

THE SKOPOS OR AIM OF THE *CATEGORIES*

Logica habet maximam difficultatem. And in particular, thinkers have always found it difficult to determine the skopos or aim of the *Categories*; a sign of which is their disagreement on this skopos. For these reasons and because the *Categories* is the first treatise in logic (the reasoned-out knowledge necessary for all the rest) which has come down to us from Aristotle, one should follow the advice of Friar Laurence to Romeo:

Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast.

The Greek Commentators on the *Categories* help us to proceed wisely and slowly towards the skopos of this book by their going through a number of steps in determining that skopos. As Aristotle determines the skopos of wisdom in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, first in general (showing that it is about causes) and then in particular (showing that it is about the *first* causes), so also the Greek Commentators determine the skopos of the *Categories* in a number of steps going gradually from the general to the particular. Perhaps the fullest enumeration of these steps in order is first given by Ammonius Hermias although there are thinkers after him who also go through these steps.

Ammonius goes through seven steps in determining the skopos of the *Categories* although some of these steps are not fully developed by him. The first four of these steps (although applied to the skopos of the *Categories*) could have an application to the skopos of any treatise in logic. Although especially relevant to the determination of the skopos of the *Categories*, they seem to touch upon more general matters than the last three which are necessary to separate the skopos of the *Categories* from that of other treatises in logic. Perhaps it would be best to enumerate in order these steps before taking them up one by one. We may give first the four more general steps and then, second, the three more particular steps.

The first step is a dialectical disputation as to whether the skopos is things or thoughts or vocal sounds. Reasons from the text are given for each position.

The second step is resolution of this doubt or, at least, the first step in the resolution of this doubt. This step consists in seeing that there is an element of truth in each position or that the skopos of the *Categories* includes all three: things, thoughts and vocal sounds.

The third step consists in seeing that logic or the *Categories* can be about each of these or any one of them, only if the other two are brought in.

Thus, for example, logic or the *Categories* is about things only insofar as they are signified by vocal sounds through thoughts. Or it is about vocal sounds only insofar as they signify things through thoughts or insofar as they signify thoughts about things. Or it is about thoughts of things signified by vocal sounds.

The fourth step consists in seeing that the chief skopos is vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts.

The above four steps, although they are taken in regard to the skopos of the *Categories* and the questions in them are asked about the skopos of the *Categories*, could nevertheless be taken in regard to logic as a whole. One could ask, for example, whether logic is about things or thoughts or vocal sounds. The skopos or aim of a book is *what it is about*.

Since the *Categories* is the first book in logic by Aristotle that has come down to us, it is especially necessary to go through these more general steps in determining its skopos or what it is about. Further, these questions arise more forcefully in the case of the *Categories* than in any other treatise of logic. (For example, in what other treatise of logic would the commentator be more led to ask whether the book is about things than in the *Categories*?)

The next three steps taken by Ammonius and some of the other commentators are necessary to distinguish the skopos of the *Categories* from that found in other logical treatises and to limit that skopos to what can be accomplished within logic.

The first step is to separate the vocal sounds considered in the *Categories* from the principal ones considered in the *Peri Hermeneias* and in the *Prior Analytics* and the other books about the syllogism and the other forms of argument. The *Categories* is about simple vocal sounds whose parts do not signify anything by themselves while the statement or enunciation considered in the *Peri Hermeneias* and the syllogism and other kinds of argument considered in the *Prior Analytics* and the books following it are about speeches, that is, about vocal sounds having parts that signify something by themselves.

But a second step is necessary. Although the *Peri Hermeneias*, the *Prior Analytics* and the books following are chiefly about speeches or vocal sounds composite in their signification, these books also define those simple vocal sounds that make them up; as in the *Peri Hermeneias*, Aristotle not only defines the statement or enunciation, but also the simple vocal sounds that make up a statement - the noun and the verb. Here the Greek Commentators distinguish between the first placing of simple vocal sounds which is *upon things* from a second placing of simple vocal sounds which is *upon vocal sounds themselves*.

If we use the word *name* for any simple vocal sound (that is, a vocal sound not having parts that signify by themselves) and do not limit it to nouns, it can be said that we first place names upon things and then our reason comes back upon these names and recognizes some as nouns and some as verbs and hence puts names upon these names, calling some *nouns* and some *verbs*. The latter placing of names is called the *second* placing of names since we *first* place names upon things. The *Categories*, the Greek Commentators say, is about the first placing of names.

Combining the first step (which is more fully that the *Categories* is about simple vocal sounds signifying simple things through simple thoughts) with the second step, we now arrive at the position that the *Categories* is about the *first placing of simple vocal sounds signifying simple things through simple thoughts*. But such vocal sounds are not limited, and it is not possible in an art or science to go through the unlimited. Hence, it is necessary to limit the consideration of such vocal sounds and their signification to some number which can be done by considering what they signify generically (for there are only ten highest genera of what is signified by these names - substance, quantity etc.) This constitutes the third and perhaps last step in the determination of the skopos of the *Categories*.

All of the above seven steps are not found in all the Greek Commentators. Some steps are considered more fully by some than by others. Sometimes some of these steps are not under their consideration of the skopos, but under some other consideration, such as that of the title of the book (which naturally bears upon the skopos of the book).

Are these seven steps necessary in determining the skopos of the *Categories*? I do not think that one can understand well the skopos of the *Categories* without going through these seven steps. Some of these steps may not be fully explained or defended by the Greek Commentators. Questions could be raised about the sufficiency of their consideration of some of these steps (especially about the seventh step and perhaps the sixth step, and the fourth step may puzzle many).

We shall now go through each one of these steps, one by one. We shall go through each step, drawing upon various Greek Commentators in the explanation of each step. Further, in these seven steps, we shall bring in texts from Thomas Aquinas (and perhaps occasionally other Latin commentators) that seem to confirm or correct or complete what the Greeks say.

STEP ONE

The first step is a dialectical disputation as to whether the *Categories* is about things or vocal sounds or thoughts. Something can be said for and against each of these, especially the first two.

The division of beings in Chapter 2 would seem to be a division of things rather than thoughts or vocal sounds. The distinction between substance and accident is met here and this is a distinction between things. Later various accidents (e.g., quantity and quality etc.) are distinguished and this is also a distinction between things. The *Categories* then is about these things: substance, quantity, quality and so on.

On the other side, it is argued that the consideration of being as being (or thing as thing) belongs to wisdom or metaphysics (as is shown in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*) and not to logic. But the *Categories* belongs to logic.

The division of those said in Chapter 2 seems to be a division of vocal sounds. One part of this division is either an affirmation or a negation (as is clear from Chapter 4) which are species of enunciation or statement that is defined as a vocal sound in the *Peri Hermeneias*. Hence, the other member of the division (those said without any intertwining) must also be vocal sounds, especially since they are said in Chapter 4, not to be by themselves an affirmation or negation, but only by being combined or intertwined do they form an affirmation or negation. But if the latter are composite vocal sounds, what makes them up (those said without intertwining) must also be vocal sounds.

Further, it is said in Chapter 4 that "each of these said without intertwining signifies either substance or how much etc." But it is not things that *signify* (things are *signified*) but vocal sounds that signify. Hence, Aristotle is talking about vocal sounds when he speaks of those *said without intertwining*.

But the consideration of vocal sounds as vocal sounds belongs to grammar. It seems to be a lowering of the dignity of logic to say it is about vocal sounds.

In the beginning of Chapter 10, after he has considered substance, quantity etc., Aristotle refers to them as *genera*. Moreover, he gives rules for ordering genera, their species and differences, in Chapter 3. But genera, differences, species and other such universals would seem to be in the mind in our thoughts. Genus and species are differences in our thoughts, not differences in things. When I say that Socrates is a *man* and that he is an *animal*, *man* and *animal* do not differ as two things, but rather as a more general and a more particular thought of what Socrates is.

But the consideration of thoughts as such pertains to the third book *On the Soul*.

The above is a sample of the dialectical discussion of whether the skopos of the *Categories* is things or thoughts or vocal sounds. Each of these positions was held by some thinker *before* the Greek Commentators whose works we have.

If there is a part of the truth in each of the above three positions, it is good to have a dialectical discussion about them. For such a discussion will bring out those elements of the truth without making us think that anyone of them is the whole truth. Such a manuductio corresponds to the nature of our mind which, as Aristotle points out in the *Metaphysics*,¹ sees a part of the truth before it see the whole truth. Further, one man often sees one part of the truth and another man, another part of the truth, so that it is only through the efforts of many that the whole truth is eventually seen by later thinkers.

There is a text of Thomas Aquinas (pointed out by Msgr. Dionne) which seems to say that logic is about things, about the nature of things. The example in this text is also found in the treatise of the *Categories* in particular. The text also contrasts logic with grammar as is done in part of the dialectic above. Here is the text:

passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat...vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout grammaticus considerat.²

But there are also texts in Thomas from which someone might draw the conclusion that the *Categories* is about concepts or thoughts:

De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.³

Finally, there are texts in Thomas where he seems to say that the *Categories* is about simple *dictiones* which are vocal sounds:

Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro *Praedicamentorum* de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum *triplex* potest esse consideratio. *Una*

¹Book Two, Chapter 1

²In *II Sent.*, Dist. XXXV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 5

³In *I Peri Hermeneias*, Proemium, n. 2

quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinent ad librum *Praedicamentorum*....⁴

One might thus draw from different texts of Thomas some confirmation that there is an element of truth in each of the above positions discussed dialectically by the Greek Commentators. Hence, it is good to discuss each of these positions, trying to bring out the element of truth in each without exaggeration, by arguing dialectically for and against each.

THE SECOND STEP

The second, third and fourth steps pertain to the solution of the problem(s) raised by the dialectic of the first step. The second step is a natural result of perfecting the first step. Once the dialectic is perfected, the mind begins to see that there is an element or part of the truth in each of the three positions; the *skopos* of logic and of the *Categories* in particular must somehow involve all three: things, thoughts and vocal sounds. The text of Aristotle itself touches upon all three as brought out in the dialectic.

We have seen above that Thomas speaks of each of these three in different texts on logic, but we can consider more formally now whether Thomas thinks that logic is about all three in some way. This is the second step.

When Thomas paves the way for our consideration of logic in his two proemia to logic (his major proemium at the beginning of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* and his minor proemium at the beginning of his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias* - both of these proemia are a proemium to the whole of logic, especially the major one), he does not begin with the above three (things, thoughts and vocal sounds). Rather he begins by saying that logic is about three acts or operations of reason which he distinguishes. Further, in the major proemium especially, he brings out that logic is the art which directs these three acts. Logic is an art which helps reason order its own acts. From this starting-point, we can see how Thomas regards thoughts, vocal sounds and even things in some way as pertaining to the *skopos* of logic.

A fundamental text for seeing the connection in Thomas' mind between ordering the acts of reason and considering thoughts and vocal sounds is the following:

⁴In *I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio I, n. 5

Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae.⁵

If logic helps reason order its own acts, and reasons orders its own acts by ordering its own thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify them (as Thomas says here), then logic must consider thoughts and vocal sounds that signify them. Otherwise logic could not help reason order its own acts; for, as has been said, reason orders its own acts only by considering and ordering its own thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify them. If we want to help someone, we must first see what that one is doing. Hence, Thomas concludes that logic or rational philosophy must be about the order in our vocal sounds and in our thoughts if it is to bear upon the order which reason makes in its own act:

Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur, secundum...diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae...Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum adinvicem et ad conclusiones.⁶

Does Thomas see any connection between logic being about the acts of reason and being about things? There is a connection through the *intentions of reason*:

Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his, quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de *intentionibus* rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent.

Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, *sylogismum*, *enunciationem*, *praedicatum*, aut aliquid huiusmodi.⁷

In the first part of this text, Thomas sees a certain connection between logic and things through the intentions of reason *quae ad omnes res se habent*. But in the second part, he seems to deny that logic is about things. Albert the Great also sees logic as about intentions and not things, but in the very text where he says this, he sees that this consideration of intentions cannot be entirely divorced from things:

Quamvis enim logicus intentiones rerum considerat, et non res: principaliter tamen logicus intentiones considerat relatas ad res: et sic considerat res stantes sub intentionibus quas considerat.⁸

⁵In *I N. Ethicorum*, Lectio I, n. 1

⁶In *I N. Ethicorum*, Lectio I, n. 2

⁷In *I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171

Does Albert contradict himself when he says in the first sentence that the logician considers the intentions of things and *not* things and in the last sentence when he says that the logician considers things standing under the intentions which he considers? I think this would be a sophistical refutation of Albert based on the mistake of simply and in some respect. He denies that logic is about things and affirms that logic is about things standing under intentions. He admits that logic is about things in some way (*secundum quid*) and denies that it is about things simply (*simpliciter*, without any qualification or addition). Thomas also affirms that logic is about things in this way:

Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in Praedicamentis. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis...Sed Philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia.⁹

Here it is clear that logic is about things *in some way* (*secundum quid*), but the consideration of things as such belongs to the first philosopher (and the consideration of natural things as such to the natural philosopher, etc.). This is also clear from another text of Thomas:

Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei.¹⁰

What Thomas says here, that logic considers *modum praedicandi*, is reflected in the Latin words in the first part of logic, the *praedicabilia* and the *praedicamenta*. It is also seen in the Greek word that gives its name to the *Categories*.

STEP THREE

The third step consists in seeing that logic and the *Categories* in particular are not about one of these without reference to the other two. This is seen most clearly in the case of vocal sounds. The logician is not interested in vocal sounds as such, but only insofar as they signify. But what do they signify? They signify our thoughts about things or they signify things through our

⁸*Comm. In Priora Analytica*, Bk. II, Tract VII, Cap. X, Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, pp. 164b-165a

⁹*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1576

¹⁰*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1658

thoughts. The Greek Commentators point out with reason that the philosopher is not concerned with thoughts that have no foundation in things, that are not about things. Likewise, we can say that vocal sounds signify the things we want to know, as when we use the name of a thing in asking what it is. But vocal sounds signify things only through thoughts. Hence, when the logician speaks of vocal sounds, he must bring in explicitly or implicitly both thoughts and things.

This line of argument is fully in accord with the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas also insists that logic is interested in vocal sounds only insofar as they signify:

Sed quia Logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius; significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici.¹¹

Although Thomas says that vocal sounds signify immediately concepts or thoughts, they do not do so without reference to things at last. This part of Thomas' teaching is beautifully brought out in part of his explanation of why Aristotle says that vocal sounds signify the *passions* of the soul when by *passions* he means the conceptions or thoughts of reason:

Utitur autem potius nomine *passionum* quam *intellectuum*...quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam impressionis vel passionis.¹²

Since logic is ordered to knowing things, logic is interested in vocal sounds insofar as they signify things. But here it is even clearer that we must bring in thoughts also. For we name things insofar as we know them or have some thoughts of them. As Thomas says:

secundum autem quod res sunt nobis notae secundum hoc a nobis nominatur¹³

A sign of this is that the order in naming follows the order in knowing, not the order in things; for we name sensible things first etc. Further, it is not possible that vocal sounds signify things immediately:

Non enim potest esse quod significant immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen *homo* naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate

¹¹*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 13

¹²*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 16

¹³*In V Metaphysicorum*, Lect I, n. 751

hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam *ideam* hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.¹⁴

Thus if logic is about vocal sounds signifying things, it must also bring in what is between them - namely, thoughts.

If logic is about things in some way, it must consider them in reference to thoughts and vocal sounds. Logic cannot consider things as things for this is the task of wisdom or metaphysics. (Likewise, the matter of logic cannot be natural or political things as such.) The way logic considers things is exemplified in the first two definitions of Chapter 1 of the *Categories*. There we learn that things can be named equivocally or univocally. But it is impossible to consider things in this way without bringing in names and thoughts. For names are vocal sounds and whether a name is said equivocally or univocally of things depends upon the thought (or thoughts) we have in mind when saying the name of those things. If logic considers things as named, it must also consider them as known in some way - for we name things as we know them. And if we know them in some way, they must be in our mind. But they are not in our mind without our having some thought about them.

If logic is a tool for knowing things and things are known only when they are in our mind (logic is concerned with getting things into our mind), then logic must consider things insofar as they are in our mind. But they are in our mind when we think about them and have thoughts about them. Hence, if logic is about things in this way, it must also consider things in reference to our thoughts. But how could man or logic talk about our thoughts of things without using words? Albert the Great points this out:

ad scientiam incogniti per cognitum non devenitur, nisi per dispositum sermonem ad significandum, sive homo inquiret apud seipsum per interius dispositum sermonem, sive inquiret apud alium per sermonem exterius prolatam.¹⁵

Albert the Great also insists that logic must consider things insofar as they stand under words:

Et dicuntur univoca per oppositum modum ad aequivoca, res scilicet univocatae in nomine uno, ut res ipsa ad dici et ad sermonem referatur, quia aliter non esset logicum quod dicitur:

¹⁴Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 15

¹⁵*De Praedicamentis*, Tract I, Cap. I, ed. Doyon, p. 2

quia res in se considerata, non secundum quod stat sub dictione, non ad logicum, sed ad Philosophum pertinet.¹⁶

When we say that logic is about thoughts. we must be careful to keep it distinct from the study of the soul. The Greek Commentators point out that the consideration of thoughts as such belongs to the *De Anima*. This is why Aristotle is so brief in his consideration of thoughts in the *Peri Hermeneias* when he shows that written words signify vocal sounds, vocal sounds signify thoughts and the latter are likenesses of things. Aristotle excuses himself from a more lengthy consideration of thoughts which he says belongs to another consideration, that of the soul. Here is Thomas' commentary on the passage:

excusat se a diligentiori harum consideratione: quia quales sint animae passiones, et quomodo sunt rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro *De Anima*. Non enim hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, sed ad naturale.¹⁷

In what way then is logic about thoughts?

Logic helps reason to order its thoughts for the sake of knowing things. Reason must also order its thoughts when about to do or make something, but such an order of thoughts is not the concern of logic. If logic helps reason to order its thoughts for the sake of knowing *things*, then how can logic be about ordering our thoughts *without any reference to things*? Logic then must be about thoughts with some reference to things.

Likewise, is it possible for reason to order its thoughts without using vocal sounds to signify them? Reason doesn't even know clearly what it thinks before it expresses its thought in words. The Poet puts this well in the words of Miranda to Caliban:

.....I pitied thee
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
One thing or other; when thou didst not, savage,
Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
A thing most brutish, I endow'd thy purposes
With words that made them known.¹⁸

¹⁶*De Praedicamentis*, Tract I, Cap. III, ed. Doyon, p. 10a

¹⁷*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 22

¹⁸Shakspeare, *Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2

If reason could order its thoughts without using vocal sounds (like an angel), logic would not be about vocal sounds. But then we would not be animals with reason and there would be no need for logic.

This ends our consideration here of the third step. It adds to the second step, which was that the skopos includes things, thoughts and vocal sounds, the important clarification that it is about each of these three only in reference to each other or about each of them in reference to the other two.

STEP FOUR

Although logic is about things, thoughts and vocal sounds and it can talk about any of them in reference to the others, the Greek Commentators do not think that the logical treatises of Aristotle are equally about each of these in reference to the others. Rather they are unanimous in saying that these treatises (including the *Categories*) are about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*. They all put vocal sounds first as the genus in the definition of the skopos of the *Categories*.

The beginning for this consideration is the *Peri Hermeneias*. There Aristotle makes very clear that the book is about vocal sounds. In his proemium, he enumerates what he is going to consider in the book (noun, verb, negation, affirmation, enunciation and speech); and when he comes to define them, he puts vocal sound or voice (phone) that signifies by human agreement as the genus in each definition. The *proemium* and the division of the *tractatus* all revolve around vocal sounds, as Thomas explains:

Praemisso proemio, Philosophus accedit ad propositum exequendum. Et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt voces significativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de *significatione* vocum: et deinde de vocibus significativis determinat de quibus in proemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi, *Nomen ergo est vox significativa* etc.¹⁹

From this solid basis, one can argue in two ways that the other treatises of logic are also about vocal sounds that signify by agreement. One can reason from part to part, using the kind of argument called *example*. And one can argue that what is considered in the logic of the first act becomes a part of a statement and that statements make up syllogisms and other arguments,

¹⁹In *Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 11

considered in the logic of the third act. Hence, since statements are voices or vocal sounds, so also what are put together into statements or put together from statements, must also be vocal sounds.

I used to wonder how to translate the Greek word *logos* which is the genus in the definition of syllogism and the definition of definition. In particular, my question was whether Aristotle was defining the *logos* in words or the *logos* in the mind which was signified by those words. The solution I then gave was this. Aristotle is chiefly interested in the *logos* in the reason and only secondarily in the *logos* in words, insofar as the latter signifies the former. Hence, although the definition could be adapted easily to both according as we took either sense of *logos*, it should be taken as referring primarily to the *logos* in the reason and only secondarily as referring to the *logos* in words. Hence, when I translated the definition of syllogism into English, I would translate *logos* by *argument* (which is or could be something in reason) rather than by *speech* which in English names the *logos* in words. Likewise, in translating the definition of definition, I would try to avoid translating by *speech* which would again limit it to the *logos* in words. But here I had difficulty in finding one word (as I had found the word *argument* to translate *logos* in the definition of syllogism). I experimented with clumsy circumlocutions like *a composition of thoughts* etc.

I now think that these former attempts to translate the genus in the definitions of definition and syllogism were mistaken. Further, I have come to think that the reason I gave for translating in that way, has a fundamental defect in it.

One could argue against my attempts at translation first by the argument called *example*. The definitions of syllogism, definition and statement all have as their first part or genus the word *logos*. If I was correct in trying to translate *logos* as the *logos* in reason in the definitions of syllogism and definition, then likewise, I should translate *logos* in the definition of statement as *in reason*. But Aristotle in the *Peri Hermeneias* defines the *logos* in the definition of statement as a voice or vocal sound (*phione*), not as a thought or combination of thoughts. Hence, there was something wrong in my attempted translation and, consequently, in the reason I gave for so translating.

Further, since a syllogism is made up of statements, one could also reason from statement being in vocal sounds to syllogism being something in vocal sounds, a speech. Even though we give the statement or enunciation another name when it becomes part of the syllogism, corresponding to its new status as a premiss (in Latin this is *propositio*) the premiss is still a statement. As Albert states:

propositio et enuntiatio non differant secundum substantiam et secundum id quod sunt propositio et enuntiatio, differunt tamen secundum esse, et secundum intentiones nominum.²⁰

Hence, I was wrong in not translating *logos* in the definition of syllogism as *speech* or some other word indicating it was something in vocal sounds (or in not understanding *argument* as something in vocal sounds). Consequently, too there was something wrong in the reason why I tried to translate in this way.

If the *logos* in both the definitions of statement and syllogism is a vocal sound (in particular, a speech), why not also the *logos* in the definition of definition? Indeed, if statements and syllogisms are sometimes made out of definitions, and the former are vocal sounds, so too must the definitions out of which they are made. But there are also other reasons for thinking that Aristotle is defining the definition in words.

When Aristotle is teaching us how to define in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*, he gives us a warning not to define by metaphors (end of Chapter 12). Since the metaphor is a word, he could hardly give this warning if the definition was not in words. But words are vocal sounds. Hence, the *logos* in the definition of definition is that vocal sound or voice called a *speech*.

Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, gives this definition of definition:

definitio est oratio significans quod quid est²¹

This definition has three parts as does Aristotle's definition of definition at the beginning of Chapter 5 of Book One of the *Places* (*Topics*). The three parts of each definition clearly corresponds to each other. But we are here concerned only with the first part of the definition, the genus in each. Where Aristotle has *logos*, Thomas has *oratio*. But *oratio* (being connected with *oro* and *os*, meaning mouth) corresponds to *speech* in English, just as *orator* does to *speaker*. It is significant that in the translation of *logos* in the definition of definition (and for that matter, in the definitions of statement and syllogism) into Latin, Thomas uses *oratio* rather than *ratio*. The former (*oratio*) refers more to speech and vocal sounds while the latter (*ratio*) can refer more to thought.

In the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*, when he discusses definition, Aristotle also calls it a *logos* (at the beginning of Chapter 10, 1034b 20). The

²⁰*Commentaria in Liber I Priorum Analyticorum*, Tractatus I, Caput II, ed. Doyon, p. 4r

²¹*In II Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio II, n. 419

Latin translation used by Thomas does not use *oratio* here, but *ratio* which word surely lends itself to an understanding of definition as something in thoughts. But notice how Thomas in his commentary on this passage does not understand it this way:

Dicit ego primo, quod omnis "definitio est quaedam ratio", idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata.

Unum enim nomen non potest esse definitio, quia definitio oportet quod distincte notificet principia rerum quae concurrunt ad essentiam rei constituendam; alias autem definitio non sufficienter manifestaret essentiam rei.

Et propter hoc dicitur in primo *Physicorum*, quod definitio dividit "definitum in singulare", idest exprimit distincte singula principia definiti. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi per plures dictiones: unde una dictio non potest esse definitio, sed potest esse manifestativa eo modo, quo nomen minus notum manifestatur per magis notum.

Omnis autem ratio partes habet, quia est quaedam oratio composita et non simplex nomen.²²

If then the other logical treatises are about vocal sounds, it is reasonable (reasoning from part to part) to say, as do all the Greek Commentators, that the *Categories* is about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*.

Further, we can argue as Porphyry does (and many of the Commentators following him) from what Aristotle says after he has said that each of those said without intertwining signifies either substance or quantity etc. After this, he says²³ that none of those said without intertwining by itself is said in an affirmation, but that by intertwining affirmation or negation comes to be. But affirmation and negation are defined in the *Peri Hermeneias* as vocal sounds or voices. Hence, what makes them up must be the same.

One could also reason from definition being a composition of names ordered by reason. Since what are considered in the *Categories* are used in definition, they must be names and hence vocal sounds.

Thus, we can agree with the fourth step of the Greek Commentators, that the *Categories* is about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*.

The defect in the reason that led us to think that Aristotle was defining what is in reason rather than what is in words is not hard to see. Even though thoughts are more important than vocal sounds and vocal sounds are for the

²²In *VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 1460

²³Chapter 4, 2a 5-10

sake of thoughts, it does not follow that logical treatises are about thoughts except in the way indicated in steps two and three. If you ask me what is a smile?" or "What is a frown?" I would put in my definition first that it is a facial expression that signifies. Then I would add the emotion or feeling which a smile or a frown signifies. Suppose mirth or merriment is what a smile signifies. Mirth may be more important than a smile and a smile may be for the sake of signifying mirth. But yet the genus of smile is not mirth or merriment, but a facial expression signifying the same. There is in the face a sign of what is within us.

Thomas Aquinas has written a treatise on the sacraments. The genus of a sacrament is *sign* in its first meaning (a sensible sign). Strictly speaking, the seven sacraments are not seven *graces*, but seven signs signifying and causing seven graces (if there is no impediment). In defining sacrament as a sign, Thomas is not saying that sensible signs are more important than graces or denying that these sensible signs are for the sake of the graces that they cause. Likewise we are not maintaining that vocal sounds are more important than thoughts or denying that they signify and are for the sake of thoughts. Just as sacraments are both tools and signs, so also the vocal sounds considered by the logician are both tools and signs. Perhaps we should develop a bit this double aspect with the help of some texts of Thomas.

In the following passage, Thomas gives us a good summary of the centuries old teaching that logic is not studied for its own sake, but is a tool and about tools:

scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio *Metaphysicorum*, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa.

Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias.

Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad eam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus.

Unde secundum Boetium in *Comment. super Porphyrium* (L. 1, cap. 3) non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.²⁴

[adminiculum: I a prop, a support, *the pole on which the vine is trained* I Transf. aid help]

²⁴In *Boetii de Trinitate*, Lectio II, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2

Thomas teaches us clearly that speech and its parts can be used as instruments or tools:

ratio potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus quasi instrumentis.²⁵

The use of speech and its parts as tools or instruments is not considered entirely by logic. There are, for example, speeches such as commands, prayers etc. which are tools used by reason to get someone to do something. Logic is not concerned with the use of speech and its parts for such purposes. But before we go further along this line, we must consider how speech and its parts are to be defined as instruments or tools of reason:

oratio, quamvis non sit instrumentum alicuius virtutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumentum rationis, ut supra dictum est.

Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine, qui est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut et omnis vocis significativae, est significare conceptionem intellectus....

duae autem sunt operationes intellectus, in quarum una non invenitur veritas vel falsitas, in alia autem invenitur verum et falsum. Et ideo orationem enunciativam definit ex significatione veri et falsi, dicens quod *non omnis oratio est enunciativa, sed in qua verum vel falsum est...*

Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse verum et falsum, sicut in *signo* intellectus veri vel falsi: sed sicut *in subiecto* est verum vel falsum in mente, ut dicitur in libro *Praedicamentorum*, ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est.²⁶

Here we see that speech is a tool of reason insofar as it signifies. Hence, statement and definition are defined by what they signify. Likewise the parts of speech and, in particular, those said without any intertwining (the subject of the *Categories*) are defined by what they signify or how they signify. (Notice by the way how vocal sounds, thoughts and in a more remote way things enter into the discussion of statement above.)

It is difficult, if not impossible, for reason to use a tool that is not sensible. The teacher uses vocal sounds as a tool to order the thoughts of the student. But even when a man tries to order his own thoughts by himself, he needs to use vocal sounds even if he only imagines them in his head.

STEP FIVE

²⁵*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio VI, n. 81)

²⁶Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermeneias*. lectio VII, nn. 83-84

The *skopos* of the *Categories* so far has been determined in a general way that does not distinguish it from the *skopos* of other logical treatises. For every logical treatise is in some way about vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts. Hence, the part of the determination of the *skopos* that we have seen so far is proportional to the first part of Aristotle's determination of the *skopos* of the *Metaphysics* or wisdom in which he shows that wisdom is about causes. This is common to wisdom and other forms of reasoned-out knowledge. The part of the determination of the *skopos* of the *Categories* beginning with Step Five will separate the *skopos* of the *Categories* from that of other logical treatises. This is proportional to the second part of Aristotle's determination of the *skopos* of wisdom where he shows that it is about the *first cause*, thus separating it from all other forms of reasoned-out knowledge. (We should note that the *skopos* in the *Metaphysics* is not the subject of wisdom, but its goal. Further, in the *Metaphysics* we are concerned with the *skopos* of one whole reasoned-out knowledge while in the *Categories* we are concerned with the *skopos* of one part of a reasoned-out knowledge)

There is an interesting text of Thomas where he enumerates the chief subjects of the three parts of logic which correspond to the three acts of reason:

Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, *sylogismum*, *enunciationem*, *praedicatum*, vel aliquid huiusmodi.²⁷

The syllogism is without doubt the principal subject of the logic of the third act of reason (which is reasoning). Indeed, someone might say that it is the principal subject of logic as a whole:

Inter species autem argumentationis praecipua est syllogismus. Propter quod quidam dixerunt quod logica tota est de syllogismo et partibus syllogismi: determinantes commune subjectum logicae secundum id quod est subjectum principale.²⁸

There are, of course, other species of argumentation (*species* is here used *communiter loquendo*) considered in the logic of the third act, but the principal one is the syllogism:

De his vero quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat in libro *Priorum* et in consequentibus in quibus agitur de syllogismo *simpliciter* et diversis

²⁷In *I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171

²⁸Albert the Great, *De Praedicabilibus*, Tract. I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 8r

syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud.²⁹

There is no difficulty in seeing that the subject of the logic of the second act of reason is the enunciation or statement:

De his quae vero pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat Philosophus in libro *Peri Hermeneias*.³⁰

But does St. Thomas think that *praedicatum* is the chief subject of the logic of the first act?

Someone might challenge the interpretation of the above text of Thomas on the subject of logic and assert that, after having enumerated the chief subjects of the third and second acts (syllogism and enunciation), he was not also stating the chief subject of the logic of the first act when he adds *praedicatum*. But why should he give the chief subjects of the third and second acts, but not of the first?

A student of Albert the Great might question making *praedicatum* the chief subject of the logic of the first act for two reasons. First, if the first act of reason is perfected by definition, and hence there is a consideration of definition in the logic of the first act (as Albert teaches, even though such a part has not come down to us from Aristotle) then it would be definition that is the principal subject of the logic of the first act. Second, in talking about the *Categories* and the *Isagoge*, Albert uses the words *praedicamentum* and *praedicabile* respectively, not *praedicatum* (which he uses more to name the four problems of the *Topics*)

In his two *Proemia* to logic, Thomas speaks only of the *Categories* belonging to the logic of the first act. In the minor proemium:

De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.³¹

And in the major proemium:

Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur

²⁹St. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in Libros Peri Hermeneias*, Liber I. Proemium, Marietti ed., n. 2

³⁰Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Proemium n. 2

³¹*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Proemium, n. 2

informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.³²

However, someone might respond that Thomas here is speaking only of the books of Aristotle that have come down to us and is not determining the question of what is the chief subject of the logic of the first act. There are many texts where Thomas does link definition with the first act. Here are three such texts:

sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secunda, enuntiatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio.³³

The understanding however forms two things by two of its operations. For by its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by its operation in which it composes and divides, it forms a statement or something of this kind.³⁴

veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in primo, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid.³⁵

Did Aristotle write a book on definition for the logic of the first act and it has been lost? Or did he never get around to writing such a book? Or did he think the consideration of definition in Book II of the *Posterior Analytics* and in the *Topics* (esp. Book VI) sufficient and another consideration in the logic of the first act superfluous?

We cannot consider here whether there should be a consideration of definition in the logic of the first act. But without saying whether Thomas thinks there is or is not such a consideration, we can say that in the logic of the first act that has come down to us from Aristotle the subject of the *Categories* is a *praedicatum* according to St. Thomas. And if we understand *praedicatum* in a restricted sense, we are very close to determining the subject of the *Categories*. A principal text from St. Thomas on this restricted sense of

³²*In I Post. Analyticorum*, Proemium, n. 4

³³*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2

³⁴*In I Super Iohannem*, Lect 1, n. 25

³⁵*In I Sent.*, Q. V. Art I, Ad 7

praedicatum is found in his commentary on the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* :

cum praedicatur accidens de subiecto, non praedicatur per aliquod aliud subiectum; cum autem praedicatur subiectum de accidente, vel accidens de accidente, fit praedicatio ratione eius quod subiicitur termino posito in subiecto; de quo quidem praedicatur aliud accidens accidentaliter, ipsa vero species subiecti essentialiter.

Et quia in quolibet praedictorum modorum utimur nomine *praedicationis*, et sicut possumus nomina ponere, ita possumus ea restringere; imponamus sic nomina in probatione sequenti, ut *praedicari* solum dicamus illud, quod dicitur hoc modo, scilicet non ratione alterius subiecti.

Illud vero quod dicitur illo modo, scilicet ratione alterius subiecti, velut cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, vel accidens de accidente, non dicatur praedicari, vel si dicatur praedicari, non dicitur praedicari *simpliciter*, sed *secundum accidens*.

Et accipiamus semper illud, quod se habet per modum *albi*, ex parte praedicati, id autem, quod se habet per modum *ligni*, accipiat ex parte subiecti.

Hoc ergo supponamus praedicari semper, in probatione sequenti, quod praedicatur de eo, de quo praedicatur *simpliciter*, et non *secundum accidens*. Et ratio quare debemus sic uti vocabulo praedicationis, haec est: quia loquimur in materia demonstrativa, demonstrationibus autem non utuntur nisi talibus praedicationibus.

Deinde cum dicit: *Quare autem in quod* etc., ostendit differentiam praedicatorum *per se* ad invicem.

Et circa hoc duo facit: primo distinguit praedicata ad invicem secundum diversa genera; secundo, ostendit differentiam praedicatorum: ibi: *Amplius substantiam quidem* etc.

Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nos praedicari dicimus solum illud, quod praedicatur non secundum aliud subiectum, hoc autem diversificatur secundum decem praedicamenta; sequitur quod omne quod sic praedicatur, praedicetur aut *in quod quid est*, idest per modum *substantialis* praedicati, aut per modum *qualis*, vel *quantis* vel alicuius alterius praedicamentorum, de quibus actum est in *Praedicamentis*.³⁶

St. Thomas also uses the word *praedicatum* in this restricted sense in one of the principal texts where he explains briefly the distinction of predicates according to the ten categories or praedicaments:

Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum *tripliciter* se potest habere..

³⁶Lectio XXXIII, nn. 281-283

Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.

Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quae quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute...vel inest ei non absolute...

Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum...³⁷

In a rough way, then, we may say with Thomas that *praedicatum* or some kind of *praedicatum* is the subject of the *Categories*. But how would we define this *praedicatum* or predicate and how would it differ from the chief or principal subject of the other acts (enunciation and syllogism)?

If the subject of every logical treatise is a vocal sound, then the *Categories* must also be about a vocal sound. Hence, *praedicatum* must be a vocal sound. But it is not a speech or *oratio*, a vocal sound having parts that signify by themselves. It is rather a name (*nomen*) than a speech (*oratio*), as Thomas seems to indicate in discussing a position of Avicenna on the predicates found in the genera of accidents:

Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamento dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, in quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum.³⁸

The *praedicatum* then, which is the subject of the *Categories* is a *name*. More precisely it is a *name said of many things univocally* (in the sense of Chapter 1 of the *Categories*). But we need not explain or defend the whole of this definition of *praedicatum* now. Knowing the genus *name* is sufficient for separating the skopos of the *Categories* from that of the chief subjects of the logic of the second and third acts. Both enunciation or statement and syllogism are clearly speeches or vocal sounds composite in their signification or vocal sounds having parts that signify by themselves; but name is a vocal sound simple in its signification. This difference is also sufficient to separate *praedicatum* from the other kinds of argumentation considered in the logic of the third act. It also separates *praedicatum* from definition (wherever one puts it in logic) since a definition is also a speech.

³⁷In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, nn. 891-892

³⁸In *V Metaphysicorum*., Lectio IX, n. 894

STEP SIX

To say that the *Categories* is about vocal sounds whose parts do not signify anything by themselves separates the subject of the *Categories* from the principal subjects in the logic of the second and third acts which have parts that signify something by themselves. But since in considering statement and syllogism, we also consider parts of them which do not have or need not have parts that signify by themselves (such as noun and verb in the statements and term in the syllogism), it is also necessary to consider the difference between the simple vocal sounds belonging to the treatise of the *Categories* and those treated of in the books on statement and the syllogism. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes them thus:

Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro *Praedicamentorum* de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum *triplex* potest esse consideratio.

Una quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum *Praedicamentorum*.

Alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significant aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt *enunciationem*.

Tertio modo, considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinantur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro *Priorum*.³⁹

This is similar to a distinction which is made in practical philosophy. What a man should do belongs to three considerations and treatises: ethics, domestics and politics. We can say at first that ethics is about what an individual man should do while domestics is about what the family should do and politics about what the city or nation should do. And because an individual man is not a community of men as is a city or the family, we have distinguished the principal subject of these sciences. But since domestics and politics also consider what individual men should do (for example, what a father or a king or a citizen should do), it is necessary further to distinguish what the difference is between ethics and domestics and politics when they talk about what one man should do. And there we find a distinction proportional to that above. Ethics considers what one man

³⁹*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio I, n. 5

should do considered absolutely or simple as a man (rather than a beast or angel). Domestic considers what one man should do as a part of the family and, hence, as a father or a son. Politics considers one man insofar as he is apart of the city such as a king or a legislator or merely a citizen.

The Greek Commentators also address themselves to this question, but in a more particular way and with a different distinction. They aim mainly at distinguishing between the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* and in the *Peri Hermeneias*. The distinction they see is between the *first placing* of names and the *second placing* of names. We must first understand this distinction and, second, see whether it is sufficient to distinguish the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* and the *Peri Hermeneias*. A third consideration will then be necessary to see if this distinction is useful or sufficient for separating the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from all other considerations of simple vocal sounds in logic.

It is easy to misunderstand what the Greek Commentators mean here by the *first* and *second placing* of names. There are, indeed, at least three ways in which we can speak of a first and second placing of names. In two of these, we speak of the first and second placing of the *same* name.

We sometimes place a name upon one thing and then carry over this same name and place it upon another thing in reference to the first. Thus the name *road* is placed upon the pavement over which we walk or drive. And because when we walk or drive down this pavement, one part comes *before* or *after* another; we carry over this name *road* and place it upon the before and after in our knowledge which has a certain likeness to the original road.

A second way in which we could understand the first and second placing of names is this. We first place a name upon a thing and then second, we place that name in a statement. And when we place the statement in a syllogism (in Latin, they are named from this placing *propositiones*), the same name has consequently been placed a third time as a major or a middle or a minor term.

A third meaning of the *first and second placing* of names is the one used by the Greek Commentators here. In the beginning, there were no names, but there were things. Then man placed names upon things, calling this a *man* and that a *horse* etc. This is the first placing of names, the placing of names upon things. Then man, by a second consideration, came back over the names of things and called some of them *nouns* and some of them *verbs*, depending upon whether they signified with time or without time.

Boethius, following the Greek Commentators, explains it thus:

prius breviter hujus operis aperienda videtur intentio, quae est hujusmodi: rebus praejacentibus, et in propria principaliter naturae constitutione manentibus, humanum solum genus exstitit, quod rebus nomina possit imponere. Unde factum est ut sigillatim omnia prosecutus hominis animis singulis vocabula rebus aptaret. Et hoc quidem, verbi gratia, corpus, hominem vocavit, illud vero lapidem, aliud lignum, aliud vero colorem. Et rursus quicumque ex se alium genuisset, patris vocabulo nuncupavit. Mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis terminavit, ut diceret bipedale esse, aut tripedale, et in aliis eodem modo.

Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis, ad ipsorum rursus vocabulorum proprietates figurasque reversus est, et hujusmodi vocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen vocavit; quae vero temporibus distribui, verbum.

Prima igitur illa fuit nominum positio, per quam vel intellectui subjecta vel sensibus designaret. Secunda consideratio, qua singulas proprietates nominum figurasque perspicerent, ita ut primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum: ut, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo dicatur. Quod autem ipsum vocabulum, idest homo, nomen vocatur, non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur, sed ad figuram, idcirco quod possit casibus inflecti.

Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram:

et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designaretur...

In hoc igitur opere haec intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et de vocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt...

Est igitur hujus operis intentio de vocibus res significantibus, in eo quod significantes sunt pertractare.⁴⁰

If we compare these three senses of the first and second placing of names. we can see that in the first two, it is the *same* name that is placed first, second and sometimes more. But in the third sense, it is not the same name that is placed. Rather one name is placed upon a thing and then *another* name is placed upon the first name. The name *dog*, for example, is placed upon the familiar four-footed animal. And then *another* name, *noun* is placed upon the name *dog*. But in the first and third senses, we speak also of a first and second *placing upon (impositio)* of names, but not in the second sense.

Having seen which meaning of the *first and second placing of names* the Greek Commentators and Boethius have in mind, we can ask whether this distinction is sufficient to separate the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from that in the *Peri Hermeneias*.

⁴⁰In *Categorias Aristotelis*, Liber Primus, in PL, Vol. 64, pp 159-160

This distinction does help us to separate the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from that in the *Peri Hermeneias* if we say that the *Categories* is about names like *substance*, *quantity* and *quality* and the *Peri Hermeneias* is about names like *noun* and *verb*. Names like *substance*, *quantity* and *quality* are names of things or names placed upon things while names like *noun* and *verb* are names of names or names placed upon names.

Yet using this distinction does raise certain questions. The first question is about how this distinction can be used at all within logic to distinguish between various parts of logic; and the second question is, assuming that this distinction can be used within logic, whether it is the best way of separating the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from that in the *Peri Hermeneias*.

One rare place where Thomas makes a similar distinction is in his commentary on the *Sentences* :

Nec tamen hoc nomen "ratio" significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen "definitio", et alia nomina secundae impositionis.

Et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. Non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo.⁴¹

Here Thomas distinguishes between *nomen rei* and *nomen rationis*. We might also call the *nomen rationis* here a *nomen intentionis* ("ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis") Finally, he puts names that signify the intention of a concept like *definition* among *nomina secundae impositionis*. Would then a *nomen rei* be called a *nomen primae impositionis*?

It is important to see that when St. Thomas here uses the phrase *nomina secundae impositionis*, he is not referring to the *secunda impositio* of one and the same name. He is making a distinction similar to that above in the third meaning of *first and second placing* of a name, but the second placing here is the placing of a name upon an intention rather than upon a name.

We may now approach our first problem or question:

⁴¹*In I Sent.* Dist. II, Q. I, Art. III, Ad 1 & 2

aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectis⁴²

If other sciences are about things and about intentions, to which of these two groups does logic belong? Thomas seems to touch upon the answer here:

Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis: logica etiam erit de his, quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de *intentionibus* rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis.⁴³

Hence, it would seem that all the names belonging to logical treatises would be names of intentions rather than of things even though these intentions have a remote foundation in things. All names in logic would seem to be like the word *genus* :

Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et huiusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum huius nominis "genus" non est similitudo alicujus rei extra anima existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et huiusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. et similiter est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et huiusmodi.⁴⁴

If logic is about intentions and not things, then the names considered in logical treatises should be names of intentions and not names of things. There is an interesting example of the reverse case objected to in the article on the definition of *person* in the *Summa Theologiae* :

3. Praeterea nomen intentionis non debet poni in definitione rei. Non enim esset bona assignatio, si quis diceret, *homo est species animalis*: *homo* enim est nomen rei, et *species* est nomen intentionis. Cum igitur *persona* sit nomen rei (significat enim substantiam quandam rationalis naturae), inconvenienter *individuum* quod est nomen intentionis, in eius definitione ponitur...

Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia substantiales differentiae non sunt nobis notae, vel etiam nominatae non sunt, oportet interdum uti differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium, puta si quis diceret: *ignis est corpus simplex, calidum et siccum*: accidentia enim propria sunt effectus formarum substantialium, et manifestant eas.

⁴²*Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput XI

⁴³*In I Post. Anal.*, Lectio XX, n. 171

⁴⁴*In I Sent.* Dist. II, Q. I, Art. III, Ad 2

Et similiter nomina intentionum possunt accipi ad definendum res, secundum quod accipiuntur pro aliquibus nominibus rerum quae non sunt posita. Et sic hoc nomen *individuum* ponitur in definitione personae, ad designandum modum subsistendi qui competit substantiis particularibus.⁴⁵

Can we accept then what the Greek Commentators and Boethius say about the *Categories*, that it is about names placed on things? These commentators are not saying the reverse of what Thomas says in the above reply; that is, they are not saying that we are using names of things because we lack names of intentions. Rather they are simply saying that we are talking about names of things without any mention of intentions.

We have seen above in the Second Step that logic is about things *secundum quid* and that *principaliter logicus intentiones considerat relatas ad res*, but these two truths do not seem sufficient for a whole treatise in logic to be chiefly about names of things rather than of intentions.

But logic considers the common way of proceeding in reasoned-out knowledge. And in every reasoned-out knowledge, we place names upon things. Hence, the placing of names upon things belongs to the consideration of logic.

Yet to this someone might object that it perhaps belongs to logic to consider how we place names upon things, but the actual placing of names upon things belongs to the reasoned-out knowledge that considers those things. It belongs to political philosophy, for example, to place names upon the various kinds of government or to consider the names which have been placed upon various kinds of government; and to ethics, to place names upon the various virtues and vices or to consider the names which have been placed upon them.

We must now try to untie these difficulties. We have seen before that logic is not about things *simpliciter*. It is not true to say that logic is about things unless we qualify this or add to it some diminution, for logic is about things only *secundum quid*. Nevertheless, logic is ordered to knowing things. Further, as Albert says, although logic considers intentions and not things, it nevertheless considers intentions chiefly as related to things. Finally we have pointed out that logical treatises are about vocal sounds and the first part of logic about names. Our solution of these difficulties must start from these truths.

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from logic being ordered to a knowledge of things (without being itself a knowledge of these things). The logic of the third act would not be interested in syllogisms and

⁴⁵Prima Pars, Q. 29, Art. 1, Obj. 3 and Ad 3

other arguments if these were not useful for knowing things. Likewise, the logic of the second act would not be interested in statements if statements were not about things, if statements were not true or false because of the way things are. Finally the logic of the first act would not be interested in names if we did not place names upon things or if things were not named by us. Always *there is some order to knowing things* in everything considered by the logician.

Since logic's order to knowing things is seen most easily in the logic of the third act, the logic of arguments; and the logic of the second act is ordered to the third act, and the logic of the first act to the second; we can reason from the interest in things in the third act to that in the second and from there to the first. If a syllogism or other argument is to bear upon things, then the statements composing it must be about things. And if a statement is going to be about things, the names in the statement must be placed upon things.

If we do not place names upon things, we cannot make statements about things. And if we cannot make statements about things, we cannot reason about things.

If the logic of the first act is about names (the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*), it must be about names of things in some way. It must consider names said of things or names placed upon things or even the placing of names upon things. If names were considered without any reference to things, the logic of the first act would lose any order to knowing things. Consequently the whole of logic would be cut off from any reference to things.

But in what way and to what extent can logic be concerned about the placing of names upon things? Does its concern extend to how we place names upon things? And if it does, is that the limit of its consideration? Or does it also distinguish the names placed upon things?

The famous question discussed in the *Cratylus*, whether names are placed upon things by nature or by human agreement, is to this part of logic like the question of innate knowledge is to the *Posterior Analytics*. Perhaps it is a fundamental principle in this part of logic that names are placed upon things by convention and not by nature.

Since logic is order to reasoned-out knowledge which is a knowledge of the universal and not of the singular as such, it is clearly interested in names said of many things rather than in names said of only one individual. Hence, it makes this distinction and proceeds to consider names said of many things. Can logic make this distinction? Yes if it is based on the distinction of universal and individual, a distinction in intentions.

When logic takes up *name said of many things*, it distinguishes between names said univocally and names said equivocally and names said proportionally, of many things. This is also a distinction that logic is able to make because it is based upon the intentions of these names or their ratios.

Logic is not so much interested in the name said of many things (purely) equivocally. For such names are said of many things by chance and no reasoned-out knowledge is about what is by chance. Hence, the consideration of names said of many things by chance is extremely brief (as is the consideration of accidental being in Book VI of the *Metaphysics*). Further, such names are not useful in coming to know one meaning from the other, as is the proportional name. Moreover, men are rarely if ever deceived by the equivocation of such names in universal matters (as they are by the equivocation by design of proportional names).

We shall leave for another occasion what logic can say about names said proportionally of many things.

The *Isagoge* of Porphyry enables us to divide *name said of many things univocally* in a way that is clearly within the ability of logic. Every name said of many things univocally signifies either their genus or their difference or their species or their property or an accident of them. This distinction is again based on the intentions which logic considers (chiefly as related to things).

In the *Isagoge*, we learn how the same thing can be a genus and a species, but in comparison to what is below and what is above it. Then we learn that there is a genus which is not a species and a species which is not a genus, that there is a highest genus and a lowest species. In the *Categories*, we learn the names of the highest genera which turn out to be ten in number. But can the placing of names upon things in logic extend so far as to take up even the names placed upon the ten highest genera? This is possible only if these ten are distinguished by something proper to logic's consideration. What is proper to logic's consideration is brought out well by Thomas:

Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei. Unde quicquid respondetur ad quid est, dicit pertinere ad quod quid est; sive illud sit intrinsecum, ut materia et forma; sive sit extrinsecum, ut agens et finis. Sed Philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse. Unde si dicamus, domus est aliquid prohibens a frigore et caumate, logice loquendo significatur quod quid erat esse, non autem secundum considerationem Philosophi.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ In *VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1658

A beautiful distinction of the way of logic and the way of natural philosophy is that the former proceeds *per viam praedicationis* and the latter *per viam motus*:

Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae. Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicta praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicentur, et unicuique eorum quae de "ipso praedicantur," idest diversa quidditas et essentia.⁴⁷

And this is necessary for distinguishing diverse genera in logic:

Hic ostendit quot modis dicuntur aliqua diversa genere; et ponit duos modos respondententes ultimis duobus modis generis...

Primo igitur modo dicuntur aliqua genere diversa, quia eorum primum subiectum est diversum. sicut primum subiectum coloris est superficies, primum autem subiectum saporis est humor...

Alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicuntur "secundum diversam figuram categoriae", idest praedicationis entis...

Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.⁴⁸

And in another passage:

ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi...Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi."⁴⁹

We are about at the limit of the consideration of logic in distinguishing names placed upon things. The species of these highest genera cannot be distinguished by diverse modes of predication. And, hence, Aristotle, for the most part, does not in the *Categories* divide these highest genera into their species with the notable exception of quantity and quality. But why he names the species into which quantity and quality are first divided is not necessary to our consideration of the skopos of the *Categories*. (A clue to this is perhaps found in the comparisons Thomas Aquinas makes of these with the distinction of the meanings of these names in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*.)

⁴⁷Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, nn. 1287-1289

⁴⁸Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphys*, Lectio XXII, n. 1124-1127

⁴⁹Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphys*, Lectio IX, n. 890

STEP SEVEN

We have really covered Step Seven in the last step in seeing how far the logician can go in distinguishing names placed upon things without stepping into some other reasoned-out knowledge.

The Greek Commentators do not, I think, develop enough the reason for this limitation of logic's consideration of names placed upon things. Some of them seem to be content to say that no reasoned-out knowledge can consider the unlimited and the multitude of names placed upon things are without any limit. This is insufficient because the logician could draw the limit somewhere else further on than he does if there was not some reason why logic is limited here.

The limit of the logician's distinction would seem to be based upon his proceeding *per viam praedicationis*. The Greek Commentators seem to say rightly that logic is concerned with some names placed upon things, but without seeing precisely how it is able to do this in a way proper to logic or from beginnings proper to logic. Hence, they perhaps do not see fully why its consideration of names placed upon things is limited and why the limits come where they do.

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