CUSTOM AND AUTHORITY IN EDUCATION

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Richard H. Sullivan, C. S. C.

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Propositiones

1) Voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt similitudines rerum.

2) Duo sunt principia per se in esse et in fieri rerum naturalium, materia et forma; et unum per accidens, privatio.

3) Fortuna est causa per accidens in his quae fiunt secundum propositum propter finem in minori parte.

4) Esse per se convenit formae.

5) Felicitas est operatio propria hominis secundum virtutem in vita perfecta.

The effect which lectures produce on a hearer depends on his habits; for we demand the language we are accustomed to, and that which is different from this seems not in keeping but somewhat unintelligible and foreigh because of its unwontedness. For it is the customary that is intelligible.

The force of habit is shown by the laws, in which the legendary and childish elements prevail over our knowledge about them, owing to a habit. Thus some people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks mathematically; others unless he gives instances; while others expect him to cite a poet as witness.

Aristotle

II Metaphysics, ch. 3.

INTRODUCTION

During the past year a mother took her five year old son to see Walt Disney's animated cartoon "Cinderella". There were many things in it to hold the child's attention - Cinderella, the cruel step-mother and her evil daughters, the fairy godmother and the Prince Charming, castles and coaches, the birds, the cat, the mice and the horses. When the mother asked her son how he had liked the picture, his answer indicated that he had been more puzzled than pleased : "The mice didn't act that way in the book".

It is of little importance that a child be disturbed because painted mice act differently from literary mice but it is important to note that custom had already become the measure of the child's judgment. At such an early age he had taken a criterion which would remain with him as a first principle to conform to in much of his thinking throughout life : "We demand the language we are accustomed to, and that which is different from this seems not in keeping but somewhat unintelligible and foreign because of its unwontedness". Because he had already heard the story read to him, his mind was set on the manner in which the mice should attend upon Cinderella. What was first heard quite unconsciously predetermined his outlook for the picture. As he grows older and listens to or observes his parents, associates with his companions, and attends

school, his ideas will assume a certain cast. If he hears his parents speak of God he, in turn, will think and speak of God; if he notices that his parents consider Sunday as the man-made institution for prolonged rest or golf, the child will consider sleep and golf to be much more important than God; the opinions he hears expressed about other peoples and races will form in him kindness towards them or prejudices against them; and so, through word and example, parents, teachers and companions help determine the pattern of the individual's life. He may change it later in life, but most likely he will not. It is much easier to follow along the paved road than to cut one's way through the bush.

Regularity in thought should not disturb anyone even though he be accustomed to think that freedom of thought means liberation from all custom. Regularity is the price of man's success. He adjusts his life in part to the regularity of nature. The constant course of the sun and earth and moon gives him the basis on which he forms his plans and realizes them in their proper time; indeed, he would be greatly disturbed if the seasons became confused and he should have short days and snow during his summer vacation; he would be obliterated if the earth broke from its regular orbit about the sun. He depends on the fertility of the land, the mating of animals, and his own digestive system for his physical being.

Since he depends so fully upon this order in nature, it is not surprising that he adjusts his self-controlled acts as close to the course of nature as he can. He rises at a certain hour, eats his meals at determined hours of the day, catches the bus at the same time each day, follows the routine at the office, reads his preferred newspaper day after day, watches his favorite television program, and tries to get to bed at the same hour every night. The failure of the alarm clock to call him in the morning, a change in the bus schedule, the illness of the newspaper boy may cause a great disturbance.

In practically all fields of endeavor order and regularity imposed by custom or authority are essential. The military trains its recruits for months in marching and the handling of guns so that action in battle will be a matter of spontaneous reaction. Football coaches drill their teams for hours on one play to make it automatic. Master mechanics teach their apprentices to tear down and to reassemble motors so that the beginners may acquire facility in their work. Practise and repetition under a master are the recognized parents of skill.

Social life follows much the same rule. Etiquette and politeness, which society demands, are acquired only by much training. The virtues of charity, fortitude and temperance, which God demands, are, in so far as they depend on us, results of sustained effort.

It would be a matter of wonderment if man, establishing his life on the relative uniformity of nature, and acquiring regularity in the mechanical, artistic, social and moral elements of his life under the guidance of others, believed that his thoughts and manner of thinking are, or should be, free from all regularity owing to his environment and to the authority under which he lives.

There are three groups of people, however, who consider such freedom from custom the only means to ensure development. The first group distorts the notion of freedom into a denial of objective truth. Some parents, for example, refuse their children religious instruction lest it prejudice their minds. Many teachers of philosophy consider that the proper mode of procedure is to allow the student to watch the history of philosophies go by as a parade of wooden dolls; let him take his pick, and if he likes the head of one doll, the arms of another and the legs of a third then let him assemble the parts he prefers to make up the kind of doll he likes. To teach a definite doctrine, they feel, would be to violate the right of the student's freedom. Upholding this theory, Professor Boyd H. Bode, commenting on the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, has this to say :

> The road to freedom, therefore, is a road away from the old loyalties and the old patterns of thinking and judging. Mr. Russell's pattern for education and the good life collides with our traditional culture all along the line. He is a rebel because tradition is so largely an enemy of spiritual values. ——

> It is the familiar problem of the relation between the individual and the surrounding group culture. It is a problem which, as Mr. Russell says, meets us everywhere - in politics, in ethics and in metaphysics, as well as in education. But it has a certain simplicity in education because it is in this field that the forces of exploitation are so clearly discernible. The state wants good citizens; the church wants prospective saints or priests; the spirit of the Renaissance wants gentlemen; and a snobbish democracy - at any rate, according to Mr. Russell - wants "an education which makes a man seem like a gentleman". This shameless struggle for the possession of the minds and hearts of helpless children is, in essence, a repudiation of morality, since the rights of children are ignored - and the purpose of the struggle is to fortify the vested interests, to create loyalties which will protect the special values without giving the individual any voice in the matter whatever. The child is, in very truth, the Forgotten Man. In terms of relation between the individual and society, the pupil isoverwhelmed and submerged by external demands; he is a means to an end, the clay on the potter's wheel (1).

The Second group maintains that the new wine of philosophy is better than the old. Descartes spent nine years in travel to forget all that he had learned in order to find his philosophy of clear and distinct ideas. Many since then have not bothered to study the wisdom of the past and have learned the philosophies of their contemporaries only as springboards for their own originality. Novelty is always welcome and more satisfying, and, after all, a new novelty should be as plausible as an old one.

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(1). - The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 5 (Northwestern Univ., 1944), p. 622-624.

The third group represents those who have suffered from the evil effects of totalitarian propaganda. Disillusioned by the calculated and unscrupulous indoctrination to which they had been subjected, they revolt against any imposition of teaching. An American reporter quotes a teacher in Frankfurt, Germany, as saying :

> The young German today tends to be skeptical, that is true, but this is not entirely negative. You see, he is completely disillusioned with voices from the outside, with propaganda, with authoritarianism, wherever he meets it, with all theory that is not backed up with practice. He is beginning to believe only what he discovers himself.

Now, to question such opinions which emphasize the individual's freedom of thought that does not mean that there no limits to the role of custom and authority in education. On the contrary, we hold that there are truths which are quite objective and to which the individual intellect must conform of its own accord; yet the child or the student requires assistance to know these truths, so that it is the duty of authority to appoint teachers who will lead the student to know the truth. In fact, the rejection of authority and tradition has been a main cause of disaster in society. There are, then, two answers to objection against authority in education, one doctrinal, the other factual.

The factual answer is the net result of the revolt against authority and tradition ; it has been forcefully expressed by Herman

Rauschning (1).

> In the intellectual and ethical realms, ideologies and standards are being dissipated through curious dialectical processes. The integrating forces of society and the state are growing feeble. Ideological perplexity is shaking the very principles of justice, the idées générales of the civilization. All the elements of public order, the organs and substance of social life, are involved in the general dissolution. We are immersed in one of the rare great historical crises — Contemporaries and later generations may well interpret the general confusion as a kind of delirium (2).
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> Cultures, societies plunge to ultimate ruin when their creeds decay, when they lack the strength to renew their faith and from it refashion and reformulate their ethical norms. Today we are witnessing a complete corruption of norms and creeds in western civilization. (The new tentative social orders which boast of their progressiveness are coercive societies (3).
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> If the substructure of society is moral and ethical, social breakdown signifies a crisis within man himself And this indeed is at the heart of the great crisis. It will be necessary to show later how the Enlightenment and the shattering of Feudalism led, by an inevitable dialectical process, to the degeneration of all positive norms and of the very concept of norms. It led finally to the collapse of the normative function of the intellect. The liberation of humanity from authority and traditionalism resulted in total ideological perplexity and an abandonment of values. It resulted in nihilism. (4).

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(1) - Time of Delirium, D. Appelton-Century Co., New York, 1946.
(2) - p. 1, 2, etc.
(3) - pp. 37-38.
(4) - p. 38.

> The key to an understanding of the crisis is to be found in the spiritual realm. The great historical process of man's liberation from the burdens of his own past, from the weight of his traditions and authorities, his values and ideologies - this process is being completed in the last phase of the crisis (1).
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> The liberal revolt against authority and tradition, which began in the late Middle Ages and had its greatest flowering in the Renaissance and the great revolutions of the eighteenth century, the social Age of Reason - that process of liberation destroyed confidence, undermined confidence in institutions, values, dogmas. It engaged in a constant battle against false confidence, which humiliates man, enchains him, hinders him from attaining his great destiny. To this spiritual liberation man owes the tremendous upsurge of the past century. But in the twentieth century its destructive influence was to become more apparent that its liberating effect.
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> This process of liberation followed a logical course. It arrived at last at a point where it no longer restricted itself to "debunking" historical forms of authority. The ceaseless progression of "enlightenment" eventually implied that nothing at all deserved faith; that values and standards, ideas and ideologies, are merely the expression of particular circumstances among men; and finally, that not even reason itself can be considered an authority. Nothing fixed and lasting remained, upon which confidence could be based. Thus the "liberation" of the Enlightenment progressively ate away what remained of intellectual substance. By it man's spiritual and ethical baggage is continually lightened, until at last he throws away the last burden, intellect itself (2).

The doctrinal answer to those who would remove custom and authority from education is based upon Aristotle and St. Thomas :

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(1) - p. 184.
(2) - pp. 184-85.

what a person is accustomed to hear becomes for him the measure of truth; therefore, it is encumbent on authority, in so far as possible, to appoint teachers who possess the truth so that the student's mind will be set on the path to truth; otherwise, it will be almost impossible for the student whose mind is determined by false conceptions to progress toward the truth.

The purpose of this present treatise is to explain this doctrine in general and to apply it in particular to the study of philosophy. The first chapter deals with the different factors entering into the development of the speculative intellect. The second chapter concerns the special habitus which the mind of the student acquires, and which rectifies what we may call his intellectual "mores". The third chapter treats of the authority which appoints the teacher, and, more particularly, of the authority of the Catholic Church even in philosophy. The final chapter concerns the appointment of St. Thomas Aquinas as the Teacher of Philosophy by the Magisterium of the Church (1).

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(1) - Note : Education in its complete sense pertains to the development of the entire man who is complex both in his nature and in hispurpose. It consists in bringing to perfection his complex nature by the development of his body, of his appetites by training in virtue, and of his intellect in both the speculative and practical orders. Education has also as its end the preparation of man to fulfill his complex purpose as an individual person and as a member of the domestic, political and ecclesiastical societies; moreover, since man has been given a supernatural end, education must assist him in attaining that end.

Continued -

In the words of Pope Pius XI : Since education consists essentially in preparing man for what he must be and for what he must do here below inorder to attain the sublime end for which he was created, it is clear that there can be no true education which is not wholly directed to man's last end, and that in the present order or Providence, since God has revealed Himself to us in the Person of His only begotton Son, who alone is "the Way, the Truth and the Life", there can be no ideally perfect education which is not Christian education. It aims at securing the Supreme Good, that is, God, for the sould of those who are being educated, and the maximum well-being here below for human society" (Encyclical Letter on Christian Education).

In this treatise we are limiting our considerations to the development of the speculative intellect.

Chapter I

Development of the Speculative Intellect.

In the order of speculative knowledge we are confronted with a striking contradiction. On the one hand, it is of the nature of the speculative intellect to conform itself to reality so that it is measured and determined by the objects known. On the other, there is a wide divergence of opinion concerning objective truths. Since the nature of the intellect is the same in all men it would seem that all intellects measured by the same objects would naturally agree in truth, much the same as many mirrors reflecting the same chair conform in their representations. Such is not the case. Moreover, we find a divergence of opinion which has the pecularity of falling into determined groups which we call "schools of thought" : students trained in one school retain on the whole a certain doctrine at variance with the doctrine held by students of another school; one community of scholars follow a pattern of thought disagreeing with the pattern of thought in another community. Given the nature of the intellect, how is this possible ?

An explanation of these differences both between individuals and between groups is to be found in the different factors entering into the development of the speculative intellect. The first is the fact that men are not equally intelligent.

I. - Natural Ability.

While the proposition that all men are created equal is true, it is also true that all men are created unequal. Just as all men are equal in the possession of eyes and ears but differ in acuteness of sight and hearing, so all have intellects but differ in intellectual capacity.

There is a common denominator of knowledge possessed by all which consists in the knowledge of the very first principles. Given the notion of whole and part, every one knows immediately that the whole is greater than any of its parts; given the notion of being, every one knows that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time under the same aspect. In the simple matters of knowledge all men are equal - "no one gets lost in the doorway".

This parity disappears when we get beyond the doorway of knowledge. Some advance very far into speculative truth while others stop just on the other side of the threshold. Nowthe reason for this difference in intellectual ability is twofold. First, one intellect is better than another. Since the intellect is a faculty of the soul, its perfection depends on that of the soul; the soul's perfection, in turn, is determined by the condition of the body it informs : every act or form is received in matter according to the capacity of the matter. Furthermore, since the disposition of the body is indicated by the perfection of the basic sense of touch,

differences in natural ability result from differences in this basic sense. As Aristotle says :

> While in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals, in respect of touch we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination. That is why man is the most intelligent of animals. This is confirmed by the fact that it is to differences in the organ of touch and to nothing else that the differences between man and man in respect of natural endowments are due; men whose flesh is hard are ill-endowed by nature, men whose flesh is soft, well-endowed (1).

The second reason for the differences lies in the difference of the internal senses which have the brain as their organ. The intellect is dependent in its operation on the memory and imagination; the better these sense faculties are, the better the intellectual understanding will be (2).

II. - Means of Attaining Knowledge.

Granted then that men are differently endowed it remains true that many have qualities of mind very similar so that we might expect that such men would be conformed to the same truth in the same way. This, again, is contrary to fact. Intellectual progress is not assured by the innate quality of the mind. There are many factors which enter into the development of speculative intellect. Before it actually begins to know, the human intellect is as a blackboard on which nothing is written : "Sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil scriptum est" (3)

(1) - De Anima, ch. 9, 421a20 (McKeon, p. 574).
(2) - Ia, qu. 85, a. 7.
(3) - In III de Anima, lect. 9, n. 722.

but on which many things can be written. This is true not only at the very inception of intellectual activity but at the outset of every order of learning. The intellect is in potency to know all things, and the process of learning consists in bringing the intellect from potency to actual knowledge. Now, there are two methods of acquiring knowledge : self-education or discovery and learning from others or discipline. In discovery natural reason by its own power comes to know that was unknown; in discipline it receives help from another (1).

1. - Discovery.

A. - One might be led to consider discovery as the more perfect of the two methods because of the pleasure experienced in it and because it indicates the perfection of the intellect. The joy experienced by Archimedes as he ran through the streets shouting "Eureka" after he discovered the principle of the fulchrum has been shared by all the discoverers of speculative knowledge and mechanical principles down the ages.

Thus Horace briefly congratulates himself :

> Momentum exigi perennius aono.
> (I have erected a monument more lasting than bronze).

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(1) - De Ver., qu. 11, art. 1.

Aristotle, more at length :

> For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original discoveries generally make an advance that is small at first, thought much more useful than the development which later spring out of them. For it may be that in everything, as the saying is, "the first start is the main part" ; and for this reason also it is the most difficult ; for in proportion as it is the most potent in its influence, so it is the smallest in its compass and therefore most difficult to see; whereas when this once discovered, it is easier to add and develop the remainder in connection with it. This is, in fact, what happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and to practically all the other arts. — Of this inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. Moreover, on the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of reasoning we had nothing else of an earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches. If then, it seems to you after inspection that, such being the situation, as it existed at the start, our investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradition, there must remain for all of you or for our students, the task of extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks (1).

That discovery indicates the perfection of the intellect is mentioned by Hesiod, quoted by Aristotle :

> Iste quidem optimus qui omnia intellexerit. Bonus autem ille quid benedicenti obsedit. Qui autem neque ipsemet intelligit, neque alium audiens in animo ponit, hic rursus inutilis vir.

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(1) - De Sophisticis Elenchis 183b17, McKeon, p. 211.

> For best is he who knows all things himself,
> Good, he that hearkens what men counsel right,
> But, he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
> Another's wisdom, is a useless wright (1).

This perfection made apparent in discovery consists in the excellence of the agent intellect in abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasms and in giving light to the possible intellect thereby enabling a person to make progress in knowledge by his own ability; as Cajetan remarks, since it is more noble to move oneself than to be moved by another, so it is more noble for a person to acquire science through discovery than to receive it from another (2). As a result of this ability the discoverer is held in great admiration and honor by others who recognize in him a perception, judgment and sharpness of intellect beyond those of other men (3).

To this may be added another reason for the excellence of discovery : the discoverer can be said to be taught by God rather than by man. Everything in nature mirrors some perfection in God as the truth of things aremeasured by the Divine ideas. The intellect, therefore, which of its own power can fathom the mystery contained in nature without going through the medium of another's intellect can be said to be taught by God, just as a person who is able to com-

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(1) - I Eth., c. 4, 1095a10. McKeon, p. 938.
(2) - In 3a, q. 9, a. 4. n. 12.
(3) - In I Metaph., lect. 1, n. 31.

prehend Shakespeare without the help of a teacher would be said to be taught directly by the great poet. St. Thomas says that he who is taught by man does not receive knowledge immediately from the concepts which are in the mind of the teacher but through the medium of words, which are signs of the intellectual concepts; so, just as words formed by man are signs of hisintellectual knowledge, so creatures made by God are signs of His wisdom; thus, as it is more worthy to be taught by God than by man, so it is more worthy to receive one's knowledge from sensible creatures rather than through the doctrine of man (1). In this same vein Plato remarks :

> There was a tradition in the temple of Dordona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of that day, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from oak or rock, that was enough for them; whereas you seem to think not of the truth but of the speaker, and of the country from which the truth comes (2).

B. - Although discovery in itself is the more perfect method of acquiring knowledge, it is insufficient.

The principle that a conclusion of fact cannot be drawn from a premise based on possibility (a posse ad esse non valet illatio) holds valid for education. Just as the right to vote does not always mean the actual power to express one's choice, so neither does the su-

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(1) - IIIa, qu. 12, a. 3, ad 2.
(2) - Phaedrus, Transl. Jowett.

periority of self-education always mean that man can educate themselves. The reasons are many.

The human intellect is the lowest in the order of intellects and is in potency to receive the determinations of truth. These determinations come first from the senses and then through the light of the agent intellect to the possible intellect; because of the weakness of this intellectual light, man needs help - to pass from potency to act; he needs assistance from someone who is already in act in the order of knowledge (1). Experience is sufficient indication of this. St. Thomas mentions the insufficiency of discovery in several places which we now give. Man would not need an external help if he were of sufficient intellectual penetration that by himself he could draw conclusions from known principles; but this penetration is in men only in a greater or less degree (2). Again, - although man has the bodily organs by which he may draw knowledge from corporeal things, nevertheless because of the weakness of the intellectual power men are not able to acquire a perfect knowledge of those things which pertain to man, unless aided by superior minds, and this is according to the divine disposition according to which inferiors acquire their perfection through superiors (3). Thirdly, we must consider that in the human

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(1) - De Verit., qu. 14, a. 10.
(2) - In II De Anima, lectl. 11, n. 372.
(3) - III Contra Gentes, c. 81.

species the off-spring is in need not only of nutrition for the body as in the case of other animals, but also of instruction for the soul; other animals naturally have their instincts by which they are able to provide for themselves, but man lives by reason which requires experience of a long time to arrive at prudence; therefore it is necessary that children be instructed by their parentswho are already experienced; nor are the children capable of this instruction right after birth but only after a long time and, especially, after having reached the age of reason; and after this, a long time isagain required for this instruction (1).

A fourth reason is this. While it remains true that discovery of truth by oneself is the more perfect manner in itself. learning through a teacher is the more perfect manner for the beginner because by discipline a student more easily and readily learns. The teacher explicitely knows the entire science and so is fitted to lead to knowledge a student who knows the principles of the science only in a general and confused way . Thus St. Thomas says that in the student are described intelligible forms from which science received through teaching is developed, immediately from the agent intellect and mediately from the teacher; for the teacher offers signs of the intelligible things and from these signs the agent intellect accepts the intelligible species and forms them in the possible intellect; thus, the very words

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(1) - III Contra Gentes, c. 122.

of the teacher either heard or read are the causes of science in the student in like manner to things existing in nature because from both words and things the intellect receives its concepts; in comparison, however, the words of the teacher are more apt to cause knowledge than are sensible things in nature because the word are signs of concepts (1).

A fifth reason is found in the comparison of the senses of sight and hearing. Other things being equal, sight is more certain than hearing as, for example, judging the speed of a car is more certain by sight than by hearing. But if he, whom one hears speak, exceeds by far the sight of the one who sees, then hearing is more certain than sight; thus a person of little knowledge is more certain of that which he hears from a learned person than of that which seems to be true according to his own reason; thus hearing, the sense proper to the student, is more certain than sight, the sense proper to the discoverer. St. Thomas gives a practical example of this fact in comparing a person born blind with one born deaf and dumb; since the blind person can be taught by others he is more wise than the other who can see but cannot hear, - though modern methods of sign language make the example to some extent outmoded (2).

Moreover other reasons why the method of discovery is insufficient

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(1) - De Ver., q. 11, a. 1, ad 11.
(2) - De Sensu et Sensato, lect. 2, n. 31.

in learning are because men must dedicate the greater part of their time to the material necessities of life and consequently have little time for thought and research, because most men are too lazy to make the effort to find out much for themselves, and because it is only by the method of teaching that the treasures of the past in science and art can be handed down from generation to generation.

A final reason why discovery is not the better method is that by submitting oneself to a teacher one avoids presumption which is rooted in pride. If it is aggravating for tourists to lose their way because the driver is too stubborn and self-assured to ask for directions, it is disastrous for one's intellectual training - and for those to be influenced by him later - to be so presumptuous of one's own ability that he refuses to accept guidance. St. Thomas speaks of this in reference to Divine revelation but it is applicable to the human revelation by teacher to student; he there states that one utility of revelation is the repression of presumption, the mother of error; there are some men who are so satisfied with their own genius that they think they can measure all nature by their own intellect, thinking that every thing is true which seems to them to be true, and everything false which seems to them false (1).

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(1) - I Contra Gentes, c. 5.

2. - Discipline.

Since, therefore, discovery is not the method to assure the development of the speculative intellect, it remains that man must receive his knowledge and training from others through teaching.

Teaching in its proper meaning signifies leading another to knowledge : "Dicendum quod docere proprie dicitur qui in cognitionem ducit" (1). Now, while a person is led to knowledge either by receiving light or by receiving the intelligible object from another, the only way in which man can teach man is in the order of the object. To teach by giving light would be to give either the intrinsic power of the intellect (lumen intellectuale potest dici ipse vigor intellectus ad intelligendum (2) or by strengthening this power as in a way comparable to the light of the sun strengthening the eye to see; it is evident that one man cannot give to another a good intellect nor by the power of his own intellect can he infuse light into another's intellect, - despite any proximity of a struggling student to a brilliant teacher there is never a direct passage of light from the teacher's intellect to that of the student. The only way, then, in which man can teach is by presenting an object to the consideration af another.

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(1) - In II Sent., D. 9, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4, p. 231.
(2) - De Ver., q. 9, a. 1.

As we are considering the development of the speculative intellect in general we are using the word "teacher" in the general meaning of one who leads another to knowledge - parents, elders, school teachers, etc. Therefore, what we are to say about the teacher is not applicable in its full extent to everyone who is said to teach another. We feel it necessary, however, to mention the following points : the essential mark of the teacher is evidence of what he teaches; the manifestation of the truth to the student is illumination; the teacher causes knowledge in the student not as a natural agent nor as the principal agent but only as an assisting agent; as assisting, however, he is not merely an accidental but is an essential agent; finally, he is an essential agent both by presenting the object and by training the student to reason.

A. - Since the teacher is to cause knowledge in the student, the first requirement is that he possess explicitely and perfectly what he is to teach. One cannot give what one does not have. Therefore he must have evidence of what he teaches in so far as the object itself permits, - otherwise it would be the case of the blind leading the blind and both falling into the ditch (1).

B. - The teacher must then express to the student the concepts he possesses. Because man is not a pure intellect but uses his body not only for the acquisition of his own knowledge but also to convey his

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(1) - Doctrina autem importat perfectam actionem scientiae in docente vel magistro; unde oportet quod ille qui docet vel magister est, habeat scientiam quam in alio causat, explicite et perfec-

knowledge to others; this he does by using sensible signs, especially, words. The word, the meaning of which is determined by authoritative use, is a sign of the concept just as the concept is a likeness of reality. It is by means of the sensible sign, the word, that the teacher communicates his concepts to the student. "Conceptus sunt similitudines rerum, verba autem signa intellectuum".

Not all speech, however, enlightens the mind of the hearer. Bearing in mind the fact that man cannot teach either by giving or increasing the light of the intellect as distinguished from teaching by presenting an intelligible object (1), man is able to give light in the

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te, sicut in addiscente per doctrinam. (De Ver., a. 11, a. 3).

Magister docet in quantum actu scientiam habet. (Ibid., ad 6).

The word "evidence" is taken from the act of the sense of sight Sight is superior to the other senses in the wide range of objects, its ability to distinguish them and its power to represent them. So it is fitting that the proper act of sight (videre) be applied to the intellect when it attains its objects with clarity and distinction, and that the objects thus known be called "evident". The intellect has evidence of its objects when it knows the definition of the nature of things or is able to distinguish one nature from another, when it knows principles arising from the definitions of natures, and when it knows conclusions of demonstrations as seen in the light of evident principles. The sign of evidence is to be had from its effect : there is evidence when the object is attained and fully convinces and satisfies the intellect.

(2) - Haec doctrina (quod obiectum repraesentant) non per modum illuminationis sed per modum locutionis. II Sent., D. 9, qu. 1, a. 2, ad 4.

sense that the intelligible object itself is light for the intellect, "ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux" (1) and that light is said to be a certain manifestation of truth, "lumen secundum quod ad intellectum pertinet nihil aliud est quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis" (2); therefore to teach is to give light or to illumine in so far as it is to give to another the manifestation of the known truth, "illuminare est manifestationem agnitae veritatis alii tradere" (3). Words, then, which give the manifestation of truth are said to be "illumination"; otherwise, they are mere speech (locutio). The distinction of "illumination" in speech and mere "speech" is based upon the double source of the word.

The one source of the word is the concept; the other is the will of the speaker. Truth, the good of the intellect, consists in the intellect recognizing that its concept is in conformity to reality, that it is measured by reality; moreover, things in reality are true as they are measured by and conform to the Divine Intellect; therefore the perfection of man's intellect consists in the truth which has as its font the Divine Truth. To know, for example, the nature of man - his matter or body and his form or soul and all the truths which follows upon these principles, to know his efficient cause, proximate and ultimate, and his final end,

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(1) - Ia, qu. 12, a. 5.
(2) - Ia, qu. 106, a. 1.
(3) - Ibid.

intermediary and ultimate, is to perfect the intellect : "conceptus sunt similitudines rerum". Therefore, to convey this truth to another is to perfect the intellect of the other; and as truth is the light of the intellect, to give truth is to enlighten. "Illuminati mper se importat actionem perfectivam alterius" (1).

The other source of the word or of speech is the human will. The passing of habitual knowledge to actual knowledge, and the passing of actual knowledge to being expressed by word depends on the will (2). The human will, however, is not the source of perfection for the human intellect as it is not the rule or measure of truth. The word, seen in this origin of the will, belongsto mere speech (locutio) but not to illumination. Although there is some knowledge given in saying that "John said this and did that", this knowledge does not strengthen the intellect of the hearer nor give him understanding nor enable him to reason more perfectly, as St. Thomas remarks (3).

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(1) - Ia, qu. 106, a. 1, Cajetan, n. 1.
(2) - Ia, qu. 107, a. 1.
(3) - Locutio per hoc quod aliqua prius occulta proponuntur ut cognoscenda sine hoc quod virtus cognoscentis fortificetur; ut patet in recitationibus historiarum, in quibus aliquis cognoscit quod prius nesciebat, sine hoc quod suus intellectus clarificetur. In II Sent., D. 11, q. 2, a. 3, p. 287.

Cajetan develops this in saying that the manifestation of what one says or thinks, as such, is not illumination but a simple proposition of what is true - not as true but as freely expressed; truth as light is not truth merely manifested in itself, but truth as it depends on the first truth (1). It does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect to know what another person says or knows but only what is the truth of reality (2).

Now, teaching is intended not merely to give information but to perfect the intellect, "doctrina est proprie de his quibus perficitur intellectus (3). Therefore, to teach, inasmuch as it consists in communicating to another a truth already known is to perfect an intellect. It consists, therefore, in "illumination" and not merely in "locution", or, in other words, it consists in speech as giving light, as expressive of the teacher's concepts in conformity with reality. Moreover, since the perfection of the intellect is to know with certitude, and since our intellects can have certitude only of that which is universally and necessarily true, teaching, properly speaking, can be had only of those things which are universal and necessary; therefore, mathematics is for us the first of doctrines, and poetry, in which there is already to be found a certain universality, as for instance, in a given dramatic character is still a doctrine.

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(1) - Ia, qu. 107, a. 2, n. 5.
(2) - Ia, qu. 107, a. 2.
(3) - De Ver., qu. 9, a. 5, ad 6.

This doctrine concerning illumination is expressed by St. Thomas and Cajetan as follows :

> Veritas est lumen intellectus et regula omnis veritatis est ipse Deus, manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod dependet a prima veritate et locutio est, et illuminatio (v.g. homo est animal).... Ex voluntate intelligentis non potest dici illuminatio sed locutio tantum (volo hoc facere). Voluntas creata non est lux nec regula veritatis sed participans lucem; unde communicare ea quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est illuminare ; non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei quid tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei veritas habeat (1).
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> Manifestatio huius non est illuminatio sed simplex propositio seu oblatio veri (i.e. non : verum ut verum, sed : veru ut liberum). Locutio non aliter manifestat nisi quia libere praesentat obiectum. Quod veritas est lumen, infertur non quod manifestatio eius sit illuminatio; sed quod manifestatio eius ut dependet a prima veritate est illuminatio (2).
>
> Velle et intelligere uno modo ut distinguitur contra rem volitam aut intellectam ; ita res volita et intellecta in nullo genere causae pendeat a volitione aut intellectione ut sic, ut patet, cum volumus aut intelligimus Deum esse; impertinens est ad perfectionem intellectus debentis intelligere res ab aliis cognitas aut volitas, scire quid alii circa illas velint aut noverint. Alio modo ut ipsum velle aut intelligere est res quaedam. Et sic pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus eo modo quo cogitationes cordium pertinent ad perfectionem illius. Cogitatio cordis cognita, sicut et quodlibet singulare cognitum perficit intellectum, ut perficere distinguitur contra inficere : solum enim falsum intellectum inficit. Non autem perficitur ut perficere distinguitur contra facere, et denotat quemdam excessum : quia non confortat intellectum, non enim ex hoc intellectus potentior redditur ad aliorum notitiam (3).

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(1) - Ia, qu. 107, a. 2.
(2) - Ibid., Cajetan, n. 5.
(3) - Ibid., Cajetan, n. 6.

Since the words of the teacher bring the student to the knowledge of truth, they are the cause of knowledge in a way similar to things existing in reality. For the teacher proposes the signs of the intelligible objects and from these signs or words the agent intellect takes the intelligible species (intentiones) and describes them in the possible intellect. Thus the very words of the teacher, either heard or written, cause knowledge in the intellect as do things existing in reality. However, the words of the teacher are more immediate in causing knowledge than are things in reality because already in themselves they are signs of concepts (intelligibilium intentionum) (1).

C. - Since the words of the teacher, as the expression of his own concepts, are the cause of concepts in the intellect of the student, the next question is to ask what kind of a cause are the words. This we answer briefly in saying that words are instruments of the intellect both in giving and acquiring knowledge. Since they are instruments of the teacher, we next ask what kind of an agent is the teacher in causing knowledge in the student. The teacher may be either a natural agent or an agent as in art; as an artistic agent he is either the principal agent or a secondary one; as a secondary agent, he is either essential or accidental.

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(1) - De Ver., qu. 11, art. 1, ad 11.

First of all, a teacher is not a natural agent. He does not cause knowledge in the student as fire causes fire in a piece of wood or as heat in water is caused by the heat in the fire. Were this true, learning on the part of the student would consist in being exposed to the lectures of the teacher and, as it were, soaking into himself the new learning without pain or effort. Thus the teacher does not pour knowledge into the student so that there would be a numerical unity in the knowledge of the teacher and that of the student; the only unity between the knowledge consists in the object known - outside of which there are the differences of intellects, of intellectual habits, and of intelligible species. The knowledge of the student is like to the knowledge of the teacher but is not the same except in the object known (1).

The teacher, then, is an agent as a craftsman is an agent in producing an artifact. As is well known, art is defined as "recta ratio factibilium" (2); it is an analogous term, the first imposition of the term referring to the practical arts in which there is an action of the artisan changing and transforming physical matter as making a statue of Napoleon out of a block of marble; the term, then, is applied to any activity which has a "factibile" (something made) as its end. In the case of teaching, the"factibile" is knowledge in the intellect of the student.

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(1) - De Ver., qu. 11, a. 1, ad. 6; De Unitate Intellectus, ch. 5, n. 51.
(2) - Ia IIae, qu. 57, a. 3.

Now, in natural things there may be a potency to become something in two ways. In one the potency is completely passive so that the intrinsic principle is not sufficient to develop into act by itself. Thus, for example, lumber of itself does not become a house; there must be a carpenter to fashion and form the lumber into a house. Therefore, the carpenter, is the principal agent. It is not in this way that the teacher forms the mind of his student.

The other potency in natural things is an active potency. In this case the intrinsic principle is able of itself to develop into perfect act. The example used by St.Thomas to illustrate this potency is the power of the body to overcome sickness and regain health; a sick person has within himself the power to become well. Now, to help this natural power the sick person may have recourse to the help of a doctor. In giving this help the doctor is not the principal agent in causing health; he can only assist nature; in this sense though it may be quite necessary his role remains secondary. Now, in assisting nature by the art of medecine, the doctor must imitate nature, that is, by the use of medicines and purges, by the application of heat-pads and ice-bags, he assists nature in regaining more easily and rapidly its equilibrium. As the doctor assists the sick man to become well, so the teacher assists the ignorant to become learned. The teacher is not the principal agent but acts only as an assistant to the principal agent, the student.

The student is not a mere passive potency; he also has an active

power because by the natural light of the agent intellect he possesses knowledge of the first notions such as the notion of being, of the one etc., and of certain first principles. These things the intellect immediately knows. As we saw when speaking of learning by oneself the intellect is able to apply these general principles to particular things so that it passes from potency to act as it acquires knowledge, proceeding from general per se known principles to a more determined subject and to particular conclusions, and from these to others. What the student could do of himself, if only his intellectual powers were sufficiently potent, the teacher can help him to achieve by giving him aids and means to go from the known to the unknown (1).

D. - Now there are two ways in which a person can cause knowledge in another : one is accidental, the other essential. The difference might be seen, for example in the starting of a car; a person who inserts the key in the ignition and presses on the starter is in a fashion the essential cause of the car's movement; once the motor is running, the person who releases the break could be called the accidental cause. Another example would be that of an author. The author is the essential cause in writing the book; the servant who awakens the author and with insistence urgeshim to write would be the accidental cause.

So, in knowledge, one person may be the cause of another's knowledge merely by recalling to his mind something he already knows so that his habitual knowledge passes to actual consideration; such a person

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(1) - Ia, q. 117, a. 1; De Ver., q. 11, a. 1.

would be only an accidental cause of knowledge. The role of the teacher is that of an essential cause. He causes in the student knowledge which the student does not possess (1).

E. - The teacher is an essential cause of knowledge by bringing the student to know things which he does not know in two ways : one in the order of the objects of knowledge and the other in the order of the acts of the intellect in reasoning.

In the first way, the teacher gives the student help and means which the intellect uses to acquire knowledge. These are, for example, less universal principles which the student is able to judge from his already acquired knowledge; thus it belongs to the teacher, who possesses explicitely and perfectly what he teaches, to distinguish and divide his concepts so that they are in proportion to the capacity of the student; thus he gives his knowledge by dividing and distinguishing it into concepts the student can grasp : "Qui bene distinguit, bene docet". This method is exemplified in the source books of philosophy and theology - the commentaries; St. Thomas takes the text of Aristotle, whose great mind enabled him to express his truth-laden concepts in pithy phrases, and enucleates the thought therein contained by means of distinctions and divisions so that our minds are able to understand Aristotle; again, the commentators, as Cajetan and John of St. Thomas,

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(1) - De Ver., qu. 11, a. 1, ad 12.

explain the text of St. Thomas by making his thought more proportioned to our own capacity; the class-room teacher furthers this process for beginners; - without such commentators, the all embracing thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas can be for lesser minds the source of unsuspected error and unhappy confusion. Other helps given by the teacher consist in examples taken from sense experience and art, in comparisons between similar or dissimilar things, etc.

The second way in which the teacher is an essential cause of learning in the student is by assisting the student to reason. The teacher proposes to the student the order of principles to conclusions and thereby helping the student to build up his own power of ordering his concepts and of reasoning from cause to effect, effect to cause, etc. (1).

It is, therefore, through discipline or learning from another that the greatest progress of the speculative intellect is to be made.

III. - Moral Virtues :

Having seen that the speculative intellect of its nature conforms itself to "the things that are" either by discovery or by discipline, we are confronted with the problem whether in fact the intellect thus reaches truth. If so, how can there be such divergence in knowledge in intellects that are nearly equal in ability and subjected to the same

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(1) - Ia, q. 117, a. 1; De Ver., q. 11, a. 1;
De Unitate Intellectus, ch. 5, p. 51.
II Contra Gentes, ch. 75.

amount of schooling ?

In part answer to this question we may recall that one of reasons given for the insufficiency of discovery was the inordinate trust in one's own ability or presumption, which St. Thomas calls the "mother or error". Now, presumption is a fault, not of the intellect but of the will in the moral order. If in the matter of discovery the appetite is the cause for error we may ask the general question in what way does the acquisition of speculative knowledge depend upon the appetite or how can our moral life influence the development of the speculative intellect.

In answering we must first state that there are three moral virtues which act as a "removens prohibens", that is, which remove the hindrances preventing the speculative intellect from attaining truth whether by discovery or by discipline. The first of these moral virtues is control of the senses.

1) - Human knowledge begins in the sense and the more perfect the senses are, the more perfect will the intellect be in its operation. The senses, however, do not exist for the intellect alone. If the sense of touch is called the sense of the intellect because it gives us certitude and is the basis for the perfection of the intellect, it is also the sense of physical life; on it are based the appetites for food and drink to assure the preservation of the individual, and the appetite of sex for the preservation of the race; if the eyes afford us the richest source

ceive the intelligible species; if, therefore, there be no impediment, in the presence of the objects received through experience the intelligible species immediately comes to the intellect as the reflection of a mirror in the presence of a body; if there be an impediment, as happens in the case of youths, it is necessary to remove the impediment so that the intelligible species be received in the intellect (1).

Advancement, therefore, depends on the condition of peace and quiet within man so that there is an order of subjection of the lower appetites to the higher. Now, since the strongest appetites are those concerned with sex and food, the moral virtues most necessary for an intellectual life are chastity and temperance. Otherwise, the effects of these appetites would hinder learning : the memory and imagination would be so filled with images concerning sensual pleasure that the intellect would be unable to have concepts of a speculative nature; likewise, the pleasure taken in such matters would be so strong that the enjoyment had in intellectual pursuits would never be tasted and never desired, - one does well those things which give him pleasure, but the contrary he does not at all or poorly. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, since impurity causes blindness of the mind, and intemperance causes dullness, the opposite virtues of abstinence and chastity are of the greatest value in disposing man to perfection in his intellectual activity (2).

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(1) - In VII Phys., lect. 6, n. 9.
(2) - IIa IIae, q. 15, a. 3 (St. Thomas in the answer to the first objection says that some men do outstanding work in the intellectual order even though addicted to their passions because of great natural ability and acquired habit - but they are impeded by vice from their best possible achievements).

After the control through the virtue of chastity which avoids blindness of the mind, and the virtue of temperance which avoids dullness of the mind, there must be a control over the other senses; without the restraining of sight and hearing, control of the sense of touch would be impossible. Therefore, the eyes must be restrained from such objects which would disturb the imagination and distract the mind; also the student must refrain from listening to conversations and music which would impede the attention of the mind required for study.

Finally, great restriction must be placed on the movement of the body so that the life of study will not be impeded by external disturbances - "tumultus exteriores". Concentration demands quiet. There is truth in the saying that one becomes learned by remaining seated : "sedendo sapiens fit".

Once intellectual activity is made possible by external quiet and by mastery over the senses and passions there is need of a second control, - that of curiosity.

(2) - Not only must the student be able to apply his mind but he must do so to the correct matter. Curiosity is the fault of a person who studies, but not well. He wastes his time on matters which hinder rather than help his intellectual development - the sayings and doings of other persons which are not his concern, knowledge that may be excellent in itself but is sought not for love of knowledge or utility but only for the sake of boasting and self-elation, the seeking and search-

ing of a prurient mind, superstitious interest in astrology and the foretelling of the future, the constant interest in topics other than those duty imposes for the present, seeking solutions for problems far beyond one's mental development or capacity, etc. The good student, controlling curiosity, devotes his effort and time to his class requirements and to truths which truly develop his intellectual powers (1).

3) - Once the student has directed his efforts in the right channels then he must practise a third virtue, moderation in his work or studiousness. Study is the strong application of his mind to some truth; now, just as a person must use moderation through temperance of the goods of sense so he must use moderation in his desire for knowledge. For lack of this virtue some men, devoted to learning, lose contact with their fellowmen; others ruin their health, physical or mental, by straining beyond their capacity. Therefore, the student must observe the moderation needed in all matters which prudence controls through reason (2).

As a summary of these virtues needed to enable one to be a good student, one should bear in mind the letter written to a student, which has been attributed to St. Thomas :

> You have asked me, dear friend in Christ, how we must study to acquire the treasure of knowledge. My advice to you is based on this principle : you must go through the rivulets

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(1) - Cfr. IIaIIae, q. 167.
(2) - Cfr. IIaIIae, q. 166.

> and do not try at once to come to the sea, because we must necessarily go to the more difficult through the less difficult. This, then, is my advice to you.
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> Be low to speak; love purity of conscience; pray often, love to be in your room; be kind to everyone; do not inquire into the affairs of others; do not be interested in the sayings and doings of the people of the world; do not be too familiar with anyone because too great familiarity breeds contempt and gives occasion for leaving off study; avoid all needless running about; imitate the saints and the just; remember every good thing you hear and do not consider who says it; understand what you read and hear; labor to fill the storehouse of your mind; do not inquire into the things above you.

4) - A fourth moral virtue required is humility. This virtue moderates and directs the appetite so that one will not be carried to judge matters above his intellectual power but will submit to the truth regardless of its source. Thus St. Thomas states that pride indirectly impedes purely speculative truth by removing its cause; the proud man neither subjects his intellect to God to receive the knowledge of truth from Him, nor does he deign to learn even from men (1).

5) - Finally, in order to receive knowledge from others through discipline there are two qualities required : docility and faith. Docility is defined as the habit by which a person is well disposed to receive doctrine, "ut aliquis sit bene disciplinae susceptivus" (2). St. Thomas places docility as a part of prudence; because of the infinite variety of

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(1) - IIaIIae, q. 162, a. 3, ad 1.
(2) - IIaIIae, q. 49, a. 3.

means towards a particular end which can be known by experience only after a long time, the prudent person must rely on the experience of others and profit by this vicarious insight to know what is best to be done. Docility, however, also applies to the student in speculative matters; he must be willing to learn from others. (As St. Thomas states, one man must use another as himself in those things in which he is deficient; therefore he must hold to those things which another knows).

Docility, nevertheless, is not sufficient. A student may be docile in learning what he is taught and yet not accept the doctrine as true. Therefore, the student needs to have faith; he must accept on faith what he is taught. Just as the distinctive mark of the teacher is evidence, the distinctive mark of the student is faith.

Since the intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms so that of itself it isnot determined to adhere to one thing rather than to another, it will receive its determination by that which can move it - either by the evidence of the object or by the will (1). Since the intellect of the student is in potency and cannot come immediately to perfect knowledge it must in the beginning suppose to be true the things taught, which it is not able to understand : "oportet addiscentem credere" (2); the student must, in other words, use the intellect of his teacher as if

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(1) - De Ver., q. 14, a. 1.
(2) - De Ver., q. 14, a. 10.

it were his own, and must hold to the knowledge of others, which he himself does not have, as though he himself knew it (1). It is only by doing this that he will have a foundation which will enable him someday to have the evidence and certitude of truth, the perfection of his intellect.

Pertinent quotations from St. Thomas are the following :

> Non autem in principio suae doctrinae statim ei qui instruitur, tradit rationes subtilium de quibus instruere intendit : quia tunc statim in principio scientiam haberet perfecte qui instruitur; sed tradit ei quaedam, quorum rationes tunc, cum primo instruitur discipulus, nescit; sciet autem postea perfectus in scientia.
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> Et ideo dicitur quod oportet addiscentem credere : eo aliter ad perfectam scientiam pervenire non posset, nisi scilicete supponeret ea quae sibi in principio traduntur, quorum rationes tunc capere non potest (De Ver., q. 14, a. 10).
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> Ex hoc enim quod captivat, submittit intellectum suum his quae sunt fidei, meretur quod aliquando pervenit ad videndum hoc quod sperat. Visio enim est merces fidei. (In Haebr., c. 11, lect. 1. This quotation which refers to supernatural faith has its fitting application to the faith of a student in natural learning).
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> Quandoque ab aliquo agente movetur aliquid ad id quod est proprium illi agenti, oportet quod a principio ipsum mobile subdatur impressionibus agentis imperfecte, quasi alienis et non propriis sibi, - quousque fiant ei propriae in termino motus; sicut lignum ab igne primo calefit, et ille calor non est proprius ligno, sed praeter naturam ipsius; in fine autem quando iam lignum ignitum est, fit ei calor proprius et connaturalis. Et similiter

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(1) - In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 3, a. 1.

cum aliquis a magistro docetur, oportet quod a principio conceptiones magistri recipiat non quasi eas per se intelligens, sed per modum credulitatis, quasi supra suam capacitatem existentes : in fine autem quando iam edoctus fuerit, eas poterit intelligere (III Contra Gentes, c. 152).

Et quia in convictu hominum unus homo oportet quod alio utatur sicut seipso, in quibus ipse sibi non sufficit; ideo oportet quod stet illis quae alius scit et sunt sibi ignota, sicut his quae ipse cognoscit (In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 3, a. 1).

Intellectus autem possibilis, cum, quantum sit de se, sit in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium formarum, sicut et materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium; est etiam, quantum est de se, non magis determinatur ad hoc quod adhaereat compositioni quam divisioni, vel e converso. Omne autem quod determinatur ad duo, non determinatur ad unum eorum nisi per aliquod movens ipsum. Intellectus autem possibilis non movetur nisi a duobus : scilicet a proprio obiecto, quod est forma intelligibilis, scilicet quod quid est, et a voluntate quae movet omnes alias vires (De Ver., q. 14, a. 1).

IV. - Environment.

While the different intellectual endowments coupled with the possession of or lack of the prerequisite moral virtues explain the various levels of individual intellectual attainment, they do not answer the phenomenon that the divergence is so definitely channeled into determined groups or that studious intelligent men cling so ardently to error. The answer to this problem is to be found in environment or milieu and the intellectual mores. Since the child or student is in potency to knowledge, since he is uncapable of discovering many truths -

especially difficult ones - for himself, since he must therefore have docility towards his elders and believe what he is told, it follows that his mind will be formed according to the teaching he receives. This teaching will be according to the accepted truth of the milieu in which he lives.

This can be seen in every stage of a person's intellectual development. In the early years of childhood there are many determinations of the youthful mind especially in regard to things presented as good or bad as, for example, that people of another nationality, creed or color are inferior or wicked. As the child grows older and proceeds in school he will be taught the customarily held doctrine of the school in matters of history, science, religion, philosophy etc. Since the words of the elders are the signs of their conceptions of reality, the student accepts these words as expressing objective truth. Therefore, where the custom of thought is different in various families, milieus and schools, it follows that the student's mind will be formed accordingly. If he is unable to reach reality himself, the conceptions he receives take the place of reality. Moreover, since these customary statements are the first things which the child or student hears, they become for him "first principles" in the order of knowledge - the origin for further consideration and the final criterion into which are resolved further conclusions. Thus the children of the same milieu and the students of the same school receiving their first intellectual determinations from the same source will form

their intellectual mores accordingly.

If such is the case, however, are we not confronted with a double problem ? Is not the freedom of the intellect destroyed ? Are we not thereby led to relativism ?

In answer to the problem of freedom we say, first of all, that since it is according to nature that man should teach man, it is impossible that education be conducted in any other way. Even though some should decry the effects of teaching as a "destruction" of freedom, they themselves do not hesitate to teach and strive to influence minds to accept their own teaching; for anyone to be sincere in criticizing the teaching of a determined doctrine, one would necessarily desist from teaching by word or writing. A more direct answer, however, is that of experience. Just as in all things which are not necessarily determined by nature and which are according to the human manner of acting, we can speak of a continued determination of mind according to one's environment only according to the greater number of cases - "ut in pluribus". To say that a person will retain throughout life the teaching received in his milieu is to state a fact that is ordinarily the case. Nevertheless, the passage from a deep-seated prejudice to tolerance, from one scientific hypothesis to another, from one philosophy to another, from atheism to religion, from one religious belief to another, is a sufficiently frequent occurence to indicate that the intellect's freedom is not destroyed by early teaching.

The nature of the intellect remains such that it is determined by the truth; once it is developed and mature, it has the strength to discover the truth for itself. Therefore, we must distinguish the freedom of the intellect and the use of that freedom. It is in the use of the freedom that most men fail; they do not possess the spirit to investigate further into truth or they remain attached to what they were taught and unwilling to change their conceptions of what they hold to be true.

In answer to the problem that to hold that environment is the determining factor in the student's intellectual development makes truth merely relative, we respond that since truth consists in the adequation of the intellect to reality, the speculative intellect has truth only when it is conformed to its objects as they are in themselves. Teaching is a means to an end - the conformity of the student's intellect to reality. Now, if the teacher does not himself possess the truth, the result of his teaching will be ignorance or error on the part of the student, - and the total result can be the disaster of whole communities and peoples being misled into error and suffering its horrible practical consequences. It is precisely because of this that the teacher is of such great importance in a community and that every means possible must be taken to assure students of a teacher whose words and conceptions correspond to reality.

In conclusion we may summarize this chapter in stating that the explanation of the divergence of opinion, despite the nature of the spe-

culative intellect to conform itself to reality, results from the factors entering into the development of the intellect. Differences between individual and individual find their explanation in the unequal levels of natural ability and the diverse possessions of moral virtues. Differences between group and group are based on the teaching given in the various milieus. That there should be such a definite acceptance of a particular teaching is based upon the fact that the student is in potency to knowledge while the teacher is in act, - or, in other words, that the teacher has evidence while the student must believe ; oportet addiscentem credere. Finally, that there should be such acontinued acceptance of a particular doctrine is to be explained by the intellectual mores. Their nature is the topic of our next chapter.

Chapter II

Intellectual Mores

I. - The Term : Intellectual Mores.

The chapter on "Student and Teacher" ended with the observation "oportet addiscentem credere", - the student must believe. The teacher sees; the student believes. The intellect is determined by either of two things : the proper object, which is the intelligible form or the "quod quid est" (the "what a thing is"), or by the will. The teacher's intellect is determined by the proper object; that of the student by the will. This is true because the intellect proceeding from potency to act receives its determination only gradually; it begins with general notions and general principles, gradually develops these by further knowledge of particular things into less universal principles, learns to reason from principles to conclusions by comparing one thing to another, sees causes in their effects and effects in their causes, grasps the what things are under the external trappings of sense qualities. In this process of developing the capacity of such understanding and reasoning, the student needs help, and this the teacher gives. He offers this help in the same way as a medical doctor offers medicine and advice; if the desired effect is to take place, the student and the sick person must use the aid given. The assistance of the teacher consists in expressing by word the concepts of his own mind so that the student on hearing the word may form in his

own mind concepts which correspond to the teacher's words and concepts. If the student is able directly to recognize that his concepts correspond to reality, he has evidence of the truth, and his knowledge is rooted in reality; if not, then his concepts are rooted in the mind of the teacher, - and there they retain their basis until the student has evidence of the truth himself.

From this follows the all-importance of the teacher. If the teacher's concepts correspond to reality, the student is placed on the right path to truth; if not, the student may be irretrievably lost. Thus a good teacher is one of the greatest good fortunes a person may have in life; a teacher who does not possess truth is one of the greatest misfortunes one can suffer. The student is as clay in the hands of his teacher to be formed and molded according to the ideas of the master; when the work is completed the clay hardens and retains its form - clear in outline and a mirror of reality or a confused and botched anomaly. For what the student is accustomed to hear becomes for him the measure of truth; after his intellect is formed, his further knowledge is judged true or false in so far as it agrees or disagrees with what he already knows, - as taught him by others.

It is because the student's intellect is determined under the direction of the will that we can speak of the intellectual mores. The word "mores" is the nominative plural of "mos". The word "mos", according to

St. Thomas has two meanings : custom and a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something. Thus, the term "moral virtue" is taken from the second signification, as a moral virtue means a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something; this meaning, however, is closely allied to the signification of "mos" as custom, because custom in someway is changed into nature and causes an inclination which is similar to a natural inclination. Since an inclination properly belongs to an appetitive potency, the word "mores" is properly linked with the inclination of the will (1).

Cognate to this passage is another in the Commentary on the Metaphysics. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, states that men more willingly listen to and more easily receive that which they are accustomed to hear; the customary, in other words, is a measure of truth : what is according

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(1) - Mos autem duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem. — Quandoque vero significat inclinationem quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. ——

Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio quae significat consuetudinem ; nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum. (IaIIae, q. 58, a. 1).