various sciences already mentioned do not exclude the possibility of this theory, but they make it appear very improbable.

For the convenience of the "skimmer" who prefers his discourse in small, capsule form, the author and publishers have presented the various scientific arguments in the first five chapters, and the final chapter entitled "Evolution and God" in very brief, syllogistic form, neatly boxed so that they cannot be missed. However, this reviewer found these little capsules to be rather intellectual *hors d'oeuvres*, stimulating the appetite for a delightful intellectual repast.

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Aristotle On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. **Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962. Pp. xiii + 271, with index. Paper, $6.50.**

Once in a while a scholarly work has both a timely appearance and a timeless excellence. Jean T. Oesterle's translation of the Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan on Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* is just such a rare publication. Mrs. Oesterle combines thorough scholarship with graceful style in making available for the first time in English this most illuminating commentary on the most fundamental of Aristotle's treatises on formal logic. She has included Cajetan's completion of St. Thomas's unfinished commentary (most of Book II), a supplement which "was published so frequently after the Venetian edition of 1496 along with the commentary of St. Thomas that it has become inseparable from it" and "was explicitly composed with the intention of completing St. Thomas's work" (p. 4). Unfortunately, the Leonine edition of Cajetan's text used by Mrs. Oesterle, as she regrets, "is not a critical edition of his work (nor is one available at the present time . . . but obvious difficulties with the text have been noted by the translator.)" (p. 4)

Noteworthy, as Richard Connell remarks in the foreword, is that Mrs. Oesterle's text "contains a rendering of Aristotle's original work which corresponds in its terminology to the medieval commentary of St. Thomas." That Mrs. Oesterle could have used an available translation of Aristotle's text—her primary object is St. Thomas's commentary—

but preferred to make an appropriately definitive version of her own exhibits a quality of careful scholarship that extends to remarkably complete and revealing footnoting. A good example of this is found in footnote 3 on page 19 in which the translator explains her choice of "name" over "noun" to translate *ὄνομα*, a word that first appears in line 16a 1 of the Greek text: Aristotle's treatise has not grammar but logic as its subject, and Aristotle uses *ὄνομα* to cover both the noun and the adjective, and in certain instances even the verb, as is clear from his statement in 16b 19 where he says that verbs in themselves are names: *Αὐτα μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι.*

Mrs. Oesterle obviously possesses not only the technical tools to do the primary job, one of translation, but also the competence in philosophy to do that job with full appreciation of the subtleties of philosophical thought and expression. Her translation of lines 17b 12-17 of Aristotle's text is an excellent case in point. The Greek is:

Επὶ δὲ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου κατηγορεῖν τὸ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· οὐδεμία γαρ κατάφασις ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἐν ᾗ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ καθόλου κατηγορεῖται, οἷον ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πᾶν Ζῶον

The Oxford translation of this passage reads:

> If, however, both subject and predicate are distributed, the proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, under such circumstances, be true. The proposition 'every man is every animal' is an example of this type.

This translation adds in English the phrase "both subject and" which does not appear in the Greek. But it is not taking the subject universally that makes affirmative enunciations false in which the predicated universal is predicated universally; it is taking the predicated universal in this way that does it. Aristotle says: *οὐδεμία γὰρ κατάφασις ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἐν ᾗ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ καθόλου κατηγορεῖται.* His statement thus applies to affirmative enunciations in which the subject is taken universally and to those in which it is taken only particularly. Mrs. Oesterle's superior translation of these lines reads as follows:

> But as regards the predicate the universal universally predicated is not true; for no affirmation will be true in which a universal predicate is predicated universally, for example, 'Every man is every animal.'

It is the enunciation, however, and not the predicate that can be true

or false. Mrs. Oesterle's translation of the first sentence tends to obscure this fact. A better translation would appear to be the following: "But in the case of the predicated universal, to predicate it universally is not true"; etc.

The translator's Introduction is a small masterpiece in itself. Besides the usual historical and bibliographical information, it contains a section entitled "The significance of the doctrine" in which attention is focused on the often ignored distinction between a name and a symbol, crucial for any understanding of the differences between Aristotelian and modern logic. The discussion of supposition, of name and verb, of first and second intentions, with Mrs. Oesterle's concise explanation of their place and importance in a treatise on logic, situates the reader of the commentary in the midst of twentieth century controversy and shows the futility of the various attempts that have been made to locate Aristotle's logic in ancient Greece or St. Thomas's explanation of it in medieval Europe.

The translator defends Aristotle's lengthy discussion of contingency in Chapter 9 by pointing out that "the special type of proposition which is neither determinately true nor determinately false" (i. e., singular enunciations about future contingent matters, which are the topic of Chapter 9 and Lessons 13 and 14 of the Commentary) cannot be analyzed without reference to the extra-logical. If everything were necessary, there could be no question of enunciations that are neither determinately true nor determinately false; they could have nothing even remotely to do with reality. That there is contingency in history and in nature is important to establish also for modal enunciations (discussed in Book II and in Lessons 8-12 of Cajetan's Commentary) to have a basis in reality.

St. Thomas's statement at the end of Lesson 14 that "These things have been stated to save the roots of contingency that Aristotle posits here, although they may seem to exceed the mode of logical matter," has even wider application than to certain kinds of enunciations. For if there were no contingency in the acts of human reason, there would be no need of, nor could there, be a special art to direct them. Where there is perfect determination to action, where the activity is not affected by the presence of a *potentia ad utrumlibet* like the *possibilitas materiae*, there is no need for logic. If the acts of human reason, then, were entirely determined *ad unum*, they could not be the object of artistic direction. Analogously, no one makes laws about what is anyhow necessary—"Ea quae sunt necessaria, legi non subduntur."

Readers already familiar with St. Thomas's text will perhaps be startled by some departures from its literalness which Mrs. Oesterle has consciously made in her translation for the sake of readable and up-to-date English. Here are two examples that the reader can judge better for himself:

1) St. Thomas's regular use of such phrases as "Circa hoc duo facit" (concerning this, he does two things) and "Circa primum tria facit" (concerning the first point,—argument, etc., as the case may be—he does three things) by which St. Thomas calls attention to the major divisions of the argumentation found in Aristotle's text and also in his own commentary has been generally suppressed in the translation. Mrs. Oesterle has, however, made some provision in the translation to preserve the guide-lines afforded the reader of the original text by these outlining remarks of St. Thomas.

Still, for the sake of clarity, it would appear better to have kept the original "Concerning this he does two things," and so forth, wherever they appear—and also the original paragraphing—despite any awkwardness such expressions may entail for colloquial English.

2) The examples used by Aristotle and St. Thomas to illustrate their teaching have been changed in the English whenever a literal translation would either weaken the example or obscure the original meaning. Thus Mrs. Oesterle uses the name "Campbell" as an example of a proper compound name instead of the "Fairsteed" of the Oxford edition or the "Goodsteed" of the Loeb which are literal translations of the Greek κάλλιππος but less evident examples in English of a proper name. The point being illustrated is that "A name is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no part of which is significant separately." The name "Campbell" has the parts "camp" and "bell" in it, but in the one name "Campbell" they are not separately significant and are not themselves names as they are when taken not as parts of a name but in themselves.

Whenever the translator anglicizes the original text in this particular fashion, there is a footnote to explain what has been done and why and, best of all, these footnotes are illuminating commentaries that enhance one's understanding of the entire treatise. Mrs. Oesterle not only translates with skill, but can also teach what she translates, and actually does so often enough in this book to convince the reader that this capacity is the *causa perficiens* of the fine translation she has made.

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