

cannot be an object of the irascible power in this way; the other, after the manner of a terminus from which (a quo), and in this way that which is regarded with contempt is the object of that very contempt: and in this way nothing prevents God from being an object of the irascible power, namely inasmuch as the irascible power unrestrained by reverence for God reacts against its proper object.

Reply to 5. Although the irascible power is the subject of many passions, nevertheless it is denominated from anger as from its ultimate passion, Hence Avicenna defines the irascible power only according to the passion of anger and not according to the other irascible passions.

Reply to 6. Envy is not in the irascible power but in the concupiscible power, since it is sorrow over another's good fortune,^{†27} but sorrow like pleasure is in the concupiscible power, and hatred like love also pertains to this same power. Nevertheless even if envy were in the irascible power, pride would not on that account be prevented from being in the irascible power, since it (pride) is the cause of it (envy): for nothing prevents one act or passion of a power from being the cause of another act or passion of the same power, as for instance love is the cause of desire even though both are in the concupiscible power.

Reply to 7. An act can pertain to some vice in three ways: in one way directly, in another way antecedently, and in a third way consequently; for example, desire of vengeance pertains directly and as it were essentially to anger, but resentment about an injury inflicted pertains to anger antecedently, and pleasure over the punishment of him who inflicted the injury consequently. So accordingly, the inordinate desire of excellence pertains to pride directly and as it were essentially, but the judgment that such excellence is due to himself alone pertains to pride antecedently, and inasmuch as he manifests this judgment and desire in words and deeds pertains to it consequently. Of these three, the first pertains to the irascible power but the other two pertain to reason: for the apprehension of reason precedes the appetitive movement, and the command of reason in regard to the external execution follows it.

Reply to 8. Humility and wisdom are found in the same man inasmuch as humility disposes to wisdom, because he who is humble subjects himself to the wise in order to learn and does not rely on his own opinion; nevertheless wisdom and humility need not be in the same part of the soul: since what is in the lower part can dispose to that which is in the higher part, as for instance excellence of imagination disposes to science.

Reply to 9. Cognition of the truth is related antecedently to humility, because as long as a person keeps the truth in mind he does not exalt himself beyond his measure.

Reply to 10. Pretense is related to pride consequently, for from the fact that a person desires to excellence it follows that he conducts himself exteriorly in such wise that in the eyes of others he excels in some way.

Reply to 11. Entertaining loftier beliefs about oneself is said to be the first act of pride because it precedes the desire for pre-eminence.

Reply to 12. Reason inasmuch as it rules the lower powers and moves them, restrains them from inordinate movements; hence the law of God according as it is in the reason excludes pride not indeed formally, as blackness excludes whiteness, for thus they would be in the same subject, but effectively, as a painter excludes blackness. Hence it is not reasonable that pride would be in the reason in which the law of God is.

Reply to 13. Pride is said to be the queen of the other vices inasmuch as its dominion extends to all the other vices because of the order of its end to the ends of other vices, not because of this that it (pride) is in the reason.

Reply to 14. Heresy is shown by that authority to be an effect of pride; but nothing prevents that which is in one power of the soul from having an effect on another power of the soul.

Reply to 15. The first sin is said to be in the reason antecedently, but in the appetite essentially, namely inasmuch as the appetitive power tends to something unlawful or inasmuch as the judgment of reason is hindered by it (the appetitive power).

Reply to 16. Sin is in the lower power of the soul i.e. the appetitive power, inasmuch as it departs from the rectitude of reason; hence even if justice pertains in some way to reason, it does not necessarily follow on that account that every sin is essentially in the reason as in a subject.

Reply to 17. A sin is said to be voluntary or spontaneous not only when the act of sin is elicited by the will but also when it is commanded by the will, which commands the acts of the lower powers; hence nothing prevents a sin in a lower power of the soul from being voluntary.

Reply to 18. Socrates maintained that all the virtues are forms of scientific knowledge, as is said in Book VI of the Ethics;†28 and therefore Socrates himself, and the Stoics following him in this,†29 held that all virtues are in the power that is rational essentially. But because the appetitive power rather than the reason is directly perfected by moral virtue, therefore according to Aristotle †30 it is more accurate to say that moral virtues are in the appetitive power, which is rational by participation, inasmuch as it is moved by the command of reason.

Reply to 19. Justice in a manner of speaking is the whole of virtue inasmuch as through justice we are ordered to obedience to the law, as is said in Book V of the Ethics.†31 Hence although justice is in the will, nevertheless all the virtues which receive the name of justice in the foresaid way need not be said to be in the reason or the will, since the reason and the will can also move the other powers of the soul.

Reply to 20. To strive after perceptible or imaginable honors inasmuch as they have the aspect of arduous or exalted pertains not only to the will but also to the irascible power.

Reply to 21. To be proud is to go beyond by exceeding one's proper measure, which can pertain not only to a higher but also to a lower power.

Reply to 22. All the passions of the irascible power begin from love, which is a passion of the concupiscible power, and terminate in joy or sorrow which are also in the concupiscible power. Hence nothing prevents those things that pertain to the concupiscible power even if they are attributed antecedently or consequently to pride from being in the irascible power.

Reply to 23 and 24. The answers to the twenty-third and twenty-fourth arguments are evident from the foregoing.

Question VIII, Article 4 †p

On the Species of Pride

Gregory assigns the species of pride in Book XXIV of the Moralia†1 where he says "There are four marks by which all the pride of the arrogant betrays itself, either when they judge the good they have is from their own efforts, or if they believe it to be given to them from above, they think it is due to their own merits that they have received it, or when they boast of having what they do not have, or despising others they want to appear as possessing it in singular manner."

But it seems that these species of pride are not properly assigned, for the following reasons.

1. That a person judges the good he has is not from another but from his own efforts, pertains to unbelief, since true faith holds that God is the author of all good. Therefore that a person judge his good is attributable to himself ought not to be assigned as a species of pride but rather as a species of error or disbelief.
2. Among all the goods possessed in this life, the principal one is the good of grace, about which some people are even proud. But to believe that grace is given to man on account of his merits pertains to the Pelagian heresy.†2 Therefore that a person believe that what he has is given to him by God on account of his merits ought not to be assigned as a species of pride.
3. To boast of having what one does not have pertains to lying, which is a vice distinct from pride; therefore boasting ought not to be assigned as a species of pride.
4. To want to be noticed pertains to vainglory, which is not pride but one of its daughters, as Gregory says in Book XXIV of the Moralia.†3 Therefore that a person wants to appear singular ought not to be assigned as a species of pride.
5. Jerome says †4 that nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful. But ingratitude is not enumerated among these four species of pride. Therefore it seems that Gregory's enumeration of the species of pride is not sufficient.
6. Augustine says †5 that to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed pertains to pride. But this is not enumerated among these species of pride. Therefore the species of pride are not sufficiently treated.
7. It seems to pertain especially to pride that a person presumptuously strives to obtain something that is above him. But this is not mentioned among the four Gregory refers to. Therefore it seems that the species of pride are not adequately treated.

On the contrary:

The authority of Gregory quoted at the beginning is sufficient.

Response:

As Dionysius says,†6 good results from a cause that is one and integral, but evil from single defects; for example, beauty results from the fact that all the members of the body are properly i.e., symmetrically formed, of which if just one of them be improperly formed, unsightliness results. Accordingly then, it pertains to virtue that the appetite of man be moved to some or other excellence according to the rule of reason and the measure proper to him; but the evil of pride consists in this that a man in seeking some excelling good exceeds his proper measure: hence there are as many species of pride as there are ways of exceeding one's measure in the desire one's own excellence.

Now this occurs in three ways: in one way as regards this excelling good itself that one desires, as when the appetite of a person claim for himself a good that exceeds his measure; and the third species of pride corresponds to this, namely when a person boasts of having what he does not have; in another way as regards the manner of obtaining it, namely as having some excellence by his own efforts or by his own merits which he cannot obtain except thanks to another (*per gratis alterius*), and in this way the first two species are derived, inasmuch as a thing can be attributed to us in a twofold manner: either simply, as when we do something, or by way of a certain preparation, as when we merit a thing; in a third way a person can exceed his proper measure so far as concerns the manner of having it, namely inasmuch as a person makes a show of having something in a manner that excels others which it befits him to have in the same way as others.

Reply to 1. The judgment of reason is corrupted in two ways: in one way universally, in another way in some particular matter on account of some passion. The corruption then of true judgment about those things that directly pertain to faith or to good morals, if it be universally, pertains to the sin of heresy, but not if it be in a particular matter on account of passion, according as it is said in Proverbs (14, 22) "They (all) err that work evil"; for example, if someone were to hold universally that fornication is not a sin, he would be an unbeliever, but the fornicator who chooses fornication as a good on account of the passion of concupiscence is not held to be an unbeliever. And in like manner it would pertain to heresy if someone were to judge universally that God is not the author of all good or that the good of grace is owing to one's own merits; but not if, on account of an inordinate love of excellence which begins in concupiscence, the judgment of reason is corrupted in a particular matter in such a way that a person presumes that he can have some good by his own efforts or by reason of his own merits; which pertains to the proud man.

Reply to 2. The answer to the second argument is evident from foregoing.

Reply to 3. Boasting is counted as a species of pride, not as regards the external act itself which is a consequence of pride as was said above (in q. 8, a. 3), but as regards the internal frame of mind from which such an external act proceeds, namely inasmuch as a man conceives of himself as already having what he does not have, and his mind is set on such excellence of which he is not capable unless he were to have what he does not have.

Reply to 4. To want to appear singular also pertains to pride consequently. But essentially the fourth species of pride consists in the fact that a man already conceives of himself as exceeding all others in a singular manner, and his mind is strongly moved toward such excellence.

Reply to 5. The first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude: for he is ungrateful who does not acknowledge a benefit gratuitously bestowed on him or who thinks that he has obtained this by his own merits.

Reply to 6. As the Philosopher says,†7 to be without some evil is thought to be in a sense good, and therefore just as it pertains to the third species of pride that a person boasts of himself having what he does not have, so also that he excuses himself of a sin he has committed.

Reply to 7. The sin of pride sometimes is more evident from certain acts preceding or following pride than from that in which it essentially consists; and therefore Gregory has assigned †8 the species of pride according to certain antecedent and consequent acts although all the species of pride consist essentially in a certain presumption of the soul.

Question 9

Question IX

On Vainglory

Article 1 †p

Whether Vainglory Is a Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Vainglory consists in this that a person wants his good works to be seen by others. But this is not a sin but praiseworthy, for it is said in Matthew 5, 16 "Even so let your light shine before men, in order that they may see your good works." Therefore vainglory is not a sin.

2. The desire of vainglory consists in this that a person seeks to have his good works praised by men. But this is commended to us by the Apostle in Romans 12, 17 "Provide good things not only in the sight of God but also in the sight of men." Therefore vainglory is not a sin.

3. Every sin consists in a deordination of a natural appetite. But by reason of vainglory a thing is not desired which is not naturally desirable: for man has a natural desire to know the truth and that he himself be known. Therefore vainglory is not a sin.

4. It is said in the Epistle to the Ephesians (5, 1) "Be you . . . imitators of God, as very dear children." But inasmuch as a man seeks glory he becomes an imitator of God Who seeks His own glory." Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to seek glory.

5. To desire the recompense promised to man as a reward is not a sin. But glory is the recompense promised to man as a reward, for it is said in Job (22, 29) "He that hath been humbled shall be in glory" and in Proverbs (3, 35) "The wise shall possess glory." Therefore the desire of glory is not a sin.

6. That which is an incentive to works of virtue does not seem to be a sin. But the desire of glory is of this kind: for Tully says "Glory inflames all men to do their utmost."†1 Therefore the desire of glory is not a sin.

7. That which is desired alike by the virtuous and the wicked does not seem to be a sin. But Sallust says "The good and the ignoble man alike desire glory and honor and power for themselves."†2 Therefore the desire of glory is not a sin.

8. Augustine says †3 that vainglory is the judgment of men speaking well of one. But to desire this is not a sin, because as he himself says †4 a person is inhuman who neglects his good name. Therefore vainglory is not a sin.

9. That which is the object of cupidity is not a sin although cupidity itself is a sin, as is obvious in the case of money and the desire for money. But vainglory is the object of cupidity, as is clear from what is said in the Epistle to the Galatians (5, 26) "Let us not become desirous of vainglory." Therefore vainglory is not a sin.

10. Sin is opposed to virtue in regard to the same matter. But vainglory is not opposed to true glory, for they can be in the same subject so it seems. Therefore vainglory is not a sin.

On the contrary:

That which impedes a man from faith, by which we become pleasing to God,†5 is a sin. But such is the desire of human glory, for it is said in John (5, 44) "How can you believe, who receive glory from one another, and the glory which is from God alone, you seek not?" Therefore vainglory is a sin.

Response:

To resolve this question we must first determine what glory is, and secondly what vainglory is, and then thirdly, we will be able to determine in what way vainglory is a sin.

It should be noted then, that as Augustine says,†6 glory signifies a certain clarity, hence to be glorified and to be made clearly known are taken for the same thing in the Gospel. Now clarity implies a kind of clearness according to which a thing is made visible and manifest in its splendor, and therefore glory implies a manifestation of someone's goodness; but if someone's wickedness is manifested it is no longer called glory but ignominy. And on account of this Ambrose says Super Epistolas ad Romanos,†7 that glory is clear knowledge with praise.

But glory is considered according to a threefold state. For according to its highest state, glory consists in this that the good of someone is manifested to a multitude of people: for that we say is clear which can be clearly seen by all or by many. Wherefore Tully says that "glory is consistent good report with praise,"†8 and Titus Livius introduces Fabian as saying "It is no time for me to glory, talking, as I am, to one man."†9 However, in a second way glory refers to any state of it according as the good of one man is manifested even to a few or to only one. Yet again in third way glory is spoken of according as someone's good consists in his consideration of it, namely according as someone considers his own good under the aspect of a certain clarity as something to be manifested and wondered at by many; and accordingly a person is said to glory when he desires or even delights in the manifestation of his good either to a multitude or to a few or even one or to oneself only.

But in order to understand what vainglory is or what it is to glory vainly, we must be aware of the fact that 'vain' is usually taken in three ways: for sometimes 'vain' is taken to mean that which has no subsistence, as false things are called vain: wherefore it is said in Psalm 4, 3 "Why do you love vanity and seek after lying"; but sometimes 'vain' is taken as that which has no solidity or stability, according to which it is said in Ecclesiastes 1, 2 "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity," which is said on account of the mutability of things; sometimes however a thing is called vain when it does not attain its proper end,†10 thus a person who does not recover his health is said to have taken medicine in vain: wherefore it is said in Isaiah 49, 4 "I have labored in vain, I have spent my strength without cause and in vain."

According to this then glory can be called vain in three ways. First, when a man glories falsely, for example, in a good which he does not have: wherefore it is said in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (4, 7) ". . . What hast thou that thou hast not received. And if thou hast received it, why dost thou boast as if thou hadst not received it." Secondly glory is called vain when a man glories in a good that quickly passes away, according to that passage of Isaias (40, 6) "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field."†11 In a third way glory is called vain when man's glory is not ordered to its proper end: for it is natural to man to desire knowledge of the truth, because his intellect is perfected in this way; but for a man to desire his good to be known by someone is not properly a desire of perfection. Hence he has a certain vanity unless this is useful for some end.

On the other hand to desire one's good to be known can be laudably ordered to three things. First, to the glory of God: for by someone's good being manifested glory is given to God to Whom as its primary author that good is principally attributed; hence it is said in Matthew (5, 16) "Even so let your light shine before men, in order that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in heaven." Secondly, it is useful for the salvation of our neighbors, who seeing a person's goodness are motivated to imitate him, according to the First Epistle to the Corinthians 10 †12 "Let each one of you please his neighbor by doing good, for his edification." In a third way glory can be ordered to the profit of the man himself who, when he considers that his good works are praised by others, gives thanks because of them and persists in them more firmly; hence the Apostle †13 frequently recalls to the mind of the faithful in Christ their good works so that they may more firmly persist in them.

If then someone desires the manifestation of his good works or even takes pleasure in the manifestation of them but not for any of three reasons just mentioned, his glory will be vain. For clearly in each of those ways mentioned before, vainglory denotes a certain deordination of the appetite which constitutes the nature of sin: wherefore vainglory in whatever manner it is taken, is a sin. But nevertheless vainglory taken in the third way is more common i.e. extensive: for thus a person can glory vainly both about what he has and about what he does not have, both as concerns spiritual goods and also as concerns.

Reply to 1. The Lord there commands that we make known our good works to others for the glory of God, hence it is added (in Matthew 5, 16) "In order that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in heaven." And this is not vainglory.

Reply to 2. The Apostle commissions us to provide good things in the sight of men for their profit, hence he adds (in Romans 12, 18) "If it be possible, as far as in you lies, be at peace with all men," which intention also excludes vainglory.

Reply to 3. Every perfect being naturally communicates itself to others so far as is possible, and this belongs to each thing in imitation of the first perfect being, namely God, Who communicates His goodness to all creatures; but the good of a person is communicated to others both as regards being and as regards knowledge, hence it seems to pertain to a natural desire that a person wishes his good to become known. If then this is referred to the proper end, it will pertain to virtue; but if not, it will pertain to vanity.

Reply to 4. The ultimate end of the rational creature is to know the divine goodness, for beatitude i.e. happiness, consists in this; hence the glory of God is not to be referred to anything else, rather it is proper to God Himself that His glory be sought for the sake of itself. But no knowledge of any creature's good makes the rational creature happy, hence no glory of the creature is to be sought as an end in itself, but for the sake of something else.

Reply to 5. The glory promised as a reward is not vain but true glory which consists in the cognition of God; and (to desire) such glory is never a sin.

Reply to 6. Many men are incited to do works of virtue for the sake of certain temporal goods; nevertheless inordinate desire for temporal goods is not on that account without sin. So even if most people perform works of virtue for the sake of glory, nevertheless inordinate desire for glory is not on that account without sin, since works of virtue should not be done for the sake of glory but rather for the good of the virtue, or better still for the sake of God.

Reply to 7. As Sallust adds there †14 "The virtuous strive for glory in the right way," i.e. by means of virtue; and this is not to seek glory out of vanity but to strive for it in an orderly manner.

Reply to 8. The judgment of those speaking well of one pertains to vainglory if it is desired without usefulness.

Reply to 9. Glory according as it is in those who know our good is an object of cupidity i.e. covetousness, and thus it is not a sin, for it can be desired either rightly or wrongly; in another way according as it (glory) is in our appetite, and thus it implies vanity and has the nature of sin.

10. True glory and vainglory can be in the same subject but not in the same respect.

Question IX, Article 2 †p

Whether Vainglory Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. Nothing excludes the eternal reward except mortal sin.†1 But vainglory excludes the eternal reward, for in Matthew (6, 1) it is said: "Take heed you do not your justice before men in order to be seen by them, otherwise you shall have no reward with your Father in heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

2. On the same text, Chrysostom says of vainglory that "it enters secretly, and imperceptibly robs us of all our interior goods."†2 But nothing robs us of interior and spiritual goods except mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

3. It is said in Job (31, 26-28): "If I beheld the sun when it shone, and the moon going in brightness, and my heart in secret hath rejoiced, and I have kissed my hand with my mouth: that is a very great iniquity." Which Gregory interprets to be about vainglory.†3 Therefore vainglory is a most grave and mortal sin.

4. Jerome says †4 that nothing is so dangerous as the desire of glory and the vice of boasting, and a soul swelling from a consciousness of virtue. But that which is especially dangerous seems to be mortal. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

5. [Every capital vice is a mortal sin. But vainglory is a capital vice. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.]†5

6. Whoever appropriates what is proper to God sins mortally much more than he who steals his neighbor's property. But whoever desires vain glory usurps for himself what is proper to God, for it is said in Isaiah (42, 8): "I will not give my glory to another" and in the First Epistle to Timothy, i, 17 †6 ". . . to . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore it seems that vainglory is a mortal sin.

7. It seems to be a sin of idolatry to attribute God's glory to a creature, according that passage of Romans (1, 23) "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man." But that man who desires glory seems to desire for himself what belongs to God, for glory properly belongs to God, as was said above (in arg. 6). Therefore vainglory is a sin of idolatry, and so it follows that it is a mortal sin.

8. Augustine says †7 that to spurn glory is a mark of great virtue. But a great evil is opposed to a great virtue. Therefore to desire glory is a grave sin.

9. Vainglory seeks to please men: since according to the Philosopher "glory is a thing which, if no one knew of it, you would not care to have it." †8 But to seek to please men is a mortal sin, because it excludes us from the service of Christ, according to that passage in Galatians (1, 10) "If I still sought to please men, I should not be a servant of Christ." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

10. Just as a form gives species in natural things so does the object in moral matters. But those things that have a natural form in common do not differ in species, therefore in moral matters those things that have an object in common do not differ in species. But venial and mortal sin differ in species. Since then vainglory has only one object, it seems that it is not possible for vainglory in one case to be a mortal sin and in another a venial sin. But clearly in one case vainglory is a mortal sin. Therefore vainglory in all cases is a mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. On Matthew (10, 14): "Shake off the dust from your feet," the Gloss says †9 "Dust is the shallowness of worldly thinking from which even the most excellent teachers cannot be immune when attending to the cares of those subject to them." But that which even the most excellent teachers cannot avoid is a venial sin. Therefore the shallowness of worldly thinking which pertains especially to vainglory is a venial sin.

2. On that same text (Matthew 10, 14), Chrysostom says †10 that whereas other vices find an abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds an abode even in the servants of Christ. But no mortal sin finds an abode in the servants of Christ. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.

3. A sin of word and of deed is graver than a sin of the heart.†11 But not all vainglory in deeds or in words is a mortal sin. Therefore by no means should we say that all vainglory that arises in the heart is a mortal sin.

Response:

The truth in regard to this question can be shown from the preceding question (q. 9, a. 1): for it was stated that glory is called vain when a person glories either about something false or about something temporal or when he does not refer his glory to its proper end.

In regard to the first two it is obvious that not all vainglory is a mortal sin: for no one would say a person sins mortally who glories in his singing thinking he sings well when in fact he sings badly, or who glories because he owns a horse that runs well. But there seems to be a serious doubt about the third mode of vainglory: for since that which is not referred to the proper end is in vain,^{†12} the glory of man seems either not to be vain if it is referred to God, or it is a mortal sin if it is not referred to God but man's intention is fixed on it as an end; for then a person would enjoy the creature as an end or goal, which cannot be done without mortal sin.^{†13}

And therefore we must consider that it can occur in two ways that an act is not referred to God as to an end: in one way so far as concerns the act, inasmuch as the act itself is not ordered to the end; and in this way no disordered act is referable to the ultimate end, whether it be a mortal sin or a venial sin: for a disordered act is not a proper means for arriving at a good end, just as a false proposition is not a proper means for arriving at true knowledge. In another way as concerns the agent himself, whose intention is not ordered actually or habitually to the proper end: for from this it follows that the act proceeding from such an intention is ordered to something else as to the ultimate end; and then the human act, which is not referred to God as to an end, is always a mortal sin. Now I say 'man's intention is not ordered to God actually or habitually', because it sometimes happens that a man does not actually order some act to God although that act of itself contains no deordination by reason of which it is not referable to God as to an end, nevertheless since man's intention is habitually related to God as to an end, that act is not only not a sin but it is even a meritorious act.

So accordingly it must be said that if glory is called vain from the fact that it is not referred to God as to an end because the intention of man glorying in something is not turned to God actually or habitually, then vainglory is always a mortal sin: for it follows that man glories in some created good not referred actually or habitually to God as to an end. But if glory is called vain from the fact that the act itself done by the person is not referred to God as to an end because it is not referable to God as to the end on account of this that it is disordered, in this way vainglory is not always a mortal sin, for although any deordination of glory makes it incapable of being ordered to God, for example, when a person glories in something he ought not or more than he ought or any other due circumstance is neglected, nevertheless a mortal sin does not follow from this that any due circumstance is neglected but only when the inordinate act is contrary to the law of God.

So accordingly it must be said that the sin of vainglory is not always a mortal sin.

Reply to 1. The Lord is speaking of the occasions when man refers the works of justice to human glory as to an ultimate end: for then vainglory is a mortal sin and completely excludes a man from eternal reward. However, it can be said that vainglory, even when it is a venial sin, excludes a man from the eternal reward not indeed absolutely but by reason of some particular act, namely inasmuch as it makes that act that proceeds from vainglory incapable of eternal reward, just as venial sin too is incapable of eternal reward; nevertheless the vainglory which is a venial sin does not absolutely exclude a man from the reward of eternal life.

Reply to 2. Vainglory robs man of the interior goods he possesses in two ways: in one way as regards the acts of the interior virtues for which he does not merit the reward of eternal life if he does them for the sake of vainglory, even if the vainglory is a venial sin; in another way as regards the interior habits themselves, namely inasmuch as vainglory deprives man of the interior virtues. But vainglory does this only inasmuch as it is a mortal sin.

Reply to 3. That argument is valid in regard to vainglory inasmuch as a man glories in himself about his own good works, not referring them to God in any way either actually or habitually, according as it is a mortal

sin.

Reply to 4. That is said to be dangerous which easily leads to man's destruction or ruin; but vainglory easily leads to a man's destruction inasmuch as it causes him to place his trust in himself: hence it is said to be a most dangerous sin not so much because of its gravity but because it is a disposition to more serious sin.

Reply to 5. We must not judge that all sins that are called capital, are mortal sins by reason of their genus; otherwise it would follow that every sin of gluttony and anger would be a mortal sin, which is patently false. Wherefore all vainglory need not be a mortal sin although vainglory is a capital vice. But since a vice is called capital from which other sins arise whether they be venial or mortal, it can be said that every sin that is capital in regard to other mortal sins is a mortal sin, if 'capital sin' is understood according as one sin arises from another as ordered to the end of that sin. For clearly whoever is so much affected by some sin that he is willing to sin mortally to obtain the end or goal of that sin, sins mortally even in the first sin, for example if a person is so affected by the pleasure of taste that he is willing to sin mortally for the sake of it, even the gluttony itself will be a mortal sin for him; and so too vainglory is a mortal sin when a person commits another mortal sin for the sake of vainglory.

Reply to 6. Just as in a kingdom, honor and glory are owed in one way to the king, in another way to a commander or a soldier, so also in the universe a special glory and honor is owed to God alone; which if someone should will to usurp for himself, he would be attributing to himself what belongs to God, just as also if a soldier in a kingdom were to desire the glory that is owed to the king, by that very fact he would be coveting that royal honor for himself. But not all who vainly desire glory desire the honor and glory owed to God alone, but that which is owed to man on account of some excellence; nevertheless in this they sometimes sin against God inasmuch as they do not refer such glory to the proper end. And so, although they do not usurp for themselves the glory of God according to its substance i.e. in itself, nevertheless they do usurp the glory of God as regards the manner of having it: for it is proper to God alone that His glory not be referred to another end.

Reply to 7. Whoever would usurp for himself the glory and honor of divinity, as we read many tyrants have done,†14 would be truly an idolater; but not all who glory vainly usurp divine glory in this manner: hence not all are idolaters.

Reply to 8. To avoid lesser sins is a mark of more abundant virtue, as is clear from what the Lord says in Matthew (5, 21-22), that justice which avoids not only murder but also anger is more abundant than the justice of the Old Law which forbids murder; hence from the fact that spurning vainglory is a mark of great virtue it cannot be concluded that vainglory is a grave sin.

Reply to 9. We can both rightly and wrongly desire to please men. For if a person intends to please men so as to edify or motivate them in regard to good, this is virtuous and praiseworthy; wherefore the Apostle in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 10 †15 says "Let every one of you please his neighbor by doing good for his edification . . . as I myself in all things please all men." But to intend to please men solely for the sake of worldly glory is a sin of vainglory: sometimes indeed a mortal sin, namely when a person makes human approval his end, loving it more than the observance of the God's commands, and in this way excludes himself from the service of God; but sometimes the sin is venial, when a person takes inordinate pleasure in the approval men, not however contrary to God but under God i.e. as approved by God.

Reply to 10. In moral matters the object determines the species, not according to that which is material in the object but according to its formal aspect as 'object'; but the object of vainglory differs according as the sin is venial or mortal, according to the formal aspect of the object, that is, according to the difference of end and that which is for the sake of the end; for the sin will be mortal when human glory is constituted as the end, but venial when it is not constituted as the end.

Question IX, Article 3 †p

On the Daughters of Vainglory, Which Are Disobedience, Boasting, Hypocrisy, Contention, Obstinacy, Discord, Presumption of Novelties †1

It seems that these are not fittingly assigned for the following reasons.

1. All of these seem to pertain to pride, whose daughter is this very vainglory. Therefore such vices should not be assigned as daughters of vainglory but along with vainglory ought to be counted as daughters of pride.

2. A general sin ought not to be derived from another sin. But disobedience is a general sin: for Ambrose says †2 that sin is "a transgression of the law and disobedience of the heavenly commands." Therefore disobedience ought not to be assigned as a daughter of vainglory.

3. Boasting is the third species of pride, as is clear from what was said above (in q. 8, a. 4 arg. 1). If then boasting is a daughter of vainglory, it will follow that pride is a daughter of vainglory. Which is patently false, since pride is the mother of all sins, as Gregory says in Book XXXI of the Moralia.†3

4. Contentions and discords seem to arise chiefly from anger. But in the enumeration of the capital vices, anger is a capital vice distinguished in opposition to vainglory. Therefore discord and contention ought not to be designated as daughters of vainglory.

On the contrary:

1. The authority of Gregory who assigns these daughters of vainglory in Book XXXI of the Moralia. .†4

Response:

A vice is called 'head' i.e. 'capital' and mother for the same reason, namely inasmuch as other vices arise from it as ordered to its end. For this corresponds to the notion of head according as the head has governing power in respect of those things that are subject to the head, and indeed every conception of government is taken from the end; it also corresponds to the notion of mother: for a mother is one who conceives within herself. Hence that vice is said to be the mother of others, which proceed from the conception of its special end.

Therefore, since the special end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, those vices by which a man strives for the manifestation of his own excellence will be called daughters of vainglory. Now a man can manifest his own excellence in two ways: in one way directly, and in another way, indirectly. Directly either by words, and such is boasting; or by deeds what are genuine and an occasion of astonishment, and such is the presumption of novelties: for novel or singular deeds are usually a greater source of astonishment to men; or by deeds that are feigned, and such is hypocrisy. And indirectly a man manifests his excellence by striving to show he is not inferior to another. And this in regard to four things: first, as regards the intellect, and such is obstinacy, by which a man relying on his own judgment, is unwilling to accept a sounder judgment; secondly, as regards the will, and such is discord, when a man refuses to concur with the will of better men; thirdly, as regards discourse, and such is contention, when a man is unwilling to be outdone in a discussion or argument with another; fourthly, as regards deeds, when someone is unwilling to subject his actions to the command of a superior [and this is disobedience].†5

Reply to 1. Pride as was said above (in arg. 3), is generally regarded as the mother of all vices, and under it are placed the seven capital vices, among which vainglory is especially akin to it: for the excellence which

pride seeks vainglory strives to manifest and from that very manifestation seeks to gain a kind of excellence; and consequently all the daughters of vainglory have an affinity with pride.

Reply to 2. Disobedience is designated as a daughter of vainglory according as it is a special sin, for thus disobedience is nothing else than contempt for a command; however, disobedience according as it is a general sin, signifies a simple departure from the commands of God, which in some cases is not done out of contempt but from weakness or ignorance, as Augustine says.†6

Reply to 3. Boasting is counted as a species of pride as regards the interior affection by which a person aspires to an excellence beyond his measure, as was said above (in q. 8, a. 4); but as regards the exterior act by which a person manifests his excellence by words, boasting pertains to vainglory.

Reply to 4. Contention and discord are never caused from anger except in conjunction with vainglory, when a person does not want to appear inferior inasmuch as his will is subject to the will of another, or inasmuch as his discourse or arguments seem less effective than those of another.

Question 10

Question X

On Envy

Article 1 †p

Whether Envy is a Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. As the Philosopher says in Book II of the Ethics†1 we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions. But envy is a passion: for Damascene says †2 that "envy is sorrow over another's good"; therefore no one is blamed for envy. But a person is rendered blameworthy for any sin. Therefore envy is not a sin.

2. What is not voluntary is not a sin, as Augustine says.†3 But envy, since it is sorrow, is not voluntary: for as Augustine says in Book XIV On the City of God, "Sorrow occurs about those things that befall us against our will."†4 Therefore envy is not a sin.

3. Since good is contrary to evil, good does not move a person to sin, which is evil, just as neither does a contrary move to its contrary.†5 But what moves a person to envy is a good: for Remigius says †6 that envy is sorrow over another's good. Therefore envy is not a sin.

4. Augustine says in Book XIV On the City of God†7 that in every sin there is an inordinate turning to a transitory good. But envy is not a turning to a transitory good but rather a turning away from it, since it is sorrow over another's good. Therefore envy is not a sin.

5. Augustine says in the book On the Free Choice of the Will†8 that every sin is from inordinate desire. But envy since it is sorrow does not proceed from inordinate desire, which is a desire for pleasure. Therefore envy is not a sin.

6. That which cannot possibly occur cannot be a sin. But it seems that it is impossible for someone to envy: for since good is that which all things desire,†9 no one can be sorry about good, which is to envy. Therefore envy cannot be a sin.

7. Every sin consists in some act. But envy since it is sorrow curtails action, which is carried out by reason of the attendant pleasure. Therefore envy curtails sin, consequently it is not a sin.

8. Moral acts are called good or bad according to the formal aspect of the object. But the object of envy is a good, as was said (in arg. 3): because it is sorrow about another's good. Therefore the act of envy is good; consequently it is not a sin.

9. The evil of punishment is distinguished from the evil of fault, as is clear from Augustine.†10 But envy is a kind of penal evil, as Isidore says in the book *De Summo Bono*,†11 "jealousy, i.e. envy, punishes its own author." Therefore envy is not a fault.

10. Augustine says in Book XIV *On the City of God*†12 that every sin is ill-directed love. But envy is not ill-directed love, because love causes us to rejoice over the virtues of a friend and to grieve over his evils. Therefore envy is not a sin.

11. It seems to be graver to be envious of a person's spiritual goods than of his bodily goods. But envy of spiritual goods is not a sin, for Jerome says †13 in regard to the education of a friend's daughter "Let her have companions that she may learn together with them, be stimulated to emulate them, be motivated when they are praised and grieved when she is excelled by them. Therefore envy is not a sin.

On the contrary:

Extremes in moral matters are vices. But envy is a certain extreme, as is evident in Book II of the *Ethics*.†14 Therefore envy is a sin.

Response:

Envy is a sin by reason of its genus.

Since a moral act has its species or is assigned to a genus because of its object, from this it can be known that a particular moral act is evil by reason of its genus, if the act itself is not properly related to its matter or object.

Now it must be noted that the object of the appetitive power is good and evil just as the objects of the intellect are the true and the false. But all the acts of the appetitive power are reduced to two general acts, namely to pursuit and flight, just as likewise the acts of the intellective power are reduced to affirmation and negation, in such a way that pursuit in the appetitive power corresponds to affirmation in the intellect and flight in the appetitive power corresponds to negation in the intellect, as the Philosopher says in Book VI of the *Ethics*.†15 But good is characterized as attractive since good is what all things desire, as is said in Book I of the *Ethics*,†16 and on the contrary evil is characterized as repulsive because evil is contrary to the will and the appetite, as Dionysius says.†17

Consequently, every act of the appetitive power pertaining to pursuit, whose object is evil, is discordant with the matter or object of the appetitive power, and therefore all such acts are sins by reason of their genus, for example, to love evil and to rejoice in evil, just as also to affirm what is false is a vice of the intellect. And similarly, every act pertaining to flight whose object is good, is discordant with the matter or object of the appetitive power, and therefore every such act is a sin by reason of its genus, for example to hate good, to abhor good and to be sorry about it, for also in regard to the intellect it is a vice to deny what is true. Nevertheless for an act to be good it is not sufficient that the act include pursuit of good or flight from evil unless the pursuit is of a proper good and the flight is from an evil that is contrary to that good: because more things are required for good which is achieved by a whole and integral cause than for evil which results from single defects, as

Dionysius says.†18 But envy implies sorrow for good: hence clearly envy is a sin by reason of its genus.

Reply to 1. Since passion is a movement of the sense appetite, as Damascene says,†19 passion considered in itself cannot be a virtue or a vice nor something laudable or blameworthy, because these (virtue or vice) pertain to reason; but according as the sense appetite in some measure partakes of reason inasmuch as it can obey reason, according to this even the passions themselves can be laudable or praiseworthy inasmuch as they can be regulated or restrained. Hence the Philosopher says in the same place †20 that a man is not praised nor is he blamed who simply feels angry but for being angry in a certain way, i.e. according to the order of reason or contrary to it.

Reply to 2. That authority does not say that sorrow is an involuntary movement, but that the object of sorrow is in some measure involuntary; but nothing prevents a man's action in regard to something involuntary that befalls him from being good or bad, namely inasmuch as a person can bear something involuntary well or badly.

Reply to 3. Good considered in itself always moves a person to good, but someone affected by a perverse disposition may be moved as a consequence of good to the evil of envy, just as also because of a sickly condition of the body healthful food may be injurious to a person.

Reply to 4. To be without some good is taken to be a kind of evil, as the Philosopher says;†21 and according to this to be opposed to good through sorrow amounts to the same thing as to be turned towards an evil which is joined to a transitory good inordinately loved.

Reply to 5. Just as good is naturally prior to evil which is a privation of good, so also the passions of the soul whose object is good are naturally prior to those passions of the soul whose object is evil, and on that account arise from the former; and therefore hatred and sorrow are caused by some love, desire or pleasure, and according to this, envy results from some inordinate desire.

Reply to 6. No one can be sorry about good under the aspect of good but a person can be sorry about good inasmuch as it is apprehended under the aspect of evil either real or apparent; and in this way envy is sorrow over another's good, namely inasmuch as it is impeditive of his own excellence.

Reply to 7. Just as an activity is intensified by the pleasure proper to it, so also the pleasure taken in it impedes extraneous activity, as the Philosopher says †22 for example, a person who takes pleasure in learning, studies more intently and is less taken up with other things. So accordingly, the sorrow that occurs from our neighbor's good impedes actions that tend to our neighbor's good, and even incites to contrary acts by which the good of our neighbor is impeded.

Reply to 8. Just as in the love of good there cannot be sin except inasmuch as that which is loved even if it is apprehended under the aspect of good nevertheless is not really good but evil, so also sorrow in regard to a good that is apprehended as evil, which is not really but apparently evil, is nonetheless evil, because it is incompatible with such an object which is really good; for thus a moral act is good by reason of its object inasmuch as the act is in conformity with the object.

Reply to 9. Certain punishments or penalties are attached to certain sins, and then penalty and fault are the same under different aspects: fault, according as it (the sin) proceeds from the disordered will of man, and thus it is not from God, and penalty, according as it has a certain attendant pain pertaining to punishment, and this is from God, according to that Psalm 49, 21 "I will reprove thee and set before thy face"; and so too Augustine says in Book I of the Confessions †23 "Thou has commanded, Lord, and so it is that every disordered soul is its own punishment." And in this way envy can be both a penalty and a fault.

Reply to 10. Every sin is ill-directed love so far as concerns its cause but not as concerns its essence: because every affection of the soul, even sorrow, proceeds from love, as Augustine says in the same book.†24

Reply to 11. Aristotle in Book II of the Rhetoric, distinguishing between zeal and envy, says †25 that emulation of good things possessed by others is the mark of virtuous persons, "whereas envying is perverse and the mark of perverse persons." For the zealous person on account of emulation takes steps to obtain the good things in question, but the envious on account of envy takes steps to stop his neighbor having them: for envy is felt when someone is sorry that his neighbor possesses good things which he does not have, but zeal is felt when a person is sorry that he himself does not have the good things his neighbor has. Now Jerome in the passage quoted (in arg. 11) takes envy as zeal: for it is praiseworthy for a person learning to strive to learn what another is learning, according to the Apostle in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (12, 32) "Be zealous for the better gifts."

Question 10, Article 2 †p

Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Gregory says †1 that "It very often happens that without charity being lost, the downfall of our enemy gladdens us and his glory saddens us . . . ," etc. But this is to envy. Therefore envy does not exclude charity, and so it is not called a mortal sin.

2. Damascene says †2 that passion is a movement of the sense appetite. But this movement is called sensuality, as Augustine says in Book XII On the Trinity;†3 therefore envy since it is a passion of the soul, is in the sense appetite, in which there is only venial sin, as Augustine says in the same book.†4 Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

3. Just as acts which are good by reason of their genus can become evil, but those which are evil by reason of their genus cannot become good, as Augustine says in the book Against Lying,†5 so those that are venial by reason of their genus can become mortal, but those that are mortal by reason of their genus by no means can become venial, as is obvious in the case of homicide and adultery. But not all envy is a mortal sin. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus.

4. A sin of deed is graver than a sin of the heart †6 in the same genus. But to impede the good of a neighbor by a deed is not always a mortal sin. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin to be sorry about a neighbor's good, which is to envy.

5. In virtuous men there cannot be mortal sin. But a movement of envy can arise in them surreptitiously. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

6. There cannot be mortal sin in infants not yet able to talk because they do not yet have the use of reason, on which alone mortal sin depends. But there can be envy in children: for Augustine says †7 "I myself have seen and known an infant to be envious; though he could not yet speak he became pale and cast bitter looks at his foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

7. Every mortal sin is contrary to the order of charity. But envy which is sorrow about another's good inasmuch as it redounds to one's own harm, is not opposed to the order of charity, according to which everyone ought to love himself more than another, and his neighbors more than strangers, as Ambrose says.†8 Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

8. Every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is not contrary to any virtue but to a certain passion, which the Philosopher calls 'nemesis' i.e. righteous indignation.†9 Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. Gregory in Book VI of the Moralia explaining that text of Proverbs 14, 30 "Envy is a rottenness of the bones," says: "Because of the vice of envy even valiant acts of virtue are worthless in the sight of God."†10 But only mortal sin causes this. Therefore envy is a mortal sin.

2. In the Itinerarium Clementis,†11 Peter is reported as saying that three sins in equal measure deserve punishment: when someone murders with his own hand, when he detracts with his tongue, and when he envies or hates with his heart. But murder is a mortal sin. Therefore also envy.

3. Isidore says †12 "There is no virtue to which envy is not opposed, for only pity is without envy." But nothing is contrary to every virtue except mortal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal sin.

4. As Augustine says on that Psalm 104, 25 †13 "He turned their heart to hate his people", "envy is hatred of another's good fortune." But hatred is inveterate anger, as he himself says in Book XI of his Literal Commentary on Genesis.†14 Therefore all envy is something inveterate, and so it cannot be a venial sin as if stealing upon one unawares.

5. Nothing causes spiritual death except mortal sin. But envy causes spiritual death according to Job (5, 2) "Envy slays the little ones, and on that text in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (2, 15), "We are the fragrance of Christ", the Gloss says †15 "This fragrance gives life to those who love, brings death to those who envy." Therefore envy is a mortal sin.

Response:

As was said (in q. 10, a. 1), the genus or species of a moral act is assigned according to the matter or object; from which matter or object a moral act is also called good or bad according to its genus. But the life of the soul comes from charity which unites us with God through Whom the soul lives, hence it is said in the First Epistle of John (3, 14) "He who does not love abides in death", for death is the privation of life.

When therefore from a comparison of an act with its matter something opposed to charity is perceived in it, that act must needs be a mortal sin by reason of its genus, for example, to murder a man signifies something contrary to charity by which we love our neighbor and want him to live and to be and to have other good things: for this is of the nature of friendship, as the Philosopher says in Book IX of the Ethics†16 and therefore murder is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. If however from the comparison of the act with its object something is not found to be contrary to charity, it is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus, for example to speak an idle word or other such acts; which however can become mortal sins by reason of something else supervening, as was said above (in q. 7, a. 3). But envy implies something opposed to charity from the very comparison of the act with its object: for it is of the nature of friendship to will good to our friends as we do to ourselves, as is said in Book IX of the Ethics,†17 because a friend is as it were another self; hence for someone to be sorry about another's happiness is manifestly contrary to charity, inasmuch as through it (charity) our neighbor is loved, Hence Augustine says †18 "He who envies a good singer does not love the good singer." Hence envy by reason of its genus is a mortal sin.

Nevertheless we must bear in mind that in the genus of any mortal sin some act can be found which is not a mortal sin on account of its imperfection, namely because it does not fulfill all the requirements of the formal nature of that genus. Which can occur in two ways: in one way on the part of the active principle, namely because the act does not proceed from reason deliberating, which is the proper and chief active principle of human acts; hence sudden movements even in the genus of homicide or adultery are not mortal sins, because

they do not fulfill all the requirements of the formal nature of a moral act, whose principle is reason. In another way this can occur as regards the object, which on account of its smallness does not fulfill the formal nature of 'object'; for reason takes what is small as nothing,†19 as is clear in the species of theft; for if someone takes one ear of corn from another's field or the like, it should not be assumed that he sins mortally, because this is regarded as nothing both by the one who takes it and by the one who owns it.

Accordingly then it can happen that a movement of envy is not a mortal sin, even though envy is a mortal sin according to its genus, on account of the imperfection of the very movement itself, either because it is sudden and does not proceed from deliberate reason, or because a man is sorry about another's good which is so small that it is not deemed to be of any importance, for instance if a person is envious of the winner of a game they are playing such as racing with him or some such sport.

Reply to 1. Since that which is accidental (per accidens) is not stated in the definition of a thing but only what is essential (per se), when it is said that envy is sorrow about another's happiness or glory, it must be understood according as someone is sorry about another's happiness as such, about which he is sorry for this reason that he wants to excel in a singular way; hence he who is surpassed by someone in glory or happiness, and is grieved about this, is properly said to envy. But someone may be sorry about another's happiness for other reasons, which do not pertain to envy but sometimes to other vices; for whoever hates a person is sorry about his happiness not inasmuch as it is a certain excellence but inasmuch as it is simply a good of him whom he hates: for when a person wills evil to an enemy, it follows that he is sorry about any good his enemy has. Hence the difference between him who envies and him who hates is that the envious person is sorry about another's good only because he is surpassed, or is deprived of the singularity of his own glory; but the one who hates is sorry about any good whatsoever of his enemy. There can also be another reason why someone is sorry about another's happiness, namely because he is afraid some harm may befall himself or those he loves from another's good fortune, which pertains more to fear than to envy, as the Philosopher says in Book II of the Rhetoric.†20 But fear may be either good or bad: hence this fear can occur either with sin, when the fear is bad, or without sin, when the fear is good; hence Gregory explaining the words quoted in the objection adds that †21". . . we believe this, with the fall of this man that other persons will deservedly rise, and with the elevation of that man we fear that many will be unjustly oppressed", hence he also interposes †22 that such sorrow is without the fault of envy.

Reply to 2. When the movement is of sensuality alone it cannot be a mortal sin, but when the movement of sorrow proceeds from the deliberation of reason, then not only is it a movement of sensuality but also of reason, and therefore it can be a mortal sin. Although it can also be said that the names of such passions sometimes signify simple movements of the will itself; and according to this, sorrow will not be in sensuality but in the rational part of the soul.

Reply to 3. That which is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial if the act is perfect, i.e. fulfills all the requirements of that genus of moral act, nevertheless it can happen on account of the imperfection of the act as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 4. Impeding someone's good can be without mortal sin on account of the imperfection of the act, because that which is impeded does not have the complete nature of good or because it is small or because it is not rightly deserved.

Reply to 5. A sudden and indeliberate movement of envy is imperfect; and such a movement of envy occurs even in children who do not have the use of reason.

Reply to 6. The response to the sixth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 7. Whenever a man is sorry about another's happiness on account of the harm that thereby

threatens himself or his family, such sorrow does not pertain to envy but to fear; hence sometimes this can be without sin, as was said above (in the Reply to 1).

Reply to 8. Envy has regard to two objects, for envy is sorrow about the prosperity of a good person. And according to this envy can be contrary to two virtues: for as regards the prosperity about which someone is sorry, pity which is sorrow for the adversity befalling good persons is contrary to envy; but as regards the good person for whose prosperity someone is sorry, righteous anger after the manner of zeal †23 to which nemesis refers i.e. when a person is grieved because some evil men prosper in their wickedness, is opposed to envy. And although pity and righteous anger (i.e. nemesis) seem to be passions according to the aspect of sorrow, nevertheless inasmuch as the choice of reason supervenes they take on the nature of virtue.

Replies to the arguments On the contrary:

1. Gregory is speaking there of envy as it is a mortal sin. And it is also of such envy of the heart that St. Peter is speaking (in the second argument On the contrary), which indeed deserves equal punishment with homicide as regards the kind of punishment, since both deserve eternal punishment.

2. The answer to the second argument is evident from the foregoing.

3. Mortal sin is opposed to the virtue of the sinner, but envy as Isidore says, is opposed to every virtue not of the sinner himself but of the person he envies; hence it cannot be proved from this that envy is a mortal sin.

4. Envy is not hatred of man but of happiness, according as under hatred are comprehended all the passions of the soul that tend to evil which derive from hatred. And the statement of Augustine that hatred is inveterate anger is not to be understood as though all hatred is of this kind, as is a particular state of the movement of hatred, but that inveterate anger causes hatred.

5. Those authorities are speaking of envy as it is a mortal sin.

Question X, Article 3 †p

Whether Envy is a Capital Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. It pertains to a capital vice to have daughters, but it does not pertain to it to be the daughter of another vice. But envy is the daughter of pride, as Augustine says.†1 Therefore envy is not a capital vice.

2. Envy is a kind of sorrow, as we have already said (in q. 10, a. 2, Reply to 1). But sorrow signifies a sort of terminus of an appetitive movement: for when a person incurs an evil that he had formerly hated, he becomes sorrowful. Therefore envy is not a capital vice, because it is of the nature of a capital vice that from it all other vices have their origin.†2

3. Certain daughters are assigned to each capital vice. But envy does not seem to have any daughters: for in Book XXX of the Moralia†3 Gregory assigns to it five daughters which are hatred, tale-bearing i.e. gossiping, detraction, exulting over another's misfortune, sorrow over another's prosperity, none of which seem to be daughters of envy, for hatred arises rather from anger, and tale-bearing, detraction, and exulting over another's misfortunes arise from hatred, and sorrow over another's prosperity seems to be the same as envy. Therefore envy is not a capital vice.

On the contrary:

Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia enumerates envy among the capital vices.†4

Response:

As was said above (in q. 8, a. 1), they are capital vices from which other vices naturally arise as being their end or final cause. But an end has the nature of good; and the appetite tends in the same manner to good and to the enjoyment of good, that is, pleasure, and therefore just as from the intention of good the appetite is moved to pursue a thing, so also from the intention of pleasure.

But we must take into consideration that just as good is the end of the appetitive movement which is pursuit, so evil is the end of the appetitive movement which is flight:†5 for just as a person who wills to obtain a good pursues it, so a person who wills to be free from an evil flees from it, and just as pleasure is the enjoyment of good, so sorrow is a kind of malice according to which the soul is oppressed by evil; and therefore from the fact that a person rejects the sorrow, he is induced to do many things by which he fends off the sorrow or to which the sorrow inclines him. Since then envy is sorrow over another's glory inasmuch as it is apprehended as an evil, it follows that a person out of envy tends to do certain inordinate acts against his neighbor, and according to this envy is a capital vice.

Now in that effort of envy, something is as it were a beginning or initial stage and something as it were a terminus. The beginning or initial stage of this effort is the envious person's intention to exclude the glory of another which grieves him; which is accomplished by diminishing the other's good character or by speaking evil of him both secretly, which is done by tale-bearing or gossiping, and openly, which is done by detraction. On the other hand the terminus of this effort can be considered in two ways: in one way in respect to him who is envied; and in this way the movement of envy sometimes terminates in hatred, namely inasmuch as a man is not only sorry about another's greater excellence but further, simply wills him evil. In another way the terminus of this effort can be taken as regards the envier himself, who if he can attain the intended end of diminishing his neighbor's glory, rejoices, and thus exulting over another's misfortunes is designated as a daughter of envy; but if he is unable to attain his purpose, namely of impeding his neighbor's glory, he is sorrowful, and thus sorrow over another's prosperity is designated as a daughter of envy.

Reply to 1. As Gregory says,†6 pride is the common mother of all vices; hence envy is not excluded from being a capital vice by the fact that it is a daughter of pride.

Reply to 2. Although sorrow is the terminus i.e. last in execution, it is the first in intention, namely inasmuch as many other movements have their origin in flight from sorrow.

Reply to 3. Nothing prevents the same vices from originating from diverse vices from different motives. Hatred, then, has its origin from anger according as he who provoked to anger inflicted an injury, and from envy according as the good of the person envied is perceived as an obstacle to one's own excellence; in like manner also tale-bearing and detraction and exulting over another's misfortunes arise from hatred inasmuch as hatred belittles or disparages every good of his enemy and by devious means contrives his downfall. These vices arise from envy for the sole purpose of removing excellence. But sorrow at another's prosperity is in a certain manner envy itself and in a certain manner its daughter: for according as a person is sorry about someone's prosperity inasmuch as he is opposed to someone's singular excellence, thus it is envy itself; but according as a person is sorry about someone's prosperity for this reason that it comes about despite his effort to impede it, thus it is a daughter of envy.

Question XI

On Acedia †1

Article 1 †p

Whether Acedia Is a Sin?

It seems that it is not a sin, for the following reasons.

1. Virtue and sin, since they are contraries, are in the same genus.†2 But virtue is in the genus of love: for Augustine says in the book *On the Morals of the Church*†3 and in *Book XV On the City of God*†4 that virtue is well-ordered love. Since then acedia is not in the genus of love but rather is a kind of sadness, as Damascene says,†5 it seems that acedia is not a sin.

2. On "Let us acknowledge to the Lord his mercies . . .," etc. (Psalm 105, 1), the Gloss †6 enumerates four temptations: error, the difficulty of overcoming concupiscence, tedium, and the tempestuous world. But error, difficulty, and the tempestuous world are not sins. Therefore neither is tedium, i.e. acedia a sin.

3. Every sin is man's, according to Osee (13, 9) "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." But acedia since it is a kind of sadness is not from man, because on that text "Not grudgingly (ex tristitia) or from compulsion . . .," etc. (Second Epistle to the Corinthians (9, 7), the Gloss†7 says "If you act with sadness, the act is done by you but you do not act." Therefore acedia is not a sin.

4. It is not possible for an act to be at the same time meritorious and sinful. But an act done with tedium or weariness is meritorious: for example, when a person fasts by reason of a vow or out of obedience, and yet the fasting itself is saddening, and hence in that act there is acedia, which is sadness about the spiritual good of virtue. Therefore acedia is not always a sin.

5. Damascene says †8 that acedia is an oppressive sadness. But oppression seems to be a punishment rather than a fault. Therefore acedia is not a sin but rather a punishment.

6. Acedia seems to be a sadness or tedium concerning an interior good,†9 about which it is said in the Gloss on Psalm 106, 18 †10 "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat." If then acedia is a sin, either it is a sin because the soul does not welcome a spiritual good, or because spurning it, it embraces a bodily good. But acedia cannot be a sin because the soul does not embrace spiritual good, since not-embracing is not an act but a privation of a sort, and all praise and blame follow upon an act, as the Philosopher says,†11 but blame is incurred for sin. It remains then, if acedia is a sin, that it is a sin because having spurned a spiritual good it pursues some bodily good; but pursuit of good seems to pertain to the concupiscible power, just as fleeing from evil pertains to the irascible power. Therefore it seems that acedia is in the concupiscible power though it seems to pertain rather to the irascible power.

7. Gregory says in *Book XI of the Moralia*†12 that acedia is an internal sadness of the mind owing to which a person prays or sings less devoutly. But it is not within man's power to pray devoutly; therefore it is not in man's power to avoid acedia. Consequently acedia is not a sin because no one sins in respect to that which he cannot avoid.†13

8. Damascene †14 takes acedia to be a species of sadness, which is one of the four passions. But passions are not sins, because we are neither praised nor blamed for them.†15 Therefore acedia is not a sin.

9. That which the wise choose is not a sin. But the wise choose acedia or sadness; for it is said in

Ecclesiastes (7, 5) "The heart of the wise is where there is mourning (tristitia)." Therefore acedia or sadness is not a sin.

10. That which God rewards is not a sin. But God rewards sadness: for it is said in Malachias (3, 14) in the person of the wicked: "What profit is it that we have kept his ordinances, and that we have walked sorrowful before the Lord." Therefore acedia or sadness is not a sin.

On the contrary:

Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia†16 enumerates acedia among the other sins, and also Isidore in the book De Summo Bono.†17

Response:

As is clear from Damascene,†18 acedia is kind of sadness, hence too Gregory †19 sometimes puts sadness in place of acedia; but the object of sadness is a present evil, as Damascene says.†20 Now just as good is twofold, one that is really good and the other that is apparently good because it is in some respect good, for that is not really good which is not good simply, i.e. in every respect, so also evil is twofold, one that is really and simply evil and another which is apparently and in some respect evil but is really good simply.

Therefore just as the love and desire and pleasure concerned with what are really good are praiseworthy, but concerned with what are an apparent good and not really good are blameworthy, so also the hatred, distaste, and sadness concerned with what is really evil are praiseworthy, but concerned with what is in some respect or apparently evil but simply good, are blameworthy and are sins. Now acedia is a tedium or sadness concerning a spiritual and internal good, as Augustine says †21 on that Psalm 106, 18 "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat"; and therefore since an internal and spiritual good is really good and can only appear to be evil, namely inasmuch as it is contrary to carnal desires, it is evident that acedia is of itself (de se) a sin.

But we must take into account that acedia since it is a sadness can be considered in two ways: in one way according as it is an act of the sense appetite, in another way according as it is an act of the intellective appetite, which is the will: for all the names of such affections according as they are acts of the sense appetite are certain passions, but according as they are acts of the intellective appetite are simple movements of the will. But sin of itself (per se) and strictly speaking is in the will as Augustine says.†22 And therefore if acedia designates an act of the will fleeing from an internal and spiritual good, it can have the nature of sin simply, but if acedia is taken according as it is an act of the sense appetite, it has nature of sin only if it derives from the will, namely inasmuch as such a movement of the sense appetite can be prevented by the will: consequently if it is not prevented, acedia has to some extent the nature of sin but imperfectly.

Reply to 1. Love is the principle or source of all the affections, as is clear from Augustine in Book XIV On the City of God†23 and therefore when it is said that virtue is well-ordered love, the predication is by way of the cause, not by way of the essence:†24 for not every virtue is essentially love, but every virtuous affection derives from some well-ordered love, and similarly every sinful affection derives from some disordered love.

Reply to 2. That mode of arguing is not valid; for it does not necessarily follow that whatever is predicated of one of the members that divide something common is also predicated of the others: for those things which are enumerated one after the other as dividing something common, share in that common thing, but not necessarily in anything else. Hence those four temptations agree in what is common to them which is temptation, yet nothing prevents one of them from being a sin and the others not being sins; for instance temptation which is from the flesh is not without sin, but temptation which is from the enemy can be entirely without sin.†25

Reply to 3. Acts that are done out of sadness or fear are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, as is said in Book III of the Ethics,†26 and insofar as they partake of the involuntary they are not from us; nevertheless the very movement of sadness is from us.

Reply to 4. Nothing prevents some work considered in itself from being disagreeable which nevertheless is pleasurable according as it is referred to the service of God, wherefore even the martyrs are said to have sown in tears, as Augustine explains;†27 nor is that sadness pertaining to passion acedia: since that sadness does not concern an interior good but an exterior evil: for the martyrs rejoiced over the interior good, and so much the more was that joy meritorious as the exterior evil was more painful. And similarly if someone voluntarily fulfilling obedience or a command is sad about some distressing or laborious work, such sadness is not acedia, because it is not about an interior good but about an exterior evil.

Reply to 5. Sadness is said to be oppressive inasmuch as it suppresses passion so that it does not rise to act, and according to this the oppressive sadness concerning good works has the nature of fault rather than punishment, because it originates from us.

Reply to 6. The irascible and concupiscible powers are not distinguished according to pursuit and flight, because it belongs to the same power to pursue good and to flee the opposite evil; rather they are distinguished according to this that pursuit of the arduous good or flight from the arduous evil pertain to the irascible power, but pursuit or flight from the absolute good pertain to the concupiscible power. And according to this just as hope and fear pertain to the irascible power, so joy and sadness pertain to the concupiscible power, hence acedia according as it is in the sense appetite is in the concupiscible power. But nonetheless it does not necessarily follow from the fact that acedia flees from a spiritual good that it is not a sin, because the flight itself is a certain appetitive movement and is not solely a privation, and because even if it were a solely a privation, i.e. not embracing a spiritual good, even this could have the nature of fault. and then it is said to be a sin of omission.

Reply to 7. Man's devotion is from God. Nevertheless inasmuch as man can dispose himself to having devotion or can even impede devotion, according to this, lack of devotion is a sin; although in the authority cited it is not said that acedia is lack of devotion but that lack of devotion proceeds from acedia.

Reply to 8. Damascene is not speaking of acedia as it is a sin, namely according as it is sadness concerning an internal spiritual good, but universally according as acedia is sadness concerning any evil; and therefore he is speaking of acedia according as it is a species of passion and not according as it is a sin.

Replies to 9 and 10. To the ninth and tenth arguments it must be said that those arguments are valid concerning sadness about that which is evil simply; which is praiseworthy.

Question XI, Article 2 †p

Whether Acedia Is a Special Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Acedia, since it is sadness, is opposed to joy. But joy is not a special virtue: for any virtuous person finds enjoyment in his own act of virtue, as is evident in Book I of the Ethics.†1 Therefore sadness concerning a spiritual good is not a special sin.

2. That which follows on every sin is not a special sin. But sadness concerning spiritual good follows on every sin: for that is saddening to anyone which is contrary to him; and indeed some spiritual good of virtue is contrary to every sin. Therefore acedia is not a special sin.

3. But it was argued that acedia is sadness about spiritual good for a special reason, namely inasmuch as it is impeditive of bodily rest or relaxation. But counter to this: to seek bodily rest or relaxation pertains to carnal vices. Now to desire something and to be sorry that it is impeded amounts to the same thing; if then the only reason that acedia is a special sin is that it is impeditive of bodily rest or relaxation, it would follow that acedia is a carnal sin, whereas Gregory lists acedia among the spiritual sins, as is evident in Book XXXI of the *Moralia*.†2 Therefore acedia is not a special sin.

On the contrary:

Gregory enumerates acedia with the other (capital) vices in Book XXXI of the *Moralia*,†3 therefore it is a special sin.

Response:

If acedia were simply sadness concerning any spiritual good, for any reason whatsoever, it would follow necessarily that acedia would not be a special sin but a kind of consequence of every sin; therefore in order to affirm that acedia is a special sin we have to establish that it is sadness concerning a spiritual good for some special reason. But it cannot be said that this special reason consists in its (acedia's) being impeditive of some bodily good, since according to this acedia would not be a sin distinct from that sin pertaining to that bodily good: since a person delights in a good and flees that which is impeditive of it for the same reason, just as also in natural things it is by reason of the same natural power that a heavy object leaves a higher place and tends to a lower place;†4 and in view of this we see that just as a person takes delight in food on account of gluttony, so also it is because of the same vice that he is sad about abstinence from food. But even if being impeditive of a bodily good is the reason why spiritual good is saddening, nevertheless it is not the reason why the sadness about this good is a special sin.

Therefore we have to consider that nothing prevents a thing considered in itself from being a special good, which nevertheless is a common end of many things: and accordingly charity is a special virtue, because it is first and principally love of a divine good, but secondarily a love of the good of our neighbors; a good of which kind is the end of all or many other goods. So accordingly a work of some special virtue, say chastity, can be lovable and delightful in two ways: in one way according as it is the work of this virtue, and this is proper to chastity, in another way, according as it is ordered to a divine good, and this is proper to charity.

Therefore in answer to this question we must affirm that to be sad about this special good which is an internal and divine good makes acedia a special sin, just as to love this good makes charity a special virtue. Now this divine good is saddening to man on account of the opposition of the spirit to the flesh, because as the Apostle says in Galatians 5, 17 "The flesh lusts against the spirit"; and therefore when love of the flesh is dominant in man he loathes spiritual good as if something contrary to himself, just as a man with embittered taste finds wholesome food distasteful and is grieved about it whenever he has to take such food. Therefore such distress and abhorrence or weariness (tedium) about a spiritual and divine good is acedia, which is a special sin; hence to repel this, the wise man advises in Ecclesiasticus (6, 26) "Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her (wisdom), and be not grieved (accedieris) with her bands."

Reply to 1. Joy in a spiritual and divine good pertains to a special virtue which is charity, according to that text of Galatians 5, 20 "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace."

Reply to 2. Any sinner is sad about spiritual good according to the special nature of that virtue to which his sin is opposed: but according to the nature of a divine spiritual good, which is the special object of charity, his enmity about it proceeds from acedia.

Reply to 3. The answer to the third argument is evident from what has been said (in the Response): for

opposition to bodily rest or relaxation, makes spiritual good saddening but it does not establish a special nature of sin.

Question XI, Article 3 †p

Whether Acedia Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. No mortal sin is found in wholly virtuous men. But acedia is a sadness found in wholly virtuous men, of whom the Apostle says in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians 6, 10 "As sorrowful yet always rejoicing." Therefore acedia is not a mortal sin.

2. Every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of God. But acedia does not seem to be contrary to any precept, for no precept about joy is included among the ten commandments. Therefore acedia is not a mortal sin.

3. Since sadness concerns a present evil, as Damascene says,†1 acedia which is a kind of sadness must be concerned with a present evil, which is really a good but appears to be evil. But it cannot be about the really good which is an uncreated good: both because the presence of such a good has no tedium or bitterness, for in the book of Wisdom 8, 16 it is said of divine wisdom that "her conversation has no bitterness nor her company any tediousness"; and also because if an uncreated good is present, mortal sin cannot be present; therefore it remains that acedia is sadness about some present created good. But turning away from a created good does not constitute a mortal sin but only turning away from an uncreated unchangeable good. Therefore acedia is not a mortal sin.

4. A sin of deed in the same genus is not less grave than a sin of the heart.†2 But to refrain in deed from some created spiritual good which leads to God is not a mortal sin: for whoever does not fast or whoever fails to pray does not sin mortally. Therefore even withdrawal of the heart from a created good by reason of sadness is not always a mortal sin; and consequently acedia is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus, because if this were the case it would always be a mortal sin, like homicide and adultery.

5. But it was argued that to refrain in deed from some created good of obligation constitutes a mortal sin. But counter to this: works that are not obligatory sometimes are more spiritual, and nevertheless to refrain from these is not a mortal sin unless they become necessary by reason of a vow; indeed it is not even a sin if someone does not observe virginity or poverty [otherwise everyone would have to observe the counsels]. Therefore neither is every sadness about spiritual good a mortal sin.

6. To refrain in deed from some spiritual good is a mortal sin only inasmuch as a person is obliged to do that good work. But even if a person is obliged to do a certain spiritual good work, nevertheless he is not obliged to do it with joy, because joy taken in a work is a sign of an inhering habit;†3 and so those who do not have the habit of virtue cannot be obliged to do this. Therefore even acedia concerning a spiritual good that is obligatory is not a mortal sin.

7. Every mortal sin is contrary to the spiritual life. However it does not necessarily pertain to the spiritual life that a person work joyfully but it suffices that he do the work; otherwise whoever would do a work he is obliged to do, if he were not to find joy in it, would sin mortally. Therefore acedia which is contrary to spiritual joy is not a mortal sin.

8. Not all concupiscence is a mortal sin, because the tendency to concupiscence is imminent in us by

reason of the corruption of man's nature. But by reason of the same corruption the tendency to desist from effort and to avoid labor is imminent in us; which seems to pertain to acedia. Therefore not all acedia is a mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. Damascene says,†4 that acedia is a kind of sorrow, but it is not a sorrow according to God because thus it would not be a sin; therefore it is a sorrow according to the world. But as the Apostle says in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (7, 10) "The sorrow that is according to the world worketh death." Therefore acedia is a mortal sin.

2. Augustine †5 commenting on Jacob saying to his sons "You will bring down my old age with sorrow unto the underworld" (Genesis 42, 38)†6 says that Jacob seems to have feared that he would be so disturbed by too much sorrow that he would not go to the peace of the blessed but to the hell of sinners. But everything of the kind that keeps a person from the peace of the blessed and brings him to the hell of sinners is a mortal sin. Therefore the sadness which is acedia is a mortal sin.

3. On that Psalm 42, 5 "Why art thou sad, O my soul" the Gloss says †7 that "this teaches that we must flee the sadness of the world which extinguishes patience and charity and hope, and confounds the whole virtuous life." Therefore acedia is a mortal sin: for we call that which extinguishes charity and the other virtues a mortal sin.

Response:

From what has been said previously (in q. 11, a. 2) it can easily be shown that acedia according as it is a special sin is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. For acedia signifies a kind of sadness from the repugnance of human affections to a spiritual divine good: indeed such opposition is obviously contrary to charity, which adheres to a divine good and rejoices in it. Since then what is contrary to charity, which gives life to the soul, makes a sin mortal, it clearly follows that acedia is a mortal sin by reason of its genus: because as we read in the First Epistle of John (3, 14) "He who does not love abides in death."

Moreover, we must take note of the fact that just as envy which is sorrow over a neighbor's good is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, inasmuch as it is contrary to charity as regards the love of neighbor, so acedia which is sadness about a spiritual divine good, is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, inasmuch as it is contrary to charity as regards the love of God. Nevertheless it is true in all sins which are mortal by reason of their genus, that imperfect movements in the genus of such sins, namely movements that are without the deliberation of reason, are not mortal sins; consequently such movements of acedia are venial sins, as was said above about movements of envy (in q. 10, a. 2). But when carnal affection so prevails over reason that man deliberately is sorrowful about a spiritual divine good, obviously such a movement of the will is a mortal sin.

Reply to 1. In wholly virtuous men an imperfect movement of acedia can occur at least in sensuality, because no one is so perfect that some opposition of the flesh to the spirit does not remain in him. However the Apostle does not seem to be speaking there of the sadness about spiritual good, which is acedia, but rather of sadness concerning temporal evils.

Reply to 2. Acedia is contrary to the command of keeping holy the Sabbath, in which repose of the mind in God is commanded according as it is a moral precept.

Reply to 3. God, inasmuch as He is present to the mind, does not permit sadness or mortal sin with Him; hence acedia is not sadness about the presence of God Himself but sadness about some good pertaining to Him which is divine by participation.

Reply to 4. Acedia is not a withdrawal of the mind from every spiritual good but from a spiritual good to which the mind ought necessarily to adhere, which is a divine good, as has already been said (in the Response).

Reply to 5. [The answer to the fifth argument evident from the foregoing.]†8

Reply to 6. That argument is valid about the spiritual good of some act of a particular virtue; for, that a person should take joy does not fall under a precept but that he should take joy in God does fall under a precept, just as that man should love God, because joy follows upon love.

Reply to 7. The joy which arises from charity, to which acedia is opposed, necessarily belongs to spiritual life, as does charity itself, and for this reason acedia is a mortal sin.

Reply to 8. Just as the concupiscence that occurs in sensuality alone, which derives from the corruption of human nature, is not a mortal sin because it is an imperfect movement, so also neither is acedia of this kind a mortal sin.

Question XI, Article 4 †p

Whether Acedia Is a Capital Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Just as joy proceeds from love, so sadness proceeds from hatred. But hatred is not a capital vice. Therefore much less is acedia, which is a kind of sadness.

2. Those vices are called capital which move a person to other sinful acts. But acedia does not seem to be of this nature but seems rather to immobilize a person; for it is an oppressive sadness, as Damascene says.†1 Therefore acedia is not a capital vice.

3. A vice is capital that has daughters assigned to it. But they do not seem to be daughters of acedia which are assigned to it by Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia:†2 for malice is common to all sins, and rancor pertains to hatred, which is born of anger, moreover pusillanimity and despair pertain to the irascible power, but acedia is not in that power but rather in the concupiscible power, and sluggishness about what is commanded seems to be the same as acedia, on the other hand wandering of the mind seems to be contrary to the nature of sadness, which is constrictive. Therefore acedia ought not to be assigned as a capital vice.

On the contrary:

The authority of Gregory who enumerates acedia among the capital vices in Book XXXI of the Moralia.†3

Response:

As was stated above (in q. 8, a. 1), a vice is capital which gives rise to other vices as being their final cause. Now just as men proceed to do or to avoid many things on account of the pursuit of pleasure, so also on account of flight from sadness: for both seem to be for the same reason, i.e. to seek good and to flee from evil. Since then acedia is a kind of sadness about an internal divine good, as envy is concerning our neighbor's good as was said (in q. 11, a. 3), just as many vices arise from envy inasmuch as man does many inordinate acts to repel such sadness that results from our neighbor's good, in such a way too acedia is a capital vice.

And indeed since no one can long endure sadness without joy, as the Philosopher says,†4 therefore two

effects follow from sadness, one of which is that a person withdraws from the saddening things; the other is that he turns to other things in which he finds pleasure. And in accord with this the Philosopher says in Book II of the Ethics†5 that those who are incapable of enjoying spiritual pleasures, for the most part devote themselves to bodily pleasures; and thus out of the sadness which is conceived about spiritual goods, there follows a wandering of the mind after illicit things in which the carnal soul finds pleasure; but in the flight from such sadness the process observed is that first a person flees from those things, secondly he attacks them. And to the flight from spiritual goods which can give pleasure pertains both the withdrawal from the divine good hoped for, and this is despair; and in turn a withdrawal from spiritual good works to be done: which at least as regards the things applicable to everyone which are necessary for salvation, is sluggishness about the commandments, but as regards the arduous things which fall under the counsels, it is pusillanimity i.e. faint-heartedness. And further, if a person is kept occupied against his will with spiritual goods that sadden him, first he may conceive indignation against prelates or any persons keeping him occupied with such matters, and this is rancor; but secondly he may conceive anger and hatred even against the spiritual goods themselves, and this strictly speaking is malice.

Reply to 1. Among the virtues love i.e. charity from which joy arises is regarded as the principal virtue, because the divine good and the good of our neighbor are of themselves loveable; and are not of themselves hateable but only inasmuch as they are saddening on account of something accidental. And therefore capital vices are taken according to sadness rather than according to hatred.

Reply to 2. Acedia immobilizes the person subject to it as regards those things that are the cause of his sadness, but it renders its subject prompt in regard to contrary things.

Reply to 3. Malice is not taken there as it is common to every sin but as it implies a kind of opposition or hostility to spiritual goods. Indeed nothing prevents rancor from being generated by anger and also by acedia: for the same thing can be caused by diverse causes in different respects. And the fact that pusillanimity and despair pertain to the irascible power does not prevent them from being caused by acedia: since all the passions of the irascible power have their origin from the concupiscible passions. And sluggishness about things to be done is not sadness itself but the effect of sadness. Hence sadness arises from acedia, as though from acedia's very constricture, the heart is weighed down; and consequently the heart fleeing such heaviness wanders after other things.

Question 12

Question XII

On Anger

Article 1 †p

Whether All Anger Is Evil or Is Some Anger Good?

It seems all anger is evil, for the following reasons.

1. Jerome in his exposition of Matthew (5, 22) "Everyone who is angry with his brother . . .," etc. says, "In some codices 'without cause' is added; however in the authentic codices the statement is unqualified and anger is completely forbidden: for if we are commanded to pray for those who persecute us, every occasion for anger is eliminated. 'Without cause' then should be deleted, since the anger of man does not work the justice of God."†1 Therefore all anger is evil and forbidden.

2. As Dionysius says,†2 fierceness is natural in a dog but contrary to the nature of man. But that which is

contrary to the nature of man is evil and a sin, as is clear from Damascene in Book I On the Orthodox Faith.†3 Therefore all anger is a sin.

3. The evil of the human soul lies in activity contrary to reason, as Dionysius says in the same place.†4 But anger is always contrary to reason: for the Philosopher says "anger seems to listen to reason to some extent, but to mishear it,"†5 but to hear to some extent is to hear poorly, as he afterwards explains.†6 Therefore anger is always evil.

4. In Matthew (7, 3-5) the Lord denounces the man who, having a beam in his own eye, wants to cast out a mote from another's eye. Therefore much more to be denounced is he who sets up a beam in his own eye in order to cast out a mote from another's eye. But such a one is anyone who in anger undertakes to correct another: for Cassian says in Book VIII of the Institutes that "any intense movement of anger blinds the eye of the soul."†7 Therefore he who in anger undertakes to correct his brother is to be denounced; and much more if a person is angry for any other reason whatsoever.

5. Man's perfection consists in imitating the divine; hence it is said in Matthew (5, 48) "You therefore are to be perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect." But as is said in Wisdom (12, 18) "God judges with tranquillity." "Anger, however, deprives of peace of mind," as Gregory says in Book V of the Moralia.†8 Therefore all anger detracts from human perfection, namely as keeping us from a likeness to God.

6. Everything that is good or morally indifferent is useful for a virtuous act, since virtuous action is the right use of good things, as Augustine says.†9 But no anger is useful for virtue: for Cassian says in the foresaid book,†10 "When the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Ephesians (4, 31), 'we should put away from us all anger', he makes absolutely no exception needful or useful for us." Tully too says,†11 "Fortitude does not need wrath summoned to its aid, it is perfect enough armed with its own weapons." Therefore no anger is good.

7. Gregory says in Book V of the Moralia,†12 "When peace of mind is lashed with anger, torn and rent, as it were, the soul is thrown into confusion so that it is not in harmony with itself and loses the force of its inward likeness," and thus obviously anger seriously harms the soul. But evil is so-called because it harms, as Augustine says.†13 Therefore all anger is evil.

8. On Leviticus 19, 17 "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart" the Gloss says †14 that anger is desire of revenge. But to seek revenge is contrary to the divine law, for in the next verse (19, 18) it is added, "Seek not revenge." Therefore anger is always a sin.

9. Of similar things the judgment is the same,†15 therefore of things similarly named the judgment ought to be the same. But anger is named among the capital vices: and any of the others that are called capital vices is always evil and is never good, as is evident to anyone running through them one by one. Therefore anger is always evil and never good.

10. Although principles are minimum in number, nevertheless they are greatest in power, as the Philosopher says.†16 But capital vices are certain principles of sins, therefore they are greatest in evil. Consequently they have no admixture of good. And therefore no anger is good.

11. That which impedes man's highest act is evil. But even anger that derives from zeal †17 for rectitude impedes man's highest act, namely contemplation: for Gregory says †18 "When a person is smitten with zeal for what is right, that world of contemplation which cannot be known save by a heart in tranquillity, is shattered." Therefore all anger is evil.

12. As Tully says in the Tusculan Disputations, †19 passions are certain diseases of the soul. But every physical disease is evil for the body, therefore every passion of the soul is evil for the soul. But anger is a passion of the soul. Therefore all anger is evil.

13. As the Philosopher says in the book on the Topics†20 the person subject to passion and refraining from it is one who is exposed to passion and is not led by it, but the good-tempered person is one who is immune from passion; by which it is implied that to be virtuous consists in freedom from passion, and so every passion is contrary to virtue. But anything of this kind is evil. Therefore all anger since it is a passion is evil.

14. Whoever usurps what belongs to God sins. But whoever is angry usurps to himself vengeance which belongs to God alone according to Deuteronomy (32, 35)†21 "Revenge is mine": for anger is desire for vengeance, as the Philosopher says.†22 Therefore whoever is angry sins.

15. Valerius Maximus †23 relates of Architas Tarentinus that when his servant had offended him, said: "I would punish you severely were I not angry with you." Therefore it seems that anger impedes due correction.

16. If any anger is good, it is only that which rises up against sin. But no anger is of this kind, for anger since it is a passion of the sense appetite, rises up only against evils perceived by the senses. Therefore no anger is good.

On the contrary:

1. Chrysostom says †24 "He who is angry without cause will be guilty, but he who is angry with cause will not be guilty: for without anger, teaching will be ineffective, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore some anger is good and necessary.

2. The divine precepts induce only to good. But we are induced to be angry by a divine precept according to that text of Ephesians 4, 26 "Be angry and do not sin;" and the Gloss explains †25 "Be angry against sinners, because it is the soul's natural movement, which usually pertains to the improvement of wrong-doers. Therefore it says be angry, to show that this anger is good." Not all anger then is evil.

3. Gregory says "They fail to interpret aright, who would only have us be angry with ourselves, and not likewise with others when they sin. For if we are commanded to love our neighbors as ourselves, it follows that we should be as angry with their erring ways as with our own evil practices."†26

4. Damascene says †27 that anger was in Christ; in Whom however there was no sin as is said in the First Epistle of Peter (2, 22). Therefore not all anger is a sin.

5. Every sin is blameworthy. But not everyone who is angry is blamed, as the Philosopher says.†28 Therefore not all anger is a sin.

Response:

At one time there was a controversy among philosophers about this question: for the Stoics †29 maintained that all anger is evil but the Peripatetics †30 affirmed that some anger is good.

In order then to see what is more in conformity with the facts, we must take into consideration that in anger as in any other passion two elements can be considered: one, which is as it were formal, the other, which is material. The formal element in anger is that which derives from the appetitive part of the soul, namely that anger is the desire for revenge,†31 and the material element is that which pertains to the bodily disturbance, namely that anger is a boiling i.e. a violent movement of blood around the heart.†32

If then anger is considered according to that which is formal in it, thus anger can be both in the sense appetite and in the intellective appetite which is the will, in keeping with which a person can will to take revenge: and according to this it is evident that anger can be both good and bad. For clearly when a person seeks

vengeance in conformity with the proper order of justice, this is virtuous, for example when he seeks vengeance, i.e. punishment, for the correction of sin without violation of the order of the law: and this is to be angry against sin; on the other hand when a person inordinately seeks vengeance it is a sin, either because he seeks vengeance contrary to the order of the law, or because he seeks vengeance with the intention of banishing the sinner rather than abolishing the sin: and this is to be angry against a brother; and as concerns this, there was no disagreement between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, for even the Stoics conceded that to seek vengeance sometimes is virtuous. But the whole controversy was about the second, that is, the material element in anger, namely, the commotion or agitation of the heart, because such agitation impedes the judgment of reason, in which the good of virtue principally consists; and so for whatever reason a person is angry, it seems to be detrimental to virtue, and to this extent it seems that all anger is vicious.

However if a person rightly examines the matter he will find that the Stoics erred in their consideration in three ways: first in regard to this that they did not distinguish between what is best simply and what is best in a particular case. For something may be better simply which is not better in a particular case, for example, absolutely speaking it is better to be a philosopher than to make money, but for one lacking the necessities of life it is better to make money, as is said in Book III of the Topics,†33 and so too fierceness is good in a dog according to the condition of its nature, but it is not good in a man.†34 So accordingly, since man's nature is a composite of body and soul and of an intellective and a sentient nature, it pertains to the good of man that the whole in itself should be subject to virtue, namely both according to the intellective part and according to the sentient part and according to the body; and therefore for the virtue of man it is required that the desire for due vengeance not only should be in the rational part of the soul but also in the sentient part, and in the body itself, and the body itself should be moved to serve virtue.

Secondly the Stoics did not take into consideration that anger and other passions of this kind can be related in two ways to the judgment of reason: in one way antecedently, and thus of necessity anger and every such passion always impedes the judgment of reason, because the soul can best judge truth in a certain tranquillity of mind; hence the Philosopher says †35 the possession of knowledge and prudence is produced by the soul settling down from the restlessness natural to it. In another way anger can be related to the judgment of reason consequently, namely inasmuch as after reason has judged and determined the manner of vengeance, then the passion arises to carry it out, and thus anger and other such passions do not impede the judgment of reason which has already preceded, but rather help to execute the judgment of reason more promptly, and in this way the passions are useful to virtue; hence Gregory says in Book V of the *Moralia* "It is needful to take great care that that same anger which we adopt as an instrument of virtue never gain dominion over the mind, nor take the lead as a mistress, but like a handmaid, prompt to render service, never depart from following in the rear of reason; for then anger stands up more firmly against vice when it as a subject serves reason."†36

Thirdly the Stoics erred inasmuch as they did not rightly understand anger and the other passions. For although not all appetitive movements are passions, they did not distinguish passions from other appetitive movements in that some appetitive movements are in the will, but passions in the sense appetite, since they made no distinction between the two appetites; but they kept them separate by calling the passions appetitive movements that transgress the moderation of well-ordered reason: hence they held that these are certain diseases of the soul,†37 just as bodily diseases exceed the due proportion proper to health; and accordingly all anger and all passion must be evil. But since anger is in truth a particular kind of movement of the sense appetite, and since movement of this kind can be regulated by reason, and inasmuch as it follows the judgment of reason it serves reason in promptly executing the judgment of reason, and what is more the condition i.e. make-up of human nature demands this that the sense appetite be moved by reason, therefore it is necessary to say in agreement with the Peripatetics that some anger is good and virtuous.

Reply to 1. Jerome is speaking of the anger by which a person is angry with his brother, as is evident from the words of the Lord that he is explaining; and all such anger is evil, but the anger which is directed against sin is good as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. Anger that prevails over reason is not natural to man, but that anger be the servant of reason is natural to him.

Reply to 3. The philosopher is speaking there of the incontinent man's anger which is not subject to reason.

Reply to 4. When anger follows the judgment of reason it does disturb the reason somewhat but it is an aid to the prompt execution of the judgment of reason, consequently anger does not remove the order of reason which was already firmly established by the preceding judgment of reason; hence Gregory says †38 that anger that comes from vice blinds the eye of the mind but anger that comes from zeal does not blind but only disturbs the eye of the mind.

Reply to 5. God is without a body, hence just as He operates without bodily members, so without the sense appetite; nevertheless it pertains to human virtue that man use the movement of the sense appetite as also that he use bodily instruments.

Reply to 6. Anger preceding the judgment of reason is not useful but harmful to virtue, but anger following the judgment of reason is useful in carrying it out, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 7. Those words of Gregory are to be understood of anger according as it is a vice; hence in what follows he himself also shows that there is another kind of anger that is praiseworthy and virtuous.

Reply to 8. In the law that vengeance which proceeds solely from vengeful malice is forbidden, but not that which proceeds from zeal for justice.

Reply to 9. Judgment should not be based on names but on the nature of things; hence it does not necessarily follow that whatever things are similarly named should be judged the same, otherwise the fallacy of equivocation †39 would be done away with. We should know then that, as the Philosopher says, †40 the vices opposed to good-temper are without names, and therefore we use the name of the passion as the name of the capital vice. And since passion can be good and evil, therefore anger can be good and evil. But other capital vices are designated by names proper to the vices, and therefore are always evil.

Reply to 10. As Dionysius says †41 evil does not act except in virtue of good, and therefore capital vices are not principles or sources of action in virtue of evil but rather in virtue of good, according to which their ends are desirable and are motives for certain acts; hence capital vices need not be totally and purely evil. Nevertheless it can be said that anger according as it is a capital vice is never good.

Reply to 11. Not everything that is impeditive of something better is evil, otherwise matrimony would be evil because it impedes virginity; but further, that which is impeditive of some good for the moment can even be better at that time. Hence although contemplation absolutely speaking is the best of all human activities, nevertheless in a particular case an action, to which anger gives support, can be better.

Reply to 12. That argument is valid in regard to anger inasmuch as it signifies a disordered movement, as the Stoics took it to be.

Reply to 13. The Philosopher †42 in the Topics introduces as examples certain positions which are not true according to his own opinion but which he presents as accepted views according to the opinions of others; an instance of this is his statement that virtue consists in experiencing no passion: for this was the position taken by the Stoics; but in Book II of the Ethics †43 he disproves the opinion of those who said that virtues are certain passionless states. Nevertheless it can be said that virtue consists in undergoing no inordinate passion.

Reply to 14. That person who is angry at his brother's sin does not seek his own vengeance but God's: for sin is nothing else but an offense against God, and therefore he who is justly angry does not usurp what belongs to God.

Reply to 15. Architas had not determined the manner of vengeance, i.e. punishment, and therefore he was unwilling to determine it while angry for fear of excess.

Reply to 16. In regard to anger two things can be considered: namely the cause of anger which (cause) reason conveys i.e. announces, and this can be a sin; and secondly the injury, on which the sense appetite is intent, and this is always something perceptible to the senses.

Question XII, Article 2 †p

Whether Anger Can Be a Sin or Not?

It seems it cannot be a sin, for the following reasons.

1. Anger is a passion. But we neither merit nor demerit by the passions, nor are we praised or blamed for them, as is clear from the Philosopher.†1 Therefore anger is not a sin.

2. Just as a lame man is a man, so a fallen nature is a nature. But anger is characteristic of a fallen nature. Therefore anger is something belonging to the nature. But nothing of this kind is a sin. Therefore anger is not a sin.

3. That which of itself can be ordered to good or to evil ought not to be judged a sin. But anger can be ordered either to good or to evil. Therefore of itself anger is not a sin.

4. The proper acts of the natural powers of the soul are not sins, because sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene says.†2 But anger is an act of the irascible power, which is a natural power of the soul. Therefore anger is not a sin.

5. Every sin is voluntary, as Augustine says.†3 But anger is not voluntary; because as the Philosopher says,†4 the angry person acts with pain, and pain is among those things that happen to us against our will, as Augustine says.†5 Therefore anger is not a sin.

6. That which is not in our power is not a sin: for no one sins in that which he cannot avoid, as Augustine says.†6 But anger is not in our power because on Psalm 4, 5 "Be ye angry and sin not" the Gloss†7 says that the movement of anger is not in our power. Therefore anger is not a sin.

7. The Philosopher says †8 that anger is a boiling, i.e. a violent movement, of the blood around the heart. But this does not imply any sin. Therefore anger is not a sin.

8. Jerome says †9 that it is characteristic of man to be angry but of a Christian not to inflict injury. But that which is characteristic of man inasmuch as he is a man is not a sin. Therefore anger is not a sin.

9. In every sin there is a turning to a transitory good.†10 But in anger there is not a turning to a transitory good but rather to evil, i.e. to the infliction of injury on a neighbor. Therefore anger is not a sin.

On the contrary:

1. The Apostle says in Ephesians 4, 31 "Let all . . . wrath and indignation . . . be removed from you,"

which would not be said unless anger were a sin. Therefore anger is a sin.

Response:

Anger signifies a certain movement of the appetite; however it does not signify flight but pursuit: for it is a desire of something to be attained; and since the proper object of pursuit is good and not evil, therefore it was said above (in q. 10, a. 1) that all appetitive movements whose object is evil, if they pertain to pursuit are evil, for example loving or desiring evil and rejoicing over evil. But anger implies a certain desire of an evil, i.e. of harm which it seeks to inflict on a neighbor, yet it does not seek this under the aspect of evil but of a good, which is righteous vengeance, or punishment: for an angry person seeks to injure another to avenge an injury done to himself. But appetitive movements are judged according to that which is formal in the object rather than according to that which is material in it; hence it is more correct to say that anger is the pursuit of good rather than the pursuit of evil, because that which it seeks is evil materially but good formally. And although all pursuit of evil is evil, nevertheless not all pursuit of good is good, but it is necessary to consider whether that good is really and simply good or is only apparently and in some respect good: for pursuit of that which is really and simply good is good, for example, love and desire of wisdom and joy therein, but pursuit of that which is apparently and in some respect good, but simply and really evil, is evil, as is evident in gluttony and lust in which the desire of the apparent and not of the real good is blamed. So accordingly, on the point at issue it must be said that if anger is desire of vengeance insofar as it is really just, then anger will be good and virtuous, and is called zealous anger; but if it is desire of vengeance that appears just but is not really just, then the anger is a sin; which Gregory calls vicious anger.†11

Now there is a vengeance, desired in this manner, that appears just on account of a preceding injury which reason dictates is to be avenged; nevertheless it is not really and simply just, since the proper order of justice is not preserved: because perhaps a person seeks more severe punishment than he ought, or because he seeks to take revenge on his own authority though this not lawful, or because he does not seek vengeance with the proper intention. And therefore the Philosopher says †12 that the angry man begins to hear reason, namely inasmuch as he judges that an injury should be punished, yet he does not fully hear reason because he does not take heed to follow the right order of vengeance as reason dictates; wherefore the Philosopher compares anger to servants who hasten to carry out an order before they hear the whole of what is said, and therefore muddle up the order.

Reply to 1. Passions are said to be neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, because in themselves they do not signify anything in keeping with reason or contrary to reason; however if something is added to the passion so it agrees with reason, the passion will be praiseworthy, but if something be added to it so it disagrees with reason, the passion will be blameworthy: and in this way anger is counted as a sin inasmuch as it does not fully listen to reason as was said (in the Response). And nevertheless anger is said to be a sin not only inasmuch as it is a passion, that is, a movement of the sense appetite, but also inasmuch as it designates an act of the intellective appetite which is the will as was said (in q. 12, a. 1).

Reply to 2. Something can belong to a lame man inasmuch as he is a man; and this belongs to man essentially (per se) but to a lame man accidentally (per accidens): also something that accidentally is related to man can belong to him inasmuch as he is a lame man; and in like manner anger belongs to a fallen nature inasmuch as the nature is fallen: for from this (i.e. a fallen nature) it happens that the movement of anger departs from the order of reason.

Reply to 3. As was said above (in q. 12, a. 1), because the vice opposed to good-temper has no name, therefore the name of the passion which of itself is indifferent, is used for the name of the vice, and in this way we say that anger is a sin; and thus anger is taken only as evil.

Reply to 4. A similar answer is to be given to the fourth argument: for there anger designates an act of a

natural power or faculty according as it is a certain passion related indifferently to good and to evil.

Reply to 5. The angry man acts with pain which follows from the injury inflicted; hence from this it cannot be held that anger is involuntary, but that something involuntary is the cause of anger: for a person would never be angry unless something were done to him against his will.

Reply to 6. That Gloss is speaking of inordinate anger as it is in sensuality preceding the full deliberation of reason; but such movements of sensuality are in our power in particular instances, because we can impede a particular movement by directing our cogitation to other things, however we cannot prevent some inordinate movement from arising.

Reply to 7. That definition of anger is given according to that which is material in anger, for the boiling or violent movement, of the blood around the heart pertains to a physical change; but a bodily disturbance of this kind follows on the appetitive movement, which is formal in anger, in which the nature of sin consists.

Reply to 8. Sometimes the name "man" is used for human weakness, as in that passage in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (3, 3) "For since there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not carnal, and walking as mere men?"; and to be inordinately angry in this way is said to be characteristic of man, because it pertains to human weakness.

Reply to 9. The object of anger is evil under the aspect of some good, and therefore it implies a turning to some good.

Question XII, Article 3 †p

Whether Anger Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. On Ephesians (4, 26) "Do not let the sun go down upon your anger," the Gloss says †1 that Christ never dwells together with anger. But only mortal sin is incompatible with Christ dwelling in the soul. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

2. In Matthew (5, 21-22) the Lord says "You have heard that it was said to the ancients, 'Thou shall not kill'; and that whosoever shall murder shall be liable to judgment. But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment"; from which it is evident that the same punishment is incurred for anger under the New Law as was incurred for murder under the Old Law. But under the Old Law murder was always a mortal sin. Therefore anger under the New Law is a mortal sin.

3. Anything that merits eternal condemnation is a mortal sin. But anger merits eternal condemnation: for the Gloss on "Everyone who is angry . . ." etc. (Matthew 5, 22) says †2 that these three, namely the Court, the Sanhedrin, Gehenna, signify respectively the different abodes in eternal damnation corresponding to the kind of sin. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

4. Gregory says in Book V of the *Moralia* †3 "By anger justice is abandoned, social harmony is lost, the splendor of the Holy Spirit is shut out." But these things come about only through mortal sin. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

5. Every inordinate desire of that which Christ has reserved to Himself is a mortal sin. But as Augustine says, †4 "Anger is lust for revenge"; but Christ has reserved vengeance to Himself according to that text of Deuteronomy (32, 35) "Vengeance belongeth to me and I will repay", in keeping with that further text †5 where

we have †6 "Vengeance is mine." Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

6. That which causes an increase of evil deeds seems to be a heinous act, i.e., a mortal sin. But anger causes an increase of evil deeds, as the Gloss says †7 on that text of Proverbs 28 †8 "A passionate man provoketh quarrels." Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

7. Nothing corrupts the intellect except an excessive sin, since even an excessive intensity of the objects of the sense powers corrupts the senses.†9 But anger corrupts the intellect: for Gregory says in Book X of the Moralia†10 that anger blinds the eye of reason. Therefore anger is an excessive sin, of which kind is mortal sin.

8. That which is contrary to reason seems to be a mortal sin. But inordinate anger is contrary to the judgment of reason, as is clear from what was said above (in q. 12, a. 1). Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

9. That which is contrary to the nature of man is a mortal sin.†11 But anger is of this kind: for man is by nature a good-tempered animal,†12 and anger is contrary to good-temperedness. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

10. Whatever is contrary to an act of charity is a mortal sin. But anger is contrary to an act of charity which wills good to one's neighbor, whereas anger wills harm to one's neighbor. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

11. Sin is called mortal from this that it kills spiritually. But in Job 5 †13 it is said that "anger killeth the foolish man." Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. On Psalm 4, 5 "Be ye angry, and sin not" the Gloss †14 says "Anger that does not carry into effect is venial." But those things which are mortal sins according to their genus are never venial by reason of consent alone even before they carry into effect. Therefore anger is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus.

2. A sin of deed is not less serious than a sin of the heart.†15 But an angry deed is not always a mortal sin: for instance, when through anger a person inflicts some slight injuries on someone, either by striking him lightly or by rebuking him or by doing something of this kind. Therefore likewise neither is anger a mortal sin by reason of its genus.

3. Augustine says †16 that Christian teaching does not consider whether a person is angry but rather why a pious soul is angry. But no mortal sin can exist together with piety. Therefore anger is not a mortal sin.

4. There is a kind of anger that is virtuous, as was shown above (in q. 12, a. 1), and a kind of anger that is a mortal sin. Therefore there is also a kind of anger midway between, which is a venial sin.

5. No mortal sin can coexist with the Holy Spirit. But anger can coexist with the Holy Spirit: for we read in the fourth book of Kings (2, 15) that the spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus and, notwithstanding, immediately afterwards †17 Eliseus cursed the little boys and "there came forth two bears out of the forest and tore forty-two of them to pieces"; which seems to pertain to extreme anger. Therefore anger is not a mortal sin.

6. Under the New Law no mortal sin is permitted. But anger is permitted, as is clear from the Gloss †18 on Ephesians 4, 26, "Be ye angry and do not sin." Therefore anger is not a mortal sin.

7. According to the Philosopher in Book VII of the Ethics†19 concupiscence is more disgraceful than anger. But concupiscence is not always a mortal sin. Likewise therefore neither is anger.

8. No movement of the appetite preceding the complete deliberation of reason is a mortal sin. But anger always precedes the complete deliberation of reason, because anger never completely hears reason, as is said in

Book VII of the Ethics.†20 Therefore anger is not a mortal sin.

Response:

Whether moral acts are good or evil by reason of their genus, and if evil, whether they are mortal or venial, ought to be considered in relation to their objects, since moral acts derive their species from their objects. Now we have said (in q. 12, a. 2) that the object of anger, inasmuch as it is a sin, is unjust revenge which is nothing else but an injury inflicted on a neighbor contrary to the debt or duty of justice; and this of its nature implies a mortal sin: for, since what is justly owed to others falls under a precept,†21 whatever is contrary to the nature of the duty of justice is contrary to the precept, hence it is a mortal sin. Consequently vicious anger †22 is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, since it is nothing other than the will to injure one's neighbor unjustly on account of a preceding offense.

But as was said above in regard to other sins (in q. 11, a. 3 and q. 10, a. 2), a sin may be mortal by reason of its genus which nevertheless is venial on account of the imperfection of the act. And it was pointed out above (in q. 10, a. 2) that a person's act may be imperfect in two ways: in one way on the part of the agent, and thus an imperfect act of a person is one which belongs to the sense appetite alone, preceding the judgment of reason, which is the proper active principle in man; and according to this the movement of the sense appetite to commit any mortal sin, even adultery or murder, is a venial sin. In another way an act is called imperfect on the part of the object which because of its smallness is regarded as nothing: for reason reckons that which is small or trifling as nothing, as the Philosopher says in Book III of the Politics;†23 and according to this, although taking another's property is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, nevertheless taking something small which as such is of no value or importance, is not a mortal sin: for example if a person should take a small bunch of grapes from someone's vineyard. And in both ways a venial sin may be found in the genus of the sin of anger: in one way as a sudden movement of anger to which reason does not consent is a venial sin; and in another way because of the smallness of the injury, say if a person angry at some boy should pull his hair or ear a bit or do some other slight thing to punish him. But when a person strives to avenge himself outside the bounds of justice, by inflicting some grave injury with the consent of deliberate reason, such anger is always a mortal sin.

And since one kind of anger is a mortal sin and another kind venial, we need to answer the arguments in regard to both.

Reply to 1. That Gloss is speaking of vicious anger when the movement of anger is complete both on the part of the agent and as regards the object; for in this way anger is always a mortal sin as was said (in the Response).

Replies to 2, 3, and 4. Similar answers are to given to the second, third, and fourth arguments.

Reply to 5. In regard to vengeance God has reserved something to Himself alone. For He committed the taking of revenge for public sins to others who are constituted to positions of authority: for in Romans (13, 4) it is said of the man possessing authority that he is "an avenger of God to execute wrath on him who does evil"; but He has reserved to Himself alone the judgment and revenge for hidden sins, according to the First Epistle to the Corinthians (4, 5) "Pass no judgment before the time." Furthermore God has reserved to Himself alone the taking of revenge on one's own behalf. For man ought not to take revenge on his own behalf but on account of the fault committed against him which is an offense against God. When then a person seeks revenge on his own behalf or contrary to order of judicial authority, he usurps to himself what belongs to God, and therefore sins mortally unless the act be imperfect, as we have said (in q. 12, a. 2).

Reply to 6. An increase of evil deeds can come about not only by way of addition of evil deed to evil deed but also by way of furnishing an occasion of such deeds, and in this way anger which is a venial sin can bring about an increase of evil deeds.

Reply to 7. Something can corrupt the intellect or reason in two ways: in one way of itself (per se) and directly by certain contrariety, and only mortal sin corrupts the judgment of reason in this way; in another way indirectly and by reason of something else (per accidens), inasmuch as the use of reason is impeded by some bodily change; and in this way even anger that is a venial sin can impede the use of reason, however it is not properly said to blind except when it leads the reason to consent to sin.

Reply to 8. Reason directs everything in terms of the end. Therefore that which excludes the proper end is directly contrary to reason, which occurs only through mortal sin; but if the inordinateness concerns those things that are for the end without excluding the end, it is not strictly against reason but along side it, and is a venial sin.

Reply to 9. Anger, inasmuch as it is contrary to reason, is contrary to the nature of man who is a rational animal, and this is attributed only to the anger that is a mortal sin.

Reply to 10. Charity wills good to one's neighbor under the aspect of good, and therefore hatred is properly opposed to charity. But anger desires evil for one's neighbor not precisely as evil but under the aspect of just revenge, as was said (in q. 12, a. 2); and therefore on the part of object which is not really but seemingly just, it is contrary to justice, but on the part of the passion it is contrary to good-temperedness which preserves the mean in regard to anger.

Reply to 11. That authority is to be understood as speaking of the unqualified movement of vicious anger,

Replies to On the contrary:

1. That Gloss is speaking of anger that is present only in sensuality which is said to carry into effect not only in exterior deed but also through interior consent, which with God is imputed as done.

2. That argument is valid of anger that is imperfect on the part of the object.

3. A pious soul is angry out of zealous anger, which is virtuous, as was said above (in q. 12, a. 1).

4. Nothing is midway between just and unjust revenge, and therefore likewise neither between virtuous anger and anger that is a mortal sin, except perhaps imperfect anger which is a venial sin.

5. Eliseus did not curse the boys out of vicious anger as it were from vengeful malice, but out of zeal for divine justice.

6. The Apostle permits the movement of imperfect anger which consists in sensuality alone.

7. If the concupiscence is unqualified concupiscence of that which is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, it too is a mortal sin; but if the concupiscence is imperfect the sin is venial as was said of anger (in the Response).

8. Anger does not fully hear dissuading reason, but sometimes it fully hears consenting reason.

Question XII, Article 4 †p

Whether Anger Is a Less Grievous Sin Than Hatred and Envy and Other Sins of This Kind?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. As Augustine says,†1 evil is so called because it harms; therefore the greater the harm a sin causes, the more grievous the sin. But anger causes greater harm to a man than envy: for Hugh of St. Victor says †2 that "pride severs God from man, envy severs his neighbor, and anger severs him from himself." Therefore envy is not a graver sin than anger.

2. An effect is likened to its cause. But the effect of envy is anger, as Hugh says in the same book.†3 Therefore anger is not a less grievous sin than envy.

3. It seems that anger is not a less grievous sin than hatred: because the gravity of sins is judged according to the effect; but the effect of hatred and anger is the same, namely the infliction of injury on one's neighbor. Therefore hatred is not a graver sin than anger.

4. It seems that anger is a graver sin than concupiscence of the flesh: because according to the Philosopher,†4 if the greatest of this is greater than the greatest of that, then this is greater than that without qualification. But the greatest sin in the genus of anger, i.e. murder, is graver than any sin whatsoever in the genus of concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore anger is a graver sin simply than concupiscence of the flesh.

5. The graver the sin, the greater the repentance it induces. But repentance is associated more with anger than with concupiscence of the flesh: because as the Philosopher says in Book VII of the Ethics,†5 an angered man sins with pain, but the concupiscent man without pain. Therefore anger is a graver sin than concupiscence.

6. In Ezechiel (16, 44) it is said "As the mother . . . so also . . . the daughter." But blasphemy which is a daughter of anger, according to Gregory,†6 is the gravest sin. Therefore anger is a graver sin than all the foresaid vices.

On the contrary:

Augustine compares anger to a mote, but hatred to a beam.†7

Response:

Among these sins the difference is to be sought where some agreement is found. Now the sin of anger agrees with three sins in its object: for the object of anger as we have said (in q. 12, a. 2), is the infliction of an evil under the aspect of a certain good; therefore so far as concerns the evil, anger agrees with hatred, which wills evil to a person, and with envy which is grieved about the good (of one's neighbor); and as concerns the good desired, the sin of anger agrees with concupiscence, which is also an inordinate desire of a good.

But absolutely speaking anger lacks the gravity of the three foresaid vices. For hatred seeks the evil of one's neighbor under the aspect of evil, and envy is opposed to the good of one's neighbor under the aspect of good, but anger does not seek the evil of one's neighbor, nor impede his good except under the aspect of a good i.e. of just revenge; and therefore that which hatred and envy do directly (per se) aiming at evil or an impediment to good, this anger does directly (per se) aiming at good but incidentally (per accidens) at evil. Now that which is the per se cause of an effect is always more effective than that which is incidentally †8 the cause of an effect; and therefore envy and hatred surpass in malice the sin of anger. Similarly too, the sin of concupiscence derives from being intent on that is pleasurable to the senses, but anger is inordinately intent on a good that is apparently just, which is in accordance with reason; and therefore since the good of reason is better than the good of the senses, the movement of anger comes closer to virtue than the movement of concupiscence, and therefore simply speaking anger is a less grievous sin. Hence the Philosopher says †9 that the incontinence concerned with concupiscence is more disgraceful than the incontinence concerned with anger. And in fact this comparison is based upon the very genera of the sins: for nothing prevents anger from being a graver sin than

the others by reason of certain supervenient circumstances.

Reply to 1. Envy severs his neighbor from a man by a kind of opposition to himself; but anger does not sever a man from himself in this way but indirectly inasmuch as the bodily disturbance pertaining to anger impedes the use of reason as a result of which a man is not master of himself.

Reply to 2. According to the Philosopher †10 anger is caused from pain, and therefore, since envy is a sort of pain, anger may be caused from envy; however it does not necessarily follow that anger is equal to envy, because an effect is not always equal to its cause although it does have some likeness to it.

Reply to 3. Anger and hatred proceed to inflict harm on one's neighbor in diverse ways, and this diversity can be examined in reference to a number of things, as the Philosopher says in Book II of the Rhetoric: †11 first, because anger does not intend harm except under the aspect of just reparation for an offence, hence it seeks to harm only those who have harmed us or those related to us so that a certain recompense may be made; but hatred can be against any strangers, who have never harmed us at all, merely because their disposition or character is not to our liking. Secondly because anger is always against individual persons, since it is caused by injurious acts, and acts are attributed individuals; †12 but hatred can be against some general thing, as for instance a man hates the whole class of thieves. †13 Thirdly because an angry person seeks harm to a neighbor only in that measure that is required, as he sees it, by retributive justice, which when attained the anger subsides; but hatred is not satisfied with any evil no matter of what kind or degree: for hatred intends evil in itself to one's neighbor. Fourthly because the angry person desires that the one on whom he is inflicting harm should understand that this evil has befallen him on account of the injury he has done; but the person who hates does not care howsoever undeservedly evil befalls the person he hates. From which differences it is obvious that hatred is a more grievous sin than anger.

Reply to 4. That argument would be valid if murder were a species of anger, but it is not a species of anger but an effect of anger. On the other hand a greater evil may sometimes result from a lesser evil.

Reply to 5. Concupiscence is even more likely to be repented of than anger because anger is more rational; and the pain which is associated with anger does not pertain to penitence, since the pain does not come from the act of anger but from the cause provoking to anger, namely from the injury inflicted.

Reply to 6. Since evil causes nothing except in virtue of good, in the process of committing sins we proceed from that which has more the appearance of good, and therefore for the most part man is led from lesser sins to greater sins; hence it is not reasonable that anger would be of so great a gravity as blasphemy.

Question XII, Article 5 †p

Whether Anger Is a Capital Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. That which is from a head is not itself a head or source. But anger has a different source; for it is caused by sadness i.e. acedia or pain, as the Philosopher also says. †1 Therefore anger is not a capital vice.

2. Every capital vice is a special sin. But anger seems to be a general sin, since it is not contrary to only one virtue but to many: for it is contrary to charity and to justice and to good temperedness. Therefore anger is not a capital vice.

3. Certain other vices are opposed to the other capital vices, for example, pusillanimity to pride, false joy to acedia. But no other vice is opposed to anger. Therefore anger is not a capital vice.

On the contrary:

On Proverbs (29, 22) "A passionate man provoketh quarrels" the Gloss †2 says "The gateway to all vices is anger: if it be closed, peace will be rendered within by the virtues; if opened the soul will be armed for every crime."

Response:

As was said above (in q. 10, a. 3), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise as being their final cause; but it frequently happens that many inordinate acts are done with a view to achieving the end or aim of anger, i.e. taking revenge, which inordinate acts are certain sins, and therefore anger is a capital vice. And Gregory in Book XXXI of the *Moralia*†3 enumerates six daughters of anger which are "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation, and blasphemy." And the explanation of this enumeration is that anger can be considered in three ways: in one way as it is present in the heart, in another way as expressed in speech, in a third way as proceeding even to deeds.

Now according as anger is present in the heart, one vice arises from it on the part of its cause, i.e. the injury inflicted: for the injury inflicted provokes to anger only inasmuch as it is considered under the aspect of unjust, for in this way vengeance is warranted for it: and the lower the man is in rank and the more answerable to him whom he injured, the more unjust will be the injury done to him, and therefore the angry man considering the injury to himself, magnifies in his mind the injustice and as a result of this proceeds to avenge the unworthiness of the person causing the injury; and this properly speaking is indignation. Another vice also arises from anger, present in the heart, on the part of that which the angered person seeks: for he who is angry devises diverse methods and measures by which he can avenge himself, and by such cogitations his mind is so to speak inflated, according to that passage of Job (15, 2) "Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?"; and thus from anger arises swelling of the mind. Then too anger issues in speech: both against God Who permits the injury to be inflicted, and thus blasphemy is caused from anger, and against one's neighbor who causes the injury, and thus there are two stages of anger, which are touched on in Matthew (5, 22). One of which occurs when a person breaks out into inordinate speech without expressing a specific wrong, as for example he who says to his brother, "Racha", which is an interjection of an angered person: and thus from anger arises clamor, i.e. an inordinate and jumbled utterance indicating a movement of anger. Another stage of anger occurs when a person breaks out into injurious words, as when he says to his brother "You fool", to which contumely pertains. On the other hand, according as anger proceeds to action, quarrelling arises, under which are included all its consequences, for instance wounds, murders and the like.

Reply to 1. The sadness from which anger arises is not that sadness i.e. acedia which is a capital vice; hence anger is not included under any capital vice.

Reply to 2. Anger is a special vice, yet it is opposed to various virtues under different aspects. For as regards the very inordinateness of passion, anger is opposed to good-temperedness, and as regards the harm it intends to inflict, anger is opposed to charity, and as regards the aspect of apparent justice which the angry person contemplates, it is opposed to true justice: however anger is more opposed to good-temperedness which moderates anger.

Reply to 3. There is a vice opposed even to anger, which is the vice of inordinate remissness in anger; of which Chrysostom on that text of Matthew (5, 22) "Everyone who is angry with his brother . . .," etc., says that "Unreasonable patience sows seeds of vice, encourages negligence, and incites to evil not only the wicked but also the virtuous."†4 However since this vice is without a name, no other vice seems to be opposed to anger.

Question 13

Question XIII

On Avarice

Article 1 ¶p

Whether Avarice Is a Special Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Every special vice has a special matter, because in moral matters the species are always determined according to their objects. But avarice does not have a special matter but a general matter: for Augustine says ¶1 "Avarice which in Greek is called 'philargiria' is to be understood not only of silver or money but of all things that are inordinately desired wherever anyone in any way desires more than is sufficient." Therefore avarice is not a special sin.

2. That which contains under it diverse genera of sins is not a special sin. But avarice or greed contains under it diverse genera of sins, for even pride which is the inordinate desire of excellence ¶2 is contained under avarice: for Gregory ¶3 in a homily on "Jesus was led . . .," etc. (Matthew 4, 1) says: "Avarice is not only of money but even of high position when eminence is sought beyond measure." Therefore avarice is not a special sin.

3. Tully says ¶4 that avarice is an immoderate love of having. But we are said to have all the things that pertain to us, both our substantial parts and our qualities and quantities and external accidents (e.g. a coat or a ring on our hand), as the Philosopher says in Book V of the Ethics. ¶5 Therefore avarice is not a special sin.

4. Every special sin has another sin opposed to it, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. ¶6 But avarice does not have any sin opposed to it, as is clear from the Philosopher in Book V of the Ethics. ¶7 Therefore avarice is not a special sin.

5. That which has an affinity with all the genera of sins does not seem to be a special sin. But avarice has an affinity with all the genera of sins: for it is said in the First Epistle to Timothy (6, 10) "Cupidity is the root of all sins," by which is meant avarice, as Augustine says. ¶8 Therefore avarice is not a special sin.

6. If avarice is a special sin this will be especially inasmuch as avarice is an inordinate desire for money. But even in this manner avarice is a general sin, because every sin consists in a turning to a transitory good as Augustine says; ¶9 and nearly all temporal goods can be acquired by money, according to Ecclesiastes (10, 19) "All things obey money." Therefore in no way is avarice a special sin.

7. No special sin is contrary to diverse virtues because one thing is contrary to one thing, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics. ¶10 But avarice is contrary to diverse virtues: for it is contrary to charity, as Augustine says; ¶11 it is also contrary to liberality as is commonly said; ¶12 it is also contrary to justice inasmuch as justice is a special virtue, as Chrysostom says ¶13 in explaining Matthew (5, 6) "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice"; for justice signifies either a general virtue or a particular virtue opposed to avarice. Therefore avarice is not a special sin.

8. It is proper to avarice to retain what ought not to be retained; but spiritual goods especially are not to be retained, because when shared they are not diminished but increase, therefore avarice is concerned with spiritual goods. But obviously avarice is concerned with goods pertaining to the body. Therefore with all goods

universally. Avarice then is not a special but a general vice.

On the contrary:

1. No general thing is divided into members of which one is general and the others special. But avarice is one member within a division of special sins, for Gregory in Book XXXI of the *Moralia* distinguishes avarice from the other capital vices †14 also in the Gloss on Genesis 3, 1 †15 it is said that the devil tempted the first man in respect to gluttony, pride, and avarice; and so avarice is distinguished from the other sins. Therefore avarice is a special sin.

2. A special sin is contrary to a special virtue. But avarice is contrary to justice according as it is a special virtue, as is clear from Chrysostom (in arg. 7 above). Therefore avarice is a special sin.

3. A root has the nature of a principle. But a principle is distinguished from those things of which it is the principle, because nothing is a principle or cause of itself.†16 Since then avarice is the root of all evil, as the Apostle says (in the First Epistle to Timothy 6, 10), it seems that avarice is a sin distinct from the other sins; and therefore avarice is not a general but a special sin.

Response:

Avarice according to the first imposition of its name, signifies an inordinate desire of money: for a person is called 'avaricious' as if 'avid for money' as Isidore says,†17 and consonant with this in Greek avarice is named 'philargiria',†18 as it were 'love of money'; hence since money is a special kind of matter, avarice seems to be a special vice according to the first imposition of the name. But because of a certain likeness this name has been extended to signify an inordinate cupidity or desire of any goods whatsoever. And in this sense avarice is a general sin, because in every sin there is a turning to some transitory good with inordinate desire; and therefore Augustine says †19 that there is a general avarice by which a person desires anything more than he ought, and there is a special avarice which more commonly is called love of money.

The reason for this distinction is that since avarice is inordinate love of having, just as 'having' can be taken in one way generally and in another way particularly, according as we are said to have possession †20 of that which we can do with what we wish, so also 'avarice' is taken generally for an inordinate love of having anything whatsoever, and in another way particularly for love of having possessions all of which are comprehended under the name of money because their value is measured by money, as the Philosopher says in Book IV of the *Ethics*.†21

However, because sin is opposed to virtue, we must take into consideration that both justice and liberality are concerned with possessions or money, but each in a different way. For the mean of equality established in the things possessed, namely that each one have what is his due, pertains to justice; liberality, on the other hand, establishes a mean in the very affections of the soul, namely so that no one be too much a lover of money or too covetous, and each be ready to give it with pleasure or at least without sorrow, when he ought and where he ought. Some authors †22 therefore speak of avarice as being opposed to liberality, and according to this, avarice signifies a certain defect in regard to the dispensing of wealth and a certain excess in regard to its acquisition and retention because of an excessive love of money. However in Book V of the *Ethics*,†23 the Philosopher speaks of avarice as the opposite of justice, and according to this the avaricious man is one who takes or keeps another's goods contrary to the debt of justice: for to liberality is opposed not avarice but illiberality or meanness, as is clear in Book IV of the *Ethics*.†24 And the authority of Chrysostom quoted above (in arg. 7) is in keeping with this, and likewise what is said in Ezechiel (22, 27) "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravaging the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness (avare)."

Reply to 1. Augustine there is speaking about avarice in the general sense.

Reply to 2. A similar answer is to be given to the second argument.

Reply to 3. We are especially said to have the possessions of which we are wholly the masters; hence when Tully says that avarice is inordinate love of having, it is to be understood strictly inasmuch as we are said to have possessions.

Reply to 4. That objection is valid in regard to avarice as it is opposed to justice: for justice is a mean between too much and too little but it is not a mean between two vices as are other virtues, as is said in Book V of the Ethics.^{†25} But that someone be excessive in taking or keeping beyond the debt i.e. obligation of justice is a kind of malice and pertains to avarice; however that someone have less than is his due i.e. has too little, is not to do what is unjust but to suffer what is unjust, which is a penalty rather than a fault. And according to this avarice is not opposed to some sin.

Reply to 5. Avarice pertains to all sins, not as a genus but as a root and principle; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that avarice is a general sin but that it is a general cause of sin.

Reply to 6. Certain things are acquired by money which are desirable under the same aspect as money, namely inasmuch as they are useful for the needs of life, so even all those things that are called possessions are included under the name of money, and are the matter of avarice designated as special; but there are certain other things which can be acquired by money and yet have a different aspect of desirability: and these pertain to other special vices as for instance, eminence in honors which pertains to ambition, and impropriety in praise which pertains to vainglory, and pleasure in food which pertains to gluttony, and in sex which pertains to lust.

Reply to 7. Avarice is opposed to justice and to liberality according to the diverse senses or interpretations of avarice, but it is opposed to charity as is every mortal sin, inasmuch as it constitutes a created good as its end.

Reply to 8. Spiritual goods are not to be retained but to be shared; however the manner of having and of sharing these is not the same as that of having and sharing possessions; hence spiritual goods do not pertain to avarice properly so called.

Question XIII, Article 2 †p

Whether Avarice Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. Nothing excludes a person from the kingdom of God except mortal sin. But avarice excludes a person from the kingdom of God: for it is said in Ephesians (5, 5) "No fornicator or unclean person or covetous one (which is to serve idols), has any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and God." Therefore avarice is a mortal sin.

2. Every sin that is contrary to charity is mortal, because it is through charity that the soul has life according to the First Epistle of John 3 †1 "If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him." But avarice is contrary to charity: for Augustine says †2 that cupidity is the poison of charity. Therefore avarice which is the same as cupidity is a mortal sin.

3. It is said in the First Epistle of John (2, 15): "If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him." But avarice proceeds from inordinate love of the world. Therefore avarice excludes the love of God from man, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

4. That which is contrary to justice seems to be a mortal sin, inasmuch as justice has the nature of a debt which falls under a precept.†3 But avarice is contrary to justice: for it withholds certain things which can be beneficial to our neighbor: for Basil on that passage in Luke 12, 18 "I will pull down my barns . . .," etc. says: "It is the hungry man's bread that you hoard, the naked man's cloak that you retain, the needy man's money that you withhold. Wherefore as many as you have wronged you might have succored."†4 Therefore avarice is a mortal sin.

5. A gift of the Holy Spirit is a more perfect thing than virtue. But avarice is opposed to a certain gift of the Holy Spirit, namely piety, as is said in the Gloss on Luke XI.†5 Therefore avarice is a mortal sin.

6. Mortal sin is a turning away from an unchangeable good and a turning to a transitory good.†6 But this is especially true of avarice, which is an inordinate desire of a transitory good. Therefore avarice is a mortal sin.

7. That which weighs down the mind with earthly things so that it cannot rise to higher things seems to be a mortal sin. But avarice is of this kind: for Gregory says in Book XIII of the Moralia that "avarice renders the mind it has infected so heavy that it cannot be raised up to seek exalted things."†7 Therefore avarice is a mortal sin.

8. Incurableness is a condition of the gravest sin: for a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is the gravest sin, is called unpardonable.†8 But avarice is incurable, as the Philosopher says in Book IV of the Ethics.†9 Therefore avarice is a mortal sin and the gravest sin.

On the contrary:

1. On the First Epistle to the Corinthians (3, 12) "If anyone builds upon this foundation . . .," etc., the Gloss†10 says that he builds on wood, hay, and straw who cogitates about the things of the world, how he may be pleasing to the world; which pertains to the sin of avarice. But not mortal but venial sin is signified by this, for the Gloss adds †11 that "he will be saved as it were by fire." Therefore avarice is not a mortal sin.

2. Avarice is opposed to extravagance. But extravagance is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. Therefore neither is avarice, since contraries are in the same genus.†12

3. It pertains properly to avarice to accumulate superfluous temporal things. But this is not always a mortal sin, since it is not contrary to any precept. Therefore avarice is not a mortal sin.

4. Not to take another's goods seems to be praiseworthy. But sometimes avaricious persons do not wish to take over other's possessions, as the Philosopher says in Book IV of the Ethics.†13 Therefore avarice sometimes is not evil and consequently neither is it a mortal sin.

Response:

As we have said above (in q. 13, a. 1) avarice is twofold: for sometimes it is taken as opposed to justice, and this is always a mortal sin, except perhaps on account of the imperfection of the act, as was explained in regard to other vices (in q. 10, a. 2 and q. 12, a. 3): for thus it pertains to avarice to take or keep the goods of others unjustly, and this is always a mortal sin, although the first movements in this genus are not mortal sins. On the other hand, sometimes avarice is taken as opposed to liberality, and the Philosopher in Book IV of the Ethics†14 calls this illiberality or meanness, and then it pertains to avarice to be excessive in the love and desire of money and of all that money can buy. And so if we speak of desire and love in a general sense, avarice is not always a mortal sin; but if we speak of love and desire in a strict sense, thus avarice is always a mortal sin: for since love and desire concern the good, and good properly and principally is the end, and that which is ordered to the end does not of itself (per se) have the nature of good except by reason of its order to the end, it follows

that love and desire properly and principally concern the end, and secondarily those things which are for the sake of the end.

If then avarice be called love and desire of temporal goods in such a way that it constitutes them as the end, avarice will always be a mortal sin: for to be turned to a created good as to an end causes a turning away from an unchangeable good, which must be the ultimate end, since there cannot be many ultimate ends. But if avarice be called an inordinate love or desire of the things of this world generally speaking, in this way avarice is not always a mortal sin: because as is said in the Gloss†15 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (3, 12) on that text "If anyone builds . . . ," etc. "certain people as yet love secular things and are engaged in earthly affairs, in such a way however that their heart does not withdraw from Christ and they put nothing else ahead of Christ."

Reply to 1. The Apostle does not say without qualification that every avaricious person will have no part in the kingdom of Christ and God, but adds †16 "which is to serve idols": for that avarice excludes from the kingdom of Christ and God which is compared to idolatry, in that it shows to a creature the honor owed to God inasmuch as it constitutes temporal goods as the end, which (honor) is owed to God alone.

Reply to 2. The cupidity that extinguishes charity is that cupidity which constitutes temporal goods as the end; but that cupidity which does not constitute temporal goods as the end although it exceeds the proper measure, does not extinguish charity but impedes it from its act.

Reply to 3. The answer to the third argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 4. That objection is valid in regard to avarice as it is opposed to justice. However the avarice that is the same as illiberality is not always opposed to justice: for it can happen that a person is illiberal because he does not give what it would be laudable to give, but which he is not under obligation to give, or because even those things which he does give he gives with sadness and stingily. But Basil is speaking of the case in which a person is bound to disburse his goods to the poor, for instance when they are more than sufficient for him, according to Luke (11, 41) "Give that which remains as alms"; and avarice of this kind is also opposed to piety, as the Gloss says there.†17

Reply to 5. The answer to the fifth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 6. That argument is valid in regard to avarice according as it constitutes temporal goods as the end.

Reply to 7. A similar answer is to be given to the seventh objection.

Reply to 8. Avarice is incurable in one manner and a sin against the Holy Spirit in another manner: for a sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be incurable by reason of the complete attachment of the will to the sin. For he who sins through ignorance chooses sin only incidentally (per accidens), for he chooses that which is a sin which however he does not know is a sin; and he who sins through weakness chooses that which is a sin in itself (per se) but from a motive that quickly passes, namely on account of the impulse of passion; but he who sins from pure malice †18 chooses sin as desirable in itself; and therefore such incurability pertains to the gravity of the sin. Avarice, on the other hand, is said to be incurable because of the condition of the subject, since human life continually tends to deficiency; and every deficiency tends to incite to avarice: for the reason temporal goods are sought is to relieve the deficiencies this life.

Replies to On the contrary:

1. That objection is valid in regard to avarice according as it does not constitute the end in temporal

goods which it inordinately loves and desires.

2. Avarice or illiberality is more opposed to the virtue of liberality than extravagance is, as the Philosopher shows in Book IV of the Ethics†19 and therefore illiberality or avarice is more likely to be a mortal sin than extravagance is.

3. To accumulate temporal goods contrary to justice is always a mortal sin; hence it is said in Habacuc (2, 4) "Woe to him that heapeth together that which is not his own." Likewise, even if it is not contrary to justice to accumulate temporal goods, nevertheless if they are constituted as the end, it is a mortal sin.

4. Not to take another's goods considered in itself does not have the nature of sin, but not to take those things which are gifts from others with the intention of avoiding having to give to others, is blameworthy.

Question XIII, Article 3 †p

Whether Avarice Is a Capital Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Avarice in one way is opposed to liberality, as was said above (in q. 13, a. 1). But liberality is not a principal virtue. Therefore avarice is not a capital vice.

2. As was said above (in q. 12, a. 5) a capital vice is one from which other vices arise as being their final cause. But this does not seem to be applicable to avarice: because money which is the matter of avarice does not have the nature of an end but is always sought as merely useful and for the sake of something else, as the Philosopher says.†1 Therefore avarice is not a capital vice.

3. A vice is capital from which other vices arise. But avarice arises from other vices: for Gregory says †2 that avarice sometimes arises from pride, sometimes from fear: for some fearing they will be without enough to meet their expenses, allow their mind to yield to avarice; there are others, who desiring to appear more powerful are inflamed with greed for the honors of others. Therefore avarice is not a capital vice.

On the contrary:

Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia enumerates avarice among the capital vices.†3

Response:

Avarice ought to be counted among the capital vices. The reason for this is that, as was said previously (in q. 12, a. 5), a vice is called capital that has a principal end to which many other vices are naturally ordered, and thus by way of final causality many other vices have their origin from such a vice. But the end or goal of the whole of human life is happiness which all men desire;†4 hence inasmuch as in human affairs something participates really or apparently in any condition of happiness, happiness has a certain pre-eminence in the genus of ends.

But there are three conditions of happiness according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Ethics,†5 namely that it be a perfect good and sufficient of itself (per se) and accompanied by pleasure. Now a thing seems to be perfect inasmuch as it has a certain excellence, and therefore excellence seems to be something principally desirable, and in accord with this, pride or vainglory is designated as a capital vice; and in sensed things the most intense pleasure has to do with the sense of touch in food or sex, and therefore gluttony and lust are designated as capital vices; moreover a sufficiency of temporal goods is assured chiefly by money, as

Boethius says in Book II ¶6 and Book III ¶7 On the Consolation of Philosophy, hence avarice, which is an inordinate desire of riches, also must be counted as a capital vice.

To the latter Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia assigns seven daughters, ¶8 which are treachery, fraud, deceit, perjury, restlessness, violence, obduracy in regard to mercy. The distinction of these can be understood in the following way. For two characteristics pertain to avarice, one of which is to be excessive in retaining, and in furtherance of this, obduracy in regard to mercy or inhumanity, arises from avarice, namely because the avaricious man hardens his heart so that he will not out of compassion come to the aid of anyone at the expense of his possessions. The other characteristic pertaining to avarice is to be excessive in taking, and according to this avarice can be considered first as it is in the avaricious person's heart: and thus restlessness, arises from avarice, because avarice brings a man unnecessary anxieties and cares: for the greedy person is not satisfied with money as is said in Ecclesiastes (5, 9); secondly avarice can be considered as it is in the execution of the work, and thus in acquiring other people's goods sometimes force is used and so there is violence, and sometimes deceit. Which if done by word will be falsehood in word alone by which one person deceives another for gain, however in word confirmed by oath it will be perjury; but if the deceit is committed by deed, then as regards the things themselves it will be fraud, and as regards the persons treachery, as is clear in the case of Judas ¶9 who because of avarice became a betrayer of Christ.

Reply to 1. Virtue is achieved in accordance with reason, but vice in accordance with the inclination of the sense appetite; and therefore it does not necessarily follow that a principal vice is opposed to a principal virtue, because what is principal in virtue differs from what is principal in vice.

Reply to 2. Although money has the aspect of useful, nevertheless because it has the aspect of universality, in that all things obey money, as is said in Ecclesiastes (10, 19), from this very fact it has a certain likeness to happiness; hence according to this, avarice is a capital vice, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice, from which for the most part many vices arise, from sometimes arising even from other vices, as was said above (in q. 8, a. 1).

Question XIII, Article 4 ¶p

Whether Lending at Usury Is a Mortal Sin? ¶1

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. No mortal sin was allowed in the divine law. But usury i.e. lending at interest was allowed in the divine law, for it is said in Deuteronomy (23, 19-20) "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money at usury, nor fruits of the earth, nor any other thing. But to the stranger." Therefore usury i.e. lending at interest, is not a mortal sin.

2. But it was argued that this was not approved for those people but rather permitted on account of the hardness of their hearts, as was the bill of divorce. ¶2 But counter to this: that which is permitted as an evil is not promised in return as a reward of justice, for what is promised as a reward is proposed as good and to be desired. But lending money at interest is promised in the law of God as a reward of justice, for it is said in Deuteronomy (28, 12) "Thou shalt lend at interest (fenerabis) to many nations, and thou shalt not borrow of any one." Therefore to lend at usury is not a mortal sin.

3. To give up or forego a counsel is not a mortal sin; because as is said in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (7, 28) a woman who marries does not sin although she puts aside the counsel of virginity. But to lend money without usury is counted among the counsels in Luke (6, 27 and 35) where it is said "Love your

enemies, do good to those who hate you . . . and lend, not hoping for any return," in which usury is forbidden as many authors explain.†3 Therefore to lend money at interest is not a mortal sin.

4. As a man has ownership of his house or his horse, so too he has ownership of his money. But a man can lease his house or his horse at a price. Therefore with equal reason a man can take a profit on the money he loans.

5. A contract obliging a person to what he is bound by natural law does not seem to be unlawful; but a person is bound by natural law †4 to pay some recompense to him who has done him a service; and he who lends money does a service, for he comes to the help of someone in need. Therefore if for this service the lender should bind the borrower by a fixed contract to make some recompense to him, the contract does not seem to be unlawful.

6. Positive law is derived from natural law, as Tully says.†5 But civil law †6 permits usury, therefore it is not contrary to natural law to lend money at interest. Consequently it is not a sin.

7. If lending money at interest is a sin. it must be opposed to some virtue, and since usury consists in a certain transaction, that is, in a loan, it seems to be opposed particularly to justice if it is a sin, for justice is concerned with transactions of this kind, as is said in Book V of the Ethics.†7 But usury is not opposed to justice: for it cannot be said that he who pays interest for the use of money suffers injustice, for he suffers injustice neither from himself, because no one does injustice to himself, as the Philosopher shows,†8 nor from another, because no one suffers injustice from another except through deceit or violence; neither of which applies in this case, because he who borrows money, knowingly and willingly pays the usury; in no way then does he suffer injustice. Therefore neither does the usurer do an injustice; consequently the usurer does not sin.

8. But it was argued that in this case we have a forced act of a mixed nature; for he who borrows money pays usury as it were under compulsion. But counter to this: a morally forced act has a place where a threatening emergency is imminent, as is clear in the case of him who throws his cargo overboard to avoid the loss of his ship.†9 But sometimes people take a loan at interest without great need. Therefore at least in such a case lending money at interest is not a mortal sin.

9. Anyone can hand over to another that of which he is the master. But he who pays usury is the master of his money that he pays to the usurer. Therefore he can hand over the money: and so the usurer who receives it can lawfully keep it.

10. In the contracting of a loan two persons concur, namely the debtor and the creditor. But the creditor can licitly dismiss i.e. forgive what is owed to him by the debtor. Therefore also the debtor can hand over more without sin.

11. It is much more grievous to kill a man than to accept interest for money loaned. But to kill a man is lawful in a particular case. Therefore much more is it lawful in a particular case to lend money at interest.

12. That to which a man obliges himself can be lawfully demanded of him. But he who pays usury commits himself to this when he takes a loan. Therefore he who lends money at interest can lawfully demand it.

13. Simony is committed no matter what gift is accepted whether oral remuneration or monetary remuneration or equivalent service.†10 If then accepting monetary remuneration for money loaned were a mortal sin, with equal reason it also seems that whatever equivalent service someone accepted for money loaned would be a mortal sin, which seems extremely harsh.

14. Compensation (interesse)†11 is of two kinds: one, because of the fact that something is not available, namely because a person has not acquired what he could have acquired, and no one is obliged to compensate for

this; the other is compensation because of the fact that something is taken from him, namely because something which was of service to a person has been taken from him, and an obligation does arise concerning compensation in such a case. But it sometimes happens that a man suffers a loss in what was of service to him because of money loaned. Therefore it seems that he can take some compensation for this without sin.

15. It seems more praiseworthy to grant a person money for some useful purpose than merely for vain display. But when a person loans someone his money for vain display, the lender can accept a recompense for this without sin. Therefore much more so if he loans his money for some need.

16. The deeds of Christ are proposed to us in Holy Scripture for our imitation according to John 13, 15: "I have given you an example that as I have done to you, so also you should do." But the Lord says concerning Himself (Luke 19, 23) ". . . that I on my return might have gotten it with interest (usuris)", i.e. the money loaned. Therefore to exact usury is not a sin.

17. Whoever consents to someone sinning mortally, himself commits a mortal sin, for it is said in Romans (1, 32) ". . . (they) are deserving of death; and not only they that do such things but they also who consent to them that do them." But he who borrows money at usury gives consent to him who takes usury. If then to loan money at usury is a mortal sin, it will be a mortal sin also to borrow money subject to usury; which seems to be false in view of the contrary practice of many good men.

18. A person is thought to sin who furnishes aid to a person committing mortal sin, for instance if someone loans weapons to an enraged man or one bent on murder. If then the usurer loaning money at usury sins mortally, it seems that those who deposit money with him also sin mortally.

19. But it was argued that if without necessity someone borrows money subject to usury, or deposits his money with a usurer, he commits a mortal sin, but if out of necessity, he is excused from sin. But counter to this: the necessity of taking a loan subject to usury can be only to avoid some temporal loss. But we ought not to consent to or furnish the matter for another's sin because of any temporal loss, because we are bound to love the soul of our neighbor more than all temporal goods. Therefore the foresaid persons are not excused from mortal sin on account of such necessity.

20. Theft seems to be a greater sin than lending money at usury, because the former is entirely involuntary, but the latter is voluntary in some manner on the part of him whose money is taken i.e. borrowed. But theft can sometimes be lawful, as is clear in the case of the children of Israel who borrowed from the Egyptians vessels (of silver and gold) which they did not return, as is related in Exodus (13, 35-36). Therefore much more can lending money at usury be without sin.

On the contrary:

1. Gregory of Nyssa says †12 "If anyone should call the malignant contriving of usury 'theft' or 'murder' he will not be wrong. For what difference does it make that any one takes possession of things snatched by breaching a wall or takes possession of things unlawful by compulsion of usury?" But murder and theft are mortal sins. Therefore lending money at usury is also a mortal sin.

2. "If what is stated in a proposition is true then the opposite will be true in the opposite proposition," as the Philosopher says. †13 But not to lend money at usury leads men to life: for it is said in Ezechiel (18, 17) that he who has not taken usury, living he shall live, and In Psalm (14, 5) "He who hath not put out his money to usury . . . He shall receive a blessing from the Lord" (Psalm 22, 25). Therefore to take usury leads to death, and takes away the blessing of God; therefore it is a mortal sin.

3. Everything that is contrary to a precept of divine law is a mortal sin. But to lend money at usury is contrary to a precept of divine law, for it is said in Exodus (22, 25) "If thou lend money to any of my people that

is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries." Therefore lending money at usury is a mortal sin.

Response:

Lending money at usury is a mortal sin; and it is not a sin because it is prohibited, but rather it is prohibited because it is in itself a sin: for it is contrary to natural justice. And this is evident if anyone rightly considers the nature of usury: for usury is so called from use,^{†14} namely inasmuch as a certain price is taken for the use of money, as if the very use of loaned money may be sold.

But we must take into consideration that diverse things have diverse uses. For there are certain things whose use consists in the consumption of the substance of the things themselves, for instance the proper use of wine is drinking it, and therein the substance of the wine is consumed, and similarly the proper use of wheat or bread is eating it, which is the consumption of the wheat or bread itself; so also the proper use of money is spending it in exchange for other things; for money was devised for the purpose of exchange as the Philosopher says in Book II of the Politics.^{†15}

However there are certain other things whose use does not consist in the consumption of the substance of the things themselves, for example the use of a house is inhabitation; but it is not of the nature of inhabitation that the house be demolished, and if it happens that a house is improved or deteriorates by being dwelt in, this is incidental (*per accidens*); and the same is to be said of a horse and a garment, and other things of this kind. Since then such things strictly (*per se*) speaking are not consumed by use, therefore either the thing itself or its use can be given over or sold separately, or both together: for a person can sell a house while retaining for himself the use of it for a time, and similarly a person can sell the use of a house while keeping for himself the ownership and title to the house. On the other hand in the case of those things whose use is their consumption, the use of the thing is nothing else than the thing itself, hence whoever is given the use of such things is also given the ownership of the things themselves, and conversely. When therefore a person lends money with this stipulation that the entire sum be returned to him and in addition, demands a fixed price for the use of the money, obviously he is selling separately the use of the money and the very substance of the money; but the use of money as we have said is nothing else than its substance, wherefore he either sells what does not exist or he sells the same thing twice, i.e., the money itself whose use is its consumption, and this is clearly contrary to the precept of natural justice: therefore lending money at usury is in itself a mortal sin. And the same argument holds for all other things whose substance is consumed by use, as is clearly the case with wine, bread and other things of this kind.

Reply to 1. Taking usury from strangers was not approved for the Jews as lawful but permitted, namely inasmuch as they would not be punished for it by temporal punishment; the reason for which permission was that they were inclined to avarice. Hence they were permitted a lesser evil, namely taking usury from pagans, to avoid a greater evil, namely taking usury from Jews, the worshippers of God; but later they were admonished by the prophets to abstain from usury altogether, as is clear from the authorities quoted against it in On the contrary.

Reply to 2. Lending at interest (*fenrare*), i.e. the practice of usury, is sometimes taken broadly for lending (*mutuare*), as is evident from Ecclesiasticus (29, 10) "Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, . . ." etc., i.e. they have not lent; but lending pertains to him who has an abundance, and therefore the words 'thou shalt lend at usury' (*fenrabis*), is to be taken as 'thou shalt lend' (*mutuabis*) so that by this we are given to understand that they will be so affluent in temporal goods that they could lend to others and would have no need to borrow from anyone.

Reply to 3. According to a superficial reading of the Gospel text it can be taken to mean that lending

money is a matter of counsel, but if the loan be made, it is a matter of precept that it be without hope of usurious gain; and so far as concerns the first point lending is enumerated among the counsels. Or it can be said that certain directives are really precepts or prohibitions, which nevertheless are over and above the precepts according to the interpretation of the Pharisees, for example in Matthew (5, 21), to this precept 'Thou shalt not kill' which the Pharisees took to mean the external deed of murder, the Lord added (in verse 22) ". . . everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment"; and in this way so far as concerns the Pharisees who think that it is not universally forbidden to lend money at usury, lending without hope of usurious gain is counted among the counsels. Or it can be said †16 that Luke is speaking there not of the hope of usurious gain but of the hope which we put in man: for we ought not to do our good deeds hoping for a reward from man but from God alone.

Reply to 4. Some authors †17 say that a house and a horse lose in value through use, and therefore something can be taken as a recompense for this; money on the other hand does not lose in value; but this reasoning is not sound, because according to this a person could not justly accept a greater price for his house that was rented than the house may lose in value thereby. It must to be said, then, that it is lawful to sell the very use of the house but not of money, for the reason given above (in the Response).

Reply to 5. As the Philosopher says, †18 a return for a service received is made in one way in the case of a friendship of utility and in another way in the friendship of virtue, because in the useful friendship the return is to be measured according to the benefit he has obtained who receives the service, but in the virtuous friendship the return is to be measured according to the affection of him who gave the service. Now binding someone by a fixed contract to return a service does not befit a virtuous friendship, because in such a friendship the friend doing the service moves the affection of his friend to freely and generously make a return when the opportunity offers, but binding by a fixed contract to make a return for a service is proper to a friendship of utility, and therefore a person ought not to be bound to return more than he has received; but a person has not received (in a loan) anything more than the very amount of the money, because its use which consumes the money, is nothing else than the money itself, and therefore one ought not to be obliged to more than the restoration of the money.

Reply to 6. Positive or civil law principally intends the common good of the multitude i.e. the community. But it sometimes happens that if a certain evil is prevented, great damage ensues for the community, and therefore sometimes positive law permits something by way of exception not because it is just that that evil be done but in order that the community may not suffer greater damage; just as God too permits the doing of certain evil deeds in the world to avoid impeding the good deeds that He Himself knows how to elicit from these evil deeds. And in this way positive law has permitted usuries on account of the many benefits or advantages which people sometimes obtain from money loaned, even if at usury.

Reply to 7. The person who pays usury suffers injustice not from himself but from the usurer who, though not inflicting violence on him in an unqualified sense, does inflict on him a kind of moral violence, namely because the usurer imposes on him who has need to borrow money, the onerous condition of returning more than was given to him. And indeed it is similar to someone selling a thing to a person in need for much more than the thing is worth; for the sale would be unjust, just as likewise the loan of the usurer is unjust.

Reply to 8. The 'necessary' is twofold, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics †19 one, without which a thing (i.e. in this case a person) cannot live as for example food is necessary; the other, without which a thing can live yet not so well and adequately and according to this all useful things are called necessary; and he who borrows money is always under necessity either in the first or in the second way.

Reply to 9. He who gives his money as payment to a usurer does not give it wholly voluntarily, but somewhat under compulsion, as was said (in the Reply to 7).

Reply to 10. Just as a creditor can lawfully take less of his own accord i.e. voluntarily, so also a debtor

can give more of his own accord, and he to whom he gives it can lawfully accept it; but if this is included in a contract for a loan the contract is unlawful, and the acceptance is unlawful.

Reply to 11. Killing is to be considered generally in the same way as making loans, and each can be rightly or wrongly done; but killing an innocent person designates a definite species of evil, and this can never be rightly done, just as neither can making a loan at usury.

Reply to 12. That to which a man has committed himself can lawfully be exacted from him when the obligation is lawful; but the usurious obligation itself is by nature unjust, hence the usurer cannot lawfully exact that to which he bound another unlawfully.

Reply to 13. The usurer by reason of having made a loan can look for some gift either remuneration in money or orally or in equivalent service in two ways: in one way as a debt by reason of an certain obligation tacit or expressed, and thus whatever gift he looks for, he looks for unlawfully; in another way he can look for a gift not as a debt but as gratuitous and rendered without obligation, and thus he who makes a loan can lawfully look for a gift from him to whom he has made a loan, just as he who does a service for a person trusts that the person will amicably do a service for him in return. However the case of the simonist and of the usurer is different, because the simonist does not give that which is his but that which is Christ's and so he ought not to look for any return to be made to himself, but only the honor of Christ and the benefit of the Church, but the usurer gives to another only what is his (the usurer's), and hence he can look for some amicable return in the foresaid manner.

Reply to 14. On account of money loaned he who lends it can incur damage in two ways to the property till now in his possession: in one way, because the money is not returned to him at the time specified, and in such a case he who borrowed the money is bound to make compensation; in another way, within the time specified, and then he who borrowed the money is not bound to make compensation: for he who loaned the money ought to have guarded against incurring a loss to himself, and the borrower ought not to incur a loss because of the stupidity of the lender. And a parallel case is found in buying: for the buyer of an article justly gives for it only as much as it is worth, but not as much as he who sells it is damaged by its loss.

Reply to 15. As the Philosopher says in Book I of the Politics†20 there can be a twofold use of a thing, one, proper and principal, the other, secondary and common; for example, the proper and principal use of shoes is wearing them, and the secondary use is exchange; but conversely the principal use of money is exchange: for money was created for this purpose; but anything else can be the secondary use, for instance that it be given as security, or used to show off. Now exchange is a use consuming as it were the substance of the thing exchanged inasmuch as it in effect removes it from him who exchanges it, and therefore if someone gives his money to another for use as exchange which is what money is for, and for the use asks for another price beyond the principal,†21 it will be contrary to justice; but if someone gives his money to another for a different use in which the money is not consumed, the rule will be the same as for those things which are not consumed by their use, which are rented and hired out lawfully. Hence if someone gives money sealed in a purse to a person to be used as security, and thereupon accepts a fee, it is not usury, because in that case there is not a contract for a loan but rather a renting and hiring out. And the same rule applies if anyone gives money to another to use for ostentatious display; just as, conversely, if someone hands over shoes to a person for use as exchange, and asks a price for this beyond the value of the shoes, it would be usury.

Reply to 16. An increase of spiritual goods, which God requires of us for our benefit are there metaphorically called usuries. But a proof cannot be drawn from metaphorical expressions.†22

Reply to 17. It is one thing to consent or concur with someone in wickedness, another thing to use the wickedness of someone for good; for he consents or concurs with another in wickedness to whom it is pleasing that that other person engage in wickedness, and perhaps induces him to it, and this is always a sin; but he uses another's wickedness who turns this evil that someone does to some good, and in this way God uses the sins of

men by eliciting from them some good; hence it is lawful too for a man to use the sin of another for good. And this is clear from Augustine †23 who, when Publicola asked whether it was lawful to make use of an oath of a person swearing by false gods and obviously sinning in this, answered that he who uses, not for an evil but for a good purpose the sincerity of a man who certainly swore by false gods does not become a party to his sin of swearing by demons but to his honest contract by which he kept his word; however if it were pleasing to someone that another would swear by false gods and would induce him to it, he would sin. A similar answer is given to the case at hand that if a person uses the wickedness of the usurer for some good when borrowing from him at usury, he does not sin; but if a person were to persuade someone to lend money at usury who was not prepared to lend at usury, he would undoubtedly sin in every case as agreeing or consenting to him sinning.

Reply to 18. If someone were to deposit money with a usurer with the intention of obtaining usurious gain therefrom, he would undoubtedly sin as consenting to the sin; and the same is to be said, it seems, of someone who knowingly hands over his money to a person of whom he believes that he going to use it for usurious gain which otherwise that person could not engage in. But if someone hands over his money to a usurer who at times engages in usuries not so that the usurer may profit but that his need be succored, then he makes use of the usurer's wickedness rather than consents to his sin or furnishes him matter for sinning, and therefore this can be done without sin.

Reply to 19. A man ought not to consent to the sin of another to avoid any bodily harm. But nevertheless a man can lawfully use the wickedness of another or not withhold from him but offer him the matter of sin for the sake of avoiding bodily harm to himself; for example if a thief were about to cut a person's throat and to avoid the danger of death the person were to reveal to the thief the location of his treasure that could be stolen, he would not sin, according to the example of those ten men who said to Ismaël "Kill us not: for we have stores (Vulgate: 'treasures') in the field," as related in Jeremias (41, 8).†24

Reply to 20. That the children of Israel carried off the borrowed vessels was not theft, because those things were transferred to their ownership by the authority of Him Who is the Lord of all.

Question 14

Question XIV

On Gluttony

Article 1 †p

Whether Gluttony Is Always a Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. No one sins in that which he cannot avoid, as Augustine says in Book III On the Free Choice of the Will.†1 But no one can avoid gluttony: for Gregory says †2 that "because in eating, pleasure is blended with necessity, we fail to discern what necessity itself demands and what pleasure secretly demands." Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

2. Augustine says in Book X of the Confessions "Who is there, O Lord, who does not partake of food a little beyond the limit of his need?"†3 But this pertains to gluttony, therefore it is impossible to avoid gluttony. Consequently gluttony is not a sin.

3. Augustine says in Book II On the Free Choice of the Will†4 that where nature and necessity are in control there is no culpability. But nature and necessity move man to an act of gluttony. Therefore it seems that gluttony is not a sin.

4. As the Philosopher says in Book II On the Soul,†5 hunger is a desire for food. Therefore immoderate hunger is an immoderate desire of eating, in which the nature of gluttony consists. But it is not within our power not to be immoderately hungry, therefore it is not within our power to avoid gluttony. Consequently gluttony is not a sin.

5. Augustine says in the Confessions "You have taught me to set myself to take food as I would medicine."†6 But taking medicine is not counted as a sin. Therefore it seems that gluttony, which consists in the taking of food, is not a sin.

6. Every sin is opposed to some virtue as an extreme to a mean, as is clear from the Philosopher.†7 But gluttony is not opposed to temperance or sobriety as an extreme to a mean: because if it were thus opposed it would follow that virtue would be destroyed by an insufficient taking of food; which seems to be false, because this pertains to abstinence as is clear in regard to fasting and other such practices. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

On the contrary:

That by which as by an enemy we are impeded from spiritual combat seems to be a sin. But gluttony is of this nature: for Gregory says in Book XX of the Moralia that "we cannot stand up to the conflict of the spiritual contest unless the enemy posted within, i.e. our gluttonous appetite, is first conquered."†8 Therefore gluttony is a sin.

Response:

As Dionysius says †9 the evil of the soul is to be contrary to reason; hence in regard to whatsoever things a departure from the rule of reason takes place, there sin is present: for sin is nothing else than an inordinate or evil act.

Now a departure from the rule of reason occurs both in external actions and in the internal passions of the soul which ought to be directed by the rule of reason. But sin occurs more frequently in certain passions inasmuch these are more difficult to subject to the rule of reason. And among all the passions the most difficult to regulate according to reason is pleasure, and this is especially true of natural pleasures "engrained as they are in our life";†10 and such are the pleasures in food and drink, without which human life cannot be lived; and therefore for the most part a departure from the rule of reason occurs in regard to such pleasures. When then a desire for such pleasures exceeds the rule of reason it is a sin of gluttony; hence it is said †11 that "gluttony is an inordinate desire of eating."

But the sin of gluttony does not consist in the external acts concerning the eating itself except as a consequence, namely inasmuch as it proceeds from inordinate desire for food, as is also the case in all the other vices concerned with the passions; hence Augustine says "I do not fear the uncleanness of food but the uncleanness of cupidity."†12 Hence it is clear that gluttony is principally about the passions and it is opposed to temperance according as it concerns the desires and pleasures in food and drink.

Reply to 1. The rule of reason in these matters is that a person should take food commensurate with the sustenance of nature and the good condition of man and the society of those with whom he lives, as is said in Book III of the Ethics.†13 When therefore a person desires and takes food according to this rule of reason he takes it according to need; but when he exceeds this limit, he transgresses the rule of reason by departing from the mean of virtue to satisfy the desire of pleasure. However, as the Philosopher says,†14 sometimes the departure from the mean of virtue is considerable and this can be easily perceived, but sometimes the departure is slight and this is not easily discernible, hence this has little of the nature of sin. And in this way the statement

of Gregory is to be understood.

Reply to 2. Not everyone who takes food beyond the limit of necessity sins from the vice of gluttony: for it can happen that what a person believes to be necessary for him is in fact superfluous, and in that case the desire for food is not immoderate, because it does not depart from the rule of reason. But gluttony, as was said (in the Response), does not primarily and of itself (*per se*) denote immoderate taking of food but immoderate desire of the taking itself. Now the measure of the very taking of food is determined according to the norm of one's bodily nature; hence this can be more accurately ascertained according to the art of medicine than the rule of prudence, in accordance with which however it can be judged whether the desire for food is moderate or immoderate, although neither can this be easily discerned where the departure from reason is not very much, as was said (in Reply to 1); but a person can discern it especially with the help of God. Hence after the words quoted (in the objection) Augustine adds †15 "Whoever he is", namely who does not take more food than is necessary, "he is great, let him magnify Thy Name."

Reply to 3. Nature and necessity induce man to take food, but in the act of gluttony natural necessity, in accordance with which reason moderates concupiscence, is exceeded.

Reply to 4. The appetite for food is twofold: one, the natural appetite according to which the appetitive, the retentive, the digestive and excretive powers †16 serve the nutritive power, which is a power or faculty of the vegetative soul; and this appetite is hunger which does not follow any apprehending power but follows the need of nature; hence an excess of hunger is not a moral fault but rather diminishes or entirely excuses fault. The other is the sense appetite following apprehension, in which (appetite) are the passions of the soul; and the immoderate concupiscence of this appetite in the taking of food constitutes the nature of gluttony. Hence the argument in the objection proceeded by way of equivocation on the two meanings of 'appetite'.

Reply to 5. Food and medical remedies have this in common that both are taken to counter the impairment of bodily nature; but a difference between them can be noticed in regard to two things: first, because remedies are taken in accordance with the rule of the medical art, hence if there is a disorder in the taking of remedies, it is imputed to the physician prescribing them rather than to the patient taking them; on the other hand the taking of food for the most part is a matter of a person's own judgment, and therefore it is imputed to him as a sin if on account of immoderate desire for the pleasure of food he takes too much food. Secondly, the taking of remedies is not pleasurable as is the taking of food, and so in taking medicines there is no sin from inordinate desire of pleasure as there is in the taking of food; nevertheless if a sick person were to take more of some pleasant-tasting medicine than he ought contrary to the counsel of the doctor, on account of the desire of pleasure, he would likewise sin from the vice of gluttony.

Reply to 6. Too much and too little and the mean are taken in moral virtue not according to absolute quantity, but according to a proportion in relation to right reason, in keeping with which the mean of virtue is determined, as is clear from the definition of virtue in Book II of the Ethics. †17 And therefore sometimes virtue may consist in an extreme according to absolute quantity which however consists in the mean in proportion to right reason, as the Philosopher says about the magnanimous man that "he is an extreme in greatness," namely because he aims at the greatest deeds, "but he is a mean in respect to the rightness of them" †18 in this way then virginity, poverty, and fasting observe the extreme according to absolute quantity but nevertheless they observe the mean in proportion to right reason, to depart from which even by excessive abstinence is a sin. Hence Gregory in Book XXX of the *Moralia* says: "Frequently when the flesh is restrained more than is just, it is weakened even for the exercise of good works, so that it does not have the strength for prayer and preaching, while it hastens to stifle completely the incentives to virtues within itself; and so while we attack the enemy we hate, we also slay the citizen we love." †19

Whether Gluttony Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. On the text "Lest there be any immoral or profane person, such as Esau . . . ," etc. (Hebrews 12, 16) the Gloss†1 says that Esau was profane because he was a "belly-gorger" i.e. a glutton. But no one is called profane except on account of mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

2. Virtues are destroyed only by mortal sin. But virtues are destroyed by gluttony, for Gregory says †2 "As long as the vice of gluttony rules over men, they lose all that they have valiantly done, and while the belly is not restrained, all their virtues come to naught." Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

3. Anything that deviates or departs from the mean of virtue corrupts virtue which consists in the mean, and consequently is a mortal sin. But gluttony departs from the mean of virtue, as was said (in q. 14, a. 1). Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

4. It is a graver sin for a man to kill himself than to kill another; likewise it seems to be a graver sin for a man to injure his own body than another's body. But injury is caused to man's own body by gluttony: for it is said in Ecclesiasticus (37, 33-34) "For in many meats there will be sickness" and . . . "by surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin as also is anger, which aims at the injury of one's neighbor.

5. Just as an order or gradation of precepts is evident in good deeds so an order of prohibitions is evident in sins. But the first prohibition given to man was in regard to gluttony, as is clear from Genesis (2, 17) where the Lord commanded Adam not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the first and greatest sin, and so it seems to be a mortal sin.

6. Mortal sin consists in a turning away from God.†3 But gluttony turns man away from God, because it makes a man idolatrous, according to Exodus (32, 6) "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play", i.e. to honor an idol †4 it also causes man to commit fornication: for it is said in Osee (4, 10) "They shall eat and shall not be filled, they have fornicated and have not ceased." Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

7. Jerome says in Book I Against Jovinianus†5 "Greediness for food which is the mother of avarice binds the soul with fetters." But the soul is bound with fetters only by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

8. Jerome says in the same book †6 that it is contrary to nature to revel in pleasures. But that which is contrary to nature is a mortal sin:†7 because it must also be contrary to reason. Therefore gluttony which consists in indulging in pleasures, is a mortal sin.

9. That sin is a mortal sin whose effect is always a mortal sin. But the effects of gluttony are always mortal sins: because on the words of the Psalmist (Psalm 135, 10) "Who smote Egypt with their firstborn" the Gloss says †8 "Lust, pride, and greed are the sins that the belly first begets." Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

10. In Ecclesiasticus (39, 31-32) it is said "The principal things necessary for the life of men, are water, fire, and iron, salt and milk, and wheat bread and honey, and a cluster of grapes, and oil, and clothing: all these things shall be for good to the holy, so to the sinners and the ungodly they shall be turned into evils"; the Gloss on this says "To sinners, that is to those abusing them they will turn into evils, i.e. into eternal condemnation."†9 But the abuse of these good things often occurs from gluttony. Therefore gluttony merits eternal condemnation, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

11. That which makes man bestial is a mortal sin and the gravest sin. But intemperance, a part of which is gluttony, makes man bestial, as the Philosopher says.†10 Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

12. Idolatry is a mortal sin. But gluttony is a kind of idolatry: for it is said in Romans (16, 18) about certain people that they do not serve Christ the Lord but their belly, and in The Epistle to the Philippians 4 †11 it is said "Many walk . . . of whom their end is ruin, whose god is their belly." Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

On the contrary:

1. Mortal sin is not found in holy men. But gluttony is sometimes found in holy men: for Augustine says in Book X of the Confessions †12 "But sometimes excessive eating creeps upon your servant; thou wilt be merciful so that it may be put far from me"; but excessive eating pertains to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

2. Every mortal sin is contrary to some precept of the law. But gluttony is not contrary to any precept of the law, as is obvious to anyone running through each of the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

3. Gregory explaining Job 11, 11 "For He knoweth the vanity of man" says: "From vanity we are led to iniquity, when we first let ourselves fall into light sins so that habit making all things light, we are not at all afraid afterwards of committing even graver sins," †13 and among the other examples he gives he adds in regard to gluttony: "Whilest we give ourselves over to gluttony we are straightway betrayed into the folly of levity," †14 and thus gluttony is reckoned among light faults. But mortal sins are not called light sins. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

4. Augustine says †15 "Whenever man takes more food or drink than is necessary, he should know that this pertains to lesser sins." But to take more food or drink than is necessary pertains to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

Response:

When we ask in general about some sin whether it is mortal, the question ought to be understood as whether it is mortal by reason of its genus: because as we have said many times previously (in q. 10, a. 2; q. 11, a. 3; and q. 13, a. 2), in any genus of mortal sin, for instance homicide or adultery, some movement that is a venial sin can be found, and likewise in any genus of venial sin some act that is a mortal sin can be found, as in the genus of 'idle word' when the act is referred to the end or aim of mortal sin. Now the moral species of an act is taken from the object; †16 hence if the object of a sin is contrary to charity in which the spiritual life consists, that sin is necessarily mortal by reason of its genus or by reason of its species, for example, blasphemy by reason of its object is contrary to charity as regards the love of God, and murder as regards the love of neighbor, wherefore both are mortal sins.

Now the sin of gluttony consists in an inordinate desire for the pleasure of food; but the very pleasure of food considered in itself is not contrary to charity either as regards the love of God or as regards the love of neighbor, but according as the inordinateness is added, the pleasure can be in a certain way contrary to charity and in a certain way not contrary to charity. For the desire of this pleasure can be inordinate in two ways: in one way to such an degree that it excludes the order to the ultimate end; which occurs when a man desires pleasure of this kind as his ultimate end, since it is not possible for one man to have many ultimate ends; and such deordination is contrary to charity as regards the love of God, Who ought to be loved as the ultimate end. In another way the desire can be inordinate in regard to those things that are for the end, while preserving the order to the ultimate end: for example, when a man excessively desires food but does not desire it in such a way that he would be willing to transgress the divine precepts to obtain it; and such inordinateness is not contrary to charity. Now inordinateness of desire is of the nature of gluttony, but an inordinateness that excludes the order to the ultimate end does not pertain to its nature; and therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its species, but sometimes it can be a mortal sin and sometimes a venial sin according to the two modes of inordinateness just designated.

Reply to 1. Esau †17 was called profane by reason of his gluttony because in him the inordinate desire of food was so great that he sold his birthright for a mess of pottage, hence in some measure he seems to have desired the pleasure of food as an end.

Reply to 2. A sin destroys virtues in two ways: in one way directly by contrariety to virtue, and in this way the gluttony which is a mortal sin destroys the virtues, as do other mortal sins; in another way dispositively, and in this way even venial sins destroy the virtues because as is said in Ecclesiasticus 28, †18 "He that contemneth small things, shall fall little by little."

Reply to 3. Every sin, venial and mortal, corrupts, i.e. departs from the mean of virtue, for there would be no sin unless there were a departure from the mean of reason; but only that sin which is contrary to charity on which all the virtues depend, destroys the habit of virtue, and according to this the gluttony which is a venial sin does not corrupt the mean of virtue in the habit but only in the act.

Reply to 4. Injury of a neighbor is in itself (per se) the object of anger, for anger seeks unjust revenge, †19 which consists in the injury of a neighbor; however injury of one's own body is not the proper object of gluttony, but sometimes it accompanies the proper object of gluttony apart from one's intention, and such an injury is outside the nature of gluttony. Nevertheless if someone knowingly were to inflict grave harm on his own body because of his immoderate desire for food by eating too much or by taking harmful foods he would not be excused from mortal sin.

Reply to 5. That prohibition given to Adam was not a prohibition of the vice of gluttony: for he could have eaten that fruit †20 without any sin of gluttony, if the prohibition had not intervened; but it was a disciplinary precept, †21 namely so that man would experience the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, as Augustine says. †22 Hence the first sin of man was not gluttony but disobedience or pride.

Reply to 6. Gluttony dispositively leads to idolatry and lust, but not in such a way that these two vices are of the nature of gluttony; hence it does not follow that the sin of gluttony is a mortal sin, since even a venial sin can dispose to mortal sin.

Reply to 7. Mortal sin fetters the soul completely inasmuch as it prevents the soul from being able of itself (per se) to return to the order of charity, but venial sin fetters the soul in a certain respect inasmuch as it hinders it from a virtuous act and thus gluttony binds the soul in one way inasmuch as it is a venial sin and in another way inasmuch as it is a mortal sin.

Reply to 8. Reason is of man's nature; hence whatever is contrary to reason is contrary to the nature of man. Therefore to revel or give oneself up to pleasures is contrary to man's nature inasmuch as it transgresses the rule of reason either by putting aside the order to the end, which is to be simply contrary to nature, or by putting aside the order of the means to the end, which is to be in some respect contrary to reason or rather to be beside reason.

Reply to 9. Those three vices (lust, pride, and avarice) are said to be effects of gluttony inasmuch as gluttony disposes to them; but it does not follow from this that gluttony is always a mortal sin.

Reply to 10. 'To use' is to refer something to the ultimate end which constitutes our happiness. Hence in the proper sense they abuse created things who make them an end, by not referring them to the ultimate end; and this deserves condemnation in the same way in the case of gluttony as in other sins in which man thus abuses created things.

Reply to 11. The Philosopher does not say that intemperance in itself makes a man bestial, but that rejoicing in such pleasures and especially in loving them is bestial, and this for the reason that pleasures of this kind are those that we share in common with the beasts: for the pleasures proper to man are of another kind; and he who constitutes these pleasures as the end loves them above all others.

Reply to 12. They who constitute their end -- which ought to be in God alone -- in the pleasures of foods pertaining to the belly, serve their belly as god.

Replies to On the contrary:

The answers to those arguments is readily evident, for the arguments given there are valid in regard to gluttony as it is a venial sin.

However we need to reply to the second argument, which seems to show that gluttony is never a mortal sin because it is not contrary to any precept. For it must be said that the precepts of the Decalogue command and forbid those things that natural reason judges are to be done or not to be done: for they fall within the comprehension of everyone. Hence not all mortal sins are directly contrary to the precepts of the Decalogue but (some) are so reductively, for example the prohibition of simple fornication is reduced to the precept: "Thou shalt not commit adultery";†23 and in like manner the prohibition of gluttony according as it is a mortal sin is reductively contrary to the precept of keeping holy the sabbath,†24 by which is understood a spiritual tranquillity,†25 which is impeded by the inordinateness of gluttony.

Question XIV, Article 3 †p

On the Species of Gluttony

Gregory assigns the species of gluttony in Book III of the Moralia when he states: "the vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways: for sometimes it anticipates the hour of need, sometimes it seeks more sumptuous foods, sometimes it wants foods which we must needs take more daintily prepared, sometimes it exceeds the reasonable measure in the quantity taken, but sometimes we sin more fatally by the very ardor of ravenous desire"†1 and these are contained in the following verse:

'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, ravenously, fastidiously.'†2

But it seems that these five species of gluttony are not properly distinguished, for the following reasons.

1. The foregoing modes of gluttony differ according to diverse circumstances: for 'hastily' refers to time, 'sumptuously' refers to the substance or costliness of food, and so on. But circumstances do not differentiate species, since they are accidents of the act. Therefore the diverse species of gluttony ought not to be distinguished according to the five foresaid modes.

2. In any sin it is possible to transgress the rule according to the diverse circumstances, for instance the illiberal person takes when he ought not and where he ought not, and likewise according to the other circumstances. But the diverse species of illiberality are not distinguished in this way. Therefore neither should the diverse species of gluttony to be distinguished according to the five foresaid modes.

3. Just as time is regarded as a circumstance, so also is place and the substance i.e. the person of the sinner. If then one species of gluttony is taken according to time, other species also ought to be taken according to place and according to the seven other circumstances,†3 so there should be seven or eight species of gluttony.

4. According to the Philosopher in Book III of the Ethics,†4 temperance, to which gluttony is opposed, concerns the pleasures of taste not as such but inasmuch as it concerns the sense of touch. But 'sumptuously' and 'fastidiously' seem to pertain to the goodness of flavor which is the proper object of taste. Therefore these two species of gluttony are improperly assigned.

5. Augustine says †5 that "the people in the wilderness deserved to be reproved not because they desired flesh-meat but because in their desire for food they murmured against God." But Gregory in Book XXX of the Moralia†6 says that the people disdained the manna and sought flesh-meat that they thought more sumptuous." Therefore to desire sumptuous food does not seem to pertain to the sin of gluttony, and so it seems that the foresaid species of gluttony are not properly assigned.

On the contrary:

The authority of Gregory who distinguishes these species in the place mentioned.†7

Response:

In distinguishing the species of moral acts it is necessary to consider especially the motives that are the proper objects of the voluntary acts, because the object moving the will is as it were its form: wherefore voluntary acts are distinguished according to the diverse motives just as the acts of natural things are distinguished according to the diverse forms of the agents. Now it sometimes happens that the same motive is the reason why a man transgresses the mean of virtue according to the different circumstances, and then the different species of sin are not taken according to the different inordinate circumstances: for example, in the case of avarice, a man is moved to seize the another's goods when he ought not and where he ought not and from whom he ought not, on account of one and the same motive, namely to amass money; and therefore the species of avarice are not differentiated according to this. If however the motives for sinning were diverse, in like manner there would be diverse species of avarice, for instance, if someone was inclined to the transgression of some circumstances because of a defect in giving but to the transgression of other circumstances because of an excess in taking. Likewise then it must be said that the forementioned species of gluttony are distinguished according to diverse motives: for as we have said (in q. 14, a. 1), the sin of gluttony consists in the inordinate desire of the pleasure in foods; and such inordinateness can be referred either to the pleasure or to the desire itself.

Now the cause of the pleasure can be either natural or artificial: natural, as when someone excessively seeks pleasure in the eating of costly and choice foods, according to Amos (6, 4) "You . . . that eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the midst of the herd"; and the cause of the pleasure is artificial, as when a person excessively desires food delicately prepared. Therefore as regards the first, a person is said to desire 'sumptuously', as regards the second 'fastidiously'.

However, as regards the concupiscence or desire, the inordinateness can be differentiated in three ways according to the diverse motives. For desire is a movement of the appetitive power tending to pleasure; but the inordinate vehemence of the movement even in its bodily aspects can be considered in three stages: first, before it arrives at the term to which it tends and thus the vehement movement hastens to arrive at its term: in like manner also, desire when it is inordinately vehement, cannot brook delay in the taking of food but hurriedly eats; and in this way is taken what is called 'hastily'. Secondly the vehemence of the movement is considered in the very arrival at its term: because what is violently moved bodily is inordinately united with that to which it is tends, and likewise when the desire for food is vehement, a man acts inordinately in taking food; and to this pertains what is called 'ravenously'. Thirdly, the vehemence of the bodily movement is considered after it arrives at the object to which it tends, since it does not stop there but proceeds further: and in like manner when a person inordinately desires food, his desire does not stop with the moderate amount of food which nature requires but takes more; and to this pertains what is called 'too much'.

Reply to 1. The foresaid species are not diversified on account of the diverse circumstances but on account of the diverse motives, as we have said (in the Response).

Replies to 2 and 3. The answer to the second and third arguments is evident from the foregoing: for the transgression of the diverse circumstance does not always have diverse motives.

Reply to 4. The glutton does not take pleasure in costly and delicately prepared foods because of his appraisal of the flavors as wine-testers do, which is proper to taste as such: for the inordinateness of that pleasure pertains more to curiosity than to gluttony; but the glutton takes pleasure in the very taking of costly and daintily prepared food, which taking is on account of a certain touch.

Reply to 3. To eat costly or sumptuous food is not a sin, as Augustine says; but the inordinate desire for sumptuous food can be a sin according to the objective Gregory has in mind.

Question XIV, Article 4 ¶p

Whether Gluttony Is a Capital Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Just as pleasure occurs in the sense of taste and of touch, so also to the other senses. But no capital vices are assigned concerning the pleasures of the other senses. Therefore neither should gluttony which concerns the pleasures of taste be assigned as a capital vice.

2. Pride, according to Gregory,†1 is not designated as a capital vice but as the queen of vices, because all the other vices have their origin from it. But drunkenness is the root of all the vices: for it is said in Decretum dist. XXXV †2 "Above all else clerics should avoid drunkenness which enkindles and fosters all the vices", but drunkenness is a species of gluttony. Therefore gluttony ought not to be enumerated among the capital vices.

3. One capital vice is not numbered among the daughters of another capital vice. But uncleanness, which Gregory assigns †3 as a daughter of gluttony pertains to lust, according to the Epistle to the Ephesians (5, 3): "But immorality (fornicatio) and every uncleanness . . . let it not even be named among you." Therefore since lust is a capital vice, it seems that gluttony is not a capital vice but precedes the other capital vices.

4. To strive after joyful things is characteristic of the proud as Bernard says.†4 But pride is not a daughter of any capital vice. Since then unseemly joy or mirth is assigned by Gregory †5 as an daughter of gluttony, it seems that gluttony is not a capital vice.

On the contrary:

Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia†6 enumerates gluttony among the capital vices.

Response:

As was stated in the preceding questions (q. 13, a. 3 and q. 12, a. 5), a vice is called capital from which other vices arise as being their final cause, namely inasmuch as the object of some vice is particularly desirable right from the beginning as having a likeness to happiness, which all men naturally desire.†7 Now one of the conditions of happiness is pleasure †8 without which happiness is not possible, and therefore the sin of gluttony, which is concerned with one of the principal pleasures, the pleasure consisting in food and drink, is a capital vice.

But from gluttony certain vices arise which are called its daughters as being those that can issue from immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Which can be considered either as regards the body, whose defilement readily follows from excessive consumption of food, and thus 'uncleanness' is designated as a daughter (species) of gluttony; or it can be considered as regards the soul, whose function is to rule the body, and whose governance is impeded in many ways on account of immoderate pleasure in food and drink. And first as regards the reason, whose acuteness is blunted by an excessive consumption of food or solicitude about its consumption, because when the lower bodily functions are upset by an inordinate consumption of food reason itself as a consequence is impeded; and thus 'dullness of sense in understanding' is assigned as a daughter of gluttony. Secondly, a deordination follows in the emotional state which is inordinately affected when the governance of reason is benumbed; and thus there is 'unseemly joy.' Thirdly, inordinateness of speech follows; and thus there is 'garrulousness', because when reason fails to weigh its words, the result is that man lapses into verbosity. Fourthly, inordinate action follows; and thus there is 'scurrility', i.e. a ludicrousness in outward gestures, resulting from a want of reason, whose function it is to see to the composure of the outward members. So accordingly, gluttony is a capital vice and has five daughters, as Gregory says †9 namely unseemly joy, scurrility, garrulousness, uncleanness, and dullness of sense in understanding.

Reply to 1. The pleasures of the other senses result from a union with the pleasurable object only according to a likeness but the pleasures of touch result from a physical union with the pleasurable object: and therefore capital vices are assigned in regard to the pleasures of touch as being more principal and major pleasures and not in regard to the pleasures of the other senses except taste inasmuch as it is a kind of touch.

Reply to 2. From drunkenness follow all sins not as originating from a final cause but as from the removal of an impediment to sin, namely inasmuch as drunkenness removes the judgment of reason by which man is restrained from sin: hence it does not follow that gluttony or drunkenness is the source of all vices, as pride is, but of certain ones in particular that arise directly from gluttony as its proper effects.

Reply to 3. Defilement of the body can come from a cause pertaining to man's animal nature, for example from the desire of an apprehended pleasure and this pertains principally to lust; or from an intrinsic bodily cause, namely from the superfluous humor abounding within the body by which man is incited to defilement of the body, and in accordance with this uncleanness is assigned as a daughter of gluttony.

Reply to 4. To seek joyful things belongs to pride; but it belongs to gluttony inasmuch as unseemly joy or mirth follows from gluttony because reason is impeded, as we have said (in the Response).

Question 15

Question XV

On Lust

Article 1 †p

Whether Every Act of Lust Is a Sin?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Fornication is an act of lust. But fornication is enumerated among certain things that are not sins in themselves but lawful: for it is said in Acts of the Apostles (15, 28-29) "For the Holy Spirit and we have decided to lay no further burden upon you but this indispensable one, that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from what is strangled and from immorality (fornicatione)." But no eating of food is in itself a

sin, according to the First Epistle to Timothy (4, 4) "Nothing is to be rejected that is accepted with thanksgiving." Therefore neither is fornication a sin, and so not every act of lust is a sin.

2. To know a woman sexually is a natural act, therefore considered in itself it is not a sin, just as neither is it a sin to look at her since each of them is the act of a natural power. But to look at a woman who is not one's wife is not a sin. Therefore neither is it a sin to know a woman sexually who is not one's wife.

3. If fornication is a sin, either this is by reason of the faculty from which the act proceeds, or by reason of the matter or by reason of the end. But fornication is not a sin by reason of the faculty, because the faculty from which the act proceeds is natural; nor by reason of the matter, because the matter is a woman created by God for this purpose, according to Genesis (2, 18) "Let us make him a helpmate like unto himself"; and it may not even be a sin by reason of the end, for instance if someone in fornicating intends to generate a child to cultivate the worship of God. Therefore it seems that not all fornication is a sin.

4. According to the Philosopher,†1 semen is a secretion of left-over nutriment. But it is lawful to discharge other left-over products of nutriment in any manner whatsoever and to do this without sin, so it seems that likewise the discharge of semen may be done without sin. Therefore not every act of lust is a sin.

5. That which is a sin by reason of its genus cannot lawfully be done for any good end whatsoever, according to Romans (3, 8), "Not as some calumniously accuse us of teaching (may we) do evil that good may come of it." Yet as the Commentator says in Book V of the Ethics,†2 a just or virtuous man commits adultery with the wife of a tyrant in order to kill the tyrant and liberate his country. Therefore even adultery is not of itself a sin; much less then are the other acts of fornication.

6. No act of a just man insofar as he is just, is a sin. But fornication seems to be an act of justice: for in Genesis 38, 26, Judah said of Tamar with whom he had committed fornication "She is more just than I", or "She was justified because of me" according to the Hebrew original as Jerome says.†3 Therefore fornication is not a sin.

7. Augustine says in Book VII On the City of God†4 that every vice is contrary to nature. But fornication is not contrary to nature; for on Romans 1, 26 "Their women have exchanged the natural use," the Gloss says †5 "The natural use is for a man and woman to unite in copulation." Therefore fornication is not a sin.

8. No sin is committed by following the precept of God. But fornication sometimes is committed by following the precept of God: for we read in Osee (1, 2), "The Lord said to Osee: Go, take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication in itself is not a sin.

9. Any vice that consists in an excess is opposed to a virtue consisting in a curtailment. But lust signifies a certain excess in the desires for sexual pleasures, and the opposed curtailment, which is virginity or perpetual continence, is not a sin but something praiseworthy. Therefore neither is lust always a sin.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews (13, 4) "Let marriage be held in honor with all, and let the marriage bed be undefiled, for God will judge the immoral (fornicores) and adulterers." But that for which man is subject to divine judgment is a sin. Therefore fornication and adultery and all such acts of lust are sins.

2. In Tobias (4, 13) it is said "Take heed to keep thyself, my son, from all fornication, and besides thy wife never endure to know a crime." But they are called acts of lust which are other than sexual intercourse with a lawful wife. Therefore every act of lust is a sin.

Response:

Lust is a vice opposed to temperance according as it moderates desires for the pleasures of touch in sexual intercourse, just as gluttony is opposed to temperance inasmuch as it moderates desires for the pleasures of touch in eating and drinking, hence lust principally signifies a deordination in the desires for venereal pleasures according to excess. Now an deordination of this kind can be either in the interior passions alone or even beyond in the very external act which is inordinate in itself and not merely because of the inordinate concupiscence from which it proceeds. For it pertains to inordinate concupiscence that because of a desire for pleasure a man performs an act which is inordinate in itself; as is obvious in the case of desire for money: for a man can have an inordinate desire to acquire or retain his own money that is due to his own efforts, and then such acquisition or retention of money is not vicious in itself but only inasmuch as it arises from inordinate concupiscence; but sometimes by reason of an inordinate desire for money a person may even will to take or keep what belongs to another, and then the very taking or keeping is inordinate in itself and not merely as it proceeds from inordinate concupiscence; and both of these pertain to the vice of illiberality, as is clear from the Philosopher.†6

In like manner also we must speak of lust. Because sometimes it signifies only an inordinateness of interior desire, as is evident in him who approaches his own wife with inordinate desire: for then the act itself is not inordinate in itself but only as it proceeds from inordinate concupiscence; but sometimes along with the inordinate concupiscence there is also a deordination of the very external act in itself, as occurs in every use of the genital organs outside the conjugal act.

And indeed that every act of this latter kind is of itself inordinate is evident from the fact that every human act which is not proportionate to its proper end is said to be inordinate: for example, eating is inordinate if it is not proportionate to bodily health to which eating is ordained as to an end. Now the end or purpose of the use of the genital members is the generation and education of offspring, and therefore every use of these members which is not proportionate to the generation of offspring and its proper education is in itself inordinate. And any act whatsoever of the foresaid members outside the sexual union of a man and woman obviously is not suitable for the generation of offspring.

Moreover every sexual union of a man and woman outside the law of marriage is impropportionate to the proper education of the offspring. For the law of marriage was instituted to exclude promiscuous copulation, which is opposed to the identification of offspring: for if any man could indiscriminately approach for sexual intercourse any woman who was not limited to him, the identification of offspring would be done away with, and as a consequence the solicitude of the father about the upbringing of the children; and this is contrary to what is proper to human nature, because men are naturally solicitous about the identification of offspring and the education of their own children. Indeed this pertains even more to fathers than to mothers, because the rearing of children during infancy is the responsibility of the mother, but afterwards it is the concern of the father to educate the child and instruct him, and to make provision for his whole life.†7 And so we see even in the other animals that in whatever species the young need the common rearing by male and female, copulation among them is not promiscuous but is of the male with a particular female, as is evident in all birds that jointly build their nests.†8 Hence clearly every sexual union of a man and woman outside the law of marriage, which law excludes promiscuous copulation, is in itself inordinate. But we are not dealing now with the question of whether this limitation extends to having one or many partners either successively or simultaneously, for these matters pertain to the treatise on marriage; yet howsoever this may be, every sexual union of a male and female outside the law of marriage is inordinate.

So accordingly every act of lust is a sin either because of the deordination of the act or even because of the inordinateness of concupiscence alone, which inordinateness primarily and in itself (per se) pertains to lust. For Augustine says in Book XII of the City of God†9 that lust is not the fault of beautiful and pleasing bodies but of the soul that perversely loves sensual pleasures, to the neglect of temperance, which attaches us to realities far more beautiful and pleasing in their spirituality.

Reply to 1.†10 The Apostles wishing to bring converts from paganism in the early church into unanimous agreement with those who were converted from Judaism, excluded obstacles to this union by removing from each side what could be burdensome to the other; and therefore to the Gentiles they forbade the things which were offensive to the Jews, not under the consideration of whether they were sins or not, but only that they were causing scandal, i.e. were a stumbling block. Now the Gentiles judged that all food was in itself lawful to eat, which was true, but the Jews abhorred this because of the ancient custom of the law, and therefore the Apostles forbade for the time being those foods especially loathsome to the Jews; on the other hand the Gentiles falsely thought that simple fornication was not a sin which the Jews, taught by the law, rightly abhorred as a sin. And therefore the Apostles also forbade this as a sin, since this too was a cause of dissension.

Reply to 2. Nothing hinders a thing from being mine to see, which however is not mine for some other use: for example, gold on display along the street is mine to see but not mine to possess. In like manner also a woman may be mine to see or even to have as a servant, but not mine to use for sexual intercourse except according to the determination of law of marriage.

Reply to 3. The act of lust is a sin by reason of the power or faculty, namely inasmuch as the concupiscible power is not kept under the control of reason, and by reason of the matter, because an act suitable for the generation and education of children not only requires a woman as matter but also a woman bound by marriage, as we have said (in the Response). Likewise the end or aim of the act itself is inordinate according to its nature, even though as regards the intention of the agent the end may be good, which intention does not suffice to free the act from fault, as is evident in one who steals with the intention of giving an alms.

Reply to 4. As the Philosopher says in the same book,†11 the semen is a superfluity at least as far as the act of the nutritive power is concerned but it is needed for the generation of offspring, and therefore every voluntary discharge of semen is unlawful unless it is in keeping with the end intended by nature; but other superfluities such as perspiration, urine, and the like, are superfluities which are not needed, and so it does not matter how they are discharged.

Reply to 5. The Commentator is not to be upheld on this point: for a man ought not to commit adultery for any expediency, just as he ought not to tell a lie for any expediency, as Augustine says in the book *Against Lying*.†12

Reply to 6. Tamar is said to be justified not because of the fornication she committed, but because she did not want to beget offspring of hers from a tribe other than the one from which it was lawful for her to have a husband.

Reply to 7. An act of lust can be called contrary to nature in two ways: in one way without qualification (absolute), namely because it is contrary to the nature of every animal: and thus every act of lust outside the sexual union of male and female is said to be contrary to nature inasmuch as it is not proportionate to generation, which occurs in every genus of animal by copulation of the two sexes; and the Gloss speaks in this fashion. In another way something is said to be contrary to nature because it is contrary to the peculiar nature of man, whose obligation it is to order the act of generation to the proper rearing of offspring, and in this way any fornication whatsoever is contrary to nature.

Reply to 8. Just as because of the precept of God in whose power are all things, that which otherwise would have been theft was not theft for the children of Israel when they despoiled the Egyptians, as is related in Exodus (12, 35-36), so also because of the authority of God Himself Who is the source of law of marriage, that sexual union was not fornicacious which otherwise would have been fornicacious; hence 'wife of fornications' and 'children of fornications' is used not because on that occasion there was fornication but because otherwise it would have been fornication.

Reply to 9. Virginity i.e. perpetual continence is not opposed to lust as an extreme but as a mean, inasmuch as the mean in virtues is not taken according to quantity but according to right reason, as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man.†13 But an extreme according to curtailment would occur if someone were to abstain from sexual intercourse contrary to right reason; as is evident in the case of a husband who disdains rendering the debt to his wife, or who abstains out of a reverence for demons, as do necromancers and vestal virgins.

Question XV, Article 2 †p

Whether Every Act of Lust Is a Mortal Sin?

It seems it is not, for the following reasons.

1. On the First Epistle to Timothy (4, 8) "Godliness i.e. piety is profitable to all", the Gloss of Ambrose says †1 "the whole of Christian teaching can be summed up in mercy and godliness; which if a person aims at, even though he suffer lapses of the flesh, undoubtedly he will be punished, but he will not perish." But whoever sins mortally not only will be punished but will perish. Therefore not everyone who suffers a lapse of the flesh by an act of lust sins mortally.

2. Every mortal sin is contrary to some precept of the divine law. But among the sins of lust only adultery is contrary to a precept of the law, namely to that precept "Thou shalt not commit adultery."†2 Therefore among the acts of lust only adultery is a mortal sin.

3. But it was argued that in the prohibition of an adulteress i.e. of adultery every unlawful sexual union is prohibited. But counter to this: the prohibition of a graver sin does not include by implication the prohibition of a lesser sin. But adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. Therefore the prohibition of simple fornication is not understood by inference in the prohibition of adultery.

4. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity by which the soul has life, according to the First Epistle of John (3, 14) "We have passed from death to life because we love the brethren." But simple fornication is not contrary either to the love of God, because it is not a sin against God, or even to the love of neighbor, because it does no injury to our neighbor: for a woman who as her own master consents to an act of simple fornication does not suffer injury, because no one willingly suffers an injustice, as the Philosopher says.†3 Therefore fornication according to its genus is not a mortal sin.

5. Isidore says †4 that if the pleasure of fornication delights a man more than the love of chastity, sin still has mastery over him: from which it seems that fornication can be present in man together with the virtue of chastity. But mortal sin and virtue cannot be present in a man simultaneously. Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

6. A sin may be less grave in two ways: in one way on account of man's weakness, in another way on account of the vehemence of the temptation. But man suffers a greater weakness in regard to the sin of lust than in regard to the sin of gluttony: because the procreative power, to which the sin of lust pertains, not only is disordered, as is the nutritive power to which the sin of gluttony pertains, but also is infected;†5 likewise the temptation is more violent on the part of the enemy in regard to lust than in regard to gluttony: because the devil tempts man especially in regard to lust, as is clear from the statement in Job (40, 11) "His strength is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly"†6 which Gregory relates to the sin of lust.†7 Therefore it seems that the sin of lust is less serious than the sin of gluttony; but not every sin of gluttony is a mortal sin, as was said above (in q. 14, a. 2); therefore not every act of lust is a mortal sin.

7. The corruption of human nature consists in rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. But this rebellion resulted from the sin of gluttony: for Bernard explaining what is recounted in Genesis 3, 6 "The woman saw that the tree was good" says †8 that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit followed from the inordinate concupiscence i.e. desire for the forbidden tree. Therefore the nutritive power, to which such concupiscence pertains is more corrupt than the procreative power; and so since not every act of gluttony is a mortal sin, it seems that much less is every act of lust a mortal sin.

8. Punishment corresponds to fault. But graver punishment ensues for the nutritive power from the sin of our first parent than for any other power of the soul: for to the nutritive power pertain hunger and thirst, and other such wants which sometimes bring a man even to his death. Therefore the fault is graver in the case of the nutritive power than it is in the case of the procreative power; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

9. Mortal sin cannot be other than the fault of reason, as is clear from Augustine in Book XXII On the Trinity. †9 But sometimes the act of lust is committed without the deliberation of reason, as is clear in the case of Lot who unknowingly had sexual intercourse with his daughters, as is related in Genesis (19, 33-37). Therefore it seems that the act of lust is not always a mortal sin.

10. When reason is absorbed, an act is not imputed to man as a mortal sin. But in the act of lust the reason is totally absorbed: for on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (6, 18) "The man who fornicates sins against his own body" the Gloss says †10 "herein the soul abjectly serves the body inasmuch as man cannot think or will anything else at the very moment and experience of so shameful a thing, for the very submersion and absorption in inordinate passion hold the mind captive." Therefore it seems that the act of lust is not a mortal sin.

11. On Deuteronomy (23, 17) "There shall be no whore among you," etc., the Gloss says †11 "This forbids sexual intercourse with those whose depravity is venial." Therefore to have sexual intercourse with a whore is a venial sin.

12. The sexual union of the male and female is ordained to the act of generation and the education of offspring. But the generation and education of the offspring sometimes can follow from a fornicacious union. Therefore not every fornicacious union is a mortal sin.

13. He who never intends to engage in the act of generation prevents the good of the generation and education of offspring more than he who has fornicacious intercourse with a woman. If then fornicacious sexual intercourse were a sin because of the prevention of the education of the offspring, much more would it be a mortal sin to observe continence, since the generation of offspring would be totally prevented by this.

14. Obviously the generation of offspring cannot result from sexual union with a woman who is sterile or old. But nevertheless this can sometimes take place in the married state without mortal sin. Therefore the other acts of lust from which the generation and the proper upbringing of children do not follow can also be without mortal sin.

15. In Matthew V †12 it is said that if the soul is titillated i.e. pleasurably excited by concupiscence, although it is a sin, nevertheless it is not a crime. But titillation of this kind is an act of lust. Therefore not every act of lust is a crime i.e. a mortal sin.

16. The pleasure of fornication as it is present in cogitation alone is not a mortal sin. But consent to venial sin is not a mortal sin, therefore neither is the consent of reason to this pleasure as it is present in cogitation a mortal sin, nevertheless it is an act of lust. Therefore not every act of lust is a mortal sin.

17. What is not a mortal sin for one is not a mortal sin for another. But consent to (sexual) pleasure is not a mortal sin for a man having a wife, because not even the act itself is a mortal sin for him; therefore neither is

consent to the pleasure of lust a mortal sin for others. Consequently not every act of lust is a mortal sin.

18. Touches, embraces, and kisses are also acts of lust. But such acts do not seem to be mortal sins: for when the Apostle in the Epistle to the Ephesians (5, 3-4) had said: "But immorality (fornicatio) and all uncleanness or covetousness . . . or obscenity," which consists in embraces and kisses as the Gloss explains,†13 "or foolish talk or scurrility, . . . let it not even be named among you," afterwards adds (in verse 5) "No fornicator, or unclean person, or covetous one . . . has any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and God", omitting obscenity, foolish talk, and scurrility. Therefore it seems that such things are not mortal sins that exclude one from the kingdom of God.

On the contrary:

1. As the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Galatians (5, 19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are immorality (fornicatio), uncleanness, licentiousness . . . "; and afterwards he adds (in verse 21) "They who do such things will not attain the kingdom of God." But nothing excludes a person from the kingdom of God except mortal sin. Therefore every act of lust is a mortal sin.

2. In Matthew (5, 28) it is said: "Anyone who even looks with lust at a woman has already committed adultery with her in his heart," and so he sins mortally. But the first and least of all the acts of lust is merely looking at a woman. Therefore much more are all the other acts (of lust) mortal sins.

Response:

As was said above (in q. 15, a. 1), an act of lust can be inordinate in two ways: in one way on account of the inordinateness of concupiscence alone, in another way on account of the deordination of the act itself.

Therefore when there is a sin of lust on account of the inordinateness of concupiscence alone, as when a man lustfully approaches his wife for sexual intercourse, then we must distinguish. Because sometimes the inordinateness is such that it excludes the order to the ultimate end, for example, when someone desires sexual pleasure so much that he would not abstain from it on account of the precept of God and that he would will to know that woman sexually or even another woman sexually outside the law of marriage: and this is a mortal sin, because the concupiscence is not restrained within the limits of marriage. But sometimes the inordinateness of concupiscence does not exclude the order to the ultimate end: namely when a man, even though he is excessive in the desire of sexual pleasure, nevertheless he would abstain from it rather than act contrary to the precept of God, nor would he know sexually this or another woman if she were not his wife: and if that is so, the concupiscence remains within the limits of marriage and the sin is venial as we have likewise distinguished above (in q. 14, a. 2) concerning gluttony.

However, if the act of lust is a sin on account of the deordination of the act itself, namely because the act is not proportioned to the procreation and education of offspring, then I say that the sin is always mortal: for we see that not only is homicide which takes away a man's life a mortal sin, but also theft which deprives man of the exterior goods that are ordered to sustaining man's life; hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus (34, 25) "The bread of the needy is the life of the poor; he that defraudeth them thereof is a man of blood." But more closely ordained to man's life than any external possessions whatsoever is human semen, wherein man is potentially; hence the Philosopher says in the Politics†14 that in man's semen there is something divine, namely inasmuch as it is man potentially; and therefore deordination in regard to the discharge of semen is a deordination in regard to the life of man in proximate potency.

Hence it is evident that every such act of lust is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. And since the interior appetite or desire derives its goodness or badness from that which is desired, it follows that even the desire of a disordered act of this kind is a mortal sin if it is fully desired, namely deliberately desired; otherwise it is a venial sin.

Reply to 1. Ambrose is speaking there of a lapse of the flesh according as it is a venial sin, as is evident in the conjugal act, as was said (in the Response); or it can be said and more likely, that he is speaking even of the lapse into mortal sin. But it is not to be understood simply i.e. without qualification that if a person perseveres in such a lapse of the flesh even until death that he will evade condemnation on account of works of godliness or piety, but that repeated works of godliness dispose a man to do penance more readily, and after he has done penance, to more readily make amends for his past sins: for which reason even the Lord in Matthew (25, 41-46) imputed to the damned only the lack of mercy, namely that they did not devote themselves to expiating their past sins by works of mercy, as Augustine says in Book XII On the City of God.†15

Reply to 2. By that commandment 'Thou shalt not commit adultery'†16 is understood the prohibition of every unlawful use of the genital organs, which is a mortal sin by reason of its genus.

Reply to 3. The precepts of the Decalogue were given directly to the people of God; hence they are given in that form in which they are clearly apprehensible to the natural reason of everyone even the ordinary man. And indeed everyone by natural reason can see immediately that adultery is a sin, and therefore among the precepts of the Decalogue adultery is forbidden; however fornication and other corrupt practices are forbidden by the subsequent precepts of the law that were given by God to the people through Moses,†17 because the deordination of those acts since it does not clearly contain by implication an injury to one's neighbor, is not evident to all but only to the wise through whom it ought to be conveyed to the knowledge of others.

Reply to 4. All the perversions of lust which are outside the lawful use pertaining to marriage are sins against one's neighbor inasmuch as they are contrary to the good of the offspring to be generated and educated, as was said (in the preceding article).

Reply to 5. The love of chastity can be pleasing not only to him who possesses chastity but also to him who is without the virtue of chastity, inasmuch as man by natural reason esteems the good of virtue and loves it and is attracted by it even if he does not have it.

Reply to 6. That argument is valid in regard to the gravity of sin which is judged according to the circumstances, which is outweighed by the gravity of sin that is judged according to the species of the act; hence it is clear that however much a person is induced to commit murder, it is a graver sin than if he speaks an idle word even without inducement. The same is true even if a man is more severely tempted to an act of lust than to an act of gluttony, and is weaker in respect to it, nevertheless because the act of lust is in itself a mortal sin since it has unlawful matter opposed to charity, which the act of gluttony does not have, therefore it does not follow that the sin of lust is less grave than the sin of gluttony. However it would follow perhaps in the case in which the act of lust is a venial sin: because if a man eats food without need he sins venially just as he who needlessly has sexual intercourse with his wife, unless something else enters in to make the sin mortal in both cases. But if someone eats food stolen or forbidden by the law, he sins mortally, though less seriously than the fornicator inasmuch as food or any other external thing is less closely connected with the life of man than human semen, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 7. In the sin of our first parent gluttony was the material element, but the formal and principal element was the sin of pride by which man was unwilling to be restrained under the rule of divine precept; and the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit followed from this as Augustine says,†18 and not from the vice of gluttony.

Reply to 8. Rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which is experienced to a marked degree in the genital members, is a greater punishment than hunger and thirst: because the latter is purely corporeal, the former spiritual.

Reply to 9. Since it pertains to reason to consent to an act as Augustine says,†19 an act of fornication cannot take place without the deliberation of reason, except perhaps in him who does not have the use of reason; and then if this impediment of reason should arise from an unlawful cause, the person is not entirely excused from sin, as is clear in the case of Lot who because of drunkenness committed incest, unless perhaps that drunkenness occurred without his fault, as happened in the case of Noah †20 because of his inexperience in regard to the strength of wine. But if the cause of such a defect of reason is without fault, the ensuing act of lust or of whatsoever sin is not imputed as a sin, as is evident in maniacs and the insane.

Reply to 10. In the very act of lust reason cannot deliberate, but reason could deliberate before when it consented to the act; and therefore the act of lust is imputed to the person as a sin.

Reply to 11. That wording †21 of the Gloss is corrupt: for it ought not to read 'whose depravity is venial' but rather 'whose depravity is venal'.

Reply to 12. The act of procreation is ordered to the good of the species, which is a common good; and a common good can be prescribed by law but a private good is subject to the ordination of each individual: and therefore although in respect to the act of the nutritive power which is ordered to the preservation of the individual, each one may determine for himself the food appropriate for himself, nevertheless to determine how the act of procreation ought to be ordered does not pertain to the individual but to the lawgiver to whom it belongs to see to the proper ordering in regard to the propagation of children, as the Philosopher says in Book II of the Politics.†22 Now the law does not take into consideration what may happen in a particular case but what is wont to happen generally; and therefore although in a particular case of the act of fornication the intention of nature can be carried out as regards the generation and education of children, nevertheless the act in itself is inordinate and a mortal sin.

Reply to 13. In that state in which it was obligatory to be devoted to the increase of the human race, it was not without fault that someone abstained from the procreative act, both according to human law †23 and according to divine law.†24 But in the time of grace there is an obligation to insist rather on spiritual propagation for which those living a celibate life are more fitted; and therefore in this state it is considered more virtuous to abstain from the procreative act.†25

Reply to 14. The common or general law is not formulated with reference to what may possibly occur in some particular cases but with reference to that which occurs for the most part;†26 and therefore that act is said to be contrary to nature in the genus of lust, from which according to the general species of the act, generation cannot follow, but not that act from which it cannot follow because of some particular incidental circumstance such as old age or infirmity.

Reply to 15. That argument is valid in regard to an act of lust in which there is fault only on account of the inordinateness of concupiscence, but which does not exclude the order to the ultimate end.

Reply to 16. Consent to that which is venial by reason of its genus is not a mortal sin; but the pleasure of fornication as it is present in cogitation is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, just as fornication itself is, but that it be venial is accidental to it on account of the imperfection of the act, due to the lack of the deliberation of reason, at the advent of which through deliberate consent it returns to the nature of its genus so that it is a mortal sin.

Reply to 17. As the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics,†27 pleasures differ in respect of their goodness and badness according to the pleasurable activities, and therefore just as carnal copulation is not a mortal sin for the married but is a mortal sin for the unmarried, so there is also a corresponding difference about the pleasure and about the consent to pleasure: for consent to the pleasure cannot be a graver sin than consent to the act, as is clear from Augustine.†28

Reply to 18. Touches, embraces, and kisses insofar as they are ordered to the act of fornication aim at consent (to the fornication), but insofar as they are ordered to pleasure only, they aim at consent to the pleasure, which is a mortal sin: and therefore in both cases they are mortal sins. However because such things are not mortal sins according to their species, as fornication and adultery are, but only according as they are directed to something else, i.e. to the forementioned consents, therefore the Apostle does not mention again 'obscenity, scurrility, and foolish talk', but only those acts which in themselves are mortal sins.

Question XV, Article 3 †p

On the Species of Lust Which Are Fornication, Adultery, Incest, Seduction, Rape, and the Unnatural Vice

It seems that these are not properly distinguished, for the following reasons.

1. Diversity of matter does not diversify species. But the foresaid acts are distinguished only according to matter, namely according as a man defiles either a married woman, or a virgin or a woman of another status. Therefore the foresaid acts are not diverse species of lust.
2. Lust essentially consists in the sexual pleasures procured in the copulative act of a man and a woman. But that a woman is married or unmarried or a virgin is incidental (accidit) to such a union. Therefore the foresaid acts differ only accidentally (per accidens), and so they are not diverse species, because an accidental difference does not diversify species.
3. Lust in itself (per se) is opposed to temperance. But some of the foresaid acts are opposed to justice, especially adultery and rape. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are not properly assigned.

On the contrary:

1. The Master assigns these species in Book IV of the Sentences.†1

Response:

As we have said previously (in q. 15, a. 1 and 2), the sin of lust has inordinateness in two ways. In one way on the part of concupiscence or desire, and such inordinateness does not always constitute a mortal sin, in the other way on the part of the very act, which of itself is inordinate and consequently is always a mortal sin; and therefore the foresaid species of sin are assigned on the part of the very act in which greater gravity of sin is found. Now an act of lust is inordinate either from this that the generation of offspring cannot result from the act, and such is the vice against nature [e.g. homosexuality or bestiality], or from this that the proper education of children cannot ensue, namely because the woman is not explicitly bound to the man so that she is his according to the law of marriage. And this occurs in three ways: first because she is not specified as belonging to him alone; and thus there is 'fornication', which is sexual intercourse between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman; and this is so-named from 'fornice' i.e. a triumphal arch,†2 because women who were prostitutes flocked to such public sights. Secondly because it is impermissible that she be explicitly bound to him as his according to the law of marriage; and this either because of kinship, which entails a special reverence contrary to such an act, and such is 'incest'†3 which is sexual intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or kinship; or because of a certain inviolability or purity, and in that case it is 'seduction',†4 which is the unlawful violation of a virgin. Thirdly because the woman belongs to another, either according to the law of marriage and then it is 'adultery', or according to some other restriction, and then it is 'rape',†5 as when a girl is snatched (rapitur) from the home of her father under whose custody she is.

Reply to 1. The foresaid six acts differ not only materially but also have diverse kinds of deformity i.e.

moral depravity and therefore they are different species of sin.

Reply to 2. Although the foresaid acts are incidental to a woman inasmuch as she is a woman, nevertheless they are an essential (per se) consideration in regard to a woman according as she is ordained to marriage.

Reply to 3. Because the deformity of injustice is ordered to the end or object of intemperance, therefore all the species of lust pertain to the genus of intemperance.

Question XV, Article 4 †p

Whether Lust Is a Capital Vice?

It seems that it is not, for the following reasons.

1. Uncleanliness is assigned as a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory.†1 But one capital vice is not assigned as the daughter of another capital vice. Since then uncleanness pertains to lust, as is evident from the Epistle to the Ephesians (5, 3), it seems that lust is not a capital vice.

2. Isidore says †2 "He who is held in the grip of pride falls into lust of the flesh." Therefore lust is a daughter of pride; consequently it is not a capital vice.

3. Despair is a daughter of acedia, as is evident from Gregory.†3 But despair causes lust, according to the Epistle to the Ephesians (4, 19) "Who despairing have given themselves up to shameful sexual acts." Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

On the contrary:

Gregory in Book XXXI of the Moralia enumerates lust among the capital vices.†4

Response:

As was said above (q. 14, a. 4), because pleasure is one of the conditions of happiness, therefore the vices that have pleasure for their object are capital vices as having an end that is especially desirable to which other vices are naturally ordered.

Now sexual pleasure, which is the end or object of lust, is the most intense of physical pleasures, and therefore lust is rightly designated as a capital vice; and it has eight daughters: namely, blindness of the mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, temerity, self-love, hatred of God, love of the present world, and despair of a future world, as is clear from Gregory.†5 For obviously when the attention of the soul is vehemently intent on an act of a lower power, the higher powers are weakened and disordered in their act. Consequently when, from the vehemence of the pleasure in the act of lust, the whole attention of the soul is drawn to the lower powers, i.e. to the concupiscible power and to the sense of touch, the higher powers, namely the reason and will, are bound to be subject to defect.

Now there are four acts of reason according to which it directs human acts: the first of which is a understanding by which a person judges rightly about the end which is as it were the starting point or principle in practical matters, as the Philosopher says; †6 and inasmuch as this is impeded 'blindness of mind' is assigned as a daughter of lust, according to that text of Daniel (13, 56) "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." The second act is counsel about things to be done, which is precluded by concupiscence. For Terence says to Eunuchus †7 "This is a thing that admits of neither counsel nor moderation, you cannot

control it by counsel," and he is speaking of lustful love; and in regard to this, 'thoughtlessness'

is assigned. The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this too is impeded by lust. For it is said in Daniel (3, 9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not remember just judgments"; and in regard to this, 'temerity' is assigned, namely when a person is inclined to consent rashly without waiting for the judgment of reason. The fourth act is command about the thing to be done, which likewise is impeded by lust, inasmuch as a person does not remain steadfast in his decision about what he should do, as Terence also says of Eunuchus †8 "These words", namely which declare you are about to leave your mistress, "are undone by one little false tear"; and in regard to this, 'inconstancy' is assigned.

Moreover as regards the deordination of affection two things are to be considered: one of which is the desire for pleasure to which the will inclines as to an end; and in regard to this 'self-love' (amor sui) is assigned, by which a person inordinately desires pleasure for himself, and on the other hand 'hatred of God', namely inasmuch as He forbids the pleasure desired. The other is the desire of the means by which a person attains this end and as concerns this, 'love of the present world' is assigned, i.e. of all those things pertaining to this world by which he attains the end he intends; and on the other hand, 'despair of a future world', for the more excessive a person's love of carnal pleasures, the more he despises spiritual pleasures.

Reply to 1. Uncleanliness is assigned as a daughter of gluttony inasmuch as pollution of the body comes about from a bodily cause, i.e. from an excess of humors, and not from a cause on the part of the soul, namely from concupiscence, which especially pertains to lust.

Reply to 2. It is not contrary to the nature of a capital vice that it arises from pride, from which all the vices originate.

Reply to 3. Despair is accidentally (per accidens) the cause of lust as removing the hope of future happiness for the sake of which a person desists from lust. But the origin of the capital vices is not determined according to accidental causes but according to proper (per se) causes.

Question 16

Question XVI

On the Demons †1

Article 1 †p

Whether the Demons Have Bodies Naturally United to Them?

It seems that they do, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says in Book IX on his Literal Commentary on Genesis, †2 "In the case of the spirit of a rational creature, it is a good that it lives and gives life to a body, whether an ethereal body, as in the case of the devil himself and of the demons, or an earthly body as in the case of the soul of man." But a body that is given life is naturally united to the spirit giving it life, because life is something natural. Therefore the demons have ethereal bodies naturally united to them.

2. Experience comes about from the several memories of the same thing which result from past sense perceptions, as is said at the beginning of the Metaphysics †3 and so wherever there is experience there is sense perception; but sense perception is not possible without a body, because sense perception is the act of a bodily organ. But experience is found in the demons: for Augustine says †4 that they know certain truths, partly

because they are endowed with acute and subtle sense powers, partly because of their shrewdness due to the experience they have had over the long ages they have lived, partly because they learn from the good angels. Therefore the demons have bodies naturally united to them.

3. Dionysius says †5 that the evil in the demons is "an irrational rage, a deranged concupiscence and a shameless imagination." But these three pertain to the sentient part of the soul in which are the imagination and the irascible and concupiscible powers. But the sentient part does not exist apart from a body. Therefore the demons have bodies naturally united to them.

4. The higher a thing of a lower order is, the greater affinity it has with a higher order: hence it is said in the book *On Causes* †6 that among the intelligences there is that which is intelligence only, namely the lower, and among these there is that which is god-like intelligence, namely the higher; and among souls there is that which is soul only as the irrational animals', and of these there is that which is the intellectual soul, as man's; and of bodies there is that which is body only, and among these there is that which is a living body. Hence Dionysius says †7 that divine wisdom unites the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second things. But air is a more noble body than earth. †8 Since then there are certain earthly living bodies, with even better reason there will be certain ethereal living bodies: and we call such beings demons.

5. That by means of which something is united with another is more receptive of that thing, for example if an opaque body is illuminated by means of a diaphanous body, the diaphanous body †9 is more receptive of illumination. But the earthly body of man or another animal is given life by vital spirits †10 which are ethereal bodies. Therefore an ethereal body is more receptive of life than an earthly body; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

6. A mean partakes of the nature of the extremes. †11 But the highest, i.e., the heavenly body partakes of life since it is a living being according to the Philosopher; †12 likewise even in a lower body, namely earth, water, and the lower part of the air †13 are found certain animated bodies having life; therefore also in the middle region of the air there are certain animated living bodies. But such beings can only be demons, since birds cannot ascend to that region. †14 Therefore the demons are living beings having bodies naturally united to them.

7. That which belongs to a creature in comparison to God, belongs to it naturally: because the relation of the creature to God is established in the creature. But Gregory says †15 that the spirits of angels by comparison with our bodies are spirits, but "in comparison to the highest and infinite spirit are bodies"; and Damascene says †16 that "compared to us the angel is called incorporeal and immaterial: indeed compared to God every being is found to be gross and material, for only God is essentially incorporeal and immaterial." Therefore the demons have bodies naturally united to them, since they are of the same nature as the angels.

8. That which is stated in the definition of a thing is natural to it, since the definition signifies the nature of the thing. †17 But 'body' is stated in the definition of a demon: for Calcidius says †18 "A demon is a rational animal, immortal, passible in soul, ethereal in body," and Apuleius says in *De Deo Socratis* †19 that demons "are of an animal nature, passible in soul, rational in mind, ethereal in body, eternal in duration"; thus Augustine maintains when he introduces Apuleius's account of the manners and actions of the demons in Book VII *On the City of God*. †20 Therefore demons have bodies naturally united to them.

9. Anything which incurs the penal action of material fire by reason of its body has a body naturally united to it. But the demons are of such a nature, for Augustine says "it is the same fire which is to serve for the punishment of men and of demons, because there are certain depraved bodies even among the demons." †21 Therefore demons have bodies naturally united to them.

10. That which belongs to a thing from the beginning of its creation and ever after, belongs to it naturally. But a body belongs to a demon from the beginning of its creation and ever after: for Augustine says:

"Plotinus thought it pertains to the mercy of God the Father that men, having a mortal body, would not be forever confined to the miseries of this life; but of this mercy the demons' malice was judged unworthy, who in conjunction with a soul subject to suffering, unhappily have received a body not mortal like man's but eternal."†22 Therefore the demons have bodies naturally united to them.

11. Augustine says in Book XI On the City of God†23 "It was precisely that we might understand that the merits of souls are not to be judged by the qualities of their bodies, that the wickedest demon possesses an ethereal body, while man, wicked, it is true, but with a wickedness small and venial in comparison with the demon, received even before his sin a body of clay." But man has a body of clay naturally united to him. Therefore likewise the demon has an ethereal body naturally united to him.

12. The more perfect a substance is, the better endowed it is with that which required for its operation. But the human soul, which is of a lower nature than a demon, has naturally united to it the bodily organs required for its operations. Therefore, since demons need bodies for certain operations -- otherwise they would not assume bodies --, it seems that they have bodies naturally united to them.

13. More goods are better than fewer goods. But body and spirit are more goods than spirit alone. Since then man who is of a lower nature is composed of body and spirit, much more is a demon who is of a higher nature.

14. No other power is found separated from bodily organs except the intellect and will. But demons produce certain effects in lower bodies, as is clear from Job (1, 2 and 2, 7); which effects are not produced by the will alone, because it is proper to God alone that corporeal matter obey Him at His nod, as Augustine says,†24 and consequently neither by the intellect alone which does not operate on exterior things except through the will; and so demons have other operative powers besides the intellect and will. Therefore they have bodies naturally united to them.

15. Nothing can act on a distant thing unless its power is conveyed to that thing by a medium. But the power of a pure spirit cannot be conveyed by a bodily medium, because a body is not capable of spiritual power. Since then a demon acts on a distant thing, it seems that a demon is not a pure spirit but is a being composed of body and spirit.

16. Imaginative power is not possible without a bodily organ. But imaginative power is found in angels and demons: for Augustine says in Book XII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis,†25 that from their knowledge of future events the angels and demons form beforehand in their spirit likenesses of corporeal things. Therefore angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them.

17. Augustine says in the same book,†26 that "when the soul is taken hold of and carried away by some spirit, it is raised up to see the likeness of bodies. But the soul would not be able to see the likenesses of bodies in a completely spiritual substance. Therefore the spirit of the angel or demon taking hold of the soul has certain bodily organs in which species of this kind are preserved.

18. Matter is the cause of plurality according to number;†27 but angels and the demons too are many in number: for a distinction of person is made among them; therefore in them there is matter from which a plurality according to number is caused. But this is matter contained under dimensions, which if these, i.e. quantity and substance, are separated, the substance is indivisible, as is said in Book I of the Physics†28 and thus numerical plurality could not be caused by the division of matter. Therefore there are corporeal dimensions in the angels and demons, and so they have bodies naturally united to them.

19. Wherever the property of a body is found, the body also is found. But to go forth and to move pertain properly to bodies; which nevertheless is ascribed to the demons: for it is said in Job (1, 12) that Satan went forth from the presence of the Lord. Therefore demons have bodies naturally united to them.

On the contrary:

1. Nothing composed of soul and body is called a spirit: wherefore it is said in Isaiah (31, 3) "The Egyptian is a man, not a god; their horses are flesh, not spirit." But the demons are called spirits, as is evident in Matthew (12, 43) "When the unclean spirit has gone out of a man . . .," etc. Therefore the demons do not have bodies naturally united to them.

2. Demons and angels are of the same nature: for Dionysius says †29 that "demons were not always evil nor are they evil by nature, but only owing to the lack of angelic virtues." But the angels are incorporeal, as he says in the same chapter.†30 Therefore neither do demons have bodies naturally united to them.

3. It is said in Mark (5, 9) that when the Lord asked the demons "What is thy name?" the answer was "My name is legion, for we are many." But a legion, as Jerome says,†31 comprises six thousand, six hundred and sixty-six; but it would be impossible for so many demons to be in one man's body if they were corporeal. Therefore the demons do not have bodies naturally united to them.

4. Damascene says †32 that angels "are not circumscribed or contained, nor are they confined by walls and doors and bolts and seals." But if they had bodies naturally united to them they could be confined by doors and bolts, since many bodies cannot be simultaneously in the same place;†33 or if this were done by cleaving them apart, the death of the demons would follow. Therefore the demons do not have bodies naturally united to them.

Response:

The question of whether the demons have or do not have bodies naturally united to them makes little difference in regard to the teaching of Christian faith. For Augustine says †34 "The devils, as certain learned men have thought, have a kind of body made of that dense and humid air which we feel strikes us when the wind is blowing. However if anyone should assert that the demons have no bodies, we ought not to belabor the point nor engage with them in a painstaking inquiry or contentious discussion." Nevertheless in order that the truth about this question may be made known, we must consider what some authors have thought about the corporeal and the incorporeal, and about demons.

For some who first began to thoroughly investigate the things that are, were of the opinion that nothing but corporeal beings exist, as Aristotle relates concerning the first philosophers who investigated natural things,†35 from whose opinion is derived the error of the Manicheans †36 who even held that God is a kind of corporeal light; which came about from this that they were unable to rise above the imagination through the use of the intellect. Now it was shown that something is manifestly incorporeal from the intellect's own operation which cannot be an operation of a body, as is demonstrated in Book III On the Soul.†37

When then that opinion (of the first philosophers) was rejected, others maintained that something incorporeal does exist but that there is nothing of this kind that is not united to a body, indeed they even held that God is the soul of the world as Augustine recounts of Varro in Book VII On the City of God.†38 But Anaxagoras rejected this opinion on account of the universal power of moving all things, maintaining that the intellect which moves all things must itself be unmixed with anything;†39 and Aristotle [rejected it], because of the eternity of motion, which can proceed only from the infinite power of the first mover: but it is impossible for an infinite power to exist in any finite magnitude, hence in Book VIII of the Physics†40 he concludes that the first mover is without parts and without corporeal magnitude; and Plato [rejected it]†41 way of abstraction, maintaining that 'good' and 'one' which can be understood without the nature of 'body', subsist in the first principle without a body.

And therefore having supposed that the first principle, which is God, is neither a body nor united to a

body, some maintained that this is proper to God alone, but that other spiritual substances are united to bodies: hence Origen says in Book I On First Principles†42 that "to exist without material substance and apart from any association with a bodily element is proper to God alone." But this opinion was excluded for an obvious reason. For it is always true that what is found united to a thing not according to its proper nature but according to something else, is found without it: thus fire is found without a mixture of other elements that do not pertain to its proper nature, but an accident is not found without a substance,†43 because this pertains to the proper nature of an accident. Now it is evident that the intellect is united to a body not just as intellect but keeping with the other powers; wherefore it is clear that other intellects are found separated from a body. But God is above the intellect.

Having seen these things about the corporeal and the incorporeal, it must be noted that in regard to the demons, the Peripatetic followers of Aristotle did not affirm the existence of demons, but said that those things attributed to demons come to pass from the power of the heavenly bodies and of other natural things. Hence Augustine says in Book X On the City of God that it seemed to Porphyry that "by means of herbs and stones and animals and by certain incantations and other utterances, and by drawings, sometimes fanciful, and sometimes copied from certain movements of the stars observed in the seasonal revolution of the heavenly bodies, men fabricate on earth certain forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositio of the stars."†44 But this seems manifestly false, in view of the fact that some operations of the demons are found which in no way can proceed from any natural cause, for example that a person possessed by a demon speaks an unknown tongue;†45 and many other works of the demons are found both in cases of possession and in the necromantic arts, which cannot in any way come about except as proceeding from some intellect.

And therefore others, even philosophers, were forced to admit the existence of demons. Among whom Plotinus, as Augustine relates in Book IX On the City of God,†46 "said that the souls of men are demons, and from men they become heroes or demi-gods (lares) if they merit good, but if evil, malevolent spectres or ghosts (lemurs seu larves), and benevolent spirits (manes) if it be uncertain whether they merit good or evil." But, as Chrysostom says commenting on Matthew 8, 28 †47 "demons came forth from the tombs intending to impose a pernicious dogma, namely that the souls of the dead become demons; hence many of the soothsayers even slayed children to have their soul as a co-worker. But it is not reasonable that an incorporeal power can be transformed into another substance, namely a soul into the substance of a demon; nor likewise is it reasonable that the soul separated from the body wanders about on earth; for the souls of the just are in the hands of God,†48 and those of sinners are immediately taken away from here."

Hence when that opinion was retracted others asserted, as Augustine recounts in Book VIII On the City of God,†49 that there is a threefold division of all animals having a rational soul into gods, men, and demons: and the gods they said have celestial bodies, demons ethereal bodies, and men earthly bodies; and thus Plato †50 put these three orders of substances united to bodies under intellectual substances entirely separated from bodies.

But in regard to the demons this position seems to be impossible: first because, since air is a body which is such that the whole and the parts are of the same nature,†51 if some parts of the air are held to be living it follows that the whole must be living, which is plainly false: because no living operation or activity is discovered in the whole air either by way of motion or by way of anything else. Secondly because every living body of a lower order is organic †52 on account of the diverse operations of the soul, but a body cannot be organic unless it in itself is capable of boundary and shape, which is not attributable to air: hence no ethereal body can be living, especially because it could not be distinguished from the surrounding air if in itself it is without a boundary. Thirdly, since form is not for the sake of matter but rather the reverse,†53 therefore the soul is not united to the body because it is such a body, but rather the body is united to the soul because the body is necessary for some living operation, namely for sensation or for some or other movement; but movement of some or other part of the air is not necessary for the generation of things as the movement of the heavenly bodies is, which some regard as living, hence the only reason a spiritual substance would be united to an ethereal body would be in order to move it; it remains then that this (union with a body) is principally for the

sake of sensation, as is the case with us. Hence even the Platonists †54 maintained that demons are animals with a passible soul, which pertains to the sensory part of the soul. But sensation cannot occur without touch which is the foundation of all the senses,†55 hence when touch deteriorates the animal deteriorates. But it is impossible for an organ of touch to belong either to an ethereal body or to any simple body as is shown in the book *On the Soul*.†56 Hence it remains that no ethereal body can be animated i.e. living: and therefore we say that demons do not have bodies naturally united to them.

Reply to 1. There and in many other places, Augustine is speaking of the bodies of demons according to the opinion of certain learned men, i.e. the Platonists, as is clear from his statement quoted above (at the beginning of the Response).

Reply to 2. Experience properly pertains to sensation. For although the intellect knows not only separated forms as the Platonists held †57 but also bodies, nevertheless the intellect does not know these as they are here and now, which is to experience in the proper sense, but according to their general nature: for the name 'experience' also is transferred to intellectual cognition, as are the names of the senses such as 'seeing' and 'hearing'. However, nothing prevents us from saying that Augustine assumes the demons have experience according as they are alleged to have bodies, and consequently, senses.

Reply to 3. It is quite probable that Dionysius, who was a follower of the opinion of the Platonists in most matters, believed with them that demons were certain animals having sense appetite and perception. Yet it can be said that rage and concupiscence is ascribed metaphorically to the demons on account of a likeness of operation: not according as they signify certain passions of the sentient part pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible power, since they are also ascribed in this way i.e. metaphorically to the holy angels, as is clear from Book IX of Augustine's book *On the City of God*,†58 and from chapter two of Dionysius' *Celestial Hierarchy*,†59 and similarly imagination ('phantasia') which takes its name from vision, as is said in the book *On the Soul*,†60 is attributed metaphorically to demons, as is also 'seeing' to the intellect.

Reply to 4. Even if air is a more noble body than earth, nevertheless not only air but all the other elements are related to mixed bodies after the manner of matter: hence the form of a mixed body is more noble than the form of an element. And on account of this, that the soul is the most noble of forms,†61 it cannot be the form of an ethereal body, but only of a mixed body, in which earth and water are rather abundant in quantity, so that there may be a balanced mixture of the elements.†62

Reply to 5. The soul is compared to the body in two ways: in one way as the form; and thus the spirit which is an ethereal body is not a medium between the soul and a mixed earthly body, but is directly united to the mixed body as its form. In another way the soul is compared to the living body as mover,†63 and in this comparison an ethereal body, i.e. the spirit, is a medium between the soul and the living body; and because the relationship of form precedes the relationship of mover, it follows that the animatable mixed earthly body is prior to the ethereal body.

Reply to 6. If it be supposed that the heavenly bodies are living, as some assert,†64 nevertheless it is not necessary on that account that there are living bodies in the middle region: for the lowest bodies, reduced to a mean by mixture have a greater likeness to the heavenly bodies in respect to remotion from contrariety than do simple bodies like fire and air, in which there are contraries of a superlative kind.

Reply to 7. It is possible that in regard to that point Damascene †65 followed Origen so that he believed both angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them, by reason of which in comparison with us they are called spirits, but in comparison with God, corporeal. However it can be said that 'corporeal' is taken both by Damascene and Gregory for a composite, so that by their words nothing more is meant than that angels and demons are simple in comparison with us, but in comparison with God are composite.

Reply to 8. That definition is given in accordance with the suppositions of the Platonists.

Reply to 9. Augustine is also speaking there †66 in reference to the Platonists; hence he says in the same place "as certain learned men have thought."

Reply to 10. There Augustine is arguing against the Platonists †67 who held that divine worship was to be offered to demons on account of the eternity of their bodies; against whom Augustine uses their own position, showing that if demons have incorruptible bodies they are more miserable on that account, since they are passible in soul i.e. capable of suffering.

Reply to 11. There Augustine is arguing against Origen, †68 who held that according to the difference of merits different spirits received more noble or less noble bodies; and in accordance with this, it would be reasonable to expect that demons, whose malice is greater, would have grosser bodies than men.

Reply to 12. The soul has naturally united to it bodily organs which are needed for its natural operations; but appearing to men is not a natural operation of a demon, nor is any other for which a corporeal organ is required; hence the demons have no need to have bodies naturally united to them.

Reply to 13. More goods are better than fewer goods, provided however that each is of the same order; nevertheless that which has the perfection of its goodness in one, as God does, is far better than that which has its goodness dispersed in different parts; and in keeping with this an angel who is a pure spirit according to its nature is superior to man who is composed of body and spirit.

Reply to 14. The angel or the demon if they be considered incorporeal, do not have any other power or operation except intellect and will; hence Dionysius says †69 that "all of their substances, powers and operations are intellectual." For the power and operation of any thing whatever follows upon its nature, and the angel is not intellect according to a part of it like the soul but is intellectual according to its whole nature, hence no power or potency can be in the angel except the power or potency pertaining to intellectual apprehension or appetite. And indeed it is not unreasonable that angels should move some bodies at least by local motion merely by the command of the will; for we see that the human soul moves the body united to it by intellect and will alone; and the higher the intellectual substance, the more universal is its moving power; hence an intellectual substance separated from a body can, by the command of its will, move a body not united to it, and the more so, the higher the intellectual substance is, to such a degree that even the heavenly bodies are said to be moved by the ministry of certain angels. †70 But it is proper to God alone that corporeal matter obeys Him at His nod so far as concerns the reception of forms.

Reply to 15. The angel does not act directly on a body distant from it, because as Damascene says, †71 an angel is there where it operates; but nevertheless by using certain bodies which by the mere command of the will it moves locally, whose power is diffused as in an intermediary, it acts on certain distant objects, just as also it uses the power of corporeal things to produce certain corporeal effects, as Augustine says. †72

Reply to 16. Augustine does not say that by way of affirmation but by way of doubt, which is clear from the manner in which he speaks. For he says †73 "In what way do these things seen enter into the spirit of man, whether they are formed there or whether they are presented already formed and perceived as a consequence of some sort of union, so that the angels may show men their cognitions and the likenesses of corporeal things which they fashion beforehand through their knowledge of future events, is most difficult to know, and even if we know, it is most laborious to discuss and explain." Now the first part is truer, namely that angels form in the imagination of men likenesses of the things which they reveal; but it does not seem reasonable that the angels should form those likenesses in their own spirit and that the spirit of man should see those likenesses formed in them.

Reply to 17. The answer to the seventeenth argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 18. Matter subject to dimensions is the principle of numerical distinction in those things in which many individuals of one species are found, for such things do not differ according to form; but in the angels the distinction of species and individuals is simultaneous, since many individuals of one species are not found among them, as was shown elsewhere.†74

Reply to 19. Angels are not in place after the manner of a body; hence those things which pertain to local motion are not said univocally of angels and of bodies.

Replies to On the contrary:

1. It could be answered, if someone were to maintain that demons have ethereal bodies, that demons are not subject to their bodies as we are, but rather have their bodies subject to them, as Augustine says in his Commentary on Genesis;†75 hence demons can more properly be called spirits than we can, even though they have bodies naturally united to them, especially since even the air itself is called 'spirit'.

2. It can be said that Dionysius explicitly concluded that the higher angels are incorporeal as likewise the Platonists maintained. But it is possible that he did not think that the demons are from among the higher angels but from among the lower angels who have bodies naturally united to them; hence Augustine says in his Commentary on Genesis †76 that "some of us do not think that they (the demons) were celestial or supercelestial angels and Damascene says †77 that their prince presided over the terrestrial order.

3. The reply to the third argument On the Contrary is missing.

4. Just as air since it is a body cannot be present at the same time with another body in the same place and yet it is not confined by locks or doors, because it can escape through the thinnest crevices, so also it can be said of the bodies of demons; especially since it is not reasonable to assume that they have a gross body naturally united to them.

Question XVI, Article 2 †p

Whether Demons are Evil by Nature or by Will?

It seems they are not evil by will but by nature, for following reasons.

1. In the demon, since he is an intellectual substance separated from a body, there is only an intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But the object of an intellectual appetite is the good itself, as is said in Book XI of the Metaphysics.†1 But no one becomes evil by desiring that which is good simply; therefore the demon could not become evil by his own will. Therefore the demon is naturally evil.

2. Nothing unnatural is immutably present in a thing: for each thing left to itself reverts to its own nature. But evil itself (malitia) is immutably present in the demons. Therefore evil itself belongs to them naturally.

3. But it was argued that the demon's will is the cause of such immutability. But counter to this: a mutable cause cannot produce an immutable effect. But the will of the demon is mutable i.e. changeable; otherwise he could not from good have become evil by his own will; the immutable wickedness (malice) of the demon, then, cannot be from his will. Therefore he is immutably evil by nature.

4. A power can be moved only in respect to its proper object, as sight can see only the visible; but the object of the will is the good apprehended;†2 therefore the will cannot be moved to anything unless it is

apprehended under the aspect of good. Either then it (the object) is really good, and so the will will not become evil by desiring that good, or it will not be really good, and so the apprehension will be false; therefore whoever's apprehension of a thing cannot be false, neither can his will be evil. But the demon's apprehension of a thing is only by the intellect in which falsity does not occur; for Augustine says †3 that "whoever understands a thing to be other than it really is does not understand it at all," and the Philosopher says †4 that the intellect is always right, hence our intellect cannot err in its understanding of first principles. Therefore the will of the demon cannot become evil.

5. Falsity does not occur in our intellect except as it composes and divides,†5 and this occurs also inasmuch as in reasoning the reason is beclouded by the imagination; but the intellect of a substance separated from a body does not understand by composing and dividing, nor by discursive reasoning, nor by means of a phantasm or image which is not possible without a body. Therefore the demon who is a substance separated from a body cannot err on the part of his intellect. And so also it seems that his will cannot become evil.

6. The substance and operation of an intelligence is above time and in a moment of eternity.†6 But what is of this nature is unchangeable. Therefore since the demon is an intellectual substance, its operation cannot be changed from good to evil according to the operation of the will.

7. Dionysius says †7 that evil is the corruption of good. But corruption is not found in those things that lack contrariety, for instance in the heavenly bodies,†8 but only in those that admit of contrariety, namely in the elements and in things composed of the elements;†9 and contrariety is found even in the reason inasmuch as it is open to opposites,†10 but not in the intellect which is determined to one; hence the intellect is compared to reason as the center to a circle and as the instant to time, as Boethius says.†11 Therefore the evil of voluntary sin cannot be found in the demons, who are not rational substances like men but intellectual substances like the angels.†12

8. Spiritual substances are more noble than the heavenly bodies. But error cannot occur in the motion of the heavenly bodies.†13 Therefore much less in the voluntary movement of a spiritual substance.

9. Man can become evil by his own will because he can desire something that is good for him according to his sentient nature and is evil for him according to his intellectual nature. But this has no place in a demon, because he is not composed of spirit and body like man. Therefore the demon could not become evil by his own will.

10. It is said in the book On Causes†14 that an intellectual substance "when it knows its own essence knows the other things that are under it and when it knows the other things it knows its own essence." Therefore when any one thing is known it knows all the others; so it cannot happen that in a desirable subject an intellectual substance considers one circumstance according to which the subject is good and does not consider another according to which the subject is evil. But the wickedness of the will seems to proceed from this that something is considered as it is good in some respect and is not considered according as it is evil simply. Therefore it seems that in an intellectual substance such as the demon, there cannot be wickedness of the will.

11. The wickedness of the will is that which is corruptive of virtue by excess or defect. But there cannot be any excess in regard to truth, which is a desirable good of an intellectual substance, because however much truer something is, the better it is. Hence there is no wickedness of the will in the demons.

12. If the demon became evil voluntarily, either it is by a defective will or it is not. But it cannot be said that the demon became evil by a will that is not defective, because such a will is a good tree which cannot bear bad fruit, as we read in Matthew (7, 18); but if by a defective will, that very defect, i.e. lack of good, is a kind of evil, as Dionysius says;†15 and then again it will be asked about that evil whether it is caused by a defective will, and so on endlessly. Since then, an infinite regression is not possible, it seems that the first cause of the demon's evilness is not the will, but rather his nature.

13. The will of man is moved to evil by three things: namely the flesh, the world, and the devil. But the will of the devil is not moved by these things. Therefore the devil did not become evil voluntarily.

14. Grace together with nature is more efficacious than nature alone; but if grace together with nature does not advance, it declines, because charity either increases or diminishes, as Bernard says †16 therefore even nature alone if it does not advance, declines. But the nature of the demon could not of itself (per se) advance in charity. Therefore of necessity declining it (the nature) became evil: the demon then is not evil by will but by nature.

15. That which exists in a thing in the first instant of its creation exists in it naturally. But it was possible for the demon to be evil in the first instant of his creation; which is seen from the fact that physical light and certain other created things can exercise their activity †17 in the first instant in which they begin to exist; even the soul of a child is infected in the first instant in which it is created. Therefore the demon is naturally evil.

16. God's operation is twofold, namely creation and governance. But it is not contrary to the goodness of him who governs that some evil should be subject to his governance. Therefore it is not contrary to the goodness of the Creator that some evil should be created by Him, and consequently He could create an evil demon who would thus be naturally evil: because that which exists in a thing from its creation exists in it naturally.

17. He who has power over the whole has power over the part. But God can take away from a just angel his nature and justice simultaneously by reducing him to nothingness, therefore even from the beginning He could deprive the angels of justice; consequently He could have created him evil, and thus he would be naturally evil: because that is natural to anything which it has from God.

18. There is in some men a natural tendency to evil by reason of the body, for instance some are naturally irascible or lustful. But according to some authors †18 demons have bodies naturally united to them. Therefore according to this they could be naturally evil.

On the contrary:

1. Dionysius says †19 "demons are not evil by nature."

2. What belongs to a thing naturally, belongs to it always. But the demon was once good according to Ezechiel (28, 12-13) "Full of wisdom . . . thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God." Therefore the demon is not naturally evil.

3. On Psalms 68, 5 "Then did I pay that which I took not away" the Gloss says †20 that the devil wanted to appropriate divinity i.e. have it for himself. Anselm too says †21 that the devil abandoned justice by willing what he ought not to have willed. Therefore the demon is evil by will, not by nature.

Response:

A thing is said to be evil in two ways: in one way because it in itself is evil, for instance theft and murder: and this is evil simply; in another way something is said to be evil in reference to someone and nothing prevents this from being good simply but evil in some respect, for example justice which is of itself and simply good turns into an evil for the thief who is punished by reason of it. But when we say that something is naturally evil it can be taken in two ways: in one way that its nature or something pertaining to its nature or a property following on its nature is evil; in another way something can be said to be naturally evil because it has a natural inclination to evil, for instance some men are naturally irascible or lustful owing to their temperament. †22

In the first way then nothing prevents something from being naturally evil among those things to which contrariety naturally pertains; for fire is in itself good but it is naturally evil in regard to water, because it destroys it and vice versa; and for the same reason the wolf is naturally evil to the sheep.†23 But that a thing in this way should be in itself naturally evil is impossible. Indeed it involves a contradiction: for a thing is called evil from this that it is deprived of some perfection proper to it, and a thing is perfect inasmuch as it attains to that which is proper to its nature;†24 and in this way Dionysius proves †25 by many arguments that demons are not naturally evil.

But if in the second way a thing be called evil because it has a natural inclination to evil, not even in this way is it admissible that demons are naturally evil. For if demons are certain intellectual substances separated from bodies, they cannot have an inclination to evil for two reasons: first because the appetite is the inclination of any being that desires, and in intellectual substances as such, the appetite is in respect to good simply, hence every natural inclination in them is to good simply; indeed since nature inclines to what is similar to itself, and since each thing according to its nature is good as has been shown above (in the Response), it follows that the natural inclination is only to something good; nevertheless inasmuch as that good turns out to be particular and contrary to good simply or even to the particular good of another thing, to that degree the natural inclination is to evil simply or to the evil of another thing, as for instance the inclination to concupiscence, which is in respect to the sensually pleasurable, which is a certain particular good, if it be immoderate is opposed to the good of reason which is good simply. Hence it is evident that in the demons there cannot be a natural inclination to evil simply, if they are intellectual substances: because the inclination of any nature is to what is similar to itself and consequently to that which is good and befitting to it. But a thing is evil simply only because it is in itself evil, as was said above (in the Response). Hence it remains that anything that has a natural inclination to evil simply, is a composite of two natures, the lower of which has an inclination to some particular good pleasing to it but contrary to the higher nature according to which good itself is taken into account. For example in man there is a natural inclination to that which is agreeable to carnal sense contrary to the good of reason; but this has no place in the demons if they are intellectual and simple substances separated from bodies.

In fact even if the demons have bodies naturally united to them, there cannot be in them a natural inclination to evil according to the whole genus of demons: first because since matter is for the sake of form,†26 it is impossible that the total matter of a species would have a natural repugnance to its formal good, but perhaps this happens in a few instances on account of some corruption: wherefore it is impossible that a natural inclination to evil exists in the demons as a whole by reason of the nature of their bodies; secondly because as Augustine says †27 demons are not subject to their bodies as we are, but govern their bodies as subject to themselves and change them into whatever form they wish; hence by reason of their bodies there cannot be in them any inclination that would impede them very much from good. So accordingly it is clear that in no way are demons naturally evil; it remains then that they are evil by will i.e. voluntarily.

But in what way this occurs remains to be considered. It should be noted, then, that the appetite is nothing else but a certain inclination to what is desirable, and just as a natural appetite follows on the natural form, so too the sense or the rational i.e. the intellective appetite follows on the form apprehended: for the appetite is only of a good grasped by the senses or the intellect; therefore evil cannot occur in the appetite from this that the appetite is discordant with the perception which it follows, but inasmuch as the appetite is discordant with a higher rule. And therefore we must consider whether that perception which the inclination of the appetite follows, is subject to the direction of a higher rule. For if it does not have a higher rule by which it ought to be directed, then it is impossible that there be evil in such an appetite. And this occurs in two cases. For the perception of the brute animal does not have a higher rule by which it ought to be directed, and therefore there cannot be evil in its appetite: for it is good that such an animal be moved to concupiscence or to anger in accordance with the form perceived by the senses. Hence Dionysius says †28 that it is good for a dog to be fierce. Likewise the divine intellect does not have a higher rule by which it can be directed: therefore there cannot be evil in God's appetite i.e. His will.

But in man there is a twofold perception (apprehensio) which is to be directed by a higher rule: for sense

cognition ought to be directed by reason, and reason's cognition, by wisdom i.e. divine law. Consequently evil can be in man's appetite in two ways: in one way because the sense perception is not regulated according to reason, and in keeping with this Dionysius says,†29 that the evil of man is to be contrary to reason; in the other way because human reason ought to be regulated according to wisdom and divine law, and in keeping with this Ambrose says †30 that sin is a transgression of the divine law.

But in substances separated from a body there is just one kind of cognition, namely intellectual, which ought to be directed according to the rule of divine wisdom; and therefore evil can be in their will from this that their will does not follow the order of a higher rule, namely divine wisdom. And in this way the demons became evil by will i.e. voluntarily.

Reply to 1. As Augustine says †31 in the book *On the Nature of Good*, evil is not only a privation of species but also of mode i.e. of measure, and of order. Hence sin can be in the will in two ways: in one way because it tends to that which is evil simply, as it were without the species of good, as when someone chooses theft or fornication; in another way when someone wills what is simply and of itself good, say to pray or to meditate, but does not devote himself to it according the order of the divine rule. So accordingly it must be said that the first evil of the demon's will was not from this that he willed evil simply, but because he willed what is good simply and pleasing to himself, not however as following the direction of a higher rule, i.e. divine wisdom; for Dionysius says in chapter four *On the Divine Names*†32 that "the evil in the demons is a turning away, namely from a higher rule, and a departure from what is proper to them," namely because they willed as though not governed by a higher rule to obtain what was pleasing to them, which exceeded their level of being.

Reply to 2. Something can be immutably in a thing in two ways: in one way from a positive cause, and in this way it is impossible that something that is contrary to a thing's nature should be in a thing immutably, because that which is besides the nature is related to the thing accidentally (*per accidens*), hence it is possible that it not be present: in another way from a privative cause, and in this way nothing prevents what is contrary to the nature from being in something immutably: because some natural principle can be irreparably withdrawn, for instance, blindness is contrary to the nature of an animal and nevertheless it is immutably present in the animal on account of the irreparability of sight. In such a manner then evilness is irreparably in the demons on account of the privation of grace.

Reply to 3. A mutable cause cannot in a positive way produce an immutable effect but it can in a privative way, as when the immutable blindness of a person is caused by man's will.

Reply to 4. According to Augustine,†33 evil consists not only in the privation of species but also in the privation of measure and order; hence evil in the act of the will comes not only from the object, which gives species to the act †34 in which a person wills evil, but also from a privation of the proper measure and order, for example if a person in the very act of willing good does not preserve due measure and order. And such was the sin of the demon by which he became evil: for he did not desire an evil but a good pleasing to himself; nevertheless he inordinately and immoderately desired that good, namely because he did not desire it as a thing to be obtained through divine grace but by his own power, which exceeded the due measure of his condition, as Dionysius says in chapter four *On the Divine Names*.†35 "The evil in the demons is therefore a turning away," namely inasmuch as their appetite turned away from the direction of a higher rule, and "a departure from what befitted them," namely inasmuch as in desiring the goods pleasing to themselves they exceeded their measure. But in sin the defect of the intellect (or reason) and of the will always proportionately accompany each other; hence it is not necessary to stipulate such a defect of the intellect in the first sin of the demon that he judged something falsely, for instance that evil is good, but rather in his failure to understand his rule and his order.

Reply to 5. From the fact that the demon does not use images or discursive reasoning and from other considerations of this kind it can be known that in those things that pertain to natural cognition the demon does not err in such a way that he judges something false to be true. Nevertheless because the demon cannot

comprehend God on account of His infinity, nothing prevents his intellect from having failed to apprehend sufficiently the order of divine government: and on account of this, sin followed in his will.

Reply to 6. Not all things that are above time are equally in eternity nor consequently do they equally have immobility. For God is wholly (perfecte) eternal and immutable but other substances which are above time participate in eternity and immutability each according to its level of being. For we see that immutability follows upon a certain totality. For those things that receive something partially, are changed as it were from one part to another: for example, the matter of the elements, since it does not receive simultaneously all corporeal forms or some one complete form virtually containing in itself all forms -- as is clear in regard to the matter of the heavenly body --,†36 in consequence of this is changed from one particular form to another, which does not happen in the matter of the heavenly bodies; and nevertheless because a heavenly body has a particular position in place, a resumption of its position occurs in it.†37 So accordingly, the intellect of the angel has a totality in its object in comparison with our intellect which gathers a universal form from different singulars, moreover the intellect of the angel grasps the universal form itself according to its very universality; and nevertheless the angelic intellect in comparison with the divine intellect has particularity in its object. For the divine intellect comprehends universally all being and all truth in one; hence His intellect is absolutely immutable in its operation: for it has no reason to pass from one to another, because it considers all things simultaneously in one; but the intellect of the angel which does not consider all things in one but one or another in themselves apart from the others, can pass from one to the other. However in regard to this that it always understands, its operation is immutable. And the will of the angel, whose operation is proportionate to the operation of the intellect is to be considered in like fashion. Hence it is not unreasonable that the will of the angel would change from good to evil.

Reply to 7. The sin of the demon did not proceed from a defect of reason that would have the nature of contrariety -- for the demon did not approve evil as good nor the true as false --,†35 but only from a defect having the nature of negation, namely inasmuch as his will was not regulated by the rule of divine governance; which defect can have a place in an intellectual nature that is without contrariety.

Reply to 8. The heavenly bodies are subject to the rule of divine governance not as being themselves active agents but as acted upon or moved by another; and even if in their movements some defect or deviation from the order of divine rule should occur, this would not redound to a defect of God's ordering which cannot be defective. But intellectual and rational natures are subject to divine governance as directing themselves in accordance with the divine rule; hence a deordination in them can occur from a defect on their part without a defect on the part of the ruler.

Reply to 9. That argument proves that sin could not be in the demons in this way that they would desire something evil as good for themselves, since by reason of the simplicity of their nature it is not admissible that something is good for them according to one part (of their nature) that is not good for them according to another part [as in the case of man].

Reply to 10. An intelligence when it knows its essence or the other things under it, knows according to the mode of its substance; but the first cause exceeds the mode of an angel's or demon's substance, hence it does not follow that an angel in knowing its essence would apprehend the whole order of divine government.

Reply to 11. That argument also proves that the demon did not sin from this that he desired something which was evil by excess or defect.

Reply to 12. The devil sinned by a defective will and that very defect of the will is his sin, just as a man runs by moving his body and this very movement of the body is his running.

Reply to 13. Of those three things that move one to sin, one of them, namely the devil, moves by way of persuading, but the other two, namely the flesh and the world, move by way of attracting. And although the

demons did not sin by reason of another's persuasion, nevertheless they sin, attracted not by the flesh which they do not have, nor by the things of the world perceptible to the senses which they have no need of, but by the beauty of their own nature. Wherefore it is said in Ezechiel (28, 17) "Thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty."

Reply to 14. It is not to be understood that charity always actually diminishes when it does not actually increase; but rather when charity does not increase in man he is disposed to defect, on account of the seeds of the vices which stem from the corruption of human nature. But this has no place in the angel.

Reply to 15. The angels could exercise some act of the will in the first instant of their creation, but their act in the first instant of their creation could not be the act by which they became evil; the reason for this will be explained later (below in a. 4). Nor is there any similarity with the human soul which is infected in the first instant of its creation, because this infection is not from the operation of the soul but from its union with an infected body; which cannot be said of an angel.

Reply to 16. All things which come under the work of creation proceed from God as from a principle; and because God is not the author of evils,^{†39} it is impossible that any evil would come under the work of creation. But many things come under the work of divine government of which God is not the author but only permits; and therefore some evils can be subject to His governance.

Reply to 17. God can withdraw gratuitous justice from man without violating justice even without man's having sinned, because God freely bestowed it out of His generosity over and above the mode of man's nature; if however gratuitous justice were withdrawn in the foresaid manner, man would not on that account become evil but would remain good by the goodness pertaining to his nature. Natural justice, on the other hand, accompanies an intellectual and rational nature, whose intellect is naturally ordained to truth and whose will is naturally ordained to good; hence it is not possible that such justice be withdrawn from the rational nature by God, the nature itself remaining. However He can because of His absolute power reduce the rational nature to nothingness by withdrawing the influx of being.

Reply to 18. Even if the demons were corporeal they could not have a natural inclination to evil, for the reason given above (in the Response).

Question XVI, Article 3 ^{†p}

Whether the Devil Sinned by Desiring Equality with God?^{†1}

It seems that he did not, for the following reasons.

1. Dionysius says that "the evil of the demons is a turning away."^{†2} But he who desires equality or a likeness to someone, does not turn away from him but rather with eager desire turns towards him. Therefore the devil did not sin by desiring equality with God.

2. Dionysius says in the same place ^{†3} that the evil in the demons is "a departure from what befitted them," namely because they excessively desired to have what was pleasing to them. But to have equality with God in no way befitted them. Therefore they did not desire equality with God.

3. Anselm says ^{†4} the devil desired that to which he would have attained had he remained steadfast. But he never would have attained equality with God. Therefore he did not desire equality with God.

4. But it was argued that the devil did not desire equality with God absolutely but in some respect, namely that he preside over the multitude of angels. But counter to this: the devil did not sin by desiring that which befitted him according to the order of his nature, but he fell from what is according to nature into that

which against nature, as Damascene says.†5 But to preside over all the other angels befitted him in keeping with the order of his nature according to which he was more eminent than the others, as Gregory says.†6 Therefore he did not sin by desiring to preside over the multitude of angels.

5. Supposing it be said that the devil desired to rule over the multitude of angels in like manner as God does.†7 Counter to this, it is said in John (5, 19): "Whatever the Father does, this the Son does in like manner." But from this that the Son does in like manner as the Father, Augustine proves †8 that the Son is absolutely equal to the Father. Therefore according to this the devil desired absolute equality with God.

6. Likewise it was said that the devil desired divine equality in this respect that he not be subject to God.†9 But counter to this: nothing can exist except by participation in the divine being which is subsistent being itself. But every participant is subject to that of which it is a participant. If then the devil desired not to be subject to God, it follows that he desired not to be: which is unreasonable, because every being desires to be.

7. But it was argued that the will can wish for impossible things, as is said in Book III of the Ethics,†10 and therefore an angel could wish to be but without being subject to God, even though this is impossible. But counter to this: although the will can be of impossible things, nevertheless it cannot be of things not apprehended by the senses or the intellect: because the good apprehended is the object of the will, as is said in Book III On the Soul.†11 But that anything besides God have being and not be subject to God does not fall under the mind's grasp because it involves a contradiction: for 'being' said of any other thing whatsoever, signifies subjection to God by way of participation. Therefore in no way could an angel desire not to be subject to God.

8. But it was argued that what implicitly involves a contradiction sometimes falls under the desire of the will because reason is confused; and therefore on account of a confusion of the cognitive power the devil could have desired something that involves a contradiction. But counter to this: the confusion of reason is either a punishment or a fault. But neither fault nor punishment preceded the first sin of the devil of which we are now treating. Therefore the devil out of a confusion reason could not have desired something involving a contradiction.

9. The devil sinned by free will, whose act is to choose. But choice is not concerned with impossible things, although there may be a wish for impossible things as is said in Book III of the Ethics.†12 Therefore the devil could not have desired not to be subject to God nor equality with God, since this is impossible.

10. Augustine says in the book On the Nature of Good, †13 "Sin is not a desire of evil things but an abandoning of better things." But nothing can be better than being equal with God. Therefore the devil could not have sinned by desiring equality with God as if that were to forsake something better.

11. Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine,†14 "Every perversity consists in enjoying things as an end which should be used as a means, or in using things as a means that should be enjoyed as an end." But if the devil desired equality with God, he did not desire it as one using it, because he could not refer it to something better; and if as one enjoying it, he did not sin, because he enjoyed a thing that is to be enjoyed. Therefore in no way did the devil sin by desiring equality with God.

12. Just as the intellect is moved to that which is connatural to it so also is the will. But it is not connatural to the devil that he be equal with God. Therefore he could not have desired this.

13. The appetite is only of the good.†15 But it would not have been good for the devil to be equal with God: because if he were transferred to the level of a higher nature, he would no longer have his own nature, just as if a horse were to become a man it would not be a horse. Therefore the devil did not desire equality with God.

14. Isidore says †16 that the devil did not desire those things that are God's but those that are his own.

But equality is pre-eminently proper to God. Therefore the devil did not desire equality with God.

15. Just as good and evil are opposed, so likewise are the praiseworthy and the blameworthy. But to be unlike God is reprehensible and blameworthy; therefore it is praiseworthy in the highest degree to be like God, which pertains to the nature of equality. Therefore the angel did not sin by desiring equality with God.

On the contrary:

1. In the Epistle to the Philippians (2, 6) "He . . . did not consider being equal to God a thing to be clung to," the Gloss says †17 that the devil usurped for himself equality with God; but the Apostle is speaking there of the equality of the Son with the Father, which is an absolute equality. Therefore the devil desired absolute equality with God.

2. On Psalm 68, 5 "Then did I pay that which I took not away" the Gloss says †18 that the devil wanted to snatch divinity and he lost happiness. Therefore the devil coveted equality with God.

3. In Isaiah (14, 13) it is said of Lucifer that he declared "I will ascend into heaven." But this cannot be taken to mean the empyrean heaven, †19 in which he was created with the other angels; therefore it refers to the heaven of the Holy Trinity. †20 Consequently he wanted to ascend to equality with God.

4. As can be understood from Augustine in Book IX On the Trinity, †21 the appetite is moved to more than the intellect; hence the soul, which does not know itself perfectly, desires to know itself perfectly. But the intellect of the angel knew that God is infinite. Therefore the angel's appetite could strive still more to obtain equality with God.

5. Those things that cannot be divided according to nature sometimes can be divided according to the will and reason; hence nothing prevents a person from desiring that on which not-being follows, for instance to be free of misery, although he does not desire not to be. Likewise then, it seems that nothing prevents the devil from having desired equality with God even though it follows from this that he would not be.

6. Augustine says †22 that libido i.e. inordinate desire, is the dominant factor in every sin. But the sin of the devil was the greatest sin, because it was the first of its kind, therefore he had the greatest inordinate desire; consequently the devil desired the greatest good, which is equality with God.

7. Isidore says †23 that the devil sinned inasmuch as he wanted his power to be preserved not by God but by himself. But to preserve the creature and not to be preserved by any one higher is proper to God. Therefore the devil wanted what is proper to God; and consequently he wanted to be equal with God.

Response:

Diverse authorities seem to incline to the opinion that the devil sinned by inordinately desiring to be equal with God. But it is not possible that he desired absolute equality with God.

The reason for this is evident. First, so far as concerns God, to Whom not only is it impossible for anything to be equal, but it is even contrary to the nature of His essence. For God by His essence is subsistent being itself; nor is it possible for two such beings to exist just as neither would it be possible for two separate ideas of man or two whitenesses to subsist of themselves (per se). Wherefore whatever other than God exists it must needs be that it exists as participating in being, which cannot be equal to that which is essentially being itself. Nor could the devil in his condition be ignorant of this, for it is natural to an intelligence or separated intellect to understand its own substance; and thus he naturally knew that his being was imparted from someone higher, which natural knowledge in him was not yet corrupted by sin; hence it remains that devil's intellect could not grasp his equality with God under the aspect of possible. But no one aims at that which he apprehends

as impossible, as is said Book I On the Heavens and the Earth;†24 hence it is impossible that the movement of the devil's will would aim at attaining absolute equality with God.

Secondly this is evident so far as concerns the desiring angel himself. For the will always desires something good either for itself or for another; but the devil is not said to have sinned from this that he wanted divine equality for another -- for he could without sin want the Son to be equal with the Father --, but from this that he desired equality with God for himself. For the Philosopher says in Book IX of the Ethics†25 that each person desires good for himself, but if he were to become someone else he no longer cares what would happen to himself; hence it is evident that the devil did not desire that by the fulfillment of which he would no longer be the same person; but if he were equal with God, supposing this were possible, he himself would no longer be the same person; for his species would be destroyed if he were transferred to a level of a higher nature. Hence it remains that he could not desire absolute equality with God. And for a similar reason he could not desire not to be absolutely subject to God, both because this is impossible, nor could it fall under his apprehension as possible, as is clear from what was said above (in the Response), and also because he himself would cease to exist if he were not totally subject to God.

And his evil could not consist in anything else that can be said to pertain to the order of nature. For evil is not found in those things that are always in act but only in those in which potency can be separated from act, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics†26 but all the angels were so formed that they had immediately from the moment of their creation whatever pertains to their natural perfection; nevertheless they were in potency to supernatural goods which they could obtain through God's grace. Hence it remains that the sin of the devil did not consist in anything that pertains to the order of nature but in something supernatural. Therefore this was the first sin of the devil that to attain supernatural happiness which consists in the full vision of God, he did not direct himself to God as desiring with the holy angels his final perfection through God's grace, but wanted to obtain it by virtue of his own nature; not however without God operating in nature, but without God bestowing grace. Hence Augustine in Book III On the Free Choice of the Will†27 attributed the sin of the devil to this that he delighted in his own power, and in Book IV of the Literal Commentary on Genesis he says †28 that if the angelic nature turned to itself and the angel took delight more in itself than in Him in union with Whom he is happy, swollen with pride, he would fall. And since to have final beatitude by virtue of His own nature, not from the grace of a higher being, is proper to God, it is evident that in this regard the devil desired equality with God; and in this regard also he desired not to be subject to God, namely in such a way that he would need His grace over and above the power of his own nature. This likewise is in agreement with what was stated above (in q. 16, a. 2 Reply to 1), that the devil did not sin by desiring something evil but by desiring something good, namely final happiness but not according to the proper order, i.e. not as a thing to be attained by the grace of God.

Reply to 1. The devil in desiring equality with God was turned towards God as concerns that which he desired which was in itself good, but he was turned away from God so far as concerns the measure (modum) in which he desired it, namely because as concerns this he turned away from the order of the divine rule; just as likewise any sinner so far as concerns this that he desires some transitory good, is turned towards God by participation in Whom all things are good, but inasmuch as he inordinately desires that good, he is turned away from God, i.e. from the order of His justice.

Reply to 2. The evil of the demons was 'a departure from what befitted them', namely inasmuch as they desired the happiness for which they were created and to which they would have attained if they had desired it in the proper measure, but they exceeded the measure of the proper order, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 3. The answer to the third argument is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 4. It can be said that the devil sinned inasmuch as he desired to preside over the multitude of angels not according to the natural order, but so far as concerns this that others would obtain through his favor the happiness which he willed to obtain by virtue of his own nature.

Reply to 5. Even as to that the devil did not desire to preside over the lower angels in the manner that God does, namely that he would rule absolutely as a first principle; but he could desire to rule like God in the manner indicated (in the Response).

Reply to 6. That argument is valid concerning absolute non-subjection to God; which the devil could not desire in respect to those things which pertain to the natural order.

Reply to 7. A similar answer is to be given to the seventh argument.

Reply to 8. There could not be confused knowledge in the angel except perhaps after sin; however in respect to gratuitous things their cognition could be defective.

Reply to 9. The will which is said to be of impossible things is not the perfect will striving to obtain an objective, because no one strives for that which he considers impossible, as was said (in the Response), but it is the kind of imperfect will which is called velleity,†29 by which a person would will that which he considers impossible, but under this condition that it was possible: and such is the will of turning away and of turning towards, in which sin and merit consists.†30

Reply to 10. Sin is said to be an abandonment of better things so far as concerns turning away, which formally fulfills the nature of sin; but in the sin of the devil the turning away is considered not in regard to what he desired but in regard to this that he departed i.e. withdrew from the order of divine justice, and according to this he abandoned better things, because obviously the rule of divine justice is better than the rule of the angelic will.

Reply to 11. Whoever covets a thing desiring it for himself desires it for his own sake, and therefore derives pleasure from it, but he uses that which he desires; and according to this the devil desiring for himself equality with God in the way stated (in arg. 11), used things that were to be enjoyed.

Reply to 12. The will of the angel sinning was intent on that to which his nature was ordered, although it was a good that exceeded the good of the nature itself, but nevertheless the measure (modum) was not befitting to his nature.

Reply to 13. That argument is valid concerning the desire of absolute equality with God.

Reply to 14. Because movement receives its species from its term i.e. its end,†31 he is said to desire those things that are his, who desires something to be his even when he desires something belonging to another; and in this way the devil desired the things that are his by desiring for himself what is proper to God.

Reply to 15. To be like God in the way befitting to each thing is praiseworthy; however he perversely wills to be like God who desires a likeness to God not according to the order instituted by God.

Replies to On the contrary:

1. It pertains to the excellence of Christ which the Apostle there intends to commend, that He has absolute equality with the Father; which equality man and the devil sinned by desiring not absolutely but in some respect.

2. A similar answer is to be given to the second argument.

3. As Augustine says in Book III and Book XI of the Literal Commentary on Genesis,†32 some maintained that the demons who sinned were not among the celestial angels but among those who have charge

of the terrestrial order, and according to this it [i.e. passage cited] it can be understood literally of an ascent to the physical heaven. But if the demons were among the celestial angels, as is more commonly held,^{†33} it must be said that they willed to ascend to the heaven of the Holy Trinity, not indeed by desiring absolute equality with God but some sort of equality with God as was said above (in the Response).

4. So far as concerns objects, the appetite cannot tend to more than the apprehending power, since the appetite can be only of the good apprehended.^{†34} But as regards the intensity of the act they can exceed one another, because sometimes the fervor of desire is greater than the clarity of cognition, and sometimes the reverse. It can also happen that the intellect knows of a thing but does not have it, and the will can desire that thing as so to speak known: and in this way although the intellect does not have perfect cognition of itself, nevertheless because the intellect understands what perfect cognition is, the will can desire it, just as conversely the intellect can understand that which is not within the power of the will; and accordingly, it does not follow that the devil would desire something to be i.e. come about that he could not understand.

5. When a person wishes to free himself of something, he uses himself as the terminus from which (a quo), which is not necessarily to be saved in the movement, and therefore a person can desire not to be i.e. exist, in order to be free of his miseries; but when a person desires some good for himself, he uses himself as the terminus to which (ad quem); and it is necessary that a terminus of this kind be saved in the movement, and therefore a person cannot desire a good for himself which, when had, he himself does not exist.

6. It is not necessary that the greatest inordinate desire be of the greatest good, but of that which is greatest among those desirable.

7. The devil wanted his power to be preserved not in regard to all things but in regard to this that he would attain happiness by his own efforts, and be preserved in it.

Question XVI, Article 4 [†]p

Whether the Devil Sinned or Could Sin in the First Instant of His Creation?

It seems that he could sin and did sin.

1. For we read in the First Epistle of John (3, 8) that the devil sinned from the beginning. But 'from the beginning' cannot mean from the beginning in which he brought death to man by tempting him,^{†1} for the devil was himself evil before that. Therefore this is taken to mean from the beginning in which he was created.

2. In the Gospel of John (8, 44) it is said of the devil that he has not stood in the truth. But he would have stood in the truth if he had not sinned in the first instant of his creation. Therefore it seems that the devil could sin in the first instant of his creation.

3. The power that the devil had in the first instant of his creation was neither increased nor diminished before sin. But he could sin and did sin after the first instant of his creation. Therefore even in the first instant of his creation he could sin.

4. But it was argued that if the devil had sinned in the first instant of his creation, that sin would be imputed to God Who is the cause the devil's nature. But counter to this: God operates in the being of the angel so long as the angel exists, and not only when he was first created, as is clear from Augustine in Book IV of his Literal Commentary on Genesis^{†2} hence it is said in the Gospel of John (5, 17) "My Father works even until now, and I work." If then the sin of the devil committed in the first instant of his creation is referred to God, with equal reason in whatsoever other instant the devil sinned it would be referred to God; which is clearly false.

5. The natural power of the angel which was bestowed on him by God was related to both, that is, to good and to evil, and the angel would not have proceeded to evil unless he was determined to that by something. But he could not be determined to evil by God, but only by his own will. Therefore even if the angel had sinned in the first instant, it would not be imputed to God but to his own will.

6. The effect of the second cause can be defective without it being imputed to the first cause, for example lameness is not attributed to the power that imparts motion but to the deformed instrument.†3 But God is compared to the act of the angel as a first cause. Therefore if the angel sinned in the first instant of his creation it would not be imputed to God but to the angel's free will.

7. But it was argued that if the devil had sinned in the first instant of his creation, he could never have been without sin, and thus he would be necessarily evil and not from free will; which is contrary to the nature of sin. But counter to this: this necessity is none other than that according to which that which is, must needs be while it is,†4 which necessity is found in every act of sin. If then this necessity is contrary to the nature of free will it would follow that no sin would proceed from free will. Which is unreasonable.

8. But it was argued that in other sins, before the act of sin an instant is afforded in which the sinner is not subject to the foresaid necessity. But counter to this: no one sins before he performs the act of sin. But those things which are of the nature of sin are simultaneous with the sin. Therefore the possibility of sinning or not sinning is not required before the act of sin.

9. The sin of the devil consisted in this that he inordinately desired beatitude i.e. perfect happiness. But he could understand happiness in the first instant. Therefore even in the first instant he could inordinately will happiness.

10. Any agent not acting out of natural necessity can avoid doing what he does. But if the devil had sinned in the first instant of his creation, he would not on account of this have sinned out of natural necessity. Nonetheless then, he could avoid sin; and so nothing seems to prevent the devil from being able to sin in first instant of his creation.

11. If the devil did not sin in the first instant of his creation, something unreasonable seems to follow from every standpoint. For if before he sinned the devil was not foreconscious of his fall,†5 but the good angels were assured of their future steadfastness without which they could not be happy, it would follow that God had distinguished between the latter and the former by revealing to some, and not to others, what pertained to them without a preceding difference of merits; which seems unreasonable. But if the devil was foreconscious of his fall, he had the punishment of pain before fault; which also is unreasonable. Therefore it should not be said that the devil did not sin in the first instant of his creation.

12. According to Augustine in Book I of the Literal Commentary on Genesis,†6 formlessness of the formed creature was not prior in time to the formed creature but only formlessness in nature or origin preceded its formation which is described in the work of the six days. But as he himself says subsequently,†7 by the division (God) made between the light and the darkness is understood the separation of the good angels from the bad. Therefore right in the first instant of the creation of things there were certain good angels and certain bad angels.

13. Simultaneously when the good angels turned towards God, the bad angels turned away from Him; otherwise there was no reason why God would have confirmed the former and not the latter, if there had been no obstacle on the part of those who were not confirmed. But it seems that in the first instant of their creation the good angels turned towards God, because according to Augustine,†8 by 'evening of the first day' is understood the turning of the angelic intellect to its own nature, which was in the first instant of its creation, but by 'morning of the following day' is understood the turning of the angelic intellect towards the Word. If then

according to Augustine's opinion, all the things that are referred to in the works of the six days were created at the same time, it seems that simultaneously when the angel knew himself in the first instant of his creation he turned towards God or away from Him by sinning.

14. According to Dionysius †9 the angel does not have discursive cognition like us, namely as proceeding from principles to conclusions, but considers both simultaneously. And thus the end is related to those things that are for the end as principles to conclusions, as the Philosopher says. †10 Since then the nature of the angel is related to God as to an end it seems that the angel simultaneously was moved to himself and to God, by turning towards Him or away from Him; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

15. If the angel in the first instant of his creation was good, it is apparent that he loved God; he also naturally loved himself. Therefore either he loved himself, and God for his own sake, and thus sinned by enjoying himself as an end; or he loved himself for God's sake which is to turn towards God out of charity. Therefore it follows necessarily that the angel in the first instant of his creation either turned towards God or turned away from Him; and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

16. Man was created to repair the fall of the angels, as the saints say; †11 therefore man was not created before the devil fell by sinning. But man seems to have been created in the beginning of the creation of things, according to the opinion of Augustine, †12 who holds that all things were created simultaneously. Therefore the devil also sinned in the first instant of his creation.

17. A spiritual creature is more powerful than any corporeal creature. But some corporeal creatures have instantaneous movement, for instance light and a visual ray. †13 Therefore much more could the angel be moved to an act of sin in the first instant of its creation.

18. The nobler a thing is, the less idle it is. But the will seems to be nobler than the intellect, because the will moves the intellect to its act. Since then the intellect of the angel was not idle in the first instant of its creation, it seems that neither was his will; and therefore the angel could sin by his will in the first instant of its creation.

19. An angel is measured by aeviternity. †14 But aeviternity is said to be a simultaneous whole. †15 Therefore at whatever time the angel sinned, he sinned in the first instant of his creation.

20. Just as a person sins by free will, so also does he merit. But a creature did merit in the first instant of his creation, namely the soul of Christ. †16 Therefore likewise the devil could sin in the first instant of his creation.

21. Just as the angel is a creature of God, so also is the soul. But the soul of an infant is subjected to sin in the first instant of its creation. Therefore likewise the angel in the first instant of its creation could be evil.

22. Just as the creature would fall into nothingness unless it was sustained by the power of God, as Gregory says, †17 so also the rational creature would fall into sin unless it was sustained by grace. If then the angel in the first instant of his creation did not have grace, it was not possible for him to avoid sin; but if he had grace and did not use it, he likewise sinned. And if he used it by turning towards God he was confirmed in good so that from then on he could not sin. Therefore all the angels who sinned, sinned in the first instant of their creation.

23. A property is simultaneous with that of which it is a property. But sin is a property of the devil according to Gospel of John (8, 44) "When he tells a lie he speaks from his very nature (ex propriis)." Therefore the devil sinned in the first instant in which he was created.

On the contrary:

1. In Ezechiel (28, 12-13) it is said to the devil in the person of the king of Tyre "Thou wast full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty . . . in the pleasures of the paradise of God."

2. It is said in the book *On Causes*†18 "Between a being whose substance and action is in a moment of eternity and a being whose substance and action is in a moment of time there is an intermediate being whose substance is in a moment of eternity and whose action is in time." But God is a being Whose substance and action is in eternity, and a body is a being whose substance and action is in time. Therefore the substance of the angel, which is midway between, is in eternity and its action is in time. The angel then could not sin in the first instant of its creation.

3. As Augustine says,†19 evil is so named because it harms. And it harms because it deprives of good; but God created the angel good in the integrity of its nature. Since then nothing can be simultaneously integral and defective, it seems that the angel in the first instant of creation could not be evil.

4. What is not deliberate cannot be a sin, at least not a mortal sin. But what is momentary cannot be deliberate; therefore it cannot be a mortal sin. It seems impossible then that the angel in the first instant of its creation became evil by sinning.

Response:

Augustine takes up this question in Book XI of his *Literal Commentary on Genesis*†20 and in Book XI *On the City of God*†21 in neither place, however, does he come to a definite conclusion on this matter, although in Book XI of the *Literal Commentary on Genesis* he appears to incline more to the opinion that the angel sinned in the first instant of his creation, on the other hand in Book XI *On the City of God* he seems to incline more to the contrary opinion.

Wherefore certain moderns †22 have presumed to assert that the devil was evil in the first instant of his creation, not indeed by nature but by the movement of free will by which he sinned. But this position was rejected by all the masters †23 then teaching at Paris. And indeed that the angel did not sin in the first instant of his creation but at one time was good, is held to be based on the authority of the canon of Scripture: for it is said in Isaiah 17 †24 "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning" and it is said in Ezechiel (28, 13) "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God." Which texts however Augustine explains in his *Literal Commentary on Genesis*†25 in such a way that these statements are understood to be made about the devil in regard to his members, i.e. in regard to men who fall away from the grace of Christ.

But it is necessary even though difficult, to assign the reason why the devil could not have sinned in the first instant of his creation. For some †26 assigned the reason for this on the part of the angelic nature which was created by God: hence they say that the devil must have been good in the first instant of his creation, such as he was created by God, lest something be called integral and defective simultaneously, as was argued above (in arg. 3 On the contrary). But this does not seem to be a compelling argument: because the evil of fault is not inconsistent with to the goodness of a nature but is located in it as in a subject; hence Augustine says †27 that whoever assents to this opinion disagrees with the opinion of the Manicheans, who hold that the devil has an evil nature opposed to God. Nor would it be unreasonable to say that, as created by God, the angel in the first instant had a nature completely integral, in such a way however that this integrity was soon impeded by the resistance of the angelic will, just as for instance if a ray of the sun be impeded from illuminating the air at the very rising of the sun.

But others †28 assign the reason from this, that they hold that deliberation is required in every sin, and since deliberation cannot take place in an instant they assume that the sin of the angel could not have taken place in an instant; but the angel was not evil except at the terminus of his sin; hence it remains that in the first instant of his creation he could not have been evil.

However these persons are deceived owing to this that they judge the angelic intellect after the manner of the human intellect when in fact it is far different. For the human intellect is discursive, and therefore just as it proceeds by reasoning in theoretical matters, so also it proceeds by taking counsel, or deliberating, in practical matters: for taking counsel is a kind of investigation as is said in Book III of the Ethics†29 but the intellect of the angel grasps the truth without discursive reasoning and investigation as Dionysius says,†30 and so nothing prevents an angel in the first instant he understands the truth from being able to choose, which is an act of the free will; just as a man in the very instant he becomes certain through counsel, chooses what is to be done, and if he were certain without counsel of what ought to be done, he would choose immediately in the first instant, as is evident in the art of handwriting and in other such arts in which there is no need to take counsel. If then the angel could grasp in the first instant what was to be desired, no deliberation being required, immediately in the same instant he could choose. Therefore the reason why the angel could not sin in the first instant of his creation is not that he could not choose in that instant, which is an act of free will. Consequently we must look for the explanation elsewhere.

We must consider, then, that there is a difference between the motion which is measured in such a way by time that it causes time, as is the movement of the (first) heaven,†31 and the motion which is measured by time but does not cause time, as are the movements of animals, in which succession of time does not correspond to the difference or sameness of the mobile object: for an animal may remain in the same place while time nonetheless moves on; for rest is measured by time, just as motion is, as is said in Book VI of the Physics.†32 But in the motion which causes time, succession of time and of motion accompany one another because for the before and after in motion there is a before and after in time, as is said in book IV of the Physics.†33 And therefore whatever is distinguished in such a movement is in different instants of time: for what is not distinguished in such a movement cannot be in different instants; hence when the movement of the heaven ceases there will inevitably be a simultaneous cessation of time, according to what is said in the Apocalypse (10, 7)†34 that "there shall be time no more."

Moreover we must consider that in the conceptions and affections of the angels there is a kind of temporal succession: for Augustine says †35 that God moves the spiritual creature in time. For angels do not actually understand all things simultaneously, because an angel does not understand all things by one species but diverse things by diverse species, and the more things by fewer species an individual angel naturally knows, the higher it is; wherefore Dionysius says †36 that the higher intelligences have more universal knowledge and in the book On Causes†37 it is said that the higher intelligences have more universal forms, that is, forms extending to greater number of knowable things; just as among men we see that the more profound a person's intellect the more things he can know from fewer principles. But only God knows all things in one, namely in His own essence.

And therefore man cannot actually understand many things simultaneously, because his intellect cannot be perfectly and conclusively actualized in respect to diverse species just as neither can the same body in respect to diverse forms; hence even in the case of the angels it must be said that all those things which an angel knows by one species it can know simultaneously, but those which it knows by diverse species it cannot know simultaneously but successively. But this succession is not measured by the time that is caused by the movement of the heaven, above which are the angels' affections and conceptions -- indeed the higher is not measured by the lower --, but rather these conceptions and affections succeeding one another must cause the diverse instants of this time. Therefore in regard to those things which an angel cannot grasp according to one species it is necessary that he move in different instants of his time.

But those things that are above nature pertaining to grace, in respect to which the sin of the angel was committed, as was said (in q. 16, a. 3), differ more from anything whatsoever naturally known than things naturally known differ from one another; hence if on account of their difference the angel cannot grasp by one species and simultaneously all the things he naturally knows, much less can he move simultaneously to things naturally known and to supernatural things that are gratuitous. Now clearly the movement of the angel at first is

to that which is connatural to him, because through that he attains to that which is above nature; and therefore the angel in the first instant of his creation must have turned to the natural knowledge of himself, according to which he could not sin, as is clear from what was said above (in q. 16, a. 3), but afterwards he could turn towards that which is above nature or turn away from it. And therefore the angel in the first instant of his creation was neither blessed by completely turning towards God nor a sinner by turning away from Him; hence Augustine says in Book IV of the Literal Commentary on Genesis †38 that after the evening of the first day, morning is made, when this spiritual light, namely the angelic nature, following the cognition of its own nature as distinct from God, turns back to praise the light which is God Himself, by contemplation of Whom it is formed.

Reply to 1. Augustine in Book XI On the City of God †39 explains the statement that "the devil sins from the beginning," i.e. from the beginning of his sin he persists in sin. Some †40 however explain "from the beginning" as immediately after the beginning.

Reply to 2. The devil is said not to have stood in the truth, not because he never stood in the truth but because he did not persevere in it, as Augustine explains. †41

Reply to 3. That the angel could not sin in the first instant was due neither to the lack of any power which was afterwards supplied, nor to a perfection which was afterwards withdrawn before his sin, but to the order of the act: since it was necessary first that he would consider that which pertained to his nature and afterwards would be moved in regard to supernatural things by a turning towards or a turning away.

Reply to 4. The operation which a thing has in the beginning of its existence corresponds to (congruit) its nature, and therefore it should be rightfully referred to the author of the nature; but afterwards the angel could move from those things which are according to nature to other things either well or badly, and this ought not to be referred to the author of the nature but to the will of the angel sinning.

Reply to 5. The will of the rational creature is determined to one inasmuch as it is naturally moved, for instance every man naturally wills to be, to live, and happiness; †42 and these are the things either to the understanding of which or the willing of which the creature is first moved naturally, because natural action is always presupposed to other actions; and therefore if the devil had sinned in the first instant of its creation it would seem that this is attributable to its nature, and thus it would be referred in some measure to the author of nature.

Reply to 6. A defect arising from the second cause is not imputed to the first cause in the case of those things which the second cause does have from the first cause, as for instance the leg does not have crookedness from the power that causes motion; but the first action of the angel must needs be in keeping with its natural powers, which it has from God; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply to 7. The counter-argument in that objection proceeded on the assumption that the movement of free will in the angel resulted from the deliberation of counsel. For the person deliberating needs to take counsel about two alternatives either one of which he can do in order to choose the one he is going to do. But when deliberation does not precede choice, then it is not required that before someone chooses he have the power to choose or not to choose, but in that very instant he moves freely to this or to that.

Replies to 8, 9, and 10. We concede the eighth, ninth and tenth arguments.

Reply to 11. Just as the angel did not sin in the first instant of his creation, so neither was the good angel completely happy in the first instant of his creation. And therefore it was surely not the case that the good angel was foreconscious of his future steadfastness, just as neither were the bad angels foreconscious of their fall before they sinned. However, since the beatitude i.e. the happiness of the angel comes principally from God, but

the sin from the free will of the creature, God could have made the angel happy in the first instant of its creation by moving him to that which is above nature -- because even the very fact that he was moved in the first instant to that which is according to nature came to him from God --, but the angel by its own power (per se) could be moved perversely in regard to that which is above nature only after the first instant.

Reply to 12. That distinction of light from darkness can be understood to have been made, not in that beginning of things, but during the whole time which is now being considered, in which the good are distinguished from the bad; but this seems to be an allegorical interpretation as is said in the same place,†43 and so Augustine there proposes another explanation, that by light is understood the formation of the first creature, and by darkness the formlessness of the creature not yet formed. But in Book XI On the City of God,†44 he says that by light and darkness is meant the distinction of the good angels and bad angels according to divine foreknowledge; hence he says there "He alone could make this distinction, Who could foreknow before they fell those who were going to fall.

Reply to 13. Augustine leaves in doubt †45 whether the angels know all those things [that the sacred text sets down separately] at the same time, and thus day and evening and morning were in them simultaneously, or not simultaneously but successively; and howsoever it may be, it suffices for his intention that this distinction of days be taken according to the angels' cognition, and not according to days temporally passing.

Reply to 14. The angel in the first instant of his creation at the same time as he was moved in regard to its own nature was also moved in regard to God as the author of nature, for it is said in the book On Causes,†46 an intelligence in knowing its essence knows its cause; nevertheless he was not then moved towards God as He is author of grace.

Reply to 15. To love oneself for the sake of God inasmuch as He is the object of supernatural happiness and the author of grace, is an act of charity; but to love God above all things and one's self for the sake of God inasmuch as the natural good of every creature consists in Him, is naturally befitting not only to the rational creature but also to the brute animals and to inanimate bodies, inasmuch as they participate in the natural love of the highest good, as Dionysius says.†47 And in this way the angel in the first instant of his creation loved himself for the sake of God.

Reply to 16. That argument is erroneous on three counts: first because man was not created principally for the reparation of the fall of the angels, but for the enjoyment of God and the perfection of the universe, even if the fall of the angels had never taken place. Secondly, because man at least as to his body was not actually created in the work of the six days according to the opinion of Augustine †48 but only according to the seminal principles, for only those things which could not exist virtually in the seminal principles prior to existing in themselves were created in the beginning of the creation of things according to Augustine; thirdly, because nothing prevents something from being done for a future purpose which man foreknows, as for instance a man cuts wood in the summer for the cold to come in the winter.

Reply to 17. Some movement of the free will can occur in the soul in an instant; nevertheless in the instant of its creation the angel could not have a movement of free will to sin, for the reason given above (in the Response).

Reply to 18. Even if the angel in the first instant of his creation had a movement of his will as also of his intellect, nevertheless it does not follow that he had a movement of the will to sin.

Reply to 19. Aeviternity measures the existence of the angel; nevertheless it does not measure his actions in which there is succession both of the intellect and of the will, as is clear from what was said above (in the Response).

Reply to 20. The nature of merit and sin differ. For merit proceeds from this that the mind of the rational

creature is moved by God, Who from the beginning can move the creature to whatever He wills;†49 but the mind of the rational creature, is moved to sin by itself, which can move itself only according to the exigencies i.e. the needs, wishes, desires, etc., of the natural order,

Reply to 21. The soul in the first instant of its creation becomes evil not by its own action but by union with an infected body; hence there is no like reason in the case of the angel who could not become evil except by its own act.

Reply to 22. That argument errs on two scores: first because as the creature would fall into nothingness unless it was sustained by divine power, so also would it fall into what is not good if it was not sustained by God, nevertheless it does not follow that unless the creature was sustained by God through grace that it would fall into sin, but only in the case of a corrupted nature which of itself has an inclination to evil; secondly because man is not obliged by the necessity of a precept always to use grace, since affirmative precepts are not binding at all times; and therefore it is not necessary that a person in every instant merits or sins.

Reply to 23. The devil is said to tell a lie from his very nature not because lying is a natural property of his, but because he does not have from himself but from God those things which are true, but that he utters what is false he has from himself and not from God.

Question XVI, Article 5 †p

Whether the Free Will of the Demons Can Return to Good After Sin?

It seems that it can, for the following reasons.

1. Dionysius says †1 that the natural gifts of the demons remain integral after sin. But before sin the devil could turn to good. Therefore after sin the devil could return to good.

2. Nothing that is contrary to nature remains permanently in a thing: because that which is contrary to nature is accidental, in fact those things that are accidental can be easily removed, because "the accidental is that which is present or absent without destruction of the subject."†2 But sin is contrary to the angel's nature, for he fell from that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says.†3 Therefore it is not possible that the devil's free will would persist irrevocably in evil.

3. But it was argued that this belongs to the devil by reason of his state, namely that immediately upon sinning he lost the state of wayfarer,†4 to which pertains changing from good to evil and vice versa. But counter to this: the state of reward or punishment which is from God, succeeds the state of wayfarer. But irrevocability in sin cannot be from God, because God is not the preserver of that of which He is not the author. Therefore it is not possible that irrevocability in sin belong to an angel by reason of the state that he now has.

4. Anything that does not inherently (per se) belong to a thing must be in it from some cause. But irrevocably sinning does not belong to the angel in itself: for if this were the case it would belong to it according to its nature and consequently the angel would be naturally evil, which was disproved above (in q. 16, a. 2); nor does it belong to him from some cause: since it is neither from God nor from nature, as was proved (in q. 16 a. 2), nor even from his own will, because since the will of the creature is of itself changeable, it does not seem that the will can be the cause of irrevocability. Therefore irrevocably sinning in no way can be attributed to the devil.

5. Augustine says in the book *De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia*†5 "If the devil could hope in God and acknowledge his fault, what he does not find in himself he would find in God's mercy, i.e. forgiveness of his sin. But the devil can hope in God because hope springs from faith as does fear: for it is said in the Epistle of James

4 †6 that "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it is possible for the devil to obtain pardon for his sin, and consequently not to persevere irrevocably in sin.

6. If the devil cannot hope in the mercy of God, either this is on his part or this is on the part of God. But this is not on the part of God because, as Augustine says in the same book,†7 any whatsoever evil is slight in comparison with the mercy of God; and if it be said that this is on the devil's part, namely because he cannot of his own self (per se) rise from sin, with equal reason this would apply to everyone who sins mortally: because no one of his own self can arise from sin unless he is freed by God, and yet not all who sin mortally persist irrevocably in evil. Therefore the devil does not persist irrevocably in evil.

7. This consequence is valid: I can run if I wish, therefore I can run. But the devil can turn to good if he wishes, because the turning-to consists in the wishing itself. Therefore the devil can turn to good.

8. If movement is natural, it follows that rest is natural, because by that nature by which a thing is moved towards a place it also rests in a place; therefore with equal reason if movement is voluntary, rest is voluntary. But the devil was voluntarily moved to evil. Therefore he voluntarily rests in evil; not then out of necessity.

9. According to Chrysostom †8 as the light of the sun is to the air, so is the uncreated light to the spiritual substance. But the purer the air, the better it can receive the light of the sun; but among spiritual substances the angel is of a more subtle nature than the soul; since then the soul after sin can receive the light of grace it seems that much more so can the angel. Therefore it seems that the angel does not persist irrevocably in evil.

10. What is such by nature is always such. But the angel is naturally such that it can turn to good. Therefore the angel can always turn to good, just as before sin so too after sin.

11. The devil did not gain any advantage from his sin; but before sin he was bound to turn to God; therefore even after sin he was bound to turn to God. But no one is bound to what is impossible;†9 therefore it is not impossible for the devil to turn towards God. And so, it seems, he does not remain irrevocably in sin.

12. The lower an agent is, the more it is determined to one; for instance, a heavy or light body is more determined to one movement than reason, which can be moved to diverse things. But in the order of nature the soul is below the angel. Since then the soul is not so determined to one that after sin it cannot turn again to good, it seems that much less is the angel.

13. The lower appetite can be directed by the higher appetite, as in us the sense appetite is directed by the rational appetite, as is said in Book III On the Soul.†10 But above the appetite of the demon is another higher appetite, namely that of God and of the good angel. Therefore the appetite of the demon by which it tends to evil can be directed to good.

14. Each thing naturally turns towards that which is better. But the devil realizes that the divine good is better than his own good, therefore he can turn towards the divine good. He does not then persist irrevocably in turning away from God, which is evil for him.

15. The change of state does not take away from the devil liberty of choice which is natural to him. But it pertains essentially (per se) to freedom of choice to be able to turn to good, because the capability of sinning is not liberty of choice, nor a part of liberty, as Anselm says.†11 Therefore the change of state does not take away from the devil the capability of turning to good.

16. Before the devil sinned he could turn to good; but if after sin he cannot turn to good, either this is due to some withdrawal or on account of an addition. But it is not due to a withdrawal because their natural powers remain integral in them, as do their other natural goods, as Dionysius says:†12 nor likewise is it on

account of an addition: because what is added to a thing, is received in it according to the mode of the recipient; and therefore, since the free will of the angel in itself is changeable, it seems that what is added to it inheres in it changeably. Therefore the devil does not persist irrevocably in evil.

17. The will is proportionate to the intellect by which it is moved. But the intellect of the angel does not so understand one thing that it cannot also understand another, therefore the angel does not so will one thing that it cannot revert to willing another. And therefore the angel does not persist irrevocably in evil.

18. Dionysius says,†13 that the demons both understand and will good. But nothing else seems to be required for their turning towards good but that they consent to this will. Therefore it seems that they can again turn towards good.

19. Anselm says †14 that if there is freedom of choice in the demons it must be in them either in order to keep uprightness of will, or in order to abandon uprightness of will, or in order to recover it. But this is not in them in order to keep uprightness of will, for they do not have it; nor in order to abandon it, for this pertains to an ability to sin, which is not a part of liberty. It remains then that free choice must be in them in order to recover uprightness of will. And therefore the demons do not persist irrevocably in evil.

20. What is similarly deformed, can be similarly reformed. But the devil is deformed in a way similar to many men who sin from the same cause, namely malice.†15 Therefore since men can be reformed, so also can the demons.

21. Just as the appetite is related to good and to evil, so the intellect is related to the true and the false. But no intellect so adheres to what is false that it cannot return to what is true. Therefore the will of the devil does not so adhere to evil that it cannot return to good.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in the First Epistle of John (3, 8) "The devil sins from the beginning" (of his sin). Augustine explaining this in Book XI On the City of God†16 says that he sins forever from the beginning of his sin.

2. Gregory says in chapter XXXIV of the Moralia†17 "The heart of the ancient enemy will be hardened like a stone because it will never be softened by any penitent conversion."

3. The angel is midway between God and man. But God has a free will which is unchangeable before and after choice, and man has a free will which is changeable before and after choice, therefore the angel is midway between, namely inasmuch as his will is changeable before but not after choice: for the contrary is impossible, namely that his will can change after and not before. Therefore the angel cannot return to good after the choice of sin.

Response:

On this question Origen erred †18 in judging that the free will of any creature in any state can change from good to evil and from evil to good; hence he thought that even the demons at some time or other by free choice can return to good and through divine mercy obtain pardon for their sins. But Augustine says in Book XXI On the City of God†19 "The Church (not without reason) condemned Origen for this and other errors: because he lost even the credit of being merciful, by allotting to the saints real miseries for the expiation of their sins, and false happiness, which brought them no true and secure joy, i.e. no fearless assurance of eternal blessedness." For the same reason,†20 Origen held that even the good angels and men at some time or other could sin through free will and thus fall from blessedness; which is clearly contrary to the judgment of the Lord †21 Who says "And these will go into everlasting punishment; but the just into everlasting life."

It should be noted that this error of Origen arose from the fact that he did not rightly examine what pertained essentially (per se) to the power of free choice which man in no state is found without. Therefore we must consider that it pertains to the nature of free choice that it can extend to diverse things. Wherefore things lacking cognition, whose actions are determined to one, do nothing by their own choice; irrational animals, on the other hand, indeed act by choice but not by free choice: because the judgment by which they pursue or flee from something is determined in them by nature so that they cannot not do it, for example the sheep cannot not flee from the wolf it sees;†22 but every being that possesses intellect and reason, acts by free choice, namely inasmuch as the choice, in virtue of which it acts, follows on the apprehension of the intellect or reason which extends to many things. And therefore as was said above, it pertains to the nature of free choice that it can extend to diverse things.

But this diversity can be considered in three ways: in one way according to the difference of things that are chosen for the sake of an end. For everything has by nature one proper end which it seeks from natural necessity, since nature always tends to one;†23 but because many things can be ordered to one end, the appetite of the intellectual or rational nature can extend to diverse things in choosing those things that are for the end. And indeed in this way God naturally wills His goodness as His proper end and cannot not will it; but since diverse modes and orders of things can be ordered to His goodness, His will does not so bear on one among His effects that so far as concerns His will it cannot bear on another. And according to this, liberty of choice properly belongs to God. In like manner the angel and man have beatitude i.e. happiness as an end naturally appointed for them; hence they naturally desire it and they cannot will misery, as Augustine says in Book VIII On the Trinity.†24 But since diverse things can be ordered to happiness, the will both of man and of the angel either good or bad can be moved to different things in choosing those things that are for the end.

The second diversity to which free will can extend, is considered according to the difference of good and evil; but this diversity does not pertain to the power of free will essentially (per se) but is related to it incidentally (per accidens), inasmuch as it is found in a nature capable of defect. For since the will of itself is ordered to good as to its proper object, that it tends to evil can occur only from this that evil is apprehended under the aspect of good; which pertains to a defect of the intellect or reason, from which liberty of choice has its origin; but it does not belong to the nature of any power that it be defective in its act, for example it does not pertain to the nature of the power of sight that a person sees indistinctly; and therefore nothing prevents us from discovering the existence of a free will which so extends to good that in no way can it extend to evil, either by nature, as in God, or by reason of the perfection of grace, as in the saints and the blessed angels.

The third diversity to which free will can extend, is considered according to the difference of change. This does not consist in the fact that a person wills diverse things, for even God Himself wills diverse things to come about in keeping with diverse times and persons: but a change in free will consists in a person not willing the same thing and in the same circumstances as he willed previously, or in willing what he did not will previously. And neither does this diversity pertain essentially (per se) to the nature of free will, but is accidental to it in keeping with the condition of a changeable nature; just as it is not of the nature of the power of sight to see in diverse ways, but this occurs at times on account of a different disposition of the one seeing, whose eye sometimes is clear and sometimes blurred. And in like manner also the changeability i.e. diversity of the free will is not of the nature of free will but is accidental to it inasmuch as it is in a changeable nature. For in us free will is changed by an intrinsic cause and by an extrinsic cause: by an intrinsic cause, either owing to reason, as when someone learns something of which he was previously ignorant, or owing to the appetite, which sometimes is so disposed by passion and habit that it tends to something pleasing to it which is not pleasing to it when the passion or habit ceases; and by an extrinsic cause, as when God changes the will of a person from evil to good through grace, according to Proverbs (21, 1)†25 "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, and whithersoever He will He shall turn it."

Now this twofold cause ceases in the angels after their initial choice. And at first they are immutably established by nature in those things which pertain to the order of nature: for change is a coming to be of that which is in potency, as is said in Book III of the Physics†26 Now it pertains to the nature of the angels that they

have actual knowledge of all those things which they can know naturally, just as we have by nature actual knowledge of first principles from which we proceed discursively to acquire knowledge of the conclusions, which does not occur in the angels because in the very principles they intuit all the conclusions which pertain to their natural knowledge; and therefore, just as we are constituted irrevocably in the knowledge of first principles, so their intellect is irrevocably constituted in regard to all those things it knows naturally, and since the will is proportioned to the intellect it follows that even their will is naturally unchangeable in regard to those things which pertain to the order of nature. On the other hand it is true that they are in potency in respect to movement to supernatural things either by turning-towards or turning-away. Hence only this change can be present in them that they move from the level of their nature to that which is above nature by turning themselves towards or turning away; but since anything that accrues to a thing accrues to it according to the mode of its nature, it follows that the angels persist irrevocably either in their turning away or turning-towards in respect to a supernatural good.

Even on the part of an extrinsic cause they are unchangeable either in good or in evil after the initial choice, because then the state of wayfarer is ended in them; hence it does not pertain to the nature of divine Wisdom that an additional infusion of grace be imparted to the demons by which they are turned back from the evil of their first turning-away, in which they persist irrevocably: and therefore although they choose diverse things by free choice, nevertheless in all of them they sin, because the force of their first choice remains in their every choice.

Reply to 1. The natural goods of the angels are integral so far as concerns the order of nature, nevertheless they are corrupted or perverted i.e. depraved in comparison with the capacity for grace and glory.

Reply to 2. Sin is contrary to nature not according to that which the sinner desires, but according to the deordination from which it has the nature of evil; and therefore nothing prevents the sinner from persisting irrevocably in that which he desires in sinning.

Reply to 3. God is the cause of the state of the angels in which they are obstinate in evil, not indeed by causing or preserving evil, but as not imparting grace; for thus it said that some are hardened according that text of Romans (9, 18): "He has mercy on whom He will; and whom He will He hardens."

Reply to 4. To persist irrevocably in evil does not belong to the devil by reason of one cause but by reason of two: for to be in a state of evil belongs to him by reason of his own will; but to adhere irrevocably to that to which the will is attached belongs to him from his own nature.

Reply to 5. The devil cannot properly speaking acknowledge fault in himself, namely in such a way that he would apprehend and flee from his sin as an evil of fault, because this would pertain to a change of free will; and consequently he cannot hope for pardon out of divine mercy as from fault.

Reply to 6. The devil not only cannot rise from sin by his own power, just as neither can man, but furthermore it is proper to him according to the mode of his nature to adhere irrevocably to that which he has chosen by his own will; and therefore his sin is more irremediable than man's sin.

Reply to 7. When I say 'I can run if I wish', the antecedent is possible and therefore the consequent is possible; but when I say 'the devil can return to good if he wishes', the antecedent is impossible as is clear from what was said (in the Response); hence the reasoning is not alike.

Reply to 8. Just as the movement of turning away from God was voluntary in the devil, so also resting in that which he willed is voluntary, for he voluntarily persists in evil; but nonetheless his will perseveres in this irrevocably, for the reason already stated (in the Response).

Reply to 9. A spiritual substance is enlightened by the uncreated light in two ways: in one way by the light natural to it, and thus the angel good or the bad is more enlightened than the soul; in another way by the light of grace, and thus the bad angel is less capable of this enlightenment because of the obstacle to grace which remains in them irrevocably, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 10. The free will of the devil is not naturally changeable so far as concerns his natural goods, but has changeability only in respect to supernatural goods towards which he can turn or from which he can turn away; which when he has done, he persists in it irrevocably, as we have said (in the Response).

Reply to 11. Just as a drunkard is bound not to sin, not indeed in view of his present condition, but when considered as the voluntary cause of his drunkenness, according to which a thing is imputed to him as a fault, so also it can be understood that the devil is bound to turn towards God, although this is impossible for him according to his present state, because he has fallen into this state of his own free will.

Reply to 12. That which is lower is more determined to one in respect to objects, because a higher power extends itself to more objects; but nevertheless that which is highest is more determined to one by reason of unchangeableness; and in this way the free will of the devil is determined to evil.

Reply to 13. Only God has the power to move the will, Who according to His absolute power could change the demon's will to good; but nevertheless this is not in keeping with the demon's nature, as was said (in the Response). Hence there is no similarity with the sense appetite, which according to its nature is changeable.

Reply to 14. The devil realizes that the divine good as it is the source of all natural good is better than his own good, but not that the divine good as it is the proper principle of gratuitous good is better than his own good, because he still remains in his initial perversity in which he willed to obtain complete happiness by his natural power.

Reply to 15. By the change of state the demon did not lose free will so that he is unable to move to a connatural good; nevertheless he lost it so far as concerns the capability of attaining the good of grace.

Reply to 16. The irrevocability of the devil in evil is caused properly by adherence, which is akin to an addition; and from the fact that the devil adheres to a thing according to the mode of his nature it follows that he adheres irrevocably rather than revocably.

Reply to 17. The appetite of the devil can seek diverse things, as was said (in the Response); but nevertheless he persists irrevocably in evil in all the things he seeks, as is clear from what has been said (in the Response).

Reply to 18. That argument is valid concerning the cognition and willing of natural good; but now we are speaking of gratuitous good and of the evil of fault that is opposed to it.

Reply to 19. The devil has the liberty to preserve rectitude if he had it; for as Anselm says in the same book,^{†27} free will always has the power to preserve rectitude, both when it possesses it and when it does not possess it, just as not only does a person have the power to keep money if he had it, but even if he does not have it.

Reply to 20. Although a man may sin for the same reason that the devil sinned, nevertheless he is not in like manner utterly deformed on account of this, but the devil irrevocably, and man revocably, each in keeping with what is proper to his nature.

Reply to 21. Just as the devil persists irrevocably in evil to which he adheres, so also would he persist irrevocably in a falsehood to which he assented.

Whether the Devil's Intellect Is So Darkened After Sin That He Can Fall into Error or Deception?

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. It is said of Leviathan, by which is understood the devil, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old" (Job 41, 23); in explaining which Gregory says †1 "For he esteems the abyss to be growing old who thinks that in those punished the heavenly condemnation will sometime end." But this is false. Therefore there is false or erroneous opinion in the devil.

2. Whoever is in doubt can err. But the devil sometimes is in doubt, as is clear from what he himself says in Matthew (4, 33): "If thou art the Son of God command that these stones become loaves of bread." Therefore the devil can err.

3. But it was argued that the devil can err so far as concerns gratuitous cognition but not as concerns natural cognition. But counter to this: Dionysius says †2 "We affirm that the natural goods bestowed on them" i.e. the demons, "have never changed but are integral and most splendid, although they themselves, blocking their powers of contemplating the good, do not see them." But he who does not see because he blocks his own vision, can be deceived or err. Therefore the devil can err even concerning his natural goods.

4. Wherever potency can be found without act, there evil is possible, as is clear from the Philosopher in Book IX of the Metaphysics.†3 But in the angelic intellect, even in regard to natural cognition, there can be potency without act: for angels do not actually consider simultaneously all the things to which their natural cognition extends -- otherwise they would not change in time i.e. after the manner of succession, as Augustine says in Book VIII of the Literal Commentary on Genesis†4--; therefore in the angel's intellect there can be evil. But falsity is the evil of the intellect, as is said in Book II of the Ethics.†5 Therefore even though the devil has an angelic nature, nothing prevents a false opinion from being found in his intellect.

5. The will of the devil can fall into sin because it is made of nothing, as is clear from Augustine in Book XII On the City of God.†6 But likewise his intellect is made of nothing. With equal reason then it can fall into error.

6. Sin excludes a person from beatitude i.e. from supreme happiness. But beatitude pertains to the intellect more than to the will according to John (17, 3): "This is everlasting life, that they may know thee, the (only) true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou has sent." Since then the devil's will is so depraved through sin that he persists forever in sin, much more is his intellect so depraved that it persists forever in error.

7. Anselm proves †7 that there is only one truth, namely the uncreated truth; and likewise Augustine says †8 that all things are seen in the divine light. But the demons are excluded from participation in God according to the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (6, 14), "What fellowship has light with darkness?" Therefore the demons can know no truth.

8. On the text ". . . who was made to fear no one" (Job 41, 34) Gregory says of the devil †9 that "he turned the desire for pre-eminence into a rigidity of mind so that now by reason of hardheartedness he does not think himself evil who sought to be first in glory." But it is clear that he has acted evilly. Therefore he has a false opinion of himself.

9. Whoever thinks that is false which he previously thought to be true sometimes errs. But this applies to the devil: because on that text †10 "As he (i.e. Pilate) was sitting in the judgment-seat, his wife sent to him . . . ,"

etc., the Gloss says †11 "The devil now at last understanding that on account of Christ he was about to lose his spoils, just as he had first brought about death through a woman [Eve], so now through a woman [Pilot's wife] he wanted to free Christ from the hands of the Jews lest by Christ's death he should lose his dominion over death"; from which apparently at one time it seemed to the devil expedient that Christ should die, i.e. while he was procuring Christ's death, but afterwards it seemed to him that this would not be expedient for his dominion. Therefore it seems that at one time the devil had a false opinion.

10. Augustine says †12 "We must guard against the lower regions of hell," i.e. the graver punishments after this life, "where there can be no calling to mind of truth because there is no rational activity; and this because there is no diffusion of the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into this world." But the demons are in the state of those lower regions of hell. Therefore they know no truth nor is there any rational activity in them.

11. Just as true knowledge is related to right desire, so false knowledge is related to perverse desire. But there cannot be right desire unless true knowledge precedes it. Therefore false knowledge always precedes perverse desire. But in the demons, their appetite is always perverse. Therefore in them there is false knowledge.

12. On the text "And beating him, they went their way, leaving him half-dead (Luke 10, 30), a certain Gloss says †13 that man is wounded in his natural powers by sin. But grace amends that in man which is wounded by sin. Since then grace amends the whole image, †14 under which is comprised not only the will but also the intellect, it seems that through sin the devil's intellect was wounded even in regard to natural cognition. And therefore it seems that there can be error and deception even in his natural cognition.

13. Dionysius says †15 that no one looks to evil, as evil, to guide him in his actions. But that which the devil does is evil. Therefore he is deceived in his judgment.

14. Augustine says in the book On True Religion †16 "That angel, in loving himself more than God, was unwilling to be subject to Him, was swollen with pride, and fell away from the supreme being" i.e. he fell through sin; "and as a result of this he became lower, because in wanting to enjoy his own power rather than God's, he willed to enjoy what is lower." But in the very act in which he perversely adhered to his own nature and power, and because of this became lower, he seems to have departed from the order of his own natural powers. Therefore he can fall into falsity or deception even in his natural cognition.

15. Gregory says †17 what is right seems perverse to a mind overcome with rage. But the mind of the devil is overcome with rage, for Dionysius says †18 the evil of the devil is an irrational rage; therefore everything that is right he thinks perverse. And consequently he is deceived in his opinion.

16. Universal knowledge is a source of deception in us; as when considering the lily's whiteness, which is common to the lily and many other things, we are deceived in thinking that 'to be white' is 'to be a lily'. But the angels know through universal forms, and the more universal the forms, the higher they are. †19 Since then Lucifer †20 was the highest among the angels, and consequently has the most universal forms, it seems that he especially can be deceived.

17. A simple being turns completely to whatever it turns. Therefore likewise it completely turns away from whatever it turns. But the devil is a simple being according to his essence. Therefore since he has turned away from God, it seems that he has completely turned away from Him, i.e. both so far as concerns affection and as concerns cognition. Consequently it seems that his cognition is totally lacking in truth, since God is truth.

18. On that text in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (6, 15) †21 "What harmony is there between Christ and Belial?" the Gloss †22 says that the devil in all that he does is an evil-doer. But to understand is itself a kind acting or doing. Therefore it seems that the devil does even the act of understanding badly. And

consequently it seems that there can be false opinion in his intellect.

On the contrary:

1. Dionysius says †23 that angels are simple intellects. But there cannot be falsity in an act of simple understanding even of man. Therefore far less in angelic cognition. But the devil has an angelic nature. Therefore there cannot be falsity in his cognition.

2. In the demons, since they are incorporeal substances, there is only intellectual cognition. But the intellect is always right, as the Philosopher says in Book III On the Soul†24 and Augustine shows †25 in the book On Eighty-three Diverse Questions that no one who understands a thing to be other than it really is, really understands it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be deception in the cognition of the demons.

3. But it was argued that there cannot be deception in the demons' cognition so far as concerns natural cognition, but only as concerns gratuitous cognition. But counter to this: gratuitous cognition is especially concerned with God as He exceeds the natural cognition of the creature. But as the Philosopher shows in Book IX of the Metaphysics,†26 there cannot be falsity in the cognition of the simple substances that are above us, but there is in them only the defect of not attaining the cognition. Therefore there cannot be any false opinion in the demons concerning gratuitous cognition but only the failure to attain the cognition.

4. Everything receives what is above it according to the mode of its own nature [i.e. not according to the mode of that which it receives], as is said in the book On Causes.†27 If then demons cannot err according to their natural cognition, it seems that they cannot err even regarding the cognition of gratuitous things, which supervenes in them.

5. But it was argued that demons can err in regard to affective cognition.†28 But counter to this: angelic cognition exceeds all human cognition. But there is a cognitive power in man which does not err, even in a sinner, namely synderesis. Therefore it seems that the cognition of a sinning angel surely is much more without error.

6. The demon sinned from free choice, which is a faculty of the will and reason.†29 But the reason and will are concerned with different objects, for the will regards the good, but reason the true. Therefore nothing prevents the devil's will from being in error in regard to the good, yet in such a way that his intellect is not in error in regard to the true.

7. Nothing is corrupted or diminished except by its opposite. But sin is not opposed to nature. Therefore it seems that sin neither corrupts nor diminishes the good of nature. But natural cognition is not subject to error. Consequently it seems that neither can error be in the devil even after sin.

8. Gregory says in Dialogue IV †30 that the soul elevated from the body, knows truth without error. But the angel, even a bad angel, is more elevated from a body than the soul is. Therefore it seems that far less can error occur in the bad angels.

Response:

A false opinion is a defective operation of the intellect just as a monstrous birth is a defective operation of nature, hence the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Ethics†31 falsity is the evil of the intellect; but a defective operation always proceeds from a defect of some principle, for instance a monstrous birth proceeds from some defect of the semen, as is said in Book II of the Physics.†32 Hence every false judgment proceeds from a defect of some principle of knowing, as in us a false opinion often occurs from bad reasoning. But nothing can be defective in regard to that in respect to which it is always in act according to its very nature, but something can be defective in that in respect to which it is in potency: for that which is in potency can be

subject both to perfection and to privation. Act, on the other hand, is opposed to privation to which every defect is referred.

Now as was said above (in q. 16, a. 3 and 5), the angel according to the condition of its nature actually has perfect knowledge of all those things to which his knowing power naturally extends: for the angel does not go from principles to conclusions but immediately sees the conclusions in the very principles known; otherwise if, while actually having knowledge of the principles, he were to know the conclusions potentially, he would, like us, have to acquire knowledge of the conclusions by reasoning from the principles; the contrary of which is evident from Dionysius in chapter VII On the Divine Names.^{†33} Therefore just as we cannot have a false opinion concerning the first principles naturally known by us, so neither can the angel have a false opinion about whatever things come under his natural cognition; and since the devil by sinning did not lose what is proper to his nature, but his natural gifts remain integral and most splendid, as Dionysius says,^{†34} it follows that neither can the devil have a false opinion about whatever things come under his natural cognizance.

On the other hand, although the devil's mind is in act in respect to those things he can know naturally, nevertheless it is in potency in respect to those things which exceed his natural cognition and to know these he needs to be enlightened by a higher light. For just as the higher the active power, the more it can extend to doing more things,^{†35} so the higher the knowing power, the more it can extend to knowing more things; hence in respect to those things in which the higher intellect exceeds the lower, the lower intellect is as it were in potency, needing to be perfected by the higher intellect. Therefore in respect to those things that pertain to divine cognition every angelic intellect is in potency, needing to be enlightened in order to know them by a supernatural light which is the light of divine grace.

And so in regard to this gratuitous cognition some defect can exist in everyone, but differently in some than in others. For in the good angel in respect to knowable things of this kind there can be a defect, but of simple negation, in keeping with what Dionysius says in chapter VII of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy^{†36} that they are freed from their nescience. But there cannot be in them the defect of false opinion, because since their will is well-ordered, they do not apply their intellect to judging those things which exceed their cognition. But in the bad angels, because of their inordinate and proud will, there can be the defect of false opinion in respect to knowable things of this kind, inasmuch as they presumptuously apply their intellect to judging those things that exceed them. And this falsity in respect to such knowable things can be in them both speculatively, inasmuch as they peremptorily give vent to false judgments, and also practically or affectively, inasmuch as they erroneously think something is to be desired or to be done in relation to the foresaid knowable things.

Reply to 1. The interminability of the divine condemnation pertains to gratuitous cognition, because the reason for the divine judgments exceeds all natural cognition of the creature, according to Psalm 35, 7: "Thy judgments are a great deep (abyssus)." Nevertheless the devil is not ignorant of the interminability of his punishment. For this would lessen his misery: indeed just as certainty about the continual duration of glory pertains to the increase of the happiness of the blessed, so the certainty of unending misery pertains to the increase of the misery of the damned. Hence it must be noted that the devil is said to esteem the deep as growing old as Gregory explains there,^{†37} because the devil dins into the minds of men in this world the opinion that punishments are terminable so that men will have less fear of sinning.

Reply to 2. That doubt of the devil was about the mystery of the incarnation,^{†38} which exceeds the natural cognition even of the angels.

Reply to 3. The demons are said not to see their natural gifts, not that they absolutely do not see them -- otherwise they would know nothing, because, as is said in the book On Causes,^{†39} an intelligence understands all other things in understanding his own essence --; but that they do not see their natural gifts as ordered to gratuitous goods, from the consideration of which they turn away their attention, adhering finally only to their own natural goods.

Reply to 4. 'Having actual knowledge' can be taken in two ways: in one way so far as concerns actual consideration of the knowledge already had; and in this way it is not taken to mean that the angel has actual knowledge of all those things to which his natural cognition extends; in another way so far as concerns habitual knowledge: because, as is said in Book II of On the Soul†40 and in Book VIII of the Physics,†41 in one way a person is said to be in potency to know before he learns, i.e. when he does not yet have the habit of science, and in another way when he has the habit of science but is not actually considering the knowledge he already has; and in this latter way i.e. habitually the angel has actual knowledge in respect to all the things that he can know naturally. And this is sufficient to reject the contrary falsity: for we are not always actually considering the principles, but the very habit of the principles is sufficient to reject every contrary error connected with knowledge of the principles.

Reply to 5. From the fact that something comes to be from nothing it follows that it is changeable in some respect, but nevertheless it does not necessarily follow that it is changeable in all respects: indeed the heavenly bodies are changeable according to place but not according to substance.†42 And in like manner from the fact that the angel's intellect comes to be from nothing, it can err about supernatural things, but not as concerns natural cognition, because the will of the angel can even sin in regard to such matters i.e. supernatural, as was said above (in q. 16, a. 3).

Reply to 6. Active beatitude i.e. happiness resides in the intellect, to which the vision of God pertains, rather than in the will, to which pleasure pertains: because pleasure follows upon activity as an effect on a cause, and is joined to activity as a supervenient perfection. Hence the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics†43 that pleasure completes the activity as an end that supervenes, as the bloom of youth does in those in the flower of their age. Now it is especially proper to the will to desire the end and to move towards it, and this is impeded by sin; sin therefore pertains more to the will than to the intellect.

Reply to 7. The demons are excluded from participation in the divine truth and the divine light according as this is participated in by grace, but not as it is participated in by nature.

Reply to 8. The devil does not think that he acted evilly because he does not apprehend his fault as evil but with an obstinate mind still persists in evil; hence this pertains to the falsity of practical or affective cognition.

Reply to 9. The effect of the passion of Christ pertains to supernatural cognition about which the devil could err.

Reply to 10. When it is said that in hell there is no calling to mind of truth, this is not to be understood as if they (the demons) know no truth -- otherwise they would not know they have committed acts of sin, and thus the worm of conscience †44 would be excluded --; rather it is to be understood that they are not in the state of acquiring knowledge of the truth by which their intellect would be perfected.

Reply to 11. According to Dionysius †45 good results from a total and integral cause, but evil from any single defects, and therefore more things are required for good than for evil; hence it does not follow if true cognition of the intellect is required for rectitude of the appetite, that perversity of the appetite cannot occur without falsity of cognition. Although it can also be said that the appetite can even be right when some false knowledge precedes, for instance when a person shows paternal honor to one whom he mistakenly thinks is his father. And in like manner the perverse appetite is always accompanied by some falsity of practical knowledge.

Reply to 12. Sin wounded man in his natural powers so far as concerns his capacity for gratuitous goods, but not in such a way that it takes away anything of the essence of his nature; and so it does not follow that his intellect erred except about gratuitous matters.

Reply to 13. That argument is valid in regard to practical or affective cognition, according to which a person with good in view chooses evil.

Reply to 14. Inasmuch as the devil adhered more to himself through love than to God, he sinned in regard to the order of natural goods to gratuitous goods, because he did not refer the love of his own nature to God; and also because of this he is said to be lower, inasmuch as he is deprived of gratuitous being i.e. of grace.

Reply to 15. "Rage" is said metaphorically of the devil, and from such figurative speech a sound argument cannot be drawn;†46 nevertheless it can even be said that this too pertains to practical knowledge.

Reply to 16. The angels are said to have universal knowledge, not because they know only the universal nature of things, by reason of which mode of knowing, universal knowledge in us is a cause of deception; rather their cognition is said to be universal inasmuch as it extends universally to many knowable things of which they have explicit and complete knowledge.

Reply to 17. The angel is simple in essence but manifold in power, namely inasmuch as its power extends to many things, but not by diverse powers, as the sense and intellectual appetites are in us; for this would be contrary to the simplicity of its essence. Therefore in keeping with its intellectual appetite inasmuch as it can extend to many things, the angel can turn away from a thing under one aspect and not under another; and so his appetite is not turned away from God so far as concerns natural things, but as concerns gratuitous things.

Reply to 18. The devil does everything evilly so far as concerns those things he does from free choice; but natural actions in him are good because strictly speaking those natural actions are attributable to God the author of the nature.

Replies to arguments On the contrary:

Reply to 1. The angel's intellect is simple in this respect, that just as he does not know truth by reasoning from principles to conclusions but immediately in the principles sees the truth of the conclusions, so too he does not know by adding a predicate to a subject after the manner of the composition and division of our intellect,†47 but immediately in a simple consideration of a subject he considers those things which are proper to it or which are excluded from it: for the reason for each is the same, inasmuch as the disposition i.e. the organization or make-up of the subject is the principle of knowing the inherence of the predicate in it; hence the angel knows by a simple apprehension of the subject that it is such or is not such, just as we do by composing or dividing: for there is nothing unreasonable about knowing a composite simply i.e. directly, just as what is material is known immaterially. But because of this, falsity can arise in our intellect in composing, inasmuch as it judges something to be or not to be such; consequently there can be falsity in the demon's intellect, especially in regard to those things that exceed his natural cognition.

Reply to 2. The intellect is said to be always right in understanding, because as Augustine says,†48 whoever really understands a thing, understands it to be as it really is; nevertheless the faculty of the intellect can err by not understanding what is true, as is clear in him who has a false opinion.

Reply to 3. In regard to the divine essence itself, the demon can fail only in not attaining it, as the argument in the objection shows; but in regard to those things which God does in creatures over and above their nature, the intellect of the demon can err by making a false judgment about such matters.

Reply to 4. The demon's mode of knowing corresponds to his substance; nevertheless he does not have the same ability to judge those things which exceed his nature as he has of judging those things which are connatural to him. And therefore although he never can have a false judgment about those things which pertain to his natural cognition, nevertheless he can have a false judgment about those things which exceed his natural cognition.

Reply to 5. Synderesis is knowledge of the universal principles pertaining to things to be done i.e. to moral action] which man knows naturally,†49 just as he knows universal theoretical principles naturally; hence from this it can be concluded only that the demons do not err in their natural cognition.

Reply to 6. The will is not moved by the good except inasmuch as it is apprehended; hence the will cannot be defective in its desire of the good unless there is some underlying defect in the apprehension of the good, not indeed so far as concerns the universal principles of which synderesis consists, but as concerns particular things to be chosen.

Reply to 7. Since sin is not directly opposed to nature, it follows that the demons by sin did not incur falsity so far as concerns natural cognition.

Reply to 8. Gregory is speaking there of the elevation of the soul which is effected by grace: for the light of grace excludes all falsity.

Question XVI, Article 7 †p

Whether the Demons Know Future Events?

It seems they do, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says "The temporal effects of divine power are more perceptible to angelic minds even of the evil spirits than to the minds of us weak human beings."†1 But by considering the effects of divine power men foreknow many future events, for instance the doctor health, the sailor fair weather ahead. Therefore much more can the demons foreknow future events.

2. No one can truly foretell that of which he has no foreknowledge. But as Augustine says in the book On the Divination of Demons,†2 the demons foretell some true things about future events. Therefore demons have foreknowledge of future events.

3. If demons are incorporeal substances they must be above time according to substance and operation, in keeping with what is said in the book On Causes,†3 that the substance and operation of an intelligence is above time. But past, present, and future are the differences of time. Therefore so far as concerns the demon's knowledge, it makes no difference whether something is present, past or future. But demons can know present and past things. Consequently they can also know future things.

4. But it was argued that for a thing to be known, not only must the knower be actually present but also the object known. But counter to this: God's knowledge is more certain than the demon's. If then for the certitude of the demon's cognition the object known must be actually present, much more must this be so for God's knowledge; and in that case neither would God know the future. Which is unreasonable.

5. All cognition is in keeping with the mode of the knower.†4 But in the demon, since he is an incorporeal substance, there is no sense cognition but only intellectual. Since then the intellect abstracts from the here and now, it seems that it makes no difference so far as concerns the demon's cognition whether a thing is present, past or future.

6. It is evident that the demons know singular things while they are. But they do not know them through species acquired from the things, because this is not possible except by means of the senses. Therefore they know singular things by means of innate species. But innate species were in the demon's mind from the beginning of his creation. Therefore from the beginning of his creation the demon knew all future singular

things.

7. But it was argued that innate species do not suffice for those things which exceed the angel's natural cognition, but infused species are required. But counter to this: to whomever's cognition something greater is subject, much more so is what is less. But immaterial substances, which are more exalted than substances perceptible to the senses, are subject to the demon's natural cognition. Therefore singular perceptible things do not exceed their cognition.

8. Just as the ideal exemplars †5 that are in the divine mind are in causing and knowing, so the likenesses of the things that are in the angelic mind are in knowing. But the ideal exemplars that are in the divine mind are equally principles of causing and knowing past, present, and future things. Therefore it seems that the species that are in the angelic mind are equally principles of knowing present, past, and future things.

9. Just as God through his Word produced forms in matter, so also He produced the forms in the angelic intelligence, as is clear from Augustine in Book II in the Literal Commentary on Genesis.†6 But the forms of things in corporeal matter stand in the same relation to the present, the past, and the future. Therefore it seems with equal reason the species of things that are in the angelic mind stand in the same relation to the present, the past, and the future; and so it seems that the demons through such species can know the future.

10. Isidore says †7 the demons have the advantage of a threefold acuteness of knowledge: partly from the subtlety of their nature, partly indeed from their long experience, and partly from the revelation of the good spirits. But all these modes can extend to knowledge of the future as well as the present. Therefore the demons can know future events.

11. But it was argued that the demons can know future things that come about necessarily and that have determinate causes, but not other things. But counter to this: experiential knowledge proceeds from similar things to similar things. But of all the things that occur, no matter how contingent they are, some similar things preceded in past ages in which the demons existed: for it is said in Ecclesiastes 1, 10 "Nothing under the sun is new . . . it hath already gone before in the ages that were before us." Therefore the demons have knowledge of all future contingent events.

12. Experience arises from sensation, for the Philosopher says †8 "From sensation memory is produced . . . and from the several memories of the same thing a single experience is produced." But the demons do not have senses. Therefore experience produces nothing in them that would enable them to know that certain things will be rather than others.

13. If the demons do not know those things that do not have a determinate cause when they are future, but do know them when they are present, it seems to follow that their intellect is reduced i.e. is moved from potency to act. But this seems impossible: because nothing is moved from potency to act except by something more excellent, and no created thing is said to be more excellent than the angelic intellect. Therefore it seems that the demons know contingent things that do not have determinate causes even before they occur.

14. Everything that comes about from many ordered and unimpeded causes seems to take place necessarily. But every effect that comes about in this world occurs from a conjunction of many causes ordered to each other and not impeded: because if they were impeded the effect would not follow. Therefore everything that comes about in this world occurs necessarily, and so it seems that the demons know all future events.

15. Fortune and chance are among those things which happen for the least part †9 i.e. rarely; but if nothing happens rarely, nothing will be contingent for the most part but all things will come about necessarily: for those things which occur for the most part differ from things which occur necessarily only inasmuch as they fail for the least part i.e. rarely; if then nothing happens by chance or fortune, it follows that everything takes place necessarily. But the first supposition seems to be true according to the opinion of Augustine †10 who says

that nothing happens in this world at random, i.e. by fortune or chance. Therefore everything takes place necessarily, and such being the case the demons know all future events.

16. All the movements of lower bodies are referred to the movements of the heavenly bodies as to their causes: for Augustine says †11 that God governs the lower bodies through the agency of the higher. But the movements of the higher bodies come to pass uniformly and necessarily. Therefore all the things that happen in the lower bodies also come to pass necessarily; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

17. But it was argued that this is valid in regard to purely corporeal movements but not in regard to those that are caused by free will. But counter to this: the principle of movement in man and in every animal is from something happening anew in corporeal things, for instance, when digestion is finished, man awakens by himself and rises, as is said in Book VIII of the Physics.†12 If then what happens externally in corporeal bodies is subject to the necessity of the heavenly bodies, it seems with equal reason so do those things that come about from free will.

18. Free choice seems to pertain to the will, which is the rational appetite, whose act is choice. But the will is moved by the good as by its proper object. Therefore it is moved necessarily to the choice of good and the fleeing of evil. So accordingly all things come about necessarily, even the things done by free will; and thus it seems to follow that the demons can foreknow all future events.

On the contrary:

1. Damascene says †13 that neither men nor demons foreknow the future, but only God.

2. A person can know better what pertains to himself than what pertains to others; hence it is said in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (2, 11)†14 "Who . . . knows the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him." But the demons did not foreknow their future downfall, as is clear from Augustine in Book XI of the Literal Commentary on Genesis.†15 Therefore much less can the demons foreknow other future events.

3. Cognition is only of the true i.e. of that which cannot be other than it is.†16 But future contingent things do not have determinate truth, as the Philosopher shows.†17 Therefore the demons do not determinately know future events.

Response:

Future events can be known in two ways: in one way in themselves; in another way in their causes.

They can be known in themselves by no one except God. The reason for this is that future events, precisely as they are future, do not yet have being in themselves; but being and truth are convertible;†18 hence since all cognition is of something true, it is impossible that any cognition regarding future events in their condition as future know future events in themselves. Now since present, past, and future are differences of time designating the order of time, anything that in any manner whatsoever is in time is related to the future under the aspect of future. And therefore it is impossible that any cognition subject to the order of time know future events in themselves. But such is all creatures' knowledge, as will be confirmed later (in the Response). Therefore it is impossible for any creature to know future events in themselves; but this is proper to God alone Whose cognition is elevated above the whole order of time in such a way that no part of time is related to the divine operation under the aspect of past or future, but the whole course of time, and all those things that take place during the whole of time, are present and conformed to His sight, and His simple gaze embraces all things simultaneously, exactly as each is in its time. An appropriate likeness can be taken from the order pertaining to place: for the before and after in motion and in time correspond to the before and after in magnitude, as is said in Book IV of the Physics.†19 So accordingly God sees simultaneously all things as present which are related to one another according to the order of present, past, and future -- which is not possible for anyone whose view

falls under the order of time --, just as for instance he who is stationed in a high tower †20 sees simultaneously all those passing-by as present, not under the aspect of as preceding and following with respect to him from although he sees some preceding others; however anyone who is on the way itself in the ranks of those passing-by can only see those preceding or near him.

On the other hand, future things are in their causes in a threefold way: in one way only potentially, namely because it is equally possible for them to be or not to be: which are called contingent in respect to either;†21 but some are in their causes not only potentially but according to the nature of an active cause which cannot be impeded from producing its effect, and these are said to occur necessarily †22 other things are in their causes both potentially and according to an active cause which however can be impeded from producing its effect, and these are said to occur for the most part.†23 But since each thing is known according as it is actual and not according as it is in potency, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics,†24 it follows that those things that are related to either of two alternatives cannot be foreknown determinately in their causes but only under disjunction, namely that they will be or will not be; for only on this condition do they have truth. On the other hand, those things that are in their causes as proceeding from them necessarily can be known in their causes with certainty by man, and much more certainly by a demon or an angel, by whom the power of natural causes is better known than by men. And those things which occur for the most part can be known in their causes, not with complete certainty, but by a certain conjectural knowledge, more certainly however by the good or bad angels than by men.

However it should be noted that to know the future in its cause is nothing other than to know the present inclination of the cause to its effect. Hence strictly speaking this is not to know the future but the present. Therefore the cognition of future events belongs only to God, according to that text of Isaiah 41, 23 "Show us the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods."

Reply to 1. That argument is valid concerning future events as they are known in their causes.

Reply to 2. The demons sometimes foretell true things about the future and sometimes false things. Now they foretell true things foreknowing them either from a revelation of the good spirits derived from God or in their external causes whose power they know, or in their (the demon's) intention, as when they foretell those things they themselves are about to do. On the other hand, they sometimes foretell false things wishing to deceive men for, as we read in John 8, 44 "The devil is a liar and the father of lies"; sometimes indeed because they themselves are deceived, as when they are prevented by God from doing what they intended to do or when by divine power something occurs outside the normal course of natural causes, as Augustine says.†25

Reply to 3. The substance and the operation of the demon is indeed above time which is the number of the heaven's motion;†26 nevertheless time is connected with his operation inasmuch as he does not actually understand all things simultaneously. Which time is a kind of alternation or succession of his affections and conceptions of intelligible things. Hence Augustine says in Book VIII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis†27 that God moves the spiritual creature in time.

Reply to 4. The reasoning is different in regard to God, Who sees all time as present because His intellect is entirely free from time, and thus sees the future as existing; which cannot be said of the angel or the demon.

Reply to 5. Every intellect abstracts from the here and now in some manner, but the human intellect in a manner different from the angelic intellect. For the human intellect abstracts from the here and now both as to the things known, since it does not know singulars, which are subject to the here and now, and as to the intelligible species themselves, which are abstracted from their individuating conditions. On the other hand, intellect of the good or bad angel abstracts from the here and now as to the intelligible species themselves, which are immaterial and universal, but not as to the things known; for he knows through the intelligible species

by reason of their efficacy, not only universals but also the singulars; and therefore in the demon's cognition, knowing present things and knowing future things differ.

Reply to 6. Angels do not know singulars, when they become actual, through species newly acquired, but through the species that they already have, through which species however they did not know those things according as they were future. The reason for this is that all cognition takes place by a kind of assimilation of the knower and the thing known;^{†28} but the intelligible species that are in the angelic intellect, are directly likenesses corresponding to the natures of the species, through which however they can know singulars, but only inasmuch as the singulars participate in the nature of the species, which does not take place before the singulars actually exist; and therefore immediately when the singulars actually exist, they are known by the angels, just as happens conversely with us that the eye immediately when it receives the species or likeness of the stone knows the stone that exists beforehand; for the forms of the angelic intellect exist before the things in time, just as the forms of the things exist before our perceptions of them.

Reply to 7. To know singular temporal things as they are present is not beyond the power of the angelic intellect, but to know them inasmuch as they are future is beyond their power.

Reply to 8. As Dionysius says,^{†29} "There cannot be found a faithful" i.e. a perfect "likeness of the creature to God"; and therefore although the species that are in the angelic intellect may be similar in one way or another to the ideal exemplars in the divine intellect, nevertheless they cannot equal them, i.e. in such a way that they embrace or comprise all the things that the ideal exemplars comprise. Hence although the ideal exemplars in the divine intellect, which are utterly above time, refer without distinction to present, past and future, it does not follow that the same is true of the species in the angelic intellect.

Reply to 9. The forms that are in things, originating from the divine mind, always remain the same as to the nature of the species but not as to the participation of the individuals in the nature of the species, for the form of the species is participated in by some individuals at one time but by others at other times. And so also the species in the angelic intellect always remain the same in themselves, but by reason of the change of the individuals occurring in nature it sometimes happens that they are included or comprised in the species existing in the angelic intellect, and sometimes not.

Reply to 10. What the demons know from some revelation of the celestial spirits, exceeds their natural power; but what they know by reason of the subtlety of their nature pertains to their natural cognition, by which they can foreknow effects in their natural causes; but concerning human acts deriving from free will, the demons can know many things from experience, which cannot be foreknown from natural causes.

Reply to 11. Those things that are future have indeed preceded in past ages according to some likeness, not however in all respects, but it may happen that one future effect is similar to diverse past effects in different respects. Yet on account of the change of matter from one form to another, the knowledge that derives from similarities in contingent things does not have certitude, but rather is conjectural knowledge.

Reply to 12. Experience arises from sensation inasmuch as the sense is cognizant of a thing that is present; and according to this, experience is ascribed to the demons, not because they perceive anything by the senses, but because they know a thing when it becomes present that they had not known before, in the manner already explained (in Reply to 6).

Reply to 13. That the demon does not know that which future, is not because his intellect is in potency, but because the future singular does not yet participate in the form of the species the likeness of which actually pre-exists in the demon's intellect.

Reply to 14. Those who hold that all things come about necessarily proceeded in four ways. One of which was the way of the Stoics ^{†30} who imposed necessity on future events because of a determinate series of

interconnected causes which they called fate; and the argument in that objection tends to this opinion. But Aristotle refutes this argument in Book VI of the *Metaphysics*,†31 saying that if two suppositions are granted, namely that everything that happens has a cause, and that given the cause the effect necessarily ensues, it follows that everything happens necessarily: for to reduce every future effect to some cause either present or past as being that from which it comes about or came about, it will follow necessarily that the effect ensues or ensued. For instance, this person will be killed if he goes out of his house at night; but he will go out if he wants a drink, which he will want if he is thirsty, and this will happen if he eats salty food, which perhaps he had eaten or is eating; hence it follows necessarily that he will be killed. But both of the foresaid suppositions are false. For it is false that when the cause is given, even if it is of itself sufficient that the effect necessarily follows, for it can be impeded, for instance, a fire from burning wood by throwing water on it. Similarly it is not even true that everything that happens has a cause. For some things happen accidentally, but what is accidental does not have a cause because strictly speaking it is akin to non-being, as Plato said.†32 Hence that this man digs a grave has a cause, and again that a treasure is found in a certain place †33 has a cause, but this concurrence or coincidence, which is accidental, namely this man wanting to dig a grave in the place where a treasure is buried, does not have a cause because it [the coincidence of the two] is accidental.

Reply to 15. Some philosophers †34 wanted to impose necessity on future events because of divine providence, to which they assigned fate; and the argument in the present objection seems to tend to this: for Augustine says that nothing in this world happens at random i.e. without reason, because all things are subject to divine providence. But this does not do away with the contingency of future events, either on account of the certitude of divine cognition or on account of the efficacy of the divine will. And in regard to knowledge this is clear from what was said above (in the Reply to 14): for just as divine knowledge is in relation to future contingent events, so our eye is in relation to contingent things that occur here and now, as was said (in the Response); hence just as we most certainly see Socrates sitting while he is sitting, but nonetheless it does not follow from this that his sitting is absolutely necessary,†35 so also from the fact that God sees in themselves all the things that take place, the contingency of things is not done away with. And as regards the will we must take into account that the divine will is universally the cause of being and universally of all the things that follow on this, hence even of necessity and contingency; but His will itself is above the order of the necessary or contingent just as it is above all created being. And therefore necessity and contingency in things are distinguished not in relation to the divine will, which is a universal cause but in relation to created causes which the divine will has ordered proportionately to the effects, namely in such a way that the causes of necessary effects are unchangeable, and of contingent effects changeable.

Reply to 16. Some †36 have attempted to impose necessity on future events on account of the power of the heavenly bodies, on which they based fate; and the argument in that objection proceeds in this way. But it fails, first inasmuch as not all the principles of future events are subject to the power of the heavenly bodies: for the intellect, and consequently the will which is in the reason, are not powers of any corporeal organ,†37 and therefore are not directly subject to the action of any corporeal or physical power. It fails also in regard to purely physical effects. For the power of a heavenly body is a natural power, and nature always tends to one;†38 but that which is accidental is not really one, as is said in Book V of the *Metaphysics*†39 hence what is accidental can indeed sometimes be reduced i.e. referred to some intellectual cause which can take as one that which is accidental, but not to a natural cause. Now clearly many things happen accidentally so far as concerns purely physical effects, for instance that lightning strike in a wooded area where there are many trees that are set on fire and burn up the whole forest; hence not all purely physical effects can be reduced to the power of a heavenly body as to a cause. And on account of this not all physical effects of the heavenly bodies come to pass necessarily since they can be impeded accidentally; as is said in the book *On Sleep and Wakefulness*,†40 that many events in regard to atmospheric disturbances the signs of which preceded in the heavenly bodies do not take place.

Reply to 17. Reason and will are indeed roused to act by something external that induces a passion in the body or in the sense powers, but it remains within the power of the reason and will to act or not to act according to the movement of such passions.

Reply to 18. That argument touches on a fourth way in which some †41 wished to impose necessity on human acts. But to refute this we must take into account that the will is moved by the good just as the intellect is by the true. Now the intellect necessarily assents to first principles, which are self-evident,†42 and to all those truths which it considers to be necessary conclusions drawn from these principles, since without these principles the conclusions cannot be true. And in like manner the will necessarily desires the ultimate end, which is desired for its own sake -- for all men necessarily desire to be happy --;†43 and likewise the will necessarily desires those things without which it considers happiness is not possible. But the will does not necessarily assent to other things worthy of choice that can be considered either as pertaining to happiness as having some aspect of good or as tending to impede it, in such a way however that without them happiness can be attained, so neither does the intellect assent to opinions †44 that are generally accepted [i.e. by the majority or by the philosophers], the rejection of which it sees is compatible with the stability of the self-evident principles.

Question XVI, Article 8 †p

Whether the Demons Know the Cogitations of Our Hearts?†1

It seems that they do, for the following reasons.

1. Gregory says †2"As long as we are in this life our hearts cannot be seen by one another because they are enclosed not in vessels of glass but of clay." But the grossness of vessels of clay cannot impede intellectual vision such as the demon's possess. Therefore the demons know the cogitations of our hearts.

2. Just as bodily vision is related to bodily form, so spiritual vision is related to spiritual form; but bodily sense vision can see the bodily form in the thing sensed; therefore the spiritual vision of the demon can see the spiritual form existing in our soul. But the cogitations of the heart are formed according to that spiritual form. Therefore the demon can know the cogitations of the human heart.

3. But it was argued that the demon can know those cogitations in which we use images but not those that consist in pure contemplation. But counter to this: the Philosopher says †3 that the soul never understands without an image; a sign of which is that when the organ of imagination is damaged all intellectual activity is impeded. If then the demons know those cogitations of ours in which we use images, it follows that they know all our cogitations.

4. But it was argued that the statement of the Philosopher is taken to be about those things that we know naturally, but not about those that are divinely revealed to us. But this is contrary to what Dionysius says in chapter one of The Celestial Hierarchy,†4 that "It is impossible that the divine ray shine upon us other than enveloped in a variety of sacred veils." And he calls †5 the sacred veils likenesses of things perceived by the senses. Therefore even in those things that are divinely revealed to us we need imaged likenesses of things perceptible to the senses; and consequently the demon can see all our cogitations.

5. Our intellect knows better those things that are less intelligible according to their nature, because it derives cognition from the senses †6 which has no place in the demons, and therefore they know better those things that are more knowable in themselves. But the species existing in our intellect are actually intelligible and consequently more knowable in themselves than the forms existing in natural things, which are potentially intelligible. Since then the demon by his intellect knows the forms existing in material things, much more can he know the intelligible species in our intellect according to which cogitations are formed. Therefore the demon can see our cogitations.

6. That on account of which something is such, is itself even more such.†7 But our intellect itself is intelligible on account of the intelligible species existing in it, as is clear from the Philosopher in Book III On

the Soul.†8 Therefore since the demon knows the very substance of our intellect, much more does he know the intelligible species existing in it.

7. The demon knows our souls better than we ourselves do. But cogitations are in the soul. Therefore he also knows our cogitations better than we do.

8. The demon knows effects in their causes, as was said above (in q. 16, a. 7). But he knows our soul, both its powers and its habits which are the causes of cogitations. Therefore he knows our cogitations.

9. No one can truly divulge what he does not know. But as Augustine says,†9 "It is evident from the most indubitable signs that the men's cogitations have been divulged by the demons." Therefore the demons know our cogitations.

10. All cognition takes place by assimilation of the knower to the thing known.†10 But men by their sinful cogitations are assimilated to the demons. Therefore the demons can know such cogitations.

11. The interior word of the heart is more like the demon, who is a spiritual substance, than the exterior word which is an articulate sound made by the body.†11 But the demon knows the exterior word of man that is uttered orally. Therefore much more does he know the interior word that pertains to cogitation, as is clear from Augustine in Book XIV On the Trinity.†12

12. Act is more knowable than habit. But the demon knows what is in man's habitual memory; which is clear from what Augustine says in Book XVIII On the City of God†13 namely that a certain philosopher in a dream of his, appearing to a person sleeping solved a question for him about which he was in doubt; which seems to have been effected by the demons. Therefore it seems that much more can the demon know men's actual cogitations.

13. The more exalted the cognitive power, the more powerful it is in its operations.†14 But the demon's cognitive power is higher than the cognitive power of man. Since then a man can know the cogitations of another man by certain bodily signs, according to Ecclesiasticus (19, 26) "A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance," it seems to follow that the demons even see men's interior cogitations themselves.

14. If the demons did not see those cogitations themselves but only through bodily signs, they would not know them at all: because the same bodily sign can indicate various things; for example, a flushed countenance can come from an internal passion of anger or even of shame. But it is certain that the demons know men's cogitations to some measure, as is clear from Augustine in Book XII of the Literal Commentary on Genesis†15 and in the book On the Divination of Demons†16 and in the Retractations.†17 Therefore they know the cogitations themselves.

15. Bodily signs are perceptible by the senses. But according to Dionysius in chapter seven On the Divine Names,†18 the demons do not know intelligible truth from sense perceptions. Therefore the demons do not know cogitations from bodily signs but know the very cogitations themselves.

16. But it was argued that the demon cannot know the interior cogitations themselves because the will has the power to hide them. But counter to this: the will does not hide them by totally removing them because thus nothing would be thought; nor again by carrying on its cogitations at a distance, because physical distance does not impede an angel's cognition; nor even by interposing something else since nothing that is in the soul is hidden from the demon. Therefore in no way can the will hide its cogitations from the demon.

17. As Augustine says in Book II of the Literal Commentary on Genesis,†19 the angels through the species they received at the moment of their creation know all those things that are below them. But our

cogitations are below them, because the soul is lower in the order of nature than the angel. Therefore the demons can know men's cogitations through those innate species.

On the contrary:

1. It is said in Jeremias (17, 9-10)†20 "The heart of man is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart and prove the reins." Therefore it belongs to God alone to know men's cogitations; consequently the demons do not know them.

2. The Apostle says in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (2, 11)†21 "Who among men knows the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him?" But cogitations are inmost to man. Therefore the demons cannot know a man's cogitations, but only the man himself.

3. It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus†22 "We are certain that the devil does not see the inner cogitations of the soul."

Response:

As Augustine says in Book XII of the Literal Commentary on Genesis†23 and in the book On the Divination of Demons†24 it is evident from indubitable signs that the demons know men's cogitations in some measure. Which (cogitations) can be known in two ways: in one way as they are seen in themselves, as a man knows his own cogitations, in another way through bodily signs.

This is especially evident when a man is incited to some passion on account of his inward cogitations. Which if it is vehement, some sign will be given even in his outward appearance which can be grasped even by the dull-witted, for instance "those who are afraid turn pale, and those who are ashamed blush," as the Philosopher says in Book IV of the Ethics †25 but even if the passion is milder, it can be detected by skilled doctors from a change in the heartbeat which is discerned from the pulse. But the demon can know such external and internal bodily signs much better than man, and therefore it is certain that the demons can know some of man's cogitations, in the foresaid way. Hence Augustine says in the book On the Divination of Demons†26 "Sometimes with the greatest ease the demons learn men's dispositions not only when expressed in speech but even when conceived in thought, when the soul manifests them by certain bodily signs."

But whether in this way the demons can see men's cogitations themselves, Augustine leaves in doubt in the Retractations,†27 saying "It is evident that these things come to the knowledge of the demons owing to their considerable experience; but it can be either most difficult or completely impossible for men to find out whether certain sensible signs, perceptible to the demons but hidden from us, are furnished by the body of persons cogitating, or whether they know these things by another spiritual power."

Therefore to investigate this difficulty we need to consider that in cogitation two things must to be taken into account, namely the species itself, and the use of the species, i.e. the thinking or cogitating: for just as in God alone form and being itself do not differ, so in Him alone the species thought and the actual thinking, which is the being of the one thinking, do not differ.

Now in regard to intelligible species it must be noted that every intellect is related in one way to the intelligible species of a higher intellect and in another way to the intelligible species of a lower intellect. For the intelligible species of a higher intellect are more universal, and therefore cannot be comprehended by the intelligible species of a lower intellect; and consequently the lower intellect cannot know them perfectly, but it can know perfectly those that are in a lower intellect as so to speak more particular, and can judge of them according to its own more universal species. And accordingly, since the angelic intellect is higher in the order of nature than our intellect, the good or bad angels can know the species existing in the soul.

But so far as concerns use, it must be noted that the use of intelligible species, i.e. actual cogitation, depends on the will; for we use the species habitually existing in us when we will; hence the Commentator says †28 that a habit is that which a person uses at will. But the movement of the human will depends on the highest order of things, i.e. the highest good, which also is taken to be the highest cause according to Plato and Aristotle: †29 for the will does not have as its proper object some particular good but the universal good, whose root or source is the highest good. But that which falls under the order of a higher cause, the lower cause cannot know but only the higher moving cause and he who is moved (by the higher cause); for example, if a citizen is under an administrative official as under a lower cause and under the king as under the highest cause, the administrative official will not be able to know in the case of the citizen whether the king has directly ordered something concerning the citizen, but this only the king will know, and the citizen who is moved in accordance with the order of the king. Hence since the will cannot be moved internally by anyone else except God Himself to Whose ordering the movement of the will, and consequently of voluntary cogitation, is directly subject, it can be known neither by the demons, nor by anyone else except by God Himself, and by the man who wills and cogitates.

Reply to 1. Man is prevented from knowing cogitations, not only by the very nature of cogitations, as are the demons, but also by the very grossness of clay bodies which the bodily senses, on which our cogitation depends, cannot penetrate; and Gregory is speaking in reference to this.

Reply to 2. Just as bodily vision cannot know every bodily form, but only that proportioned to it -- for the bat cannot see the light of the sun --, †30 so also spiritual vision cannot see every spiritual species, but only that proportioned to it. But the spiritual vision of the angel good or bad can see the spiritual forms of our intellect; nevertheless they do not on account this see how we use them in cogitating.

Reply to 3. As long as we are in this life an image is always necessary for us in using knowledge, no matter how spiritual the knowledge is: because even God is known by us through an image of His effect, inasmuch as we know Him by way of negation or by way of causality or by way of excellence, as Dionysius says. †31 Yet it certainly is not the case that all knowledge in us is caused by images: for some knowledge is caused in us by revelation.

Reply to 4. The answer to the fourth argument, which is valid concerning the use of knowledge, is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to 5. That argument shows that the demon knows the intelligible form in our intellect; nevertheless it does not follow from this that he knows our cogitations, for the reason already given (in the Response).

Reply to 6. A similar answer is to be given to the sixth argument. Although it can be said in reply to this that the intellect is intelligible to us ourselves through an intelligible species, namely inasmuch as we know the act through the object, of which the intelligible form is a likeness, and we know the power or faculty through the act; but this certainly is not true so far as concerns the intellect of the good or bad angel.

Reply to 7. There is a twofold cognition of the soul: one by which we know of the soul what it is, by distinguishing it from all other things; and as to this the demon who intuits the soul itself, knows it better than man who investigates its nature through its acts. The other cognition of the soul is that by which we know of the soul that it is, †32 and in this way man knows the soul by perceiving that it exists from its acts which he experiences. And to this mode of knowing pertains that cognition by which we are aware of ourselves cogitating about something; however the demon knows better than man what the nature of human cogitation is.

Reply to 8. Although the demon knows some causes of cogitations, nevertheless he does not know all the causes of it: because he does not know the movement of the will, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 9. Demons divulge the cogitations of men inasmuch as they know them through certain bodily signs, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 10. Cognition takes place by assimilation,^{†33} not indeed by natural assimilation but by intentional assimilation. For the stone itself is not in the soul as though through it we know the exterior stone as Empedocles held,^{†34} but rather the species of the stone is in the soul.

Reply to 11. A similar answer is to be given to the eleventh argument.

Reply to 12. A habit of the soul is a kind of quality giving it form, and therefore the demon can know the soul's habit better than its cogitations, which are subject to the will. Nevertheless it cannot be inferred from that occurrence (recounted by Augustine) that the demon knows certain things that are in man's memory: for it could be that the demon satisfied the doubter in accord with the things he himself knew, not from this that he (the demon) was aware that the philosopher knew them; or the demon could have known this through some outward signs; or it could be that this was done by some good angel.

Reply to 13. The demon knows cogitations better than the soul of another man does, not because the demon sees the cogitations themselves, but because he sees them through more hidden external signs.

Reply to 14. In general the same bodily sign can correspond to various effects; but nevertheless there are some differences in particular which the demon can perceive better than man.

Reply to 15. The angel does not derive intelligible truth which he knows naturally, from things perceptible to the senses; however he can form a conclusion about something supernatural from some effect perceptible to the senses, for example, that man is God from the raising of the dead, not because he receives intelligible species from sensible things, but because in perceiving sensible effects through the innate species he possesses, he surmises certain things that exceed his natural cognition.

Reply to 16. In none of those ways does the will conceal a man's cogitations, but it is said to conceal them because from the very fact that they originate from the will they are hidden.

Reply to 17. Augustine intends to speak of lower natures, which the angels know naturally through innate forms, but not of voluntary cogitations.

Question XVI, Article 9 †p

Whether Demons Can Transform Bodies by Changing Their Form?

It seems that they can, for the following reasons.

1. Augustine says in the book *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*^{†1} "Not unreasonably we believe that all the things which visibly take place, can be done by the lower powers of this atmosphere."^{†2} But changes of form in the lower bodies takes place visibly, sometimes naturally, sometimes miraculously. Therefore these changes can be done by the demons, who are called the lower powers of this atmosphere.

2. But it was argued that the demons make changes of this kind, not by their own power but by the power of certain naturally active causes. But counter to this: if the demons could transform natural bodies only by the power of naturally active causes, they could not make transformations other than those that could be made by the power of natural agents. But the body of a man cannot be transformed into the body of a beast by the power of natural agents; yet the demons can do this; for Augustine relates ^{†3} that by the art of magic Circe

changed the companions of Ulysses into beasts; and the Arcadians when they were swimming across a pond, were changed into wolves, and that women inn-keepers changed men into beasts of burden. Therefore demons cannot change bodies from one form to another by the power of natural causes alone.

3. On that Psalm 77, 49 "And he sent upon them the wrath of his indignation . . . which he sent by evil angels," the Gloss says †4 that God punishes through the agency of the evil angels. But sometimes such punishments are made by the transformation of human bodies, as we read in Genesis (19, 26) that Lot's wife was turned into a pillar of salt; and the companions of Diomedes are said to have been changed into birds, as Augustine relates in Book XVIII On the City of God.†5 Therefore it seems that the demons can transform bodies by changing their form.

4. The more a thing is in act the more efficacious it is in operating, because every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act;†6 and because fire (more than all the other elements) is most akin to form,†7 it has the greatest power of all the lower bodies in operating. But since the demon is a spiritual substance, he is more akin to form than any body and is more in act, therefore he is more efficacious in operating than any body. If then bodies can be changed in form by the power of certain bodies, much more can this be done by the power of the demons.

5. That which partakes of some form is deficient at times in achieving the action of that form because it does not receive that form completely. If then there were some form separated from matter, it would partake of the total action of the form. But since demons are affirmed to be spiritual and immaterial substances, it follows that they are kinds of forms separated from matter. Therefore they have the power to produce the total action of the form, and so, it seems, they can change bodies from one form to another.

6. Dionysius says †8 "The rivers of fire signify 'thearticos'" i.e. divine "harvests, that provide for them plentiful and unfailing abundance, and that nourish the life-giving generative power." But generation is a change according to form.†9 Therefore good angels can transform bodies by changing their form; with equal reason then the demons, who are of the same nature.

7. The heavenly bodies are moved by God through the ministry of the angels;†10 and the angels act by intellect and will; but the will is capable of diverse effects,†11 therefore angels can move the heavenly bodies in diverse ways. But when the movement of the heavenly bodies varies, the changes of form of the lower bodies that depend on the movement of the heavenly bodies, are varied. Therefore it seems that angels can at will transform the lower bodies by changing their form: with equal reason then the demons who are of the same nature.

8. It is said in the book On Causes†12 that the power of an intelligence is infinite in relation to what is below although it is finite in relation to what is above; but all bodies are below an intelligence; therefore by the infinity of its power an intelligence can change lower bodies in whatever way it wills. But angels either good or bad are called intelligences.†13 Therefore demons can transform bodies by changing their form.

9. Augustine says Book III On the Trinity that fire and air and other bodies of this kind are subject to the demons to the extent permitted them by God.†14 But fire and water and other such bodies are subject to change of form. Therefore the demons can transform such bodies by changing their form.

10. Whoever induces a form, causes a change of form. But demons can induce not only accidental but also substantial forms: for Pharaoh's magicians †15 by the power of the demons produced frogs. Therefore it seems that demons can transform bodies by changing their form.

11. Augustine says in the book On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions†16 that the magicians performed miracles through private pacts with the demons. But in miracles bodies are transformed. Therefore it seems that demons can transform bodies.

12. Gregory says †17 that it pertains to the angels belonging to the order of the Virtues to perform miracles in which, as was said (in arg. 11), bodies are transformed. But demons have the same nature as angels. Therefore it seems that demons also can transform bodies by changing their form.

13. The demon has more power than man's soul. But by virtue of the soul's apprehension corporeal matter is changed in form, as is evident in bewitchment according to Avicenna.†18 Therefore much more can the demon change corporeal matter by changing its form.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says in Book XVIII On the City of God†19 "I cannot by any means believe that even the body, much less the soul, can really be changed into the body and features of a beast by the art or power of the demons." But man's body is no less passive than other bodies. Therefore it seems that neither can other bodies be changed in form by the art or power of the demons.

2. The philosopher proves in Book VII of the Metaphysics†20 that the generation, that is, the coming-to-be of forms in matter is not from immaterial i.e. separated forms but from forms that exist in matter: on which text the Commentator says †21 that immaterial substances cannot change matter in respect to form. But demons are immaterial substances. Therefore it seems that they cannot transform material bodies by changing their form.

Response:

As the Apostle says in Romans 13, 1 " . . . those (powers) that are higher, are ordained by God";†22 hence the good of the universe is the good of order as Augustine says in the Enchiridion†23 and the Philosopher in Book XI of the Metaphysics.†24 And to this order all creatures are subject, since they are produced by God; and God Himself Who is the cause of this order, presides over it, but is not subject to it. And since each thing has an operation proper to it as determined by its form, this order of things is considered not only according to the excellence of the forms, but consequently according to their operations and movements, namely inasmuch as that which has a higher form, also has a higher operation. And hence it is that according to Dionysius in Book II of the Celestial Hierarchy†25 the lowest are moved by the highest through those in the middle; which Augustine too says in Book III On the Trinity.†26

And this is in keeping with the proportion that is required between the agent and the patient i.e. the one acted upon. For although the highest of beings possesses the most universal powers,†27 the lowest passive beings are not proportioned to receive a universal effect directly, but through intermediate powers more particular and more restricted, as is apparent even in the very order of corporeal things: for the heavenly bodies are principles of the generation of human beings and of other perfect animals by means of a particular power residing in the semen; although certain animals are generated from putrefaction through the power of the heavenly bodies alone, without semen. Which comes to pass by reason of their imperfection.†28 For it is evident to our senses that a weak effect is produced by a distant agent but a powerful effect requires an agent near at hand; for a thing can be warmed by a fire even if distant from it, but it cannot be ignited unless it comes in contact with the fire; hence he who wishes to ignite a thing distant from a fire in a kindled furnace does so by means of a candle. And in like manner the generation of perfect animals is caused by the heavenly bodies through intermediate, proper active principles; but the generation of imperfect animals is caused directly [i.e. without intermediate principles].

But spiritual substances are higher in the order of nature than even those heavenly bodies; hence by their own power they (spiritual substances) cannot change lower bodies as to their form except by using certain corporeal active causes proportionate to the effects they (the spiritual substances) intend, as for instance man can produce warmth by means of fire.

Reply to 1. All the things that visibly take place in this world can be done by the demons, not solely by their own power, but by means of natural active causes, as was said (in the Response).

Reply to 2. The demon uses a natural active cause as an instrument to produce an effect, but an instrument acts not by its own power alone, but also by virtue of the principal agent; and therefore something can be done by an instrument that exceeds the power of the instrument considered in itself, as a bed is fashioned with a saw by the power of art. And in like manner the demons can do certain things beyond the power of the natural agents by means of the natural active causes that they use to produce the effects; however they cannot change the distinctive features of the human body into those of a beast according to the truth of the matter, because this is contrary to the order of nature implanted by God. But in fact all the foresaid transformations were made according to imaginary appearance rather than in reality, as Augustine makes clear in the work cited.†29

Reply to 3. God does not always punish through the agency of bad angels but sometimes even through the agency of good angels, as is clear in the case of the angel who smote the camp of the Assyrians, as is related in Isaiah 37, 36. If however that change of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt was accomplished through the agency of the demons, it is clear that in that operation the demon was an instrument of divine power; hence the demon produced such an effect not by his own power but by divine power, which is not subject to the order of things but can at will directly produce any effect whatsoever, the highest or the lowest. But in regard to the companions of Diomede Augustine says †30 that they were not changed into birds, but when the men had drowned, the demons brought in birds from elsewhere and substituted them for the men, by which for a long time men were deluded,†31 when some of those birds were succeeded by others (so that the same number would be kept); from which we are given to understand that this was not just a case of imaginary appearance.

Reply to 4. From the very fact that a spiritual substance is more in act than a body it follows that it possesses a higher and more universal power; hence it cannot produce the lowest effects except through intermediate lower causes.

Reply to 5. The separated form which is pure act, namely God, is not confined within the limits of any species or genus, but without limitation possesses the whole power of being, as being subsistent being itself, as is clear from Dionysius;†32 and therefore every action is subject to His power. But other separated forms have a determinate specific nature; hence not any whatever separated form can produce any whatever effect but each that which is proper to its nature without any impediment of material defect. For example, if heat were a separated form, it would not encounter an impediment in making things hot on account of the defect of matter that does not fully absorb heat, as in the case of those things which are slow to heat; nevertheless heat [as a separated form] could not produce the effect proper to whiteness or of another form.

Reply to 6. The life-giving generative power of which Dionysius speaks can also be referred to intellectual generation, as he himself says in chapter two On the Divine Names†33 they are called fathers of others,†34 whom they purify, enlighten, and perfect.†35 If however the life-giving generative power is referred to corporeal generation, it should be understood that the power is given to them (the angels) to bring about generation by intermediate corporeal agents.

Reply to 7. That argument errs on three counts: first, because even if the angels move the heavens, nevertheless the demons, of whom we are now speaking, do not. Secondly, because even if the angels move the heavenly bodies by intellect and will, nevertheless it does not follow that they can move them in another manner than according to the mode proportionate to their nature: for the angel is not his will as God is, but has a will in a determinate nature, and the will obtains its effect according to the mode of its nature; on the other hand, God Who is His will, can without restriction do all that can fall under His will. Thirdly, granted that the angels moved the heavenly bodies in another way and by reason of this some transformation in the lower bodies followed, this would not be done by them directly i.e. without an intermediary, but by intermediate heavenly

bodies.

Reply to 8. The power of an intelligence is said to be infinite in respect to what is below inasmuch as it cannot be comprehended by the lower but exceeds them; but not in such a way that the power of an intelligence can indiscriminately produce any whatsoever effect in them.

Reply to 9. Fire and air and other such bodies are subject to the angels according to the order established by God.

Reply to 10. Pharaoh's magicians produced frogs by making use of certain natural active causes, which Augustine calls seeds,^{†36} a name taken from the hidden origins of the elements.

Reply to 11. The signs or miracles that the magicians produced by private pacts with the demons are not beyond the order of natural causes as are those that are done by divine power; but they are brought about by the power of natural active principles that exceed man's comprehension and the range of his power. And this for three reasons: first, because the demons know the power of natural active causes better than men; secondly, because they can assemble them more quickly; thirdly, because the natural active causes which they employ as instruments can be extended to greater effects by the power or art of the demons than by the power or art of men. And so those things done by demons seem like miracles to men, just as feats done by dexterous jugglers seem like miracles to inexperienced men.

Reply to 12. The angels belonging to the order of the Virtues perform miracles acting as instruments of divine power.

Reply to 13. In bewitchment by the demons, corporeal matter is not changed by the force of the apprehension alone, as Avicenna claimed, but from this that on account of a malevolent passion of envy or of wrath i.e. hatred such as often occurs in witches, the corporeal spirits of the body united to that soul are infected, and this infection extends even to the eyes, from which the surrounding air is infected, and from this the body of an infant on account of its tenderness contracts some infection,^{†37} after the manner in which surface of a new (highly polished bronze) mirror is tarnished if a woman during her menstrual period chances to look into it, as is said in the book *On Sleep and Sleeplessness*.^{†38}

Footnotes and Parallel Readings

Footnotes to Question I, Article 1

^{†p} Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 34, a. 2; *Cont. Gent.* III, c. 7, 8 and 9; *Ia*, q. 48, a. 1; In *Dionys. De Div. Nom.* cap. 4, lect. 14; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 115.

^{†1}. An *malum sit aliquid*? (Whether evil is something?). After much consideration it was decided to translate this question literally. Although the question so translated may seem vague, ambiguous, and indeed so general as to be incomprehensible, the literal wording seemed to accommodate the varying nuances of the meaning as they occur throughout the text of the question better than any other rendering. The import of the question is this: Is evil some thing, is evil numbered among the things that are? The reality of evil is not being raised; is evil a thing or in a thing is the question at issue?

^{†2}. contraries . . . same genus: cf. *Arist. Metaph.* X, 8 (1058a10-11); *Topics* IV, c. 3 (123b5).

^{†3}. evil abstractly . . . evil concretely: division of evil according to Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 34, a. 2, q. 3; cf. Thomas, *Super Sent.* II, d. 34, a. 2.

†4. evil . . . and vice: cf. Arist. Categories ch. 11 (14a25).

†5. according to . . . quality: cf. Arist. Categories ch. 10 (11b17ff.); Metaph. V, 10 (1018a21) and X, 4 (1055a33).

†6. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732D; Dion. 307); [transl. by Colm Luibheid Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987)].

†7. Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, II, c. 4 (PG 94, 876A; Bt 75).

†8. Arist. On the Soul II, 7 (418b18).

†9. Furthermore . . . : almost the same objection is found in Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 13, c. 5, in Summa fr. Alexandri [i.e. Summa of Alexander of Hales] I-II, n. 263 (p. 323) and in Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 13 dubium 2. [None of these works have been translated into English.]

†10. August. On the Morals of the Catholic Church II, c. 7 (PL 32, 1349); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. IV].

†11. Between . . . admitting of them: Arist. Categories ch. 10 (12b26-32).

†12. Arist. Categories ch. 10 (12a16-18).

†13. but as contraries: cf. Arist. Categories ch. 10 (13b20), Metaph. V, 10 (1018a20) and X, 4 (1055a33).

†14. Moreover . . . : Almost the same argument is found in Guill. Altiss., Summa Aurea II, tr. 13, c. 2. arg. 3 (f 67 rb), and in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 1 (P. 2).

†15. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 20 (PG 3, 717B; Dion. 243).

†16. nothing acts . . . is something: cf. Arist. Phys. III, 2 (202a9-11); Averroes, In Phys. III, comm. 17 (IV, 92D), In De Anima III, comm. 4 (VI, 137F: Crawford 384).

†17. Furthermore . . . : Thomas has almost the same argument in Cont. Gent. III, c. 5 arg. 3 in the Leonine edition.

†18. Arist. Phys. V, 1 (225a12-20).

†19. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 20 (PG 3, 717B; Dion. 243).

†20. Cf. Arist. Topics IV, c. 6 (128b9).

†21. Arist. Categories ch. 11 (14a23-24).

†22. constitutive difference: cf. Porphyry, Isagoge De differentia (Minio-Paluello 16) and Peter of Spain Summulae Logicales tr. 2, n. 13 (De Rijk 21). [Both of these works have been translated into English, cf. Appendix for translations].

†23. Arist. Metaph. III, 3 (998b22-26).

†24. Besides . . . : nearly the same argument if found in Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 34, a. 2, q. 3 sed contra 4.

†25. August. Enchiridion ch. 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53 as cited in Ia, q. 48, a. 1 arg. 5; [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. III and in the Fathers of the Church Vol. 4].

†26. opposites . . . stand out more clearly: cf. Arist. Rhetoric III, 17 (1418b3-4) according to the transl. of Hermann Alemanni (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 16673 f. 145 ra).

†27. Arist. Phys. V, 1 (1225a2-5).

†28. Moreover . . . : this argument seems to be taken from Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 20 (PG 3, 721B; Dion. 243).

†29. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I, 3 (318a25ff).

†30. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 20 (PG 717B; Dion. 243).

†31. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†32. sheep . . . absence: example of Avicenna e.g. De Anima I, c. 5 (f. 5 ra C; Van Riet 86); IV, c. 1 (f. 17 va B; Van Riet 7) and c. 3 (f. 19 rb A; Van Riet 38).

†33. Punishment . . . good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will ch. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1296; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 132).

†34. divided . . . and fault: cf. August. (pseudo), De Fide ad Petrum cap. 21, n. 64 (PL 40, 773) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 700A; CCL 91A, 751). See below q. 1, a. 4 On the contrary.

†35. Arist. Metaph. VI, 4 (1027b25-27).

†36. August. The City of God XI, c. 9 (PL 41, 325; CCL 48, 330; CSEL 40-1, 525).

†37. August. Tractates or Homilies on The Gospel of St. John tract. I, n. 13 (PL 35, 1385; CCL 36, 7) and Glossa Ordin. on John I, 3; [transl. of Augustine's work in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VII and in The Fathers of the Church Vols. 78 and 79.].

†38. We have not found this in the Glossa. See rather August. The Gospel of St. John tract. I, c. 1, n. 13 (PL 35, 1385; CCL 36, 7).

†39. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†40. every agent . . . end: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 5 (196b21-22) as cited e.g. I-IIae, q. 1, a. 2 On the contrary.

†41. In agent causes . . . infinite regression: cf. Arist, Metaph. II, 2 (994a1 ff.) as cited e.g. Ia, q. 46, a. 2 arg. 7.

†42. first mover . . . unmoved: cf. Arist. Phys. VIII, 6 (258b11-16) according to Thomas In Phys. III, lect. 2, n. 6; cf. also Metaph. XII, 7 (1072a24-28); [transl. of Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle's Physics by R. J. Blackwell et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963)].

†43. each thing . . . all its might: cf. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy III, pr. 11 (PL 63, 774B; CCL 94, 58; CSEL 67, 71) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 21, a. 2.

†44. equilibrium of humors: cf. Averroes, In Metaph. V, comm. 25 (VIII, 133H) and Maimonides, Dux Neutr. III, c. 11 (Justiniani, f. 75v); [Maimonides' work has been transl. under the title Guide for the Perplexed by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)].

†45. Simplicius, In Praedic. Arist. , c. 11 (Kalbfleisch p. 417, 8 ff; Pattin II, 572).

†46. contraries . . . genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 8 (1058a10-11); Topics IV, c. 3 (123b4).

†47. every . . . the object: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415a18-20) as is said e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 48, a. 2 arg. 2.

†48. privation . . . a contrary: cf. Arist. Phys. V, 1 (225b2-3), Metaph. XI, 11 (1068a5-6).

†49. first . . . the form: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 6 (1055a33) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 48, a. 1, Reply to 1.

†50. Simplicius, In Praedic Arist. c. 11 (Kalbfleish p. 386, 24-26; Pattin II, 527).

†51. evil . . . dis-acting (deagendo): this response seems to be taken from Guill. Altiss., Summa Aurea II, tr. 13, c. 2 ad 2 (f. 67rb).

†52. by reason of a deficiency . . . a monstrosity: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 14 (199b2-5) [according to that passage in Averroes In Phys. II, comm. 82 (IV, 80B)] as referred to below in q. 16, a. 6 in the Response.

†53. whatever . . . of the leg bone: example of August. On Man's Perfection in Justice ch. 2 (PL 44, 294; CSEL 42, 5) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 24, a. 13 arg. 4; [transl. of Augustine's work under the title Man's Perfection in Righteousness in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. V].

†54. Simplicius, In Praed. Arist. (Kalbfleisch p. 214, 26ff.; Pattin II, 569).

†55. Porphyry: according to Simplicius In Praed. Arist. (Kalbfleisch p. 414; Pattin II, 569).

†56. Aristotle: cf. Categories ch. 11 (14a19-25).

†57. second member: cf. Arist. Categories ch. 11 (14a20).

†58. Iamblicus: as reported by Simplicius In Praed. Arist. (Kalbfleisch p. 415, 20-34; Pattin II, 570).

†59. Cf. Arist. Phys. I, 5 (189a3-4).

†60. Aristotle . . . of Pythagoras: as reported by Simplicius In Praed. Arist. (Kalbfleisch p. 415, 30-34; Pattin II, 570).

†61. often . . . accepted by others: cf. Arist. e.g. Topics I, c. 13 (105b30-31).

†62. in the same place: Arist Phys. V, 1 (225b3-5).

†63. Dionysius: as above in arg. 16.

†64. Being is used in two senses: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 9 (1017a23-b10) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 48, a. 2, Reply to 2.

†65. Whether it is . . . What it is: cf. Arist. Post. Anal. I, 13 (78a22).

Footnotes to Question I, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 34, a. 4; Cont. Gent. III, ch. 11; Ia, q. 48, a. 3; Comp. Theol. I, c. 118.

†1. Whether evil . . . good: cf. Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 34, c. 4.

†2. Dionys. On the Divine Names. ch. 4 § 20 (PG 3, 720B-D; Dion. 250-256); cf. Thomas himself In Dionys. De Div. Nom., ch. 4, lect. 23.

†3. Moreover: this argument is taken from Dionys. On the Divine Names. ch. 4 § 21 (PG 3, 721C; Dion. 261) as is evident below in Reply to 6.

†4. August. Enchiridion ch. 14 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 55); cf. also Peter Lombard, Sententiae, d. 34, c. 5, n. 1.

†5. contradictories . . . true: cf. Arist. Metaph. IV, 6 (1011b21).

†6. Furthermore: this argument is taken from Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 21 (PG 3, 721C-D; Dion. 262 ff.). Dionysius's argument is as follows: 'Either evil must come from good, or good from evil, or else (if this is impossible) both the good and evil must be from another origin or cause. For no duality can be an originating source: some unity must be the origin of all duality. And yet it is also absurd to suppose that two entirely opposite things can owe their origin and their being to the same thing. This would mean that the source itself was not simple and unique but was divided, double, self-contradictory and discordant. '

†7. the same cause . . . contrary effects: Arist., On Gen. and Corr. II, c. 10 (336a26-28) as is said e.g. Super Sent. II, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3 arg. 3.

†8. Arist. Metaph. IX, 9 (1051a18-21).

†9. Arist. Metaph. V, 2 (1013b25-26).

†10. Arist. Phys. II, 3 (195a23-25).

†11. Arist. Phys. II, 7 (198a25-26).

†12. Isaiah 5, 20 as cited by Peter Lombard, Sententiae, II, d. 34, c. 5, n. 4.

†13. Good . . . desire: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†14. Arist. Nic. Ethics IX, 9 (1170a22-23).

†15. August. Enchiridion ch. 12 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54).

†16. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 6 (PL 42, 554; CSEL 25-2, 858); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. IV].

†17. August. Enchiridion ch. 14 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 55); see also On Marriage and Concupiscence II, c. 28, n. 48 (PL 44, 464; CSEL 42, 303) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 49, a. 1 On the contrary and cited by Peter Lomb.

Sententiae II, d. 34, c. 4, n. 1-2; [transl. of On Marriage and Concupiscence in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. V, ch. 48].

†18. August. Enchiridion ch. 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53).

†19. Arist. Metaph. IV, 2 (1004a15-16)

†20. good . . . convertible: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics. I, 6 (1096a23-24).

†21. Platonists: concerning this opinion cf. Thomas himself, Super Sent. I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; Q. D. On Truth, q. 21, a. 2 arg. 2; In Dionys. De Div. Nom. cap. 3, lect. 1; cap. 4, lect. 2; cap. 5, lect. 1; Ia, q. 5, a. 2; In De Causis, prop. 4.

†22. good . . . good: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics. I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†23. useful . . . division of good: cf. Ambrose, De Officiis I, c. 9 (PL 16, 31 [35]) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 5, a. 6; [transl. of De Officiis in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Second Series Vol. X under the title Duties of the Clergy.

†24. Platonists: as reported by Arist. Phys. I, 15 (191b35-192a1) according to the interpretation of Averroes, Phys. I, comment. 79 (IV, 44 M) which Thomas followed In Dionys. De. Div. Nom. cap. 3, lect. unic.

†25. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4, § 3 (PG 3, 697A; Dion. 158) as cited by Thomas In De Causis prop 4; cf. also Thomas In Dionys. De. Div. Nom. cap. 4, lect. 2.

†26. non-being only accidentally: cf. Arist. Phys. I, 9 (192a3-4).

†27. Cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 6 (1106a14 and 22).

†28. Arist. On the Heavens, I, 11 (281a15) according to the arabic-latin transl. (Averroes V, 78L) as Thomas recounts In De Caelo I, 25, n. 4.

†29. we say a thing is deprived . . . not have it: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 22 (1022b22-30) as is said e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2

†30. 'li' i.e. 'the': on the use of the article which was introduced into the Latin from the Gallic language, see A. Landgraf, Die Sprache der Fruscholastischen Theologie, in Dogmengeschichte der Fruhscholastik, Erster Teil Band I (Regensburg, 1952), pp. 20-29; see also Alan. de Insulis, Regulae de Sacra Theologia 25 (PL 210, 633B).

†31. Dionys On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 21 (PG 3, 721C; Dion. 261).

†32. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 6 (1096a17-34).

†33. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a3-5).

†34. August. Enchiridion ch. 13 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 55).

Footnotes to Question I, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 34, a. 3; Cont. Gent. II, c. 41 and III, c. 10; Ia, q. 49, a. 1; I-IIae, q.

75, a. 1; In Dionys. On the Divine Names cap. 4, lect. 22.

†1. It is said . . . : this argument seems to be taken from Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 21 (PG 3, 721C; Dion. 262).

†2. every . . . its like: thus Thomas passim e.g. Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 2, a. 1 ad 4; Cont. Gent I, c. 49, II, c. 46; cf. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I, c. 7 (324a10-11); On the Soul II, 11 (424a1-2).

†3. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716B) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 234).

†4. good . . . of evil: cf. August. On the City of God XII, c. 7 (PL 41, 355; CCL 48, 362; CSEL 40-1, 577).

†5. Arist. Physics II, 3 (195b27-28).

†6. Given . . . is given: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales, tr. 5, n. 19 (De Rijk 67); [cf. Appendix for translation of this work].

†7. enigmatic vision: cf. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 13, 12 (PL 191, 1662A) and Peter Lomb. Sententiae III, d. 26, c. 4.

†8. thus punishment would precede fault: which according to Augustine is impossible, cf. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1296; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 132).

†9. action . . . uncovers a treasure: example of Arist. Metaph. V, 30 (1025a14-19).

†10. for example . . . father instead: example of Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 8 (1135a28-30).

†11. Every accidental cause . . . a per se cause: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 6 (198a5-9).

†12. That which . . . for the least part: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 5 (196b10-15 and 197a17-20).

†13. Arist. Phys. II, 1 (192b21-24).

†14. Arist. Phys. V, 6 (230a27-29).

†15. Moreover . . . : this argument seems to be taken from Arist. Metaph. IX, 9 (1051a4ff.).

†16. August. Enchiridion cap. 14 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 56); cf. also On Marriage and Concupiscence II, c. 28, n. 48 (PL 44, 464; CSEL 42, 303) as cited by Thomas Ia, q. 49, a. 1 On the contrary; but cf. also Peter Lombard, Sententiae, II, d. 34, c. 4, n. 1-2.

†17. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 31 (PG 3, 732B) according to transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 303-304).

†18. for example . . . of the gravedigger: example of Arist. as above in arg. 14, fn. 9.

†19. no one . . . as it seems to him: Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion. 236) and § 31 (PG 3, 732B; Dion. 304) as is said below q. 3, a. 2 arg. 1.

†20. in univocal agents . . . in equivocal agents: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VII, 7 (1032a15ff.), and 9 (1034a21-23) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 11, a. 2.

†21. every effective . . . in act: cf. Arist. *Phys.* III, 2 (202a10); Averroes, In *Phys.* III, comm. 17 (IV, 92D), In *De Anima* III, comm. 4 (VI, 137F; Crawford 384).

†22. evil . . . is neglected: August. On the Nature of Good ch. 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857) as is said below in a. 4 arg. 6.

†23. privation . . . but does not have: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* V, 22 (1022b22-30) as is said e.g. *Super Sent.* I, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

†24. every evil . . . but accidentally: Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C; Dion. 305) as is clear below in Reply to 5.

†25. of this evil . . . in the seed: cf. Arist. *Phys.* II, 8 (199b2-7) [according to an interpretation of Averroes, In *Phys.* II, comm. 82 (IV, 80B)] as is said below in q. 16, a. 6 beginning of the Response.

†26. August. On the City of God XII, c. 7 (PL 41, 355; CCL 48, 362; CSEL 40-1, 577).

†27. August, *Enchiridion* ch. 15 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 56).

†28. Arist. *Phys.* VIII, 1 (251a32) according the old transl. (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 16141, f. 173r).

†29. afterwards: Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C; Dion. 305).

†30. 'the' ('li'): cf. above q. 1, a. 2 Reply to 2, fn. 27.

†31. for instance . . . living in the house: almost the same example is given in Arist. *Metaph.* XI, 8 (1064b19-20).

†32. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 306).

†33. going to . . . not intend this: roughly the same example is found in Arist. *Phys.* II, 4 (196a3-5).

†34. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 6 (1106b28-35) and II, 9 (1109a24-25).

†35. corruption . . . to universal nature: cf. Thomas himself In *Phys.* V, 10 and In *De Caelo* II, 9.

†36. generation . . . without corruption: Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I. 3 (318a25-27) as is said above in q. 1, a. 1 arg. 16.

Footnotes to Question I, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 35, a. 1; Ia, q. 48, a. 5.

†1. *Utrum Malum Convenienter Dividatur per Poenam et Culpam?* (Whether Evil Is Properly Divided into Punishment and Fault?). 'Poena' can be translated here as "punishment", "penalty", or "pain". In general, in this article and elsewhere, 'punishment' apparently is the meaning St. Thomas intends but, at times and in a

given context, we have used "penalty" or "pain".

†2. Every . . . by opposites: cf. Arist. e.g. *Metaph.* X, 8 (1058a7-11).

†3. Gregory, *In Ezechiel*, I Hom. 11, n. 24 (PL 76, 915A; CCL 142, 179).

†4. But it was argued . . . of concomitance: an opinion already cited by Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II, d. 36, c. 2, n. 3.

†5. August. *Confessions* I, c. 12 (PL 32, 670; CSEL 33, 17).

†6. The second perfection . . . first perfection: cf. Arist. *On the Soul* II, 1 (412a10 and 23) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 2, a. 1 arg. 7.

†7. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* I, 7 (1097b23ff.).

†8. Every . . . causes anxiety: cf. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, II, c. 14 and 16 (PG 94, 932B and D; Bt 121-122).

†9. August. *Expositions on the Psalms*, Psalm 57, 9, n. 18 (PL 36, 687; CCL 39, 724) as cited by Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II. d. 36, c. 1, n. 1 and *Glossa* of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 1, 26 (PL 191, 1334D).

†10. August. *On the Nature of Good* ch. 4 (PL 42, 554; CSEL 25-2, 857).

†11. afterwards: August. *On the Nature of Good*, ch. 7 (PL 42, 554; CSEL 25-2, 858).

†12. August. *On the Nature of Good* c. 7 (PL 42, 554; CSEL 25-2, 858) as above in arg. 6.

†13. The very act . . . from God: see below q. 3, art. 2.

†14. every corruption . . . punishment: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 36, c. 2, n. 3.

†15. punishment . . . just: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1296; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 132).

†16. It is of the nature . . . voluntary: cf. August. (pseudo), *De Fide ad Petrum* cap. 21, n. 64 (PL 40, 773) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 700A; CCL 91A, 751).

†17. Arist. *Topics*, I, c. 15 (106b14-15), as is said e.g. II-IIae, q. 92, a. 2 arg. 1.

†18. good is used in three ways: cf. Ambrose, *De Officiis* I, c. 9 (PL 16, 31 [35]) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 5, a. 6; [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers*, Second Series Vol. X under the title *Duties of the Clergy*].

†19. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 6 (1106b28-33), and 9 (1109a24-29).

†20. August. (pseudo) *De Fide ad Petrum* cap. 21, n. 64 (PL 40, 773) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 700A; CCL 91A, 751).

†21. And perfection is twofold: cf. Arist. *On the Soul* II, 1 (412a10 and 23) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 2, a. 1 arg. 7.

†22. according to the judgment of the Catholic Faith: see below q. 5, a. 4 On the contrary 1 and 2.

†23. tradition of faith holds it as certain: see below q. 5, a. 4 On the contrary 1 and 2.

†24. the effect of which is called passion: cf. Anonymous Fragments, Liber Sex Principiorum III [29] (Minio-Paluello 41).

†25. for example . . . crippled leg: example of Augustine as above q. I, a. 1 Reply to 9 in fn. 53.

†26. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 1 n. 1 (PL 32, 1221-1222; CCL 29, 211; CSEL 74, 3).

†27. August. Confessions I, c. 12 (PL 32, 670; CSEL 33, 17) as above in arg. 2.

†28. not every defect . . . to have: Arist. Metaph. V, 22 (1022b27-30) as is said e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

Footnotes to Question I, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 37, q. 3, a. 2; Ia, q. 48, a. 6.

†1. deprivation of the vision of God: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 33, c. 2, n. 5 and below q. 5, a. 1.

†2. digging . . . treasure: example of Aristotle, Metaph. V, 30 (1025a15-16).

†3. whatever is the cause . . . still more: cf. Arist. Post. Anal. I, 2 (72a27-28) according to anon. transl. (Minio-Paluello 114) and Jacobi (Minio-Paluello 9) as is said below q. 2, a. 3 arg. 8.

†4. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion. 236) and § 31 (PG 3, 732B; Dion. 304).

†5. in the same place: Dionys. On Div. Names ch. 4 § 32 according to the translation of Sarracenus (Dion. 306).

†6. whatever is the cause . . . still more: cf. Arist. as above in arg. 7.

†7. August. Enchiridion ch. 12 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54).

†8. death is a kind of punishment: see below q. 5, a. 4.

†9. But Lot . . . punishment: cf. Genesis 19, 8.

†10. Cf. Gregory, Moralia XIV, c. 10, n. 12 (PL 75, 1046A).

†11. Rightly Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 6 (1106b28-32) and 9 (1109a24-28), as above in q. 1, a. 4 arg. 13; but cf. Topics 6 (112b12-13).

†12. among good things . . . for the sake of the end: cf. Arist. Topics III, 1 (116b22-23).

†13. The "fomes" . . . : cf. Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 8, n. 2.

†14. August. The City of God III, c. 1 (PL 41, 79; CCL 47, 65; CSEL 40-1, 109). See however, ibid. IV, c. 2 (PL 41, 112-113; CCL 47, 99; CSEL 40-1, 163).

†15. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857).

†16. Cf. fn. 3 above. The maxim here is stated in a negative form.

†17. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 22 (PG 3, 724B) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 271).

†18. But act . . . exercise of knowledge: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 1 (412a10 and 23). as is said e.g. in Q. D. On Truth q. 2, a. 1 arg. 7.

†19. solecism: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales tr. 7, n. 17 (De Rijk, 94).

†20. God . . . of fault: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1223; CCL 29, 211: CSEL 74, 3).

†21. the love . . . concupiscence . . . love . . . friendship: cf. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 1, c. 4 (f. 36 va).

†22. God . . . what He wills: cf. Glossa of Peter Lombard on Rom. 1, 24 (PL 191, 1332A) from August. On Grace and Free Will c. 21, n. 43 (PL 44, 909) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 79, a. 1 Reply to 1.

†23. We should not judge . . . of a healthy person: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 10 (422b8-10).

†24. Horace, Epistle I, XVI, 50-53 as cited by the anonymous author of Moral. Dogma Philosoph. q. 5, n. 68 (PL 171, 1053D; Holmberg 71).

†25. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy IV, pr. 4 (PL 63, 805B; CCL 94, 74; CSEL 67, 90).

†26. the Philosopher: Arist. Metaph. IX, 9 (1051a15-16).

Footnotes to Question II, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 35, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 71, a. 5.

†1. August. Reply to Faustus the Manichean XXII, c. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25-1, 621); [as cited by Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1] as below q. 7, a. 1 arg. 1; [transl. of Reply to Faustus in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. IV.

†2. August. On True Religion ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†3. Contraries . . . genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 8 (1058a10-11); Topics IV, c. 3 (123b4-5).

†4. August. Tractates on the Gospel of St. John tract. I, c. 1, n. 13 (PL 35, 1385; CCL 36, 7).

†5. August. Enchiridion ch. 14 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 55); cf. however On Marriage and Concupiscence. II, c. 28, n. 48 (PL 44, 464; CSEL 42, 303) as cited by Thomas in Ia, q. 49, a. 1 and Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 34, c. 4, nn. 1 and 2.

†6. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 24 (PL 40, 17; CCL 44A, 30); [transl. by David L.

Mosher (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982)].

†7. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 24 (PG 94, 953A; Bt 145).

†8. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 7, 20 (PL 191, 1424C).

†9. every . . . an affirmation: cf. Arist. *Prior Anal.* I, c. 46 (51b34).

†10. "transit actu licet maneat reatu" ('which passes away as soon as it is committed but remains as to guilt'): wording of August. as is said below, in q. 2, a. 2 arg. 14. Cf. August. *On Marriage and Concupiscence* I, c. 26, n. 29 (PL 44, 430; CSEL 42, 241). See also Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 32, c. 1, n. 6.

†11. Arist. *Phys.* II, 8 (199b1-3).

†12. Punishment . . . for sin: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1296; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 132).

†13. Arist. *Phys.* II, 8 (199a33-b4).

†14. Arist. *Phys.* V, 6 (231a8-9).

†15. it is not true . . . their author: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1223; CCL 29, 211; CSEL 74, 3).

†16. August. *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions* q. 26 (PL 40, 17; CCL 44A, 32).

†17. contraries . . . same genus: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* X, 8 (1058a10-11); *Topics* IV, 3 (123b3).

†18. Some: opinion already cited by Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 35, c. 2, n. 11 to which he assents.

†19. August. *Reply to Faustus* XXII, c. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25-1, 621) [cited by Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1] as is said below q. 7, a. 1 arg. 1.

†20. Others: *Summa* of Alexander of Hales n. 327 (p. 333).

†21. Glossa of Peter Lomb. in Rom. 7, 15 (PL 191, 1422D).

†22. affirmation . . . to the same genus: cf. Arist. *On Interpretation* I, 5 (17a8-10).

†23. August. *On the Trinity* V, c. 7 (PL 42, 916; CCL 50, 214).

†24. Arist. *Phys.* II, 8 (199a33-b4).

†25. in natural reason: cf. Thomas himself In V Nic. *Ethics* 12; I-IIae, q. 94, a. 2.

†26. in divine law: cf. Exodus 20, 12ff.; Deut. 5, 16ff.

†27. as affirmation . . . to affirmation: cf. Arist. *On Interpretation* I, 6 (17a31-32).

†28. Arist. *Phys.* VIII, 1 (251a26ff.).

†29. if someone intending . . . treasure: example of Aristotle *Metaph.* V, 30 (1025a14-17).

†30. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C-D) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 306).

†31. are in his power . . . and not to do: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110a16-18).

†32. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298).

†33. nothing . . . when they sin: cf. August. On the Gospel of St. John tract. i, c. 1, n. 13 (PL 35, 1358; CCL 36, 7).

†34. The word Peter Lombard uses in the Gloss is "fomites" [cf. fn. 8]; in the argument given in the text (arg. 8) Thomas uses "concupiscentia", but in his reply Thomas uses the word used in the Gloss i.e. "fomites".

†35. Arist. Categories ch. 10 (12b6-15).

Footnotes to Question II, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 35, a. 4.

†1. August. Retractations I, c. 15, n. 2 (PL 32, 609; CSEL 36, 74).

†2. August. On Two Souls ch. 11 (PL 42, 105; CSEL 25-1, 70); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. IV].

†3. 'will' . . . for the act of the will: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1.

†4. August. On the Good of Marriage ch. 21, n. 25 (PL 40, 390; CSEL 41, 218-219; [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. III].

†5. John Chrysostom (pseudo), Opus imperf. on Matthew, homily 46 (PG 56, 891) cited by Thomas himself Catena in Matth. cap. 23, 33, according to the wording of another author; [transl in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. X].

†6. August. On True Religion, ch. 33, n. 62 (PL 34, 149; CCL 32, 228; CSEL 77, 45).

†7. Glossa Interlin. on Matthew 12, 35.

†8. Opposites . . . with the same thing: cf. Arist. Topics II, 4 (111a14).

†9. The same thing . . . of itself: cf. Alan. de Insulis, De Arte seu Art. Cathol. Fidei I, reg. 8 (PL 210, 600A).

†10. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 4 (PL 158, 437B; Schmitt II, 144); [transl. by Douglas Johnson and Raymond Phyles (Harvard Divinity School Library, 1967)].

†11. August. On Marriage and Concupiscence I, c. 26, n. 29 (PL 44, 430; CSEL 42, 241); see also Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 32, c. 1, n. 6.

†12. sin . . . law of God: August. Reply to Faustus the Manichean XXII, c. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25-1,

621) [according to the wording of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1] as below q. 7, a. 1 arg. 1.

†13. Exodus 20, 17; Deut 5, 21.

†14. Some: opinion already cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 2, n. 1.

†15. Cf. August. The Gospel of St. John tract 1, c. 1, n. 13 (PL 35, 1385; CCL 36, 7).

†16. Others: opinion already cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 2, n. 1.

†17. still others: opinion already cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 2, n. 1.

†18. For evil is more general . . . nature of evil: cf. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857) as is said above q. 1, a. 2 arg. 6.

†19. limping itself is called a sin (a defect): example of August. On the Perfection of Man in Righteousness ch. 2 (PL 44, 294; CSEL 42, 5) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 24, a. 12 arg. 4.

†20. according to the common usage . . . the same thing: cf. e.g. Bonaventure Super Sent. III, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ad 3.

†21. although . . . without light: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 7 (418a29ff.).

†22. essential reward . . . accidental reward: cf. Thomas himself Q. D. On Truth, Q. 12, a. 13 and Q. 26, a. 6 Reply 8.

†23. For a perspicacious consideration of how and when an erroneous conscience binds or not, and how an erroneous conscience excuses or not, see Summa Theol. I-IIae. q. 19, aa. 5 and 6.

†24. to render a service to God: cf. John 16, 2.

†25. August. On the Predestination of the Saints ch. 12, n. 24 (PL 44, 977); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. V] and On the Gift of Perseverance ch. 10 (PL 45, 1007); [transl. Ibid. Vol. V].

†26. color . . . light: cf. above, Reply to 5 fn. 21.

Footnotes to Question II, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 20. a. 1.

†1. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (416b23).

†2. Cf. Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil ch. 20 (PL 158, 352A; Schmitt I, 265); [transl. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richards (Toronto and New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1976)].

†3. Cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 131).

†4. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 7, 20 (PL 191, 1424C).

†5. it is said that . . . most infected: cf. e.g. Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 239 (p. 254) and Bonaventure Super Sent. II. d. 31, a. 1, q. 3.

†6. That on account of which . . . more: cf. Arist. Posterior Analytics I, 2 (72a27-28) according to an anonymous transl. (Minio-Paluello 114) and Jacobi (Minio-Paluello 9).

†7. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 32, 1225; CCL 29, 215; CSEL 74, 9).

†8. i.e. deprived of . . . order: cf. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857) as is said above q. I, a. 4 arg. 6.

†9. An act . . . from the object: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415a17-23) as cited by Thomas e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 48, a. 2 arg. 2.

†10. man wills . . . happiness: cf. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 282).

†11. The necessity . . . the voluntary: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 5 (1015a26-28).

†12. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110a8-19).

†13. Arist. On the Soul III, 11 (434a12-15).

†14. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 5 (1114a32-b2) according to the transl. of Robert Grosseteste (Gauthier 189).

†15. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110b24-27). To act out of ignorance removes voluntariness and hence the imputation of sin. To act in ignorance is another matter. The example Aristotle gives is of a man who acts when drunk or in a rage in which case he is not acting as a result of ignorance but is acting in ignorance, in the sense of not knowing what he is doing.

Footnotes to Question II, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 40, a. 5; I-IIae, q. 18, arts. 8 and 9.

†1. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 4 (PL 158, 437B; Schmitt II, 144).

†2. Since good . . . are convertible: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 6 (1096a23-29).

†3. differences . . . the genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. VII, 12 (1038a9ff.) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 18, a. 7.

†4. contraries . . . same genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 8 (1058a10-11); Topics IV, c. 3 (123b4).

†5. August. The Lord's Sermon on the Mount, II, c. 18, n. 59 (PL 34, 1296; CCL 35, 154-155); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VI and in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 11].

†6. Some . . . others: opinions already cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 40 c. unic.

†7. August. On the Nature of Good chs. 3 and 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857).

†8. upward movement . . . an evil action: cf. Arist. Topics I, c. 7 (103a28); Physics II, 1 (192b37) and IV, 8 (214b14-15); On the Heavens I, 2 (269a35-b1) and passim.

†9. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 733A; Dion. 309).

†10. an act . . . from its object: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415a18-21) as is said Super Sent. I, d. 48 a. 2 arg. 2.

†11. to become evil (maleficari): the word or term of Robert Grosseteste in his transl. of (Pseudo) Dionys, e.g. De Div. Nom. cap. 4 § 20 (PG 3, 717B; Dion. 243) and passim.

†12. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298) as above q. 2, a. 1 Reply to 3.

†13. in general it is said . . . : definitions commonly accepted from Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 36, c. 6, n. 5; cf. also Albertus De Bono tr. 1, q. 2, a. 4 (Col. XXVIII, 28ff.).

†14. privation of the form of fire . . . of water: cf. Arist. On Longevity and Shortness of Life ch. 2 (465a14-16) as is said Ia, q. 89, a. 5.

†15. Good has the nature of an end: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics, I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†16. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 4 (1105a26ff.).

Footnotes to Question II, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 40, a. 5; I-IIae, q. 18, a. 8-9.

†1. Being . . . is good: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 6 (1096a23-24).

†2. evil . . . to good: cf. Arist. Categories cap. 11 (13b36).

†3. there is nothing intermediate . . . and non-being: cf. Arist. Metaph. IV, 7 (1012a5ff.).

†4. the use of a thing or the enjoyment . . . abuses: cf. August. On Christian Doctrine I, c. 4 (PL 34, 20; CCL 32, 8; CSEL 80, 9) as cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae I, d. 1, c. 2, n. 3.; [transl. of Augustine's work in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. II].

†5. August. Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, q. 24 (PL 40, 17; CCL 44A, 29).

†6. everyone . . . to the divine will: cf. Thomas himself D. Q. On Truth q. 23, a. 7.

†7. by which charity is signified: cf. Glossa Interlin. in Matthew 22, 11 from Gregory In Evang. II, homil. 38, n. 9 (PL 76, 1287C).

†8. Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 8 (1151a16-17).

†9. Gregory, Moralia VI, c. 18, n. 28 (PL 75, 745B; CCL 143, 304).

†10. Rightly Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 3, 12 (PL 191, 1557D).

†11. August. On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount II, c. 18, n. 60 (PL 34, 1297; CCL 35, 156).

†12. Arist. Categories ch. 10 (12a16-18) as said above q. 1, a. 1 arg. 7.

†13. they have spoken rightly . . . who . . . : e.g. Albert De Bono tr. 1, q. 2, a. 7 (Col. XXVIII, 34), Super Sent. II, d. 40, a. 3; Bonaventure, Super. Sent. II, d. 41, a. 1, q. 3.

†14. for if any act . . . other circumstances: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 3 (1104b22-28).

†15. 'end' in the sense of purpose or motive an agent has in mind, not the end to which an act is ordered, which is not a circumstance.

†16. Gregory, Regulae Pastoralis Liber, pars 3, c. 14 (PL 77, 74A) and In Evang. I, homil. 6, n. 6 (PL 76, 1098D); [transl. of the Regulae Pastoralis in Ancient Christian Writers Vol. 11, under the title Pastoral Care].

†17. according to the opposition of affirmation and negation: cf. Arist. Categories, cap. 10 (11b20).

†18. Arist. Nic. Ethics, I, 6 (1096a23-29)

†19. not as privation and possession of a quality: cf. Arist. Categories, ch. 10 (11b21); Metaph. V, 10 (1018a21), and X, 4 (1055a33).

†20. Arist. as above arg. 2 On the contrary.

†21. those who say . . . : an opinion continuously cited ever since from Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 29, c. 4 (f. 95 va).

†22. impiety of the Pelagians: as reported by Peter Lomb. e.g. Sententiae II, d. 28 in totum.

†23. for when what is . . . it is true, but when what is not . . . it is false: Arist. Metaph. IV, 7 (1011b26-27) as is said e.g. D. Q. On Truth q. 1, a. 1 in the Response.

†24. Gregory, Moralia VI, c. 18, n. 32 (PL 75, 746D; CCL 143, 307).

Footnotes to Question II, Article 6

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. IV, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2 qc. 3; I-IIae, q. 72, a. 9; ibid. q. 18, aa. 10 and 11.

†1. The general question raised here is to what extent the circumstances of an act affect or modify a sin as to its species. The question is twofold: whether a circumstance can affect an action to such an extent that it determines its species and, whether a circumstance can affect an action to such an extent that it changes the sin to another species. The article is a complex treatment of the role of the circumstances in human actions. And certainly in this and in other articles Thomas shows how aware he was of the practical and existential character of ethics and indeed, that circumstances do alter cases.

†2. the object gives species to an act: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415a18-21) as is said e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 48, a. 2 arg. 2.

†3. for in this way . . . extravagance: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics, IV, 1 (1121a10-15).

†4. Cf. August. On True Religione ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†5. on account of local pressure: cf. Albert, Quaest. Super De Animal. XVIII, q. 6 (Col. XII, 299).

†6. Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 8 (1151a16-17) as is said above in q. 2, a. 5 arg. 9.

†7. Evil . . . according to circumstances: cf. e.g. Summa of Alexander of Hales II-IIae, n. 37 (p. 55).

†8. it is said to be a sacrilege: cf. Papias, Vocabularium s. v. sacrilegium.

†9. in the following verse: the same verse is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-IIae, n. 591 (p. 579), in Albert Super Sent. IV, d. 33, a. 20.

†10. in the following verse: Cicero Rhetoric (or De Inventionem) I, c. 24-27, as cited by Thomas I-IIae, q. 7, a. 3; see also Boethius De Diff. Top. IV (PL 64, 1205 C-D and 1212D); Mattheum Vindocinensem Ars Versificatoria I, 116 (Faral 150); Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea III, tr. 24, c. 2 (f. 236 va); [cf. Appendix for transl. of Boethius's and Matthew Vendome's works].

†11. entirely disparate species: cf. Boethius De Syllogismo Hypothetico I (PL 64, 834C) where he says 'disparata autem ea voco tantum a se diversa sunt nulla contrarietas pugnancia veluti terra vestis' . . . etc. ("those things disparate in speech which are so diverse that there is no confusion of the two opposites notions in thought, for instance 'earth' and 'clothes' . . . etc.")

†12. Lia . . . Rachel: cf. Genesis 29, 23ff.

†13. Moral actions . . . singulars: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110b6) and (1111a23).

†14. conclusions in necessary matter . . . contingent matter: cf. Peter of Spain Summulae Logicales tr. 1, n. 13 (De Rijk 7) and Thomas himself in On Interpretation I, 13; cf. Appendix for transl. of Peter of Spain's summulae Logicales.

Footnotes to Question II, Article 7

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. IV, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 1; I-IIae, q. 73, a. 7.

†1. malice . . . aversion: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and ibid. III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†2. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298) as above q. 2, a. 1 Reply to 3.

†3. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. II, c. 8 (335a11-12).

†4. confront . . . belong to fortitude: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 9 (1117a28-33).

†5. Of similar things . . . the same: cf. Boethius, De Diff. Top. III (PL 64, 1197D); Peter of Spain Summulae Logicales tr. 5, n. 33 (De Rijk 74); [for translations. see the Appendix].

Footnotes to Question II, Article 8

†p Parallel texts: below q. 7 a. 4; Super Sent. IV, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 4; I-IIae, q. 88, a. 5.

†1. Adam . . . venially: cf. Thomas himself I-IIae, q. 89, a. 3.

†2. engaging in business . . . of the person: Decretal. III tit. 50, c. 6 (Friedberg II, 659).

†3. But to get drunk often . . . a mortal sin: cf. August. (pseudo) Sermo 104, n. 2 in his supposed works (PL 39, 1946) as is said below q. 7, a. 3 arg. 1. The true source seems to be Decretum D. 25, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 93).

†4. is said to be unpardonable: cf. below q. 3, a. 15.

†5. Rightly Bernard, On Consideration II, c. 13 (PL 182, 756B; Leclercq III, 429) according to Albert Super Sent. IV, d. 16, a. 22 arg. 5; [transl. of Bernard's work by John D. Anderson and Elizabeth D. Kennan under the title Five Books on Consideration: Advise to a Pope (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1976)].

Footnotes to Question II, Article 9

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 42, q. 2, a. 5; Cont. Gent. III, c. 139; I-IIae, q. 73, a. 2; Lect. Super Matthew 11, 22; De Art. Fidei I, lines 326-384; [transl. under the title The Apostles' Creed by Nicholas Ayo (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988)].

†1. James 2, 10 as cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 41, c. 1 n. 3.

†2. Jerome, In Eccl. 9, 18 (PL 23, 1090A [1145B]).

†3. Sin is the death of the soul: cf. August. e.g. The Gospel of St. John, tract. XLIX, n. 3 (PL 35, 1748; CCL 35, 421); [for transl. see the Appendix.

†4. If something is said to be . . . absolutely. such: cf. Arist. Metaph. IV, 4 (1008b32-1009a5) as is said e.g. Cont. Gent. I, c. 13.

†5. But nothing . . . lacks all good: cf. August. Enchiridion ch. 13 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54) where he says 'nor can there ever be any evil where there is no good'.

†6. All virtues are equal: Glossa Ordin. on Apoc. 21, 16.

†7. Rightly Luke 16, 10.

†8. Sin . . . to a mutable good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†9. August. On the Trinity XIII, c. 17 (PL 42, 1031-1032; CCL 50A, 413).

†10. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298).

†11. what is white . . . expands vision to a greater degree: cf. Arist. Topics III, c. 5 (119a30-31); but cf. that whole chapter.

†12. an act . . . aversion from God: cf. August. as above in arg. 10, fn. 8.

†13. A genus . . . by its species: cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales* tr. 2, n. 19 (De Rijk 25); [cf. Appendix for translation].

†14. Evil . . . of good: cf. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53).

†15. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 32, 1225; CCL 29, 215; CSEL 74, 9).

†16. opinion of the Stoics: referred to by Jerome in *Against Jovinianus* II, n. 21 (PL 23, 315B [329A-B]), [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers. Second Series Vol. VI*]; August. *Epistle* 167, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 33, 735; CSEL 44, 592), [transl. in *Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers Vol. I*] and *On Lying* ch. 15 (PL 40, 539; CSEL 41, 511), [transl. in *Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers Vol. III*]. Cf. also Cicero *Paradoxes* III, as cited by Thomas in *I-IIae*, q. 73, a. 2.

†17. of certain modern heretics: the Cathari according to Moneta *Cremonensis Adversus Catharos et Valdenses* IV, c. 12 § 1 and 2 (ed. Rome 1743, p. 383) and Raynerius Sacconi *Summa de Catharis* (ed. Sanjek, AFP 44 [1974] p. 44).

†18. Stoics: as Cicero reports in *The Paradoxes* III.

†19. privation is twofold . . . : cf. Simplicius *In Praed. Arist.* cap. 11 (Kalbfleisch, p. 417, 8ff; Pattin II, 572). See above q. 1, a. 1 Reply to 2.

†20. sickness . . . proper to health: Averroes and Maimonides as above q. 1, a. 1 Reply to 1, fn. 42.

†21. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* IV, 5 (1126a11-12).

†22. immediately adds: cf. James 2, 11.

†23. Rightly Matthew 13, 30.

†24. in the same place the Philosopher shows: as above arg. 7, fn. 4.

†25. the Apostle says: cf. I Cor. 13, 13.

†26. *The Book On Causes* comm. 1; [transl. by Dennis J. Brand, under the title *The Book of Causes* (Niagara, NY: Niagara University Press, 1981)].

Footnotes to Question II, Article 10

†p Parallel texts: *I-IIae*, q. 73, a. 4.

†1. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 12 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54); [in the transl. of the *Enchiridion* in the *Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 4 the reference is to ch. 4, n. 12].

†2. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VIII, 10 (1160b8-9).

†3. August. *On the City of God* XV, c. 22 (PL 41, 467; CCL 48, 488; CSEL 40-2, 109); *The Morals of the Catholic Church* I, c. 15, n. 25 (PL 32, 1322), as is said below q. 11, a. 1 arg. 1; [transl. of *The Morals of the Catholic Church* in *Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers Vol. IV*].

†4. punishments . . . as medicines: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 3 (1104b16-17).

Footnotes to Question II, Article 11

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 85, a. 1.

†1. Cf. the parallel text: Thomas says there that the good of human nature is threefold: first, the principles of which the nature is constituted and the properties derived from them, such as the powers of the soul, and the like; secondly, since man has by nature an inclination to virtue, this inclination is a good of man's nature; thirdly, the gift of original justice, bestowed on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. The first good of man's nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin; the third good of the nature was totally withdrawn by the sin of our first parent; but the second good of his nature is diminished by sin.

†2. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 282).

†3. To be diminished . . . passion: cf. Arist. Physics VII, 2 (243a5-9) according to the arabic-latin transl. (ed. Averroes IV, f. 313K).

†4. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C; Dion. 305).

†5. power of good . . . rather preservative: cf. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion. 235).

†6. August. Enchiridion ch. 14 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 55); cf. also Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 34, c. 5, n. 1.

†7. Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice ch. 9, n. 28 (PL 182, 1016B; Leclercq III, 186); [transl. in Treatise III, in The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux, Vol. 7 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, Inc. , 1977)].

†8. August. A Literal Commentary on Genesis VIII, c. 12, n. 26 (PL 34, 383; CSEL 28-1, 250); [transl. under the title The Literal Meaning of Genesis by John Hammond Taylor, S. J. in the Ancient Christian Writers series, No. 41, 2 Vols. (New York: Newman Press, 1982)].

†9. Anselm, On Truth ch. 12 (PL 158, 482B; Schmitt I, 194); [transl. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Toronto/New York: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1976)].

†10. August. On the Immortality of the Soul ch. 2 (PL 32, 1022); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 2].

†11. diminution . . . motion: Arist. as above in arg. 4, cf. fn. 2.

†12. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 5 (1105b20).

†13. Glossa Ordin. *ibid.* , from Bede, In Luc ev. expos. III, c. 10 (PL 92, 468D-469A; CCL 120, 222).

†14. August. rightly On the City of God XII, c. 6 (PL 41, 353; CCL 48, 360; CSEL 40-1, 574).

†15. August. On Music VI, c. 5, n. 14 (PL 32, 1170); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 2].

†16. for example . . . whiteness makes it white: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 2 (1013b3-8) for an analogous

example.

†17. by removing and impediment: cf. Arist. Physics VIII, 4 (255b23-25) as is said below q. 7, a. 11
Reply to 2.

†18. per se . . . obstacle to light: example of August. Expositions on the Psalms, in ps. 118, 73, sermo 18, n. 4 (PL 37, 1553; CCL 40, 1725) [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII (Ps. cxix, p. 577B)].

†19. Arist. Physics VIII, 4 (256a1).

†20. Isaiah 59, 2 according to the Septuagint as cited by Jerome in Isaiah 59, 2 (PL 24, 576A [597D]).

†21. obedient to reason: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 13 (1102b30-31).

†22. wounds of the nature: an opinion commonly ascribed to Bede, cf. Thomas himself, I-IIae, q. 85, a. 3
On the contrary; on which we have found nothing.

†23. Arist. Physics III, 1 (201a33-b2).

†24. Arist. Physics VIII, 5 (257a34ff.).

†25. freedom . . . misery: cf. Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice ch. 3, n. 6-7 (PL 182, 1005; Leclercq III, 170); cf. also Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 25, c. 8. For transl. of Bernard's Work cf. above fn. 7.

Footnotes to Question II, Article 12

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 34, a. 5; Cont. Gent. III, c. 12; Ia, q. 48, a. 4; I-IIae, q. 85, a. 2.

†1. Any finite thing . . . totally taken away: cf. Arist. Physics I, 4 (187b25-26) as is said e.g. Super Sent. II, d. 34, a. 5 arg. 1.

†2. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 4 (PG 94, 876A; Bt 75).

†3. i.e. 'the fomes': cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 8, n. 2.

†4. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 35 (PG 3, 736A; Dion. 316).

†5. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 4 (PG 94, 876A; Bt 75).

†6. before they sinned . . . not have grace: see Thomas himself Ia, q. 62, a. 3.

†7. diminution . . . of motion: Arist. as above q. 2, a. 11, arg. 4, fn. 2.

†8. Rightly Arist. Physics III, 5 (205a11-12).

†9. sin . . . consists in the will: see above q. 2, a. 2.

†10. some sought to avoid: an opinion already reported by Guill. Altiss. in Summa Aurea II, tr. 26, q. 5 (f. 87ra).

†11. but it cannot be said . . . : opinion already reported by Guill. Altiss. , Summa Aurea II, tr. 26, q. 5 (f. 87ra).

†12. August. On the City of God XII, c. 9, n. 2 (PL 41, 357; CCL 48, 364; CSEL 40-1, 580).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II. d. 32 q. 2, a. 1; ibid. d. 37, q. 2, a. 1; Ia, q. 49, a. 2; ibid. q. 19, a. 9; I-IIae, q. 79, a. 1.

†1. The Apostle says . . . : The same argument is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 4 (p. 8).

†2. Glossa of Peter Lombard on Romans 1, 24 (PL 191, 1332A) from August. On Grace and Free Will ch. 21, n. 43 (PL 44, 909).

†3. in the same place: see above in fn. 2.

†4. punishment . . . is voluntary: cf. August. (pseudo) De Fide ad Petrum, cap. 21, n. 64 (PL 40, 773) = Fulgentius (PL 65,700A; CCL 91A, 751).

†5. Furthermore: the same argument is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 4 (p. 8).

†6. Whatever . . . its effect: cf. Alan. de Insulis, De Arte seu Art. Cathol. Fidei I, reg. 1 (PL 210, 597D).

†7. Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 299).

†8. August. On Nature and Grace ch. 26 (PL 44, 261; CSEL 60, 255).

†9. August. Confessions II, c. 7 (PL 32, 681; CSEL 33, 41).

†10. Besides: Bonaventure has the same argument in Super Sent. II, d. 44, a. 1, q. 1.

†11. Arist. Topics IV, c. 5 (126a34ff.) as in Boethius's transl. (Aristoteles Latinus, Topica Minio-Paluella p. 79).

†12. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 1, n. 2 (PL 32, 1271; CCL 29, 275; CSEL 74, 90).

†13. consists in turning away: August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35); ibid. III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†14. Arist. On Sleep and Sleeplessness ch. 1 (454a8) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 51, a. 3.

†15. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 3 and q. 4 (PL 40, 11 and 12; CCL 44A, 12 and 13).

†16. Fulgentius, Ad Monimum I, c. 19 (PL 65, 167C; CCL 91, 19-20); cf. also Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 3, 5 (PL 191, 1354A).

†17. For sin commonly so-called: cf. Arist. Physics II, 14 (199a33-b5) as is said above q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3 On the contrary and in the Response.

†18. from a defect . . . of the seed: Arist. as above q. 1, a. 1 Reply to 8 in fn. 52.

†19. Sin . . . from the ultimate end: cf. August. e.g. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†20. Dionys. *on the Div. Names* ch. 9 § 6 (PG 3, 913C; Dion. 467).

†21. the form of water . . . of fire: Arist. *On Longevity and Shortness of Life* ch. 2 (465a14-16) according to Thomas Ia, q. 89, a. 5.

†22. movement of the leg . . . not caused by the motive power: example of August. *On Man's Perfection in Righteousness* ch. 2 (PL 44, 294; CSEL 42, 5) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 24, a. 12 arg. 4.

†23. Dionys. *On the Div. Names*. ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 281).

†24. Dionys. *On the Div. Names*. ch. 4 § 25 (PG 3, 728B; Dion. 286) as is said below q. 12, a. 1 arg. 2.

†25. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 1 (1145a19-29).

†26. according to some: Maimonides according to Thomas *Super Sent.* III, d. 12, q. 2, a. 1 Reply to 4. However we have not found this. Cf. for this response Thomas himself *Super Sent.* I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 1 arg. 2 and *ibid.* III, d. 12, q. 2, a. 1 arg. 4; Q. D.

†27. the Pharisees . . . Christ's teaching: cf. e.g. *Matth.* 15, 12.

†28. good . . . cause of evil: cf. August. *On the City of God* XII, c. 7 (PL 41, 355; CCL: 48, 362; CSEL 40-1, 577).

†29. in that manner of speaking . . . His will: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* I, d. 45, c. 6, n. 1.

†30. Bernard, *On Precept and Dispensation* ch. . 3 (PL 182, 864B-C; Leclercq III, 257-258); [transl. in *The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux*, Vol. One, *Treatises I* (Spencer, MA: Cistercian Publications, 1970)].

†31. precepts of the second tablet . . . of the first tablet: designations of August. *Sermo* 9, c. 6, n. 7 (PL 38, 80-81); cf. also Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* III, d. 37, c. 1, n. 1.

†32. some hold: cf. Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* II, c. 46 (Justiniani, f. 70r); [transl. by Shlomo Pines (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963)].

Footnotes to Question III, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 37, q. 2, a. 2; I-IIae, q. 79, a. 2

†1. Dionys. *On the Div. Names*. ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion. 236) and § 31 (PG 3, 732B; Dion. 304).

†2. by reason of their species . . . sins: see above q. 2, a. 4.

†3. August, *On Man's Perfection in Righteousness* ch. 2 (PL 44, 294; CSEL 42, 5).

†4. August. On the Trinity III, c. 4, n. 9 (PL 42, 873; CCL 50, 136).

†5. Among the earlier authorities . . . twofold opinion: opinions already cited by Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 37, c. 1 and 2 as is said *Super Sent.* II, d. 37, q. 2, a. 2.

†6. since God Himself . . . derived from Him: Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 5 § 4 (PG 3, 817C-D; Dion. 331ff.) as is said I-IIae, q. 79, a. 2.

†7. is put in a category of being: cf. Arist, *Categories* c. 9 (11b1).

†8. But God . . . and corporeal: August. as above in On the contrary (in fn. 4).

†9. heavenly body . . . the lower bodies: Dionys. On the Div. Names. ch. 4, § 4 (PG 3, 700A; Dion. 166). as is said Ia, q. 115, a. 3 On the contrary.

†10. whatever there is . . . to the leg: example of August. On Man's Perfection in Righteousness ch. 2 (PL 44, 294; CSEL 42, 5) as is said e.g. D. Q. On Truth q. 24, a. 12 arg. 4.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 80, a. 1.

†1. August. On the Trinity IV, c. 12, n. 15 (PL 42, 897; CCL 50, 180).

†2. Bede, *Super Act.* 5, 3 (PL 92, 954D).

†3. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) III, c. 5, n. 33 (PL 83, 666B).

†4. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 23 (PL 40, 244; CCL 46, 63).

†5. first in any genus . . . follow in that genus: Arist. *Metaph.* II, 1 (993b23-26) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 5, a. 9 On the contrary 3; cf. also *Metaph.* III, 3 (998b3-4).

†6. cogitative power . . . bound to a bodily organ: so the physicians have determined as referred to by Thomas, *Cont. Gent.* II, c. 60; cf. e.g. Avicenna *De Anima* IV, c. 1 (f. 17vb; Van Riet 11); Averroes *In De Anima* III, comm. 6 (VI, 154A; Crawford 415). The words 'cogitating', 'cogitation', and 'cogitative' in this argument, derive etymologically from 'co' and 'agitare', and the 'agito' signifies 'to pursue', 'to turn over' or 'to plan' or 'devise' (in the mind). Our words 'thinking' and 'thought' are synonyms but are more abstract and do not capture the notion of pursuing, turning over, etc. The word also refers to a specific power of man, the cogitative power, which is taken to be the highest of the interior sense powers, which in man is the power related to the virtue of prudence. The force of this objection and the reply to it presupposes understanding that this cogitative power (sometimes called 'particular' or 'practical reason' and in animals, 'the estimative power') is confined to a bodily organ, and thus is open to possible influence by the devil. It is not to be confused with reason understood as an intellectual power, which is not tied to a corporeal organ.

†7. August. On the City of God XIX, c. 4, n. 3 (PL 41, 629; CCL 48, 665; CSEL 40-2, 375) as cited by Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* III, d. 17, c. 2, n. 2.

†8. August. A Lit. Comment. on Genesis, XII, c. 12, n. 25 (PL 34, 463; CSEL 28-1, 395).

†9. Averroes, In Metaph. XI (-XII), comm. 18 (VIII, 305D-E).

†10. Arist. Eudemian Ethics VII, c. 14 (1248a17-32) from the Anonymous transl. (Deman, *Le 'Liber de bona fortuna'*, p. 39-40).

†11. the moving principle . . . intellect; Cf. Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b11-13) as below q. 16, a. 3 arg. 7.

†12. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 12 (PL 40, 14; CCL 44A, 19); [transl. by David L. Moser, in *The Fathers of the Church* Vol. 70 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1982)].

†13. Isaiah 50, 1 according to the Septuagint as cited by Jerome In Is. *ibid.* (PL 24, 475A [492C]).

†14. Jerome, Against Jovinianus II, n. 3 (PL 23, 286-287 [299C]).

†15. Dionys. On the Eccl. Hierarchy ch. 5, pars. 1 § 4 (PG 3, 504C; Dion. 1330) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth, q. 27, a. 4 arg. 8; cf. also On the Eccl. Hierarchy ch. 4 § 3 (PG 3, 181A; Dion. 812).

†16. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, q. 4 (PL 40, 12; CCL 44A, 13).

†17. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1223; CCL 29, 211; CSEL 74, 4).

†18. For sometimes that which disposes . . . that which is effecter is called the cause: Avicenna. Suffic. I, c. 10 (f. 19ra B), as is said I-IIae, q. 17, a. 1 arg. 1.

†19. This is the cause in the real and proper sense . . . effect follows: cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales*, tr. 5, n. 19 (De Rijk 67); cf. also Thomas himself, In Metaph. V, 1 (1012b34).

†20. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, q. 4 (PL 40, 12; CCL 44A, 13).

†21. good apprehended . . . of the will: Arist. On the Soul, III, 10 (433b11-13) as is said below Q. 16, a. 3 arg. 7.

†22. to be determined . . . of nature: cf. Arist. Metaph. IX, 2 (1046b5-6).

†23. Hence the intellect necessarily assents . . . known: cf. Thomas himself *Super Sent.* II, d. 25, a. 2.

†24. nor can anyone will misery: August. On the Trinity XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 5, a. 8 On the contrary.

†25. the movement of fire . . . such a form: cf. Arist. Physics VIII, 4 (255b34-256a1).

†26. incline the will . . . He wishes: Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 1, 24 (PL 191, 1332A) from August. On Grace and Free Will, ch. 21, n. 43 (PL 44, 909) as above q. 3, a. 1 arg. 1.

†27. that from which . . . properly called the cause: Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales*, tr. 5, n. 19 (De Rijk 67); cf. also Thomas himself In Metaph. V, 6 (1015a20-21).

†28. for instance when the fingers . . . sight for instance contradicts this: example of Arist. Metaph. IV, 6 (1011a33-34); On Dreams, ch. 2 (460b20-27); Arist. (pseudo), *Problemata* XXXI (958b14), (959a15), XXXV (965a36); cf. also Albert, Metaph. IV tr. 3, c. 7 (Col. XVI, 196); On Sleep and Sleeplessness II tr. 1, c. 7. To make the example clearer than it is here in the text, we have used the example as it is given in the text of On Dreams.

†29. as is evident in persons possessed: cf. August. Literal Commentary on Genesis XII, c. 19 (PL 34, 470; CSEL 28-1, 408).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 80, a. 2.

†1. Grennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, cap. 81 (PL 58, 999A).

†2. August. *On the Trinity* III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 875; CCL 50, 139).

†3. Arist. *Metaph.* VII, 8 (1033b19-1034a8).

†4. Arist. *On the Soul* II, 30 [III, 3] (429a1-2) according to the older transl. (Alonso p. 285).

†5. in the likeness of a serpent: Genesis 3, 1ff.

†6. Christ in the desert: Matthew 4, 1.

†7. Dionys. *On the Celestial Hierarchy* ch. . 4 § 3 (PG 3, 180C; Dion. 811) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth*, q. 12, a. 8 *On the contrary* 2.

†8. it is said that to understand is a sort of undergoing [i.e. being acted upon]: Arist. *On the Soul* III, 4 (429b24) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth*, q. 12, a. 1 *Reply to 1 On the contrary*.

†9. Arist. *Metaph.* VII, 8 (1033b19-1034a8).

†10. August. *On the Trinity* III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 876; CCL 50, 141).

†11. August. *On the Trinity* III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 876; CCL 50, 141).

†12. Arist. *On Dreams*, ch. 3 (461b11ff.).

†13. treasury . . . species interiorly retained: Avicenna, *De Anima* IV, c. 1 (f. 17 vb C; Van Riet 8) as is said *Super Sent.* I, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1 ad 2.

†14. Philosopher says in the same book: Arist. *On Dreams*, ch. 2 (460b5-7).

†15. demons are called tempters: cf. e.g. Matthew 4, 3; Mark 1, 13; Luc 4, 1.

†16. August. *Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*, q. 12 (PL 40, 14; CCL 44A, 19) as is said above q. 3, a. 3 *arg.* 12.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: Ia, q. 114, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 80, a. 4.

†1. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 4 (PG 94, 877B; Bt 77).

†2. Dionys. *On the Div. Names* ch. 4 § 18 (PG 3, 716A; Dion. 231).

†3. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) III, c. 5, n. 22 (PL 83, 664A).

†4. Grennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* cap. 82 (PL 58, 999A).

†5. Response: this response, from the beginning to 'by which our first parents' and from 'And if any sins' to 'imitate him who was the first to sin' is contained verbatim in Ia, q. 114, a. 3 in the Response and Reply to 2.

†6. Origin, *On First Principles* III, c. 2, n. 2 translation of Rufinus (PG 11, 305C-D; GCS 22, 247); [Engl. transl. of Origin's *Peri Archon* under the title *On First Principles* by G. W. Butterworth, Torchbook Edition (Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1973)].

†7. Isidore: as above in arg. 4.

†8. children of the devil . . . him who was the first to sin: August. Gospel of St. John tract XLII, n. 10 (PL 37, 1703; CCL 36, 369).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 6

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 76, a. 1; In Nic. Ethics III, 3.

†1. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 24 (PG 94, 953B; Bt 146).

†2. Cf. August. *On True Religion* ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†3. August. *On Two Souls* ch. 10, n. 12 (PL 42, 103; CSEL 25-1, 68).

†4. in regard to turning-from . . . nature of evil: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†5. Dionys. *On the Div. Names* ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732D; Dion. 307).

†6. intentional ignorance: cf. Guill. Altiss. *Summa Aurea* II, tr. 29, c. 1, q. 3 (f. 93 ra).

†7. Bede: we have not found this opinion which is commonly ascribed to Bede.

†8. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A) from Gregory, *Moralia* XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A); cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 22, c. 4 n. 11.

†9. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 131).

†10. Arist. *Physics* VIII, 4 (255b15-256a3).

†11. For the knowledge of grammar . . . speaking correctly: cf. Peter Helias, *Comm. In Priscianum Maior.*: 'Grammatica ergo est scientia gnara recte loquendi', i.e. 'Grammar is the scientific knowledge of writing and speaking correctly' (ms. Brugge Stadsbibl. 535 f. 1 ra).

†12. Arist. On the Soul III, 11 (434a16-22).

†13. inordinate concupiscence (concupiscentia fomitis): cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 8.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 7

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 22, q. 2, a. 1; I-IIae, q. 76, a. 2; Quodlib. I, q. 9, a. 3.

†1. Opposites belong to the same genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 8 (1058a11); Topics IV, c. 3 (123b3-5).

†2. August. On the Trinity V, c. 7 (PL 42, 916; CCL 50, 213).

†3. knowledge . . . of habit: cf. Arist. Categories ch. 8 (8b28-29).

†4. sin . . . of God: August. Reply to Faustus XXII, c. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25-1, 621) [as cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1] as is said below q. 7, a. 1 arg. 1; [transl. of Reply to Faustus in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers, Vol. IV].

†5. Alanus de Insulis, Regulae de Sacra Theologia 75 (PL 210, 660C).

†6. August. Retractations I, c. 15 [c. 14], n. 3 (PL 32, 609; CSEL 36, 74); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 60].

†7. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 19, n. 53 (PL 32, 1297; CCL 29, 306; CSEL 74, 133).

†8. all men . . . to know: Arist. Metaph. I, 1 (980a21) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth, q. 2, a. 3 arg. 15.

†9. Moreover: The same argument is found in Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 22, a. 2, q. 2 contra 4.

†10. Every sin is voluntary: cf. August. On True Religion ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†11. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1111a22-23).

†12. Besides: The same argument is found in Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 22, a. 2, q. 2 contra 3.

†13. No sin . . . except original sin: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 32, c. 1, n. 6 from August. On Marriage and Concupiscence I, c. 26, n. 29 (PL 44, 430; CSEL 42, 241).

†14. Moreover: The same argument is found in Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 22, a. 2, q. 2 contra 5.

†15. namely by rejection: cf. Glossa of Peter Lomb. in I Cor. 14, 38 (PL 191, 1672D).

†16. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 24, n. 71 (PL 32, 1306; CCL 29, 317; CSEL 74, 148).

†17. for this is . . . of any privation: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 22 (1022b22-30); IX, 1 (1046a32-36).

†18. On the other hand, error . . . as true: cf. August. e.g. Enchiridion ch. 17 (PL 40, 239; CCL 46, 57).

†19. Dionys. rightly On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 § 3 (PG 3, 209C; Dion. 859).

†20. faith directs intention: August. Expositions on the Psalms Ps. 31, 1, n. 4 (PL 36, 259; CCL 38, 227) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 22, a. 13 arg. 11.

†21. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments I pars 7, c. 27 (PL 176, 293D); [transl. under the title On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith by Roy J. Ferrari (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1951)].

†22. absence of original justice: Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 82, a. 1 arg. 1. In fact it is an opinion of certain ancient doctors [of the Church] extracted from the words of Anselm as Albert reports in Super Sent. II, d. 30, a. 3.

†23. the fomes: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 8.

†24. turning to a transitory good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35), III. c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 8

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 22, q. 2, a. 2; I-IIae, Q. 76, aa. 3 and 4; Super Romans cap. 1, lect. 7; Super I Timothy cap. 1, lect. 3; Super Dionys. De Div Nom. cap. 4, lect. 22; Quodlib. VIII, q. 6, a. 5; In Nic. Ethics III, 11, and V, 13.

†1. Ambrose: rightly Glossa of Peter Lombard on Rom. 2, 4 (PL 191, 1338D).

†2. neque a toto neque a tanto (either wholly or by much): the wording since the time of the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 324 (p. 329).

†3. Decretum C. 24, q. 1, c. 34 (Friedberg I, 979).

†4. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 5 (1113b30-31) according to the older transl. (Gauthier 33-34).

†5. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110b28).

†6. of the nature . . . is voluntary: cf. August. On True Religion ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†7. good apprehended . . . object of the will: Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b12-13) as is said e.g. below q. 16, a. 3 arg. 7.

†8. ignorance of the law: cf. Decretum C. 1, q. 4, c. 12 (Friedberg I, 422) and Digesta 22. 6. 1, 2, 4, 9 (Mommsen 293).

†9. every wicked man is ignorant: Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110b28) as is said above in arg. 5.

†10. when it is invincible: Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 5, n. 1 and Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 29, c. 1, q. 3 (f. 93rb).

†11. is customarily explained: Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 323 (p. 328); Albert, Super Sent. II, d. 22, a. 9 ad 3; Bonaventure, Super. Sent. II, d. 22, a. 2, q. 3 ad 2.

†12. Or he is speaking . . . : Thomas has nearly the same exposition from this first 'Or he is speaking' to the end of this reply, in *Super Rom. cap. 2, lect. 1*.

†13. ignorance . . . intentional: cf. *Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 29, c. 1, q. 3 (f. 93ra)*.

†14. to sin from weakness: *Isidore Sententiae. II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A)* from *Gregory, Moralia XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A)*; cf. *Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11*.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 9

†p Parallel texts: *I-IIae, q. 77, a. 2 and 3*; *In Nic. Ethics VII, 3*.

†1. *Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b12-13)*.

†2. *Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732D; Dion. 306)*.

†3. *Arist. On Interpretation (Perihermeneias) II, c. 14 (23b35ff.)*.

†4. A universal negative . . . are contradictory: cf. *Peter of Spain Summulae Logicales tr. 1, n. 12 (De Rijk 6)*.

†5. contraries . . . in the same subject: cf. *Arist. Metaph. IV, 6 (1011b21)*.

†6. opinion . . . fear of the contrary: cf. *Avicenna De Anima V, c. 1 (f. 22vb; Van Riet 79)*; *Isaac Liber de Diffinicionibus (Muckle 340)*.

†7. *Arist. Posterior Analytics I, 1 (71a16-19)*.

†8. *Arist. On Interpretation I, 1 (16a3-4)* as is said in *Q. D. On Truth q. 2, a. 1*.

†9. *August. The City of God XIV, c. 20 (PL 41, 428; CCL 48, 442; CSEL 40-2, 44)*.

†10. *Bede*: An opinion commonly ascribed to *Bede*; cf. e.g. *I-IIae, q. 85, a. 3* On the contrary. We have found nothing on this.

†11. every action occurs through contact: *Arist. On Generation and Corruption I, 6 (322b23-24)* as is said below *q. 16, a. 10 arg. 3*.

†12. *Isidore De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A)* from *Gregory Moralia XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A)*; cf. *Peter Lombard Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11*.

†13. generally accepted by all: cf. authors and works cited above in fn. 12.

†14. when some bodily humor . . . something of the sort: cf. definition of health in *Averroes, In Metaph. V, comm. 25 (VIII, 133H)*, *Maimonides, Dux Neutrorum (Guide for the Perplexed) III, c. 11 (Justiniani, f. 75v)*; [cf. Appendix for transl. of *Maimonides' work*].

†15. *August. The City of God XIV, c. 7, n. 2 (PL 41, 411; CCL 48, 423; CSEL 40-2, 14)*.

†16. Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 2 (1145b21-27).

†17. he called: Socrates as reported by Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 13 (1144b27-29).

†18. he called: Socrates as reported by Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 2 (1145b27-28).

†19. whenever . . . intent on its act: cf. Avicenna De Anima IV, c. 2 (f. 18 ra B; Van Riet 14).

†20. acts are about particulars: Arist. Metaph. I, 1 (981a16-17) as referred to by Thomas In Metaph. V, 3 (1014a20-25).

†21. By reason of the passions . . . body: Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I. 4 (319b33) as is said e.g. Super Sent. III, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 sol. 1.

†22. and choice is the desire of what has been decided on by previous deliberation: Arist. Nic. Ethics III. 2 (1112a14-16) as is said below in q. 6, On the contrary 1.

†23. and deliberation is a kind of inquiry: cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22 (PG 94, 945B; Bt 137).

†24. But the intemperate man . . . However both the continent and incontinent man . . . Hence each uses four propositions: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 3 (1147a25ff) as is said I-IIae, q. 77, a. 2 Reply to 4.

†25. Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 3 (1147a10-24).

†26. Arist. Politics I, 5 (1254b3-5).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 10

†p Parallel texts: I-II, q. 77, a. 8.

†1. affection of the soul . . . affection of the body: cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22 (PG 94, 940C; Bt 132); and Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. c. 18 (PG 40, 677B; Verbeke 96), as is said I-IIae q. 31, a. 3. in the Latin text of St. Thomas the word used here is 'passio', i.e. 'passion', which we have translated as 'affection', one of the meanings of the Greek word 'pathos'. to avoid the rather enigmatic phrase 'passion of the body'. which even the use of the phrase 'affection of the body' does not clarify very much. In fact the word 'passion' here is used in a broad sense in reference to both the soul and the body. A passion of the soul is an emotion or an affection, its usual meaning; as extended to the body, 'passion' refers to an urge or impulse, e.g. bodily urges related to sex, food or drink. This interpretation is confirmed in the text On the Orthodox Faith noted above in which Damascene says, "the term 'passion' is equivocal", and in speaking of 'passions of the body' he says "in its common and general sense it means 'animal passions'."

†2. Sin . . . on account of its consequence: cf. Thomas himself, Super Sent. II, d. 21, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5 and below in q. 7, a. 1 at the beginning of the Response in fn. 31.

†3. shameful or criminal acts: cf. August. On Christian Instruction III, c. 10, n. 16 (PL 34, 72; CCL 32, 87; CSEL 80, 89); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 4.

†4. Peter: cf. Matth. 27, 70-72; Mark 14, 68-70; Luke 22, 57-60; John 18, 25-27.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 11

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 77, a. 6.

†1. August. The City of God IX, c. 5 (PL 41, 261; CCL 47, 254; CSEL 40-1, 415).

†2. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 32, 1225; CCL 29, 215; CSEL 74, 9).

†3. That on account of which sin becomes pardonable: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. n. 11.

†4. Voluntary . . . is in the agent himself: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1111a22-23).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 12

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 43, a. 1; I-IIae, q. 78, a. 1.

†1. 'from malice i.e. from certain knowledge': cf. Isidore, Sententiae II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 85, 620A) from Gregory, Moralia XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A); cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11.

In the question raised here we have used 'with malice aforethought' in place of 'from certain knowledge' as it is in the text itself. It could be translated 'deliberately', or according to Gregory 'of set purpose', or 'intentionally', but this would raise difficulties in relation to other contexts in which these (especially the first and the third) are used, so it seemed better to use a phrase more consistent with Thomas's phrase.

†2. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion. 236) and § 31 (PG 732B; Dion. 304).

†3. object of the will . . . apprehended good: Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b12-13) as is said below q. 16, a. 3 arg. 7.

†4. loves wine only incidentally: example of Arist. Topics II, c. 3 (111a4) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 26, a. 4 On the contrary.

†5. of itself what is heavy moves downward: cf. Arist. e.g. Physics II, 9 (200a2).

†6. Bede: an opinion commonly ascribed to Bede cf. e.g. I-IIae, q. 85, a. 3 On the contrary, on which we have found nothing.

†7. thus the same thing . . . the cause of itself: cf. Alan. de Insulis, De Arte seu Art. Cathol. Fidei I, reg. 8 (PL 210, 600A).

†8. a sin . . . the gravest sin: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43 in its entirety.

†9. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 31 (PG 3, 732B; Dion. 303-304).

†10. Damascene: rightly Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. cap. 40 (PG 40, 769B; Verbeke 147).

†11. contraries . . . same genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 8 (1058a10-11); Topics IV, c. 3 (123b4).

†12. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 9 (1117b22-23).

†13. synderesis is never extinguished: cf. Thomas himself Q. D. On Truth q. 16, a. 3. Synderesis is not a special power but a special habit in man's practical reason comparable to the special habit in man's speculative reason. For a fuller explanation of synderesis cf. *Summa Theologiae* Ia, q. 79, a. 12.

†14. August. *Confessions* II, c. 6, n. 12 (PL 32, 680; CSEL 33, 38).

†15. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 5 (1113b14-15).

†16. in the same place: *Nic. Ethics* III, 5 (1114a12-14).

†17. merchant . . . will not be lost: example of Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 1 (1110a8-11).

†18. August. *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* II, c. 14, n. 47 (PL 34, 1290; CCL 35, 139).

†19. which is a good quality of the mind: Augustine's definition of virtue as cited by Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 27, c. 1, n. 1 (cf. note in Quaracchi ed. 1971, p. 480).

†20. The universal principles . . . pertain to synderesis: Augustine as cited by Thomas *Super Sent.* II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 arg. 3 and Albert, *Summa de Homine*, q. 71, a. 1 arg. 2. Although our text as it is here is not found verbatim in Augustine, the wording can be gathered from his work on *The Free Choice of the Will* II, c. 10, n. 29 (PL 32, 1256; CCL 29, 257; CSEL 74, 65) and *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 15 (PL 42, 1052; CCL 50A, 450-451). In regard to the first principles of natural law cf. *Summa Theologiae* I-IIae, q. 91, a. 2 and q. 94, a. 2.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 13

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 78, a. 4.

†1. Whether He Who . . . etc.: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11.

†2. by some: cf. *Glossa Ordinarius* as here below in Reply to 2.

†3. Cassian, *Collationes Patrum* IV, c. 19 (PL 49, 606C-607A); [transl. under the title *Conferences* by Colm Luibheld (New York: Paulist Press, 1985)].

†4. voluntary . . . in the agent himself: cf. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 1 (1111a22-23).

†5. passion, which passes quickly: cf. Arist. *Categories* ch. 8 (9b28-29).

†6. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 8 (1150b33-35)

†7. Arist. *Physics* II, 9 (200a19-24).

†8. *Glossa Ordin.* on *Ecclesiasticus* 42, 14 from Gregory *Moralia* XI, c. 49, n. 65 (PL 75, 982D-983A).

Footnotes to Question III, Article 14

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 43, a. 1 and 2; II-IIae, q. 14, a. 1; *Super Matth.* cap. 12, 31-32; *Super Rom.* cap. 2, lect. 1; *Quodlib.* II, q. 8, a. 1.

†1. But a sin . . . in the heart and in deed: Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 12, 3 (PL 191, 1650C) from Augustine On the Gospel of St. John tract. LXXIV, n. 1 (PL 35, 1827; CCL 36, 513) as below Reply to 1.

†2. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. n. 1-5.

†3. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. n. 2.

†4. August. Epistle 185, c. 11, n. 49 (PL 33, 814; CSEL 57, 42); [transl in The Fathers of the Church Vol. IV of the Letters; Vol. 12 in the series.

†5. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. n. 2.

†6. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion. 236) and § 31 (PG 3, 732B; Dion. 304).

†7. Malice is twofold . . . contracted . . . committed malice: cf. Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 43, a. 2, q. 1.

†8. Bede: A statement commonly ascribed to Bede e.g. I-IIae, q. 85, a. 3 On the contrary, on which however we have found nothing.

†9. Masters: an opinion already cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. n. 1. Cf. also Glossa of Peter Lomb. in Rom. 2, 4 (PL 191, 1340); Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II tr. 30, c. 4 (f. 108 va; Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 689 (p. 676); and Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 43, a. 2, q. 2.

†10. August. Confessions VIII, c. 5, n. 10 (PL 32, 753; CSEL 33, 178).

†11. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. n. 2.

†12. Moreover, as power is appropriated, etc.: An argument taken from Peter Lomb. Sententiae II. d. 43, c. unic. n. 11.

†13. namely, Hilary, etc.: Hilary, Comment. on Matth. cap. 12, n. 17 (PL 9, 989). See Thomas himself Catena super Matth. 12, 32. Ambrose, Expos. on Luke, VII, n. 119 (PL 15, 1729B [1817]; CCL 14, 253; CSEL 32-4, 332). Jerome, Comment. on Matth. II, c. 12, 32 (PL 26, 81 [84A]; CCL 77, 95). Chrysostom, ex Catena super Matth. 12, 32; Cf. John Chrysostom, In Matth. hom. 41, n. 3 (PG 57, 449); [transl. of Chrysostom's Homilies On the Gospel of St. Matthew in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. X].

†14. according as . . . and Holy: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae I, d. 10, c. 3.

†15. Pharisees: cf. Matth. 12, 24; Luke 11, 15.

†16. in the Gospel: cf. Matth. 12, 32; Luke 12, 10.

†17. it is stated that . . . in the world to come: Matth. 12, 32.

†18. August. De Verbis Domini: i.e. Sermo 71, c. 3 n. 5-6 (PL 38, 447-448).

†19. August. On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount I, c. 22, n. 73-75 (PL 34, 1266-1267; CCL 35, 81-85); cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43, c. unic. [Transl. of Augustine's work On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount in Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers Vol. VI and in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 11].

†20. August. De Verbis Domini: i.e. Sermo 71, c. 3, n. 6 (PL 38, 448).

†21. August. Retractations I, c. 19, n. 7 (PL 32, 616; CSEL 36, 93); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 60].

†22. August. De Verbis Domini: i.e. Sermo 71, c. 6-9 (PL 38, 450-452).

†23. many words . . . Jeremiah: cf. August. Sermo 71, c. 13, n. 22 (PL 38, 456) according to Thomas Super Matth. cap. 12, 32.

†24. the Prophets: e.g. Isaiah 38, 4; Jeremiah 1, 4.

†25. Holy Spirit . . . through charity: cf. August. Sermo 71, c. 12 and c. 20 (PL 38, 453-455 and 463-464) according to Thomas Super Matth. cap. 12, lect. 2.

†26. August. Sermo 71, c. 12, n. 20 (PL 38, 455).

†27. Masters: Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 30, c. 4 (f. 108rb); Albert Super Sent. II, d. 43, a. 1; Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 43, a. 1.

†28. a heavy object moves downward: Arist. Physics II, 9 (200a2).

†29. the removal of an impediment: Arist. Physics VIII, 4 (255b17-31).

†30. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 43 c. unic. n. 2.

†31. According to the opinion . . . according to other opinions: see the Response.

†32. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 12, 3 (PL 191, 1650C) from August. On the Gospel of St. John tract. LXXIV, n. 1 (PL 35, 1827; CCL 36, 513); [transl. in Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers Vol. VII].

†33. according to the interpretation of the early saints . . . of the Masters: see the Response.

†34. according to the early saints . . . Augustine and the Masters: in the Response.

†35. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 4 (1105a27ff). Cf. also V, 6 (1134a16) as is said II-IIae, q. 14, a. 4 arg. 2.

Footnotes to Question III, Article 15

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 43, a. 4; II-IIae, q. 14, a. 3; Quodlib. II, q. 8, a. 1; Lect. super Matth. cap. 12, 31-32; Super Rom. cap. 2, lect. 1.

†1. August. On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount I, c. 22, n. 74 (PL 34, 1266; CCL 35, 84); (actually Augustine there is speaking of Judas).

†2. contraries are healed by contraries: the opinion of Hippocrates as reported by Jerome Epistle 121 praef. (PL 22, 1007; CSEL 56, 4). Cf. Hippocrates De Flatibus I (Heiberg p. 92, 7-8 and Nelson p. 7). [Many of Jerome's Letters are translated in the Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers, Second Series, Vol. VI, but not Letter 121.]

†3. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 26 (PL 40, 17-18; CCL 44A, 32).

†4. Rightly Matth. 12, 31.

†5. August. Sermo 71, c. 13, n. 21 (PL 38, 456).

†6. according to Augustine's interpretation: Sermo 71, c. 12, n. 20 (PL 38, 455).

†7. August. Sermo 71, c. 12, n. 20 (PL 38, 455).

†8. Gregory: Dialogues IV, c. 39 (PL 77, 396A-B); [transl. by Odo John Zimmerman, in *The Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 39.

†9. other interpretations: see above in q. 3, a. 14.

†10. wine-bibber and a glutton: cf. Matth. 11, 19.

†11. inasmuch as a person . . . in the Church: see above in q. 3, a. 14.

†12. John Chrysostom from Catena in Matth. 12, 32. Cf. John Chrysostom In Matth. hom. 41, n. 3 (PG 57, 449),

†13. charity is said never to fall away: cf. I Cor. 13, 8.

†14. 'Venial' is said of sin in three ways . . . by reason of its genus . . . from the outcome . . . by reason of the cause: cf. Thomas himself Super Sent. II, d. 21, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5 and here below q. 7, a. 1, beginning of the Response, in fn. 31.

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, D. 30, q. 1, a. 1; *ibid.*, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1; Cont. Gent. IV, c. 50-52; I-IIae, q. 81, a. 1; Super Rom. cap. 5, lect. 3; Comp. Theol. I, c. 196.

†1. It is worth noting that in approaching the complex topic of original sin, the order Thomas follows is first to raise the question of whether any sin is contracted by way of origin before addressing the question of what is original sin; in other words, *An est* (Whether it is?) before *Quid est* (What it is?).

†2. the spiritual death of the soul: cf. August. The Gospel of St. John, tract. XLIX, n. 3 (PL 35, 1748; CCL 36, 421).

†3. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, cap. 14 (PL 58, 984B).

†4. which is the cause of sin: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 31, c. 5, n. 1.

†5. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 5 (1114a25-28).

†6. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1221-1222; CCL 29, 211; CSEL 74, 3).

†7. suffering . . . of being acted upon: cf. *Liber Sex Principiorum* III [29] (Minio-Paluello 41) =

Porphyry's Isagoge [see Appendix for translation].

†8. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, cap. 76 (PL 58, 998A).

†9. active and passive qualities: cf. Arist. *On Generation and Corruption* II, 2 (329b24); *Meteorology* IV, c. 1 (378b10ff); and Thomas himself *In De Anima* I, 14 and *ibid.* II, 5.

†10. Anselm, *On the Virgin Conception* ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 82, a. 1 arg. 1. In fact it is a definition of certain early doctors which is taken from the words of Anselm as Albert reports in *Super Sent.* II, d. 30, a. 3.

†11. Anselm: as above in fn. 10.

†12. Dionys. *On the Div. Names* ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 281).

†13. Movement . . . in the composite: cf. Arist. *On the Heavens* I, 2 (269a1-3).

†14. commonly: see below q. 5, a. 1 and Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II. d. 33, c. 2, n. 5.

†15. Nothing . . . is in act: cf. Arist. *Physics* III, 2 (202a10-11); Averroes *In Phys.* III, comm. 17 (IV, 92D), *In De Anima* III, comm. 4 (VI, 137F; Crawford 384).

†16. detached seed: cf. Albert e.g. *De Animalibus* XV tr. 2, c. 1 (St II, 1015ff.).

†17. On the contrary: this first argument On the contrary, in its entirety is taken from the Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 5, 12-13 (PL 191, 1388B-C).

†18. Rightly Wisdom 2, 24-25.

†19. Rightly August. *On the City of God* XIII, c. 14 (PL 41, 386; CCL 48, 395; CSEL 40-1, 632).

†20. Pelagians: as August. reports e.g. *De Haeres.* cap. 88 (PL 42, 48; CCL 46, 341); Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 5, 12-13 (PL 191, 1388B-C) taken from August. *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins* I, c. 9, n. 9 (PL 44, 114; CSEL 60, 10) [transl. in *Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers* Vol. V]; August. (pseudo) *Hypognosticon*. praef. n. 3 (PL 45, 1614), *ibid.* V. c. 1, n. 1 (PL 45, 1647).

†21. Dionys. *On the Eccl. Hier.* ch. 7 pars. 3 § 11 (PG 3, 568 A-B; Dion. 1468ff.) as is said *Quodlib.* III, q. 5, a. 1.

†22. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* IX, 8 (1168b31-32) as referred to by Thomas Ia, q. 75, a. 4 Reply to 1.

†23. not only . . . seminal power: August. *A Literal Commentary on Genesis* X, c. 20, n. 35 (PL 34, 424; CSEL 28-1, 323) as is said Ia, q. 119, a. 2 arg. 4.

†24. August. *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* I, c. 10, n. 11 (PL 44, 115; CSEL 60, 12) according to the Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 5, 12 (PL 191, 1389A) as Thomas reports *Super Rom.* 5, 12; [transl. of Augustine's work in *Nic. and Post Nic. Fathers* Vol. V].

†25. we say color . . . an intention of it: Thomas explains this more fully in *Q. D. On Truth* q. 27, a. 4 Reply to 4 and in *Q. D. On the Power of God* q. 3, a. 7 Reply to 7.

†26. soul is in the seed . . . an intention of it: Cf. Arist. *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 1 (735a4-9);

cf. Albert De Animal. XVI, tr. 1, c. 8 (St II, 1084) and Quaest. Super De Animal. XVI, q. 1 (Col. XII 273).

†27. Boethius, On the Trinity ch. 2 (PL 64, 1250 D).

†28. Arist. On the Generation of Animals II, c. 3 (736b30ff.). See Albert, De Animal. XVI tr. 1, c. 13 (St II, 1097ff.) and Quaest. Super De Animal. XVI, q. 3 (Col. XII, 275).

†29. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729 C; Dion. 298).

†30. Arist. On the Generation of Animals II, c. 3 (736b30ff.); cf. Albert, De Animal XVI tr. 1, c. 13 (St II, 1097ff.) and Quaest. Super Animal. XVI, q. 3 (Col. XII, 275).

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 82, aa. 1 and 3.

†1. August. On the Baptism of Infants (i.e. On Merits and Remission of Sins and On the Baptism of Infants I, c. 9, n. 10 (PL 44, 115; CSEL 60, 11) according to the wording of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 10, n. 1; [transl. of Augustine's work in Nic. and Post- Nic. Fathers Vol. V].

†2. Anselm: rightly The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice q. 3, c. 7 (PL 158, 530C; Schmitt II, 274); [transl. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson in Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. 2 (Toronto/New York: Edwin Mellon Press, 1976)].

†3. in the same book: Anselm, rightly Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man) I, c. 24 (PL 158, 397A; Schmitt II, 92).

†4. August. Retractations I, c. 15, n. 2 (PL 32, 609; CSEL 36, 73).

†5. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 30 (PG 94, 976A; Bt 162); see also ibid. IV, c. 20 (PG 94, 1196C; Bt 356).

†6. nature . . . animals this: Digesta I, tit. 1, lege 1 (Mommsen 1); Institutiones I, tit. 2, lege 1 (Krueger 1).

†7. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 25 (PG 3, 728B; Dion. 287).

†8. Arist. Nic. Ethics, II, 1 (1103a15ff.).

†9. the common opinion of theologians: a opinion referring to the definition of virtue by the Master (Peter Lombard) taken from Augustine: 'virtue as Augustine says is a good quality of the mind which enables us to live rightly and which no one uses badly which God alone works in man,' Sententiae II, d. 27, c. 1, n. 1; see August. On the Free Choice of the Will II, c. 19, n. 50 (PL 32, 1268; CCL 29, 271; CSEL 74, 85) as is said e.g. I-IIae q. 55, a. 4 On the contrary.

†10. original sin . . . of every sin: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 8.

†11. original sin . . . as to its guilt: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 32, c. 1, n. 6 from August. On Marriage and Concupiscence I, c. 26, n. 29 (PL 44, 430; CSEL 42, 241).

†12. according to Augustine: cf. e.g. *Against Julian* V, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 44, 787); [transl. in *The Fathers of the Church* Vol. 35].

†13. Anselm *On the Harmony of the Foreknowl. Predest. and the Grace of God with Free Choice* q. 3, c. 7 (PL 158, 529D; Schmitt II, 273); [cf. fn. 2 above for transl.].

†14. in the same book: Anselm *On the Harmony of the Foreknowledge . . .* q. 3, a. 7 (PL 158, 530A; Schmitt II, 273); for transl. cf. fn. 2 above].

†15. Hugh or St. Victor, *On the Sacraments* I pars 7, c. 28 (PL 176, 299A).

†16. Anselm, *On the Virgin Conception*. ch. 24 (PL 158, 458C; Schmitt II, 167); [transl. in Anselm of Canterbury, *Theological Treatises* Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity School Library, 1967)].

†17. the Master: Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 24, c. 1, n. 2ff.; see also Summa of Alexander of Hales I-II, n. 492 (p. 689).

†18. heretical: cf. Grennadius Lib. *De Eccl. Dogm.* cap. 34 (PL 58, 989A).

†19. The subject . . . of an accident: Arist. *Metaph.* VII, 5 (1030b14ff) and Averroes, *In Metaph.* VII, comm. 18 (VIII, 167E) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 3, a. 7 arg. 2.

†20. Also it was said . . . : the same argument is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 221 (p. 235).

†21. the Gloss: Glossa of Peter Lomb. at this place [i.e. Psalm 84, 2] (PL 191, 795D).

†22. Moreover . . . : the same argument is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 221 (p. 235).

†23. Ambrose: *Apologia David altera* cap. 3, n. 19 (PL 14, 893B [935A]).

†24. Hugh of St. Victor: *De Sacramentis* I pars 7, c. 31 (PL 176, 302A).

†25. Furthermore . . . : almost the same argument is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II arg. 1, n. 221 (p. 235).

†26. Anselm: cf. *On the Virgin Conception*. ch. 28 (PL 158, 462A; Schmitt II, 171); [for transl. cf. above fn. 16].

†27. August. rightly *On the City of God* XIV, c. 19 (PL 41, 427; CCL 48, 442; CSEL 40-2, 42).

†28. turning away from . . . to a mutable good: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35); *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†29. body . . . is composed: cf. Arist. *On Longevity and Shortness of Life* ch. 3 (465b1ff.); Albert *De Morte et Vita* tr. 2, c. 2.

†30. through the detachment . . . seed: cf. Albert e.g. *De Animalibus* XV tr. 2, c. 1 (St II, 1015ff.).

†31. namely the will: cf. Anselm (pseudo) i.e. Eadmerus, *De Similitudinibus* cap. 2 (PL 159, 605C) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 22, a. 12 *On the contrary* 1.

†32. Arist. On the Soul III, c. 11 (434a12-15).

†33. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. p. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 733A; Dion. 309).

†34. hence it is . . . in a dog: example of Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 25 (PG 3, 728B; Dion. 286).

†35. a heavy body . . . downwards: cf. Arist. e.g. Physics VIII, 4 (255b13-27).

†36. August. Retractations I, c. 15, n. 2 (PL 32, 608; CSEL 36, 73).

†37. Nor do I believe . . . with purely natural endowments: cf. Thomas himself Ia, q. 95, a. 1.

†38. Anselm On Truth ch. 12 (PL 158, 482B; Schmitt I, 194) as is said above q. 2, a. 11 arg. 14; see also On the Virgin Conception. ch. 3 (PL 158, 436A; Schmitt II, 143).

†39. if snub-nosed . . . of snub-nosed: example of Aristotle in Metaph. VII, 11 (1037a30).

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 83, a. 1.

†1. August. (pseudo): Advers. Quinque Haereses cap. 5, n. 7 (PL 42, 1107).

†2. But the punishment . . . is death: cf. below q. 5, a. 4.

†3. Ambrose, De Noe et Arca, cap. 12, n. 41 (PL 14, 379A [398C]; CSEL 32-1, 439).

†4. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 7 (1097b23-1098a17).

†5. if it be a univocal cause . . . if it be a non-univocal agent: Arist. Metaph. VII, 9 (1034a21-23) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 11, a. 2.

†6. as the sun generates man: example of Arist. Phys. II, 2 (194b13).

The sun is a more universal cause, and is regarded by Aristotle as being of a different nature, i.e. incorruptible, and brings about something neither the same nor similar in species, as e.g. man, and hence is a non-univocal, i.e. an equivocal cause of man. An implied point is that there would be no generation or life without the sun.

†7. there is a twofold order . . . but on the contrary . . . to act: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 11 (1018b9-1019a14) and *ibid.* IX, 8 (1049b4-1050a2).

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1; I-IIae, q. 83, a. 2.

†1. Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 31, a. 1, q. 2 does not hold the opinion approved here by Thomas [i.e. that original sin is first in the essence of the soul].

†2. Anselm On the Virgin Conception ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 82, a. 1 arg. 1. In fact this is a definition of certain early doctors extracted from the words of Anselm as Albert reports in Super Sent. II, d. 30, a. 3.

†3. as he himself says: Anselm On the Virgin Conception ch. 3 (PL 158, 436A; Schmitt II, 143).

†4. August. Retractations I, c. 15, n. 2 (PL 32, 608; CSEL 36, 73).

†5. original sin . . . fuel (fomes) of sin: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 8.

†6. But such a defect . . . but of punishment: cf. August. (pseudo) De Fide ad Petrum cap. 21, n. 64 (PL 40, 773) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 700A; CCL 91A, 751).

†7. Arist. Metaph. I, 1 (981a16-17) as cited by Thomas In Metaph. V, 3 (1014a20-25).

†8. end of generation . . . of the thing generated: cf. Averroes In Phys. II comm. 70 (IV, 73M), and Thomas himself In Phys. II, 11 and Ia, q. 44, a. 4 arg. 2 and Reply to 2.

†9. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170). See above arg. 1 in fn. 2.

†10. At first sight . . . compelling: the opinion of Thomas himself, Super Sent. II, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1 and ibid. ad 3.

†11. elsewhere: Q. D. De Anima a. 9.

†12. Arist. Metaph. VII, 1 (1028a31-b1).

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1; I-IIae, q. 83, aa. 3-4; Q. D. On Truth q. 25, a. 6.

†1. procreative power . . . more infected: cf. e.g. Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 239 (p. 254) and Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 31, a. 1, q. 3.

†2. Anselm On the Virgin Conception ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170). See above q. 4, a. 4 arg. 1 in fn. 2.

†3. turning from . . . to a transitory good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and ibid. III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†4. the Commentator: an earlier anonymous commentator on Ethics III (Heylbut, p. 169, 21-25) Robert Grosseteste's transl. (Mercken, 293).

†5. Punishment . . . the vision of God: see below q. 5, a. 1.

†6. Anselm: On the Virgin Conception ch. 3 (PL 158, 436A; Schmitt II, 143)

†7. blame: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 5 (1106a1-2).

†8. Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 1 (1129a3-5); cf. also ibid. V, 1 (1129b25ff.).

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 6

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2; I-IIae, q. 81, a. 3.; Super Romans cap. 5, lect. 3.

†1. Death . . . of original sin: see below q. 5, a. 4.

†2. Jerome, Epistle 59, n. 3 (PL 22, 587; CSEL 54, 543); there is a summary of Jerome's answers to Marcella's questions in the Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Second Series Vol. VI.

†3. by all: cf. e.g. Ambrose (pseudo), Super I Thess. 4, 14 (PL 17, 450 [475C]; CSEL 81-3, 226); August. On the City of God XX, c. 20, n. 2 (PL 41, 688; CCL 48, 734; CSEL 40-2, 476) as is said Super Sent. II, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

†4. what rests on opinion: cf. Arist. Topics I, c. 1 (100b21-23).

†5. the impossible . . . from the contingent though false: cf. Thomas himself In Metaph V, 22 (1024b17-21) 'if it is said you are sitting while you are standing it is a false contingent proposition because the predicate is not applicable to the subject although it is not impossible that it be applicable'.

†6. August. Enchiridion ch. 115 (PL 40, 285; CCL 46, 110).

†7. Moreover: almost the same argument is found in Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2 arg. 5.

†8. Furthermore: nearly the same argument is found in Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2 arg. 5.

†9. If the opposite . . . the genus in question: Arist. Topics IV, c. 4 (124b4-5) as in Boethius's translation (Aristoteles Latinus Topica, Minio-Paluello, p. 79).

†10. Besides: nearly the same argument is found in Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2. arg. 2.

†11. Romans 5, 15: from the Glossa of Peter Lomb. (PL 191, 1392D).

†12. August. On the Baptism of Infants (i.e. On the Merits and Remission of Sins and The Baptism of Infants) II, c. 30 (PL 44, 180; CSEL 60, 119).

†13. When the inferior is corrupted . . . but the other way around: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales tr. 5, n. 12 (De Rijk 63); [for transl. see Appendix].

†14. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 7 (PL 158, 441C; Schmitt II, 149).

†15. August. On Man's Perfection in Righteousness ch. 4 (PL 44, 295; CSEL 42, 8).

†16. The action . . . but in time: cf. The Book of Causes prop. and comm. 31 (30); [transl. by Denis J. Brand (Niagara University Press, 1981)].

†17. Arist. On Animals XV (i.e. On the Generation of Animals) I, c. 18) (726a26); cf. Albert, De Animal. XV tr. 2, c. 5, n. 100 (St II, 1035).

†18. to the man . . . not to the sun: cf. Arist. Physics II, 2 (194b13).

†19. August. On Marriage and Concupiscence I, ch. 24 (PL 44, 429; CSEL 42, 239); however see August. (pseudo) De Fide ad Petrum cap. 2, n. 16 (PL 40, 758) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 679B; CCL 91A, 721).

†20. body composed of the elements: cf. Averroes In Metaph. XII, comm. 20 (VIII, 306F).

†21. reduced [i.e. referred] to the active qualities of the elements: Arist. On Gen. and Corr. II, c. 2 (329b23-24); Meteorology IV, c. 1 (378b10ff); see q. 4, a. 1 arg. 9, fn. 9.

†22. to a bad will: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 17, n. 48 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 304; CSEL 74, 130).

†23. Dionys. On the Div. Names ch. 4 § 4 (PG 3, 700A; Dion. 168) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 5, a. 4 arg. 2.

†24. fruit: the word 'pomum' ('fruit-tree' or 'fruit') is not found in Genesis 2, 17 and 3, 3; however it is found in August. Expositions on the Psalms 70, Sermon 2, n. 7 (PL 36, 897; CCL 39, 966); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII]. Perhaps it comes from a false interpretation of Canticle 8, 5.

†25. August. (pseudo) De Fide ad Petrum cap. 2, n. 16 (PL 40, 758) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 679B; CCL 91A, 721).

†26. Arist. Physics II, 3 (194b30-31).

†27. Arist. On the Generation of Animals II, c. 1 (734b5ff.); see Albert De Animal. XVI tr. 1, c. 13 (St II, 1097ff.), and Quaest. Super De Animal. XVI, q. 3 (Col. XII, 275).

†28. Jerome, Epistle, 119, n. 7 (PL 22, 971; CSEL 55, 454); [cf. Jerome's answer in Letters of Jerome, Letter CIX in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers, Second Series, Vol. VI.

†29. others: cf. August. On the City of God XX, c. 20, n. 2 (PL 41, 688; CCL 48, 734; CSEL 40-2, 476).

†30. more commonly held: cf. Albert, Super Sent. IV, d. 43, a. 21; Bonaventure, Super Sent. IV, d. 43, a. 1, q. 2.

†31. August. On the Merits and Remission of Sins and On the Baptism of Infants I, c. 6 (PL 44, 112; CSEL 60, 8); [for transl. cf. fn. 12].

†32. August. The Lord's Sermon on the Mount II, c. 8, n. 28 (PL 34, 1281; CCL 35, 116).

†33. concupiscence . . . material element in original sin: see above q. 4, a. 2 in the Response.

†34. the newness of Christ . . . the oldness of Adam: cf. Romans 6, 4-6 and Glossa of Peter Lomb. ibid. (PL 191, 1403-1404).

†35. if black . . . white expands it: cf. Arist. Topics VII, 3 (153a37-b1); Metaph. X, 7 (1057b8-9). In the English translations of these works referred to here, 'black' is said 'to compress vision' and 'white' 'to pierce vision'.

†36. by rising restored life: cf. the Preface of the Easter Mass.

†37. some: cf. Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 30, a. 3, q. 1.

†38. The Book of Causes prop. 1 and comm.; [for transl. cf. fn. 16].

†39. Arist. in the Response, cf. fn. 27.

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 7

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 31 q. 1, a. 2 ad 3 and ad 4; *ibid.* d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 5; I-IIae, q. 81, a. 4.

†1. The same question is treated by the Master, *Sententiae* II, d. 31, c. 7; Alex. of Hales, *Glossa in Lib. Sent.* II, d. 31, n. 13; Albert, *Super Sent.* II, d. 31, a. 2; and Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 31, *dubium* III concerning the wording of the Master.

†2. Rightly Genesis 4, 1.

†3. *Glossa ordin.* on Genesis 4, 1; cf. August. *A Literal Commentary on Genesis* IX, c. 4 (PL 34, 396; CSEL 28-1, 272).

†4. In the generation . . . by the female: cf. Arist. *On the Generation of Animals* I, c. 2 (716a6-7), *ibid.* II, c. 1 (732a7-8), and c. 4 (738b20). See Albert, *De Animal.* XV, tr. 1, c. 1, n. 7 (St II, 993), *ibid.* XVI, tr. 1, c. 1, n. 3 (St II, 1059) and c. 15, n. 79 (St II, 1104).

†5. matter . . . by the mother: see above in arg. 4.

†6. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 2 (PG 94, 986B; Bt 171).

†7. created nature . . . does nothing superfluous: cf. Averroes, *In Phys.* I, comm. 56 (IV, 33L).

†8. August. *A Literal Comm. on Genesis*, X, c. 19 and 20 (PL 34, 423-424; CSEL 28-1, 321-324).

†9. of the nature of matter . . . to be moved: cf. Arist. *On Gen. and Corr.* II, c. 9 (335b30-31).

†10. generation . . . of something else: Arist. *On Gen. and Corr.* I, 7 (318a25-27) as is said above in q. 1, a. 1 arg. 16.

†11. Arist. *On the Generation of Animals.* II, c. 3 (729a29ff), see Albert, *De Animal.* XVI, tr. 1, c. 13 (St II, 1097ff) and *Quaest. De Animal.* XVI, q. 3 (Col. XII, 275).

†12. even though Eve sinned first: see Genesis 3, 6.

†13. by some: cf. Thomas himself, *Super Sent.* II, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4 and Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 31, *dubium* III concerning the wording of the Master.

Footnotes to Question IV, Article 8

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1; *Contra Gent.* IV, c. 52; I-IIae, q. 81, a. 2; *Super Romans* cap. 5, lect. 3; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 197.

†1. Punishment . . . just: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will, III, c. 18, n. 51 (PL 32, 1296; CCL 29, 305; CSEL 74, 132).

†2. Rightly Matth. 27, 25.

†3. August. Sermo 28 De feria VI passionis dominicae (Angelo Mai, Novae Patrum Bibliothecae I, p. 62, n. 3).

†4. August. A Literal Comm. on Genesis X, c. 20, n. 35 (PL 34, 424; CSEL 28-1, 323) as is said e.g. Ia, q. 119, a. 2 arg. 4.

†5. Death . . . of original sin: cf. below q. 5, a. 4.

†6. In the beginning . . . now: see Thomas himself Super Sent. II, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 arg. 4 and Albert, Super Sent. II, d. 33, a. 1 sed contra 3.

†7. Gregory, Moralia IV, c. 3 (PL 75, 635B; CCL 143, 160) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. Sententiae IV, d. 1, c. 8.

†8. Jerome, Liber Hebraicarum Quaestionum in Genesi cap. 30 (PL 23, 985 [1035B]; CCL 72, 38).

†9. sons of pagan priests . . . to slavery: Decretum Causa 15, q. 8, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 729).

†10. heirs . . . against the father: cf. Raymond of Pennafort, Summa de Paenitentia (Xaverio Achoa et Al. Diez p. 498).

†11. sons . . . the dishonor of their parents: Decretum Causa 6, q. 1, c. 22 (Friedberg I, 560), Codex Justinianum. IX, 8, 5 (Krueger, 373).

†12. children of wrath: cf. Ephesians 2, 3.

†13. August. Enchiridion ch. 47 (PL 40, 255; CCL 46, 75).

†14. univocal begetter: cf. Arist. Metaph. VII, 9 (1034a21-23) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 11, a. 2.

†15. Matth. 2, 20, as cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 33, c. 2, n. 6.

†16. in that sin there was . . . and theft: cf. August. Enchiridion ch. 45 (PL 40, 254; CCL 46, 74).

†17. child . . . of the father: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics VIII, 12 (1161b18-19).

†18. as some have said: cf. Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 252 (p. 265).

†19. David: Psalm 89, 10 according to the Old Latin version.

†20. of the mediator . . . Christ: cf. I Timothy 2, 5.

†21. imagination . . . of the body: cf. Arist. e.g. On the Soul I, 1 (403a8); Avicenna, De Anima IV, c. 3 (f. 19 vb C; Van Riet 45).

†22. spirit . . . in the semen is based: cf. Albert De Animal. XVI tr. 1, c. 13 (St II, 1097-1098).

Footnotes to Question V, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: There are no parallel discussions of the question treated here in a. 1.

†1. Arist. Phys. II, 6 (197b26-27).

†2. But man . . . as to an ultimate end: cf. August. On the Trinity XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) as is said e.g. I-IIae, a. 5, a. 8 On the contrary.

†3. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith IV. c. 24 (PG 94, 1208A; Bt 367).

†4. Ezechiel: rightly 18, 4; Vulgate ` . . . as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine'.

†5. all souls . . . transmitted from another: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 18, c. 7.

†6. August. Enchiridion ch. 93 (PL 40, 275; CCL 46, 99).

†7. Chrysostom, Homilies on the Gospel of St. Matthew homily 23, n. 7 (PG 57, 317) transl. of Bergundius of Pisa `Novimus quoniam multi gehennam solum abhorrent, ego autem casum gloriae multum amariorum gehenna penam esse aio' ('Now I know indeed that many tremble only at hell, but I affirm that the loss of glory is a punishment far more harsh than hell'.) (ms. Vat. lat. 383, f. 90 vb); cf. also Thomas himself Catena in Matth. 7, 19.

†8. August. Confessions V, c. 4 (PL 32, 708; CSEL 33, 93).

†9. essential reward . . . accidental reward: cf. Thomas himself Q. D. On Truth q. 12, a. 13 in the Response and q. 26, a. 6 Reply to 8.

†10. line . . . of a point: Albert Lib de indivis. lineis cap. 6.

†11. Rightly Genesis 15, 1.

†12. August. as above arg. 3, fn. 6.

†13. According to the laws: cf. Justinian Code V. 27, 7, 1 (Krueger, 217).

†14. August. On Two Souls ch. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 107; CSEL 25-1, 73); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. IV].

†15. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception. ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 82, a. 1 arg. 1. Actually it is a definition of certain earlier doctors which is drawn from the words of Anselm as Albert reports Super Sent. II, d. 30, a. 3.

†16. Genesis 3, 12 according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 6.

†17. Gregory, Moralia IV, c. 25, n. 46 (PL 75, 660A; CCL 143, 191).

†18. Pope Innocent II: Decretales III, tit. 42, c. 3 (Friedberg II, 646).

†19. A man's body . . . of much medicine: example of Arist. On the Heavens II, 12 (292a22ff.) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 22, a. 3 Reply to 2.

†20. mediator . . . Jesus Christ: cf. I Timothy 2, 5.

†21. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 88, 48 (PL 191, 830D) from August. Exposition 2 on Psalm 88, 48, n. 9 (PL 37, 1137; CCL 39, 1240-1241).

†22. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 1 § 5 (PG 3, 593C; Dion. 39).

†23. opinion of those who hold: cf. e.g. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, c. 1 and 2 as reported by Albert Super Sent. II, d. 24, a. 1; Summa of Alexander of Hales I-II, n. 505 (p. 729), and Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 29, a. 2, q. 2.

Footnotes to Question V, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 33 q. 2, a. 1.

†1. August. (pseudo): Hypognosticon V, c. 1ff. (PL 45, 1647ff.).

†2. August. (pseudo): De Fide ad Petrum cap. 27, n. 70 (PL 40, 774) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 701B; CCL 91A, 753).

†3. Gregory, Moralia rightly IX, c. 21, n. 32 (PL 75, 877A; CCL 143, 479).

†4. Bernard, Sermons for the Seasons and Principal Festivals of the Year, sermon 3 in the time of the resurrection (PL 183, 290A; Leclercq V, 105); [transl. in Vol. II Sermon 3 for Easter Sunday (Westminster, MD: The Carroll Press, 1950).

†5. Pope Innocent III: Decretal. III, tit. 42, c. 3 (Friedberg II, 646).

†6. commonly said: this opinion is ascribed to 'the ancients' by Albert, Super Sent. IV, d. 4, a. 8; see e.g. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea I, c. 15, q. 2 (f. 30ra).

†7. a turning away . . . towards a transitory good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35), *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†8. from the very fact . . . episcopal office: cf. Decretum D. 36, c. 2 (Friedberg I, 134).

†9. August. as cited by Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 30, c. 9, n. 1; cf. August. On the Merits and Remission of Sins II, c. 4, (PL 44, 152; CSEL 60, 73) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 82, a. 1 On the contrary.

†10. of the saints: Bonaventure expresses the same opinion, Super Sent. II, d. 33, a. 3, q. 1 ad 1 and 2.

†11. error of the Pelagians: as reported by August. On Heresies ch. 88 (PL 42, 48; CCL 46, 341); Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 5, 12-13 (PL 191, 1388B-C) taken from August. On the Merits and Remission of Sins I, c. 9, n. 9 (PL 44, 114; CSEL 60, 10); August. (pseudo) Hypognosticum praef. n. 3 (PL 45, 1614) and *ibid.* V, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 45, 1647).

†12. by many: cf. e.g. Albert, *Super Sent.* II, d. 42, a. 4 ad 3, Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 42, a. 2, q. 2, and Thomas himself I-IIae, q. 89, a. 6.

Footnotes to Question 5, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2.

†1. Anything . . . : Almost the same argument is found in Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 33, a. 3, q. 2 arg. 2.

†2. man . . . desires happiness: August, *On the Trinity*, XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 5, a. 8 On the contrary.

†3. It is of the nature . . . to the will: cf. August. (pseudo), *De Fide ad Petrum*, cap. 21, n. 64 (PL 40, 773) = Fulgentius (PL 65, 700A; CCL 91A, 751) as is said e.g. above in q. 1, a. 4 arg. 11.

†4. Arist. *Metaph.* V, 5 (1015a28-30).

†5. Some: cf. Albert, *Super Sent.* IV, d. 1, a. 20.

†6. worm of conscience: cf. *Glossa Ordin.* on Isaiah 66, 24.

†7. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 93 (PL 40, 275; CCL 46, 99) as is said above q. 5, a. 1 arg. 3.

†8. Some: Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in Lib. Sent.* II, d. 33, n. 9 (p. 318).

†9. August. *On the City of God*, XI, c. 27, n. 2. (PL 41, 341; CCL 48, 347; CSEL 40-1, 553).

†10. others: Thomas himself *Super Sent.* II, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2.

†11. the sacrament of faith: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* IV, d. 4, c. 4 nn. 12-13.

†12. I Cor. 2, 9: Thus Thomas passim e.g. I-IIae, q. 5, a. 5 On the contrary.

†13. Romans 5, 15 according to the reading provided by Peter Lomb. *Glossa* *ibid.* (PL 191, 1392D).

Footnotes to Question 5, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 1; *Super Sent.* III, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1; *Cont. Gent.* IV, c. 52; I-IIae, q. 85, a. 5; II-IIae, q. 164, a. 1; *Super Romans* cap. 5, lect. 3; *Super Hebrews* cap. 9, lect. 5; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 193.

†1. Seneca, *De Remediis Fortuitorum* II, n. 1; [the only Engl. transl. of this work of Seneca, which is a dialogue between Sense and Reason, was done by Robert Whytinton, in Elizabethan English and reprinted by Ralph Graham Palmer (Chicago, IL: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1953)].

†2. Rightly Deut. 25, 2.

†3. Original sin . . . of original justice: Anselm, *On the Virgin Conception* ch. 27 (PL 158, 461A; Schmitt II, 170) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 82, a. 1 arg. 1. Rightly it is a definition of certain early doctors derived from the words of Anselm as Albert reports *Super Sent.* II. d. 30, a. 3

†4. Genesis 2, 17 according to the Old Latin version.

†5. August. *On the Trinity* XIII, c. 16, n. 20 (PL 42, 1029; CCL 50A, 409).

†6. August. *On the City of God* XV, c. 6 (PL 41, 442; CCL 48, 458; CSEL 42-2, 66).

†7. August. *Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental* ch. 1 (PL 42, 173; CSEL 25-1, 193); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. IV*].

†8. Rightly Isidore (pseudo), *De Ordine Creaturarum* cap. 10, n. 8 (PL 83, 940A). Cf. M. C. Diaz y Diaz, *Liber de ordine creaturarum* (Compostella, 1972), p. 160.

†9. according to the Catholic Faith: see above, *On the contrary* 1 and 2.

†10. a judge . . . for some crime: cf. August. *On the City of God* XXI, c. 11 (PL 41, 725; CCL 48, 777; CSEL 40-2, 539) as is said e.g. II-IIae, q. 108, a. 3; Raymond of Pennafort *Summa de Paenitentia* (Xaverio Ochoa and Al. Diez, p. 723-724); see also *Du Cange Glossarium s. v. abacinare*.

†11. Origen: as reported by Jerome *Epistle* 124, c. 1, n. 3 (PL 22, 1061; CSEL 56, 98) and August. *On the City of God* XI, c. 23 (PL 41, 336; CCL 48, 342; CSEL 40-1, 544; cf. Origen *Peri Archon* II, c. 8, n. 4. Latin transl. by Rufinus (PG 11, 224A; GCS 22, 162); [On *First Principles*, Engl. transl. by G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1930)].

†12. Origen himself: as reported by Jerome *Epistle* 124, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 22, 1066; CSEL 56, 105); cf. Origen *Peri Archon* III, c. 3, n. 5 (PG 11, 318; GCS 22, 261); [for Engl. transl. cf. Origen's *First Principles* see fn. 11 above].

†13. Romans 9, 11 according to the wording of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* I, d. 41, c. 2, n. 6.

†14. incongruous . . . imperfect things: Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* II, pr. 10 (PL 63, 765A; CCL 94, 53; CSEL 67, 65) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 18, a. 2.

†15. son . . . of the father: cf. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VIII, 12 (1161b18-19).

†16. some theologians: cf. *Summa* of Alexander of Hales I-II, n. 501 (p. 715).

Footnotes to Question V, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 85, a. 6.

†1. Everything composed of contraries is corruptible: cf. Arist. *On Longevity and Shortness of Life* ch. 3 (465b1ff.); cf. Albert, *De morte et Vita* tr. 2, c. 2.

†2. the movement . . . is natural: cf. Arist. *Phys.* VIII, 4 (255b15-31).

†3. Man . . . under the necessity of dying: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 19, c. 1, n. 3.

†4. active and passive qualities: cf. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. II, c. 2 (329b23-24), Meteorology IV, c. 1 (378b10ff.); see q. 4, a. 1 arg. 9, fn. 10.

†5. active principle . . . passive principle to itself: thus Thomas passim e.g. Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 2, a. 1 ad 4; Cont. Gent. I, c. 49, ibid. II, c. 46. Cf. Arist. e.g. On Gen. and Corr. I, c. 7 (324a10-11); On the Soul II, c. 11 (424a1-2).

†6. The life of man is preserved . . . which is a natural agent: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (416b28-29) and Thomas himself I-IIae, q. 85, a. 6 arg. 3.

†7. Arist. Phys. III, 1 (201a23-24) as is said e.g. Super Sent. II, d. 29, q. 1, a. 4.

†8. August. A literal Comment. on Genesis VI, c. 25 (PL 34, 354; CSEL 28-1, 197).

†9. Arist. Metaph. X, 10 (1058b26-28).

†10. The Master: Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, c. 1, n. 2.

†11. Gloss on Luke X: we have not found this. Cf. however Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 25, c. 7, n. 1 and d. 35, c. 4, n. 2.

†12. philosophers: cf. e.g. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I, c. 10 (328a18ff.); cf. also ibid. c. 7.

†13. That from which . . . done by God: August. Reply to Faustus XXVI, c. 5 (PL 42, 482; CSEL 25-1, 733) as is said e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2.

†14. Rightly August. On the City of God VII, c. 30 (PL 41, 220; CCL 47, 212; CSEL 40-1, 346).

†15. August. On the Trinity III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 876; CCL 50, 140-141).

†16. Arist. Phys. II, 1 (192b8-193a1).

†17. Hence since nature may refer to . . . than the matter: Arist. Phys. II, 1 (193a9-193b22).

†18. from the necessity of matter: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 9 (199b34ff.).

†19. Arist. On the Animals XIX (= On the Generation of Animals V) ch. 1 (778a30-b10); see Albert De Animal. XIX, tr. un., c. 1, nn. 2-3 (Stadler II, 1246).

†20. of a proportionate or balanced (*medie complexionatum*) of these: cf. e.g. Avicenna Canon Medicinae I fen I doct. 3, c. 2.

†21. For form is not . . . but matter for the sake of form: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 2 (194b9-10) as Thomas says Post. Anal. II, 8 (according to Thomas's interpretation of Averroes's reading of the passage provided by another) In Phys. II, comm. 26 [IV, 58 L]).

†22. foundation of the others: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 2 (413b4).

†23. Arist. On the Soul II, 11 (422b23-26).

†24. Arist. On the Heavens II, 6 (288b15-16).

†25. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 1 (1103b24-25).

†26. Commentator: namely, Averroes In De Caelo III, comm. 20 (V, 187 H).

†27. for nothing . . . by the power of the heavenly body: Arist. Phys. II, 2 (194b13) as is said Ia, q. 115, a. 3 Reply to 2.

†28. hence it is . . . of the heavenly bodies: Arist. On Gen. and Corr. II, c. 10 (336a23-b24) as is said Ia, q. 115, a. 3 Reply to 2.

†29. of nutrimental moisture: cf. Avicenna, Canon Medicinae I fen 1 doct. 4, c. 1; IV fen 1 tr. 3, c. 1.

†30. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I, 5 (322a32-33).

†31. Arist. Metaph. V, 5 (1015a28) according to Thomas's interpretation of Averroes's reading of the passage furnished by another In Metaph. V, comm. 6 (VIII, 109 L).

†32. according to some: Summa of Alexander of Hales I-II, n. 492 (p. 689).

†33. according to others: Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 29, a. 2, q. 1.

†34. painter . . . so too does the color: Arist uses an analogous example in Metaph. V, 2 (1013a6-7).

Footnotes to Question VI

†p Parallel texts: Q. D. On Truth, q. 24, a. 1; Ia, q. 83, a. 1; I-IIae, q. 13, a. 6.

†1. 'he does not choose freely but of necessity': the third error in the Parisian condemnation of 1270 (Chart. Univ. Paris, I, n. 432 (p. 486).

†2. i.e. to will . . . i.e. to run: cf. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 9, 16 (PL 191, 1460B).

†3. a certain inner impulse: cf. Arist. Eud. Ethics, VII, c. 14 (1248a17-32) from an anonymous transl. (Deman, Le 'Liber de bona fortuna' . . . pp. 39-40); [transl. of Books I, II, and VIII by Michael J. Woods (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982); there is a transl. of the entire Eudemian Ethics in the Loeb edition (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1952)].

†4. A coerced act . . . contributes nothing: Arist. Nic. Ethics, III, 1 (1110a1) and (1110b15) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth, q. 22, a. 6 Resp.

†5. August. Enchiridion, ch. 100 (PL 40, 279; CCL 46, 103); cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae, I, d. 47, c. 1.

†6. sensing . . . of undergoing: cf, Arist. On the Soul, II, 11 (423b33-424a1); *ibid.* III, 4 (429b25).

†7. Arist. On the Soul, III, 10 (433b11-13).

†8. Arist. rightly Metaph. XI (-XII), 7 (1072a26-27).

†9. the will is a passive potency i.e. power: ninth error in the Parisian condemnation of 1270 (Chart.

Univ. Paris, I, n. 432 (p. 487).

†10. the will . . . by the appetible object: ninth error, as above in fn. 9.

†11. every man . . . to be happy: cf. e.g. August. On the Trinity, XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) as is said e.g. I-IIae q. 5, a 8 On the contrary.

†12. But the intellect . . . force of the reasoning: cf. Arist. Metaph. V, 5 (1015b6-9) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth, q. 22, a 10 On the contrary 2.

†13. Arist, Metaph. VI, 4 (1027b25-27).

†14. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 13 (PG 3, 712A; Dion. 215).

†15. Avicenna, Metaph. I, c. 7 (f. 73 rb; Van Riet 46) as is said Q. D. On Truth q. 23, a. 5 arg. 1.

†16. but the possible . . . nothing impossible follows: cf. Arist. Prior Anal. I, c. 13 (32a18-20).

†17. two opposites . . . is impossible: cf. Arist. Metaph. IV, 6 (1011b21).

†18. anything that is moved is moved by another: cf. Arist. Phys VIII, 4 (254b24ff.).

†19. The beginning . . . is sensation: cf. Arist. Post. Anal. II, 19 (100a10), Metaph. I, 1 (981a2).

†20. August. On the Trinity, I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 42, 820; CCL 50, 28).

†21. Everything multiform . . . uniform: cf. Arist. Phys. VIII, 8 (264b9ff.) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 9, a. 5 arg. 1, and Phys. IV, 14 (223b18-21).

†22. a uniform motion . . . of the heaven: cf. Arist. On the Heavens, II, 5 (288a11ff.).

†23. August. Enchiridion, ch. 30 (PL 40, 246; CCL 46, 65).

†24. August. Confessions, VIII, c. 5, n. 10 (PL 32, 753; CSEL 33, 178).

†25. Arist. Nic. Ethics, III, 2 (1112a14-16).

†26. Arist. Metaph. IX, 2 (1046b4-5).

†27. Arist. On the Soul, III, 9 (432b5-7)

†28. Arist. Nic. Ethics, III, 1 (1110a17-18) and III, 5 (1114b31; cf. however Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, cap. 41 (PG 40, 776A; Verbeke, 150).

†29. Arist. Nic. Ethics, VI, 12 ((1144a7-10) according to the Thomas's interpretation of according to the reading provided by another *ibid*'

†30. Some But this opinion is heretical (i.e. from the beginning of the Response through 'heretical'): the third error in the Parisian condemnation of 1270 (Chart. Univ. Paris. I, n. 432 (p. 486).

†31. for not everything necessary . . . the principle of which is outside: Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1118a1) and (1110b15) as is said e.g. Q. D. On Truth q. 22, a. 5 in the Response.

†32. subverts . . . of moral philosophy: cf. Albert De quindecim problematibus (Col. XVII-1, 41).

†33. extraneous positions: cf. Arist. Topics I, c. 11 (104b19-20 and 34).

†34. Arist. rightly Metaph. IV, 7 (1012a18-22).

†35. Arist. On the Soul, III, 10 (433a13-20).

†36. acts . . . singulars: Arist. Metaph. I, 1 (981a15-17) as referred to by Thomas In Metaph. V, 3 (1014a20-25).

†37. an act . . . by its object: cf. Arist. On the Soul, II, 4 (415a18-20).

†38. Commentator: namely, Averroes, In De Anima III comm. 18 (VI, 161B; Crawford, 438).

†39. counsel . . . a kind of investigation: cf. Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, cap. 34 (PG 40, 736B) interpretation of Burgundius of Pisa (Verbeke, 130) as is said e.g. I-IIae, q. 14, a. 1 On the contrary.

†40. some: the Ancient Philosophers according to Arist. On the Soul, III, 3 (427a21-24).

†41. Arist. On the Soul, III, 9 (432b5-6).

†42. Arist. On the Soul, III, 3 (427a25-26) according to an early transl. (Alonso, 281). The words of certain ones that Aristotle applies here to those who hold that the intellect does not differ from the senses ones are from Homer's Odyssey XVII. 136.

†43. Arist. Eud. Ethics, VII, 14 (1248a17-32) from Anonymo transl. (Deman, Le 'Liber de bona fortuna' . . . pp. 39-40); cf. Thomas In Ethic. III, 13, lines 111-112 in fn.; [for transl. of the Eudemian Ethics cf. above fn. 3].

†44. man . . . desires happiness: August. as above arg. 8 in fn. 11.

†45. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy III, pr. 2 (PL 63, 724A; CCL 94, 38; CSEL 67, 47)

†46. Arist. Nic. Ethics, III, 5 (1114a32-b1) according to transl. of Robert Grosseteste (Gauthier, 189).

†47. all men . . . and to know: cf. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 282).

†48. whatsoever . . . He has done: cf. Psalm 134, 6.

†49. because always obtains . . . in regard to man: cf. Boethius, On the Consol. of Philosophy IV, pr. 6 (PL 63, 820A; CCL 94, 83; CSEL 67, 101) as is said Super Sent. I, d. 47, q. 1, a. 3.

†50. Rightly Arist. Metaph. IX, 5 (1048a5-10).

†51. the power of the will . . . to opposites: Arist. Metaph. IX, 2 (1046b4-5) as is said Super Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 1 arg. 1.

†52. universal . . . always: cf. Arist. Post. Anal. I, 31 (87b31-34).

†53. Arist. Metaph. VI, 3 (1027a29ff.).

†54. what is accidental . . . one: Arist. *Metaph.* XI, 8 (1064b23-30) according to Thomas's interpretation of a reading Aristotle's text furnished by another's *ibid*; cf. also *Metaph.* *ibid.* (1065a22-25).

†55. freedom . . . from fault and misery . . . from compulsion: cf. Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will* ch. 3 (PL 182, 1005; Leclercq III, 170); cf. also Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 25, c. 8, n. 1; [transl. of the treatise of St. Bernard *On Grace and Free Will* (London, Society for promoting Christian knowledge; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920); there is also a partial transl. of it in *The Life and Teaching of St. Bernard* by Ailbe J. Luddy (Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd., 1927)]. St. Bernard defines free will in the latter text as 'that faculty by which the soul has dominion of its acts, to the exclusion of all violence and constraint.'

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 42, q. 1, aa. 3 and 4; *I-IIae*, q. 72, a. 5; *ibid.* q. 88, a. 1.

†1. August. Reply to Faustus XXII, c. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25-1, 621) cited by Peter Lombard in *Sententiae* II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1.

†2. differentia which divides a genus: cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge De differentia* (Minio-Paluello 16). See also Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales*, tr. 2, n. 13 (*De Rijk* 21); [for translations of these works cf. Appendix.

†3. Whoever . . . : Nearly the same argument is given in the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, n. 272 arg. 2 (p. 286).

†4. he who turns towards . . . away from an unchangeable good: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will*, I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†5. he who approaches . . . recedes from the other: Arist. *Phys.* V, 5 (229b10-14) as is said e.g. *I-IIae*, q. 23, a. 2 in *Resp.*

†6. Every sin . . . : for this argument cf. Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 arg. 6.

†7. August. *On Christian Doctrine* I, ch. 3 (PL 34, 20; CCL 32, 8; CSEL 80, 9); transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers* Vol. II, and in the *Fathers of the Church* Vol. 4 under the title *On Christian Instruction*.

†8. a certain Gloss: under the name of August. in Gratian, *Decretum* D. 25, c. 3, § 4 (Friedberg I, 92); treated at length in Richard of St. Victor *In Cantica* cap. 25 (PL 196, 481D); cf. *Gloss Ordin.* on I Corinth. 11, 27.

†9. Anselm, *Why God Became Man*, I, c. 11 (PL 158, 376B-C; Schmitt II, 68).

†10. August. *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions*, q. 30 (PL 40, 19; CCL 44A, 38) according to the wording in the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales *II-IIae*, n. 272 (p. 286).

†11. Sermon 104, n. 3 among the supposed works of August. (PL 39, 1947). The source appears to be *Decretum* D. 25, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 93).

†12. Rightly *Decretum* D. 46, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 168).

†13. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1008; CCL 50, 372) as cited by Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II, d. 24, c. 9-12.

†14. to consent to an idle word: cf. Matth. 12, 36; August. Sermon 104, n. 3 among the supposed works of August. (PL 39, 1947); Gregory, *Moralia* VII, c. 37, n. 58 (PL 75, 800C; CCL 143, 379); *Decretum* D. 25, c. 3 § 4 (Friedberg I, 93).

†15. of spiritual sins: cf. Thomas himself, I-IIae, q. 72, a. 2.

†16. sensuality . . . with the irrational animals: cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, II, d. 24, c. 5.

†17. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 4 (PL 158, 438B; Schmitt II, 145).

†18. August. e.g. On the Trinity XII, ch. 7, n. 12 (PL 42, 1005; CCL 50, 367).

†19. August. e.g. On the Merits and Remission of Sins, and On the Baptism of Infants II, c. 22 (PL 44, 172; CSEL 60, 107).

†20. simple fornication: cf. Thomas himself II-IIae, q. 154, a. 1 On the contrary.

†21. ignorance of the law: cf. *Digesta* 22. 6. 1, 2, 4, 9 (Mommesen, 293); *Decretum* C. 1, q. 4, c. 12 (Friedberg I, 422).

†22. August. On the Morals of the Catholic Church, I, c. 15, n. 25 (PL 32, 1322).

†23. Again it was argued . . . of temporal punishment: cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, II, d. 42, c. 3, n. 2.

†24. August. The Gospel of St. John, tract. LXXXIX, n. 1 (PL 35, 1856; CCL 36, 549).

†25. The First Epistle of St. John I, 8 according to the wording of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae*, III, d. 3, c. 2 and also the *Vetus Latina* version.

†26. August.: rightly Gloss of Peter Lomb. on I Titus 1, 5 (PL 192, 386A).

†27. August.: rightly In the Gospel of St. John, tract. XLI, n. 9 (PL 35, 1697; CCL 36, 362) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 88, a. 1 On the Contrary.

†28. venial is so called from "venia," i.e. from "pardon" . . . : cf. Huguccio, *Liber Derivationum* s.v. 'venio' (ms. Paris B.N. lat. 17880 f. 203 va: 'Item a venio hec venia, venie . . . inde . . . dicitur veniale venialiter . . . quod facile meretur veniam' (' Likewise from "venio" comes venia and venie . . . from which come "venial" and "venially").

†29. Ambrose: On Paradise ch. 14, n. 71 (PL 14, 310B [327D]; CSEL 32-1, 328); [transl. in *Fathers of the Church* Vol. 42].

†30. according to some . . . according to some . . . according to some: the 'Masters' [in Theology] as Albert reports, *Super Sent.* II, d. 22, a. 4; cf. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in Lib. Sent.* II, d. 42, n. 3. [This footnote covers all three references to 'some' in the first paragraph of the Response.]

†31. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 13 (1103a3-6).

†32. For there are certain exterior acts . . . and the like: cf. *Decretum* D. 25, c. 3 § 6 (Friedberg I, 93).

†33. commonly said: cf. e.g. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in Lib. Sent.* II, d. 36, n. 8; Albert De Bono tr. 1, q. 2, a. 4 (Col. XXVIII, 29); Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 36, dub. 5.

†34. so to speak a sickness of the soul: August. *Enchiridion*, ch. 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53) as below q. 7, a. 7 arg. 14.

†35. tertian fever: cf. Avicenna, *Canon Medic.* IV, fen. 1, tr. 2, c. 4.

†36. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics*, VI, 5 (1140b16-17); cf. also VII, c. 8 (1151a16-17).

†37. Through charity . . . life of the body: cf. August. *Sermo* 161, c. 6 (PL 38, 881) and *Sermo* 180, c. 7 (PL 38, 976) according to Thomas *Super Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 arg. 2.

†38. Romans VI: rightly Rom. 5, 5.

†39. it is rightly said: cf. e.g. Albert, *Super Sent.* II, d. 35, a. 3 ad 3; Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* II, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 Response.

†40. Romans XII: rightly Rom. 13, 10.

†41. Isaias 10: rightly Isaias 3, 12.

†42. there: *Decretum* D. 46, c. 3 (Friedberg, 168) as above in arg. 11.

†43. Arist. *Nic. Ethics*, I, 13 (1102b30-31).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 5; II-IIae, q. 24, a. 10.

†1. August. *Confessions*, X, c. 29 (PL 32, 796; CSEL 33, 256).

†2. contraries . . . to the same thing: cf. Arist. *Topics* II, c. 4 (111a14).

†3. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 1 (1103b7-8). The added 'and diminished' is not in Aristotle's text.

†4. the difference that constitutes: cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge De Differentia* (Minio-Paluello, 16). See also Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales* tr. 2, n. 13 (De Rijk, 21); [for translations of these texts cf. the Appendix.]

†5. difficult to change . . . of a habit: Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales* tr. 3, n. 23 (De Rijk, 36).

†6. August. *On the Trinity* IX, c. 8 (PL 42, 967-968; CCL 50, 304).

†7. August. *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions* q. 36, n. 1 (PL 40, 25; CCL 44A, 54).

†8. August. *A Literal Commentary on Genesis* VIII, c. 12, n. 26 (PL 34, 383; CSEL 28-1, 250).

†9. Bernard: *On the Purification of the Holy Virgin Sermo* 2, n. 3 (PL 183, 369C; Leclercq IV, 340);

[transl. in St. Bernard's Sermons (Westminster, MD: The Carroll Press, 1952) Vol. III].

†10. Any virtue . . . when multiplied: cf. the Book on Causes prop. 17 [16], as is said in Q. D. On Truth q. 3, a. 2 arg. 3.

†11. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VIII, 6 (1158a10-13).

†12. Proverbs 24, 16: Vulgate: 'the just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again.'

†13. Gloss: Glossa Ordin. ibid.

†14. commonly said: cf. e.g. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea III, tr. 5, c. 5 (f. 145 vb); Bonaventure, Super Sent. I, d. 17, p. 2 a. unic. q. 3; Thomas himself Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 5.

†15. as . . . a point and a line: cf. e.g. Albert, De Indivis. Lineis, cap. 6.

†16. always produces a species: Arist. Metaph. VIII, 3 (1043b36ff.) according to Thomas, Q. D. On Truth q. 20, a. 1.

†17. August. Epistle 186, c. 3, n. 10 (PL 33, 819; CSEL 57, 53); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 4].

†18. the Philosopher: Arist. Topics III, 5 (119a27-28) as cited by Thomas, Ia, q. 48, a. 2 arg. 3.

†19. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 3 and 4 (PL 40, 11 and 12; CCL 44A, 12 and 13).

†20. some say: Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea III tr. 5, c. 5 in its entirety (f. 145 vb). Bonaventure, Super Sent. I, d. 17, p. 2 a. unic. q. 3; Thomas himself, Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 5.

†21. the Philosopher: Arist. Phys. VI, 6 (237b18-20).

†22. in Book VIII of the Physics: Arist. rightly Phys. VI, 5 (235b27-29).

†23. not only the heart . . . in God: cf. Psalm 83, 3.

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 6; I-IIae, q. 88, a. 4.

†1. August. Homilies or Tractates on the Gospel of St. John, tract. XII, n. 14 (PL 35, 1492; CCL 36, 129).

†2. Moreover, . . . : almost the same argument is found in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 273 (p. 287).

†3. Gloss of August.: Glossa of Peter Lomb. in the same place (PL 191, 405A) from August. Expositions on the Psalms Ps. 39, 13, n. 22 (PL 36, 447-448; CCL 38, 441).

†4. August. the Rule of August. n. 2 (PL 32, 1379); [transl. by Raymond Canning (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984); and by Mary T. Clark (New York: Paulist Press, 1984)].

†5. The Philosopher: Arist. Categories ch. 8 (9a10-13).

†6. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372) according to the interpret. of Peter Lomb., Sententiae, II, d. 24, c. 9-12.

†7. Moreover, a movement of disbelief . . . : nearly the same argument is found in Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2 arg. 1.

†8. surreptitiously: for the meaning of this wording cf. e.g. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 28, q. 2, c. 3 (f. 220 ra).

†9. Decretis: Decretum D. 25, c. 3 § 7 (Friedberg I, 93).

†10. Distinction 53: rightly D. 90, c. 11 (Friedberg I, 315).

†11. John. Chrysostom, In Matth. hom. 6, n. 6 (PG 57, 70-71). For this opinion cf. the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 482 (p. 470).

†12. Proverbs 13: rightly Prov. 14, 13.

†13. Glossa Interl. in this place i.e. Prov. 14, 13.

†14. Argument 9 is not included in the text by the editors of the Leonine Edition since it only seems to appear in later printed versions of the text. However since a reply to the argument is given in the Leonine text, we have included here in brackets a translation of the version of the argument given in the editorial footnotes on p. 166 of the Leonine edition.

†15. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy IV. pr. 6 (PL 63, 818A; CCL 94, 81; CSEL 67, 99).

†16. The orders . . . gifts of grace: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 9, c. 3, n. 1.

†17. But by an increase of merit . . . into a higher order: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 9, c. 6, n. 2.

†18. any venial movement . . . been mortal: for the most part a common opinion of the ancient doctors. Cf. scholion in S. Bonaventure comm . . . in II lib. Sent. (ed. Quaracchi 1885, p. 505).

†19. Arist. Categories ch. 11 (14a24-25).

†20. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372) according to the interpret. of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, c. 9-12.

†21. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 2 (1130a24-28).

†22. which is a sacred principality: cf. Alex. of Hales, Glossa in lib. Sent. II, d. 9, n. 2a: Albert, Super Cael. Hier, c. 1 § 1 dubium 1; Thomas himself, Super Sent. II, d. 9, a. 1.

†23. Dionys. On the Celestial Hierarchy ch. 3 § 2 (PG 3, 165A; according to the transl. of Eriugena Dion. 787).

†24. For a fuller treatment of the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels, see Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 108.

†25. For the sense in which men are taken up into the orders of angels, see Ia, q. 108, a. 8.

†26. of the tree . . . of good and evil: cf. Genesis 2, 17.

†27. II Peter 2, 21: Thus Thomas passim e.g. II-IIae, q. 12, a. 1 Reply to 3; *ibid.* q. 189, a. 4 arg. 1.

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. IV, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2; I-IIae, q. 88, a. 5.

†1. August. Sermo 104, n. 2 among the supposed works of Augustine (PL 39, 1946). The true source appears to be Decretum D. 25, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 93).

†2. The Master: Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, c. 12, n. 2.

†3. Arist. Categories ch. 11 (14a24-25).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 5; Q. D. On Truth q. 15, a. 5; I-IIae, q. 74, a. 9 and 10.

†1. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 7, n. 12 (PL 42, 1005; CCL 50, 367). The question of the higher reason and the lower reason, which is a distinction of reason according to function and their manner of proceeding, the former according to eternal norms and the latter according to temporal norms, as related to mortal and venial sin, is treated throughout Book XII by Augustine.

†2. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, q. 30 (PL 40, 19; CCL 44A, 38).

†3. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 7, n. 12 (PL 42, 1005; CCL 50, 367).

†4. the Philosopher: Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433a26).

†5. The Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 13 (1102b14-15).

†6. anything . . . of that in which it is: the same opinion although under different forms is ascribed to diverse authors e.g. to The Book of Causes as in Q. D. On Truth q. 24, a. 8 arg. 6 [cf. comm. 10(9) and 12(11)], to Dionysius together with The Book of Causes in Super Sent. II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1 arg. 3 [cf. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 1 (PG 3, 693 B; Dion. 146) and On the Celestial Hierarchy ch. 12 § 2 (PG 3, 293A; Dion. 937), and to Boethius as in Q. D. On Truth q. 2, a. 5 arg. 17 [cf. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy V pr. 4 (PL 63, 848C; CCL 94, 96-97; CSEL 67, 117)].

†7. sin . . . pure malice: cf. Isidore, Sententiae (or De Summo Bono) II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A) from Gregory, Moralia XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A); cf. Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11.

†8. a movement that takes us unawares i.e. an indeliberate movement, in the Latin 'ex surreptione': for the meaning this wording cf. e.g. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 28, q. 2, c. 3 (f. 91 ra) and *ibid.* III, tr. 19, c. 1, q. 4 (f. 220 ra).

†9. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1008; CCL 50, 372) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 24, cc. 9-12.

†10. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 7, n. 12 (PL 42, 1005; CCL 50, 367).

†11. in time the instant: cf. Arist. *Phys.* VI, 3 (233b32-234a4).

†12. in a line the point: cf. Arist. *Phys.* VI, 1 (231a25-26).

†13. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 4 (1148a3-5).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 6

†p Parallel texts: Super *Sent.* II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 2; Q. D. On Truth q. 25, a. 5; I-IIae, q. 74, a. 3 and 4; *Quodlib.* IV, q. 11, a. 1.

†1. Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca*, cap. 12, n. 41 (PL 14, 379A [398C]; CSEL 32-1, 439).

†2. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 27, c. 7.

†3. August. On Two Souls Against the Manicheans, ch. 10, n. 14 (PL 42, 104; CSEL 25-1, 68) according to Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 41, c. 5.

†4. sensuality . . . to us and the brutes: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 24, c. 5.

†5. 'Sed propter quod unumquodque, illud magis et prius' ('That on account of which a thing is such is that more so and first'): cf. Arist. *Post. Anal.* I, 2 (72a27-29) according to an anonymous transl. (Minio-Paluello, 114) and Jacobi (Minio-Paluello, 9).

†6. the Philosopher: Arist. *Topics* VI, 9 (147b29-34).

†7. August. *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, c. 14, n. 21 (PL 34, 207); [on this book of Augustine's cf. the Introduction to the recent transl. of his *Literal Commentary of Genesis*.

†8. August: *Sermo De Operibus Misericordiae*: this work praised in the catalogue of Possidius (PL 46, 17) is still missing; cf. G. Morin *Sancti Augustini sermones post Maurinos reperti* in *Misc. Agost.* I, p. 606. Cf. however August. On Nature and Grace ch. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257) according to Thomas IIIa, q. 88, a. 4.

†9. No man sins . . . of his will to avoid: August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 50 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 304; CSEL 74, 131) as is said below in q. 14, a. 1 arg. 1.

†10. *Glossa Interlin.* on Romans 7, 15.

†11. The Master: Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 24, c. 9, n. 3.

†12. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372).

†13. the Philosopher: Arist. rightly Nic. Ethics III, 9 (1117b23-24).

†14. In the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 4 Reply to 3, a more detailed answer is given to the relationship of a disposition and a habit.

†15. some: cf. e.g. Guill. Altiss. *Summa Aurea* II, tr. 28, q. 2, c. 2 q. incidens (f. 89 vb).

†16. In I-IIae, q. 74, a. 3 Reply to 2, Thomas gives the following example of this: A man seeking to avoid movements of concupiscence turns his thoughts from carnal pleasure to considerations of science from which sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory arises.

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 7

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 21, q. 2, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 83, a. 3.

†1. Glossa of Peter Lomb. in I Tim. 2, 14 (PL 192, 341C) from August. On the City of God XIV, c. 11, n. 2 (PL 41, 420; CCL 48, 433; CSEL 40-2, 29).

†2. for venial generically: cf. above in q. 7, a. 1.

†3. venial because it is easily pardonable: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 42, c. 3, n. 2.

†4. Gregory: rather Glossa Interlin. on Job 10, 9 from Gregory, *Moralia* IX, c. 50, n. 76 (PL 75, 900D; CCL 143, 510).

†5. August. A Literal Comment. on Genesis IX, c. 42, n. 60 (PL 34, 454; CSEL 28-1, 378).

†6. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53).

†7. August. A Literal Comment. on Genesis XI, c. 9 (PL 34, 432; CSEL 28-1, 338).

†8. Anselm, On the Virgin Conception ch. 10 (PL 158, 444A; Schmitt II, 152).

†9. Dionys. On the Divine Names IV § 32 (PG 3, 733A; Dion. 309).

†10. Every movement . . . predominate principle: cf. Arist. On the Heavens I. 2, (269a2-3).

†11. generally held: cf. e.g. Albert, Super Sent. II, d. 21, a. 10; Bonaventure, Super Sent., d. 21, a. 3, q. 1.

†12. it. is contrary to a precept . . . neighbor's downfall: cf. Glossa Interlin. on Matth. 18, 8 from Jerome Super Matth. II, c. 15, 12 (PL 26, 107 (111B); CCL 77, 129) according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 43, a. 1 On the contrary.

†13. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 15 (PL 41, 422-424; CCL 48, 436-438; CSEL 40-2, 35), *ibid.* ch. 19 (PL 41, 427; CCL 48, 442; CSEL 40-2, 42).

†14. powers . . . to their objects: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415a18-21) according to Thomas e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 48, a. 2 arg. 2.

†15. for just as . . . in practical matters: cf. Arist. Phys. II, 9 (200a15-b8) according to Thomas, Comment. on the Ethics VI, 4.

†16. sanctified in the womb: cf. Thomas himself IIIa, q. 27, a. 1.

†17. Augustine: as above in arg. 12.

†18. mortal sin . . . death of the soul: cf. August. Tract. on the Gospel of St. John tract. XLIX, n. 3 (PL 35, 1748).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 8

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 89, a. 5; Quodlib. IV, q. 11, a. 2; Super Romans cap. 8, lect. 1.

†1. Whether . . . are venial sins: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae, II, d. 41 in totum.

†2. Anselm, On Grace and Free Choice i.e. On the Harmony of Foreknowledge, Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice q. 3, c. 7 (PL 158. 530C; Schmitt II, 274).

†3. namely not to be concupiscent: cf. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 7, 24-25 (PL 191, 1430A).

†4. when the cause . . . is removed: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales tr. 5, n. 21 (De Rijk, 68).

†5. Anselm: On the Harmony of Foreknowledge, Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice.

†6. Some: the same opinion is mentioned by Thomas in Lect. super Romans, cap. 8, lect. 1; nevertheless we have not found it (cf. however Henry of Ghent Quodlib. VI, q. 32).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 9

†p Parallel texts: I-II, q. 89, a. 4.

†1. Gregory, In Evang. II, homily 29, n. 2 (PL 76, 1214B).

†2. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 869C; Dion. 401).

†3. John Chrysostom from Catena Aurea Super Marcum 1, 25; cf. John Chrysostom, De Lazaro concio [i.e. sermo] II (PG 48, 983-984).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 10

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 89, a. 6.

†1. When the cause . . . the effect is removed: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales tr. 5, n. 21 (De

Rijk, 68).

†2. August. On the City of God XXI, c. 12 (PL 41, 727; CCL 48, 778; CSEL 40-2, 541).

†3. according to Augustine . . . On the Words of the Lord: otherwise Sermo 71, c. 12, n. 20 (PL 38, 455). For the wording 'final impenitence' cf. e.g. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea II, tr. 30, c. 4 (f. 108ff.).

†4. God . . . than is deserved: cf. the Summa of Alexander of Hales I, n. 281 (p. 389); Thomas himself Super Sent. IV, d. 46, q. 2, a. 2. I, n. 281 (p. 389).

†5. August. Expositions on the Psalms 37, 2, n. 3 (PL 36, 397; CCL 38, 384) and Sermo 161, c. 4 (PL 38, 879); [transl. of Expositions on the Psalms in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII].

†6. limbo of children: cf. Albert, Super Sent. III, d. 22, a. 4 sol. and Thomas himself Super Sent. III, d. 22, q. 2, a. 1 sol. 2.

†7. the punishment . . . of its foundation: cf. Decretum D. 25, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 93).

†8. August. On the City of God XXI, c. 26, n. 1 (PL 41, 743; CCL 48, 796; CSEL 40-2, 568).

†9. August. On Faith and Works ch. 16, n. 27 (PL 40, 215; CSEL 41, 70); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 27].

†10. August. On the City of God XXI, c. 11 (PL 41, 726; CCL 48, 777; CSEL 40-2, 540).

†11. severity of punishment: cf. the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 285 (p. 299).

†12. The reply to argument 10 is missing. We give it here in brackets, translated from the reply in the editorial footnote on p. 184 in the Leonine edition. Cf. p. 16* Ed.[5] in the Preface, Part Two, "The Tradition of the Text" in the Leonine edition.

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 11

†p Parallel text: Super Sent. IV, d. 21, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1.

†1. Eccl. 11, 3: Vulgate, 'If a tree shall have fallen to the South or to the North in whatsoever place it shall have fallen there shall it be.'

†2. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 4 (PG 94, 877C; Bt, 77).

†3. Augustine . . . in the book De Paenitentia: otherwise Sermo 351, c. 2 (PL 39, 1537).

†4. state of a wayfarer: the wording used ever since Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea III, tr. 2, q. 2 (f. 195vb).

†5. essential . . . accidental reward: cf. Thomas himself, Q. D. On Truth, q. 12, a. 13 in the Response and ibid. q. 26, a. 6 Reply to 8.

†6. man . . . not of himself returning [from it]: cf. Psalm 77, 39.

†7. which oppresses the soul: cf. The Book of Wisdom 9, 15.

†8. Gregory, Dialogue IV, c. 39 (PL 77, 396A-B); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 39].

†9. Glossa Ordin. on Matth. 3, 11.

†10. August. Sermo 104, n. 1 among his supposed works (PL 39, 1946). The true source seems to be Decretum D. 25, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 93).

†11. Ambrose, On a Good Death c. 11, n. 49 (PL 14, 563A [591A]; CSEL 32-1, 746); [transl in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 65. under the title Death as a Good].

†12. exterminating punishment . . . corrective punishment: cf. Thomas himself Q. D. De Anima q. 21 ad 20; [transl. by James H. Robb (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984)].

†13. some: Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 286 (p. 300).

†14. Arist. Physics VIII, 4 (255b24).

Footnotes to Question VII, Article 12

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. IV, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 4; ibid. d. 21, q. 2, a. 1; IIIa, q. 87, a. 3.

†1. Utrum . . . and the like: cf. Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Lib. Sent. IV, d. 16, n. 16ff.

†2. in the blessing . . . of the remission of fault: cf. 'he would be freed from fault' in the blessing of water Collectarium O. P. (Prototyp. Humberti Ms. Roma, Arch. Gen. O. P. XIX. L. 1 f. 51 rb) [Rituale Romanum tit. 2, c. 8]; (i.e. the General Archives of the Dominican Order . . . etc.).

Footnotes to Question VIII, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 84, a. 3 and 4.

†1. It seems that . . . for Gregory says,,,: almost the same argument is found in Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 42, c. 6; Gregory enumerates these seven capital vices in the Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†2. 'tristitia', which is a kind of sadness or aversion, is the word Thomas uses here for 'acedia'. In Question XI where this capital vice is treated in particular, the word 'acedia' i.e. accidie (in the Greek akedia i.e. 'sourness') is used, which denotes a sort of distaste or aversion in regard to spiritual works, because of physical effort they entail. We have used the word 'acedia' here and also at times in Question XI, since it more accurately signifies the internal nature of this vice. Cf. q. 11, a. 1, fn. 1.

†3. 'luxuria', i.e. wantonness or licentiousness. is the Latin word used in the text. We have used the word 'lust' here since it is more specific and corresponds to the definition of this vice in Question XV, where it is treated in particular. It should also be noted that the sexual senses of the word is a rendering of the Vulgate 'concupiscence of the flesh' in the First Epistle of John 2, 16.

†4. Those vices . . . other vices arise: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 42, c. 6.

†5. which is called avarice: cf. below Question XIII, a. 1.

†6. Moreover vices . . . to virtues: almost the same argument is found in I-IIae, q. 84, a. 4 arg. 1.

†7. Ambrose, *Super Luke V*, n. 62 (PL 15, 1653C [1738C]; CCL 14, 156; CSEL 32-4, 207).

†8. principal or capital vices: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae II*, d. 42, c. 6.

†9. August. *Retractations I*, c. 9, n. 4 (PL 32, 596; CSEL 36, 41) as cited by Thomas in I-IIae, q. 20, a. 1
On the contrary 1.

†10. Arist. *Metaph. VI*, 4 (1027b26-27).

†11. Arist. *Categories*, ch. 11 (14a24-25).

†12. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298).

†13. August. *Rule n. 2* (PL 32, 1379); [transl. by George Lawless under the title *Augustine of Hippo and his Monastic Rule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), also by Mary T. Clark, in *Selected Writings of Augustine* (Paulist Press, 1984). There are many translations of Augustine's Rule most of them published in England.

†14. Arist. *Metaph. XII*, 4 (1070a31-33).

†15. Arist. *Nic. Ethics VII*, 8 (1151a16-17).

†16. Arist. *Nic. Ethics V*, 2 (1130a24-29).

†17. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 18, 14 (PL 191, 214A) from August. *Enarr. on Ps. 18*, 14 (PL 36, 156; CCL 38, 104-105); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers*, under the title *Expositions on the Psalms Vol. VIII, Psalm XIX*].

†18. by some: thus Albert *Super Sent. II*, d. 42, a. 8 ad 3.

†19. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 7, 7 (PL 191, 1416C) from August. *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum II*, c. 7, n. 28 (PL 42, 654).

†20. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics I*, 5 (1096a5-7) and *ibid. I*, 7 (1097a24-b7).

†21. August. *On the City of God XIV*, c. 7, n. 2 (PL 41, 410; CCL 48, 422; CSEL 40-2, 13). See Thomas himself I-IIae, q. 25, a. 2 On the contrary.

†22. August. *On the City of God XIV*, c. 28 (PL 41, 436; CCL 48, 451; CSEL 40-2, 56); cf. also *Enarr. in Ps. 64*, n. 2 (PL 36, 773; CCL 39, 824); [for transl. cf. above in fn. 17].

†23. August. *On the City of God XIV*, c. 7, n. 2 (PL 41, 411; CCL 48, 422-423; CSEL 40-2, 14).

†24. it is said . . . a usurer: cf. Raymond of Pennafort, *Summa de Paenitentia* (ed. Verona, 1744), p. 208; Ochoa, p. 541).

†25. August.: cf. *Enarr. in Ps. 79*, 17, n. 13 (PL 36, 1027; CCL 39, 1118); and Glossa of Peter Lombard on Psalm 79, 17 (PL 191, 766B); [for transl. of Augustine's work cf. above fn. 17. In that translation the reference is to Psalm LXXX, n. 10].

†26. mother and root of the virtues: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* III, d. 23, c. 3, n. 2 and c. 9, n. 2.

†27. August. in a *Homilia de Igne Purgatorii*: otherwise Sermon 104, n. 2 among the supposed works of Augustine (PL 39, 1946).

†28. *Decretum* rightly D. 25, c. 3 § 6 (Friedberg I, 93).

†29. which is punished with capital punishment: cf. Albert, *Super Sent.* II, d. 42, a. 6 sol.

†30. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621A-C).

†31. Arist. *Physics* VIII, 4 (255b24).

†32. Arist. *Metaph.* VI, 2 (1026b4-5).

†33. Arist. *Metaph.* XI (=XII), 10 (1075a12-16).

†34. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621A-C).

†35. good of man . . . and the good of exterior things: cf. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* I, 8 (1098b12-13).

†36. imaginatively grasped i.e. the good imagined or mentally pictured which moves the appetite: cf. Arist. *On the Soul* III, 10 (433b11-12).

†37. *acedia* . . . about some spiritual good: cf. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Ps. 106, 18 (PL 191, 977A) from August. *Enarr.* on Psalm 106, n. 6 (PL 37, 1422; CCL 40, 1573); [cf. above fn. 17 for transl. of Augustine's work. In that translation the reference is to Psalm CVI, n. 6 (p. 528 and fn. 1) and *ibid.* Psalm CVII, nn. 5-6 (pp. 533B-534A)].

†38. envy . . . over another's good: cf. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt, 121) and Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis* cap. 19 (PG 40, 688A; Verbeke, 101).

†39. in every sin . . . from an unchangeable good: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†40. namely the excellence of honor and renown: cf. Prosper Aquitanus, *Sententiae ex August. delibatae* 294 (PL 51, 471B; CCL 68-A, 329).

†41. Dionysius, *On the Eccl. Hier.* c. 6, pars 3 § 6 (PG 3, 537B; Dion. 1404).

†42. it pertains to error . . . as the true: cf. August. e.g. *Enchiridion* ch. 17 (PL 40, 239; CCL 46, 57).

†43. Heresy . . . gives rise to the heretic: cf. *Decretum* C. 24, q. 3, c. 31 (Friedberg I, 998) and *Postillae Hugonis a Sancto Caro in Osee* 2, 16. The *Postillae* of Hugo of St. Cher is a long continuous commentary (6 vols.) on all the books of the Bible, the purpose of which was to make accessible the most important advances in biblical interpretation in that [i.e. the 13th] century.

†44. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 10 (1118a33-b1).

†45. the hound . . . it expects: example of Arist. in *Nic. Ethics* III, 10 (1118a19-20) as cited by Thomas in *I-IIae*, q. 31, a. 6.

†46. subalternate genera . . . most general genus: Porphyry, *Isagoge*, c. 'On Species' (Minio-Paluello 11) and Peter of Spain *Summulae Logicales* tr. 2, n. 7 (De Rijk, 18); [for translations of these works cf. Appendix].

†47. Arist. *Metaph.* rightly XII, 4 (1070a31-33).

†48. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* V, 6 (1134a16ff).

†49. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI. c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†50. the Philosopher: Arist. *Rhetoric* II, 4 (1380b35-36).

†51. Augustine: as above in arg. 24., fn. 27.

Footnotes to Question VIII, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: *Super Sent.* II, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 84, a. 2; II-IIae q. 162, a. 2.

†1. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXIV, c. 23, n. 48 (PL 76, 744D).

†2. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) II, c. 38, n. 7 (PL 83, 639C).

†3. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXIV, c. 23, n. 49 (PL 76, 745C).

†4. from weakness or ignorance: cf. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A) from Gregory, *Moralia* XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A). Cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11.

†5. Gregory . . . on Ezechiel: rightly *Moralia* XXXIV, c. 23, n. 48 (PL 76, 744D).

†6. envy . . . about another's good: cf. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt, 122) and Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis* cap. 19, (PG 40, 688A; Verbeke, 101).

†7. vainglory . . . approbation of men: more clearly explained below in q. 9, a. 1.

†8. anger . . . seeks revenge: cf. Arist. *Rhetoric* II, c. 2 (1378b1-2) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 46, a. 1.

†9. August. *On Nature and Grace* ch. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257).

†10. Prosper (pseudo) = Julianus Pomerius, *De Vita Contemplativa* III, c. 2 n. 1 (PL 59, 476B).

†11. August. *On Nature and Grace* ch. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257).

†12. *Glossa Ordin.* on *Eccli.* 10, 14.

†13. *Glossa Ordin.* on *Eccli.* 10, 14.

†14. Job 33, 17: 'from iniquity' according to the Old Latin version; Vulgate: 'from pride'.

†15. *Glossa Ordin.* on Job 33, 17 from Gregory, *Moralia* XXIII, c. 22 (PL 76, 278A).

†16. August. Reply to Faustus rightly XXII, c. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25-1, 621) according to the wording of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 35, c. 1, n. 1.

†17. Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* ch. 13 (PL 158, 345D; Schmitt I, 257).

†18. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) IV, c. 40, n. 2 (PL 83, 1178D).

†19. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 24, n. 72 (PL 32, 1307; CCL 29, 318; CSEL 74, 150).

†20. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†21. which is the formal element in every sin: cf. above q. 4, a. 2 at end of the Response.

†22. Gloss of Jerome: *Glossa Ordin.* on Isaiah 60, 10 from Jerome *In Isaiah* XVII, c. 61 (PL 24, 601-602 [625A]; CCL 73A, 710).

†23. . August. *On Nature and Grace* ch. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257).

†24. In the same place: cf. above fn. 23.

†25. August. *On Nature and Grace* ch. 32 (PL 44, 265; CSEL 60, 260).

†26. Gregory: rather as referred to by Thomas in II-IIae, q. 162, a. 7 Reply to 4, *Glossa* of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 18, 14 (PL 191, 213D) from August. *Expositions on the Psalms* 18, 14 (PL 36, 156; CCL 38, 105; [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers*, Vol. VIII, Psalm XIX]).

†27. What is said . . . belongs to only one: Arist. *Topics* V, 5 (134b24).

†28. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 18, 14 (PL 191, 214A) from August. *Expositions on the Psalms* 18, 14 (PL 36, 156; CCL 38, 104; [for transl. cf. above fn. 26]).

†29. August. *Confessions* II, c. 6, n. 14 (PL 32, 681; CSEL 33, 40).

†30. desire to know . . . to man: Arist. *Metaph.* I, 1 (980a21) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth*, q. 2, a. 3 arg. 15.

†31. August. *On the City of God* XIV, c. 13, n. 1 (PL 41, 420; CCL 48, 434; CSEL 40-2, 31).

†32. August. *Confessions* II, c. 6, n. 13 (PL 32, 680; CSEL 33, 39).

†33. August. *On the City of God* XIV, c. 28 (PL 41, 436; CCL 48, 451; CSEL 40-2, 56); *Expositions on the Psalms* 64, 1, n. 2 (PL 36, 773; CCL 39, 824); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers*, Vol. VIII, Psalm LXV].

†34. hence it is called the form and mother . . . virtues: cf. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 1, 17 (PL 191, 1324B) and *Sententiae* III, d. 23, c. 3, n. 2 and c. 9, n. 2.

†35. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 620-621).

†36. if a person . . . an enemy: cf. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 1 (1111a12) and John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 24 (PG 94, 953C; Bt, 146).

†37. Milesians . . . : cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 8 (1151a9-10) according to the transl. of Robert Grosseteste of Lincoln (Gauthier, 287).

†38. August. On Nature and Grace c. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257).

†39. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 3 (1123b30).

†40. anger vengeance: cf. Arist. Rhetoric II, c. 2 (1378b1-2) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 46, a. 1.

†41. August. On Nature and Grace ch. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257); [for transl. cf. fn. 9].

†42. from the formal and material element: cf. above q. 4, a. 2 at end of the Response.

†43. Gregory. Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 620-621).

Footnotes to Question VIII, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 162, a. 3.

†1. Gregory, Moralia XXXIV, c. 23, n. 49 (PL 76, 745C).

†2. Avicenna, De Anima I, c. 5 (f. 4 vb B; Van Riet, 83).

†3. envy . . . of another's good fortune: August. Expositions on the Psalms 104, 25, n. 17 (PL 37, 1399; CCL 40, 1545) as below q. 10, a. 2 On the contrary; [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers, Vol. VIII, Psalm CV].

†4. Gregory, Moralia XXIII, c. 6, n. 13 (PL 76, 258C).

†5. contraries . . . in same subject: cf. Arist. Topics II, c. 4 (111a14).

†6. Bernard, On the Steps of Humility c. 2, nn. 3 and 5 (PL 182, 943A and ibid. 944B; Leclercq III, 18 and 20); [transl. under the title On the Steps of Humility and Pride, ed. by Halcyon C. Bachhouse (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985)].

†7. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 7 (1115b30).

†8. the Philosopher in his Poetria: in fact Averroes, Expositio Poeticae interpret. by Hermannus Alemannus (Minio-Paluello, 44-45).

†9. Glossa Ordin et Interlin on Habacuc 2, 5.

†10. Ambrose, Expos. on Ps. 118 sermo 7, n. 10 (PL 15, 1283D [1531C]; CSEL 62, 132).

†11. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 620D).

†12. Glossa Interlin. on Jeremiah 49, 16.

†13. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, cc. 9-12.

†14. August. On Two Souls, Against the Manicheans ch. 11 (PL 42, 105; CSEL 25-1, 70).

†15. Decretum C. 15, q. 1, I pars 5 (Friedberg I, 745).

†16. August. (pseudo) = Fulgentius Ad Monimum I, c. 26 (PL 65, 174A; CCL 91, 27).

†17. Decretum C. 23, q. 4, c. 23 (Friedberg I, 907).

†18. Seneca, Moral Epistles IX, epistle 59.

†19. Glossa Ordin. on Matthew 3, 15.

†20. To be proud is to go beyond: cf. Peter Helias, Comment. on Priscianum maior (ms. Brugge Statsbibliotheek 535 f. 56 ra): "from super likewise is derived superbus and superius and supremus. If then superbio is derived from superbus, they are wrong who say superbio is composed from super and eo with 'b' interposed and the 'e' changed to i, but there can be diverse opinions about this".

†21. Prosper Aquitanus, Sententiae Ex Augustini Delibitae 294 (PL 51, 471B; CCL 68A, 329).

†22. August.: rather, Bernard, On the Steps of Humility ch. 12, n. 40 (PL 182, 963C; Leclercq III, 46); [cf. fn. 6 above for translation]. 23. Gregory, Moralia II, c. 49, n. 77 (PL 75, 593A; CCL 143, 106).

†24. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 13, n. 1 (PL 41, 420; CCL 48, 434; CSEL 40-2, 31).

†25. Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433a13-18).

†26. Gregory, Moralia rightly XXXIV, c. 23, n. 49 (PL 76, 745C).

†27. sorrow over another's good fortune: cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt 121) and Nemesius De Natura Hominis cap. 19 (PG 40, 688A; Verbeke, 101).

†28. Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 13 (1144b28-29).

†29. Stoics: e.g. Seneca, as above in arg. 18. On the purport of this judgment see August. On the City of God IX, 4 (PL 41, 258; CCL 47. 251; CSEL 40-1, 411).

†30. Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 13 (1144b27-29).

†31. Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 2 (1129b26-31) and Ibid. V, 2 (1130b17-27).

Footnotes to Question VIII, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 42, q. 2, a. 4; II-IIae q. 162, a. 4; Lectio super Corinthians I, c. 4, lectio 2.

†1. Gregory, Moralia, rightly XXIII, c. 6, n. 13 (PL 76, 258C).

†2. Pelagian heresy: as reported by e.g. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 28 in its entirety.

†3. Gregory, rightly *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A) and *ibid.* n. 89 (PL 76, 621C).

†4. Jerome, *Epistle* 148, n. 4 (PL 22, 1206; CSEL 56, 332); [both in the *Patrology* in a footnote and in the *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers* it is sad that this *Epistle* is not the work of Jerome; cf. Vol. 22, p. 1206 in the *Patrology* and in the *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers, Second Series*, Vol. VI, p. 295].

†5. August. *On the City of God* XIV, c. 14 (PL 41, 422; CCL 48, 436; CSEL 40-2, 34).

†6. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298).

†7. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* V, 1 (1129b9).

†8. Gregory as above where he assigns the species of pride, cf. fn. 1.

Footnotes to Question IX, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 132, a. 1; *Lect. Super Galatians* cap. 5, lect. 7.

†1. Tully, *Tusculan Disputations* I, 2. 4.

†2. Sallust, *The War with Cataline* ch. 11 § 2.

†3. August. *On the City of God* V, c. 12, n. 4 (PL 41, 156; CCL 47, 145; CSEL 40-1, 236).

†4. as he himself says: August. *Sermo* 355 c. 1, n. 1 (PL 39, 1569).

†5. from faith . . . God: cf. *Hebrews* 11, 16.

†6. August. *Tractates on the Gospel of St. John* tract. C, n. 1 (PL 35, 1891; CCL 36, 588).

†7. Ambrose . . . ad Romanos: rather August. *Contra Maximinus* II, c. 13, n. 2 (PL 42, 770); cf. also August. *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions* q. 31.

†8. Tully, *On Invention* (i.e. *On Rhetoric*) II, 55. 166.

†9. Livy, *From the Founding of the City* c. 39, n. 9.

†10. is called vain . . . proper end: cf. Arist. *Phys.* II, 6 (197b25-26).

†11. *Isaias* 40, 6 according to the Old Latin version.

†12. *I Cor.* 10: rightly *Romans* 15, 2.

†13. the Apostle: e.g. *Romans* 12, 17; *II Cor.* 8, 21.

†14. Sallust, *The War with Cataline* ch. 11, § 2.

Footnotes to Question IX, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 132, a. 3.

†1. For nothing excludes . . . : the same argument is given verbatim in II-IIae, q. 132, a. 3 arg. 1.

†2. John Chrysostom: from *Catena Aurea* in *Matth.* 6, 1; cf. *On Matth. hom.* 19, n. 1 (PG 57, 273); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. 10* (p. 130B)].

†3. Gregory, *Moralia* XXII. c. 6 (PL 76, 218Dff).

†4. Jerome, *Epistle* 78 *mansio* (i.e. halting place) 41 (PL 22, 722; CSEL 55, 83); [See the note on this *Epistle* in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Second series Vol. VI* (p. 163A)].

†5. Argument five is missing; but since a reply to it is given in the text itself, we have supplied a translation of it from the editorial footnote in the Leonine edition on p. 212.

†6. I Timothy: rightly I Timothy 1, 17.

†7. August. *On the City of God* V, c. 19 (PL 41, 165; CCL 47, 155; CSEL 40-1, 252).

†8. the Philosopher: *Arist. Topics* III, c. 3 (1118b21-22) Boethius's transl. (Minio-Paluello, 57).

†9. *Glossa Ordin.* on *Matth.* 10, 14.

†10. Chrysostom (pseudo) *Opus Imperfectum* in *Matth. hom.* 13 (PG 56, 704).

†11. A sin of word . . . of the heart: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 42, c. 4, n. 2.

†12. proper end . . . in vain: cf. *Arist. Phys.* II, 6 (197b25-26).

†13. for then . . . without mortal sin: cf. August. *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions* q. 30 (PL 40, 19; CCL 44A, 38.).

†14. as we read . . . tyrants have done: cf. e.g. Suetonius, *On the Lives of the Twelve Caesars* IV § 22 [on Caligula].

†15. I Cor. 10: text formed by combining I Cor. 10, 33 and Romans 15, 2.

Footnotes to Question IX, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 21, a. 4; q. 37, a. 2; q. 38, a. 2; q. 132, a. 5.

†1. 'the presumption of novelties': for the explanation of this, cf. II-IIae, q. 21, a. 4 in the Response.

†2. Ambrose *On Paradise* ch. 8 (PL 14, 292D [309C]; CSEL 32-1, 296); [transl. in *The Fathers of the Church* Vol. 42].

†3. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 620D).

†4. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621A).

†5. The clause in brackets is not in the Leonine edition. We have added it here to account for the seven daughters Gregory assigns.

†6. August. On Nature and Grace ch. 29 (PL 44, 263; CSEL 60, 257).

Footnotes to Question X, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 36, a. 2.

†1. Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 5 (1105b31-32).

†2. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt, 121).

†3. August. On True Religion ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†4. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 6 (PL 41, 409; CCL 48, 421; CSEL 40-2, 11).

†5. a contrary . . . to its contrary: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales tr. 7, n. 66 (De Rijk, 121)

†6. Remigius: this reference has not been found. Cf. however I. Brady, Remigius-Nemesius in Franciscan Studies 8 (1948), pp. 275-284. For the opinion ascribed to Remigius see Nemesius De Natura Boni cap. 18 (PG 40, 688A; Verbeke, 101) and John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt, 121).

†7. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 13, n. 1 (PL 41, 420; CCL 48, 434; CSEL 40-2, 31).

†8. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 32, 1225; CCL 29, 215; CSEL 74, 9).

†9. since good . . . all desire: Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†10. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1221-1222; CCL 29, 211; CSEL 74, 3).

†11. Isidore, De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) III, c. 25, n. 1 (PL 83, 700A).

†12. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 7, n. 2 (PL 41, 410; CCL 48, 422; CSEL 40-2, 13) uses the word "ill-directed" as we have translated "improbis" in Thomas's text here; but August. uses the word "improbis" as meaning 'inordinate' in his book On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 17, n. 48 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 304; CSEL 74, 130).

†13. Jerome to Leta: or Epistle 107, n. 4 (PL 22, 871; CSEL 55, 294); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Second Series, Vol. VI].

†14. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 7 (1108b4-5).

†15. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 2 (1139a21-22).

†16. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†17. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C-D; Dion. 306).

†18. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298).

†19. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22 (PG 94, 940D; Bt 132).

†20. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 5 (1105b32-1106a2).

†21. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 1 (1129b8-9). Similarly Thomas in I-IIae, q. 70, a. 3. However see Tully, Tusculan Disputations I, 36. 88.

†22. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics X, 5 (1175a28-b24).

†23. August. Confessions I, c. 12 (PL 32, 670; CSEL 33, 17).

†24. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 7, n. 2 (PL 41, 410; CCL 48, 422; CSEL 40-2, 13).

†25. Arist. Rhetoric II, c. 11 (1388a33-34) according to the transl. of Guillelmus (Spengel 265, 5-6).

Footnotes to Question X, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 36, a. 3.

†1. Gregory, Moralia XXII, c. 11, n. 23 (PL 76, 226D).

†2. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22 (PG 94, 940 D; Bt, 132).

†3. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372) according to the wording of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, cc. 9-12.

†4. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372 according to the wording of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, cc. 9-12.

†5. August. Against Lying ch. 7, n. 18 (PL 40, 528-529; CSEL 41, 489-490).

†6. A sin of deed . . . of the heart: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 42, c. 4, n. 2.

†7. August. Confessions I, c. 7, n. 11 (PL 32, 665-666; CSEL 33, 10).

†8. Ambrose: this judgment was mistakenly attributed to Ambrose by the scholastics; however it is found in the Glossa Ordin. on Canticle 2, 4 from Origen On the Canticle of Canticles homily 2, n. 8 as transl. by Jerome (PG 13, 54A); [transl. of both Origen and Jerome by R. P. Lawson (Westminster MD: The Newman Press, 1957; London: Longmans Green and Co., 1957)].

†9. Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 7 (1108a30-b5); cf. also Rhetoric II, 9 (1386b16-24).

†10. Gregory, Moralia rightly V, c. 46, n. 85 (PL 75, 728D; CCL 143, 282).

†11. Itinerario Clementis: rightly Clemens (pseudo) Epistle I ad Jacobum transl. by Rufinus (PG 1, 480C); cf. Decretum On Paenitentia d. 1, c. 24 (Friedberg I, 1164).

†12. Isidore, De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) III, c. 25, n. 4 (PL 83, 700 B).

†13. August. Expositions on the Psalms 104, 25, n. 17 (PL 37, 1339; CCL 40, 1545); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII. Psalm CV].

†14. As he (Augustine) himself says: rightly e.g. Sermo 49, c. 7 (PL 38, 324), Sermo 58, c. 7 (PL 38, 397), Exposition on Psalm 25, n. 3 (PL 36, 189; CCL 38, 143), Exposition 2 on Psalm 54, n. 7 (PL 36, 632; CCL 39, 661), Epistle 38, n. 2 (PL 33, 153; CSEL 34, 65), [transl. of Epistle 38 in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. I]; [transl. of the Expost. on the Psalms in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII].

†15. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on II Cor. 2, 15 (PL 192, 20 D) from August. Sermo 273, c. 5 (PL 38, 1250).

†16. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IX, 4 (1166a4-5).

†17. Arist. Nic. Ethics IX, 4 (1166a30-31).

†18. August. On True Religion ch. 47, n. 90 (PL 34, 162; CCL 32, 246; CSEL 77, 65).

†19. reason . . . small as nothing: cf. Arist. Rhetoric II, c. 2 (1378b12-14) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 46, a. 3.

†20. the Philosopher: Arist. Rhetoric II, c. 9 (1386b23-24).

†21. Gregory, Moralia XXII, c. 11, n. 23 (PL 76, 226D).

†22. interposes: loc. cit. above fn. 21.

†23. anger after the manner of zeal: cf. Gregory, Moralia V, c. 45 n. 82 (PL 75, 726B; CCL 143, 279).

Footnotes to Question X, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 36, a. 4.

†1. August. On Holy Virginity ch. 31 (PL 40, 413; CSEL 41, 268); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. III].

†2. of the nature of a capital vice . . . origin from it: cf. above q. 8, a. 1.

†3. Gregory, Moralia rightly XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621 B).

†4. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†5. just as good is the end . . . which is flight: Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 2 (1139a21-22).

†6. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 620D).

Footnotes to Question XI, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 35, a. 1.

†1. The word Accidia used in the Leonine text derives from the rarely used word "accidie". It is almost impossible to find an exact equivalent for accidia in English. "Sloth" is the word used in other translations of Thomas's works and in works on spiritual matters by other authors, but it tends to become restricted to "aversion to work" or "laziness". Perhaps the closest equivalent is *tedium* or "repugnance" which Thomas uses at times. The Oxford Latin Dictionary does not list either 'accidia', 'accidie', or 'acedia', but it lists the verb 'aceo', and 'acer', 'acerbus', 'acidé', 'acidus', 'acor', all meaning 'sour' or 'bitter' in some form or other. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as the meaning of "accidie", 'sourness' and gives the Late Latin word 'acedia' as the equivalent of the Greek word 'akedia' -- [the history, various meanings, and spellings of the word in that Dictionary are enlightening]. Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives as the meaning of accidia, spiritual torpor or apathy; the French Etymological Dictionary gives as the meanings of "acedia", 'anxiete', 'peine de coeur', 'degoute'. In the arguments in this first article on acedia, Damascene, Gregory, and the Scripture quotations use 'tristitia', as does Thomas but along with 'accidia'. Given this complication as to the meaning of 'acedia', we have used 'sadness', 'tedium' and 'acedia' in the translation, leaving it to Thomas himself to explicate what is meant by this word.

†2. since . . . in the same genus: cf Arist. *Metaph.* X, 8 (1058a10-11), *Topics* IV, 3 (123b3-4).

†3. August. *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I, c. 15, n. 25 (PL 32, 1322).

†4. August. *On the City of God* XV, c. 22 (PL 41, 467; CCL 48, 488; CSEL 40-2, 109).

†5. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932A; Bt, 121).

†6. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Ps. 106, 1 (PL 191, 973A) from August. *Expositions on the Psalms* 106, 1, nn. 4-7 (PL 37, 1421-1422; CCL 40, 1572-1574); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII, Ps. CVII].

†7. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on II Cor. 9. 7 (PL 192, 63 B) from August. *Expositions on the Psalms* 91, 4, n. 5 (PL 37, 1174; CCL 39, 1282); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII, Ps. XCII].

†8. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932 B; Bt, 121).

†9. Acedia . . . to an internal good: cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *Expos. Orationis Dominicae* (PL 175, 744 B).

†10. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Ps. 106, 18 (PL 191, 977A) from August. *Expos. on the Psalms* 106, n. 6 (PL 37, 1422; CCL 40, 1573); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII, Ps. CVII].

†11. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* I, 12 (1101b14-15).

†12. Gregory: the text appears to be a conflation of Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B) and Guill. Peraldus, *Summa de Vitiis et Virtutibus* tr. 5, p. 2, c. 13 (ed. Venetiis 1571, p. 295); cf. also Bernard, *Super Cantica Sermon* 54, n. 8 (PL 183, 1042A; Leclercq II, 107); [transl. of the Bernard's work by Killian Walsh, Osco and Irene M. Edmonds, *Cistercian Fathers Series Number 31* (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1974)].

†13. no one sins . . . cannot avoid: cf. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 50 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 304; CSEL 74, 131) as below q. 14, a. 1 arg. 1.

†14. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt, 121).

†15. neither . . . nor blamed for them: cf. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 5 (1105b31-32) as above q. 10, a. 1 arg. 1.

†16. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†17. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) IV, c. 40, n. 2 (PL 83, 1178D).

†18. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932 B; Bt, 119).

†19. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†20. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 12 (PG 94, 929B; Bt, 119).

†21. August. *Expositions on the Psalms* 106, n. 6 (PL 37, 1422; CCL 40, 1573); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers*, Vol. VIII, Psalm CVII].

†22. August. *On True Religion* ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).

†23. August. *On the City of God* XIV, c. 7, n. 2 (PL 41, 410; CCL 48, 422; CSEL 40-2, 13).

†24. predication . . . of the essence: cf. Alan de Insulis, *Regulae de Sacra Theologia* 12 and 18 (PL 210, 629 and 630).

†25. temptatio . . . from the flesh . . . from the enemy: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 21, c. 6, n. 3.

†26. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 1 (1110a8ff.).

†27. August. *Sermon* 31, c. 1, nn. 1-2 (PL 38, 192-193); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers* Vol. VI].

Footnotes to Question XI, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 35, a. 2.

†1. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* I, 8 (1099a7-21).

†2. Gregory, *Moralia* rightly XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621C); cf. Thomas himself I-IIae, q. 72, a. 2 *On the contrary*.

†3. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†4. a heavy object . . . a lower place: cf. Arist. *Physics* II, 9 (200a2).

Footnotes to Question XI, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 35, a. 3.

†1. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 12 (PG 94, 929 B; Bt, 119).

†2. A sin of deed . . . sin of the heart: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 42, c. 4, n. 2.

†3. joy . . . of an inhering habit: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 3 (1104b4-5).

†4. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932 B; Bt, 121).

†5. August. A Literal Commentary on Genesis XII, c. 33, n. 64 (PL 34, 482; CSEL 28-1, 429).

†6. you will bring down . . . unto the underworld: cf. Genesis 44, 29 according to the wording of Augustine which is also the wording of the Old Latin version; Vulgate: 'deducetis canos meos cum moerore ad inferos'; ('you will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to the underworld').

†7. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 42, 5 (PL 191, 426C-D) from Cassiodorus, Exposit. on the Psalms 42, 5 (PL 70, 309A-B; CCL 97, 390); for transl. cf. Appendix.

†8. The reply to argument 5 is missing. We have supplied it here in brackets from the editorial footnotes in the Leonine edition, p. 229.

Footnotes to Question XI, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; II-IIae, q. 35, a. 4.

†1. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 14 (PG 94, 932B; Bt, 121).

†2. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†3. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†4. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VIII, 5 (1157b15-17); *ibid.* 6 (1158a23-24).

†5. the Philosopher: Arist. rightly Nic. Ethics X, 6 (1176b19-21).

Footnotes to Question XII, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 158, a. 1; Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, ch. 4, lect. 8.

†1. Jerome, Super Matth. I, c. 5, 22 (PL 26, 36 [37 B-C]; CCL 77, 27-28).

†2. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 25 (PG 3, 728B; Dion. 286).

†3. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith rightly book II, c. 30 (PG 94, 976A, Bt, 162).

†4. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 733A; Dion. 309).

†5. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 6 (1149a25-26) according to the transl. of Robert Grosseteste (Gauthier, 282).

†6. afterwards: Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 6 (1149a26-31).

†7. Cassianus, The Institutes VIII, ch. 6 (PL 49, 333A; CSEL 17, 155); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic.

- †8. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 78 (PL 75, 724C; CCL 143, 276).
- †9. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* II, c. 19, n. 50 (PL 32, 1268; CCL 29, 271; CSEL 74, 85).
- †10. Cassianus, *The Institutes* VIII, c. 5 (PL 49, 330 B-332A; CSEL 17, 155); [for transl. cf. fn. 7].
- †11. Tully, *Tusculan Disputations* IV, c. 23. 52.
- †12. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 78 (PL 75, 723D; CCL 143, 276).
- †13. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 12 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54).
- †14. *Glossa Ordin.* on *Leviticus*. 19, 18.
- †15. of similar . . . the same: cf. Boethius, *De Diff. Top.* III (PL 64, 1197D) and Peter of Spain *Summulae Logicales* tr. 5, n. 33 (De Rijk, 74); transl. of Boethius's work by Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978); for transl. of Peter of Spain's work see Appendix.
- †16. Philosopher: Arist. *On the Heavens* I, 5 (271b11-13).
- †17. even anger . . . from zeal: cf. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726C; CCL 143, 279).
- †18. Gregory *Moralia*, V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726 D; CCL 143, 279).
- †19. Tully, *Tusculan Disputations* III, c. 10.
- †20. Arist. *Topics* IV, c. 5 (125b23-28).
- †21. Deut. 32, 35 according to the wording of St. Paul, *Romans* 12, 19 and *Hebr.* 10, 30.
- †22. the Philosopher: Arist. *Rhetoric* II, 2 (1378b1-2) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 46, a. 1.
- †23. Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Acts and Sayings of Orators, Philosophers, Statesmen etc.* IV, c. 1, ext. 1; (London: Printed for Benjamin Crayle and John Fish, 1684).
- †24. John Chrysostom (pseudo), *Opus imperfectum on Matth.* homily 11 (PG 56, 690).
- †25. *Glossa* of Peter Lomb. on Eph. 4, 26 (PL 192, 206A) from Ambrose (pseudo) In Eph. 4, 26 (PL 17, 391 D [413B]; CSEL 81-3, 106).
- †26. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726C; CCL 143, 279).
- †27. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 20 (PG 94, 1081 B-C; Bt, 259-260).
- †28. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 5 (1105b31-1106a1).
- †29. Stoics: from August. *On the City of God* IX, c. 4 (PL 41, 258; CCL 47, 251; CSEL 40-1, 411) according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 158, a. 1 and Q. D. *On Truth* q. 26, a. 8 Reply to 7.
- †30. Peripatetics: cf. August. loc. cit. fn. 29.

- a. 1.
- †31. anger . . . desire of vengeance: Arist. Rhetoric II, c. 2 (1378b1-2) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 46, a. 1.
- †32. anger . . . around the heart: cf. Arist. On the Soul I, 1 (403a31) according to an older transl. (Alonso 93, 1).
- †33. Arist. Topics III, 2 (118a11-12).
- †34. fierceness . . . a dog: example of Dionysius in arg. 2 above.
- †35. Philosopher: Arist. Physics VII, 3 (247b19-20).
- †36. Gregory, Moralia V, c. 45, n. 83 (PL 75, 727A-B; CCL 143, 280).
- †37. they held: the Stoics from Tully, Tusculan Disputations III, c. 10.
- †38. Gregory, Moralia V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726C; CCL 143, 279).
- †39. fallacy of equivocation: cf. e.g. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales tr. 7, n. 26 (De Rijk, 98).
- †40. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 5 (1127b26-27).
- †41. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 732C; Dion. 305).
- †42. the Philosopher: Arist. Topics IV, 5 (125b22-28).
- †43. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 3 (1104b25-27).

Footnotes to Question XII, Article 2

- †p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 158, a. 2; Lect. on Eph. ch. 4, lect. 8.
- †1. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 5 (1105b31-32).
- †2. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 30 (PG 94, 976A; Bt, 162).
- †3. August. On True Religion ch. 14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 204; CSEL 77, 20).
- †4. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 6 (1149b21).
- †5. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 6 (PL 41, 409; CCL 48, 421; CSEL 40-2, 11) and c. 15, n. 2 (PL 41, 424; CCL 48, 438; CSEL 40-2, 36).
- †6. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 50 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 304; CSEL 74, 131).
- †7. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 4, 5 (PL 191, 86C) from Cassiodorus Expos. on Ps. 4, 5 (PL 70, 49C; CCL 97, 58); [transl. under the title Explanation of the Psalms (New York: Paulist Press, c1990-c1991)].
- †8. the Philosopher: Arist. On the Soul I, 1 (403a32-b1) according to an older translation (Alonso 93, 1).

†9. Jerome, Epistle to the Monk Antonius or Epistle 12 (PL 22, 346; CSEL 54, 42); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Second Series Vol. VI].

†10. In every sin . . . a transitory good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†11. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726C; CCL 143, 279).

†12. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VII, 6 (1149a25-28).

Footnotes to Question XII, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 158, a. 3.

†1. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Eph. 4, 26 (PL 192, 206C).

†2. Glossa Ordin. on Matthew 5, 22 from August. On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount I, c. 9, n. 24 (PL 34, 1241; CCL 35, 25).

†3. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 78 (PL 75, 724A-C; CCL 143, 276).

†4. August. On the City of God XIV, c. 15, n. 2 (PL 41, 424; CCL 48, 438; CSEL 40-2, 37).

†5. Deuteronomy 32, 35 in keeping with the further texts, namely St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans 12, 19 and to the Hebrews 10, 30.

†6. where we have "Vengeance is mine": Vulgate Deut. 32, 35.

†7. Glossa Ordin. on Proverbs 29, 22.

†8. Rightly Proverbs 29, 22.

†9. excessive intensity . . . of the sense powers: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 12 (424a28-32).

†10. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726C; CCL 143, 279).

†11. That which . . . is a mortal sin: cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 30 (PG 94, 976A; Bt, 162).

†12. man . . . good-tempered animal: cf. Arist. Topics V, 1 (128b17), *ibid.* c. 2 (130a27-28) and 3 (132a7). In the translation of the Topics by W. A. Packard-Cambridge (in the Great Books of the Western World published by the Encyclopaedia Britannica) this is translated as 'civilized animal'.

†13. Job 5, 2 according to the Parisian version (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 15467); Vulgate 'the truly foolish man.'

†14. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 4, 5 (PL 191, 86C) from Cassiodorus Expos. on Ps. 4, 5 (PL 70, 49C; CCL 97, 58); [transl. by P. G. Walsh under the title Explanations of the Psalms, in the Ancient Christian Writers series, Vol. 51 (New York/ Mahwah, N.J., 1990)].

†15. A sin of deed. . of the heart: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 42, c. 4, n. 2.

†16. August. *On the City of God* IX, c. 5 (PL 41, 260; CCL 47, 254; CSEL 40-1, 415).

†17. afterwards: *IV Kings* 2, 24.

†18. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Eph. 4, 26 (PL 192, 206A) from Ambrose (pseudo) *On Eph.* 4, 26 (PL 17, 391D [413B]; CSEL 81-3, 106).

†19. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 6 (1149b24-25).

†20. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 6 (1149a25-27).

†21. the duty of justice . . . under a precept: cf. *Exodus* 20, 15.

†22. vicious anger: cf. Gregory, *Moralia* V, c. 45, n. 82 (PL 75, 726C; CCL 143, 279).

†23. the Philosopher: Arist. *rightly Rhetoric* II, c. 2 (1378b12-13) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 46, a. 3.

Footnotes to Question XII, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 46, a. 6; II-IIae, q. 158, a. 4.

†1. August. *Enchiridion* ch. 12 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54).

†2. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Quinque Septenariis* cap. 2 (PL 175, 406 B-C); [i.e. On the Five Groups of Seven, that is, the capital vices, the requests in the Lord's prayer, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the virtues, and the Beatitudes; there is a French transl. of this in the *Sources Chretiennes*, Vol. 155 (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1969)]

†3. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Quinque Septenariis* cap. 2 (PL 175, 407A); cf. above fn. 2.

†4. the Philosopher: Arist. *Topics* III, c. 2 (117b33-39).

†5. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 6 (1149b20-21).

†6. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†7. August. *The Rule of the Servants of God*, n. 10 (PL 32, 1384); [transl. under the title *The Rule of St. Augustine*; [cf. Appendix for translation].

†8. That which is the per se . . . accidentally: cf. Arist. *Physics* II, 6 (198a1-8).

†9. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 6 (1149b24-25).

†10. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 6 (1149b20-21).

†11. the Philosopher: Arist. *Rhetoric* II, c. 4 (1382a1ff.).

†12. acts . . . to individuals: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* I, 1 (981a16-17) according to Thomas *Super Metaph.* V, 3 (1014a20-25).

†13. hate . . . the whole class: Arist. *Rhetoric* II, 4 (1382a5-6) according to Thomas Ia, q. 80, a. 2 Reply to 2.

Footnotes to Question XII, Article 5

†p Parallel texts: I-IIae, q. 84, a. 4; II-IIae, q. 158, a. 6.

†1. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* VII, 6 (1149b20-21).

†2. *Glossa Ordin.* on Proverbs 29, 22 from Bede, *Super Parabolas Solomonis Allegorica Expos.* III, c. 29 (PL 91, 1022C).

†3. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†4. John Chrysostom (pseudo) *Opus Imperfecta* on Matth. homily 11 (PG 56, 690).

Footnotes to Question XIII, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 118, a. 2.

†1. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 17, n. 48 (PL 32, 1294; CCL 29, 303-304; CSEL 74, 130).

†2. pride . . . of excellence: August. *On the City of God* XIV, c. 13, n. 1 (PL 41, 420; CCL 48, 434; CSEL 40-2, 31).

†3. Gregory, *In Evangelia* I, hom. 16, n. 2 (PL 76, 1136A).

†4. Tully, *Tusculan Disputations* IV, c. 11, n. 26; this is treated extensively in Hugo of St. Victor *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* II, pars 13, c. 1 (PL 176, 526A); [transl. of High of St. Victor's work by Roy J. Ferrari (Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951)].

†5. the Philosopher: Arist. *Categories* ch. 15 (15b17-32).

†6. Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 8 (1108b11ff.).

†7. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* V, 5 (1133b32-34).

†8. August. *A Literal Commentary on Genesis* XI, c. 15, n. 19 (PL 34, 436; CSEL 28-1, 347).

†9. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35), *ibid.* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†10. Arist. *Metaph.* X, 4 (1055a19-20).

†11. August. A Literal Commentary on Genesis XI, c. 15, n. 19 (PL 34, 437; CSEL 28-1, 347).

†12. as is commonly said: cf. the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 581 (p. 568).

†13. John Chrysostom from Catena Aurea In Matth. 5, 6; cf. In Matth. hom. 15, n. 6 (PG 57, 227).

†14. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†15. Glossa Ordin. on Genesis 3, 1 from Gregory In Evang. I, hom. 16, n. 2 (PL 76, 1136A).

†16. nothing . . . of itself: cf. e.g. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (416b16-18); August. On the Trinity I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 42, 820; CCL 50, 28).

†17. Isidore: Etymol. X, n. 9 (PL 82, 369A).

†18. in Greek . . . is named: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 17, n. 48 (PL 32, 1294; CCL 29, 303; CSEL 74, 130).

†19. August. A Literal Commentary on Genesis XI, c. 15, n. 19 (PL 34, 436 and 437; CSEL 28-1, 347).

†20. we are said to have possession: cf. Arist. Categories ch. 15 (15b26).

†21. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1119b26-27).

†22. Some authors: e.g. the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 581 (p. 568).

†23. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 1 (1129a32-b11).

†24. Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1122a13-14).

†25. Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 5 (1133b32-34).

Footnotes to Question XIII, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 118, a. 4.

†1. Rightly the First Epistle to John 2, 15.

†2. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 36, n. 1 (PL 40, 25; CCL 44A, 54).

†3. which falls under a precept: cf. Exodus 20, 15.

†4. Basil: according to the text of Catena Aurea on Luke 12, 18; cf. Basil Hom. on Luke 12, 18 "I will pull down my barns" . . . , " etc. n. 7 (PG 31, 277A) Rufinus's translation (PG 31, 1752C).

†5. Rightly Glossa Ordin.; rightly on Luke 6, 35.

†6. Mortal Sin . . . to a transitory good: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and ibid. III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†7. Rightly Gregory Moralia XIV, c. 53, n. 63 (PL 75, 1072A).

†8. a sin . . . is said to be unpardonable: cf. above q. 3, a. 15.

†9. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1121b14).

†10. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 3, 12 (PL 191, 1557A).

†11. for the Gloss adds: I Corinth. 3, 15.

†12. contraries . . . the same genus: cf. Arist. Metaph. X, 8 (1058a11); Topics IV, c. 3 (123b4).

†13. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1121b22).

†14. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1122a13-14).

†15. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 3, 12 (PL 191, 1557B).

†16. but adds: Ephesians 5, 5.

†17. Glossa Ordin. on Luke 6, 35.

†18. through ignorance . . . through weakness . . . from pure malice: cf. Isidore, De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A) from Gregory, Moralia XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A); cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11.

†19. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1122a13-16).

Footnotes to Question XIII, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; II-IIae q. 118, a. 7 and 8.

†1. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 5 (1096a5-7)

†2. Gregory, Moralia XV, c. 25, n. 30 (PL 75, 1096B).

†3. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†4. happiness . . . men desire: August. On the Trinity XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 5, a. 8 On the contrary.

†5. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 7 (1097b14-22), I, 7 (1097a30ff.), and I, 8 (1099a24-30).

†6. Boethius . . . in II. . On the Consolation of Philosophy: we have found nothing.

†7. Boethius: On the Consolation of Philosophy III, pr. 3 (PL 63, 732B-733A; CCL 94, 41; CSEL 67, 51).

†8. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†9. Judas: cf. Matth. 26, 14-16; Mark 14, 10-11; Luke 22, 3-6.

Footnotes to Question XIII, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. III, d. 37, a. 6; II-IIae q. 78, a. 1; Quodlib. III, q. 7, a. 2.

†1. Utrum Mutuare ad Usuram Sit Peccatum Mortale?. ('Whether Lending Money at Usury Is a Mortal Sin?') Usury as St. Thomas understands it, means payment for the use of money, i.e. asking a price for the use of money. The contemporary meaning of usury as lending at an excessive rate of interest is not what St. Thomas has in mind; he regards paying any price for the use of money as wrong. As the Response makes clear, money is one of those things whose use is its very consumption, like wine or bread, and so the use is not other than the thing itself; hence handing over the use of money is also to hand over the ownership of money. The basic objection to usury for Thomas, then, is that since the use of money is not other than the money itself, the lender in asking a price for the loan either sells that which does not exist, i.e., the use apart from the money, or he sells the same thing twice, i.e., the use and the money. Thomas regards this as contrary to natural law. However in the answers to the objections Thomas makes several nuanced distinctions in regard to this, in the Replies to arguments 6, 14, and 16.

†2. bill of divorce: cf. Deuteronomy 24, 1 and 3; Matthew 5, 31 and 19, 7; Mark 10, 4.

†3. many authors: Alex. of Hales Glossa on Lib. Sent. III, d. 37, n. 19 (p. 486) and n. 25 (p. 490); Albert, Super Sent. III, d. 37, a. 13; Bonaventure, In Ev. Luc. 6, 35 (VII, 157).

†4. by natural law: cf. Tully, On Rhetoric or On Invention II, c. 53, n. 161.

†5. Tully, On Rhetoric or On Invention II, c. 22, n. 65 and c. 53, n. 160.

†6. civil law: cf. Justinian, Institutiones II, tit. 4 § 2 (Krueger, 13); Digesta VII, tit. 5 lege 1 (Mommsen, 107) according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 78, a. 1 Reply to 3; [transl. of Justinian's Institutions by Peter Birks and Grant McLoes with the Latin text (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)].

†7. Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 2 (1130b35-1131b5).

†8. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 11 (1138a4-28).

†9. who throws his cargo . . . ship: example of Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 1 (1110a8-11).

†10. Simony . . . equivalent service: cf. Decretum C. 1, q. 3, c. 8 (Friedberg I, 414) according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 100, a. 5.

†11. Compensation (interesse): cf. Aegidius de Lessines, De Usuris cap. 7 'the condition . . . which is called compensation (interesse) or recompense for loss and not hope of gain.' Thomas uses this word only in this objection and the reply to it. It means literally 'to be or to lie between', the point of the objection being that someone can without sin take some compensation for a loss 'between' the time he loaned the money and the time he got it back.

†12. Gregory of Nyssa: from Catena Aurea super Luke 6, 35; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Super Eccl. homily 4 (PG 44, 672B-C).

†13. the Philosopher: Arist. Topics IV, c. 4 (124b4-6) Boethius's translation (Minio-Paluello, 75).

†14. usury is so called from `use'(usu): cf. Huguccio, *Liber Derivationum* sub voce `utor': `item ab utor hec usura, usure, incrementum pecunie mutuate'; (cf. "The Book of Derivations under the word `to use': likewise from the word `use' derives the word `usury' i.e. `a sum paid for the use of money'" (ms. Paris B.N. lat. 17880 f. 209 ra).

†15. the Philosopher: Arist. rightly *Politics* I, 9 (1257a35ff.). Cf. also *ibid.* I, 10 (1258b2-8) for Aristotle's opinion about usury.

†16. Or it can be said . . . : cf. *Glossa Ordin.* on Luke 6, 35 and Bede, *In Luc. Evang. expositio* II, c. 6, 35 (PL 92, 407C-D; CCL 120, 146).

†17. some authors: cf. *Summa* of Alexander of Hales III, n. 380 (p. 566) and Bonaventure, *Super Sent.* III, d. 37, dub. 7.

†18. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* IX, 1 (1164a33-b12).

†19. Arist. *Metaph.* V, 5 (1015a20-26).

†20. the Philosopher: Arist. *Politics* I, 9 (1257a6-13).

†21. beyond the principal: cf. *Decretum* C. 14, q. 3, c. 4 (Friedberg I, 735); *Decretales* V, tit. XIX, c. 10 and 19 (Friedberg II, 814 and 816); *Glossa Interlin.* on Luke 6, 35)).

†22. a proof . . . from metaphorical expressions: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* III, d. 11, c. 2, n. 4.

†23. August. *Letter* 47, n. 2 (PL 33, 184; CSEL 34, 130); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers* Vol. I].

†24. Jeremiah 41, 8 according to the Parisian version (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 15467).

Footnotes to Question XIV, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 148, a. 1.

†1. August. *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 50 (PL 32, 1295; CCL 29, 304; CSEL 74, 131).

†2. Gregory, *Moralia* XXX, c. 18, n. 62 (PL 76, 558B).

†3. August. *Confess.* X, c. 31, n. 47 (PL 32, 799; CSEL 33, 262).

†4. August. rightly *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1270; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†5. the Philosopher: Arist. *On the Soul* II, 3 (414b12-13).

†6. August. *Confess.* X, c. 31, n. 44 (PL 32, 797; CSEL 33, 259).

†7. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* II, 6 (1107a2-8).

†8. Gregory: rightly *Moralia* XXX, c. 18, n. 58 (PL 76, 555D).

†9. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 733A; Dion. 309).

†10. 'engrained as they are in our life': Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 3 (1105a2) according to the older transl. (Gauthier, 9), and also according to the Ross edition of Aristotle's Nic. Ethics; but in the Leonine edition of De Malo, the Latin is 'contemporanee vite nostre', i.e. contemporaneous i.e. concomitant as they are with our life.

†11. hence it is said . . . : Hugo of St. Victor, De Sacramentis II pars 13, c. 1 (PL 176, 526A); [transl. under the title On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951)].

†12. August. Confess. X, c. 31, n. 46 (PL 32, 799; CSEL 33, 261).

†13. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 11 (1119a16-20).

†14. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 9 (1109b18-23).

†15. August. Confess. X, c. 31, n. 47 (PL 32, 799; CSEL 33, 262).

†16. appetitive power, the retentive, digestive, and excretive: according to the wording in Maimonides' Dux Neutorum I, c. 71 (Justiniani f. 31 v); cf. also Nemesius De Natura Hominis cap. 23 (PG 40, 693A; Verbeke 105); John Damascene, The Orthodox Faith II, c. 12 (PG 94, 928D; Bt, 123); [transl. of Maimonides' work Guide for the Perplexed by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)].

†17. Arist. Nic. Ethics II, 6 (1106b36-1107a8).

†18. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 3 (1123b12-14) according to the transl. of Robert Grosseteste (Gauthier, 212).

†19. Gregory, Moralia XXX, c. 18, n. 63 (PL 76, 558C).

Footnotes to Question XIV, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 148, a. 2; Lect. super Romans cap. 13, lect. 3; Lect. on Galatians ch. 5, lect. 5; [transl. of the latter text under the title Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (Albany, NY: Magi Books, Inc., 1966)].

†1. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on the Epistle to the Hebrews 12, 16 (PL 192, 505C).

†2. Gregory, Moralia XXX, c. 18, n. 59 (PL 76, 556A-B).

†3. Mortal sin . . . away from God: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and ibid. III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89).

†4. i.e. to honor an idol: cf. Gloss Ordin. on Exodus 32, 6.

†5. Jerome, rightly Against Jovinianus II, n. 8 (PL 23, 297C [311A]); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Second Series, Vol. VI].

†6. Jerome, Against Jovinianus II, 9 (PL 23, 299A [312B]); [for transl. cf. fn. 5 above].

†7. that which . . . is a mortal sin: John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 30 (PG 94, 976A; Bt, 162).

†8. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 135, 10 (PL 191, 1197D) from Cassiodorus *Expos. on Ps. 135*, 10 (PL 70, 971B; CCL 98, 1226); [for transl. of Cassiodorus's work cf. Appendix].

†9. Glossa Interlin. on Ecclesiasticus 39, 31-32.

†10. the Philosopher: Arist. *Nic. Ethics* III, 10 (1118b3-4).

†11. Rightly Epistle to the Philippians 3, 18-19.

†12. August. *Confess.* X, c. 31, n. 45 (PL 32, 798; CSEL 33, 260).

†13. Gregory, *Moralia* X, c. 11, n. 21 (PL 75, 933A; CCL 143, 552).

†14. he adds: Gregory as above, fn. 13.

†15. August. *Sermo* 104, n. 3 among the supposed works (PL 39, 1946). The true source of authority seems to be *Decretum* D. 25, c. 3 (Friedberg I, 93).

†16. The moral species . . . from its object: cf. Arist. *On the Soul* II, 4 (415a18-21) according to Thomas e.g. *Super Sent.* I, d. 48, a. 2 arg. 2.

†17. Esau: cf. *Genesis* 25, 33.

†18. Ecclesiasticus: rightly 19, 1.

†19. seeks . . . revenge: Arist. *Rhetoric* II, 2 (1378b1-2) according to Thomas I-IIae q. 46, a. 1.

†20. that fruit (pomum): the word 'pomum' i.e. 'fruit' or 'fruit-tree' is not found in *Genesis* 2, 17 and 3, 3; however it is used in August. *Expositions on the Psalms* in *Ps. 70*, *Sermo* 2, n. 7 (PL 36, 897; CCL 39, 966). Perhaps it comes from a false interpretation of *Canticle* 8, 5; [transl. of Augustine's *Expositions on the Psalms* in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII*].

†21. disciplinary precept: thus Bonaventure *Super Sent.* II, d. 17, dub. 5.

†22. August. *A Literal Commentary on Genesis* VIII, c. 14, n. 31 (PL 34, 384; CSEL 28-1, 252).

†23. Thou shalt not commit adultery: *Exodus* 20, 14; *Deut.* 5, 18.

†24. precept . . . the sabbath: *Exodus* 20, 8.

†25. spiritual tranquillity: cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* III, d. 37, c. 2, n. 4.

Footnotes to Question XIV, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 148. a. 4.

†1. Gregory, *Moralia* XXX, c. 18, n. 60 (PL 76, 556-557).

†2. in the following verse: the same verse is given in the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 591 (p. 579) and Albert Super Sent. IV, d. 33, a. 20.

†3. according to the seven other circumstances: cf. above q. 2, a. 6.

†4. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 10 (1118a26-32).

†5. August. Confess. X, c. 31, n. 46 (PL 32, 799; CSEL 33, 262).

†6. Gregory, Moralia XXX, c. 18, n. 60 (PL 76, 557A).

†7. Gregory, Moralia XXX, c. 18, n. 60 (PL 76, 556-557).

Footnotes to Question XIV, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Above q. 8, a. 1; II-IIae, q. 148, a. 5.

†1. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 620D).

†2. Decretum D. 35, c. 9 (Friedberg I, 133).

†3. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†4. Bernard, On the Steps of Humility ch. 2, n. 40 (PL 182, 963C); Leclercq III, 46).

†5. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†6. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†7. happiness . . . all men desire: cf. August. On the Trinity XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389).

†8. one . . . is pleasure: cf. Thomas himself I-IIae, q. 4, a. 1.

†9. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

Footnotes to Question XV, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 153, a. 2 and 3.

†1. the Philosopher: Arist. On Animals XV or On the Generation of Animals I, c. 18 (726a26); Albert, De Animalibus XV tr. 2, c. 5, n. 100 (St II, 1035).

†2. Commentator on Book V of the Ethics: Anonymous earlier commentator On the Ethics of Arist. V, c. 14 (1137b22; Heylbut 249, lines 28-32) Robert Grosseteste's translation: 'Dirigere quod deficit. Hoc enim opus epieikeos dirigere: lege enim universaliter iubente ab aliena abstinere uxore tamen in tempore et secundum rationem factum non est inconferens, iam enim aliquis tyranni uxorem corrumpens per ipsam liberavit patriam'. ('To correct what is defective. For this is a work of equity: for though the law commands universally to abstain

from the wife of another, if it is done at the proper time and according to reason it is not blameworthy, for someone seducing the wife of a tyrant has already freed his country through her'.) (ms. Oxford All Souls College 84 f. 99 va).

†3. Jerome, Liber Hebr. Quaest. in Genesis cap. 38 (PL 23, 996B [1047B]; CCI 72, 46).

†4. August. Rightly On the City of God XI, c. 17 (PL 41, 331; CCL 48, 336; CSEL 40-1, 536) and XIV, c. 11, n. 1 (PL 41, 418; CCL 48, 431; CSEL 40-2, 27).

†5. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Romans 1, 26 (PL 191, 1333C) from Aimo [Bishop of Halberstadt] Expos. in Rom. 1, 26 (PL 117, 376A).

†6. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 1 (1121b14-1122a14).

†7. make provision . . . life: Thomas himself II-IIae, q. 101, a. 2 Reply to 2.

†8. as is evident . . . that jointly build nests: Thomas himself Super Sent. IV, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 reply to 4: 'as is evident in the case of the turtle-dove and the pigeon.'

†9. August. On the City of God XII, c. 8 (PL 41, 356; CCL 48, 362; CSEL 40-1, 578).

†10. Reply to 1 . . . : the same exposition is given in Thomas Super Sent. IV, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 sol. 3 and I-IIae, q. 103, a. 4, especially Reply to 3.

†11. the Philosopher: i.e. Arist. On the Generation of Animals I, c. 18 (724b21ff.); cf. Albert, De Animalibus XV, tr. 2, c. 5, n. 88 (St II, 1029ff.).

†12. August. rightly On Lying ch. 14, n. 25 (PL 40, 505; CSEL 41, 445).

†13. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 3 (1123b12-14).

Footnotes to Question XV, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 154, aa. 2-4.

†1. Glossa of Peter Lomb. in I Timothy 4, 8 (PL 192, 348D) from Ambrose (pseudo) In I Timothy 4, 8 (PL 17, 474 [500C]; CSEL 81-3, 275).

†2. Thou shalt not commit adultery: cf. Exodus 20, 14 and Deut. 5, 18.

†3. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics V, 11 (1138a12).

†4. Isidore, De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) II, c. 39, n. 17 (PL 83, 642B).

†5. infected: cf. e.g. the Summa of Alexander of Hales II-II, n. 239 (p. 254) and Bonaventure, Super Sent. II. d. 31, a. 1, q. 3.

†6. Job 40, 11; Vulgate text which also is the Parisian version (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 15467).

†7. Gregory, Moralia XXXII, c. 14, n. 20 (PL 76, 648A).

†8. Bernard, *Sermones in Cantica* 72, 7-8 (PL 183, 1132; Leclercq II, 230): [transl. under the title *Sermons on the Song of Songs* in 4 Vols., in Vol. 40 of the series (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1980)].

†9. August. rightly *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1008; CCL 50, 372) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 24, caps. 9-12.

†10. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on I Cor. 6, 18 (PL 191, 1584A) from Ambrose (pseudo) *In I Cor.* 6, 18 (PL 17, 215A [226C]; CSEL 81-2, 67 in fn.).

†11. Glossa Ordin. on Deut. 23, 17 from August. *Questiones in Heptateuch* [i.e. on the first seven books of the Old Testament], Deut. V, q. 37 (PL 34, 763; CCL 33, 295; CSEL 28-3, 397).

†12. Matthew V: rightly Glossa Interlin. on Matth. V, 28 from Jerome *In Matth.* I, c. 5, 28 (PL 26, 38 [39C]; CCL 77, 31).

†13. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Eph. 5, 4 (PL 192, 209C).

†14. the Philosopher: Arist. rightly *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 3 (737a7-17) according to the transl. of Scotus; cf. Albert, *De Animal.* XVI, tr. 1, c. 13, n. 7 (St II, 1098).

†15. August. *On the City of God* XXI, c. 27, n. 3 (PL 41, 747; CCL 48, 801; CSEL 40-2, 575).

†16. Thou shalt not commit adultery: cf. Exodus 20, 14 and Deut. 5, 18.

†17. however fornication . . . through Moses: cf. Exodus 20, 15-17.

†18. August. *On the City of God* XIV, c. 15, n. 1 (PL 41, 423; CCL 48, 437; CSEL 40-2, 35), *ibid.* ch. 19 (PL 41, 427; CCL 48, 442; CSEL 40-2, 42).

†19. August. *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1008; CCL 50, 372) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 24, caps. 9-12.

†20. Noah: cf. Genesis 9, 21.

†21. that wording: cf. *Summa* of Alexander of Hales n. 618 (p. 599).

†22. The Philosopher: Arist. rightly *Politics* VII, c. 16 (1334b29ff.).

†23. human law: cf. Valerius Maximus, *Dicta Memorabilia* i.e. his *Collection of Memorable Acts and Sayings of Orators, Philosophers, Statesmen*, . . . , etc. II, c. 9 § 1, according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 152, a. 2 arg. 3; [for transl. of Valerius Maximus' work cf. Appendix].

†24. divine law: Genesis 1, 28 and 9, 1 according to Thomas *Summa Contra Gent.* III, c. 136. Cf. also Deut. 7, 14.

†25. in the time of grace . . . to abstain . . . : cf. Jerome, *Against Jovinianus* II, n. 4 (PL 23, 288B ff. [301B]), and Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* IV, d. 23, a. 1.

†26. the common law . . . which occurs for the most part: cf. [Justinian] *Digesta* I tit. 3 lege 3 et 4 (Mommsen I, 5) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 96, a. 1 *On the contrary*.

†27. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics X, 5 (1175b24-36).

†28. August. On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007; CCL 50, 371-372) according to the interpretation of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, cap. 9-12.

Footnotes to Question XV, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: II-IIae, q. 154, a. 1, 6-9, and 11; Super Sent. IV, d. 41, a. 3.

†1. the Master: Peter Lomb. Sententiae IV, d. 41, c. 5-9.

†2. it is so-named from 'fornice': cf. Isidore, Differentiarum I, n. 265 (PL 83, 37B) and Etymologies X, n. 111 (PL 82, 378C).

†3. incest: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae IV, d. 41, c. 8.

†4. seduction: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae IV, d. 41, c. 6.

†5. rape: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae IV, d. 41, c. 9.

Footnotes to Question XV, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Above in q. 8, a. 1; Super Sent. II, d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; I-IIae, q. 84, a. 4; II-IIae, q. 153, a. 4.

†1. Gregory: Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†2. Isidore: De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) II, c. 38, n. 1 (PL 83, 639B).

†3. Gregory: Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†4. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87 (PL 76, 621A).

†5. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88 (PL 76, 621B).

†6. the Philosopher, Physics II, 9 (200a34-b1), cf. also ibid. 9 (199a19-24).

†7. Terrence: Eunuchus Act I, 1 verse 12.

†8. Terrence: Eunuchus Act I, 1 verse 23.

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 1

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 8, a. 1; Contra Gent. II, c. 91; De Pot. q. 6, a. 6; De Spirit. Creat. a. 5; De Subst. Separat. cap. 20.

†1. This question appears to have been added to the Paris university edition contemporary with St. Thomas while the Paris edition was already being rented out for copying. Some of the older manuscripts do not include it, but it was contained in almost all of the earliest editions of the text, and from a critical standpoint it appears to be an integral part of the whole work, with no evidence of discontinuity. Cf. the English Summary of the Preface in the Leonine edition of De Malo, p. 71* and the questions and remarks about Question XVI on pp. 5* and 55*.

†2. August. Lit. Comment. on Genesis XI, c. 13 (PL 34, 436; CSEL 28-1, 346).

†3. Arist. Metaph. I, 1 (980a29-981a7).

†4. August. Lit. Comment. on Genesis II, c. 17, n. 37 (PL 34, 278; CSEL 28-1, 61).

†5. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725B) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 280).

†6. Book on Causes prop. 19(18).

†7. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 7 § 3 (PG 3, 872B) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 407).

†8. air . . . earth: cf. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I, 3 (318b28-29).

†9. dyaphanous: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 7 (418b4-6).

†10. vital spirits: cf. August. (pseudo) De Spiritu et Anima cap. 20 (PL 40, 794); Costa ben Luca, De Differentia Animae et Spiritus cap. 2, Johannes Hispalensis' interpretation (C. S. Barach p. 130); Albert, De Spiritu et Respiratio I, tr. 2.

†11. The mean . . . the extremes: cf. Arist. Physics V, 1 (224b30-33); Politics IV, 9 (1294b17).

†12. the philosophers: cf. Arist. On the Heavens II, 2 (285a30) according to Thomas Cont. Gent. II, c. 70.

†13. the lower part of the air . . . middle region of the air: cf. Albert, Super Sent. II, d. 6, a. 5, Super Meteora. I, tr. 1, c. 8; Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 6 dub. 1.

†14. since birds cannot . . . to that region: cf. August. Lit. Comment. on Genesis III, c. 7, n. 10 (PL 34, 283; CSEL 28-1, 70); Bede, Hexameron I Super Gen. cap. 1, 20 (PL 91, 26C).

†15. Gregory, Moralia II, c. 3, n. 3 (PL 75, 557A; CCL 143, 61)

†16. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 3 (PG 94, 868A; Bt, 69).

†17. the definition . . . the nature of the thing: cf. Arist. Post. Anal. II, 3 (90b30), *ibid.* 8 (93b28).

†18. Calcidius, Comm. in Tim. cap. 135 (Waszink 175, 16).

†19. Apuleius, De Deo Socrates from August. *loc. cit.* fn. 20.

†20. August. rightly On the City of God VIII, c. 16 (PL 41, 241; CCL 47, 233; CSEL 40-1, 381).

- †21. August. *On the City of God* XXI, c. 10, n. 1 (PL 41, 724; CCL 48, 775-776; CSEL 40-2, 537).
- †22. August. *On the City of God* IX, c. 10 (PL 41, 265; CCL 47, 258; CSEL 40-1, 422).
- †23. August. *On the City of God* XI, c. 23, n. 2 (PL 41, 337; CCL 48, 342; CSEL 40-1, 545).
- †24. August. *On the Trinity* III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 875; CCL 50, 139).
- †25. August. *Lit. Comment. on Genesis* XII, c. 22, n. 48 (PL 34, 473; CSEL 28-1, 414).
- †26. August. *Lit. Comment. on Genesis* XII, c. 23 (PL 34, 474; CSEL 28-1, 415).
- †27. matter . . . according to number: cf. Arist. e.g. *Metaph.* V, 6 (1016b33) and VIII, 8 (1034a7-8).
- †28. Arist. *Physics* I, 2 (185a32-b5); cf. Albert, *Super Physics* I, tr. 2, c. 4.
- †29. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725B) according to transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 278).
- †30. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* cap. 4 § 1 (PG 3, 693C; Dion. 148).
- †31. Jerome, *Super Matth.* IV c. 26, 54 (PL 26, 200 [208C]; CCL 77, 258), however cf. Alan de Insulis, *Distinctiones Dictionum Theol. s. v. legio* (PL 210, 834D).
- †32. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 3 (PG 94, 869A; Bt, 71).
- †33. many bodies . . . in the same place: cf. Arist. *Physics* IV, 6 (213b7-8) and (213b20).
- †34. August. *On the City of God* XXI, c. 10, n. 1 (PL 41, 724; CCL 48, 776; CSEL 40-2, 537).
- †35. of the first philosophers . . . the nature of things: as reported by Arist. *Metaph.* I, 3 (983b6-8).
- †36. error of the Manicheans: as reported by August. in *De Haeres.* cap. 46 (PL 42, 35; CCL 46, 314).
- †37. Arist. *On the Soul* III, 4 (429a24-27).
- †38. Varro as August. recounts in *The City of God* VII, c. 6 (PL 41, 199; CCL 47, 191; CSEL 40-1, 311).
- †39. Anaxagoras, in Arist. *Physics* VIII, 5 (256b25-27).
- †40. Arist. *Physics* VIII, 10 (267b16-18).
- †41. Plato: cf. Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* props. 12 and 13.
- †42. Origen, *Peri Archon* i.e. *On First Principles* (cf. Appendix for translation) I, c. 6, n. 4 Rufinus's interpretation (PG 11, 170C; GCS 22, 85).
- †43. accident without a substance: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* V, 30 (1025a14).
- †44. August. *On the City of God* X, c. 11, n. 2 (PL 41, 290; CCL 47, 285-286; CSEL 40-1, 466).

- †45. unknown tongue: Thomas gives the same example in the Summa Ia, q. 115, a. 5.
- †46. Plotinus as August. recounts on the City of God IX, c. 11 (PL 41, 265; CCL 47, 259; CSEL 40-1, 423).
- †47. John Chrysostom as cited in Catena Aurea Super Matthew 8, 28; cf. In Matth. hom. 28 (PG 57, 453).
- †48. souls of the just . . . God: Wisdom 3, 1.
- †49. August. On the City of God VIII, c. 14, n. 1 (PL 41, 238; CCL 47, 230; CSEL 40-1, 376).
- †50. Plato from August. loc. cit. above fn. 49.
- †51. air . . . parts are of the same nature: Arist. On Gen. and Corr. I, 1 (314a19-21).
- †52. every body . . . organic: Arist. On the Soul II, 1 (412a28-b1).
- †53. form . . . the reverse: Arist. Physics II, 2 (194b7-9) according to the interpretation of Averroes, Super Phys. II, comm. 26 (IV, 58 L).
- †54. Platonists: Apuleius, De Deo Socratis as August. recounts in On the City of God VIII, c. 16 (PL 41, 241; CCL 47, 233; CSEL 40-1, 381).
- †55. foundation of all the senses: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 2 (413b4).
- †56. Arist. on the Soul III, 12 (434a27-29).
- †57. Platonists: as reported by Arist. Metaph. I, 6 (987b1-14).
- †58. August. On the City of God IX, c. 5 (PL 41, 261; CCL 47, 254; CSEL 40-1, 416).
- †59. Dionys. On the Celestial Hierarchy ch. 2 § 4 (PG 3, 141D; Dion. 766).
- †60. Arist. On the Soul III, 3 (429a2-4). ("Phantasia is formed from 'phaos' which means 'light', because it is not possible to see without light.")
- †61. soul is the most noble of forms: cf. Arist On the Soul I, 5 (410b13-14).
- †62. but only . . . mixture [of the elements]: on this opinion cf. the Summa of Alexander of Hales I-II, n. 434-439; Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 17, a. 2, q. 3; Thomas himself Ia, q. 91, a. 1.
- †63. soul . . . as form . . . as mover: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415b8-12).
- †64. some: August. attributes this doctrine to Plato in his book On the of City of God XIII, c. 16, n. 2 (PL 41, 388; CCL 48, 398; CSEL 40-1, 635); Macrobius Super Somnium Scipionis I, c. 14 § 8; Arist. On the Heavens II, 2 (285a29) according to Thomas, Cont. Gent. II, c. 70; Jerome, Comment. on Eccl. 1, 6 (PL 23, 1016-1017 [1068B-C]) according to Thomas Q. D On Truth q. 5, a. 9 Reply to 14.
- †65. Damascene: see the Response.
- †66. August. On the City of God XXI, c. 10, n. 1 (PL 41, 724; CCL 48, 775-776; CSEL 40-2, 537).

†67. Platonists: as reported by August. On the City of God VIII, c. 16 (PL 41, 241; CCL 47, 233; CSEL 40-1, 381).

†68. August. On the City of God XI, c. 23, n. 2 (PL 41, 337; CCL 48, 342; CSEL 40-1, 545).

†69. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 1 (PG 3, 693B) according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 147).

†70. to be moved by the ministry of the angels: cf. Thomas himself Ia, q. 110, a. 1 and q. 57, a. 2.

†71. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 3 (PG 94, 869B; Bt, 72) and ibid. I, c. 13 (PG 852A; Bt, 56)

†72. August. On the Trinity III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 876; CCL 50, 141).

†73. August. Lit. Comment. on Genesis XII, c. 22, n. 48 (PL 34, 473; CSEL 28-1, 414).

†74. elsewhere: in the Summa, Ia, q. 50, a. 4; On Being and Essence ch. 5; De Spirit. Creaturis a. 8.

†75. August. rightly On the Trinity III, c. 1, n. 4 (PL 42, 870; CCL 50, 130).

†76. August. Lit. Comment. on Genesis III, c. 10, n. 14 (PL 34, 285; CSEL 28-1, 73).

†77. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 4 (PG 94, 873C; Bt, 75).

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 2

†p Parallel texts: Summa cont. Gent. III, c. 107; Ia, q. 63, aa. 1 and 4; De Subst. Separ. cap. 20; Super Div. Nom. cap. 4, lect. 19; Super Job cap. 8, lect. 6; [there is a transl. of De Subst. Separatis under the title Treatise on the Separate Substances by F. J. Lescoe (Hartford, CT, 1959)].

†1. Arist. Metaph. XI (=XII), 7 (1072a27-28).

†2. object of the will . . . apprehended: Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b11-12) according to Thomas below in a. 3 arg. 7.

†3. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 32 (PL 40, 22; CCL 44A, 46).

†4. the Philosopher: Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433a26).

†5. according as . . . and divides: cf. Arist. On the Soul III, 6 (430a26-28).

†6. an intelligence . . . a moment of eternity: cf. Thomas himself Super De Causis prop. 31 (30).

†7. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 20 (PG 3, 717B; Dion. 243).

†8. corruption . . . heavenly bodies: Averroes De Subst. Orbis cap. 3 (IX, 10B) according to Thomas Super Sent. II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ad 5.

†9. elements and things composed of the elements: Averroes, *Super Metaph.* XII, comm. 20 (VIII, 306F).

†10. is open to opposites: cf. *Arist. Metaph.* IX, 2 (1046b4-5).

†11. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy* IV, pr. 6 (PL 63, 817A; CCL 94, 80; CSEL 67, 98).

†12. rational substances . . . like the angels: cf. Dionys. *On the Celestial Hierarchy* ch. 4 § 1 (PG 3, 177D; Dion. 803) according to Thomas Q. D. *On Truth* q. 8, a. 15 *On the contrary* 2; *On the Divine Names* ch. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 868B; Dion. 388) according to Thomas Q. D. *On Truth* q. 15, a. 1.

†13. error cannot . . . of the heavenly bodies: cf. *Arist. On the Heavens* II, 6 (288a13ff.).

†14. *Book On Causes* comm. 13 (12).

†15. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 24 (PG 3, 728A; Dion. 285).

†16. Bernard: *On Grace and Free Will* ch. 9, n. 28 (PL 182, 1016C; Leclercq III, 186); [transl. under the title *St. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, Concerning Grace and Free Will, addressed to William, Abbot of St. Thierry*; London, Society for promoting Christian Knowledge (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920)].

†17. light . . . their activity: cf. Averroes, *In Phys.* VI, comm. 32 (IV, 265M) according to Thomas *Super Sent.* I, d. 37, q. 4, a. 3 arg. 1.

†18. some authors: Apuleius, *De Deo Socratis* as recounted by August. *On the City of God* VIII, c. 16 (PL 41, 241; CCL 47, 233; CSEL 40-1, 381).

†19. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 724C; Dion. 271-272).

†20. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Ps. 68, 5 (PL 191, 629C) from August. *Exposit. on Ps.* 68, 5, sermon 1, n. 9 (PL 36, 848; CCL 39, 910); [transl. in *Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. VIII* (cf. Ps. 69)].

†21. Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* ch. 3 (PL 158, 332A; Schmitt I, 239); transl. in Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. 2, ed. and transl. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Toronto/New York: The Edward Mellen Press, 1976)].

†22. some men . . . their temperament: cf. Thomas himself *Commentary on the Nic. Ethics* VII, 6.

†23. wolf . . . to the sheep: example of Avicenna e.g. *De Anima* I, c. 5 (f. 5 ra C; Van Riet, 86) and *ibid.* IV, c. 1 (f. 17 va B; Van Riet, 7).

†24. each thing . . . to its nature: cf. Thomas himself *Super De Div. Nom.* c. 2, lect. 1.

†25. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 724C; Dion. 271-272).

†26. since matter is for the sake of form: cf. *Arist. Physics* II, 2 (194b8-10) according to Thomas *Super Post. Anal.* II, 8. [Cf. also *Arist. Physics* II, 2 (194a26ff.)]. Cf. Averroes, *In Phys.* II, comm. 26 (IV, 58L); [English transl. of *St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* by F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970)].

†27. August. *rightly On the Trinity* III, c. 1, n. 4 (PL 42, 870; CCL 50, 130).

†28. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 25 (PG 3, 728B; Dion. 286).

†29. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 32 (PG 3, 733A; Dion. 309).

†30. Ambrose, On Paradise ch. 8 (PL 14, 292D [309C]; CSEL 32-1, 296); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 42].

†31. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857).

†32. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725B according to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 279)).

†33. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 4 (PL 42, 553; CSEL 25-2, 857).

†34. from the object . . . to the act: cf. Arist. On the Soul II, 4 (415a18-22) according to Thomas e.g. Super Sent I, d. 48, a. 2 arg. 2.

†35. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725B; Dion. 279).

†36. as is clear . . . of the heavenly body: cf. Averroes De Subst. Orbis cap. 3 (IX, 10B) according to Thomas Super Sent. II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ad 5. See Arist. On the Heavens I, 9 (278b23-279a11).

†37. heavenly body . . . resumption of its position: cf. Arist. Metaph. VIII, 1 (1042b5-7); *ibid.* XII, 2 (1069b25-28) according to Thomas Super De Caelo I, lect. 6.

†38. approve . . . nor the true as false: cf. August. Enchiridion ch. 17 (PL 40, 239; CCL 46, 57); [in the transl. of the writings of August. in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 4, the reference is to c. 5, n. 17].

†39. God . . . not the author of evils: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1223; CCL 29, 211; CSEL 74, 3).

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 3

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 5, q. 1, a. 2; *ibid.* d. 22, q. 1, a. 2; Summa cont. Gent. III, c. 109; Ia, q. 63, a. 3; II-IIae, q. 163, a. 2.

†1. In this article and in article 4, St. Thomas speaks specifically of the devil, not just of the demons generally since, having determined in article 2 that the demons are not evil by nature but by will, the question remains as to how this is possible in a creature as perfect as the angel. Hence this question deals with the first sin of the devil.

†2. Dionysius, On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725B; Dion. 279).

†3. Dionysius, On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725B; Dion. 279).

†4. Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil ch. 4 (PL 332-333; Schmitt I, 240-242); cf. Albert, De Quatuor Coaequaevis tr. 4, q. 63, a. 1.

†5. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 4 (PG 94, 876A; Bt, 75).

†6. Gregory, In Evangelia II, homily 34, n. 7 (PL 76, 1250 B).

†7. desired . . . manner as God does: cf. Gregory Moralia XXXIV, c. 21, n. 40 (PL 76, 740B).

†8. August. Tract. on John Evang. tract. XX, n. 9 (PL 35, 1561; CCL 36, 208).

†9. devil . . . not be subject to God: Gregory, Moralia XXXIV, c. 21, n. 40 (PL 76, 740 B).

†10. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 2 (1111b21-22).

†11. Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b11-12).

†12. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 2 (1111b22).

†13. August. On the Nature of Good ch. 34 (PL 42, 562; CSEL 25-2, 872).

†14. August. rightly On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 30 (PL 40, 19; CCL 44A, 38) as above in q. 7, a. 5 arg. 4.

†15. The appetite . . . only the good: cf. Arist. Nic. Ethics I, 1 (1094a2-3).

†16. Isidore, De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) I, c. 10, n. 16 (PL 83, 556C).

†17. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Philip. 2, 6 (PL 192, 233C).

†18. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Ps. 68, 5 (PL 191, 629C) from August. Expost. on Ps. 68, 5 sermon 1, n. 9 (PL 36, 848; CCI 39, 910).

†19. empyrean heaven: cf. Glossa Ordin. on Genesis 1, 1 from Glossa of Strabo in Genesis 1, 1 (PL 113, 68C) as cited by Thomas Ia, q. 61, a. 4 On the contrary.

†20. of the heaven of the Holy Trinity: cf. Glossa Ordin. on Genesis 1, 1. Cf. Albert Summa de Creaturis p. I, tr. 3, q. 10; Bonaventure, Super. Sent II, d. 2 dub. 2.

†21. August. rightly On the Trinity X, c. 3 (PL 42, 975-976; CCL 50, 317-319).

†22. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 3, n. 8 (PL 32, 1225; CCL 29, 215; CSEL 74, 9).

†23. Isidore, De Summo Bono (or Sententiae) I, c. 10, n. 2 (PL 83, 554A-B).

†24. Arist. rather the Politics V, 11 (1314a23-24).

†25. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IX, 4 (1166a19-22). The remainder of this sentence in Aristotle sheds some light on what is said here: ' . . . , while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else.'

†26. Arist. Metaph. IX, 9 (1051a4-21).

†27. August. On the Free Choice of the Will III, c. 25, n. 76 (PL 32, 1308; CCL 29, 320; CSEL 74, 153); cf. however A Literal Commentary on Genesis XI, c. 14 (PL 34, 436; CSEL 28-1, 346).

†28. August. Literal Commentary on Genesis IV, n. 24 (PL 34, 313; CSEL 28-1, 124).

†29. which is called velleity: cf. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea I, c. 14, q. 4 (f. 28 ra).

†30. such is the will . . . consists: cf. August. On the Free Choice of the Will I, c. 6, n. 35 (PL 32, 1240; CCL 29, 235; CSEL 74, 35) and ibid. III, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 32, 1269; CCL 29, 274; CSEL 74, 89). On this last clause in the Reply to 9: cf. in the Preface of the Leonine Edition p. 58*, beginning "En 3, 293 . . ." etc. [i.e. in a. 3, line 293 (= Reply to 9)] for the Editor's explanation of the suppression of 'non' in this clause.

†31. movement . . . its term: cf. Arist. Physics V, 1 (224b8-9) according to Thomas Q. D. On Truth q. 15, a. 2.

†32. August. A Literal Commentary on Genesis III, c. 10, n. 14 (PL 34, 285; CSEL 28-1, 73) and XI, c. 17 and 26 (PL 34, 438 and 443; CSEL 28-1, 350 and 359).

†33. as is commonly held: cf. Alex. of Hales Glossa in Lib. Sent. II, d. 6, n. 3; Albert, Super Sent. II, d. 6, a. 1; Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1.

†34. appetite . . . only of the good apprehended: cf. Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433b11-12) as is said above in arg. 7.

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 4

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II. d. 3, q. 2. a. 1; Ia, q. 63, a. 5; Super Job cap. 8, lect. 6.

†1. death to man . . . tempting him: John 8, 44.

†2. August. A Literal Commentary on Genesis IV, c. 12 (PL 34, 304-305; CSEL 28-1, 108-110).

†3. lameness . . . deformed instrument: example of August. On Man's Perfection in Righteousness ch. 2 (PL 44, 294; CSEL 42, 5) as is said Q. D. On Truth q. 24, a. 12 arg. 4; [transl. of Augustine's work in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers Vol. V].

†4. This necessity . . . while it is: cf. Thomas himself II-IIae, q. 49, a. 6 and Arist. On Interpretation I, 9 (19a23-27).

†5. foreknowledge of his fall: cf. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis XI, c. 17 (PL 34, 438; CSEL 28-1, 349) according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 18, a. 3.

†6. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis I, c. 15, n. 29 (PL 34, 257; CSEL 28-1, 21).

†7. subsequently: August. On the City of God XI, c. 19 (PL 41, 333; CCL 48, 338; CSEL 40-1, 538) according to Thomas Ia, q. 63, a. 5 Reply to 2.

†8. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis IV, c. 22 (PL 34, 312; CSEL 28-1, 121-122).

†9. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 868B; Dion. 388).

†10. the Philosopher: Arist. Physics II, 9 (200a34-b1).

†11. as the saints say: e.g. August. Enchiridion ch. 29 (PL 40, 246; CCL 46, 65); Gregory, In Evang. II, hom. 34, n. 11 (PL 76, 1252B-1253C). Cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 1, c. 5.

†12. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis I, c. 15, n. 29 (PL 34, 257; CSEL 28-1, 21).

†13. for instance light . . . visual ray: cf. Averroes, In Phys VI, comm. 32 (IV 265 M) according to Thomas Super. Sent. II, d. 37, q. 4, a. 3 arg. 1.

†14. Angel . . . aeviternity: cf. Thomas himself e.g. Ia, q. 10, a. 5.

†15. aeviternity . . . whole: cf. Albert, Super De Div. Nom. cap. 10 § 3. (Col. XXXVII-1, 405 b).

†16. namely, the soul of Christ: cf. Thomas himself, IIIae q. 34, a. 3.

†17. Gregory, Moralia XVI, c. 37 (PL 75, 1143C).

†18. The Book of Causes, prop. 31(30).

†19. August. Enchiridion ch. 12 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 54).

†20. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis XI, c. 16 (PL 34, 437; CSEL 28-1, 349) and ibid. cc. 19-20, nn. 26-27 (PL 34, 439-440; CSEL 28-1, 352-353).

†21. August. On the City of God XI, cc. 13-15 (PL 41, 328-331; CCL 48, 333-336; CSEL 40-1, 531-535).

†22. certain moderns: the first opinion set forth by Peter Lomb. in Sententiae II, d. 3, c. 4, nn. 2-4.

†23. masters: cf. the fifth error condemned in Paris in 1241 (Chart, Univ. Paris. I, p. 171).

†24. Isaiah rightly 14, 12.

†25. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis XI, c. 24 (PL 34, 442); CSEL 28-1, 357).

†26. some: the second opinion set forth by Peter Lomb. in Sententiae II, d. 3, c. 4, nn. 5-7.

†27. August. On the City of God XI, c. 13 (PL 41, 329; CCL 48, 334; CSEL 40-1, 532).

†28. others: cf. Bonaventure Super Sent. II, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2; Albert, Super Sent. II, d. 3, a. 14.

†29. Arist. Nic. Ethics III, 2 (1112a14-16); cf. however Nemesius, De Natura Hominis cap. 34 (PG 40, 736B; Verbeke, 129).

†30. Dionys. On the Divine Names cap. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 868 B; Dion. 388).

†31. as . . . first heaven: cf. Arist. On the Heavens II, 1 (283b28-29) according to the Arabic-Latin version (Averroes V, 96A) and Thomas on that passage.

†32. Arist. Physics IV, 12 (221b6-7). Cf. however Physics IV, 12 (221b21-23).

†33. Arist. Physics IV, 11 (219a10-21).

- †34. Apoc. rightly 10, 6.
- †35. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis VIII, c. 20 (PL 34, 388; CSEL 28-1, 259).
- †36. Dionys. The Celestial Hierarchy ch. 12 § 2 (PG 3, 292C; Dion. 936).
- †37. Book of Causes prop. 10(9).
- †38. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis IV, c. 22 (PL 34, 312; CSEL 28-1, 121).
- †39. August. On the City of God XI, c. 15 (PL 41, 330; CCL 48, 335; CSEL 40-1, 534).
- †40. Some: Bonaventure, Super Sent. II, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2 ad 1.
- †41. August. On the City of God XI, c. 15 (PL 41, 330; CCL 48, 335; CSEL 40-1, 534).
- †42. every man desires . . . and happiness: cf. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725; Dion. 282).
- †43. in the same place: August. Lit Comm. on Genesis I, c. 17, n. 34 (PL 34, 259; CSEL 28-1, 25).
- †44. August. On the City of God XI, c. 19 (PL 41, 333; CCL 48, 338; CSEL 40-1, 538).
- †45. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis IV, cc. 33-35 (PL 34, 317ff.; CSEL 28-1, 131ff.).
- †46. Book of Causes comm. 8 (7).
- †47. Dionys. On the Divine Names cap. 4 § 4 (PG 3, 700 B; Dion. 168).
- †48. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis VI, c. 15 (PL 34, 349; CSEL 28-1, 189).
- †49. God . . . He wills: cf. Proverbs 21, 1 and Gloss of Peter Lomb. in Romans 1, 24 (PL 191, 1332A) from August. On Grace and Free Will ch. 21, n. 43 (PL 44, 909); [transl. in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fathers, Vol. V. Anti-Pelagian Writings].

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 5

- †p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 7, q. 1, a. 2; Q. D. On Truth q. 24, a. 10; Ia, q. 64, a. 2.
- †1. Dionysius, On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 281).
- †2. the accidental is . . . destruction of the subject: Porphyry Isagoge 'De Accidenti' (Minio-Paluello, 20); [for transl. of the Isagoge cf. Appendix.
- †3. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 4 (PG 94, 876A; Bt, 75).
- †4. state of wayfarer: cf. Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea III, tr. 11, q. 2 (f. 195 vb).
- †5. August. (pseudo) De Vera et Falsa Paenitentia, cap. 5, n. 15 (PL 40, 1118).

†6. James, rightly 2, 19.

†7. August. (pseudo) *De Vera et Falsa Paenitentia*, cap. 5, n. 15 (PL 40, 1118).

†8. Chrysostom: cf. rather John Scotus, *Hom. in prol. S. John* (PL 122, 290C-D) which homily is erroneously ascribed to John Chrysostom.

†9. no one . . . impossible: cf. Justinian, *Digesta* L tit. 17, lege 185 (Mommson, 873) and the Sixth Book of the *Decretals* of Pope Boniface VIII (V tit. 12, reg. 6 (Friedberg II, 1122)).

†10. Arist. *On the Soul* III, 11 (434a12-15).

†11. Anselm, *On Freedom of Choice* ch. 1 (PL 158, 490 B; Schmitt I, 208).

†12. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 282) as is said in Q. D. *On Truth* q. 24, a. 10 arg. 14.

†13. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 282).

†14. Anselm, *On Freedom of Choice* ch. 3 (PL 158, 494B; Schmitt I, 212).

†15. from malice: cf. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) II, c. 17, n. 3 (PL 83, 620A) from Gregory *Moralia* XXV, c. 11, n. 28 (PL 76, 339A). Cf. Peter Lomb. *Sententiae* II, d. 22, c. 4, n. 11.

†16. August. *On the City of God* XI, c. 15 (PL 41, 330; CCL 48, 335; CSEL 40-1, 534).

†17. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXIV, c. 6, n. 11 (PL 76, 723D).

†18. Origen: Origen's opinion as recounted in August. *On the City of God* is taken up in the place cited below in fn. 19.

†19. August. *On the City of God* XXI, c. 17 (PL 41, 731; CCL 48, 783; CSEL 40-2, 548).

†20. For the same reason, Origen held: cf. August. *On the City of God* in the place cited above in fn. 19.

†21. the judgment of the Lord: Matthew 25, 46.

†22. for example the sheep . . . it sees: example of Avicenna, e.g. *De Anima* I, c. 5 (f. 5 ra C; Van Riet, 86) and *ibid* IV, c. 1 (f. 17 va B; Van Riet, 7), c. 3 (f. 19 rb A; Van Riet, 38).

†23. nature . . . to one: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* IX, 2 (1046b5-6).

†24. August. *On the Trinity* rightly XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) as cited by Thomas, I-IIae, q. 8 *On the contrary*.

†25. Proverbs 21, 1. So Thomas e.g. Ia, q. 83, a. 1 arg. 3; q. 111, a. 2 *On the contrary*; I-IIae, q. 6, a. 4 *Reply to 1*; IIIa, q. 86, a. 1 in the *Response*; Q. D. *On Truth* q. 22, a. 8 arg. 1; Vulgate 'The heart of the king . . . He shall turn it' which is also the wording in the Paris version (ms. Paris B.N. lat. 15467).

†26. Arist. *Physics* III, 1 (201a10ff.).

†27. Anselm, *On Freedom of Choice* ch. 12 (PL 158, 504A; Schmitt I, 224).

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 6

†p Parallel texts: Ia, q. 58, a. 5; Summa cont. Gent. III, c. 108.

†1. Gregory, Moralia XXXIV, c. 19, n. 34 (PL 76, 737D).

†2. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C) According to the transl. of Sarracenus (Dion. 281-282). The word "cognition" as it is used in the first sentence of this argument in 'gratuitous cognition' and 'natural cognition' is St. Thomas's wording, which we have retained, although the word "knowledge" is often substituted for it. But the words "cognition" and "knowledge" differ in meaning, for 'cognition' refers to the activity or the act of knowing, whereas 'knowledge' refers to the effect of the act, the result of the cognition.

†3. the Philosopher: Arist. Metaph. IX, 9 (1051a19-21)

†4. August. Lit. Comm. on Genesis VIII, c. 20 (PL 34, 388; CSEL 28-1, 259).

†5. Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 2 (1139a27-29).

†6. August. On the City of God XII, 8 (PL 41, 355; CCL 48, 362; CSEL 40-1, 578).

†7. Anselm, On Truth ch. 13 (PL 158, 484-486; Schmitt I, 196-199).

†8. August. (pseudo) De Spiritu et Anima cap. 12 (PL 40, 788).

†9. Gregory, Moralia XXXIV, c. 21, n. 41 (PL 76, 741A).

†10. on that text: Matth. 27, 19.

†11. Gloss Ordin. in Matth. 27, 19 from Rabanus Comment. in Matth. VIII, c. 27 (PL 107, 1131B).

†12. August. On True Religion ch. 52 (PL 34, 167 CCL 32, 253; CSEL 77, 73); [transl. by J. H. S. Burleigh under the title Of True Religion, Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959)].

†13. Glossa: We have not found this Gloss; cf. however Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 25, c. 7, n. 1 and d. 35, c. 4, n. 2.

†14. grace . . . the whole image: Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Psalm 4, 7 (PL 191, 88B); [on 'the whole image' cf. Genesis 1, 26 and 27].

†15. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 19 (PG 3, 716C; Dion; 236) and § 31 (PG 3, 732B; Dion. 304).

†16. August. On True Religion ch. 13 (PL 34, 133; CCL 32, 203; CSEL 77, 19).

†17. Gregory, Liber Regulae Pastoralis pars 3, c. 16 (PL 77, 77A); [transl. under the title Pastoral Care by Henry Davis (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1950)].

†18. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725 B; Dion. 280).

†19. the angels . . . the higher the angels are: cf. Thomas himself Ia, q. 55, a. 3.

†20. Lucifer: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 6, c. 1, nn. 1-3.

†21. II Cor. 6, 15: St. Thomas's quotation of the Scripture text is "Quae comparatio Christi et Belial"; the Vulgate is 'Quae autem conventio Christi ad Belial'; the Douay version has 'What concord hath Christ with Belial'.

†22. Glossa of Peter Lomb. in II Cor. 6, 15 (PL 192, 49D).

†23. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 868 B; Dion. 388).

†24. the Philosopher: Arist. On the Soul III, 10 (433a26).

†25. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 32 (PL 40, 22; CCL 44A, 46).

†26. the Philosopher: Arist. Metaph. IX, 11 (1051b17ff.).

†27. Book of Causes comm. 10(9) and comm. 12(11).

†28. "affective cognition": i.e. practical knowledge or knowledge relating to action, which becomes clear when the objection speaks of synderesis which is knowledge of the universal principles of action, as explained in Reply to 5 On the contrary.

†29. the faculty . . . and reason: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 24, c. 3, n. 1; see Odon Lottin Psychologie et Morale I, ed. 2, p. 64, fn. 3.

†30. Gregory, Dialog. IV, c. 26 (PL 77, 357C); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 39].

†31. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics VI, 2 (1139a27-31).

†32. Arist. Physics II, 8 (199b3-7) according to Thomas's interpretation of Averroes, *ibid.* comm. 82 (IV, 80 B) from a rendition of it provided by another.

†33. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 868 B; Dion. 388).

†34. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 23 (PG 3, 725C; Dion. 281).

†35. the higher an active power is . . . of doing more things, so the higher the knowing power . . . of knowing more things: cf. Book of Causes comm. 10(9) and 17(16).

†36. Dionys. On the Eccl. Hierarchy rightly ch. 6 pars 3 § 6 (PG 3, 537 B; Dion. 1404); [transl. in Pseudo-Dionysius The Complete Works, in the Classics of Western Spirituality (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987)].

†37. Gregory, Moralia XXXIV, c. 19, n. 34 (PL 76, 737D).

†38. doubt . . . of the Incarnation: cf. Glossa Ordin. in Matth. 4, 3 from Ambrose Super Luc. IV, n. 18 (PL 15, 1617D [1701C]; CCL 14, 112; CSEL 32-4, 148).

†39. Book of Causes comm. 13(12).

†40. Arist. On the Soul II, 1 (412a11 and 23-24).

†41. Arist. Physics VIII, 4 (255a33-34).

†42. heavenly bodies . . . not according to substance: Arist. Metaph. VIII, 1 (1042b5=7), *ibid.* XI (=XII), 2 (1069b25-28) according to Thomas Super De Caelo I, lect. 6.

†43. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics X, 4 (1174b32-34).

†44. the worm of conscience: phraseology of Peter Lomb. Sententiae II, d. 33, c. 2, n. 5. See Thomas himself Super Sent. IV, d. 50, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 2.

†45. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 30 (PG 3, 729C; Dion. 298).

†46. from such figurative speech . . . be drawn: cf. Peter Lomb. Sententiae III, d. 11, c. 2 according to Thomas Q. D. On Truth q. 22, a. 11 Reply to 8.

†47. after the manner . . . of our intellect: cf. Arist. On the Soul III, 6 (430a27-28).

†48. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 32 (PL 40, 22; CCL 44A, 46).

†49. synderesis . . . knows naturally: August. as Thomas recounts in Super Sent. II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 arg. 3 and Albert, Summa De Homine q. 71, a. 1 arg. 2. Although we have not found this word for word in our texts of Augustine, nevertheless it can be gathered from August. On the Free Choice of the Will II, c. 10, n. 29 (PL 32, 1256; CCL 29, 257; CSEL 74, 65) and On the Trinity XIV, c. 15 (PL 42, 1052; CCL 50A, 450-451) where Augustine speaks of this knowledge as 'beacons or rules of virtue or right living, present for all to see'.

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 7

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2; Q. D. On Truth q. 8, a. 12; Summa cont. Gent. III, c. 154; Ia, q. 57, a. 3; Super Isaiah cap. 3.

†1. August. On the City of God IX, c. 21 (PL 41, 274; CCL 47, 268; CSEL 40-1, 439).

†2. August. On the Divination of Demons, chs. 4 and 5 (PL 40, 585-586; CSEL 41, 605-608).

†3. Book on Causes comm. 7(6).

†4. All cognition . . . mode of the knower: the same proposition although under diverse forms is ascribed to diverse authors e.g.: to the Book On Causes as in Q. D. On Truth q. 24, a. 8 arg. 6 [cf. comm. 10(9) and 12(11)]; to Dionys. as well as the Book On Causes in Scripto super Sent. II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1 arg. 3 [cf. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 4 § 1 (PG 3, 693B; Dion. 146) and On the Celest. Hierarch. ch. 12 § 2 (PG 3, 293A; Dion. 937); to Boethius as in Q. D. On Truth q. 2, a. 5 arg. 17 [cf. Boethius On the Consolation of Philosophy V, pr. 4 (PL 63, 848C; CCL 94, 96-97; CSEL 67, 117)].

†5. Ideal exemplars (*ideales rationes*): cf. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 46, n. 2 (PL 40, 30; CCL 44A, 71) according to Thomas Ia, q. 15, a. 3 On the contrary.

†6. August. Literal Comm. on Genesis II, c. 6, n. 13 and 14 (PL 34, 268; CSEL 28-1, 41) and *ibid.* ch. 8,

n. 16 (PL 34, 269; CSEL 28-1, 43).

†7. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* (or *Sententiae*) I, c. 10, n. 17 (PL 83, 556C).

†8. the Philosopher: Arist. *Metaph.* I, 1 (980b27-981a1).

†9. Fortune . . . for the least part: Arist. *Physics* II, 5 (197a31-35) according to Thomas Q. D. *On Truth* q. 24, a. 1 *On the contrary* 7. Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VI, 2 (1026b27ff.).

†10. August. *On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions* q. 24 (PL 40, 17; CCL 44A, 29).

†11. August. *On the Trinity* III, c. 4, n. 9 (PL 42, 873; CCL 50, 135).

†12. Arist. *Physics* VIII, 2 (253a18-20).

†13. John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 4 (PG 94, 877A; Bt, 76).

†14. I Cor. 2, 11 according to the wording of Ambrose *On the Holy Spirit* II, c. 11, n. 124 (PL 16, 769 [801A]; CSEL 79, 134); [transl. in *The Fathers of the Church* Vol. 44].

†15. August. *Literal Comm. on Genesis* XI, c. 17 (PL 34, 438; CSEL 28-1, 349) according to Thomas II-IIae, q. 18, a. 3.

†16. Cognition . . . the true: cf. Arist. *Post. Anal.* I, 2 (71b25) as is said e.g. Q. D. *On Truth* q. 2, a. 12 arg. 1.

†17. the Philosopher: Arist. *On Interpretation* (i.e. *Perihermeneias*) I, 9 (18a28ff.).

†18. being . . . are convertible: Bonaventure praises the same proposition in *Super Sent.* II, d. 37, a. 2, q. 3 *On the contrary* 3; cf. Albert *Summa Alberti* I, tr. 6, q. 25, m. 3, a. 3 part. 2: this proposition is based on the wording of Arist. *Metaph.* II, 1 (993b30) according to the *Metaphysica Nova*, a translation from Arabic into Latin published in the works of Averroes Vol. VIII, 29 M of the Venice edition of 1562.

†19. Arist. *Physics* IV, 11 (219a10-10).

†20. just as he . . . in a high tower: example of Boethius *On the Consolation of Philosophy* IV, pr. 6 (PL 63, 818A; CCL 94, 81; CSEL 67, 99).

†21. contingent . . . to either: cf. Arist. *On Interpretation* (i.e. *Perihermeneias*) I, 9 (18b8ff.).

†22. are said . . . necessarily: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VI, 2 (1026b27-29).

†23. are said . . . for the most part: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VI, 2 (1026b30).

†24. Arist. *Metaph.* IX, 9 (1051a30).

†25. August. *On the Divination of Demons* ch. 6, n. 10 (PL 40, 587; CSEL 41, 610).

†26. time . . . of the heaven's motion: cf. Arist. *Physics* IV, 14 (223b18-23).

†27. August. *Literal Comm. on Genesis* VIII, c. 20 (PL 34, 388; CSEL 28-1, 259).

†28. all cognition . . . and the thing known: Thomas ascribes this proposition to philosophers generally e.g. Super Sent. I, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1 arg. 4, *ibid.* d. 35, a. 1, arg. 4. Possibly they reverted to either Arist., Nic. Ethics VI, 1 (1139a10) or Isaac Liber de definitionibus (Muckle, 303 and 330). Cf. however Thomas himself Super Boethius's De Trinitate q. 5, a. 3 (among the scratched out lines, Decker p. 231) where it is expressly said, 'Hence Algazel says that knowledge (scientia) is the assimilation of the knower to the thing known', and the Philosopher in Book XI of the Metaphysics says 'the intellect in apprehending the intelligible object becomes the object'. Cf. Algazel, *Metaph.* p. I, tr. 3, sent. 2 (Muckle, 64), Arist. *Metaph.* XI (=XII), 7 (1072b20).

†29. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 2 § 8 (PG 3, 645C; Dion. 99).

†30. way of the Stoics: according to Thomas's interpretation of Nemesius (in a reading provided by another) of Nemesius's De Natura Hominis cap. 37 (PG 40, 752B; Verbeke, 138).

†31. Arist. *Metaph.* VI, 3 (1027a29ff.).

†32. Plato: as referred to by Arist. *Metaph.* VI, 2 (1026b14-15).

†33. that this man . . . is found in a certain place: example of Avicenna Suffientia I, c. 13 (f. 20 va A).

†34. some philosophers: the Stoics according to the interpretation of August. On the City of God, V, c. 8 (PL 41, 148; CCL 47, 135-136; CSEL 40-1, 221).

†35. but nonetheless . . . absolutely necessary: cf. Thomas himself II-IIae, q. 49, a. 6 and Arist. On Interpretation (i.e. *Perihermeneias*) I, 9 (19a23-27).

†36. some: the Astrologers according to August. On the City of God V, cc. 1-7 (PL 41, 141-148; CCL 47, 128-135; CSEL 40-1, 209-221).

†37. intellect . . . of any corporeal organ: cf. Arist. On the Soul III, 4 (429b4).

†38. nature . . . to one: cf. Arist. *Metaph.* IX, 2 (1046b5-6).

†39. Arist. *Metaph.* V, 6 (1015b16ff.).

†40. is said in the book On Sleep and Wakefulness: or On Prophesying by Dreams c. 2 (463b23-28).

†41. some: the third error condemned at Paris in 1270 (cf. Chart. Univ. Paris. I, n. 432).

†42. which are self-evident: cf. Arist. *Post. Anal.* I, 3 (72b20-23) as referred to by Thomas Q. D. On Truth q. 10, a. 12 On the contrary 3.

†43. all men . . . to be happy: August. On the Trinity XIII, c. 3 (PL 42, 1018; CCL 50A, 389) according to Thomas I-IIae, q. 5, a. 8 On the contrary.

†44. to opinions: cf. Arist. *Topics* I, 1 (100b21-23).

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 8

†p Parallel texts: Q. D. On Truth, q. 8, a. 13; Ia, q. 27, a. 4; Lect. super I Cor. cap. 2, lect. 2; Responsio de 43 articulis a. 39; Responsio de 36 articulis a. 36. [The last two texts, i.e. Responses, are in reference to questions Thomas received, asking for his expert opinion; the first set of questions was from the Master

General, John Vercelli; the second set was from Friar Bassiano, most of which are identical with the earlier set, but the Replies are longer and more polished.]

†1. In the Title and throughout this article the Latin wording is "cogitationes cordium nostrorum" i.e. "the cogitations of our hearts" which has usually been translated as "our secret thoughts". But "cogitation" derived from 'con' and 'agito', meaning 'to pursue something in the mind', 'to ponder', 'weigh', or 'to plot' or 'devise' seemed to us more concrete and precise and hence we have used St. Thomas's literal wording.

†2. Gregory, *Moralia* XVIII, c. 48, n. 78 (PL 76, 84 B).

†3. The Philosopher: Arist. *On the Soul* III, 7 (431a16-17).

†4. Dionys. *On the Celestial Hierarchy* ch. 1, § 2 (PG 3, 121B) according to the transl. of John Scotus Erigena (Dion. 733); [transl. of *The Celestial Hierarchy* in Pseudo-Dionysius *The Complete Works* in *The Classics of Western Spirituality* (New York/Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987)].

†5. he calls: Dionys. *On the Celestial Hierarchy* ch. 1 § 3 (PG 3, 124A; Dion. 738).

†6. because . . . from sense-perception: cf. Arist. *Post Anal.* II, 19 (100a9-11).

†7. That on account of which . . . more such: cf. Arist. *Post Anal.* I, 2 (72a27-28) according to an anonymous transl. (Minio-Paluello, 114) and Jacobi (Minio-Paluello, 9).

†8. the Philosopher: Arist. *On the Soul* III, 4 (430a2-9).

†9. August. *Literal Comm. on Genesis* XII, c. 17, n. 34 (PL 34, 467; CSEL 28-1, 403).

†10. All cognition . . . to the thing known: cf. above q. 16, a. 7 Reply to 6 in fn. 28.

†11. interior word of the heart . . . exterior word: cf. *Glossa Ordin.* in I John 1, 10 from August. *On the Trinity* XV, c. 11 (PL 42, 1071; CCL 50A, 486). See also St. Thomas himself *Super Sent.* I, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 and Albert, *Super Sent.* I, d. 27, a. 7.

†12. August. *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 7, n. 10 (PL 42, 1043; CCL 50A, 434).

†13. August. *On the City of God* XVIII, c. 18, n. 2 (PL 41, 575; CCL 48, 609; CSEL 40-2, 291).

†14. The more exalted . . . in its operations: *Book on Causes* prop. 17(16).

†15. August. *Literal. Comm. on Genesis* XII, c. 17, n. 34 (PL 34, 467; CSEL 28-1, 403).

†16. August. *On the Divination of Demons* ch. 5 (PL 40, 586; CSEL 41, 608).

†17. August. *Retractations* II, c. 30 (PL 32, 643; CSEL 36, 167).

†18. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 7 § 2 (PG 3, 868 B; Dion. 388).

†19. August. *Lit. Comm. on Genesis* II, c. 8, n. 16 (PL 34, 269; CSEL 28-1, 43).

†20. *Jeremias* 17, 9-10: according to the Parisian version (ms. Paris B.N. lat. 15467).

†21. The Apostle: I Cor. 2, 11 according to Ambrose's reading On the Holy Spirit II, c. 11, n. 124 (PL 16, 769 [801]; CSEL 79, 134); [transl. in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 44].

†22. Grennadius De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus cap. 81 (PL 58, 999A).

†23. August. Literal Comm. on Genesis XII, c. 17, n. 34 (PL 34, 467; CSEL 28-1, 403).

†24. August. On the Divination of Demons V, lin. 116; [for transl. see fn. 16 above].

†25. the Philosopher: Arist. Nic. Ethics IV, 9 (1128b13-14) according to the transl. of Robert Grosseteste (Gauthier, 224).

†26. August. On the Divination of Demons ch. 5 (PL 40, 586; CSEL 41, 608).

†27. August. Retractations II, c. 30 (PL 32, 643; CSEL 36, 167).

†28. Commentator: Averroes In De Anima III comm. 18 (VI, 161B; Crawford, 438).

†29. Plato and Aristotle: according to the mind of Thomas himself Sent. libri Ethicorum I, 6 (Leonine XLVII, 1, p. 22).

†30. the bat . . . sun: example of Arist. Metaph. II, 1 (993b9-10) according to the oldest transl. (Steele, 282). See also Guill. Altiss. Summa Aurea I, c. 3, q. 1 (f. 4 vb).

†31. Dionys. On the Divine Names ch. 7 § 3 (PG 3, 872A; Dion. 403).

†32. Cognition of the soul is twofold . . . what it is . . . that it is: Arist. Post. Anal. I, 13 (78a22).

†33. cognition . . . by assimilation: cf. above q. 16, a. 7 Reply to 6, fn. 28.

†34. Empedocles as reported by Arist. On the Soul I, 2 (404b10-15).

Footnotes to Question XVI, Article 9

†p Parallel texts: Super Sent. II, d. 7, q. 3, a. 1; Summa cont. Gent. III, q. 103; Ia, q. 110, a. 2; Q. D. On the Power of God q. 6, a. 3.

†1. Rightly August. (pseudo) Liber 21 Sent. sent. 4 (PL 40, 726).

†2. lower powers of this atmosphere: cf. Ephesians 2, 2.

†3. August. On the City of God XVIII, c. 17 and 18 (PL 41, 573 and 574; CCL 48, 607 and 608; CSEL 40-2, 288 and 289)

†4. Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Ps. 77, 49 (PL 191, 740A) from August. Exposition on Psalm 77, 49, n. 28 (PL 36, 1001; CCL 39, 1088).

†5. August. On the City of God XVIII, c. 16 (PL 41, 573; CCL 48, 607; CSEL 40-2, 288).

†6. each thing . . . it is in act: thus Thomas passim e.g. Super Sent. II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2 sed contra 2; ibid. d.

17, q. 2, a. 1; Summa cont. Gent. I, c. 73; ibid. II, c. 21; cf. Arist. Physics III, 2 (202a10-11); Averroes, In Phys. III, comm. 17 (IV, 92D); In De Anima III, comm. 4 (VI, 137F; Crawford 384).

†7. fire is most akin to form: cf. Arist. On Gen. and Corr. II, 8 (335a18-19) as referred to by Thomas Super Sent. II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 arg. 4.

†8. Dionysius, On the Celest. Hier. ch. 15 § 9 (PG 3, 337C) according to Sarracenus's version (Dion. 1032); [transl. in Pseudo-Dionys. The Complete Works in Classics of Western Spirituality (New York/Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987)].

†9. generation . . . in respect to form: cf. Arist. Physics V, 1 (225a15-17).

†10. heavenly bodies . . . ministry of the angels: cf. Thomas himself Ia, q. 57, a. 2 and q. 110, a. 1.

†11. the will is capable of diverse effects: cf. Arist. Metaph. IX, 1 (1046b4-5).

†12. Book On Causes comm. 16(15).

†13. angels are called intelligences: cf. Avicenna Metaph. X, c. 1 (f. 107 va A).

†14. August. On the Trinity III, c. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 875; CCL 50, 139).

†15. Pharaoh's magicians: cf. Exodus 8, 7.

†16. August. On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 79, n. 4 (PL 40, 92; CCL 44A, 229).

†17. Gregory, In Evang. II, hom. 34, n. 10 (PL 76, 1251C).

†18. Avicenna, De Anima IV, 4 (f. 20 vb D; Van Riet, 65) as cited by Thomas Lect. super Galatians c. 3, lect. 1; cf. also Summa cont. Gent. III, q. 103 and Ia, 117, 3 Reply to 2; [transl. of Thomas's Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians by F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1966)].

†19. August. The City of God XVIII, c. 18, n. 2 (PL 41, 574-575; CCL 48, 608; CSEL 40-2, 290).

†20. The Philosopher: Arist. Metaph. VII, 8 (1033b19-1034a8).

†21. the Commentator: Averroes, In Metaph VII, comm. 28 (VIII, 178C).

†22. Romans 13, 1 according to the interpretation of August. Contra Gaudentium I, c. 19 (PL 43, 716; CSEL 53, 214) and Glossa of Peter Lomb. on Rom. 13, 1 (PL 191, 1504B).

†23. August. Enchiridion ch. 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53).

†24. the Philosopher: Arist. Metaph. XI (=XII), 10 (1075a12-16).

†25. Dionys. On the Celest. Hierarchy ch. 4 § 3 (PG 3, 181A; Dion. 812); cf. also On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy ch. 5 pars 1 § 4 (PG 3, 504C; Dion. 1330).

†26. August. On the Trinity III, c. 4, n. 9 (PL 42, 873; CCL 50, 135).

†27. the highest . . . most universal powers: cf. Book On Causes prop. 10(9).

†28. for the heavenly bodies . . . by reason of their imperfection: cf. Albert, *Quest. Super De Animalibus* XVII, q. 14 (Col. XII, 295).

†29. August. *On the City of God* XVIII, c. 18, n. 2 (PL 41, 575; CCL 48, 608; CSEL 40-2, 290).

†30. August. *On the City of God* XVIII, c. 18, n. 3 (PL 41, 575-576; CCL 48, 609-610; CSEL 40-2, 292).

†31. men were deluded: cf. August. *On the City of God* X, c. 11, n. 2 (PL 41, 290; CCL 47, 286; CSEL 40-1, 467).

†32. Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 5 § 4 (PG 3, 817D; Dion. 333).

†33. as he himself says: Dionys. *On the Divine Names* ch. 2 § 8 (PG 3, 645C; Dion. 98). See also Thomas himself *Lect. Super Ephes.* ch. 3, lect. 4; [transl. of Thomas's *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* by M. L. Lamb (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1966)].

†34. fathers of others: loc. cit. above fn. 33.

†35. whom they . . . and perfect: cf. Dionys. *On the Celest. Hier.* ch. 8 § 2 (PG 3, 240C; Dion. 880).

†36. August. *On the Trinity* III, 9, n. 17 (PL 42, 877; CCL 50, 140).

†37. on account of a malevolent passion . . . contracts some infection: cf. Jerome, *In Epist. ad Galatians* I c. 3, 1 (PL 26, 372D-373A); *Glossa of Peter Lomb. in Gal.* 3, 1 (PL 192, 117D-118A) and Thomas himself *Lect. Super Gal.* ch. 3, lect. 1. On bewitchment cf. also *Summa cont. Gent.* III, 103 arg. 2 and Ia, 117, a. 3 Reply to 2; [for transl. of Thomas's *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* see above fn. 18].

†38. Arist. *On Sleep and Sleeplessness* i.e. *On Dreams* ch. 2 (459b27-32).