

CHAPTER THREE OF THE CATEGORIES

Chapter Three contains three statements which govern the ordering of genera and species and their differences under the highest genera. Cajetan in his commentary sees the title of this book to mean either the ten highest genera or the praedicamental orders of which these ten are the heads or beginnings:

Nomen libri est Categoriae, id est praedicamenta, id est coordinationes decem generum, vel ipsa decem genera, quae capita sunt coordinationum: de his enim tractat liber hic.¹

The first statement is this: When something is said of another as a subject, whatever is said of the predicate will also be said of the subject.

The words *as a subject* in this statement must be understood of essential predication (according to Cajetan) or univocal predication in the narrow sense (according to Simplicius). And indeed Aristotle's example confirms this understanding. When *man* is said of a *particular man* and *animal* is said of *man*, will not *animal* also be said of the particular man.

If we understand this said of another *as a subject* to mean *by univocal predication* as in the definition of things named univocally in the first chapter, the first statement is saying that what is said of the predicate signifies also in a general way what the subject is. If Socrates is a man (that is what he is) and man is an animal (that is what man is in general), then animal also in an even more general way says what Socrates is. And this will be true all the way up to the highest genus, so that Socrates is a living body, a body and a substance.

It is not difficult to see that this first statement is the beginning of the order in each category from the highest genus through the species immediately under it to those under the immediate species and so on down to the lowest species and even the individuals at the bottom.

The second and third statements are about the differences whereby the genera are divided and their species distinguished.

¹ *De Praedicamentis*, ed. Doyon, p. 5

The second statement is that the differences of other genera, and which are not ordered under one another, are other in kind. One animal may differ from another by being two-footed, but one science does not differ from another by being two-footed.

It is important to note (as Albert and Cajetan do) that the words *not ordered under one another* must be understood to include not only the case where one genus is under another genus, but also the case where two genera or species are under the same genus. Not only do dog and quadruped have a difference in common, but also dog and cat even though cat is not under dog or vice-versa.

The third statement says that when a genus is under another genus, the differences of the higher genus can be also differences of the lower genus.

The order of these statements can be seen from species being placed more directly under genera than differences in the predicamental order and from Aristotle's making use of the first statement in explaining why subalternate genera are not like those in the second statement.

We have already indicated a reason why the division of beings comes before the statements of Chapter Three. In turn, it is not difficult to see why these statements must be understood before the division of the signification in general (according to the highest genera) of those said without intertwining in Chapter Four. If the less universal was not seen to be ordered under the more universal so that the latter was said of the former and included in its meaning or signification, it would not be possible to divide the signification of everything said without intertwining under ten heads or highest genera.

APPENDIX

In this text, Thomas distinguishes between what is placed per se and properly in a genus and what can be led back to a genus:

...in genere continentur aliquid dupliciter:

vel per se et proprie, sicut species, et ea quae recipiunt
praedicationem generis;

vel per reductionem, sicut principia generis, ut materia et forma ad substantiam, et unitas et punctus ad quantitatem; quamvis neutrum sit quantitas.

Ita etiam nulla negatio vel privatio est in genere per se: quia non habet aliquam quidditatem nec esse; sed reducitur ad genus affirmationis, secundum quod in non esse intelligitur esse, et in negatione affirmatio, ut dicit Philosophus in II *Elench.*, cap. IV, quia omnis privatio per habitum cognoscitur, et remotio per positionem; et sic etiam non relatio est in genere relationis, quamvis ea de quibus dicitur ista negatio non sint in illo genere.²

If the genus of the species must be said of what the species is said, one can also point out that one of the species of the genus must also be said of what the genus is said of:

de quocumque praedicatur genus, necesse est aliquam eius speciem praedicari, sive sit praedicatio univoca sive denominativa.³

Thomas points out an interesting likeness of genus to matter in this text:

...genus quodammodo est pars speciei similis materiae. Unde sicut in natura ex pluribus materiis sufficientibus non ordinatis non fit aliquid unum; ita etiam plura genera non possunt venire ad constitutionem speciei unius.⁴

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, *Utrum in divinis sit totum universale*, Solutio:

In a text of great subtlety, Thomas brings out many things about the universal whole and its parts when showing that in God there is no universal whole:

Respondeo dicendum, quod in divinis non potest esse universale et particulare. Et hujus ratio potest quadruplex assignari:

² *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 3

³ Thomas Aquinas, *In I Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, n. 196

⁴ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Quaestiuncula I, Ad 3

primo, quia secundum Avicennam, II parte *Logicae*, cap. II, ubicumque est genus et species, oportet esse quidditatem differentem a suo esse, ut prius dictum est⁵ ; et hoc in divinis non competit;

secundo, quia essentia universalis non est eadem numero in suis inferioribus, sed secundum rationem tantum; essentia autem divina est eadem numero in pluribus personis;

tertio, quia universale exigit pluralitatem in his quae sub ipso continentur vel in actu vel in potentia: in actu sicut est in genere, quod semper habet plures species; in potentia sicut in aliquibus speciebus quarum forma, quantum est de se, possibilis est inveniri in multis, cum omnis forma de se est communicabilis; sed quod inveniatur tantum in uno, est ex parte materiae debitae illi speciei, quae tota adunatur in uno individuo, ut patet in sole, qui constat ex tota sua materia; et ista pluralitas est secundum numerum, qui numerus est simpliciter fundatus in substantiali distinctione: tres autem personae non numerantur tali numero, ut dictum est, et ideo essentia non habet rationem universalis;

quarto, quia particulare semper se habet ex additione ad universale. In divinis autem propter summam simplicitatem, non est possibilis additio, et ideo nec universale nec particulare.⁶

And in replying to an objection that there is a universal whole in God, Thomas brings out the important principles or beginnings that the *modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio* and that *sermo sit rei subjectus*:

1. Videtur quod in divinis sit totum universale. Quidquid enim praedicatur de aliquo substantialiter et non conversim, praedicatur de ipso ut totum universale de parte subiectiva. Sed essentia divina, vel Deus, hoc modo praedicatur de Patre: Pater enim est essentia divina, sed non quicumque est essentia divina est Pater. Ergo ibi est totum universale.

⁵ Distinctio VIII, Q. I, Art. I

⁶ *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, *Utrum in divinis sit totum universale*, Solutio

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio; cum, secundum Hilarium, IV *De Trinit.*, 14, col. 107, t. II, sermo sit rei subjectus. Unde sicut nulla res in creaturis invenitur similis ex toto unitati essentiae in tribus personis, sed secundum aliquid: ita etiam nullus modus praedicandi in creaturis est similis huic modo praedicandi quod essentia vel Deus de tribus personis praedicatur. Dico igitur, quod secundum id quod tactum est in objectione, habet similitudinem cum modo praedicandi totius universalis, sed differt secundum alia quae supra dicta sunt.⁷

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⁷ *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, Obj. 1 & Ad 1