

scientific knowledge will cause the greater certitude.

Secondly, if the two modes of certitude are considered separately, there is further reason for maintaining that science is more certain than faith, at least as regards man's intellect. St. Thomas says:

Dicendum est quod certitudo potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius illud quod habet certiores causas; et hoc modo fides est certior tribus praedictis (intellectus, scientia, et sapientia) quia fides innititur veritati divinae, tria autem praedicta innituntur rationi humanae.

Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subjecti; et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis; et per hunc modum, quia ea quae sunt fidei, sunt supra intellectum hominis, non autem ea subsunt tribus praedictis; ideo ex hac parte fides est minus certa.

Sed quia unumquodque iudicatur simpliciter quidem secundum causam suam secundum autem dispositionem, quae ex parte subjecti est, iudicatur secundum quid; inde est quod fides est simpliciter certior; sed alia sunt certiora secundum quid, scilicet quoad nos. (1)

(1) 11a-11ae, q. 4, a. 8.

But the question precisely is this: which produces greater certitude for man, faith of science? St. Thomas shows clearly in this passage that though faith (which is "supra intellectum hominis") may have greater certitude in itself ex causa certitudinis than the certitude of science, nevertheless, in regard to the human intellect which is weak and inept, it does not produce as great a certitude as does natural science (which plenius consequitur intellectus hominis). The object of metaphysics is more certain in itself than the object of mathematics, nevertheless, man is less certain in matters of metaphysics, which are supra intellectum hominis, and far more certain in mathematics because his intellect is more proportioned to the object. So, in like manner, the human intellect does not adhere with as great firmness to the mysteries of faith as it does to objects evidently manifests by natural science. From this follows that although faith in itself is more certain than natural scientific knowledge, nevertheless it is weaker quoad nos. Cajetan seems to support this conclusion when he says:

Et non oportet quod attendatur
(certitudo) semper penes modum co-
gnitionis quem de facto habet cognos-
cens; penes modum siquidem istum
attenditur certitudo quoad nos. Unde
fides infusa ex meritis proprii medii,
scilicet veritatis divinae, nata est
certificare magis quam lumen natu-
rale; sed propter excellentiam cre-
dibilium nos non ita certificamur.
Per habitum ergo vel actum certiores
fit objectum certius eo modo quo
habitus vel actus est certior; si
secundum se, fit secundum se certius;
si quoad nos, fit quoad nos certior.

Thirdly, science is more certain than faith
because of the admitted imperfection of faith. It is
of the essence of certitude that it determine the
intellect to firm and unwavering adherence to such an
extent that all hesitation, fear of error and doubt
are excluded. At least this much can be said, that
whatever moves the intellect to assent without ex-
cluding all doubt is less certain intensively than
that which moves the intellect assent, removing all
fear of error. It is, however, precisely in this that
faith is less certain than science because it is fact
of experience that faith does not exclude all doubt
and hesitation. If a man gives assent to a conclu-
sion scientifically known, and known that his know-
ledge is scientific, he does not withdraw assent,

where as experience shows also that men frequently lose their faith, in other words withdraw their assent. St. Thomas admits this imperfection when he says in the De Veritate:

Ad quintum dicendum quod fides habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectionis: perfectionis quidem est ipsa firmitas, quae pertinet ad assensum, sed imperfectionis est carentia visionis, ex qua remanet adhuc motus cogitationis in mente credentis. Ex lumine igitur simplici, quod est fides, causatur id quod perfectionis est, scilicet assentire; sed in quantum illud lumen non perfecte participatur, non totaliter tollitur imperfectio intellectus; et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus. (1)

Again in the Sentences he says:

Ad secundum dicendum quod credenti accidit aliquis motus dubitationis ex hoc quod intellectus ejus non est terminatus secundum se in sui intelligibilis visione sicut est in scientia et intellectu, sed solum ex imperio voluntatis. Et ideo sciens quantum ad id recedit a dubitate magis quam credens; sed credens secundum unum scilicet firmitatem adhaesionis magis recedit quam sciens secundum illa duo. (2)

(1) De Ver., q. 14, a. 1, ad 5.

(2) 111 Sent., q. 2, a. 2, q1a 3.

In the Summa this same notion is stated even more strongly:

Manifestum est autem quod imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei; ponitur enim in ejus definitione; fides enim est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium, ut dicitur Heb XI, 1, et Augustinus dicit: "Quid est fides? credere quod non vides." Quod autem cognitio sit sine apparitione vel vivione, hoc ad imperfectiorem cognitionis pertinet; et sic imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Unde manifestum est quod fides non potest esse perfecta cognitio eadem numero manens. (1)

Thus, natural scientific knowledge fulfills all that is demanded of certitude as regards both the firmness of adherence and evidence, and in this, excludes all doubt and hesitation. Nor should the role of evidence be underestimated since, when that is present, there is no fear of error. Hence it can be asserted: as regards man's intellect, what is more evident is more certain; science is evident and faith is not. Consequently, science is more certain than faith, but faith, because it does not exclude doubt

(1) Ia-IIae, q. 67, a. 3.

and hesitation, is less certain than science.

However, despite these objections, it must be said to the contrary that faith, in comparison with natural scientific knowledge, is not only certain but far more certain.

That faith has certitude is evident from the following argument: firmness and determination of the intellect to assent caused by the motive, and not evidence, is of the very formal ratio of certitude. But, infused faith determines the intellect to firm assent, because it is based on a most certain motive, namely, divine testimony. Therefore, faith is certain. St. Thomas in defining certitude, did not define it through evidence but through firmness of adherence:

Certitudo propria dicitur firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae ad suum cognoscibile. (1)

It is true that when the intellect knows according to its own proper mode of knowing, there must be evidence, because the intellect cannot be

(1) III Sent., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 1.

informed by an object whose intelligibility is not manifested to it. In making judgment according to its own mode of knowing, the intellect must see (i.e., there must be evidence) that the two extremes either go together or are disparate, otherwise the intellect is not justified in assenting. Nevertheless, this does not say that the evident object is alone in moving the intellect to assent. As has already been shown, the will also moves the intellect. Since the firm adherence of the intellect depends on that which causes it, the strength of the motive, infused faith unquestionably produces certitude since it has for its motive veritas prima sive Deus qui creditur.

Therefore, we give thanks to God without ceasing, because that when you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who worketh in you that have believed. (1)

Not only is the assent of faith certain but it is far more certain than natural scientific knowledge. The reason for this is manifest: formal

(1) I Thess. II, 13 (Douay).

certitude is greater simpliciter not because of adherence and evidence, but because of causes which, simply speaking, are stronger and hence determine the intellect more surely in regard to the object. But the motive of faith is far more certain than the motive of science. Therefore, it produces a formal certitude far greater than that produced by natural science. The evidence which science has does not as such add something in the line of certitude.

In his ergo quae per fidem credimus, Ratio voluntatem inclinans, ut dictum est, est ipsa veritas prima sive Deus cui creditur, quae habet majorem firmitatem quam lumen intellectus humani in quo conspiciuntur principia, vel ratio humana secundum quam conclusiones in principia resoluntur. Et ideo, fides habet majorem certitudinem quantum ad firmitatem adhaesionis, quam sit certitudo scientiae vel intellectus, quamvis in scientia et intellectu sit major evidentia eorum quibus assentitur. (1)

Nor does the fact that faith is inferior merely in regard to the number of notes affect the strength of its certitude because, again, the ratio

(1) III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q1a 3, (Parisii, 1933), p. 728, n. 157.

formalis of certitude is not evidence but firmness of adherence. That on which the whole certitude in the assent depends is the formal motive on which the assent is based, so that a certain assent is greater to the extent that it comes from more certain causes. Now, the formal motive of faith is simply speaking more certain and more capable of producing firmer assent than any natural formal motive because the formal motive of faith is revelation or God testifying, which far surpasses any natural motive. Just as the supernatural exceeds the natural simpliciter, so the certitude of faith, which is a certain participation in uncreated certitude, far surpasses any natural certitude man may have by himself.

Primo modo dicendum est quod certitudo potest considerari dupliciter:

- 1) uno modo ex causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius illud quod habet certiores causas; et hoc modo fides est certior tribus praedictis (intellectus, scientia, sapientia) quia fides innititur veritati divinae, tria autem praedicta inniuntur rationi humanae.
- 2) Alio modo potest considerari cer-

titudo ex parte subjecti; et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis; et per hunc modum quia ea sunt fidei, sunt supra intellectum hominis, non autem ea quae subsunt tribus praedictis. Ideo ex hac parte fides est minus certa.

Sed quia unumquodque judicatur simpliciter quidem secundum causam suam, secundum autem dispositionem, quae ex parte subjecti est, judicatur secundum quid, inde est quod fides est simpliciter certior, sed alia sunt certiora secundum quid, scilicet quoad nos. (1)

In comparing the certitude of faith and natural scientific knowledge, then, the ultimate determining factor will be the formal motive. In faith the formal motive veritas prima sive Deus cui creditur, (2) is a much stronger motive than the light of natural reason in causing the intellect to assent. In purely natural knowledge a lack of evidence will necessarily give rise to a lack of certitude, but the fact that evidence is lacking in faith will indicate only that the assent is

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 4, a. 8.

(2) III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q1a 3.

obtained according to a mode not proper to the intellect. For that reason, however, the certitude will not be lessened.

Ceteris paribus visio est certior auditu. Sed si ille a quo auditur, multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est auditus quam visus, sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientifico, quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur. Et multo magis homo certior est de eo quod audit a Deo, qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria ratione, quae falli potest. (1)

St. Thomas insists on this notion in several other places:

Certitudo enim scientiae consistit in duobus, scilicet in evidentia et firmitate adhaesionis. Certitudo vero fidei consistit in uno tantum, scilicet in firmitate adhaesionis... Quamvis certitudo fidei de qua loquimur, quantum ad illud unum sit vehementior quam certitudo scientiae quantum ad illa duo. (2)

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 4, a. 8, ad 2.

(2) III Sent., dist.³³ q. 2, a. 2, qle 3, ad 1.

And again:

Certitudo duo potest importare:
scilicet

- 1) firmitatem adhaesionis, et quantum ad hoc fides est certior omni intellectu et scientia, quia prima veritas, quae causat fidei assensum, est fortior causa quam lumen rationis, quod causat assensum intellectus vel scientiae;
- 2) importat etiam evidentiam ejus cui assentitur, et sic fides non habet certitudinem, sed scientia et intellectus....(1)

The whole strength of the assent in formal certitude, then, will be in the cause, and will be simpliciter more certain when its cause is more certain, more efficacious, more determinate, and "ad oppositum invertibilior." (2) And the superiority of the certitude of faith rests in this that the cause of its assent, veritas prima is more certain and efficacious and altogether "ad oppositum immutabilior."

These principles and conclusions are, at the same time, quite adequate for answering the objections previously stated.

(1) De Ver., q. 14, a. 1, ad 7.

(2) Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae, in III Sent., q. 1, a. 1, 1a concl.

(3) Ibid.

The first objection (page 64) was based on the the assumption that the certitude of science is stronger because of a numerical superiority of notes, that is, it has both firm adherence and evidence whereas faith has firm adherence but lacks evidence. This numerical superiority of characteristics can be easily conceded. St. Thomas says in the Sentences:

Certitudo fidei dicitur media inter certitudinem scientiae et opinionis non intensiva per modum quantitatis continuae, sed extensiva per modum numeri. (1)

The strength and intensity of the formal certitude, however, is not measured by the number of notes which characterize it, but by the firmness of adherence in which the intellect is determined to assent. Inasmuch as the motive determining the intellect in faith is incomparably stronger than the motive in science, strength and intensity of certitude is greater. While it is true that in natural knowledge certitude and evidence are joined together so that there can be no certitude without evidence

(1) III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, gla 3, ad 1.

and the certitude will be proportioned to the evidence, nevertheless evidence is not of the ratio of certitude. Whenever the object is the formal motive of certitude, it is necessary that there be on the part of the object this necessary condition, namely that its intelligibility be manifest or evident, otherwise the intellect cannot adhere to what it does not know. Evidence, moreover, must be taken into consideration whenever comparisons between various certitudes are made within the same order. When, however, the orders are different, as is the case in comparing the certitude of science, whose formal motive is the object, with the certitude of faith, whose formal motive is God testifying through the will, then the conditions necessary for one are not necessary for the other. In this case there is simply a comparison of the strength of the formal motives. Hence, reason for the conclusion: the formal motive of faith is stronger in moving the intellect to assent; therefore faith is more certain.

Quamvis certitudo fidei de qua loquimur, quantum ad illud unum (firmitas adhaesionis) sit vehementior quam certitudo scientiae quantum ad

illa duo (firmitas adhaesionis et
evidentia.) (1)

From the passage in the Secunda Secundae cited in the second objection above (page 66), it can in no way be inferred that faith is more certain in one way i.e., simpliciter, but science is more certain in another i.e., secundum quid, as if the greater certitude of one in one respect were balanced by the greater certitude of the other in a different respect. St. Thomas in this text is not dividing certitudo into two kinds, but is contrasting certitudo properly speaking, which is firm adherence by the intellect to the true, to certitudo equivocally speaking, which is the penetration of the manifested object. Even though this penetration of the object is indispensable for attaining certitudo in purely natural knowledge, it cannot properly be called certitudo. Conversely, a lack of penetration of the object is opposed to evidence, not to firm adherence on the part of the intellect, which is certitudo properly speaking. Thus in the article,

(1) III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q1a 3, ad 1.

when St. Thomas says that faith is more certain simpliciter, he understands certitude in its proper sense, as a firm adherence of the intellect. When he says that natural science is more certain secundum quid, he intends certitude to be taken in an improper sense, for the comprehension of the object. This is clear from the argument where he states that faith is more certain because it has more certain causes, but science is more certain because plenius consequitur (i.e., intelligit) intellectus humanus. The reason for this is that certitude is always determined by the motive which causes the intellect to adhere, and not by any thing else. However, the operation of the cause may be conditioned by something else, for example, a proportion between the potency and the intellectual object. Thus, an act which takes into account such a proportion (e.g., science) is said to be more certain ex parte subjecti, not because the adherence is greater, but because, the object being proportioned to the intellect, is manifested and penetrated and all doubt and hesitation are excluded. From this it follows that science does not produce a greater certitude in nobis, that

is, a firmer assent, but only a greater certitude equivocally speaking, quoad nos, in so far as the object, being more proportioned to our inferior intellect, can be penetrated and thus manifest to it. (1)

Nihil prohibet id quod est certius secundum naturam esse quoad nos minus certum propter debilitatem intellectus nostri qui se habet ad manifestissimam naturam sicut oculus nocturnae ad lumen solis, ut dicitur. Unde dubitatio quae accidit in aliquibus circa articulos fidei non est propter incertitudinem rei, sed propter debilitatem intellectus humani. (2)

St. Thomas was also cited in a third objection (page 68) to show that faith has aliquid imperfectionis and is less certain than science because it does not resolve all doubt and indecision. The argument would be valid provided it were applied to an assent where the doubt and hesitation would have their source in the cause which moves the intellect to a doubtful assent, and not in something else, such as the lack of evidence on the part

(1) Cf: Salmanticenses, Curs. Theol., Tract. 17, disp. 2, dub. 5, nn. 115-117, XI, p. 159.
(2) Ia, q. 1, a. 5 ad 1.

of the object. Doubt may arise either from the motive of from the lack of evidence. If the doubt arises from the motive, there results a doubtful assent and hence no certitude, because the intellect is not firmly determined to one part of the contradiction excluding the other. If, however, the object lacks evidence, but at the same time the formal motive moving the intellect is not the object, but the will, then the degree of certitude will depend solely on the motive moving the will and the lack of evidence in no wise lessens the certitude. Now in faith, the doubt comes in no way from the motive which is far stronger than the motive of natural science, but simply because the object is not evident.

*Illa dubitatio non est ex parte
causae fidei, sed quoad nos, inquan-
tum non plene assequimur per intellec-
tum ea quae sunt fidei. (1)*

Hence, even with the intellect hesitating before the object, the certitude of faith is not affected by the doubt. This explains why one believing can

(1) *Illa-Illae*, q.4, a. 8, ad 1.

can have doubts, sometimes only involuntarily, about the mysteries of faith even while still firmly believing in them. Since the object is not manifest, the intellect is not completely satisfied and at rest, and thus, even when moved by the will it assents, there still remains that lack of manifestation, comprehension and complete termination in the object which the intellect by its very nature seeks.

Sed in fide est assensus et cogitatio quasi ex aequo. Non assensus ex cogitatione causatur, sed ex voluntate, ut dictum est. Sed quia intellectus non hoc modo terminatur ad unum ut ad proprium terminum perducatur, qui est visio alicujus intelligibilis, inde est quod ejus motus nondum est quietatus, sed adhuc habet cogitationem et inquisitionem de his quae credit, quamvis firmissime eis assentiat. Quantum enim est ex se ipso, non est ei satisfactum nec est terminatus ad unum, sed terminatur tantum ex extrinseco.

Et inde est quod intellectus credentis dicitur esse captivatus, quia tenetur terminis alienis, et non propriis. 11 Cor. X, 5: In captivitatem redingentes omnen intellectum. Inde etiam est quod in credente potest insurgere motus de contrario hujus quod firmissime

tenet, quamvis non in intelligen-
te et sciente. (1)

And again:

Credenti accidit aliquis motus
dubitationis ex hoc quod intellectus
ejus non est terminatus secundum se
in sui intelligibilis visione sicut
est in scientia et intellectu, sed
solum ex imperio voluntatis. Et ideo
sciens quantum ad id recedit a dubi-
tante magis quam credens. Sed credens
secundum unum scilicet firmitatem
adhaesionis magis recedit quam sciens
secundum illa duo. (2)

While it is true, as the objection states,
that men do not withdraw an assent once given in
science but do sometimes lose their faith, this fact
in no way tells against the certitude of faith. If
a man loses his faith it is because, having placed
undue emphasis on the inevident object, he allows
his intellect to be moved to a denial of the truth
of faith. In doing this he substitutes as his form-
al motive the non-evident object in place of the
true motive of faith, namely the will moving by

(1) De Ver., q. 14, a. 1.

(2) III Sent., dist. 23, 2. q, a. 2, q1a 3, ad 2.

presenting to the intellect a bonum conveniens.

The conclusion to this part may be stated thus:

1) The perfection of the intellect is certitude which consists formally in the firm adherence of the intellect to its intelligible object. The intensity of the firmness will be proportioned to the strength of the cause or formal motive which moves the intellect to make the assent.

2) Faith causes a greater certitude in the intellect than science, because its formal motive, God or prima veritas testificans, is a far stronger motive for assenting to the truths which are revealed than the light of natural reason is for assenting to truths which are evident.

ii.

Can Faith and Science about the Same
Object Coexist in the Same Intellect ?

It is obvious that the above solution, namely that faith causes a greater certitude in the intellect than does science, does not of itself answer the problem of Christian philosophy. There are, conceivably, many possibilities. One person might have the certitude of faith, and another the certitude of natural reason; or, even in the same person there might be faith and evidence, but about different objects; or again, faith and evidence might be present in the same person about the same objects but successively. All of these could be included within the limits of the solution given above, yet at the same time, none of them answers the problem whether a philosopher who is Christian will have a greater perfection, as philosopher, precisely because of his faith. If the Christian philosopher's faith is to influence his science, the two must somehow be brought together to bear on the same object. In discussing

the various aspects of this problem the argument will follow simply the treatment given by John of St. Thomas in the Curso Theologicus, Tome VII, Disputation Two, Article One.

The problem may be posed as follows: is there a contradiction in saying this that one person can believe and know scientifically the same thing simultaneously? that he can have at the same time faith in an evident proof of the same object? There seems to be no impossibility in this, since evidence and lack of evidence concerning the same thing are compatible at least successively. From this it would follow that one and the same person could know something evidently through demonstration and then, having received the faith, believe what he formerly knew. Such might be the case of the philosopher who has an evident demonstration of the truth: God is; then, after having been converted to the faith, he also believes the same truth, as St. Paul says: "credere enim oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est." (1) while at the same time not losing the demonstration

(1) Heb., xi, 6.

of that truth. That he can still have a philosophical demonstration of the truth is evident since he does not lose his philosophical proof by being converted to the faith, just as the theologian who has faith can at the same time have a demonstration of God's existence. Hence, it seems to be no incompatibility if there be in the same intellect the evident act of science and the non-evident act of faith, provided that the two are not confused and made to coalesce into one.

One seems forced to admit such a conclusion because of the difficulties which would follow upon a contrary position of some kind. Of the latter there are three possible alternatives.

1. If it is not admitted that science and faith can coexist in the same knower about the same object, then it would have to be said that he who has a scientific demonstration about the truth, God is, and is then converted to the faith, retains the scientific demonstration but does not have either the act or habit of faith about that particular truth, that is, he does not believe the truth ac-

tually, but only in praeparatione animi. Consequently, the certitude which he has about that truth is a certitude of philosophy, not of faith and is no greater than the certitude which the non-Christian philosopher has.

The difficulty, however, of such a position, as Suarez notes, is that it seems incredible that the Christian philosopher should have an assent which not only would be no firmer than the assent of the non-Christian philosopher, but, at the same time, would be less firm than the assent of one who had but simple faith and no scientific demonstration of that truth. In other words, the Christian philosopher would be worse off the very reason that he had evident scientific knowledge about God's existence. Suarez says:

Sed in hoc [quod fidelis Christianus, eo ipso quod acquirit demonstrationem, amittit fidem circa easdem veritates] sine dubio vehementer fallitur [Capreolus], primo, quia videtur plane esse contra ipsam experientiam, quia fidelis factus doctior circa has veritates per scientiam, non minus firmiter illas credit, quam antea, sed eodem modo profitetur Symbolum, in quo

etiam illae continentur,
et eodem affectu firmante
intellectum quo antea. Neque
est verisimile fedelem, prop-
ter acquisitam scientiam,
factum esse peioris conditi-
onis in spiritualibus donis,
et maxime in fide, quae est
aliorum fundamentum. (1)

This reason impressed many of the theol-
ogians, among them Gregorius de Valentia,, who said:

si assensus fide et ass-
ensus evidens de eodem non pos-
sunt stare, sed assensus evidens
assensum fidei excludit ut dicunt:
non autem assensus fidei assensum
evidentem (constat enim experientia
fidem non impedire, quominus quis
acquirat evidentem assensum per
demonstrationem), sequitur hominem
quod attinet ad eos fidei articu-
los qui evidenter sciri possint,
deterioris esse conditionis si doc-
tus, sit quam si sit indoctus.
Quod certe absurditate concedi non
potest. (2)

Ripalda is of the same opinion:

Ergo possunt illi [docti]
simul habere actum evidentem et fidei.

(1) Suarez, De Fide, disp. 3, sec. 9, n. 4 (Vivès,
1858,) XII, p. 80.

(2) Gregorius de Valentia, Comm. Theologicum, De Fide,
disp. 1a, punct. 4 (Paris, 1609), III, col. 68D.

Alias, deterioris conditionis
essent docti, quam indocti,
cum circa plura objecta effice-
rent indocti actus meritorios
fidei quam docti..(1)

Toletus says the same:

Quia alias sequeretur, quod
qui hujusmodi demonstrationem
haberet, minus erat; quod dicere
perfecto est inauditum et omnino
falsum. Tunc enim esset scilicet hu-
jusmodi scientias assequere, quum
minuant fidei certitudinem.

Sequitur autem probatur, Scien-
tia et demonstratio, licet sit clari-
or, est tamen minus certa, quam fi-
des, ut ipse S. Thomas docet ques-
tione quarta. Sit igitur qui demon-
strationem habet, privatur actu
fidei circa articulum illum, ergo
minus certe assentit illi, quam
ante. (2)

A further embarrassment would arise from
the fact that not only would the Christian philosopher
be less certain than the Christian of simple faith,
but also there would be no justification for him.

(1) Ripalda, Ioannis Martinez de, De Virtutibus
Theologicis, disp. 12, sec. 3, n. 46, (Vivès, 1873),
VII, p. 226.

(2) Toletus, In Summa S. Thomae, II, q. 1, a. 5, 2a
concl., n. 1 (Rome, 1869), p. 36.

If he would not believe that God is (which this position supposes), he could not approach Him. But, as St. Paul says, this is necessary for salvation:

Sine fide autem impossibile est placere Deo; credere enim oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit.(1)

On this Suarez says:

Deus ergo philosophum habentem evidentiam de existentia Dei accedere ad Deum ut justificetur; ergo necesse est ut ille etiam credat Deum esse; credendo autem non amittit habitum scientiae, ut potest esse evidens experientia et ratione, quia actus infusus non habet oppositionem cum habitu acquisito, secunda ratione culpae, quae est opposita moralis. Propter hoc, Cajetanus ad locum Pauli exponit illud credere de quocumque assensu certo, et ita existimat necessarium non esse ut philosophus factus Christianus fide infusa credat Deum esse. Sed hoc reprobavi in superioribus, quia manifeste est contra contextum Pauli, quando enim dixit, Sine fide est impossibile est placere Deo, sine ulla dubitatione de fide infusa loquebatur...(2)

(1) Heb. 11, 6.

(2) Suarez, De Fide, disp. 3, sect. 9, n. 5.

Because of such inadmissible consequences, it seems that it must be held that faith and evident science about the same object can coexist in the same subject.

2. A second possible alternative would be to say that he who has the faith has de facto a greater certitude that God is than the non-Christian philosopher, because he has the faith, but beyond that no scientific proof of that truth. Thus, the philosopher in gaining faith with its greater certitude would at the same time lose his scientific knowledge about truths on which his faith bears. This is equally difficult to admit since it is a fact of experience that such a demonstration had before conversion remains after conversion. Furthermore, assent once given because of evident demonstration convinces the intellect perfectly and is therefore not superceded by the non-evident assent of faith, which, though it moves the intellect to a certain assent, is nevertheless obscure and imperfect as knowledge because it lacks evidence. For these reasons, then, is no justification for holding that faith eliminates the philosopher's scientific knowledge.

Ponamus ergo philosophum illum non tantum evidenter cognoscere Deum esse, sed etiam veracem esse, et habitum retinere utriusque veritatis; tunc ergo ut ille incipiat credere, oportet, ut per fidem infusam credat Deum non posse fallere, et nihilominus retinet integrum habitum scientiae. Ergo, de eadem veritate naturali circa Deum stat actus fidei cum habitu scientiae. (1)

3. There is a third possible solution if it be said that the Christian philosopher has at the same time the evident act of science along with the certitude of faith. This can be explained in two ways: by saying either (a) there is one act which has both the ratio of scientific evidence and the ratio of the certitude of faith, or, (b) the act is one, but specifically different both from faith and science but containing eminently the perfections of both. It is impossible to maintain the first of these alternatives because if the evidence of science and the certitude of faith are formally in the same act, then the evidence

(1) Suarez, De Fide, disp. 3, sect. 9, n. 5.

is specifically scientific and the certitude is formally of faith. This amounts to saying that there is no contradiction in having science and faith in the same subject about the same object. This destroys the position and admits what was originally stated to the contrary, namely that there is no incompatibility if the same individual has non-evident faith and evident scientific knowledge about the same truth. If, to escape this, it be said that the act has the ratio of science but not the certitude of faith, then equally embarrassing consequences follow. Would the certitude, then, be a natural certitude?--then, once more, the Christian philosopher would be less certain than an ignorant person who has but the faith, less certain because he knew more. Moreover, he could not be justified because he did not believe that God is. Or, would the certitude be supernatural but not of faith?--then in what species would it be, since the certitude of faith alone is based on the authority and testimony of God? If the second alternative be accepted, namely that the act is specifically different from both faith and science and yet contains

eminently the perfections of both, the position is even more difficult to sustain. Such an act would be either natural, and then the difficulties mentioned above would recur; or, it would be supernatural, and then it would be the certitude of faith, or it would be superior to both, which is impossible.

In addition these difficulties, the authority of St. Thomas might be cited to show that faith and natural scientific knowledge can coexist in the same subject. At least, he seems to find no incompatibility in holding that the same knower can have both perfect and imperfect knowledge:

Cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex parte medi impossible est quod convenient in uno medio. Sed nihil prohibet quin convenient in uno objecto et un uno subjecto. Potest enim unus homo cognoscere eadem conclusionem per medium probabile et demonstrativum. (1)

Elsewhere he says:

Scientia et opinio, quamvis sunt de eodem, non tamen secundum idem medium, sed secundum diversa, et ideo possunt esse simul. (2)

(1) Ia-IIae, q. 67, a. 3.

(2) III Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, a. 1, q1a 1, ad 4.

From this the conclusion can be drawn that since opinion, which is non-evident, can exist in the same subject with science, which is evident, because they are produced by different media, so the non-evidence of faith can coexist with the evidence of scientific proof in the same subject because they, too, proceed through different media. Moreover, St. Thomas implies just such a conclusion when he says:

Quanto autem homo habet voluntatem credendi ea quae sunt fidei, ex sola auctoritate divina, etiamsi habeat rationem demonstrativam ad aliquid eorum, puta ad hoc quod est Deum esse; non propter hoc tollitur vel diminuitur meritum fidei. (1)

These objections and counterobjections serve to show how difficult and complicated the problem is. And if there is to be any solution, it must first begin with a discussion of this fundamental question: is it possible for the same knowing subject to have both science and faith? Can the act of science and the act of faith coexist in the same subject concerning the same object? Can the

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10, ad 1.

habits of science and faith coexist in the same intellect extending to the same object, e.g., Deus est?

Despite the quotations from St. Thomas cited above, his position on this question is definite and consistent: an act of faith and an act of science, or the habits of faith and science bearing on the same truth are incompatible in the same subject because of the incompatible conditions and effects which they imply on the part of the subject. In explaining the difference between science and faith, St. Thomas proceeds by showing first that faith does not bear on evident objects.

Assentit autem intellectus
alicui dupliciter:

- 1) uno modo quia ad hoc movetur ab ipso objecto, quod est vel per seipsum cognitum sicut patet in principiis primis, quorum est intellectus; vel per aliud cognitum sicut patet de conclusionibus quarum est scientia.
- 2) Alio modo intellectus assentit alicui, non quia sufficienter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per quamdam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam; et si quidem hoc sit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis,

erit opinio; si autem sit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides. Illa autem videri dicuntur quae per seipsa movent intellectum nostrum vel sensum ad sui cognitionem. Unde manifestum est quod nec fides nec opinio potest esse de ipsis visis aut secundum sensum aut secundum intellectum. (1)

Again, he says:

Alio modo potest accipi ratio formalis credibilium ex parte nostri; et sic ratio formalis credibilis est ut sit non visum; et ex hac parte articuli fidei distinguuntur, ut visum est. (2)

St. Thomas then shows the opposition between the evident knowledge of science and the non-evident knowledge of faith:

Omnis scientia habetur per aliqua principia per se nota, et per consequens visa; et ideo oportet quaecumque sunt scita, aliquo modo esse visa. Non autem est possibile quod idem ab eodem sit visum et creditum, sicut supra dictum est.

Unde etiam impossibile est quod ab eodem idem sit scitum et

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 4.

(2) IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

creditum. Potest tamen contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno sit creditum ab alio. Etenim quae de Trinitate credimus, nos visuros speramus, secundum illud I Cor. 13:12, Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; quam quidem visionem jam angeli habent. Unde quod nos credimus, illi vident.

Et sic similiter potest contingere, ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno homine, etiam in statu viae, sit ab alio creditum, qui hoc demonstrative non novit. Id tamen quod communiter omnibus proponitur hominibus ut credendum est communiter non scitum et ista sunt quae simpliciter fidei subsunt. (1)

He proves the same in the De Veritate:

Quandocumque autem deficit ratio proprii objecti, oportet quod actus deficiat; unde quam cito aliquid incipit esse praesens vel apprens, non potest ut objectum subesse actui fidei. Quaecumque autem sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia quae per se praesto sunt intellectui. Et sic omnis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficitur. Unde impossibile est quod de eodem sit fides et scientia.

Aliquid vero est credibile non simpliciter, sed respectu aliqujus, quod quidem non excedit facul-

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 5.

tatem omnium hominum, sed aliquorum tantum, sicut illa quae de Deo demonstrative sciri possunt, ut Deum esse unum aut incorporeum et huiusmodi. Et de his nihil prohibet quin sint ab aliquibus scitia, qui horum habeant demonstrationes, et ab aliquibus credita, qui horum demonstrationes non perceperunt. Sed impossibile est quod sint ab eodem scita et credita. (1)

And St. Thomas in many other places gives the same explanation. (2)

The reason for this conclusion, as St. Thomas indicates, is faith and science are opposed because they imply evidence and non-evidence, perfection and imperfection, in so far as the knower would both see the truth and not see it at the same time. But, this is impossible because Scitum est visum, et creditum est non-visum. (3) Thus, the two cannot coexist in the same subject about the same object. The very ratio of the object of faith is that it be non-visum by the one who believes, whereas the ratio of the object of science is that

(1) De Ver., q. 14, a. 9.

(2) Ia-IIae, q. 67, a. 3; IIIa, q. 7, a. 3; III Sent., dist. 24, a.2, q1a 1; Ia-IIae, q. a.a.5. ad 4.

(3) Ia-IIae, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4.

it be visum, that is evident to the one who has the scientific knowledge.

Medium illud evidens et necessarium tollit formalem rationem objecti fidei, cum faciat illud enuntiabile, quod concludit, esse apparens et visum. Actus autem fidei non cadit super illud ubi non salvatur ratio sui objecti. Et de hoc licet quod, quam cito aliquid incipit esse praesens, vel apparens, non potest ut objectum subesse actui fidei. (1)

Were science and faith to coexist in the same intellect, it would imply that the intellect would imply that the intellect would both have evidence and not have evidence of the object, that it would be in movement towards its term of complete knowledge and at the same time have arrived and rest in that term, that it would be completely moved and convinced by the evidence and not be completely convinced--all of which is impossible.

For a clear understanding of St. Thomas'

(1) Capreolus, Defensiones, in IIIam Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, ad arg. contr 2am concl, ad 2.

argument, it must be emphasized that when the object of faith is said to be non-visum, this denomination non-visum comes from the subject who does not see, and not merely from a different medium. A misunderstanding about this point arises because some think that the difference between evident science and non-evident faith to consist solely in the different media. So, they conclude that just as a certain reason for assent does not destroy the probable reason--and it is true that one can assent with certitude to a proposition while at the same time not discarding several probable reasons--so one can assent because of an evident medium as well as because of a non-evident medium. The clear and obscure representation of an object are diverse indeed, they say, but not opposed, and in the same subject one does not exclude the other. Clarity and obscurity are not compared to one another as form and privation, but as perfect and imperfect, clear and less clear knowledge, both of which can coexist in the same intellect. (1)

(1) Cf: Ripalda, De Virt. Theol., disp. 12, sect. 3, n. 45.

St. Thomas says, however:

Quamvis lumen divinitus infusum sit efficacius quam lumen naturale, non tamen in statu isto participatur a nobis perfecte, sed imperfecte, et ideo, propter imperfectam participationem eius, contingit quod non ducimur per illud in visionem horum ad quorum cognitionem datur; sed hoc erit in patria, quando perfecte illud lumen participabimus, ubi in lumine Dei videbimus lumen. (1)

In this passage St. Thomas does not say that faith and science are opposed merely because of different media, but because they denote, simultaneously, perfection and imperfection on the part of the subject. The imperfection of faith, then, and hence the reason why it is opposed to natural scientific knowledge, must be taken not only on the part of its medium, which is obscure (as opposed to the evident medium of science), but also because of the fact that faith, if it is to be received, demands that the subject into which it is received be in se and absolutely non-videns. Hence, the object believed is said to be non-visum from a denomination taken from the subject who lacks evidence.

(1) De Ver., q. 14, a. 9.

In order to see clearly that the reason for the opposition of faith to science is founded precisely on the imperfection of faith on the part of the subject, and not merely on the obscurity of the medium of faith, special note must be taken of a distinction made by Cajetan. (1) An act, he says, may be imperfect on the part of the subject in two ways. In one way there is imperfection because the act itself is imperfect and, when found in a subject, renders the subject imperfect. Thus, a subject having only probable knowledge would be imperfect, because, since probably knowledge itself is imperfect, it renders imperfect the knower in which it resides. In another way an act may be imperfect because of an imperfection taken from the subject itself, inasmuch as the act is of such a nature that it cannot exist except in an imperfect subject. The most familiar example of this is motion, actus entis in potentia, whose imperfection, privation of its term, consists not only in the motion itself, but also in the subject

(1) Cf: Caj. in Iam-IIae, q. 67, a. 3, nn. 2-4.

capable of receiving the motion. Motion of its very nature demands a subject which has not attained, but lacks its term and is in potency to be moved to the term. Consequently, the privation of the term which is the imperfection of motion arises not only by reason of the motion itself, but also because motion must exist in a subject capable of motion. Thus, it necessarily supposes a subject which is imperfect, that is, is absolutely wanting its term. A further instance of this kind of imperfection is found in the theological virtue of hope, which cannot exist in heaven along with the actual possession that which was hoped for, because hope implies a motion towards the possession of the term. Consequently, if hope is to exist in a subject, it presupposes that the subject is lacking the possession of the term. In like manner, faith implies a certain motion towards a term, namely, the motion of the intellect towards evident knowledge in which alone it is satisfied. Hence, faith cannot exist except in subject which imperfectly and incompletely moved by its object, in other words, in a subject which is non-videns. St. Thomas includes this non-evidence on the part of the subject in the ratio formalis of faith.

Ratio formalis fidei potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsius rei creditae;...Alio modo potest accipi ratio formalis credibilium ex parte nostri; et sic ratio formalis credibilis est ut sit non visum...(1)

This is not to be taken to mean, of course, that for faith there are two formal objects.

"Ratio formalis quae est non-visum ex parte nostri." means simply that this non-evident object of faith will be attained only by a knower who has this essential condition, namely, that he be in movement and not yet arrived ad visionem.

Quamdiu sumus in corpore,
peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem
enim ambulamus et non per speciem.(2)

Cajetan's own words on this are:

Nota diligentissime quod
ubique, tam hic quam alibi, in-
venies quod objectum fidei est non-
visum vel apparens-non, etc.;
intelligitur non de objecto ex
parte rei, sed ex parte nostri. Ita
quod non-visum non est ratio forma-
lis, nec conditio objecti fidei ex

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

(2) II Cor., 5, 6-7.

parte objecti; sed redundat in
objectum ex parte credentis, et
denominat objectum denominatione
extranea, sumpta ex conditione
credentis; iam enim dictum est
quod imperfectio fidei est ex parte
subjecti, et non objecti. (1)

Thus, the opposition between faith as non-
visum and science as visum does not consist in the
fact that the same individual possesses a medium
which is non-evident and imperfect along with a
medium which is evident and perfect. The incompati-
bility arises, rather, because it is impossible for
the same subject to be itself perfectly and complete-
ly convinced by the object and made to see by reason
of the evidence, while at the same time being not
perfectly convinced and non-seeing. This is the radic-
al reason why faith and science about the same object
cannot coexist in the same intellect.

The full force of St. Thomas' position now
becomes clear. The argument may be formulated as
follows: the perfect and the imperfect cannot exist

(1) Caj. in Iam-IIae, q. 67, a. 5, n. 6.

together according to the same respect. Applied to the case of faith and science, this implies that it is impossible for the perfect or evident knowledge of science to coexist with the imperfect or non-evident knowledge of faith in the same subject with regard to the same object. The act of faith has in its very notion imperfection on the part of the subject in so far as the believer does not see what he believes, for the act of faith is an assent of the intellect not perfectly moved and convinced by its own proper object, but needing the inclination of the will by which it is moved freely to assent. Science, on the other hand, has in its very notion perfection on the part of the subject in so far as the one having scientific knowledge sees what he knows. To say that one and the same person could have an act of science and an act of faith about an object at the same time would amount to saying that he sees evidently the intelligible object and that he does not see it, that he is perfectly moved to assent and not perfectly moved thereto--which is contradictory. It is manifest, then, that it is impossible that in the same intellect an act of

scientific knowledge about the same object.

While the discussion up to this point has been concerned with proving the incompatibility of the acts of faith and science, the conclusion is no different in regard to the habits of faith and science. That St. Thomas teaches this is clear, not only from the many passages previously cited, but also in what is stated in the following:

Objectum fidei est res divina non visa. Habitus autem virtutis, sicut et quilibet alius, respicit speciem ab objecto. Et ideo excluso quod res divina sit non visa, excluditur ratio fidei. Christus autem a primo instanti suae conceptionis plene vidit Deum per essentiam. Unde in eo fides esse non potuit. (1)

In discussing the question of the duration of the virtues after this life, he says the same:

Et similiter est impossibile quod cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex parte subjecti sint simul in eodem subjecto. Fides autem in sui ratione habet imperfectionem quae est ex parte subjecti, ut scilicet credens non videat id quod credit. Beatitudo autem de sui ratione habet perfectionem

(1) IIIa, q. 7, a. 3.

ex parte subjecti, ut scilicet
beatus videat id quo beatificatur.
Unde manifestum est quod impossi-
bile est quod fides maneat simul
beatitudine in eodem subjecto. (1)

The reason for this is that it is impossi-
ble for the same object to be habitually evident and
habitually non-evident in the same intellect, just
as it was shown above that they were actually in-
compatible. But an object is habitually and per-
fectly evident by the habit of science, and habit-
ually non-evident by the habit of faith. Therefor,
that the intellect have both in regard to the same
object is impossible.

It might be objected that since faith is
a certain motion by which we tend to the vision of
God, it ceases once that vision is attained. Howev-
er, since in science God is not attained evidently
in se but only through his effects, faith, it seems,
can coexist with science. And, indeed, it is true
that faith does not tend to natural scientific know-

(1) Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 3.

ledge as its term, but to the beatific vision. Therefore, because the term of faith is not attained in natural scientific knowledge, it seems that faith can exist along with natural scientific demonstration. However, St. Thomas teaches that faith is incompatible with natural scientific demonstration as well as with the evidence of vision.

De eodem secundum idem non
potest esse simul in uno homine
scientia nec cum fide nec cum opi-
nione. (1)

Elsewhere he says:

Et de his (quae non excedunt
facultatem omnium sed aliquorum tan-
tum) nihil prohibet quin sint ab ali-
quibus scita qui horum habeat demons-
trationes, et ab aliquibus credita
qui horum demonstrationes non perper-
cerunt. Sed impossibile est quod sint
ab eodem scita et credita. (2)

Thus, St. Thomas clearly holds that not only the evidence of the beatific vision incompatible with faith, but also the demonstration of natural science is incompatible with it in the same subject. And the reason is as before: the

(1) *IIa-IIae*, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4.

(2) *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 9; Cf: *Ibid.*, q. 14, a. 3, ad 3; *IIa-IIae*, q. 1, a. 5, c.

intellect cannot at the same time be perfectly determined by evidence and imperfectly moved by faith. It cannot be seeing and non-seeing at the same time.

There is a distinction which further manifests this conclusion. Term of faith can be understood in two ways: 1) specifically, it refers to a state, that is, in so far as the Beatific Vision terminates the state of this life which man tends towards a perfect knowledge in the state of Vision. And in this way faith requires the Beatific Vision as the terminum status vitae, the term and reward of this life. Considered in this way, faith is directed not to the evidence of any scientific knowledge whatsoever, but to the perfect knowledge of heaven. 2) Term of faith can be said in a general way to refer to a condition required for all faith, namely that the intellect be determined and uncovered by the evidence of the object. In this second way, faith is directed towards any evidence which will terminate, determine and satisfy the intellect, and in this way remove the necessary condition for faith, namely that the intellect be indifferent to assent.

Quandocumque autem deficit ratio deficit proprii objecti, oportet quod actus deficiat; unde, quam cito aliquid incipit esse praesens vel apparens, non potest ut objectum subesse actui fidei. Quaecumque autem sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia, quae per se praesto sunt intellectui; et sic omnis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficitur. Unde impossibile est quod se eodem sit fides et scientia. (1)

The conclusion then stands: it is incompatible that there coexist in the same intellect an act of science and an act of faith, or the habit of science and the habit of faith in regard to the same object.

iii

How Faith Perfects the Natural Demonstration.

It is true that in the same intellect there cannot coexist an act of faith and an act of science or the habit of faith and the habit of science bear-

(1) De Ver., q. 14, a. 9.

ing on the same object, what, then, becomes of the possibility of a Christian philosophy? If it is no longer possible to maintain the original position of Suarez which based a Christian philosophy on the possibility of having faith and science about the same truth, must the notion of Christian philosophy be abandoned? Or, can the faith of the Christian philosopher have any influence in any other way on his natural scientific knowledge? If this is possible, how is it to be explained? It will be recalled that in opposition to Suarez's position there were three possible alternatives which would still admit of the influence of the philosopher's faith on his natural science. Can any one of them or parts of them be justified? The present section will discuss these solutions and answer the objections raised by Suarez. Thereby, the notion of Christian philosophy will be clarified.

The first alternative (page 89) held that he who had a demonstration about the truth God exists did not make an act of faith directly about this truth, but believed it only in praeparatione

animi. This solution can be upheld to this extent that the Christian philosopher is more certain than the non-Christian only in praeparatione animi, but in habit not in act. As long as the Christian has a demonstration about a particular truth, he does not--in fact cannot--make an act of faith about this, nor can he have the habit of faith insofar as it attains this particular object, as has been shown already. He can, however, have the habit of faith itself, which will give him greater certitude in promptitudine animi, because he is ready to believe the truth of which he has a demonstration, if the demonstration for some reason or other would cease to exist. That he retains the habit of faith is evident, since he believes actually other truths about which he has no demonstration. St. Thomas indicates this solution when he says:

Quando habet homo voluntatem credenti ea quae sunt fidei, etiamsi habeat rationem demonstrativam ad aliquod eorum puta ad hoc quod est Deum esse, non propter hoc tollitur vel diminuitur meritum fidei. (1)

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10 ad 1.,.

And he adds in the next reply:

Rationes demonstrativae inductae ad ea quae sunt fidei praeambula, non tamen ad articulos, et si diminuant rationem fidei, quia faciunt esse apparens id quod proponitur, non tamen diminuunt rationem charitatis, per quam voluntas est prompta ad ea credendum, etiamsi non apparerent. Ad ideo non diminuitur ratio meriti. (1)

This passage is noteworthy because, although St. Thomas clearly denies the possibility of the same intellect having faith and science about the same object, as has been shown, here he finds no incompatibility in the same intellect having a "rationem demonstrativam" while at the same time having a "voluntatem credendi". And, he concludes, as long as there is this ready obedience to assent, the merit of faith is not diminished. Moreover, he associates the certitude of believing with merit, not with actual assent. That St. Thomas holds that the same intellect can have evident knowledge and faith habitualiter et radicaliter

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. Ibid., ad 2.

is shown in the following passage:

Quia Paulus in raptu non
fuit beatus habitualiter,
sed solum habuit actum beato-
rum, consequens est ut simul
tunc in eo non fuerit actus
fidei; fuit tamen simul tunc
in eo fidei habitus. (1)

Here St. Thomas clearly supposes that St. Paul while rapt in his vision, had the actual vision of God at the same time he had the habit of faith.

There should be no hesitation in conceding that the Christian who has a demonstration is not as certain as some one of simple faith as regards actual assent to a particular truth, but that he has the assent of faith only radically and habitually. The Blessed Virgin and the Apostles witnessed and, therefore, had evidence of many things referred to in Sacred Scripture about which we now make an act of faith. However, merely because our faith has greater extension by reason of more specific acts, it does not follow that it is more perfect. By the same reason, Christ who had no assent of faith whatsoever

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 175, a. 3 ad 3; Cf: De Ver., q. 13, a. 2.

had, nevertheless, the merit of faith. The merit of faith consists in this that a man out of obedience to God assents to what he does not see himself. Christ had this obedience most perfectly since, if God would have proposed object which He could not have seen, He would have believed.

Meritum fidei consistit in hoc quod homo ex obedientia Dei assentit illis quae non videt, secundum illud Rom., 1: 5: Ad obediendum fidei in omnibus gentibus pro nomine eius. Obedientiam autem ad Deum plenissime habuit Christus, secundum illud Philip., 2: 8: Factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Et sic nihil ad meritum pertinens docuit, quod ipse excellentius non impletet. (1)

The Christian philosopher, besides having the assent of faith habitually and, therefore, the merit of faith because of the affectum credenti, has furthermore a knowledge which, as regards the mode of understanding and knowing scientifically with evidence, is incomparably superior and, simply speaking more perfect.

(1) IIIa, q. 7, a. 3 ad 2.

Ad perfectam rationem cognitionis intellectivae tria requiruntur: Primo, quod id quod cognoscitur intellectui proponatur; secundo, quod intellectus illis adhaereat; tertio, quod ea videat.

Ea ergo quae fidei sunt intellectui proponuntur non quidem in seipsis, sed quibusdam verbis quae ad eorum expressionem non sufficiunt, et quibusdam similitudinibus ab eorum repraesentatione deficientibus. Et ideo dicuntur cognosci in speculo et in aenigmate. Et propter hoc non videntur, proprie loquendo, sed tamen intellectus assentit eis. Et propter hoc imperfecte cognoscuntur nec omnino ignorantur. (1)

The words of St. Paul which were cited by Suarez, ad justificationem oportet credere quia Deus est, do not alter the solution. When St. Paul required belief in God's existence for justification, he was not demanding an act of faith in the existence of God as author of nature (as Suarez understands it), but in God as the author of grace and the supernatural end of man. The philosopher is not obliged to believe in the existence of God, author of nature, not only because he already knows this truth evidently, but also because this object

(1) III Sent., dist. 24, a. 2, q1a 3.

does not pertain per se to faith but to a natural light. Hence, he fulfills St. Paul's command in eliciting an act of faith about God as supernatural end. This knowledge pertains per se to faith, is necessary for the justification of adults, and admits of no philosophical demonstration. And this explanation of St. Paul's words is clearly taught by St. Thomas. (1) Therefore, although the Christian philosopher who knows the truth Deus est through evident demonstration cannot make an act of faith about it, he can attain it radicaliter et in habitu.

The second alternative (page 94) stated that since the Christian philosopher possessed the habit of faith but had actually no faith about the truth God exists; therefore the certitude which he had was actually no greater than the certitude which the non-Christian philosopher had in his act of demonstration. However, it is more in conformity with the teaching of St. Thomas to say that the Christian philosopher not only habitually but actually has a

(1) Cf: IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7; De Ver., q. 14, a. 9 ad 8.

more certain demonstration ex conjunctione ad fidem. St. Thomas teaches that among the reasons for which faith should teach even those truths about God which can be known by natural reason is this one, that the human intellect might know more certainly those things which it can know about God through its own light.

Ratio enim humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens. Cujus signum est quia philosophi de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes in multis erraverunt, et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt. Ut ergo esset indubitata et certa cognitio apud homines de Deo, oportuit quod divina eis per modum fidei traderentur, quasi a Deo dicta qui mentiri non potest. (1)

Thus, through faith, the deficiency of natural reason is corrected lest it fall into error, a fact which is all too common among non-Christian philosophers. If natural reason, then, is strengthened through faith, a demonstration proceeding from natural reason and thus strengthened is more certain than if it had its certitude from reason alone.

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 4.

Caeteris paribus visio est certior auditu. Sed si ille a quo auditur, multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est audibus quam visus. Sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientifico quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur.

Et multo magis homo certior est de eo quod audit a Deo, quo falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria ratione quae falli potest. (1)

Thus, the philosopher who, in addition to the natural evidence or demonstration, would "hear something of God" would by that fact have an added and greater certitude in his demonstration, because the act of demonstration, over and above its own natural certitude, would participate in a certitude from faith itself.

This last point, namely that this greater certitude of science is a participation in the certitude of faith, is essential for understanding the notion of Christian philosophy. In saying that the

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 4, a. 8 ad 2.

act of natural demonstration "participates" in a certitude derived from faith, it must not be understood to imply that there is a simultaneous act of faith or that the act is a combination of faith and science, both of which are impossible. The act of demonstration pertains essentially to the natural science and has a scientific certitude in common with other natural sciences. However, in so far as it is subject to faith and is corrected and illuminated by faith, the demonstration participates in a higher certitude imparted accidentally to the science by faith.

This conclusion presupposes the doctrine of St. Thomas that a superior power sometimes perfects an inferior power and communicates to it a mode of operation superior to its own proper mode. For example, in the case of the will participating in certain powers of the intellect. St. Thomas says:

Quandocumque sunt duo agentia ordinata, secundum agens dupliciter potest movere vel agere: uno modo, secundum quod competit naturae suae; alio modo secundum quod competit naturae superioris agentis. Impressio enim superioris agentis manet in inferiori et ex hoc inferius agens non