On the Power of God Bk 1 Q 3 A 5 Thes p 108

ARTICLE V

CAN THERE BE ANYTHING THAT IS NOT CREATED BY GOD?

(Sum. Th. I, Q. xliv, A. 1)

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether there can be anything that is not created by God. Seemingly this is possible.	1. Since the cause is more powerful than its effect, that which is possible to our intellect which takes its knowledge from things would seem yet more possible to nature. Now our intellect can understand a thing apart from understanding that it is from God, because its efficient cause is not part of a thing's nature, so that the thing can be understood without it. Much more therefore can there be a real thing that is not from God.

2. All things made by God are called his creatures. Now creation terminates at being: for the first of created things is being (De Causis, prop. iv). Since then the quiddity of a thing is in addition to its being, it would seem that the quiddity of a thing is not from God.

3. Every action terminates in an act, even as it proceeds from an act: because every agent acts in so far as it is in act, and every agent produces its like in nature. But primal matter is pure potentiality. Therefore the creative act cannot terminate therein: so that not all things are created by God.

On the contrary it is said (Rom. xi, 36): From him and by him and in him are all things.

I answer that the ancients in their investigations of nature proceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. Wherefore as human knowledge reaches the intellect by beginning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on the domain of the senses, and thence by degrees reached the realm of the intellect. And seeing that accidental forms are in themselves objects of sense, whereas substantial forms are not, the early philosophers said that all forms are accidental, and that matter alone is a substance. And because substance suffices to cause accidents that result from the substantial elements, the early philosophers held that there is no other cause besides matter, and that matter is the cause of whatever we observe in the sensible world: and consequently they were forced to state that matter itself has no cause, and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause. The later philosophers, however, began to take some notice of substantial forms: yet they did not attain to the knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the observation of special forms; and so they posited indeed certain active causes, not such as give being to things in their universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form: these causes they called intelligence, attraction and repulsion, which they held responsible for adhesion and separation. Wherefore according to them not all beings came from an efficient cause, and matter was in existence before any efficient cause came into action. Subsequent to these the philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and their disciples, attained to the study of universal being: and hence they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into being, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 4). This is in agreement with the Catholic Faith; and may be proved by the three arguments that follow.

First, if some one thing thing is discovered to be in common (communiter) to a number of things, it must be caused in these by some one cause. For it is not possible that that common thing belong to each because of each's own self (ex se ipso), since each one, according to what it is, is distinguished from the others; and a diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Therefore, since being (esse) is found to be common to all things, each of which is distinct from the other according to what it is, it necessarily must be that being is attributed to them not of themselves, but by some one cause. And, this appears to be Plato's argument, since he meant that before every multitude there is some unity, not only in numbers but also in the natures of things.

The second argument is that when something is found to be participated by many things in various ways, it must be attributed to all of those in which it is found imperfectly because of (ab) that in which it is found most perfectly. For those things of which there are positive predications according to "the more and the less" have this because of (ex) the closeness or remoteness of their approach to some one thing. For if that were to belong to each of these of each's own self, there would be no reason why it would be found to be more perfect in one than in another; just as we see that fire, which is the extreme of heat, is the principle of heat in all things hot. But it is possible to affirm one being (ens) that is the most perfect and most true being. This is proved from the fact that there is some mover that is is entirely immobile and most perfect, as the philosophers have proved. Therefore, from it all other less perfect things must receive their being (esse). This is the proof of the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, 1).

The third argument [that there is nothing that is not created by God] is based on the principle that that which is through another (per alterum) is reduced as to a cause to that which is through itself (per se). Hence, were there one heat existing per se, it would necessarily be the cause of all hot things that have heat by way of participation (per modum participationis). But it is possible to affirm a being that is its own being (esse). This [being] is proved from the fact that there must be a being that is pure act, in which there is no composition. Hence, it is necessary that from that one being all other beings exist, namely, any that are not their own being but have being by way of participation. This is the argument of Avicenna (in Metaphysics 8.7; 9.4).

Thus reason proves and faith holds that all things are created by God.

Reply to the First Objection. Although the first cause that is God does not enter into the essence of creatures, yet being which is in creatures cannot be understood except as derived from the divine being: even as a proper effect cannot be understood save as produced by its proper cause.

Reply to the Second Objection. From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be but also to be created: since before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creating essence.

Reply to the Third Objection. This argument proves that primal matter is not created per se: but it does not follow that it is not created under a form: for it is thus that it has actual being.