

Accordingly, assent and consideration are had in the different habits and dispositions of the intellect as follows : the operation of the intellect which knows quiddities does not have assent because there is neither truth nor falsehood present; in doubt there is a suspension of judgment, and in opinion there is only an inclination to one part of the contradiction, and so in neither is there assent; in understanding (*habitus principiorum*) there is assent but no consideration; in science there is both assent and consideration in such wise that consideration gives rise to assent and the assent terminates the consideration; in faith there are both assent and consideration but the assent is due to the influence of the will so that the consideration and seeking for more evidence may continue even though firm assent is given.

Thus, in faith, since the intellect is determined by something extrinsic to itself, it is not satisfied and so may undergo doubts concerning what it believes and may continue to look for evidence of what it believes. Therefore, while in understanding and science the intellect is not able to go contrary to what it knows, in faith it may change its assent when the truth it holds is no longer attractive to the will or the assent of faith may disappear altogether and be replaced by the assent of understanding and science when the student attains an

intrinsic evidence for the truth he holds (1).

Note : As we have been speaking about faith, it is necessary to point out the difference between divine faith and human faith. First, divine faith is a virtue whereas human faith is not. It is of the essence of a speculative virtue that it directs the intellect to truth and excludes the possibility of error. Since faith accepts doctrine on another's testimony that faith alone is a virtue which is based on an infallible authority; this is true only of divine faith. Human faith is based upon the authority of human reason; since human reason can err, the faith based upon its authority is not necessarily directed to the truth (2). Therefore, the complete assent (*cum assensu cogitare*) characteristic of divine faith is not had in human faith. Secondly, divine faith is the "substance of things hoped for" (*substantia rerum sperandarum* (3)) and is directed to man's ultimate good because of

(1) - Quantum enim est ex seipso (intellectus) non est ei satisfactum nec est terminatus ad unum; sed terminatur tantum ex extrinseco. Et inde est quod intellectus dicitur captivatus, quia tenetur terminis alienis et non propriis. Inde est quod in credente potest insurgere motus de contrario huius quod firmissime tenet, quamvis non in intelligente vel sciente (De Ver., qu. 14, a. 1).

(2) - Fides de qua philosophus loquitur innitur rationi humanae non ex necessitate concludenti, cui potest subesse falsum. Et ideo talis fides non est virtus. (IIaIIae, qu. 4, a. 5, ad 2).

"Per hoc quod dicitur 'substantia rerum sperandarum', distinguitur a fide communiter accepta, secundum quam credere dicitur id quod vehementer opinamur, scilicet vel testimonio alicuius hominis (De Ver., qu. 14, a. 2).

(3) - Ad Hebreos, c. 11, v. 1.

which man consents to the truth revealed (1); human faith, on the other hand, is under the will tending to some natural good or advantages as, for example, the acquisition of evident knowledge. Finally, the object of divine faith is beyond the power of the human reason to understand and so during this life will remain always obscure; the object of human faith, however, may become evident to the student after further study.

IV. - The Intellectual Mores.

Having treated of the influence of the will in specification of the object, which plays such a great part in the formation of the student because he must believe, it is now our purpose to speak more explicitly of the intellectual mores. These we have defined as the disposition of the intellect under the influence of the will whereby the student has a quasi-natural inclination to retain as true and as the measure of truth what he has been accustomed to hear.

St. Thomas in answering the question whether one person may have a greater faith than another person states that the quantity of a habit may be considered in two ways : according to the object and according to the participation of the subject; furthermore, the object may be con-

(1) - IIaIIae, qu. 4, a. 5.

sidered either in its material or its formal aspects; also the participation of the subject may be regarded in a two-fold manner : from the part of the intellect and from that of the will. We shall follow this order (1).

1) - The material object of the intellectual mores consist in those things which we are accustomed to hear. These customary things are the measure according to which we judge further knowledge for they are better known to us (2). The material object, then, consists in what the child or student is told or taught in literature, art, mathematics, the physical sciences, philosophy, religion, etc. It determines the mind in its concepts before the intellect has the mature ability to reason for itself, and, therefore, it is of the utmost importance that these concepts be according to the truth. Once the mind is determined in these concepts, it has the greatest difficulty to change them.

(1) - IIaIIae, qu. 5, a. 4.

(2) - Auditiones contingunt in hominibus de his quae sunt secundum consuetudines. Ea enim, quae sunt consueta, libentius audiuntur et facilius recipiuntur. Dignum enim videtur nobis, ut ita dicatur de quocumque sicut consuevimus audire. Et si quae dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimus audire, non videntur nobis similia in veritate his quae consuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus nota et magis extranea a ratione, propter hoc quod sunt inconsueta. Illud enim quod est consuetum est nobis magis notum (In II Metaph., lect. 5, n. 331).

2) - The formal object is the medium through which the students accepts or knows the material object. The material object is that which is known (id quod cognoscitur); the formal object is the medium through which (id per quod cognoscitur) the material object is known. It is according to the formal object that the different intellectual habits and dispositions are essentially constituted. In the virtue of understanding it is the evidence of the connection of terms of a principle; in the virtues of science and wisdom, it is the evident connection of conclusions with their principles or the means of demonstration (media demonstrationis); in opinion it is a universal principles which inclines the intellect to one part of a contradiction. In faith the formal reason for accepting what is said is the word of the speaker; when this word is based upon infallible truth as in divine faith, faith is a virtue establishing the intellect in truth; when the word is based on human authority, faith falls into the same category as opinion as the intellect is not certain of possessing the truth, - but differs from opinion since opinion is founded on a person's own reasoning.

The formal reason in accepting what is known in intellectual mores is the authority of the speaker or the teacher. This authority may have several foundations. It may be based on such a weak foundation as the personality and affability of the teacher, his powers of rhetoric in moving the feelings of his hearers, his qualities which are extrinsic

to the speculative intellect as holiness or financial success, attainments in other fields of learning other than that concerning which he makes pronouncements (as a physicist declaring that there is no God), etc.

The formal reason of accepting what is said may be the learning of the teacher. He is worthy of trust because he knows and has an excellent intellectual ability. Thus, to accept the word of the atheistic physicist in questions of physics is sound polity. In accepting a doctrine of Aristotle there is also a sound basis for one's intellectual mores because of his outstanding intellectual acumen.

Or, again, it may be parental, civic or ecclesiastical authority acting through law or precept. A law is an ordering of the reason for the common good promulgated by him who has care of the community (1); a precept is the application of the law to the things which are regulated by the law or to some particular ends (2). Both law and precepts are expressions of the will of an authority according to reason directing the subjects to some good. Since it is for the common good that the citizens of a state be educated, the state enacts laws making the attendance at school compulsory; likewise, since the common good requires a knowledge of the nation's history, political system and other fundamental topics, the state may also demand the teaching and studying of certain

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doctrines. Likewise, parents may oblige their children to study certain matters necessary for their development. The Church has the same power.

Sharing in the power of law is the impact of custom as a reason for accepting what is said and taught, - for custom has the power of law. In speaking about the word "mores" we saw that "mos" means custom in the sense of law (*nisi circumdamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis savli fieri*) and also a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something, and that the second meaning is closely allied to the first because from custom arises this inclination (1). Custom is defined by St. Thomas as a certain frequent repetition of those things which are in our power either to do or not to do; thus natural things and things done once or seldom cannot be called customary (2).

In society there are customs in different localities in matters of dress, food, language, attitudes, amenities of social life, politeness and etiquette, political preferences, trains of thought, religious convictions etc. - all these constitute the environment in which one lives. Due to the repeated manner of acting or thinking custom takes on the aspect of law so that those living in that environment feels himself obliged to conform himself to the others or does so with-

(1) - *IaIIas*, qu. 58, a. 1.

(2) - *Consuetudo autem importat frequentiam quandam circa ea quae facere vel non facere in nobis est. Naturalia enim et quae semel fiunt, consueta non dicuntur* (*In III Sent., d. 23, qu. 1, a. 4, sol. 2*).

out searching consideration. It can be considered a law because human law is the expression of man's will regulated by reason; thus a law may be established by custom in so far as through repeated actions the concepts of the intellect and the movements of the will are most strikingly shown.

Conforming oneself to such customs is not thought to be unreasonable. That which is repeated over and over again seems to stem from a deliberate judgment of reason and so custom is accepted as reasonable and is given as an explanation for one's actions. For example, traffic officers hear the argument many times a day as they give a ticket for unlawful parking or speeding : "everyone else does it"; parents often hear from their children on the occasion of a reprimand the excuse : "All the other fellows are doing it"; likewise, the story is told of father who gave as an explanation to his son asking why in the picture of the creation God wore long sleeves : "God always wears long sleeves when He creates". The argument is : it is always done, therefore it is reasonable; the frequent repetition or custom is an indication that there must be a reason - whatever that reason may be ! It is because of unreasoned reason that there are, as St. Thomas remarks, many laws which are vain, frivolous and childish; the legislators were guided by custom rather than truth (1).

(1) - In II Metaphys., lect. 5, n. 333.

This "reasonableness" of custom is arrived at by the same process of argument by which we posit an intellect guiding the operations of nature. That which happens always or for the most part cannot happen by chance but takes place for an end; things, however, tend towards an end only when directed by an intelligence (1). So, in matters of custom, those things which happen always or for the most part are considered to be the result, not of chance, but of deliberate judgment. Thus custom becomes the reason for doing what others do and, in fact, the law which must be followed (2).

Given in a society these determined customs, it is impossible that a person living in that society be not influenced by them (3). This is especially true of the child and student who by their very character of student must depend on others and must use others as another-

(1) - Cfr. In II Phys., lect. 12-14.

(2) - Omnis lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate legislatoris : lex quidem divina et naturalis a rationabili Dei voluntate; lex humana autem a voluntate hominis ratione regulata. Sicut autem ratio et voluntas manifestantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita etiam manifestantur facto : hoc enim unusquisque eligere ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem quod verbo humano potest et mutari lex, etiam exponi, inquantum manifestat interiorum motum et conceptum rationis humanae. Unde etiam et per actus, maxime multiplicatos, qui consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et etiam aliquid causari quod legis virtutem obtineat : inquantum scilicet per exteriores actus multiplicatur interior voluntatis motus, et rationis conceptus, efficacissime declaratur; cum enim aliquid multoties fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis iudicio provenire. Et secundum hoc, consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum interpretatrix (IaIIae, qu. 97, a. 3).

(3) - Non potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non gerens (IaIIae, qu. 95, a. 3).

self accepting the which another knows as though he, the student knew them perfectly (1). Thus, the custom that the student finds in the school he attends is the great factor in determining what he himself will hold to be true; the formal reason for accepting a certain doctrine will be the custom of the school; accordingly, graduates are marked by the school they attended - if it is known what authors are followed in a certain school of philosophy it is likewise known with great certainty what a graduate of that school holds as doctrine.

Therefore, in the intellectual mores the formal object of formal reason (*ratio formalis*) because of which a student accepts what he is taught is the word of his teacher based upon a liking for the person of the teacher, the learning of the teacher, a precept from the teacher representing the parents, the authority of state or church, or as an expression of the customs of the school or society.

3) - The perfection of the intellect, which is the co-subject of the intellectual mores, consists in certitude and firm determination to truth. This certitude is possible when the intellect has evidence of the object or an extrinsic infallible authority attesting to the truth. Otherwise, the intellect cannot be determined intrinsically by its object either by one or many acts of the mind; repetition of acts

(1) - In Boethius de Trin., qu. 3, a. 1.

does not remove the inevidence of the object (1). Therefore, the determination of the intellect in the intellectual mores is extrinsic to the intellect itself and depends upon the will.

While repetition of acts treating with an inevident object does not give determination, nevertheless it does have the effect of making the intellect familiar with the object. As St. Thomas says, customary things are more easily received, "*facilius recipiuntur*". Just as a person uses a book with which he is familiar much more easily than one of another edition, so also he uses concepts and words to which he has been accustomed more easily than those which are new and strange to him. Thus, repetition causes a proportion of familiarity between intellect and conceptions; this disposition of familiarity becomes another good which is attractive to the will as another motive for the determination of the intellect in the intellectual mores. "*Qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei*" can be applied to the intellect which has received dispositions from the concepts with which it is familiar.

h) - In regard to the will, we may apply the words of St. Thomas stating that a person may have greater faith depending on the will's

(1) - At vero loquendo de intellectu invenitur diversus modus procedendi. Nam aliquando objectum omnino certum et fir-
mum atque evidens, aliquando vero inevidens. Si ergo evi-
denter non appareat, non convincit aut quiescat intell-
tus. Unde ex vi et meritis objecti non determinatur in-
tellectus neque unico neque pluribus actibus (John of St.
Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, t. VI, disp. 13, a. 7. n. 8, p. 347).

greater promptitude, devotion and confidence (1). As mentioned above, the virtues which have the will as subject are charity (love), hope and justice. Thus, the intellectual mores which are based upon a greater affection for one's teacher or his doctrine, upon a greater hope of attaining learning, or upon a greater obedience to an authority, will be correspondingly stronger and more effective.

Herein lies the force of custom as it is only through the repetition of many acts that the will acquires a determined inclination to one object. The inclination which follows upon a natural form is always determined to one manner of acting; as long as the form remains, the inclination remains nor may a new one be introduced, as, for example, a stone regardless of the many times thrown into the air never acquires a custom of going up but always falls to the earth. The will, however, is not so determined to any particular good. However, when the intellect presents a good to the will, and the will is attracted towards it, there is a disposition or inclination to that good; when the good is presented again and again attracts the will, this disposition grows stronger and stronger as, St. Thomas says, successive drops of water hollow out a rock. So this repeated disposition or inclination to one good becomes a form in the will which inclines the will to this good with a determined inclination similar to one of nature.

(1) - *IIaIIae*, qu. 5, a. 4.

Thus it is that custom becomes a second nature and engenders a habit which inclines the will according to the manner of nature (1). Accordingly St. Thomas, speaking of the meaning of mores states that moral virtue is taken from the word mores as it means a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something; closely allied to this meaning is the other signification - custom, because custom in some way is changed into nature and causes an inclination which is like a natural inclination. (2)

So the genesis of the intellectual mores is as follows. First, the student in his immaturity is unable to comprehend what he is told and so the object does not determine the intellect: "oportet addiscentem credere". Secondly, the intellect, which moves the will in the order of specification (*nil volitum nisi cognitum*) presents this object or truth to the will under the aspect of a good; the truth, for example, is accepted by other people in one's environment or has been stated by

(1) - De Virtutibus in Communi, qu. un., a. 9; in II Ethic., lect. 1, n. 249. John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol., t. VI, disp. 13, a. 3, n. 15, p. 275 and a. 8, n. 8, p. 355.

(2) - Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mores significat quendam inclinationem naturalem vel quasi naturalem ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio quae significat consuetudinem: nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum (Ia IIae, qu. 58, a. 1).

someone in authority. Thirdly, the will is attracted to this truth as a good and so moves the intellect to accept it under this aspect of good. Fourthly, the intellect again and again presents this and like truths under the same aspect of good and with each presentation the will is inclined towards it with a stronger inclination; this disposition then becomes a form like to a natural form tending with a quasi-natural inclination to the determined truth under the aspect of good. Thus, the object, which is not in proportion to the intellect but surpassing the comprehension of the intellect, is in proportion to the will as a good and as such is accepted by the intellect. It is in this way that what is customary is more known to us and becomes for us the measure of truth.

assimilation

St. Thomas states : the reason why what is customary is more known is because custom is changed into nature; so the habit which arises from custom has an inclination by mode of nature. From this that someone has such a nature or such a habit, he has a determined proportion to this thing or that. However, a determined proportion of the knower to the known is required for any knowledge. So it is that according to the diversity of natures and habits there occurs a diversity in knowledge. For we see there are first principles innate in all men according to their human nature; and according to the habit of virtue that appears good to each one which is according to that virtue : just as a food seems to fit

one's taste according to the disposition of the tongue. So, therefore, because custom causes a habit which is like to nature, it happens that those things which are customary are the more known to us (1).

Note : We may mention such resemblances of custom to nature as the following.

Nature is the principle of motion and rest (*natura est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est prima et per se et non secundum accidens* (2)); so, too, resulting from the repetition of custom there is in the subject a form which is the principle of a motion or inclination

Nature has one form according to which the natural being has an inclination to one determined end, as the eye is determined to color and the ear is determined to sound; so, too, the form which results in a subject from custom has an inclination to one determined object.

Acts which are done according to nature are pleasant, as everyone experiences in eating, sleeping, seeing colorful objects etc.; so, too, acts which are done according to a custom have a pleasure connected with them. As Aristotle says :

(1) - In II Metaph., lect. 5, n. 332, (see page).

(2) - In II Phys., lect. 1, n. 5.

We may lay it down that pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that pain is the opposite. -- It must therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of being, particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often (1).

A fourth likeness is that habit as nature has a regularity of sequence. Nature always follows the same course : the swallow always builds the nest in the same way and the bees always follow the same process in making their hives. Custom likewise follows a regularity as in the process of doing customary things during the day or in the process of thought, etc. Again, Aristotle :

The mind tends to move to the more customary. Custom now takes the role of nature. Hence the rapidity with which we recollect what we frequently think about. For as regular sequence of events is in accordance with nature, so, too, regular sequence is observed in the actualization of movements in consciousness and here frequency tends to produce the regularity of nature (2).

Finally, just as nature is never lost, so, too, what is customary is most difficult to lose. Habits are qualities which are permanent and lasting as experience so well attests.

(1) - I Rhetoric., c. 10, McKee, p. 1362.

(2) - Memory and reminiscence, c. 2, McKee, p. 614.

Another likeness, as nature is corrected not by a reason intrinsic to nature but by an intellect extrinsic to nature, namely, the Divine Intellect. - So, too, in the intellectual mores, The student is guided by an intellect extrinsic to his own.

These notes we find in the intellectual mores. From what we are accustomed to hear there is in us a "form" which is the source of a quasi-natural inclination to something determined; those things which are customary we more willingly listen to and more easily accept as they are so familiar; also, our thoughts arising in customary matters tend to follow the same pattern and process of reasoning; finally what we have been accustomed to in intellectual considerations are most difficult to lose or change.

In conclusion, we must remark that if the formation of the intellectual mores were merely a matter of obedience and belief in one's teacher all would be well. But such is not the case. While he must believe, he must be reasonable in his acquiescence to the teaching he receives; credulity is a fault, not a virtue. Even in the case where he uses circumspection, where he gives his credence to a teacher whom he considers amply qualified or who has been appointed by capable authorities, where he has the best intentions and personal ability, where he seriously and diligently applies himself to his studies, - even in this case, his intellec-

tual mores may be bad. They are to be judged good or bad, not on the moral qualities or application of the student, but on this alone : do they or do they not place the student on the way to truth. If the student is subjected to the truth from the beginning, his intellectual mores will be good; if not, they will be bad.

Unfortunately it is hardly in the power of the student to know. He is subject to his environment, to his parents, to the authority of the society, to his school and its customs and teachers, and to the Church. In one instance alone can he be certain in those matters where human opinion plays such great a part, as in philosophy and in theology, and that instance is when he is directed by the infallible teaching of the Catholic Church; of this we now wish to speak.

After a few words about the fallible authority of natural human society and the infallible authority of the divinely instituted society of the Catholic Church, we shall conclude in treating of the influence which the teacher appointed by the Church for all her students, St. Thomas, should play in the formation of our intellectual mores. Because of the approbation given by the Church to St. Thomas we know for certain that in following him we shall be placed on the way to truth. To the faith which the student has in St. Thomas we may apply the words of Dionysius : "faith is the lasting foundation of those who believe, pla-

cing them in the truth and the truth in them". "Fides est manens credentium fundamentum, collocans eos in veritate et in eis veritatem" (1).

(1) - De Divinis Nominibus, c. 12

Chapter II

Authority in Education

I. - Authority.

Because of the lasting effect of education, the control of it has always been considered vital. Parents have looked upon the education of their children as one of their most precious rights. States have organized the education of their future citizens as the greatest safeguard of their perpetuity. The Church has always been most solicitous that her children have the opportunity to attend Catholic Schools. What has always been true in this matter has been made more evident in the past years by the efforts of totalitarian nations to take complete control of the education of children so as to bend the minds to the tenets of Nazism and Communism; these anti-God movements have taken advantage of a God-given right to pervert it to the completion of their ill-conceived purposes. The abuse of such nations has not destroyed the need of authority in education nor the natural right of legitimate authority to direct their charges.

The basis for the right of authority in education is the principle that it belongs to the same cause to produce a being and to give it its perfection (1). This is supremely true of God as the principle

(1) - *Plusdem est rem producere et ei perfectionem dare* (Ia, qu. 103, a. 5).

and end of all creation rules the universe by His Divine Providence. As in the order of being all creatures are subject to Him as the first Being, so in the order of truth all intellectual beings are subject to Him as the supreme Truth and Teacher. God teaches us by giving us our intellectual power, by assisting us with an extrinsic light which enables us to understand, and by giving us knowable objects through the things which He has made and through revelation.

While God acts immediately in all His creatures, He shares the government of the universe with them inasmuch as the superior beings direct their inferiors to perfection. just as a teacher, says St. Thomas, who not only makes his students learned but renders them capable to assist him in teaching others. Education is one instance of this participation in the government of men.

That superior beings control to some extent things beneath them is clearly seen where there are different orders of perfection. Living beings use minerals for their own perfection; plants are used for the sustenance of life in animals; brute animals are employed for the utility and pleasure of man. But such a distinction does not pertain to man as related to man. Superiority of one man over another, whereby one may direct another, is founded not on a distinction of specific natures but on the relation of cause to effect. One man may direct another because he is in some way the origin and principle of the other.

This is realized, first, in parents. Parents, as causes of the being of their offspring have the right and obligation to be the causes of their children's perfection. Nature intends not only the birth of a child but also its manner of life befitting human nature. The animals beneath man have their fewer needs more amply provided for by nature and so, are less dependent on their progenitors. Man, as a rational animal, has a body delicately fashioned as the instrument of his soul and needs for years the aid of his parents for his physical sustenance and development; this physical dependence is paralleled by the formation and strengthening of his intellect in learning and his will in virtue until he reaches the maturity enabling him to take his place in society (1).

The country and political state in which a man is born is, also, a principle of his being and, therefore, of his development. The soil of one's country provides much of the food by which he lives; the political society furnishes the means for his well-being, the protection of his rights, and the framework within which he may lead his social life. Now, in a society the ruler of the state has the obligation to promote the common good (2); since the perfection of the whole depends on the perfec-

(1) - *Pater est principium et generationis et educationis et disciplinae et ceterum quae ad perfectionem humanae vitae pertinent* (IIa IIae, qu. 102, a. 1).

(2) - *Opusc. De Regno sive de Regimini Principum*, c. 2.

tion of its parts, the good of the state depends on the perfection of its citizens; as one element in the perfection of a citizen is learning, the authority of the state has the right and obligation to promote the education of the members of the state (1).

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- (1) - Secundario (Deum summum obtinet locum) vero nostri esse et gubernationis principium sunt parentes et patria, a quibus et in qua et nati et nutriti sumus (Hallaes, qu. 101, a. 1).

Education is essentially a social and not a mere individual activity. Now there are three necessary societies distinct from one another and yet harmoniously combined by God. Into which man is born; two, namely the family and civil society, belong to the natural order; the third, the Church, to the supernatural order.

In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its peculiar purpose, the generation and formation of offspring; for this reason it has priority of nature and therefore of rights over civil society. Nevertheless, the family is an imperfect society, since it has not in itself all the means for its own complete development; whereas civil society is a perfect society, having in itself all the means for its peculiar end, which is the temporal well-being of the community; and so, in this respect, that is, in view of the common good, it has pre-eminence over the family, which finds its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil society.

The third society, into which man is born when through baptism he receives the divine life of grace, is the Church; a society of the supernatural order and of universal extent; a perfect society, because it has in itself all the means required for its own end, which is the eternal salvation of mankind; hence it is supreme in its own domain.

Consequently, education which is concerned with man as whole, individually and socially, in the order of nature and in the order of grace, necessarily belongs to all these three societies, in due proportion, corresponding, according to the disposition of Divine Providence, to the co-ordination of their respective ends (Pius XI, Encyclical "Christian Education of Youth").

The three principles of man's being are, then, the three authorities to direct his education : God, his parents, and his country. No one else has the authority to teach others except by participation. The Church, founded by Christ, participates in the authority of God to teach infallibly matters pertaining to faith and morals. Schools and their teachers have authority as participants in the rights of the parents and of the state (1). Great learning on the part of a private person does not give the right to guide others but only a certain excellence which makes him worthy to partake in the authority of others (2).

Corresponding to the authority of God and of those who share in his governing power is the obligation of the creature and the child to obey. Now as human acts proceed from the will as directed by reason, the properly human manner by which one man directs another is by a command. So, just as in the natural order inferior beings are necessarily subject to a movement imposed by superior beings, in human matters inferiors are bound to obey the commands of their superiors (3). This is the obligation of obedience, a part of the virtue of justice which requires we give to each one his due.

(1) - Etiam personae quae quantum ad aliquid providentiam circa nos gerit, particulariter participat proprietatem patris (IIaIIae, qu. 102, a. 1).

(2) - IIaIIae, qu. 102, a. 1, ad 2).

(3) - IIaIIae, qu. 104, a. 1.

God has the absolute right to direct man to truth; man has the necessary obligation to obey in accepting the truth taught him by God. Parents and the state have the right and duty to guide those under their charge in attaining perfection through education; children have the corresponding obligation of obedience to follow their directives.

Granted the existence of this right and its corresponding obligation we must ask : to what extent does this authority obligate the student ? The answer demands a distinction of the authority of parents and of the state from the authority of the Church.

II. - Human Authority.

The power to command and the obligation to obey are limited, in general, by these two principles : first, commands may be given by superiors only in that order in which the inferior is subject to the superior; secondly, a superior may not command in matters which would contradict a higher authority. Thus, in those things which pertain to human nature as such, for example, the directing of one's intention, the right to marry, the right to follow one's vocation etc., neither the parents nor the state may command their subjects; v.g. a citizen must obey in matters pertaining to the temporal common good, and a child must obey in things pertaining to his discipline and the domestic life (1). Moreover,

(1) - Sed in his quae pertinent ad dispositionem actuum et rerum humanarum, tenetur subditus suo superiori obedire secundum rationem superioritatis : sicut miles duci exercitus in his quae pertinent ad bellum; servus domino in his quae pertinent ad servilia opera exequenda; filius patri in his quae pertinent ad disciplinam vitae et curam domesticam; et sic de aliis (IIa IIae, qu. 104, a. 5).

regarding the second principle, nothing may be commanded which would be contrary to a truth or a law given by God or by the Church.

The application of these principles to education is no easy matter. Today, especially in political theories, it is the center of widespread discussion and controversy. It is our intention to make only a few general applications.

The first and most evident command which must be obeyed by students concerns the acts of study. Parents have the obligation to assure themselves that their children spend time in study. The same right is exercised by the state in enacting laws making attendance at school compulsory for a certain number of years.

Regarding the matter to be studied, a distinction must be made between the speculative sciences and the practical sciences. The speculative sciences concern those truths which the intellect recognises and does not make; the intellect must conform to reality of nature, and reality cannot be changed by parental or political authority; authority may command the student to open the eyes of his mind, but it may not ordain what it is to see. However, in the speculative sciences a distinction is also to be made. First, there are those branches of knowledge which are based on geographical and historical facts which are determined in

themselves and so determine the intellect - provided the facts are available and undistorted. Next are mathematics, the philosophy of nature, mathematical-physics, the experimental sciences and metaphysics. Because of the certainty of mathematics and the "objectivity" of the experimental sciences, no authority would reasonably endeavour to make mathematicians and scientists conform their findings and teaching to political ideology. It is different, however, in the philosophical disciplines of the philosophy of nature and metaphysics; here there is no dependence on the experimental sciences but a great dependence on sense experience and, essentially, on the acumen of the philosopher's intellect; the great difficulty to acquire true knowledge of reality is indicated by the history of philosophy and the divergence of opinion among philosophers; thus, while there is a comparative meeting of minds and constructive discussion among mathematicians and experimental scientists, there is a marked tenacity to personal opinion and little agreement among the philosophers of different schools. Therefore, while in this field authority claims no power to declare what the truth is to be, nevertheless it is here that custom and traditions in schools of philosophy have a great bearing on education and the formation of the student's intellectual mores - what the student is accustomed to hear from his teachers will become the measure of truth for him. Since these traditions are based upon fallible human reason and are not approved by an infallible judge, there is no guarantee that the student's intellect is being conformed to reality in such difficult matters.

In the practical sciences of human action or morality and art there are certain basic principles which are per se known and over which authority has no control. But in the application of these principles in the moral order to particular ends and to the means to attain these ends, the authority of parents and state has the right to direct the education of their subjects regarding the matter to be taught. Concerning education in the political order, Aristotle says :

Of all the things which I have mentioned, that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government (1).

No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution. The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives. For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the government (2).

It must be kept in mind that just as in the speculative sciences authority has no power to dictate teaching which would be contrary to the truth placed by God in natural things, so in moral matters (individual,

(1) - Politics, bk V, c. 9, McKee, p. 1251.

(2) - Ibid., bk VIII, ch. 1, McKee, p. 1305.

family, political) authority has no power to decree a teaching which would contradict the natural law or revealed truths given by God. Also, in the field of art the authority of the state has influence because art depends largely upon the customs and traditions of the country.

In conclusion, we repeat that owing to the fallibility of human reason, the authority of a natural society is no guarantee that the student's intellect is being led to the truth. Yet, this authority must appoint teachers; those teachers the student must believe : "oportet ad-discentem credere".

Now we turn our attention directly to the teaching of philosophy. As mentioned above, speculative sciences demand the conformity of the intellect to reality. Now, as long as an authority depends upon scholars for the discovery of that truth and has no gauge to measure it by anything else than the acumen of the intellect which finds it, that authority has no right to declare that such and such is the truth. In this case the superiority of the scholar's intellect is above the superiority of the ruler's power. Therefore, to each scholar belongs the right to seek truth as best he can. From this follows the wide divergence of opinion among philosophers. There is no authority to tell them that one thing is true and another false. They may glory in their "academic freedom" of always searching for the truth but never being certain what

the truth is. Such is the status of non-Catholic philosophers : to each his own.

We, as Catholics, do not deny the need of personal research and discovery, nor the influence of different schools of thought. We do assert, however, that for the Catholic philosopher there is a gauge by which truth can be measured, - a gauge outside the acumen of the intellect which has discovered the truth. It is the Catholic Church. To the Church has been given an infallible authority in matters of faith and morals - and, therefore, in matters necessary for the protection of faith and morals, in which category certain truths of philosophy fall. Therefore, the Church, in the infallibility of her magisterium, may declare "this truth is to be accepted" and "this teacher is to be followed". It is for the student to obey. In doing so, the student is infallibly certain that his intellectual mores are good : he is being placed in truth and truth in him.

III. - The Authority of the Church.

1) - The Divine Goodness which made man an individual, a member of a family and a citizen of a state, also made it possible for him to be a child of God, partaking in the Divine Nature, and a member of the society of Christ's Mystical Body. By his elevation to the supernatural state,

man's life is not limited to earth but goes beyond time and into eternity. That man might reach this supernatural end, God has given him the necessary means, culminating and centered in Christ, the Incarnate Word. The means given by Christ to enable man down through the centuries to lead a life commensurate with his dignity and purpose are the sacraments by which the Divine Life is brought to and increased in the soul, the commandments for man's moral life which trace the path leading to God, and the speculative truths for his intellect.

The revelation of these truths by God has been necessary for two reasons. First, since nothing is desired unless it is foreknown, it was necessary that God reveal to man his supernatural end and the means to attain it. The truths thus revealed are received by man on faith, that is, on the testimony of the Divine Authority. The truths themselves are not apparent as they surpass the capacity of human reason. The second reason for revelation concerns those truths which the human intellect can of its own powers know but due to the lack of acumen in most intellects, the daily necessities of life, the lassiness of most men, the profundity of the matter to be known, the attraction to sensible goods, the liability to error as shown even in the greatest intellects - for all these reasons God in His goodness revealed and commanded these truths to be held by faith. Thus he made it possible for all men to be partakers of divine knowledge without

doubt or error (1).

Revelation, however, was not sufficient in itself. It was necessary that God give an external guide and rule which can protect and teach these truths with authority. If it is necessary to have a Supreme Court to determine the correctness of a lower court's interpretation of law, it is more necessary to have a Church to declare what God has revealed. Revelation is filled with difficulties; if its explanation and truth depended on the private judgment of each reader of Sacred Scripture then, as has happened, apocryphal books would be introduced, contradictories would be accepted as true - faith in other words, would slip and slide, rise and fall depending on the personal decision of a learned scholar or of an ignorant who feels he "has the spirit". Private judgment is not permitted in law; much less can it be accepted in matters of revelation.

Therefore Christ, in His Divine Wisdom, established an external guide to indicate to men the truths of revelation. This guide is the Magisterium of the Church, which has been the consolation of all Catholics from the beginning. Thus it is the Church and not private learning which is the basis for the Catholic's belief; St. Augustine said that he would not believe the Gospel unless moved by the authority of the Catholic Church; likewise, St. Thomas has said that the teaching of the Doctors of the Church

(1) - Ia, qu. 1, a. 1;
Summa Contra Gent., c. 4.

receives its authority from the Church itself so that one must base his judgment on the authority of the Church rather than on the authority of either Augustine or Jerome or any other Doctor (1). This truth has been stated by Pope Pius XII in his Encyclical "Humani generis" in the following words :

This sacred Office of Teacher in matters of faith and morals must be the proximate and universal criterion of truth for all theologians, since to it has been entrusted by Christ, our Lord, the whole deposit of faith - Sacred Scripture and divine Tradition - to be preserved, guarded and interpreted (2).

Together with the sources of positive theology God has given to His Church a living Teaching Authority to elucidate and explain what is contained in the deposit of faith only obscurely and implicitly. This deposit of faith our Divine Redeemer has given for authentic interpretation not to each of the faithful, not even to theologians, but only to the Teaching Authority of the Church (3).

While the Church is infallible, not every part of the Church is infallible, just as while the Church is holy, not every member is a saint. In a nation not all are kings or presidents but there is one king or one president and the others are ruled and governed, so also in the Church the rule of authority and the prerogative of infallible teaching rest in the Head of the Church, the Pope.

(1) - *Illicitas*, ca. 10, a. 12.

(2) - *Humani Generis*, NCCU transl., p. 9, n. 18.

(3) - *Ibid.*, p. 10, n. 21.

This truth is based upon the words of Our Lord :

And I tell this in my turn, that thou art Peter, and it is upon this rock that I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; and I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven; and whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven (1).

Simon, Simon, behold, Satan has claimed power over you all, so that he can sift you like wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith may not fail; when, after a while, thou hast come back to me, it is for thee to be the support of thy brethren (2).

And he said to him (Peter), "Feed my lambs — feed my sheep" (3).

So Peter was chosen to be the visible Head of the Church as the vice-gerent of Christ to guide it in the peace and unity of faith and morals with the prerogative of infallibility. This prerogative has been enjoyed and exercised down the centuries by the successors of Peter. It has been used in the infallible declarations that certain doctrines, such as those of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, are contained in the deposit of revealed truths. It has also been used in the exercise of the magisterium of the Church in her common teaching concerning faith and morals, as Christ has said, "Who hears you, hears me" (4); accordingly, Pope Pius XII has stated :

(1) - St. Matthew, ch. 16, v. 18-19, Transl. Knox.

(2) - St. Luke, ch. 22, v. 32.

(3) - St. John, ch. 21, v. 15, 17.

(4) - St. Luke, ch. 10, v. 16.

It is true that Popes generally leave theologians free in those matters which are disputed in various ways by men of very high authority in this field; but history teaches that many matters that formerly were open to discussion, no longer now admit of discussion.

Nor must it be thought what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their Teaching Authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to say: "He who heareth you, heareth me"; and generally what is expounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, accordingly to the mind and will of the same Pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians (1).

Since the Popes in their Encyclicals and in Canon Law have made declarations concerning philosophy, the teaching of philosophy and the teacher of philosophy, we must point out in what way the Church has authority in this speculative science.

2) - (a) - The prerogative of infallibility given to the Church through the visible Head of the Church is for the Church's benefit, namely, its protection from error in matters of faith and morals. But faith and morals cannot be protected without theology and sacred doctrine; so the infallibility of the Pope must extend to theology and sacred doctrine. Now, the difference of faith, theology and sacred doctrine is as follows.

(1) - Humani Generis, nn. 19, 20.

Faith is the knowledge concerning divine things as immediately revealed. The truths of faith are not proven but accepted from the testimony of God. They are comparable to the first principles in natural sciences as they are the principles from which the proofs of theology take their beginning and into which the theological conclusions are resolved.

Theology is a scientific or certain knowledge of conclusions towards which the theologian proceeds from formally revealed truths by applying the rules of logic to truths which are mediately and virtually revealed as deduced and formally connected with revealed truths. As the principles and conclusions in a science belong to the same order, theological conclusions are supernatural as they are seen in the same light as the revealed truths. Nevertheless, the habitus of theology, unlike the virtue of faith which is supernatural and by which one accepts revealed truths is like the virtues of science and wisdom in philosophy, a naturally acquired and human habitus. Moreover, Christian theology differs from natural theology inasmuch as the latter receives its principles from sense knowledge so that creatures are the principles, and our knowledge about God is contained in the conclusions; in Christian or supernatural theology, God and revealed truths are the principles from which conclusions are derived.

The expression "sacred doctrine" is not necessarily confined to theological science. Doctrine is any probative knowledge in which there

is a process of reasoning from principles to conclusions, whereas theology is sometimes restricted to the knowledge of conclusions that is certain. In this sense theology is the main part of sacred doctrine.

Sacred doctrine may use the authority of philosophers as arguments, but they remain extraneous and probable; it uses the authority of Sacred Scripture and of Tradition as understood by the Church, for its proper arguments. The authority of other Doctors of the Church for arguments which though proper, do not exceed probability (1). To indicate the difference between theology and sacred doctrine we may point out that the theological teaching of St. Augustine has been approved by the Church, whereas the approval of St. Thomas extends even to his doctrine; St. Augustine in following the philosophy of Plato, took from the Platonic doctrine those things which were in accordance with faith and changed for the better those which were contrary to it as, for example, he changed the false Platonic doctrine of separated and self subsisting Ideas into the true doctrine of ideas existing in the mind of God (2); St. Thomas,

(1) - Et inde est quod etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi per rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere poterunt. Sed tamen sacra doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis argumentis et probabilibus. Auctoritatibus autem canonice Scripturae utitur propria, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum Ecclesiae quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter (Ia, qu. 1, a. 8, ad 2).

(2) - Et ideo Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platoniorum imbutus fuerit, si quas invenit fidei accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quas vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit (Ia, qu. 84, a. 5).

however, followed the philosophy of Aristotle, which in its truth allowed him to proceed with certainty in his deductions and defense of the faith; therefore, while the Church has not approved of the philosophical doctrine of St. Augustine, it has approved of the doctrine and philosophy of St. Thomas.

Theology and sacred doctrine are necessary for the faith. This does not mean that theology is necessary for salvation; it does not mean that every man must be a theologian. It does mean, however, that theology and sacred doctrine are necessary for the manifestation and defence of the faith; they are necessary for the whole Church, that is, some learned men in the Church must possess theology and thereby be able to direct and instruct others by that knowledge (1).

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- (1) - It is essential that all young men, and those especially whose education is the hope of the Church, be nourished with the sound and substantial food of doctrine, so that, valiant in strength and provided with a plentiful supply of weapons, they may soon learn to defend the cause of religion forcibly and prudently (Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris*, p. 210).

Ad rationem dicitur theologia non esse praecepti necessariam ad salutem, sed ad declarandam et defendendam fidem quae est necessaria ad salutem. Itaque ex necessitate fidei simpliciter probatur utilitas theologiae, et necessitas; non pro singulis eodemmodo, sed pro communitate, et pro omnibus suo modo. Requiritur enim theologia pro omnibus, sed non ut existat in omnibus; sed in sapientibus, ut existens; in aliis, ut dirigantur a sapientibus; sicut pro omnibus requiritur gubernatio principis in eo architectonice, in aliis ministerialiter et ut in regulatis (John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, t. I, disp. 2, a. 1, p. 368, n. 5 bis).

B) - Just as theology is necessary for faith, so philosophy is necessary for theology. Since, therefore, the infallibility of the Pope extends to sacred doctrine because of the faith, so also it extends to philosophy in so far as it is necessary for theology. This necessity is in the order of manifestation and defense of theology. As St. Thomas says, theology does not receive its principles from other sciences but immediately from God through revelation; therefore, it does not receive anything from other sciences as though they were superior to theology, but, rather, it uses them as inferiors and handmaids, such as architects use workmen and civil authorities use soldiers; so it uses inferior sciences not because of a defect or insufficiency in faith or theology but because of the defect of our intellect, which proceeds from those things it knows by natural reason to truths which are above reason concerning which theology treats (1).

- (1) - Haec scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed a maiorem manifestationem eorum, quae in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tamquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tamquam inferioribus et ancillis: sicut architectonicae utuntur administrantibus ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum, quod sic utitur eis, non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri: qui ex his, quae per naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt aliae) cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea, quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur. (Ia, qu. 1, a. 5, ad 2).

Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana: non quidem ad probandum fidem (quia per hoc tolleretur meritum fidei) sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia, quae traduntur in hac doctrina. Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei (Ia, qu. 1, a. 8, ad 2).

Cf. II Contra Gentes, chs. 2, 3, 4;

John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol., t. I, disp. 2, art. 6, p. 369 (Solennes); a. 12, p. 405.

Theology, then, uses the inferior disciplines as handmaids or servants. It uses grammar, the lowest of the disciplines, when protecting the dogma of the Blessed Trinity, the highest of all mysteries. Logic is necessary for correct reasoning from principles to conclusions. In philosophy, the doctrine of potency and act are necessary for the proofs of the existence of God; the doctrine of essence and existence is necessary for knowledge of the nature of God; the meaning of nature and person are used in the manifestation of the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation; truths concerning substance and accidents, quantity and place are needed in the study of the Blessed Sacrament; the natural doctrine of the nature of man, the nature of the soul are required for the manifestation of the doctrine of grace, virtues, gifts, etc.

The importance of philosophy in the manifestation and defence of the faith has been mentioned frequently in the authoritative teachings of the Popes. We shall quote a few passages from some of these Encyclicals.

Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" (1)

Such natural help, however, as the benevolence of the divine wisdom, which ordereth all things mightily and sweetly, offers mankind is not to be despised or neglected, and of such

(1) - The Encyclicals quoted from are :

Aeterni Patris (Leo XIII) Aug. 4, 1879, A.A.S. v. XII, p. 97.

Doctoris Angelici (Motu Proprio), Pius X, June 29, 1914,

A.A.S., v. VI, p. 336.

Studiorum Ducem, Pius XI, June 29, 1923, A.A.S., v. XIV, p. 309.

help the sound use of philosophy is undoubtedly the most important kind (p. 191).

- - The Fathers of the Church were wont to attribute no small or slender part to reason and the great Augustine briefly sums it up "in attributing to this science the power of begetting, nourishing, defending and consolidating - - most salutary faith" (p. 192).

For, in the first place, philosophy, if rightly practised as it is practised by the wise, is a means of preparing and smoothing the ways, as it were, to the true faith and suitably disposing the minds of its disciples for the reception of revelation (192).

It is eminently fitting to convert these truths which the wisdom of the pagan philosophers has discovered to the use and benefit of revealed doctrine so as to show that in fact human wisdom and the very testimony of its opponents bear witness to the Christian faith (p. 193).

We are indebted to human reason in that it enables us to demonstrate the existence of God. - - It shows that God is singularly excellent in the sum of all perfections (p. 194).

Once the foundations have been thus well laid, the practice of philosophy can still render permanent service of many kinds, more particularly by investing and endowing sacred theology with the nature, habit and character of genuine science (p. 195).

Lastly, it is the function of the philosophical sciences religiously to protect the truths of divine revelation and to resist the attacks of those who dare to assail them (p. 196).

(1 - continued) - The translation of these Encyclicals as here quoted is taken from "St. Thomas Aquinas" by Jacques Maritain, Sheed and Ward, London, 1933. The pages given refer to Mr. Maritain's book.

The translation of "Humani Generis" is that of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C.

Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical "Studiorum Ducem" :

Science of this kind (theology) will be all the more perfect in a man in proportion as he is the better acquainted with the evidence for faith and has at the same time a more fully developed and trained faculty of philosophizing (p. 231).

Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "Humani Generis" :

To neglect, or to reject, or to devalue so many and such great resources which have been conceived, expressed and perfected so often by the age-old work of men endowed with no common talent and holiness, working under the vigilant supervision of the holy magisterium and with the light and leadership of the Holy Ghost in order to state the truths of the faith ever more accurately, to do this so that those things may be replaced by conjectural notions and by some formless and unstable tenets of a new philosophy, tenets which, like the flowers of the fields, are in existence today and die tomorrow; this is supreme imprudence and something that would make dogma itself a reed shaken by the wind. The contempt for terms and notions habitually used by scholastic theologians leads of itself to the weakening of what they call speculative theology, a discipline which these men consider devoid of true certitude because it is based on theological reasoning (n. 17).

Unfortunately these advocates of novelty easily pass from despising scholastic theology to the neglect of and even contempt for the Teaching Authority of the Church itself, which gives such authoritative approval to scholastic theology (n. 18).

It is well known how highly the Church regards human reason, for it fails to reason to demonstrate with certainty the existence of God, personal and one; to prove beyond doubt from divine signs the very foundations of the Christian faith; to express properly the law which the Creator has imprinted in the hearts of men; and finally to attain to some notion, indeed a very fruitful notion, of mysteries (n. 29).

If all, even in the field of philosophy, directed their attention with the proper reverence to the Teaching Authority of the Church, which as Divine institution has the mission not only to guard and interpret the deposit of divinely revealed truth, but also to keep watch over the philosophical sciences themselves, in order that Catholic dogmas may suffer no harm because of erroneous opinions (n. 34).

Thus, the Teaching Authority of the Church claims the extension of its rights to philosophy as being the handmaid of theology, which is necessary for the defence and manifestation of the faith. Such approbation, however, does not change the nature of philosophy. The Church does not prove the truths of philosophy but approves them. Philosophy uses its own principles, methods and arguments. Its principles are rooted in sense knowledge and all its conclusions, even those of metaphysics, are based upon sense knowledge. The habitus of philosophy is a natural and acquired habitus. In such matters scholastic philosophy does not differ from non-scholastic philosophies. In the order of certitude, however, scholastic philosophy does differ because many conclusions of philosophy have also been revealed and in so far as it has received the seal of approval by the Church in those matters connected with theology. Yet, it remains that the proof offered by philosophy is not faith, nor the authority of the Church, but the evidence and manifestation of truths reached by the natural power of the intellect. Once these natural truths are proved, then, and then only, are they approved by the Church.

In conclusion to this chapter on Authority we should recall that the student in his need of belief and trust in his teacher must depend upon the authority who appoints his teacher. When that authority is of a merely natural power, there is no guarantee that what he is taught is the truth - outside the guarantee of evidence on the part of his teachers. Thus he is left to the opinions and customs of his school and environment. In the one case, however, of the Catholic Church he has a certainty based on the infallibility of the Pope that what he is taught is true; he can have no greater certitude. He can have no doubt that his intellectual mores are good.

Now, the Church in approving scholastic philosophy has not remained in vague generalities but has been very specific in naming the philosophy which must be followed and in naming the teacher who is to teach us. The teacher is St. Thomas. The philosophy is that of St. Thomas. From this it follows that the student whose will is rectified by the virtue of obedience will take as his teacher the one appointed by the authority of the Church. As a student he has not yet acquired the habitus of science, he does not yet possess the evidence of science; he must believe and accept a teacher. Therefore, he will accept the teacher appointed by the Church, accepting his doctrine because it is good to accept. The reward of his obedience will be the ability to accept it, once he has matured, because it is true.

As Pope Leo XIII says :

The fact is that the human mind, being circumscribed within defined and very narrow limits, is therefore liable to innumerable errors and ignorance of many things. The Christian faith, on the other hand, being based upon the authority of God, is the most certain teacher of truth and anyone following it is not crushed in the snares of error or tossed about on the waves of fluctuating opinions. Those therefore are the best philosophers who combine the pursuit of philosophy with dutiful obedience to the Christian faith, for the splendour of the divine truths irradiating the soul is a help also to the intelligence; it not only does not deprive it of the least degree of its dignity, but even brings it an increase of nobility, acuteness and strength (1).

(1) - *Aeterni Patris*, p. 198.