

CHAPTER FOUR OF THE *CATEGORIES*

In the Fourth Chapter, Aristotle divides those said by no intertwining by what they signify. He says that those said without any intertwining signify either substance or how much or how or towards something or where or when or to be laid out or to have or to act upon or to undergo.

What does the middle word exclude in *by no intertwining*?

Although Aristotle wants to exclude most of all the intertwining of a statement in which there is the true or the false, perhaps by adding the word *no* to what he had said in the division of those said, he intended to deny not only the intertwining in a statement, but also the intertwining of natures in *ens per accidens* such as white man. Even if we used one name such as *negro* to mean a black man, one could not put it in one genus. For to be a man and to be black or white is not the same thing.

Why does he say *signifies*?

This indicates that he is speaking of names of things here, not of things as named, as in the First Chapter. Likewise, it confirms that the division of those said was a division of vocal sounds.

Aristotle does not always enumerate all of these ten when he touches upon them. But in the *Categories* and in the book *About Places (Topics)*¹, he enumerates all ten. He enumerates the ten in these two places in exactly the same order and with exactly the same name for each with one exception. Instead of calling the first, *substance* (or *ousia*), he calls it in the *About Places (Topics)* *What it is* (or *ti esti*)

The ten in the *Categories* are called the genera of predicates in the *About Places (Topics)*. In English, we are accustomed to call the ten highest genera the *categories*. But the Greek word translated by *categories* is in the text from the *About Places (Topics)* used for that of which the ten are the genera. Perhaps a *category* in that sense is whatever is *said of* individual substances either univocally (in the narrow sense of Chapter One of the *Categories*) or denominatively. And such *said ofs* or *categories* come under one of ten genera.

¹ Book One, 103b 20-39

The following text of Thomas helps us to understand the use of *what it is* in the above text from the *Places*:

...dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non est accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est.

Ipsa enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia huiusmodi talia.

Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, "aliis autem alio modo", idest secundum quid.

Quod enim "aliquo modo", idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in aliis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum in quibus est quod quid est.

Non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis.

Cum enim quaero quid est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam.

Sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. Et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. Et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia.

Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem

proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter sed quia non ens est non ens. Et similiter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.²

How are the ten distinguished?

They are distinguished by a diverse way of being said of individual substances. The praedicamenta or categories are so-called because they are distinguished *secundum diversum modum praedicandi*, by a diverse way of being said of first substance. Thomas explains well that this is how they are distinguished and hence called *praedicamenta* in Latin:

ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi..

...Propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem...³

In another text, Thomas says the *modus praedicandi* follows the *ratio* of the genus instead of a diverse way of being:

ratio generis, quam consequitur *modus praedicandi*.⁴

Even things that may be the same in substance can pertain to diverse categories because of a diverse way of being said of something:

Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sunt diversa praedicamenta.

Sed sciendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod

² In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 1331-1334

³ In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, n. 890

⁴ Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. XXII, Expositio Textus

diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet.

Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi.

Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subiecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis.⁵

Thomas takes Aristotle's figure of predication to mean one mode of being said of in this text:

Unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in figura 'praedicationis', idest quae habent unum modum praedicandi.

Alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in subiecto existentes.⁶

But why then does Aristotle not use *tropus* or *way* here? Perhaps Aristotle has in mind the praedicamental order from the highest genus down to the lowest species or even the individuals. Indeed the first statement in the third chapter had a likeness to the beginning of the syllogism (the *dici de omni*) where the word *figure* is also used. Figure is defined by limits or limits.

When Aristotle first distinguishes the categories he uses denominatives like album, not albedo, quale and not *qualitas*. Later when he distinguishes the species of quality, he uses the word *quality*. The genera of accidents can be distinguished in part by a *diversum modum denominandi* which is involved in the *modi praedicandi* of accidents as distinguished from that of substance.

When an accident is signified by a denominative, it signifies per modum accidentis:

⁵ In XI *Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 2313

⁶ In V *Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VIII, n. 878

Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico *album* et *musicum*. Nam *album* ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen *album* significat subiectum ex consequenti, in quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentaliter non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.⁷

Thomas agrees with Averroes in this matter and disagrees with Avicenna:

...subjectum non includitur in significatione nominis significantis accidens concretionem, ut dicit Commentator, V *Metaphy.*, text. 14 quamvis Avicenna, VI *Natural.*, part. I, cap. II, contrarium senserit.⁸

The concrete names signify per modum inhaerentiae:

Licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint, intellectus tamen potest ea per se intelligere, cum sit natus dividere ea quae secundum naturam coniuncta sunt. Et ideo nomina abstracta accidentium significant entia quae quidem inhaerent, licet non significant ea per modum inhaerentiae. Essent autem significata per huiusmodi nomina non entia, si non inessent in re.

Et quia ista in abstracto significata videntur non entia, magis videntur entia nomina accidentium concreta. Magis autem videtur "aliquid entium esse vaders et sedens et sanans" quia determinatur eis aliquod subiectum per ipsam nominis significationem, in quantum significantur in concretionem ad subiectum. Hoc autem subiectum est substantia. Et ideo unumquodque talium nominum, quae significant accidens in concreto, "apparet in tali categoria", id est videtur importare

⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 894

⁸ *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XVIII, Quaest. I, Art. II, Ad 3

praedicamentum substantiae; non ita quod praedicamentum substantiae sit pars significationis talium nominum (album enim, ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat); sed inquantum huiusmodi nomina significant accidentia ut inhaerentia substantiae. Bonum autem aut sedens non dicitur "sine hoc", idest sine substantia. Significat enim accidens concretum substantiae.⁹

One could distinguish the nine genera of accidents from substance as already seen in the *division of beings* in Chapter Two. And since accidents are said denominatively of substance, we could distinguish the first three genera of accidents from the last six because in the first three, substance is being denominated from something *within* it while in the last six it is being denominated from something *outside* of it. Thomas distinguishes these two denominations in this text:

But something can be denominated from something *within* or something *outside* of it:

Duplex est modus quo aliquid denominative praedicatur.

Denominatur enim aliquid ab eo quod extra ipsum est, sicut a loco dicitur aliquis esse *alicubi*, et a tempore *aliquando*:

aliquid vero denominatur ab eo quod inest, sicut ab albedine *albus*.

A relatione vero non invenitur aliquid denominari quasi exterius existente, sed inhaerente: non enim denominatur aliquis pater nisi a paternitate quae ei inest.¹⁰

And this corresponds to the distinction between the first group of accidents (how much or quantity, how or quality and towards something or relation) to each of which Aristotle devotes a separate chapter (chapter 6, 7 & 8) and the last six genera of accidents, which he only exemplifies again in chapters 9. Part of the reason for the longer and fuller consideration of the first three is because they denominate substance from something existing in the

⁹ In *VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I, nn. 1254-1255

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *S. C. Gentiles*, II, Caput 13

substance. And this diverse way of denominating is tied to the nature of the genus, as Thomas explains:

...secundum diversam naturam generis diversus est modus denominationis.

Quaedam enim genera secundum rationem suam significant ut inhaerens, sicut qualitas et quantitas, et hujusmodi; et in talibus non fit denominatio nisi per formam inhaerentem, quae est principium secundum aliquod esse substantiale vel accidentale.

Quaedam autem significant secundum rationem suam, ut ab alio ens, et non inhaerens sicut praecipue patet in actione. Actio enim, secundum quod est actio, significatur ut ab agente; et quod sit in agente, hoc accidit sibi in quantum est accidens. Unde in genere actionis denominatur accidens per id quod ab eo est, et non per id quod principium ejus est, sicut dicitur actione agens; nec tamen actio est principium agentis, sed e converso.

Et si per impossibile poneretur esse aliquam actionem quae non esset accidens non esset inhaerens, et tamen denominaret agentem et tunc agens denominaretur per id quod ab eo est, et in eo non est inhaerens. Sed quia cujuslibet actionis principium est aliqua forma inhaerens, ideo aliquid potest dici agens duobus modis; vel ipsa actione, quae denominat agentem, et non est principium ejus; vel forma, quae est principium actionis in agente, et secundum quid principium agentis; sicut dicimus ignem moveri sursum motu proprio et levitate.¹¹

How are the ways of *being said of* divided in particular down to each of the highest genera?

The logical and understandable division of anything is usually into two or three parts. When someone divides into more than three, he usually is combining more than one division into either two or three. He may divide into two or three and subdivide one of the parts or he may criss-cross two divisions into two or three. We have seen that Aristotle's division of beings into four is the result of criss-crossing two divisions by contradictories into two. Thomas, in the two places where he shows how the ten genera of

¹¹ *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

Aristotle are distinguished, follows the rule of two or three, dividing always into three or two and subdividing into two. Indeed, one could say that he gives eight divisions to arrive at the ten of Aristotle. He first divides into three and subdivides the second and the third parts into two until he has arrived at each of the ten. (The first part contains only one genus, namely substance.)

The first text where Thomas shows how the ten are distinguished is in his Exposition of the third book of *Natural History* (the *Physics*):

Sed restat circa hoc duplex dubitatio. Prima quidem quia, si actio et passio sint unus motus, et non differunt nisi secundum rationem, ut dictum est, videtur quod non debeant esse duo praedicamenta, cum praedicamenta sint genera rerum.

Item, si motus vel est actio vel passio, non invenietur motus in substantia, qualitate, quantitate et ubi, ut supra dictum est; sed solum continebitur in actione et passione.

Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta.

Tripliciter autem fit omnis praedicatio.

Unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico *Socrates est homo*, vel *homo est animal*; et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum *substantiae*.

Alius autem modus est, quando praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum *quantitatis* (nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: unde et Plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum *qualitatis* (unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum *relationis* (cum enim dico *homo est pater*, non praedicatur de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum.

Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantia praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus. Denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur quodammodo communiter in omnibus, et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad homines pertinent tantum.

Communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominatur enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori.

Cum autem quatuor sint genera causarum, duo ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et forma: unde praedicatio quae possit fieri secundum haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis, et homo est corporeus. Causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, inquantum movet agentem. Remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. Si igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum *passionis*, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum *actionis*, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est.

Mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca. Intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo uniuscuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: ab his ergo denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrinseco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis.

Exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a tempore est praedicamentum *quando*; secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est praedicamentum *ubi* et *situs*, quod addit supra *ubi* ordinem partium in loco. Hoc autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte temporis, cum ordo partium in tempore in ratione temporis importetur: est enim tempus numerus motus secundum prius et

posterius. Sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse *quando* vel *ubi* per denominationem a tempore vel a loco.

Est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est *manuatus* vel *pedatus*.

Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini in quantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accomodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur *habitus*.

Sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum.

Sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta quae sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denominationes. Nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, sumitur per modum denominationis praedicamentum passionis: et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. Et sic patet solutio primae dubitationis.

Secunda autem dubitatio de facili solvitur. Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit.

De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod

movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis. Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est.

Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipitur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur.

Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducit ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in actum, non est nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est.¹²

A TRANSLATION OF THE MIDDLE OF THE ABOVE INTO ENGLISH

...being is divided into ten predicaments [said ofs], not univocally, as a genus into species, but by diverse ways of being. But the ways of being are proportional to the ways of being said of. For in saying one thing of another, we say this is that. Whence also the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments [categories or said-ofs].

But all predication [saying of] comes to be in one of three ways.

One way is when that which is said of some subject pertains to its nature, as when I say *Socrates is a man* or *man is an animal*. And by this is taken the predicament [category or said of] *substance*.

¹² In *III Physicorum*, Lectio V, nn. 321-324

Another way is that in which there is said of something what is not of its nature, but nevertheless exists in it. This is had either on the part of the matter of the subject and by this there is the predicament [category or said of] *quantity*, for quantity properly follows matter - whence also Plato laid down the large on the side of matter; or it follows form, and this is the predicament [category or said-of] *quality* - whence also qualities are founded upon quantity, as color in surface and figure in lines or surfaces; or it is had in regard to another, and thus it is the predicament [category or said-of] *relation* - for when I say *a man is a father*, nothing absolute is said of the man, but a regard which is in him to something extrinsic.

The third way of *being said of* is when something extrinsic is said of something by way of some denomination - for thus also, intrinsic accidents are said of substance; for we do not say man is whiteness, but that man is white.

But to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in one way commonly in all and in some way specially in those things that pertain only to man.

But commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic, either by reason of cause or by reason of measure; for something is denominated caused and measured by something outside of it.

There being, however, four kinds of cause, two of these are parts of the nature: namely, matter and form - whence the being said of which could come from these two belongs to the said-of substance, as if we should say that man is rational or man is corporal. And the final cause does not cause anything by itself apart from the agent - for the end has the sense of a cause to the extent that it moves the agent. There remains therefore only the agent cause by which something is able to be denominated as from the exterior.

Thus therefore, as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament [category or said-of] *undergoing*. For undergoing is nothing other than receiving something from an agent. But conversely, as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament *acting*

upon. For acting upon is an act from the agent in another, as has been said.

Some measure is extrinsic and some intrinsic. Intrinsic, as each thing's own length and width and depth. From these, something is denominated as from something existing within; whence it pertains to the predicament quantity.

The extrinsic measures, however, are time and place. Hence, as something is denominated from time, there is the predicament [category or said-of] *when*. However, as something is denominated from place, there is the predicaments [categories or said-ofs] *where* and *position*, which adds above *where* an order of parts in place. This however was not necessary to add on the part of time since the order of parts in time is implied in the definition of time - for time is the number of motion according to its before and after. Thus something is said to be *when* or *where* by denomination from time or from place.

There is however something special in man. For nature has sufficiently given the other animals those things which pertain to the conservation of life, as horns for defense, a thick and hairy hide for covering, hoofs or something of this sort for walking without injury. And thus when such animals are called armed or clothed or shod, they are not denominated from something extrinsic, but from some of their own parts. Whence this refers in them to the predicament *substance*, as if it were said that man is with hands or footed.

But these sorts of things could not have been given to man by nature, both because they are not suitable to the subtlety of man's complexion and because of the many forms of operation which belong to man insofar as he has reason for which some determined instruments could not have been adapted by nature, but in place of all these, there is reason within man by which he prepares for himself exterior things in place of those which are intrinsic to the other animals. Whence, when man is called armed or clothed or shod, he is named from something extrinsic which has neither the notion of cause nor of measure. Whence it is a special predicament [category or said-of] and is called *habit*. [*outfitted*]

But it should be noted that this predicament is attributed to other animals, not as they are considered in their own nature, but as they come into the use of man; as if we call a horse decorated or saddled or armed.

The other place where Thomas distinguishes the ten is in his exposition of the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*):

Distinguit modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo, ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente...Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum...

Dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. Sciendum enim est quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio huius probavit Philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest.

Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia "quoties ens dicitur", idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, "toties esse significatur", idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis.

Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere.

Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.

Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid

Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter.

Uno modo ut sit omnino extra subiectum: quod quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, Socrates est calceatus vel vestitus. Si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinseca sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato ordine partium in loco, quo considerato erit situs.

Alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur ut agere. Nam actionis principium in subiecto est. Si vero secundum terminum, sic praedicabitur ut in pati. Nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur.

Quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum Est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum Est, et participium. Nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis. Unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur.

Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, in

quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalialia non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.¹³

The two distinctions of the ten are very much alike. But a brief comparison of the two is in order.

Both in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* and in his commentary on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* or *First Philosophy*, Thomas Aquinas arrives at the ten categories by eight divisions following the rule of two or three.

There is one division into three and seven divisions into two. The division into three is the same in both commentaries and is also the first in both.

Five of the seven divisions into two are the same in both, and two are different.

Two of the five which are the same in both are the division of the second part of the division into three into two and the sub-division of one of these into two more.

The different divisions are found in two of the five divisions necessary to distinguish the third part of the first division eventually into the six remaining genera.

The division of those based on cause and effect is the same as is also the division of those based on measure as well as the subdivision of one of those based on measure.

But the first division of the last six genera in both is different and consequently one of the subsequent divisions must be other.

¹³ In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, nn. 889-894

For in the third book of *Natural Hearing*, to be outfitted or to have is divided against the remaining five because it is found specially in man and the remaining five are found in common.

But in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, to be outfitted or to have with the three based on outside measure are distinguished from acting upon and undergoing. For the former are denominating from something entirely outside and the latter from something partly inside and partly outside.

Hence, in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, it is necessary to divide outfitted or to have against the three based on outside measure. And in the third book of *Natural Hearing*, it is necessary to divide the three based on outside measure against the two based on cause and effect.

But the division and the sub-division of those based on extrinsic measure is the same in both as well as the division of the two based on cause and effect (or which are from something partly inside and partly outside),

The following text (which has been placed with relation) is entered here for the sake of comparing the basis for the distinction of the species of relation with the basis for the distinction of those common genera in which something is denominated from what is outside of it.

Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur.

Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci.

Mensuratur enim aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca.

Per virtutem etiam activam unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero;

per substantiam autem et qualitatem ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas, - vel forma substantialis aut materia, - habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et numerus,

sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum aliquid magis vel minus altero consideratur: sic enim albius aliquid altero dicitur.

Et propter hoc Philosophus in V *Metaph.* species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione.¹⁴

A somewhat similar distinction of circumstances is found in the following text where the distinction of circumstances of moral act is considered:

Secundum autem quod ad moralem pertinent, potest aliter earum numerus accipi. Proportio enim actus ad finem potest accipi vel secundum id quod est in ipso actu, vel secundum id quod est extra.

Si primo modo: aut quantum ad speciem actus, et sic est quid: aut quantum ad modum ipsius; et sic est quomodo.

Si autem per comparisonem ad extra; vel per comparisonem ad causam vel per comparisonem ad mensuram.

Si primo modo: vel ad causam finalem, et sic est cur, vel ad causam efficientem vel instrumentalem, et sic est quibus auxiliis, vel principalem, et sic est quis.

Si autem per comparisonem ad mensuram: aut ad locum, et sic est ubi, aut ad tempus, et sic est quando.¹⁵

The order in which Aristotle enumerates the ten and the order in which he considers them is the same, except for the reversal of the order of toward something or relation and how or quality. The order in which they are enumerated follows their order in comparison to substance and quality is before relation. But the order in which they are considered in particular is relation before quality. The reason for this will be seen in the Chapter on relation. It is connected with the correction of the Platonic definition of relation which would include some qualities. Something like this reversal of order is also found in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry where the five predicables are

¹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 9, Corpus

¹⁵ *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XVI, Quaestio III, Art. I, Ad secundam quaestionem

enumerated in the order genus, difference, species, property and accident. But specie is considered before difference. This is because genus and species are defined and hence known in relation to each other even though difference is closer to the genus and making the species. We need to note that order of learning or knowing need not be identical with the order of being or in things.

What is the order of the ten? Why substance before the rest?

Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat quia omnia alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; similiter in aliis.¹⁶

Why are how much or quantity, how or quality and toward something or relation before remaining six?

If we order them by their closeness or distance from substance (since substance comes first), how much, how and toward something come before the last six because the former denominate substance from something in it and the latter from something outside of it. Hence, the former are obviously closer to substance.

Why quantity and quality before toward something?

One reason is that, even as a particular kind of accident, quantity and quality are something of substance, but relation as a particular kind of accident is completed in its meaning by comparison to something outside:

in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto: accidentis enim esse est inesse.

Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum.

Et in aliis quodam generibus a relatione, utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum

¹⁶ *In IX Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I, n. 1768

comparationem ad subiectum: nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae.

Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparisonem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparisonem ad aliquid extra.¹⁷

Another reason why quantity and quality are placed before relation is that relation are based on quantity and quality or they belong to substance through some quantity or quality:

Inter accidentia vero quidam ordo considerandus est. Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae quantitas dimensiva. Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur quantitate mediante, sicut color mediante superficie: unde et per divisionem quantitatis, per accidens dividuntur. Ulterius autem qualitates sunt actionum et passionum principia; et relationum quarundam, ut sunt pater et filius, dominus et servus, et alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero relationes immediate ad quantitates consequuntur: ut maius et minus, duplum et dimidium, et similia.¹⁸

Why quantity before quality?

One reason is that some qualities, at least the sensible ones and figure belong to substance through quantity, as pointed out in the last text. Other more subtle reasons are to be found in the following text from Thomas:

Sciendum autem quod substantia corporalis habet quod sit subjectum accidentium ex materia sua, cui primo inest subjici alteri.

Prima autem dispositio materiae est quantitas; quia secundum ipsam attenditur divisio ejus et indivisio, et ita unitas et multitudo quae sunt prima consequentia ens; et propter hoc sunt dispositiones totius materiae, non hujus aut illius tantum.

¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 28, Art 2, C

¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Capitulum LXIII

Unde omnia alia accidentia mediante quantitate in substantia fundantur, et quantitas est prior eis naturaliter. Et ideo non claudit materiam sensibilem in ratione sua, quamvis claudat materiam intelligibilem, ut dicitur in VII *Meta.* (1036a 8-9; Lectio X, nn. 1496-1497)

Unde ex hoc quidam decepti fuerunt, ut crederent dimensiones esse substantiam rerum sensibilium; quia remotis qualitatibus nihil sensibile remanere videbant nisi quantitatem, quae tamen secundum esse suum dependet a substantia, sicut et alia accidentia.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prima accidentia consequentia substantiam sunt quantitas et qualitas. Et haec duo proportionantur duobus principiis essentialibus substantiae, scilicet formae et materiae, quia quantitas respondet materiae - unde magnum et parvum Plato posuit differentias materiae - sed qualitas ex parte formae. Et quia materia est subjectum primum quod non est in alio, forma autem est in alio, scilicet materia; ideo magis appropinquit ad hoc quod est non esse in alio quantitas quam qualitas, et per consequens quam alia accidentia.

Ad secundum dicendum quod quantitas dimensiva secundum suam rationem non dependet a materia sensibili, quamvis dependeat secundum suum esse; ideo in praedicando et subjiciendo accipit modum substantiae et modum accidentis; unde lineam dicimus et quantitatem et quantam, et magnitudinem et magnam.¹⁹

The closeness of dimensions to material substance is especially seen in the order of undetermined dimensions to substance in this text from Thomas:

...Sicut enim Commentator dicit in I *Phys.*, et in lib. *De substantia orbis* (cap. 1), in materia generabilium et corruptibilium oportet intelligere dimensiones interminatas ante adventum formae substantialis; alias non posset intelligi divisio materiae, ut in diversis partibus materiae diversae formae substantiales essent. Hujusmodi autem dimensiones post adventum formae substantialis accipiunt esse terminatum et completum. Quidquid autem intelligitur in materia ante adventum formae substantialis, hoc manet idem numero in generato et in eo ex quo generatur,

¹⁹ *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad Tertiam Quaestionem & Ad 1 & Ad 2

quia remoto posteriori oportet remanere prius. Dimensiones autem illae interminatae se habent ad genus quantitatis sicut materia ad genus substantiae.²⁰

And in another text of Thomas:

...forma substantialis materialis aliquo modo habet ordinem ad dimensiones, cum dimensiones interminatae praeintelligentur in materia ante formam substantialem.²¹

In the discussion of the Eucharist, Thomas often points out the closeness of dimensions to material substance:

...vel ipsi dimensionibus virtute divina dabitur natura materiae propter propinquitatem ad ipsum..

Ad secundum.....tamen quantum ad aliquid dimensiones interminatae magis sunt propinquae materiae corporali quam corpus spiritui.²²

Why are where, when, to be laid out, and to have before to act upon and to undergo?

Perhaps the reason is that the former are more tied to quantity which comes before quality while the latter are tied to qualities:

...in actionibus naturalibus formae substantiales non sunt immediatum et proximum actionis principium, sed agunt mediantibus qualitatibus activis et passivis, sicut propriis instrumentis, ut dicitur in II *De anima*, quod calor naturalis est quo anima agit.²³

²⁰ *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Quartam Quaestionem

²¹ *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. III, Ad Primam Quaestionem, Ad 3

²² *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Quartam Quaestionem & Ad 2, Whether something can be generated from the dimensions etc. in eucharist

²³ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Secundam Quaestionem

This also agrees with quality being connected with the form of substance and quantity with the matter:

...agere non est nisi rei per se subsistentis. Et ideo neque materia agit neque forma, sed compositum: quod tamen non agit ratione materiae, sed ratione formae quae est actus et actionis principium.

Et quia quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae et qualitas ex parte formae, ideo quantitas non agit nisi mediante qualitate quae est per se actionis principium. Unde qualitates sunt sensibiles primo, quantitates secundo.²⁴

Why does *where* come before *when*?

The following text is useful for understanding the order of where and when:

...accidentia quaedam denominant illud in quo sunt, sicut albedo; et talia intelliguntur creata in creatione suorum subjectorum, si sunt de illis quae esse primum consequuntur, ut figura et quantitas, et huiusmodi.

Quaedam autem denominant etiam illud in quo non sunt ut in subjecto, sicut locus. Non enim est locus corporis continentis in quo est ut in subjecto, sed corporis contenti: et tempus est numerus omnium motuum, etsi primo ejus in quo est ut in subjecto, scilicet motus primi mobilis, per quem omnes alii numerantur, ut in X *Metaph.* dicitur.

Sed tamen alia est ratio de tempore et de loco: quia locus est idem per essentiam quod superficies corporis locantis; tempus autem non est idem numero cum aliquo accidente in substantia fundato: et praeterea locus totum complementum suum habet in re; sed temporis ratio aliquo modo completur ex actione animae numerantis; unde magis habet rationem extrinseci quam locus; et ideo potius connumeratur primo creatis quam locus, vel aliud aliquod accidens.²⁵

²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Primam Quaestionem

²⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaestio I, Art. V, Ad. 2

And some other texts on the same:

...locus est superficies corporis locantis; et ideo creatio loci cum creatione corporalis naturae intelligitur.²⁶

...per opus creationis instituta est tota creatura quantum ad esse suum informe; unde quae non possunt duci ad unum informe principium, quod est materia, faciunt numerum in operibus creationis.

Substantia enim et accidens non reducuntur in unam materiam, quia accidentis pars materia non est, et ideo non conveniunt in materia ex qua. Potest tamen dici aliquo modo accidens convenire cum substantia in materia in qua, secundum quod accidens est in substantia: et ideo illud accidens quod est sicut extra mensurando denominans, substantiae connumeratur, scilicet tempus.²⁷

A likeness between *to have* and *to act upon* and *to undergo* is seen in the following text:

...quamvis hoc quod est accidens in se, possit esse aliquo modo substantia alicui, ut color albedini; tamen quod est in se substantia, non potest esse accidens alicujus, quamvis conjunctio unius substantiae ad alteram possit esse accidens, ut sic una substantia alteri accidentaliter advenire dicatur, sicut vestis homini.

Sed hoc non potest esse nisi dupliciter: vel quod jungatur ei secundum contactum, sicut vestis homini vel sicut dolium vino; aut sicut mobile motori, sicut Angelus jungitur corpori quod assumit.²⁸

The following text gives another reason why *to have* is placed next to acting upon and undergoing:

²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaestio I, Art. V, Ad. 1

²⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaestio I, Art. V, Solutio

²⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest. III, Art II, Responsio

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus

Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens and id quod habetur: sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium.

Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio: sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.

Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum: unde Philosophus dicit, in V *Metaphys.*, quod *habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti*, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum *Habitus*: de quod dicit Philosophus, in V *Metaphys.*, quod *inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius*.²⁹

APPENDIX

But there is some difference between the consideration of genus by the logician and the natural philosopher and the wise man:

Hic ostendit quot modis dicuntur aliqua diversa genere; et ponit duos modos respondentes ultimis duobus modis generis...

Primo igitur modo dicuntur aliqua genere diversa, quia eorum primum subiectum est diversum: sicut primum subiectum coloris est superficies, primum autem subiectum saporis est humor...

Alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicuntur "secundum diversam figuram categoriae", idest praedicationis entis...

²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus

Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno praedicamento, et sunt unum in genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genera primo modo. Sicut corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores et sapes. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.³⁰

And another text on the same:

aliqui sunt unius generis logice loquendo, quae naturaliter non sunt unius generis, sicut illa quae communicant in intentione generis quam logicus inspicit, et habent diversum modum essendi: unde in X Metaph. dicitur quod de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus nihil commune dicitur nisi communitate nominis.³¹

A Brief Comparison of the Two Divisions of the Six Genera by Thomas

Physics

communiter in omnibus
 secundum rationem causae
 actio
 passio
 secundum rationem mensurae
 from time: *quando*
 from place: *ubi & situs*

specialiter in hominibus: *habitus*

The distinction is closer to that between natural and artificial. *Habitus* is considered more at length, why these cannot be by nature in man.

Metaphysics

³⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XXII, n. 1124-1127

³¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist III, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2

omnino extra subjectum
 by what is not a measure: *habitus*
 by what is a measure
 from time: *quando*
 from place: *ubi & situs*

secundum aliquid in subjecto
 principium: *actio*
 terminus: *passio*

Distinction is more in comparison to substance. This is more the division and order of the *Categories*. The affinity of logic and metaphysics.

Aristotle's Examples for the Genera of Categories

substance: man, horse	the substantial unity of these is most known to us in that order
quantity: two cubits, three cubits	continuous quantity is more sensible than number and more clearly an accident and measure of some substance
quality: white, grammatical	sensible quality first and then immaterial but seen in outside speech, examples from third and first species of quality where contraries are found (which distinguishes form substance and quantity), in senses of quality in <i>Metaphysics</i> second species eliminated and fourth reduced to quale quid or essential difference and first species reduced to third
toward something: double and half, greater	relations based on quantity more known to us

where: in Lyceum, in market-place	Aristotle is lecturing in the Lyceum and students leave to go to market-place
when: yesterday, last year	examples taken from past
to act upon: to cut, to burn	clearly sensible change, not operations
to undergo: to be cut, to be burned	clearly sensible change, not operations

Albert the Great, the teacher of Thomas, had divided the ten somewhat differently than Thomas. We give it here in his text and then in outline form:

Albert, *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus I, Caput VII, Laval Ed, p. 24:

...praedicabile de aliquo, aut est *substantia*, aut est accidens: et haec divisio est per opposita immediate, quae reducuntur ad affirmationem et negationem, sicut ens per se et non per se....

ens in alio ut in subjecto...in duo secundum Aristotelem dividi habet. Accidens quidem aut est accidens secundum inesse, aut secundum aliquem modum ad aliud se habere.

Si autem est accidens sive aliquod cadens secundum absolutum inesse, tunc aut inest secundum materiam, quae potentia divisibilis est et extensibilis et numerabilis ad formarum susceptionem, quae in quantum potentia primo invenitur in materia: aut inest absolute secundum potentiam formae, quae est perfectiva materiae ad actum et operationem. Si primo modo inest, tunc est *quantitas*. Si autem secundo modo inest, tunc est *qualitas* quae dispositio est substantiae ad operationes aliquas et ad actus.

Si autem non est accidens secundum esse absolutum, hoc cadit ad substantiam secundum id quod est aliquo modo habere se substantiam ad aliud: tunc non potest esse nisi duobus modis: aut enim id aliquo modo se habere ad aliud causatur a substantia comparata ad aliud, aut ab illo extrinseco comparato ad substantiam de qua praedicatur.

Si primo modo, tunc iterum non est nisi duobus modis: aut enim est in comparatione simplici ad aliud, aut secundum comparationem partium ad totum in seipso consideratum.

Et si est in secundo modo, est *situs* vel *positio*. Si autem est primo: aut secundum comparationem ortam a forma, aut secundum comparationem a toto simul. Et si est praedicabile secundum comparationem ortam a forma, est *actio*: unde dicit Averroes, quod actio nihil aliud est, nisi comparatio agentis ad patiens. Si autem comparatio illa est orta a materia, tunc est pati: propter quod idem Averroes dicit quod *passio* est comparatio patientis ad agens secundum quod agens est.

Si autem oritur a toto, non potest oriri, nisi per aliquem actum totius, quo innascitur comparatio illa, et tunc est *ad aliquid* sive *relatio*.

Si autem oritur comparatio ab aliquo extrinseco comparato ad subjectum, de quo fit praedicatio, illud extrinsecum, aut est adjacens tantum, aut adjacens et applicatum.

Si autem est adjacens tantum, et ex adjacentia simplici comparatum, aut est adjacens ei quod est cum motu et esse distenso. Si primo quidem est ortum ab adjacentia extrinseca, tunc est *ubi*. Si autem comparatio est orta ab adjacentia extrinseci secundo modo, tunc est praedicamentum *quando*.

Si autem oritur ab adjacente extrinseco et applicato, tunc est praedicamentum *habitus*.

Nec possunt plura praedicari secundum adjacentiam extrinsecam.

ALBERT'S DIVISION IN OUTLINE FORM

praedicabile de aliquo,

aut est *substantia*,

aut est accidens

secundum inesse

inest secundum materiam: *quantitas*

inest absolute secundum potentiam formae: *qualitas*

secundum aliquem modum ad aliud se habere (aliquo modo habere se substantiam ad aliud)

causatur a substantia comparata ad aliud

in comparatione simplici ad aliud

secundum comparationem ortam a parte (missing in text)

ortam a forma: *actio*

ortam a materia: *passio*

secundum comparationem ortam a toto simul (per aliquem actum totius, quo innascitur comparatio illa): *Ad aliquid* sive *relatio*

secundum comparationem partium ad totum in seipso consideratum: *situs* vel *positio*

causatur ab illo extrinseco comparato ad substantiam de qua praedicatur

aut est adjacens tantum

ex adjacentia extrinseca simplici comparatum: *ubi*

adjacens ei quod est cum motu et esse distenso: *quando*

aut adjacens et applicatum (ab adjacente extrinseco et applicato): *habitus*

Albert also follows the logical rule of two or three to arrive at the ten highest genera. But he divides them into two first while Thomas divides them into three. Both divisions are good. And they are in harmony for one can divide, as we have seen, the accidents into two which are the second and the third parts of Thomas' division. But here there is a major difference for

Aristotle puts relation with quantity and quality in his division and Albert puts it with the last six. Albert has here made a mistake, I think. And Thomas' division is more in accord with Aristotle's giving a long consideration to relation like for substance, quantity and quality. Nevertheless, Albert's mistake is a sign that relation is well ordered by Aristotle after quantity and quality and before the last six. It is closer to the last six than quantity and quality are.

Albert's distinction between quantity and quality is like that of Thomas. Albert's division of the six (leaving out relation) does separate *where* and *when* and *to have* in one part and *to act upon* and *to undergo* in another. But unlike Thomas he has *to be laid out* in the same part as *to act upon* and *to undergo* while Thomas puts it with *where* and *when* and for good and more understandable reasons. Here is, I think, another mistake of Albert. But Albert's placing acting upon and undergoing with towards another is interesting to compare with Thomas' explanation of acting upon and undergoing in the *Metaphysics*.

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