

## NOTE FOR BOOK THREE ABOUT THE SOUL, READING 11

Thomas, in his Proemium to logic, returns to this text when distinguishing three acts of reason directed by logic. The first two are discussed here, to which Thomas adds a third which is reasoning. The first act can be without the second, but the reverse is not possible. Likewise, the second can be without the third, but the reverse is not possible.

What reason understands by the first act must be one in one of the three ways indicated by Aristotle. These three ways are also distinguished in the First Book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) when Aristotle reasons against the position of Parmenides and Melissus that being is one.

Truth also presupposes unity:

Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae. Aequalitatis autem causa est unitas, ut patet in V *Metaphysicorum*.<sup>1</sup>

Hence, we can begin to see that one is before true and understandable.

In the following text, Thomas unfolds the reason why the understanding cannot consider many things at once and manifests the reason by a likeness:

ea quae cognoscuntur diversis rationibus, intellectus non potest simul considerare: quia non potest consignari diversis similitudinibus simul, sicut nec corpus diversis figuris; sed ea quae cognoscuntur una ratione, vel quorum unum est ratio alterius, nihil prohibet simul intelligi.<sup>2</sup>

Duane H. Berquist

---

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LXII

<sup>2</sup> *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist. X, Art IV, Ad 3