In the Twelfth Article We Ask: IS GOD'S EXISTENCE SELF-EVIDENT TO THE HUMAN MIND, JUST AS FIRST PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION, WHICH CANNOT BE THOUGHT NOT TO EXIST?

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Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Those things which it is given us to know naturally are self-evident. But "knowledge of God's existence is naturally given to everybody," as Damascene says.††1 Therefore, it is self-evident that God exists.

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2. "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought," as Anselm says.

10 say that the fact that God exists is not self-evident, but is known through demonstration. Still others, as Anselm,††11 are of the opinion that the fact that God exists is self-evident to this extent, that no one in his inner thoughts can think that God does not exist, although exteriorly he can express it and interiorly think the words with which he expresses it.

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The first opinion is obviously false. For we find that the existence of God has been proved by the philosophers with unimpeachable proofs, although trivial reasons have also been brought forth by some to show this.

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Each of the two following opinions has some truth. For something is immediately evident in two ways: in itself and to us. That God exists, therefore, is immediately evident in itself, but not to us. Therefore, to know this it is necessary in our case to have demonstrations proceeding from effects. This is clear from what follows.

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For a thing to be immediately evident in itself, all that is needed is that the predicate pertain to the nature of the subject. For then the subject cannot be considered without it appearing that the predicate is contained in it. But for something to be immediately evident with reference to us, we have to know the meaning of the subject in which the predicate is included. Hence it is that some things are immediately evident to everybody, as, for instance, when propositions of this sort have subjects which are such that their meaning is evident to everybody, as every whole is greater than its part. For anyone knows what a whole is and what a part is. Some things, however, are immediately evident only to those with trained minds, who know the meaning of the terms, whereas ordinary people do not know them.

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It is in this sense that Boethius says: "There are two types of common notions. One is common to everybody, for example, if you take equal parts from things that are equal. . . . The other is found only in the more educated, for example, that non-bodily things are not in a place. Ordinary people cannot see the truth of this, but the educated can."††12 For the thought of ordinary people is unable to go beyond imagination to reach the nature of incorporeal things.

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But the very thing that is being (esse) is included in the notion of no creature. For, the being of any creature is other than its quiddity. Hence, it cannot be said of any creature that the fact that it exists is per se known even in itself. But, in God, his being is included in the notion of his quiddity, because in God that which is and being are the same, as Boethius says [De hebd.]; and whether he is and what he is are the same, as Avicenna says [Met. 8.4]. Therefore, it is immediately evident in itself.

Now, existence is not included perfectly in the essential nature of any creature, for the act of existence of every creature is something other than its quiddity. Hence, it cannot be said of any creature that its existence is immediately evident even in itself. But, in God, His existence is included in the nature of His quiddity, for in God essence and existence are the same, as Boethius says.††13 And that He is and what He is are the same, as Avicenna says.††14 Therefore, it is immediately evident in itself.

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But, since the essence of God is not evident to us, the fact of God's existence is not evident to us, but has to be demonstrated. In heaven, however, where we shall see His essence, the fact of God's existence will be immediately evident to us much more fully than the fact that affirmation and denial cannot both be true at the same time is immediately evident to us now. Since, therefore, each part of the question is true to some extent, we must answer both sides.

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Answers to Difficulties:

1. Knowledge of God's existence is said naturally to be implanted in everybody, because in everyone there is naturally implanted something from which he can arrive at knowledge of the fact of God's existence.

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2. The reasoning would follow if God were not self-evident because of something connected with Himself. The possibility, however, of thinking that He does not exist is now due to something in us, who are incapable of knowing those things which are most evident in themselves. Hence, the fact that God can be thought of as not existing does not prevent Him from being that than which nothing greater can be thought.

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3. Truth is based on being. Hence, as it is self-evident that being exists in general, so it is also self-evident that truth exists. However, that there is a first being which is the cause of every being is not immediately evident to us until it is accepted on faith or proved by a demonstration. Consequently, neither is it self-evident that the truth of all things derives from some first truth. Hence, it does not follow that God's existence is self-evident.

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4. If it were immediately evident to us that the divine nature is God's existence, the argument would follow. However, at present it is not immediately evident to us, since we do not see God through His essence, but need a demonstration or faith to hold this truth.

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5. The highest good is desired in two ways. In one, it is desired in its essence, a way in which not everything desires highest good. In the other way, it is desired in its likeness, in which manner all things desire the highest good, for nothing is desirable except in so far as some likeness of the highest good is seen in it. Hence, we cannot conclude from this that God's existence, which is essentially the highest good, is self-evident.

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6. Although uncreated truth surpasses every created truth, nothing prevents created truth from being more evident to us than uncreated truth. For those things which are less evident in themselves are more evident to us, according to the Philosopher.††15

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7. To think that something does not exist can be taken in two ways. In one, it is taken to mean that these two things are grasped at the same time. In this sense, there is nothing to prevent one from thinking that he does not exist, just as he thinks that at one time he did not exist. However, in this sense, we cannot at the same time conceive that something is a whole and that it is less than a part of itself, for one of these excludes the other.

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In the other way, it is taken to mean that assent is given to what is thus conceived. In this sense, no one can assent to the thought that he does not exist. For, in thinking something, he perceives that he exists.

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8. Before present things existed, it had to be true that they would exist only on the supposition that something existed at the time when it was said that this would exist. But, if we lay down the impossible condition that at one time nothing existed, then, on the basis of such an hypothesis, nothing is true except only materially. For not only existence but also nonexistence is the subject matter of truth, for we can speak truth about being or non-being. Thus it follows that there will be truth at that time only materially and so in some respect.

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9. It is necessary to reduce that which is true in some respect to that which is true or truth simply if it is presupposed that truth exists, but not otherwise.

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10. Although the name of God is HE WHO IS, this is not immediately evident to us. Hence, the argument does not follow.

1'. According to Anselm,††16 that the fool said in his heart: "There is no God," means that he thought these words, and not that he could think this in his inner reason.

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2'. That God exists is self-evident and not self-evident in the same way with reference to habit and to act.

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3'. That we can know God only from what He has made is due to the inadequacy of our knowledge. Hence, this does not keep Him from being immediately evident in Himself.

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4'. To know that a thing exists, it is not necessary to know what it is by definition, but only what is meant by the name.

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5'. That God exists is not an article of faith but the preamble to an article of faith, unless we understand something else along with God's existence, for example, that He has unity of essence with trinity of Persons, and other things such as this.

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6'. Matters of faith are known with greatest certainty in so far as certainty means firmness of adherence. For the believer clings to nothing more firmly than those things which he holds by faith. But they are not known with greatest certainty in so far as certainty implies repose of understanding in the thing known. For the believer's assent to what he believes does not come from the fact that his understanding concludes to the things believed by virtue of any principles, but from the will, which influences the understanding to assent to what is believed. Hence it is that in matters of faith, movements of doubt can arise in one who believes.

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7'. Wisdom consists not only in knowing that God exists, but in attaining to a knowledge of what He is. But in this life we can know this only in so far as we know what He is not. For one who knows something in so far as it differs from all other things approaches the knowledge by which one knows what it is. It is to this knowledge, too, that the citation from Augustine ††17 which follows is taken to refer.

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8'. The answer to the eighth difficulty is clear from the seventh response.

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9'. Those things which have been distinguished by reason cannot always be thought of as separated from each other, although they can be considered separately. For, although it is possible to think of God without considering His goodness, it is impossible to think that God exists and is not good. Hence, although in God that which exists and existence are distinguished in reason, it does not follow that it is possible to think that He does not exist.

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10'. God is known not only in the works which proceed from His justice, but also in His other works. Hence, granted that someone does not know Him as just, it does not follow that he does not know Him at all. Nor is it possible for anyone to know none of His works, since being in general, which cannot be unknown, is His work.

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ARTICLE XIII ††*

In the Thirteenth Article We Ask: CAN THE TRINITY OF PERSONS IN GOD BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON?

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Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. The Gloss explains the passage, "The invisible things of God . . . by the things that are made. . . ." (Romans 1:13), in this way: "Invisible things refer to the person of the Father; eternal power to the person of the Son; divinity to the person of the Holy Spirit."††1 Therefore, by natural reason we can arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity from creatures.

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2. We know with natural knowledge that the most perfect power and the source of all power are in God. Therefore, we must attribute the first power to Him. But the first power is generative power. Therefore, according to natural reason we can know that there is generative power in God. But, once generative power is postulated in God, the distinction of persons necessarily follows. Therefore, by natural knowledge we can know the distinction of persons.

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That generative power is the first power was proved in this way: The order of powers follows the order of operations. But the first operation of all is to understand, for there is proof that an intellectual agent exists first, and in such an agent there is understanding, according to the manner of understanding, before willing or doing. Therefore, intellective power is the first of the powers. But intellective power is generative power, since every understanding begets its likeness in itself. Therefore, generative power is the first of the powers.

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3. Every equivocal is reduced to the univocal as every multitude is reduced to unity. But the procession of creatures from God is an equivocal procession, since creatures do not have the same name and definition as God. Therefore, according to natural reason we must assert that there pre-exists in God a univocal procession according to which God proceeds from God. Given this, there follows the distinction of the persons in God.

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4. One of the glosses says ††2 that there has been no sect which has erred about the person of the Father. But it would be a very serious error about the person of the Father to say that he did not have a Son. Therefore, even the schools of philosophers who came to know God by natural reason have held Father and Son in God.

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5. As Boethius says,††3 equality precedes every inequality. But there is inequality between Creator and creature. Therefore, we must say that there was some equality in God before this inequality. But there cannot be equality in Him unless there is distinction, for nothing is equal to itself, just as nothing is like itself, as Hilary says.††4 Therefore, according to natural reason, we must assign distinction of persons to God.

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6. Natural reason comes to the conclusion that there is the greatest joy in God. But "there is not the greatest enjoyment of any good without a companion," as Boethius says.††5 Therefore, by natural reason we can know that there are distinct persons in God, and that by reason of their companionship there is joyful possession of goodness.

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7. Natural reason reaches the Creator from the likeness in the creature. But the likeness of the Creator is seen in the creature with reference not only to the essential attributes but also to the properties of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can arrive at the properties of the persons.

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8. Philosophers have had knowledge of God only from natural reason. But some philosophers ††6 have attained to knowledge of the Trinity. Thus, it is said in Heaven and Earth: "Through this number," three, "we have applied ourselves to admiration of the grandeur of the creator."††7 Therefore.