

Summa, their locations in the sequence of the text, and the number of uses in any article. It gives no phrases or compound terms, such as *actus purus*; its entries are under *actus* and under *purus*. It gives no meanings, no sorting of the Latin terms according to their varied meanings. It presents no evaluation of the principal locus among those reported. It does not indicate what chapter or verse is referred to in some scriptural reference; it is for instance the mere word *Job* which is referred to.

The one departure from the mere listing of the word in its primary grammatical form, not in its inflectional differences, appears in a four-page list of important variants between the Leonine and Vivès texts.

Many who will use this tool for finding words in St. Thomas will regret that the system of referring to the parts of the *Summa* has departed both from the authors' own use in their *Lexikon* and from the usual style in scholarly literature. The numerals from one to five are used to refer to the parts, with the result that 4 refers to Pars Tertia, 5 to the Supplement. This system may easily cause confusion in transcription and in verifying references and in collating references when one searches not for the occurrence of *actus* or *secundus*, of *sui* or *juris*, but of *actus secundus*, *sui juris*, and other compound terms and phrases. The type adopted also shows no change of face for the numerals used for parts, questions, and articles. The citations omit precise location of the word in the objections, corpus, or replies.

Because of this narrow scope of the concordance it is likely to have little use except to very specialized scholarship in the vocabulary or terminology of St. Thomas. It seems to surpass our other tools to the *Summa* in citing rare words and proper names. The work, too, may be superseded by 1959 if the announced Italian project using I. B. M. coded cards succeeds.

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***The Poetics of Aristotle. Its Meaning and Influence.* By Lane Cooper. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Published in 1923; reissued in 1956. Pp. 157, with notes and bibliography. \$1.75.**

Probably no work of 10,000 words or less matches in importance and influence the *Poetics* of Aristotle. It is only about a hundredth part of the existing works of Aristotle, and by no means the least significant

hundredth part of many significant hundredth parts. In the second sentence of his book, Lane Cooper says: "After twenty-two centuries, it remains the most stimulating and helpful of all analytical works dealing with poetry"—to which he adds a thought not taken from the *Poetics*, "and poetry is the most vital and lasting achievement of man."

Cooper's book has a brevity parallel to that of the *Poetics* but, as with the *Poetics*, there is no brevity of comprehension. There is a well-digested understanding of poetic doctrine that makes the book a valuable commentary on the *Poetics*, yet it is a commentary not so much on the contents of the *Poetics* as on the influence the work has had for over two thousand years.

A sizeable portion of the book is devoted to showing that while the *Poetics* has been a constant stimulation to good artistic production, it has also often been misunderstood. With ample justification, therefore, Cooper presents in the relatively long second chapter a quite literal and accurate exposition of the actual contents of the *Poetics* and, in the fifth chapter, a summary of the main tenets of Aristotle on poetic doctrine. The value of having a faithful and intelligent rendition of the contents of the *Poetics* is appreciated by seeing subsequently how the *Poetics* was variously understood and evaluated from antiquity to the present century. How often, indeed, has Aristotle been used as an authority to hold what he in no way said! How often has he been held as an authority for rigid rules in producing works of art whereas, in fact, he first surveys, largely in an inductive manner, the best art of his time, drawing from his experience of such works of art, observations and principles designed to stimulate good artistic creation in the mind of the artist and discerning artistic enjoyment in the mind of the beholder.

It would take a fair-sized book alone to treat Aristotle's notion of imitation, not so much to analyze his basically simple grasp of the artist as an imitator in the sense of a maker of images, as to cast off the many inadequate presentations of the notion of artistic imitation put forth in Aristotle's name. While the Italian Renaissance did much by way of scholarship to revive the *Poetics*, it is a period in which writers often failed to distinguish vital principles from casual observations in the *Poetics*. The so-called doctrine of the "three unities" is a case in point. Aristotle's only unity is an organic unity vital to a work of art. He observes that dramatists of his time tried "to confine action within the limits of one revolution of the sun," a side remark which

quite unjustifiably led such Italian scholars as Cintio, Robortelli, Segni and especially Castelvetro, to formulate a rigid doctrine not only on unity of time, but of place as well. These and other un-Aristotelian accretions are carefully noted by Cooper in his brief but thorough examination of commentaries on the *Poetics* throughout the ages.

Cooper's little book is an admirable and judicious evaluation of the real worth of the *Poetics*. It provides documentary evidence that, at all times, the *Poetics* has wielded more influence on artists and critics alike than any other contribution in the field. Not the least significant comment is Cooper's own that, in modern times, the "growing attention to the *Poetics* is a hopeful sign in an age of excessive individuation; the treatise will always serve as an antidote to anarchy in criticism."

To which Bywater's comment should be added: Aristotle "tells one, in fact how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the *Rhetoric* he tells one how to make a good speech. And in doing this, he has succeeded in formulating once for all the great first principles of dramatic art, the canons of dramatic logic which even the most adventurous of modern dramatists can only at his peril forget or set at naught."

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***The Kantian Thing-in-Itself or The Creative Mind.* By Oscar W. Miller. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956. Pp. xix + 142, with index. \$3.75.**

Once upon a time man was at one with nature. During this pre-historic period he had no consciousness of himself as a being separate and apart from his impressions. As an instinctive part of nature, each man's self-consciousness was embedded in the general world-consciousness. This was the Golden Age of song and legend, the time when men were well adapted to their surroundings and harmonious with the earth and with each other, and when religion was the feeling of certain ties which bound each man's inner self to the powers of the universe about him.

But this Golden Age did not last. In the evolutionary development of the race, self-consciousness emerged, the old simple acceptance of sensations and experiences at their face value gave place to what we now call reflection, and the human mind then revolved about a new