

ARISTOTLE: CATEGORIES, CHAPTER 13

This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle distinguishes three senses of the word *together*. In the second part, he points out that the genus is before its species. And in the third part, he recalls the three senses of the word *together*.

In the first part, he gives as the first sense of *together* those things which come to be at the same time. The second sense is that whose being is convertible (if one is the other also must be), as double and half. The third meaning he gives is that of species by the same division of a genus. Or it could be said that he distinguishes two chief senses of what are together in time and what are together by nature and he subdivides the second into two. Cajetan writes:

In hoc decimotertio capitulo addit duos modos principales simultatis, scilicet temporis et naturae, sed subdiviso secundo modo in duo membra, tres modi efficiuntur omnes.¹

In the second part, he shows that the genus is always before one of its species because it can be without them, but not vice-versa.

In the third part, he says that together by nature are those things which are convertible in being, and one not being the cause of the other, and species of the same genus by the same division. But simply or first those things whose coming to be is in the same time.

To what senses of *before* are the second & third senses of *together* opposed?

The second sense is opposed both to the second and to the crowning sense of before. This perhaps indicates a connection between these two senses, as we have indicated in the last chapter.

¹*Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* , Les Presses Universitaires Laval, Quebec, p. 133

The third sense is opposed somewhat to the second and to the third sense of before. For we could say to some extent that something can be an animal without being a dog, but not vice-versa. And yet second substance cannot exist in things without some first substance and a genus without some species. But genus and species seemed to be distinguished only in our reason so that only there is the genus before the species. There too, the species would seem to be together.

Why does not Aristotle distinguish as many senses of *together* as of *before* (and *after*)?

The logician, and even the moral philosopher, are not much interested in a sense opposed to the fourth sense of *before*. For the knowledge of the philosopher is a knowledge of the universal, not the singular. And as discussed in one reason why good and bad can be said to be the genera of all things, formal distinction (but not material distinction) seems to require that one be better than another. Moreover, Aristotle is chiefly interested in *before* and *together* insofar as they apply to the placing and ordering of genera and species under the ten highest genera. And the senses distinguished are enough for such purposes.

What could be attached to the third sense?

Could we say that reason understands one half of a contradiction to be true and the other half false together?

Appendix

DIVISION OF CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Distinction in order of the central senses of *together*

Genus and species are not together, but the genus before the species

Listing again of the senses of together.

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