

## ARISTOTLE, BOOK TWO OF WISDOM, READING FIVE

Listenings happen according to customs. For we expect it to be said in the way to which we are accustomed. And what is apart from this does not seem similar, but more unknown and strange through unfamiliarity - for the familiar is known.

The laws, in which the mythical and childish prevail through custom over our knowledge of them, show how much strength the customary has.

Thus some will not accept what is said if one does not speak mathematically; others, if not by example; while others expect a poet to be brought in as witness..

And these, all things precisely [with certitude]: while the precise saddens those either through not being able to join one thing with another or through stinginess. For the precise has something of this sort; so that just as in contracts, so also in discussions, it seems to some to be illiberal.

Hence it is necessary to be brought up to how each should be received because it is absurd to seek at the same time reasoned out knowledge and the way of reasoned out knowledge - and neither is easy to get.

One ought not to demand mathematical precision [or certitude] in all things, but in those not having matter. Whence this way is not that of the knowledge of natural things for probably all nature has matter.

Whence one ought to consider first what is nature. And thus it will become clear what the knowledge of natural things is about and whether it belongs to one or more than one reasoned out knowledge to consider the causes and beginnings.