

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE SPECIES OF MOTION

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, Aristotle distinguishes six species of motion. And in the second part, he considers the opposition of motions.

In the first part, Aristotle enumerates six species of motion in the order of the ten highest genera: coming to be, ceasing to be (which are in substance), growing, shrinking (which are in quantity) alteration (which is in the third species of quality), and change of place (which is in where).

Then in the same part, he shows their differences, especially where this is not altogether manifest. He says that clearly coming to be and ceasing to be are different and likewise growing and shrinking, and even change of place. But alteration might not seem independent of the others so he dwells on this. And then he gives the strange example from geometry of the gnomon addition to a figure, where the same figure is kept, but a greater size is acquired, to show that there can be growth without alteration. All of this is rather puzzling to a natural philosopher who considers alteration as presupposed to growth and change of place as necessary to bring together agent and patient so there can be alteration. Aristotle may be speaking here, as is his way, according to the opinions of his predecessors before his own determination of the truth. The early philosophers thought that growth was merely the accession of like to like in which case it would not require an alteration. And they had difficulty in understanding how there could be inward change in addition to change of place.

In the second part of the chapter, Aristotle considers the opposition of motions. In general, motion is opposed to rest. Coming to be or generation is clearly opposed to ceasing to be or corruption, and growing to shrinking. Change of place is, at least opposed to rest, but if there are contrary places, then a motion up is contrary to a motion down. Alteration is opposed to rest in quality and to the alteration to the contrary quality.

In chapters 10-13, Aristotle had shown how species and genera could be distinguished and ordered and placed under their respective highest genera. In chapter 14, he shows how some other things can be led back to the ten genera though they are not species or genera in them. In particular, he shows how motion can be led back to the ten.

We should first consider what else can be led back to the ten in general, then why motion in particular is led back by Aristotle, and finally we can consider some of the points made by Aristotle in this reduction.

There are at least three kinds of things which, although not species or genera, can be led back to one of the highest genera. In the following text, Thomas distinguishes the two ways in which something can be contained in one of the highest genera:

...in genere continetur aliquid dupliciter:

vel per se et proprie, sicut species, et ea quae recipiunt praedicationem generis;

vel per reductionem, sicut principia generis, ut materia et forma ad substantiam, et unitas et punctus ad quantitatem; quamvis neutrum sit quantitas.

Ita etiam nulla negatio vel privatio est in genere per se: quia non habet aliquam quidditatem nec esse; sed reducitur ad genus affirmationis, secundum quod in non esse intelligitur esse, et in negatione affirmatio, ut dicit Philosophus in II *Elench.*, cap. IV, quia omnis privatio per habitum cognoscitur, et remotio per positionem; et sic etiam non relatio est in genere relationis, quamvis ea de quibus dicitur ista negatio non sint in illo genere.<sup>1</sup>

We must distinguish between what is placed under a genus where it belongs as a species and what is led back to some genus through the species with which it is connected. Species and *ea quae recipiunt praedicationem generis* are placed through themselves and properly under a genus but others are led back to some genus because they are the beginnings of a species, or the negation or lack of a species, or something imperfect in that species as a motion whose term or limit is some species.

In the above text it is said that neither the beginnings of a genus or species, nor the negation of them receive the predication of the genus. But they can be reduced to the genus of which they are the beginning, or the negation or lack. In the following text, Thomas shows how motion can also to be reduced to a genus:

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<sup>1</sup>*Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 3

...quilibet motus sit in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed per reductionem. Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus, reducatur ad genus actus perfecti.<sup>2</sup>

And in this text, Thomas again explains how motion is led back to some genus:

motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, in quantum proceditur de potentia ad actum:

nam in ipso motu terminus motus est in potentia,

et potentia et actus reducuntur ad idem genus.<sup>3</sup>

Other imperfect beings, like motion, can be reduced to one of the genera of categories. Consider this text from Thomas:

...virtus agendi proportionatur agenti. Unde alio modo oportet ponere virtutem agendi in agente principali; alio modo in agente instrumentali.

Agens enim principale agit secundum exigentiam suae formae. Et ideo virtus activa in ipso est aliqua forma vel qualitas habens completum esse in natura.

Instrumentum autem agit ut motum ab alio. Et ideo competit sibi virtus proportionata motui; motus autem non est ens completum sed est via in ens quasi medium quid inter potentiam puram et actum purum, ut dicitur in III *Phys*.

Et ideo virtus instrumenti inquantum huiusmodi, secundum quod agit ad effectum ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, non est ens completum habens esse fixum in naturam, sed quoddam ens incompletum: sicut est virtus immutandi visum in aere, inquantum est instrumentum motum ab exteriori visibili.

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<sup>2</sup>In *V Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 661

<sup>3</sup> *De Potentia*, Q. 3, Art. 3, Ad 8

Et hujusmodi entia consueverunt *intentiones* nominari et habent aliquid simile cum ente quod est in anima quod est ens diminutum, ut dicitur in VI *Metaphysicorum*

Et quia sacramenta non faciunt effectum spirituales nisi inquantum sunt instrumenta; ideo virtus spiritualis est in eis non quasi ens fixum, sed sicut ens incompletum.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens incompletum quod est in anima, dividitur contra ens distinctum per decem genera, ut patet in VI *Meta.* (1026a 35). Et ideo talia entia incompleta, per se loquendo, non sunt in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem: sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducit ad illud genus in quo sunt termini motus, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, quamvis ponatur in praedicamento passionis secundum quod importat ordinationem moventis ad motum, ut dicit Commentator in III *Physicorum*.

Unde et virtus haec quae est in sacramentis reducit ad idem genus in quo est virtus completa principalis agentis quae est qualitas, vel in qua esset, si in genere esset; quia virtus increata non est in aliquo genere.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, in the first three post-predicaments, Aristotle has taught us about the distinction and order of the species and genera which can be placed directly under one of the ten (highest) genera of predicates. (Something can be placed directly under a genus when that genus can be said of it as to what it is.) Now in chapter fourteen, he shows that other things can be distinguished and ordered by the ten genera because they can be reduced or led back to some genus or species placed directly under one of the ten.

There are at least three main kinds of such things.

The beginning of some genus or species can be reduced to the genus of predicates under which that genus or species is directly ordered. Thus, the point is the beginning of the line and the unit is the beginning of a number which are species of quantity. And there is a matter and a form, which are the beginnings of bodies, which are a species of substance.

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<sup>4</sup>*Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Responsio & Ad 1

A second kind is a motion or change which is the becoming, or ceasing to be, of what comes directly under some genus or species in one of the ten genera of predicates. Thus growing is the coming to be of some quantity. And in change of place, one comes to be somewhere. (Under this second kind, we might include some intentional beings because of their imperfect being.)

A third kind is the negation or lack of something directly under one of the ten highest genera of predicates. Thus death is the negation or lack of some genus or species in the genus of substance; and ignorance, of something under the first species of quality, and blindness, of something under the second species of quality.

Of these three, Aristotle shows how a motion can be led back to one of the ten genera of predicates. Why does Aristotle consider how motion can be led back to the ten rather than the way beginnings and negations can be so led?

It should not strike us as impossible, or even as strange, that Aristotle enters into the reduction of only one of the three. Euclid often gives us only one of the cases in a theorem. And as the commentators point out, he will give the most difficult case and leave the remaining cases to the reader's ingenuity. Hence, Proclus and Heath supply these remaining cases.

Thus, Aristotle will often consider the most difficult and/or the most important and/or the most fundamental and leave the rest to others. Thus he considers the axioms about being and non-being and defends them against the sophistical objections to them in the *Metaphysics*. But he leaves to us the defense of the other axioms. Thus Charles de Koninck untied a sophistical objection of Bertrand Russell against the axiom of whole and part.

Now, the reduction of motion to the ten highest genera of predicates is much more difficult than the reduction of negations and lacks to the ten. For one can negate what is in any genus. And it is clear that the negations are reduced to the genus of predicates in which is found what they negate. *Not man* will be reduced to the genus in which man is found and *not just* will be reduced to the genus in which just or justice is a species. But it is difficult to see in which genera are found motion per se and in which only per accidens.

Moreover, there is more difficulty in distinguishing the names of motion by the ten genera than the names of negations. (Motion per se and motion per accidens must be distinguished, etc.)

How opposites are reduced is more manifest and is less a problem, and to some extent it has been done in considering opposites. (Toward something is a genus and contraries in their chapter are compared with genera, and blindness is seen as the lack of sight)

And since motion is the same in some way as acting upon and especially undergoing, it is difficult to see why motion is not placed under those genera, instead of elsewhere. Hence, Thomas goes into the whole distinction of the ten genera in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* where motion and acting upon and undergoing are considered. Motion is the same act in some way as acting upon and undergoing. Changing one's place and being pushed, and becoming hot and being heated, and so on, seem to be almost the same thing. And in one particular partial enumeration of the highest genera in the seventh book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*, Aristotle actually uses *motion* in place of acting upon and undergoing. Yet motion is not given as one of the ten either here or in the first book *About Places*. Thus to make clear why motion is not a separate highest genus, this chapter is necessary.

One text of Thomas explaining the imperfection of motion and how it is distinguished from acting upon and undergoing is the following:

Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit.

De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis.

Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est.

Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiat ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur.

Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est.

Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia, non est nisi ab aliqua agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est....

Et quia positum fuit in dubitatione, utrum motus sit actus moventis vel mobilis, et ostensum est quod est actus activi ut ab hoc, et passivi ut in hoc; ad tollendum omnem dubitationem aliquantulum notius dicamus quod motus est actus potentiae activi et passivi.<sup>5</sup>

The imperfect being of motion and time is well brought out by Thomas in this reading:

Et dicit quod aut oportet dicere quod tempus non sit, si non est anima; aut oportet hoc dicere verius, quod tempus est utcumque ens sine anima, ut puta si contingit motum esse sine anima.

Sicut enim ponitur motus, ita necesse est poni tempus: quia prius et posterius in motu sunt; et haec, scilicet prius et posterius motus, inquantum sunt numerabilia, sunt ipsum tempus.

Ad evidentiam autem huius solutionis considerandum est, quod positis rebus numeratis, necesse est ponere numerum. Unde sicut res numeratae dependent a numerante, ita et numerus earum.

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<sup>5</sup>In *III Physicorum*, Lectio V, n. 324-325

Esse autem rerum numeratarum non dependet ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquis intellectus qui est causa rerum, sicut est intellectus divinus: non autem dependet ab intellectu animae. Unde nec numerus rerum ab intellectu animae dependet: sed solum ipsa numeratio, quae est actus animae, ab intellectu animae dependet.

Sicut ergo possunt esse sensibilia sensu non existente, et intelligibilia intellectu non existente, ita possunt esse numerabilia et numerus, non existente numerante.

Sed forte conditionalis quam primo posuit, est vera, scilicet quod si est impossibile esse aliquem numerantem, impossibile est esse aliquid numerabile: sicut haec est vera, si impossibile est esse aliquem sentientem, impossibile est esse aliquid sensibile. Si enim est sensibile, potest sentiri, et si potest sentiri, potest esse aliquod sentiens; licet non sequatur quod si est sensibile, quod sit sentiens.

Et similiter sequitur quod si est aliquid numerabile, quod possit esse aliquid numerans. Unde si impossibile est esse aliquid numerans, impossibile est esse aliquid numerabile: non tamen sequitur quod si non est numerans, quod non sit numerabile, ut obiectio Philosophi procedebat.

Si ergo motus haberet esse fixum in rebus, sicut lapis vel equus, posset absolute dici quod sicut etiam anima non existente est numerus lapidum, ita etiam anima non existente esset numerus motus, qui est tempus.

Sed motus non habet esse fixum in rebus, nec aliquid in actu invenitur in rebus de motu, nisi quoddam indivisibile motus, quod est motus divisio: sed totalitas motus accipitur per considerationem animae, comparantis priorem dispositionem mobilis ad posteriorem.

Sic igitur et tempus non habet esse extra animam, nisi secundum suum indivisibile: ipsa autem totalitas temporis accipitur per ordinationem animae numerantis prius et posterius in motu, ut supra dictum est.

Et ideo signanter dicit Philosophus quod tempus, non existente anima, est *utcumque* ens, idest imperfecte; sicut et si dicatur quod motum contingit esse sine anima imperfecte.

Et per hoc solvantur rationes supra posita ad ostendendum quod tempus non sit, quia componitur ex partibus non existentibus. Patet enim ex praedictis, quod non habet esse perfectum extra animam, sicut nec motus.<sup>6</sup>

It is interesting to note, however, that time is a species under quantity in the *Categories*, but motion is a post-predicament and in genera only by reduction. Why should time be a species in a genus and not motion?

Motion in the strict sense (the change from subject to subject) and how it is led back to some genus is shown by Thomas in this passage as well as its distinction from acting upon and undergoing:

Concludit ergo ex praemissis, quod cum motus sit de subiecto in subiectum, subiecta autem sunt in aliquo genere praedicamentorum; necesse est quod species motus distinguantur secundum genera praedicamentorum, cum motus denominationem et speciem a termino trahat, ut supra dictum est.

Si ergo praedicamenta sunt divisa in decem rerum genera, scilicet in substantiam at qualitatem etc., ut dictum est in libro *Praedicamentorum* et in V *Metaphysicorum*; et in tribus illorum inveniatur motus, scilicet motus qui est in genere quantitatis, et motus qui est in genere qualitatis, et motus qui est in genere ubi, qui dicitur secundum locum.

Qualiter autem motus sit in istis generibus, et qualiter pertineat motus ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis, in tertio dictum est.

Unde nunc breviter dicere sufficat, quod quilibet motus sit in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed per reductionem. Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus, reducatur ad genus actus perfecti.

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<sup>6</sup>In IV *Physicorum*, Lectio XXIII, n. 629

Secundum autem quod motus consideratur ut est in hoc ab alio, vel ab hoc in aliud, sic pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, motion is closer to a species than is the negation or lack of that species. Hence, it more pertains to the logician of the ten genera of predicates to consider how motion can be reduced to the ten than how negations or lacks can be.

And if logic is ordered to knowing things or beings, as is clear from the first two definitions of the *Categories* and the division of beings, it is clear that it is more concerned about motion than negations or lacks. For motion is a thing or being, although an imperfect one, while a negation or lack is at most a thing only in reason or a being of reason.

And as regards the reduction of beginnings, we can see the chief beginnings distinguished in substance and quantity. It is fairly easy to see the point as the beginning of a line (this is the first sense of *beginning*) and the unit as the beginning of number. But matter and form in substance are difficult to know and are known after motion and are known *per viam motus* which is proper to natural philosophy.

Moreover, the distinction of beings in chapter two included substance and accident, but not motion. In one of the distinctions of being, at the beginning of the fourth book of *Wisdom*, Thomas distinguishes four senses of being of which motion is the third. Lest then a wider consideration of being seem to contradict the completeness of the division of beings and the ten highest genera, this chapter was necessary to show how even the various kinds of motion can be led back to the ten highest genera.

If we go back to the division of beings that are criss-crossed with universal and singular in the division of beings, we can see that this is a distinction of the senses of a word equivocal by reason, *being*. When Thomas reduces the plethora of meanings of *being* or *thing* in Book Four of the *Metaphysics* to four (in the order substance, accident, coming to be or ceasing to be of substance or accident, and negation or lack of these), motion is before negation or lack and beginning does not appear. Hence, it is more relevant to one distinguishing and ordering the names of beings to consider the names of motion than of negations or beginnings. Here is the

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<sup>7</sup> In *V Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 661

text where Thomas distinguishes motion as one of the senses of the word equivocal by reason *being*:

Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci.

Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid. Secundum quid autem differant negatio et privatio, infra dicetur.

Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur. Habent enim aliquid admixtum de privatione et negatione. Nam motus est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur tertio *Physicorum*.

Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates.

Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per existens, sicut sunt substantiae.

Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, inquantum remonent aliquid trium praedictorum.<sup>8</sup>

Again, the reason why Thomas explained the distinction of the ten genera in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* is that motion is in some way the same as undergoing (and even acting upon). Why then is it placed in other genera? Thus the reduction of motion to the ten genera is more difficult to make than negations and perhaps even beginnings.

One reason for considering motion among those, which are reduced to or lead back to a category is the following text of Thomas:

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<sup>8</sup> *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I, nn. 540-543

Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sunt diversa praedicamenta.

Sed sciendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet.

Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi.

Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subiecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis.<sup>9</sup>

Just as it is important to distinguish between place and where and between time and when, so likewise it is necessary to distinguish between motion and acting upon and undergoing. A sign of this is the need of Thomas in discussing motion, acting upon and undergoing in the books of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) to consider the teaching of the *Categories*. To say motion is in the genera of acting upon or undergoing would be to say that motion is in motion:

Deinde...probat quod non sit motus in genere actionis et passionis.

Actio enim et passio non differunt subiecto a motu, sed addunt aliquam rationem, ut in tertio dictum est.

Unde idem est dicere quod motus sit in agere et pati, et quod motus sit in motu.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, change is important for knowing opposites. After the distinction of the four kinds of opposites in Book Five of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics*), Aristotle considers how it can be known that two things are opposites. He gives two ways:

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<sup>9</sup>In *XI Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 2313

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *In V Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 668

Ponit duos modos, secundum quos potest cognosci, quod aliqua sunt opposita:

quorum primus est per comparisonem ad motum. Nam in quolibet motu vel mutatione, terminus a quo, opponitur termino ad quem. Et ideo ex quibus est motus, et in quae est motus, sunt opposita, ut patet in generationibus. Nam generatio albi est ex non albo, et ignis ex non igne.

Secundo modo per comparisonem ad subiectum. Nam illa quae non possunt inesse simul eidem susceptibili, oportet quod adinvicem opponantur, vel ipsa vel ea in quibus sunt. Non enim potest idem corpus simul esse album et nigrum, quae sunt contraria. Homo vero et asinus non possunt de eodem dici, quia habent in suis rationibus differentias oppositas, scilicet rationale et irrationale. Et similiter pallidum et abum; quia pallidum componitur ex nigro, quod est oppositum albo.<sup>11</sup>

Why does he say the *species* of motion which is different from the way of speaking in all the other post-predicaments? If motion is in some way the same as undergoing (and acting upon) and undergoing is a genus, this seems to suggest that motion itself is a genus.

There is one definition of motion in some way in Book Three of *Natural Hearing*. I say *in some way* because one can argue that the words used in the definition are themselves equivocal by reason. Is there one sense of *act*, for example, in the definition of motion?

Even Thomas says that Aristotle defines motion in the third book of *Natural Hearing* and then divides motion into *its species* in the fifth book.

Since motion is the same in substance as *undergoing* and the latter is one genus, it seems that motion should also be one genus. And since time is, as it were, a property of motion, and time is one species of quantity, motion would seem to be somehow like one genus. (Even though someone might reason that time is an extrinsic measure.)

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<sup>11</sup>In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, nn. 923-924

In the following text, Thomas would seem to admit univocity for all motions in the intention of the genus, to admit in some way a common genus for all motions:

motus univocatur ad minus in intentione generis<sup>12</sup>

And in this text, he speaks of the species of motion as coming together equally in the common definition of the genus:

...omnes species motus aequaliter conveniunt in ratione communi motus; tamen secundum esse suum proprium, motus localis est prior aliis motibus.<sup>13</sup>

And in the following text, he again speaks of a *commune univocum* for motions:

...ea quae dividunt aliquod *commune univocum*, simul sunt quantum ad intentionem generis, quamvis unum possit esse causa alterius quantum ad esse, sicut motus localis est causa aliorum motuum contra quos dividitur.

Sed ea quae dividunt aliquod *commune analogum* se habent secundum prius et posterius, etiam quantum ad intentionem communis quod dividitur, sicut patet de substantia et accidente. Unde ex hoc quod una virtus dividitur alteri, non oportet quod una non sit altera principalior.<sup>14</sup>

The above three texts were taken from the *Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum*. But in later texts, Thomas seems to deny one common genus of motions:

Dicitur autem motus unus *genere*, secundum figuras praedicamenti. Omnes enim qui sunt in una coordinatione praedicamenti, possunt dici unus motus in genere: sicut omnis loci mutatio est unus motus in genere, quia est in uno praedicamento *ubi*; differt autem genere ab alteratione, quae est in praedicamento *qualitatis*, ut supra dictum est.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup>*Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist II, Q. I, Art 1, Ad 3

<sup>13</sup>*Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XV, Quaest. IV, Art. II, Ad 2

<sup>14</sup>*Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXIII, Quaest II, Art. I, Solutio I, Ad 2

<sup>15</sup>*n V Physicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 696

And in the following passage, Thomas says that, just as there is not one common genus for the ten predicaments, so there is not one for all motions:

Et sicut non sit aliquid commune decem praedicamentis quod sit genus eorum, ita non est aliquod genus commune omnium motuum. Et propter hoc motus non est aliquod unum praedicamentum distinctum ab aliis praedicamentis; sed sequitur alia praedicamenta.<sup>16</sup>

Perhaps motion is much closer to being a genus or is more a quasi genus than the other post-predicaments and this difference is brought out by Aristotle speaking of the *species* of motion.

To which genera is motion reduced?

In the fifth book of the *Physics*, by a criss-cross division into four and the elimination of one member (as in the division of plot by *before* and *not before* and by *after* and *not after* and the division of looking philosophy by *defining with matter* and *defining without matter* and by *what exists in matter* and *what does not exist in matter*), Aristotle arrives at three. Change is from *affirmative* to *affirmative* (between contraries, motion in strict sense) or from *affirmative* to *not affirmative* (between contradictories, corruption) or from *not affirmative* to *affirmative* (between contradictories, generation) He eliminates from *not affirmative* to *not affirmative* because these are not opposites. He then subdivides motion between contraries in strict sense into three.

One is said to be between contraries and two are said to be between contradictories (in the first division).

But the distinction of motions in the *Categories* is by and in the order of the ten genera. This is a logical one, but not the natural one. In the second book of *Natural History*, Aristotle gives change of place first, then growth, and last alteration. And in the order of natural philosophy, one studies first motion in general, then in particular change of place, alteration, and last growth.

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<sup>16</sup>In *XI Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 2291

Why is there no motion in *to be layed out*? This resembles a bit there being no motion in toward something.

Does motion have more than one contrary? Or is Aristotle using the word *contrary* here broadly to include also lack. Thomas states that rest is more the privation or lack of motion than its contrary in the strict sense:

quies non est negatio motus, sed privatio ipsius<sup>17</sup>

## Appendix

### DIVISION OF CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE SPECIES OF MOTION

Distinction of the six species of motion

Enumeration or naming of the six in the order of the ten genera of predicates

They are different

Where more manifest

Where less clear

What is altered need not change in other ways

What grows need not alter in quality

Opposition of motions

In general: motion is opposed to rest

In particular

corruption to generation & shrinking to growth

change of place opposed to rest in place & to change to contrary place

likewise, alteration to rest in quality & to change to contrary quality

Duane H. Berquist

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<sup>17</sup> *In IV Physicorum*, Lectio XX, n. 608

