

by Aristotle and Roger Fry; if imitation and emotionalist theories deal with what lies outside the work, while formalism and "aesthetic fineness" are intrinsic theories, the student has conveniently identified ingredients, and can proceed to Do It Himself. In order to set this situation up, Stolnitz has distorted the main emphasis of the *Poetics*, which is on the difference *formal* techniques make between the pre-artistic subject matter and the artistic experience *within* the work; he has ignored the particular meaning Aristotle gave to the poetic universal (what is probable, likely, credible) and suggested that Aristotle uses the term to refer to the relation between the hero and Everyman, a notion totally alien to Greek thought as we have it; and he has failed to understand the growing psychological connotations which terms like *idea*, *universal*, *essence* have taken on from the time of Renaissance (Neoplatonic) epistemology to the present. Similarly, in approaching formalism, he has reduced the theory to the fairly special idea of "significant form" put forward by Clive Bell and Roger Fry, failing to realize that where Bell's use of the concept was mainly theoretical, Fry's was mainly operational. Yet neither of these formalists has had the influence exerted by Woelfflin, whom Stolnitz ignores, either because he is unfamiliar with his work or else because Woelfflin's concern for the problems of representation would put his brand of formalism outside the particular category Stolnitz had marked out for it. Advanced readers will no doubt catch these failures. But students ought to be warned.

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***The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St. Thomas Aquinas.* By John E. Naus, S. J. Rome: Libreria Editrice dell' Università Gregoriana. 1959. Pp. 220, with index. \$3.50.**

As the title of this work suggests, the nature of practical knowledge, as typically human knowledge, is investigated and analyzed. Although this study is primarily psychological in character, Fr. Naus is aware of the relation of this topic to other areas, e. g., the influence of practical knowledge on ethics, a correct understanding of which helps avoid the extremes to which a "Situation Ethics" goes and, at the same time, helps safeguard an important truth contained in that position. Thus, in Chapter VI of his work, Fr. Naus, in carefully distinguishing

between judgment of conscience and judgment of choice, notes that only in judgment of choice is strictly practical knowledge present for the first time. He is able to show, as a consequence, a legitimate basis for a 'subjective morality,' the point of emphasis in "Situation Ethics," without falling into the sweeping condemnation "Situation Ethics" levels against all moral philosophy, understood as excessively deductive and wholly universal. We need more work of this kind from Thomists who, though seeing the falsity of the extreme position taken by adherents of a wholly relative and subjective ethics, nevertheless should bring out the important truth these same adherents are concerned to stress, namely the inevitable relativity of the judgment of prudence in concrete circumstances. It is in just this respect that both Aristotle and St. Thomas insist on a lack of certainty in the moral order, as distinct from moral science; the application of moral principles to individual action here and now, being beyond science, must entail a relative and subjective aspect. The Thomist can appreciate "Situation Ethics" not as ethics, but as the "situation" in which a person finds himself judging here and now what to do—not as a denial of ethical principles—but as an awareness that knowledge of ethical principles alone will not solve a wholly practical problem. All this depends upon a correct understanding of the practical intellect in man, and it is to this task Fr. Naus principally addresses himself.

The best part of Fr. Naus' work is precisely on this point in Chapter IV. He presents a careful and thorough examination of four principal texts on speculative and practical knowledge in St. Thomas: *De Veritate*, II, 8; *ibid.*, III, 3; *In Boethium de Trinitate*, V, 1, ad 4; and *Summa Theologiae*, I, 14, 16. Fr. Naus is aware that apparent contradictions in comparing the texts is resolved by noting the analogous character of both "speculative knowledge" and "practical knowledge." It is not then surprising, except perhaps for a mind wedded to rigid univocity in understanding terms, to find knowledge regarded as habitually practical in one text classified under speculative knowledge in another. Relationally terms become meaningfully fruitful when so understood, and by means of them we avoid a simplistic understanding of man's complex way of knowing.

Fr. Naus likewise has a good grasp of practical truth as distinct from practical science: "The desire of right appetite to which practical reason should conform is the desire of the right end. Speculative truth and prudence are not correlative. Prudence judges and commands that an act be placed here and now. But this is singular

and contingent. I can have at best only opinion about it. And yet I want to make a right decision, a true judgment, a good choice. So my practical intellect must rely upon something other than itself for truth. And this exterior norm is rectified appetite. But it is not a mere norm, for the intention of this rectified appetite enters constitutively into the reasoning process of the rectified appetite. Prudence, therefore, needs moral virtues which rectify the will as regards the end" (p. 182).

The book is less successful in its treatment of St. Thomas' investigation of the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect. In his first chapter, Fr. Naus, after giving the wholly definitive text from *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 79, A. 11 where St. Thomas clearly denies that the speculative and practical intellect are different potencies, wonders whether this has always been the position of St. Thomas. It is regrettable that Fr. Naus did not proceed with the same sort of amplitude in understanding and relating texts which he showed in relating the texts on speculative and practical knowledge. Instead, he labors to make the point that there is a "development of doctrine" in St. Thomas on this point. Now there is no a priori reason why St. Thomas may not have a "development of doctrine" or that he did not change his mind. On an important point such as the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect, however, had St. Thomas really changed his mind or "developed," we would expect him to allude to such a change explicitly. He does so in such texts as *Quodlibet* VI, 11, 19: "et hoc quidem mihi aliquando visum est," *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, 8, 6: "Et secundum hoc supra, I-II, 68, 4, numerum donorum assignavimus. Sed diligenter intuenti . . ." *ibid.*, III, 9, 4: "Et ideo, quamvis aliter alibi scripserim . . ." *ibid.*, III, 70, 4: "quod etiam aliquando mihi visum est. . ." The attempt of Fr. Naus to make an issue out of the supposed change from the "earlier" St. Thomas to the "later" St. Thomas is unsuccessful on two scores. First, he uses texts distinguishing between scientific and ratiocinative intellects as though they held in all respects for a distinction between speculative and practical intellect. Second, a clear text from the *Commentary on the Sentences* takes the same position on the relation of speculative and practical intellect as the text from the *Summa Theologiae*. Fr. Naus' attempts to explain away this embarrassment are not outstandingly persuasive, including the opinion that "this early text may actually represent his later thought" by a presumed revised and reedited version of the third book of the *Commentary on the Sentences*. Given

the primary task Fr. Naus had in his work, there was no need to diminish its value by raising as an issue what appears to be no issue at all.

Apart from this unsubstantiated issue, and apart from occasional looseness and even inexactness of expression (i. e., an identification, with reference to St. Thomas, of mathematics and logic; an identification, at times, of the end of a science and the end of the agent; a reference, in terms of St. Thomas, to the art of logic as a habit of reasoning in the practical intellect), Fr. Naus has presented more than a "modest contribution" to an inquiry into the nature of the practical intellect. Indeed, we hope that on the basis of this study, he will investigate further, practical knowledge and practical truth in relation to interesting problems raised by "Situation Ethics" and "emotive theories of ethics."

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***Human Freedom and Social Order, an Essay in Christian Philosophy.* By John Wild. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 250, with index. \$5.00.**

This book has grown out of a series of lectures by the author at Duke University under the auspices of the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics. It reflects the author's continued interest in Platonism and Aristotelianism joined to his later interest in modern continental existentialism as expressed in his very readable critique, *The Challenge of Existentialism* (1956).

The theme of the present book is that there has never been a Christian philosophy, though some movements have been called by this name, and that the work of Kierkegaard and his followers gives us a glimpse of how a Christian philosophy is possible. There is no pretense of trying to set up such a philosophy, but merely an attempt to point out the lines along which future efforts may be directed.

It is the author's contention that western thought shows, not a tradition of philosophy internally moved by a Christian image, but an array of rational systems claimed to be compatible with Christian faith. There has been intermixture and contamination, but not a living dialectical tension. Rationalism enabled the Greek to transcend his mythical inclusion in nature, and since the Renaissance, the same