Bk 2 Q 5 A 3 Thes p 87
ARTICLE III

CAN GOD ANNIHILATE A CREATURE?

Sum. Th. I, Q. civ, A. 3

THE third point of inquiry is whether God can annihilate a creature: and seemingly he cannot.

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1. Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 2) that God does not cause things to tend to non-existence. But this would be the case were he to annihilate a creature. Therefore God cannot annihilate a creature.

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2. Corruptible creatures whose existence is more unstable than that of others, do not cease to exist save through the action of some active cause: thus fire is extinguished by some counteracting agency. Much less therefore can other creatures cease to exist otherwise than through some agency. If then God were to annihilate a creature, this would not be except through some kind of action. But this cannot be done through an action: since every action, proceeding as it does from an actual being, must terminate in an actual being, because every maker produces its like. Now an action whereby an actual being is produced in no way annihilates. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.

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3. Whatsoever happens accidentally must be traced to something that is intended directly. Now no active cause produces imperfection and corruption save accidentally, since nothing acts without intending a good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv): thus the purpose of fire in destroying water is not to deprive the water of its form, but to introduce its own form into the matter. Wherefore imperfection cannot be caused by an agent, without some perfection being caused at the same time. Now where a perfection is produced there is not annihilation. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.

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4. Nothing acts except for an end: since the end moves the effective cause. Now the end of God's action is his own goodness: and this is indeed obtained by his producing things, so that they are made in likeness to their producer, but not by his annihilating them, since thereby they would be utterly deprived of that likeness. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.

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5. So long as the cause remains its effect must needs remain also: because if this were not necessary, it would be possible, given a cause, for its effect to be or not to be; and then it would need something else to determine its being: and thus the cause would not suffice for the existence of its effect. But God is the sufficient cause of things. Therefore as long as God exists things must needs remain in existence. Now God cannot prevent his own remaining in existence. Therefore he cannot reduce creatures to non-existence.

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6. It will be said that God would not be the actual cause if things were to be annihilated.--On the contrary, God's action is his being, wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32) that God's existence is the reason of our existence. Now his existence was never new to him. Therefore he never ceases to act, and will always be an actual cause.

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7. God cannot act against common sense, e.g. he cannot make the whole larger than its part. Now all wise men are agreed that the rational soul is immortal. Therefore God cannot cause it to be annihilated.

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8. The Commentator says (Metaph. xi, com. 41) that if a thing in itself can either be or not be, nothing else can make it be of necessity. Wherefore whatsoever creatures have being of necessity do not admit of the intrinsic possibility of being or of not being. Now such are all incorruptible things, e.g. incorporeal substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore in none of these is there the possibility of not being: so that if they be left to themselves through God withdrawing his action from them, they will not cease to exist: and thus seemingly God cannot annihilate them.

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9. The thing received does not remove the potentiality of the recipient; but it may perfect it. If then there exist a thing which potentially does not exist, it cannot receive anything that will remove this potentiality: and consequently a thing that in itself contains the possibility of not existing, cannot receive from anything else the necessity of existing.

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10. Whatever causes a generic difference belongs to the essence of things, for the genus is part of a thing's definition. Now certain things differ generically in the point of being corruptible or incorruptible (Metaph. x, 10). Therefore everlastingness or incorruptibility is part of such things' essence. Now God cannot deprive a thing of what is essential to it, thus he cannot make a man not to be an animal and yet remain a man. Therefore he cannot cause incorruptible things not to last for ever, and thus he cannot reduce them to nothing.

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11. A corruptible thing can never be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible (for the incorruptibility of bodies rising from the dead is a gift not of nature but of glory) and the reason for this is that corruptible and incorruptible differ generically, as stated above. Now if a thing which has an intrinsic possibility not to exist, could be made by something else to exist of necessity, a corruptible thing might be changed into an incorruptible one. Therefore a thing which has an intrinsic possibility not to exist cannot possibly acquire necessity of existing from another: and so we come to the same conclusion as above.

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12. If creatures have no necessity of existing except in so far as they depend on God, and if they depend on God in so far as he is their cause, their necessity of existing must correspond to the mode of causality whereby God is their cause. Now God is the cause of things not of necessity but by his will, as we have proved above (Q. iii, A. 15). Therefore necessity in things will be such as it is in things that are produced by the will. Now things effected by the will are not necessary simply and absolutely: their necessity is only conditional, inasmuch as the will is not determined by necessity to one particular effect. It follows then that in things nothing is absolutely necessary, but only conditionally: even as it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs; or walk if he wishes to walk and is not prevented from so doing. Whence it would seem to follow that no creature is simply incorruptible, and that all are corruptible: which cannot be admitted.

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13. Just as God is the sovereign good so is he the most perfect being. Now inasmuch as he is the sovereign good, it is unbecoming to him to be the cause of the evil of sin. Therefore inasmuch as he is the most perfect being it is unbecoming to him to cause things to be annihilated.

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14. Augustine says (Enchir. xi) that God is so good that he would never allow evil to be done, were he not so powerful that he can produce a good from any evil whatsoever. But no good would result if creatures were to be annihilated. Therefore God cannot allow creatures to return to nothingness.

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15. The distance from nothing to being is no less than from being to nothing. Now it belongs to an infinite power to produce a being from nothing on account of the infinite distance. Therefore only an infinite power can reduce a being to nothing. But no creature has infinite power. Hence if we take away the action of the Creator, a creature cannot be reduced to nothing: and yet only on the supposition that God's action be removed was it said that he can annihilate things. Therefore nowise can God reduce creatures to nothing.

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On the contrary Origen says (Peri Archon): That which was given can be taken away and lost. Now creatures were given existence by God. Therefore it can be taken from them: so that God can reduce them to nothing.

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Again, that which depends on God's simple will, can also cease if it be God's will. Now the creature's whole being depends on God's simple will, since he is the cause of things by his will and not by natural necessity. Therefore if it be his will creatures can be annihilated.

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Again, God is not more indebted to creatures after they begin to exist than he was before they began to exist. Now, before they came into existence, he could, without prejudice to his goodness, abstain from bringing them into being, since his goodness nowise depends on creatures. Therefore without prejudice to his goodness God can withdraw his action from creatures, with the result as proved above (A. 2) that they would cease to exist. Therefore God can annihilate creatures.

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Again, as we have proved (A. 1) God, by the same action, produces and upholds things. Now God was able not to produce creatures. Therefore he can likewise abstain from upholding them: and thus he can annihilate them.

I answer that things made by God may be said to be possible to him in two ways. First with regard to the power of the agent alone: thus before the world was made, it was possible for the world to exist, not by a possibility inherent to the creature, which did not exist, but only by the power of God, who was able to bring the world into being.

Secondly in respect of a possibility inherent to the thing made: thus it is possible for a composite body to be corrupted. Accordingly if we consider the possibility of non-existence in reference to things made, there have been two opinions on this point. Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 6) held that all things except God have in themselves a possibility of being and of non-being. Because seeing that being is something besides the essence of a created thing, the very nature of a creature considered in itself has a possibility of being, while it only has necessity of being from another whose nature is its being, and which therefore by its nature exists of necessity; and this is God. On the other hand the Commentator (Metaph. xi, text. 41: and De Subst. Orb.) holds a contrary opinion, to wit that certain things were created in whose nature there is no possibility of non-being inasmuch as a thing that has in its nature a possibility of non-being, cannot acquire everlastingness from without, so as to become by its very nature everlasting. The latter opinion would seem more reasonable. Because possibility of being and non-being does not belong to a thing save by reason of its matter which is pure potentiality. And matter since it cannot exist without a form cannot have a potentiality in respect of non-being, save as, while existing under some form it retains the possibility of receiving another form.

Accordingly it may happen in two ways, that a thing's nature does not include the possibility of non-being. First, because that thing is a pure form subsistent in its own being, such as incorporeal substances which are entirely immaterial. For if a form through being in matter is the principle of existence in material things, and a material thing cannot cease to exist save by losing its form, it follows that when a form subsists by itself it can nowise cease to exist, even as neither can existence be separated from itself.

Secondly, because the matter has no potentiality in respect of another form, and the whole of its potentiality is determined by one form: such are the heavenly bodies in which there is no contrariety of forms. Accordingly a possibility of non-being is in the nature of those things alone whose matter is subject to contrariety of forms: whereas it belongs to other things by their nature to exist of necessity, all possibility of non-existence being removed from their nature. And yet this does not imply that their necessity of existence is not from God: since one necessity may cause another (Metaph. v). For the created nature to which everlastingness belongs is produced by God. Moreover in those things which contain a possibility of non-being the matter remains, while the forms change: thus, when things are generated, they are educed from potentiality into actuality by generation even as, when they are corrupted, they are reduced from actuality so as to return to a state of potentiality. It follows then that in all created natures there is no such potentiality whereby a thing is made to have the possibility of tending to nonexistence.

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If on the other hand we consider the power of God the Maker of things, we must observe that a thing is said to be impossible to God in two ways. First, because it is impossible in itself, in that by its very nature it is outside the scope of any power whatsoever: such are things that involve a contradiction. Secondly, because the opposite of that thing is necessary: and this occurs in two ways with respect to an agent. First on the part of a natural active power that is confined to one effect: thus the power of a hot thing is confined to heating: in this way God the Father begot the Son necessarily and cannot but beget him. Secondly, on the part of the ultimate end to which everything tends of necessity: thus man necessarily desires happiness and cannot possibly desire to be unhappy: and likewise God necessarily wills his goodness, and cannot possibly will things that are incompatible with it: for example we say that God cannot lie or wish to lie. Now the simple non-existence of creatures is not in itself impossible as involving a contradiction (else they had existed from eternity: and the reason of this is that they are not their own being): thus in the statement, The creature does not exist at all, the predicate is not in conflict with the definition of the subject, whereas it is in the sentence, Man is not a rational animal: for sentences of the latter kind imply a contradiction and are impossible in themselves. Likewise God did not produce creatures by natural necessity, as though his power were determined to the existence of creatures, as we have proved above (A. 3). Likewise God's goodness does not depend on creatures, as though it could not be without them: seeing that it gains nothing by them. It remains then that it is not impossible for God to reduce things to nothing: since he is not under the necessity of giving them being, except on the presupposition of his decree and foreknowledge, in that he decreed and foresaw that he would keep things in existence for ever.

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Reply to the First Objection. If God were to reduce creatures to nothing, he would not be the cause of their tendency to non-existence: because it would result not from his causing non- existence in them, but from his ceasing to give them existence.

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Reply to the Second Objection. Corruptible things cease to exist, in so far as their matter receives another form, with which its previous form was incompatible: wherefore their corruption requires the action of a certain agent, whereby the new form is educed from its potential state into actual existence. Whereas if God were to annihilate a thing, there would be no need for any action, and it would suffice if God were to withdraw the action whereby he gives things existence: thus the absence of the sun's action in enlightening the air causes the absence of light in the air.

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Reply to the Third Objection. This argument would avail, if God could by some action annihilate things: but this is not so, rather would it be by ceasing from action.

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Reply to the Fourth Objection. Where there is no action we need not require an end. But seeing that even cessation from action cannot be in God save by his will, and that the will's object is the end, it might be possible to ascribe an end even in the annihilation of things: so that as in the production of things, the end was the manifestation of God's abundant goodness, so in the annihilation of things the end could be the sufficiency of his goodness, seeing that it is so self- sufficing as to need nothing from without.

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Reply to the Fifth Objection. The effect both follows its cause and derives its mode from the cause; wherefore effects consequent upon an act of the will, proceed from the will at the time appointed by the will; and not necessarily as soon as the will has decreed their existence. And thus since creatures proceed from God by his will, they come into being when it is God's will that they should be, not of necessity or simultaneously with God's will, otherwise they would have existed from eternity.

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Reply to the Sixth Objection. The action whereby God made things may be considered from a twofold point of view: it may be considered in its substance and in its relation to its effect. The substance of that action since it is the divine essence is eternal and cannot but be; whereas the relation to its effect depends on the divine will: because every action of a maker produces its effect according to the exigency of the principle of that action: thus fire imparts heat according to the measure of its own heat. Hence seeing that God's will is the principle of the things made by him, his action bears a relation to his effects according as his will determines. Hence though God's action cannot cease in its substance, its relation to his effects might cease, if he so willed.

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Reply to the Seventh Objection. A principle of common sense is one whose opposite involves a contradiction, for instance, `A whole is greater than its part,' because it is contrary to the definition of a whole that it be not greater than its part. Now it is not contrary to common sense that a rational soul cease to exist, as we have already made clear: but it is in common sense that the nature of the rational soul be incorruptible. Wherefore if God were to reduce a human soul to nothing this would not be through the soul's having some inherent possibility of non-existence, as stated above.

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Reply to the Eighth Objection. A thing whose nature contains the possibility of non-existence does not acquire from an external source the necessity of being so that this necessity be contained in its nature, since this would involve a contradiction, to wit the possibility of a nature's nonexistence together with the necessity of its existence; but there is nothing to prevent its acquiring incorruptibility by grace or glory. Thus by virtue of the union of the soul with its principle Adam's body was in a way incorruptible through the grace attached to the state of innocence, and the bodies of the risen dead will be incorruptible by the grace belonging to the state of glory. On the other hand a nature which does not include the possibility of non-existence is not prevented from acquiring from another source the necessity of existence, since whatsoever perfection it has, it has received it from another: wherefore if its cause withdraw its action, it would cease to exist, not on account of its inherent potentiality to non-existence, but on account of God's power to cease giving existence.

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Reply to the Ninth Objection. It has been sufficiently shown that things which are incorruptible by nature are not to be supposed, as the objection supposes, to have at first a potentiality to non- existence which potentiality is removed by something received from God: whereas in things which are incorruptible by grace, there underlies in their nature a possibility of non-existence, which however is entirely voided by grace through the power of God.

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Reply to the Tenth Objection. If by ceasing to uphold them God were to reduce incorruptible creatures to nothing, he would not by so doing deprive their nature of its everlastingness, so that it would remain without being everlasting: but their whole nature would cease to exist through their cause ceasing to exercise its influence over them.

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Reply to the Eleventh Objection. That which is by nature corruptible cannot be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible, and vice versa: although that which is corruptible by nature can be made to last for ever by the super-addition of glory. Yet it does not follow that certain corruptible things become naturally incorruptible, since were their cause to withdraw they would cease to exist.

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Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although incorruptible creatures depend on God's will, which can either give or not give them existence, nevertheless by that same will they are gifted with the absolute necessity of existence, in so far as they are created in a nature wherein there is no potentiality to non-existence: because every creature is such as God willed it to be, as Hilary says (De Synod).

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Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although God is able to reduce creatures to nothing, he cannot as long as they continue to exist, cease to be the cause of their existence. Now he is their cause both efficient and final. Accordingly just as he cannot cause an existing creature not to owe its existence to him, even so he cannot cause that creature not to be ordered to his goodness. Wherefore since the evil of sin removes the order of which he is the end, inasmuch as sin is aversion from the highest good; it follows that God cannot be the cause of the evil of sin, although he can be the cause of annihilation, by ceasing altogether to uphold a creature.

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Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine is speaking of the evil of sin: and even if he were referring to penal evil, the annihilation of things would be no evil, because every evil since it is a privation is based upon good, as Augustine says (Enchir. xi). Hence just as there was no evil before things were created, so neither would there be any evil were God to annihilate all things.

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Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. No creature has the power either of making something from nothing or of reducing a thing to nothing. The fact that if God ceased to uphold creatures they would return to nothing is not due to a creature's action but to its defect, as stated above.

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ARTICLE IV

IS THERE A CREATURE THAT OUGHT TO BE OR ACTUALLY IS ANNIHILATED?

THE third point of inquiry is whether any creature is to be annihilated, or is actually annihilated: and seemingly the answer should be in the affirmative.

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1. Just as a finite power cannot move in an infinite time, even so by no finite power can a thing exist for an infinite time. Now all corporeal power is finite (Phys. viii). Therefore no body has the power to exist for an infinite time. But there are bodies that cannot be corrupted, because nothing is contrary to them, like the heavenly bodies. Therefore at some time they must of necessity be annihilated.

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2. That which is directed to the attainment of an end is no longer needed where the end has been reached: thus a ship is necessary that we may cross the sea, but we no longer need it after crossing the ocean. Now corporeal creatures were made for the sake of the spiritual creature, in order to help it to reach its end. When therefore the spiritual creatures arrive at their ultimate end they no longer need corporeal creatures: and since there is nothing superfluous in God's works it would seem that at the last end of all things every corporeal creature will cease to exist.

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3. Nothing accidental is infinite. Now existence is accidental to the creature according to Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 4); wherefore Hilary (De Trin. vii) distinguishes God from his creatures by stating that there is no accident in God. Therefore no creature will last for ever, and all creatures will at some time be reduced to nothing.