

NATURE AND KINDS OF LOVE

NATURE OF LOVE

Thomas' most universal consideration of love is situated in the treatise on the passions or emotions or feelings in the *Prima Secundae*. But his consideration is more universal (as will be seen) than just the emotion of love. But this is the love most known to us.

And since the emotions are divided into the concupiscible (in Latin, but in the Greek they are put under *epithumia*) and the irascible (referred to in the Greek of Aristotle as *thumos*). The emotions or feelings of the concupiscible have as their object what is pleasant or painful to the senses while the irascible emotions regard some difficulty of getting the pleasant or of avoiding or getting rid of the painful. Thomas first situates love in one of these.

Love is one of the emotions in the concupiscible regarding the pleasant or good. It is the conformity or agreement of the heart (desiring power) with its object whence arise desire or wanting for the agreeable that is absent or not had and pleasure when it is present or had.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 1, Whether love (amor) is in the concupiscible appetite:

One proceeds thus to the first. It seems that love is not in the concupiscible [desiring power].

For it is said in the book of *Wisdom*, Chapter 8, v. 2 "I have loved and sought this [wisdom]". But the concupiscible, since it is part of the sensible desiring power, is not able to tend to wisdom, which is not grasped by sense. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible.

Moreover, love seems to be the same as any passion. For Augustine says in the fourteenth book of *The City of God*: "For love longing to have what is loved is desire; but having it and delighting in it is joy; fleeing what is opposed to it is fear; but sensing this, if it should happen, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible;

but fear, also enumerated here, is in the irascible. Therefore it ought not to be said simply that love is in the concupiscible.

Moreover, Dionysius, in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*, lays down a certain natural love. But natural love seems more to belong to the natural powers, which belong to the living soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible.

But against this is what the Philosopher says in the second book *About Places*, that “love is in the concupiscible”.

I answer that love is something pertaining to [the ability to] desire since the object of both is a good. Hence, there is a difference of love according to the difference of desire.

There is a certain desire not following upon the grasping of the one desiring, but of another. And this kind is called natural desire. For natural things desire what is suitable to them according to their nature, not through their own grasping, but through the grasping of the one instituting nature, as has been said in the first book.

There is however another desire following upon the grasping of the one desiring, but from necessity, not from free judgment. And such is sense desire in the beasts, which nevertheless in men partakes in something of freedom, insofar as it obeys reason.

There is moreover another desire following upon the grasping of the one desiring by free judgment. And such is reasonable or understandable desire, which is called *willing*.

In each of these desires, that is called *love*, which is the beginning of a motion tending towards the end loved. In natural desire, the beginning of this motion is the connaturality of the one desiring to that to which it tends, which can be called natural love; just as the connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place is through heaviness, and can be called natural love. And likewise the fitting of the sense desire or the will to some good; that is the agreement of the good, is called sense love, or understandable or reasonable [love].

Sense love therefore is in sense desire, as understandable love is in understandable desire. And it pertains to the concupiscible because

it is said with respect to good absolutely, not by reference to the difficult, which is the object of the irascible.

To the first therefore it should be said that that authority speaks of understandable or reasonable love.

To the second it should be said that love is said to be fear, joy, desire and sadness, not to be sure essentially, but as a cause.

To the third it should be said that natural love is not only in the powers of the living soul, but in all powers of the soul, and also in all parts of the body, and generally in all things because, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*: “the beautiful and good is lovable for all” since each thing has connaturality to that which is suitable to it according to its nature.

The second article of the first question on love brings out the nature of love as more an undergoing (*passio* in Latin) than an acting upon. Since the powers or abilities of the soul are distinguished by their objects, and either the power acts on the object (as the feeding or digestive power on food) or the object acts on the power (as color acts upon the eye or sound upon the ear), love as an undergoing fits with the heart or desiring power being one that is acted upon by its object.

Sometimes The Poet uses the Latin words *passion* in speaking of love because this signifies undergoing. Thus Warwick, representing a King, says to Lady Bona:

And, gracious madam, in our king's behalf,
I am commanded, with your leave and favour,
Humbly to kiss your hand, and with my tongue
To tell the passion of my sovereign's heart;
Where fame, entering at his heedful ears,
Hath plac'd thy beauty's image and thy virtue.¹

And a King has passion from the description of a woman's rare beauty:

Your wondrous rare description, noble earl,

¹ Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part III*, Act III, Sc. 3

Of beauteous Margaret hath astonish'd me!
 Her virtues, graced with external gifts
 Do breed love's settled passions in my heart.²

And Julia remarks about the love message of Proteus:

Lo! here in one line is his name twice writ,
 Poor forlorn Proteus, passionate Proteus.³

Passion in Latin means first suffering which is very much an undergoing. Shakespeare sometimes uses the English word:

Beatrice: But for which of my good parts did
 You first suffer love for me?

Benedick: "Suffer love," a good epithet! I do
 Suffer love indeed, for I love thee
 Against my will.⁴

Sometimes the lover is said to be overcome by the beloved. In one play, after a wrestling contest, Shakespeare uses this metaphor several times:

Rosalind to Orlando: Sir, you have wrestled well and overthrown
 More than your enemies.

Orlando to himself afterwards What passion hangs these weights upon my tongue?
 I cannot speak to her, yet she urg'd conference.
 O poor Orlando, thou art overthrown;
 Or Charles or something weaker masters thee.⁵

And later in the same play:

Celia: Come, come, wrestle with thy affections.

Rosalind: O, they take the part of a better wrestler than myself.⁶

² Shakespeare, *Henry VI. Part One*, Act V, Sc. 5

³ Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 2

⁴ Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act V, Sc. 2

⁵ *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 2

⁶ *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 3

Helena speaks to Demetrius as if he is responsible for her pursuing him, that he is moving her:

You draw me, you hard-hearted adamant!
But yet you draw not iron, for my heart
Is true as steel: leave your power to draw,
And I shall have no power to follow you.⁷

Likewise, Antony attributes his mistake in following Cleopatra out of the battle to her drawing powers as if his heart was moved by her:

Egypt, thou knew'st too well
My heart was to thy rudder tied by th'strings,
and thou couldst tow me after: o'er my spirit
Thy full supremacy thou knew'st, and that
Thy beck might from the bidding of the gods
Command me.⁸

And Titania says to Bottom that she is moved to love him:

I pray thee, gentle mortal, sing again:
Mine ear is much enamour'd of thy note;
So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape;
And thy fair virtue's force, perforce, doth move me,
On the first view, to say, to swear, I love thee.⁹

THE WOUND OF LOVE

Perhaps nothing brings out more that love is an undergoing than the lover being said to be *wounded* by the loved. For this reason also the first most known meaning of the word *passio* or *undergoing* has the sense of *suffering*.

⁷ Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 1

⁸ Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act III, Sc. 11

⁹ Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 1

When Mercutio has made fun of Romeo being love-sick over Rosaline, Romeo later observes:

He jests at scars that never felt a wound.¹⁰

And Romeo relates to Friar Laurence the sudden mutual falling in love of himself and Juliet thus:

I have been feasting with mine enemy,
Where on a sudden one hath wounded me
That's by me wounded. Both our remedies
Within thy help and holy physic lies.¹¹

Romeo here even uses the medical likeness of Friar Laurence to heal their wounds (by marrying them).

Julia speaks of healing the wound of Proteus as she reads his love-note:

And here is writ "love-wounded Proteus"
Poor wounded name! my bosom as a bed
Shall lodge thee till thy wound be thoroughly heal'd.¹²

When Lucentio speaks of his sudden love (which is aroused through his sight of the beloved), he speaks even of his eye as wounded:

Tranio, be so, because Lucentio loves,
And let me be a slave, t'achieve that maid
Whose sudden sight hath thrall'd my wounded eye.¹³

Hence, in mythology, Cupid is said to act upon us by shooting an arrow from his bow. Hermia, in love, swears by this bow and arrow:

I swear to thee by Cupid's strongest bow
By his best arrow with the golden head.¹⁴

¹⁰ Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 1

¹¹ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2

¹² Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 2

¹³ Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 3

Oberon describes how he acquired a love-potion by watching where Cupid's arrow fell upon a flower wounding it:

Yet mark'd I where the bolt of Cupid fell:
It fell upon a little western flower,
Before milk-white, now purple with love's wound,
And maidens call it Love-in-idleness. [the pansy]¹⁵

And the sad Silvius says to Phebe who will not return his love and mocks him:

O dear Phebe,
If ever, as that ever may be near,
You meet in some fresh cheek the power of fancy,
Then shall you know the wounds invisible
That Love's keen arrows make.¹⁶

And in *Wuthering Heights*, Catherine jokes about her rival for the love of Heathcliff as being ready to shoot a shaft or arrow into him:

"No, no, Isabella, you sha'n't run off," she continued, arresting, with feigned playfulness, the confounded girl, who had risen indignantly. "We were quarreling like cats about you, Heathcliff, and I was fairly beaten in protestations of devotion and admiration: moreover, I was informed that if I would but have the manners to stand aside, my rival, as she will have herself to be, would shoot a shaft into your soul that would fix you for ever, and send my image into eternal oblivion."¹⁷

Receiving love as a wound is spoken of, not only in romantic love, but also in spiritual love. Listen to St. Teresa of Avila recounting her receiving an increase of love under a likeness of an angel wounding her:

It pleased the Lord that I should see this angel in the following way. He was not tall, but short and very beautiful, his face so aflame that he appeared to be one of the highest types of angel who seem to be all afire...In his hands I saw a long golden spear and at the end

¹⁴ Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act I, Sc. 1

¹⁵ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 1

¹⁶ Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 5

¹⁷ Emily Bronte, *Wuthering Heights*, Chapter 10

of the iron tip I seemed to see a point of fire. With this he seemed to pierce my heart several times so that it penetrated to my entrails. When he drew it out, I thought he was drawing them out with it and he left me completely afire with a great love of God. The pain was so sharp that it made me utter several moans; and so excessive was the sweetness caused me by this intense pain that one can never wish to lose it, nor will one's soul be content with anything less than God.¹⁸

In a similar way, St. Therese of Lisieux received an intense increase in love:

On another occasion she related the following incident: "A few days after the oblation of myself to God's Merciful Love I was in the choir, beginning the Way of the Cross, when suddenly I felt myself wounded by a dart of fire so ardent that I thought I should die. I cannot describe the transport, and no comparison would convey an idea of the intensity of the flame. It seemed as though an invisible force had plunged me wholly into fire...But what fire! what sweetness!"¹⁹

Wonder is also said to wound us as. Thus Shakespeare speaks of "wonder-wounded hearers".²⁰ But wonder is already an imperfect love or connected with love just as is reverence:

...homo proximum in reverentia debet habere, quod pertinet ad rationem honoris. Nullus enim potest vere diligere eum quem despicit.²¹

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 2, Whether love is an undergoing:

It is moved forward to the second thus. It seems that love is not an undergoing.

¹⁸ St. Teresa of Avila, *Autobiography*, Chapter 29

¹⁹ Epilogue to the *Autobiography of St. Therese of Lisieux* by the Carmel of Lisieux

²⁰ *Hamlet*, Act V, Sc. 1

²¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Romanos*, XII, Lectio II, n. 986

1. For no virtue is an undergoing. But every love is some virtue, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*. Therefore, love is not an undergoing.

2. Moreover, love is a certain union or binding according to Augustine in the book *About the Trinity*. But union or binding is not an undergoing, but more a relation. Therefore, love is not an undergoing.

3. Further, Damascene says in the second book that undergoing is a motion. Love, however, does not imply the movement of the desiring power which is desire, but the origin of this motion. Therefore, love is not an undergoing.

But against this is what the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics*, that love is an undergoing.

I answer that it should be said that undergoing is the effect of the agent in what is acted upon. A natural agent however brings about a twofold effect in what is acted upon. For first it gives the form, and second, it gives the motion following the form; as the generator gives weight to the body, and the motion following it. And the weight itself, which is the source of the motion to a connatural place on account of the weight, is able in some way to be called natural love.

Thus also the desirable itself gives to the desiring power first a certain adaptation, or fitting with it, which is the agreeableness of the desirable, from which there follows movement to the desirable. For *the motion of the desiring power is made in a circle*, as is said in the third book *On the Soul* For the desirable moves the desiring power, putting itself in the other's aim, and the desiring power tends towards really achieving the desirable, so that, there is the end of the motion where was its beginning.

The first change therefore of the desiring power by the desirable is called *love* which is nothing other than the agreement with it of the desirable; and from this agreement there follows movement to the desirable which is desire; and, at last, rest which is joy.

Therefore, since love consists in a certain change of the desiring power by the desirable, it is manifest that love is an undergoing -

properly as it is in the concupiscible, commonly, however, and by extended name, as it is in the will.

To the first, therefore, it should be said that, because *virtue* signifies the origin of motion or action, therefore love, insofar as it is the source of the desiring power's movement, is called virtue by Dionysius.

To the second, it should be said that union pertains to love insofar as the lover, through the agreement of the desiring power, has himself to what is loved, as to himself or to something of himself. And thus it is clear that love is not the relation itself of union, but that union follows upon love. Whence also Dionysius says that love is a power that unites; and the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Politics*, that union is the work of love.

To the third, it should be said that *love*, although it does not name the motion of the desiring power tending towards the desirable, names nevertheless the motion of the desiring power by which it is changed by the desirable so that the desirable is agreeable with it.

Appendix to Love is an Undergoing

In the following reading, Thomas unfolds how we find and speak of *undergoing* or *passion* in the parts of the soul:

...ex dictis de facili potest patere qualiter in anima possit esse passio. Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur. Applicatur autem corpori et secundum essentiam suam, secundum quod est forma corporea, et secundum operationem suarum potentiarum, prout est motor ejus.

Secundum autem quod applicatur corpori ut forma, sic non consideratur ut quid subsistens, sed ut adveniens alteri. Unde sic non patitur per se, sed per accidens, sicut aliae formae moventur motis subjectis compositis.

In viribus autem animae quantum ad operationem applicantur corpori solum vires partis sensitivae et partis nutritivae. Sed quia

operatio virium nutritivae partis est in movere, non in moveri; ideo secundum eas anima non patitur, sed magis agit.

Relinquitur ergo quod pati proprie sit animae secundum partem sensitivam, ut dicitur in VII Physicorum. Sed quia hujusmodi vires non sunt subsistentes, sed formae organorum corporalium, ideo non dicuntur pati per se, neque anima secundum eas, sed per accidens, inquantum compositum patitur, ut dicitur in *I De Anima*.

Sed quia potentiae apprehensivae sensitivae sunt tantum in recipiendo speciem - quae quidem non recipitur in sensu per modum rei, sed per modum intentionis - ideo in operatione harum virium est quidem aliquo modo pati, quantum ad hoc quod sunt vires materiales et quantum ad hoc quod aliquid recipitur. Et propter hoc dicitur in *II De Anima* quod *sentire est pati quoddam*.

Sed quia sensus non movetur a sensibili secundum conditionem moventis, cum forma sensibilis non recipiatur in sensu secundum esse materiale prout est in sensibili, sed secundum esse spirituale, quod est proprium sensui - unde non habet contrarietatem ad sensum, sed est perfectio ejus, nisi secundum quod excedit proportionem sensus - ideo non proprie dicitur pati secundum has vires, nisi secundum quod excellentia sensibilibus corrumpit sensum, aut debilitat.

Relinquitur ergo quod passio proprie dicatur secundum vires appetivas sensitivas, quia hae vires et materiales sunt et moventur a rebus secundum proprietatem rei, quia non est appetitus intentionis, sed rei ipsius; et secundum hoc habet res convenientiam ad animam vel contrarietatem. Et ideo dicit Philosophus in II Ethicorum quod passio est quam sequitur delectatio vel tristitia; et Remigius dicit quod *passio est motus animae per suspicionem [susceptionem] boni vel mali*.

Sed quia accidit delectatio secundum conjunctionem convenientis et connaturalis, ideo adhuc magis proprie dicuntur passionibus illae affectiones sensitivae ad quas sequitur tristitia, vel etiam quae sunt cum vehementia sive delectationis sive tristitiae, ut dicit Philosophus, V Metaphysicorum, quia sic trahitur anima extra modum suum naturalem.

...sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia immateriales sunt, tamen est ibi aliquid de ratione passionis,

quia in apprehensione intellectus creati est receptio; et secundum hoc dicitur in *III De Anima* quod "intelligere est pati quoddam."

In appetitu autem intellectivo, est adhuc plus de ratione passionis, quia voluntas movetur a re secundum quod est bona vel mala, quae sunt conditiones rei; intellectus autem movetur secundum apprehensionem veri vel falsi, quae non sunt rei per se, sed secundum quod sunt in anima, ut dicitur in *VI Metaphysicorum*.

Unde magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et vehementius movetur quam secundum intellectum. Et sic dicit Dionysius, 2 cap. *De Div, Nom.*, quod "Hierotheus ex patiendo divina didicit divina", idest ex affectu in divina in intellectum devenit.

Et quia movetur affectus a re secundum proprietatem rei quam res habet in se ipsa, ideo per hunc modum contingit quod res habeat contrarietatem et convenientiam ad animam; sed secundum quod apprehenditur ab intellectu, omnis res habet convenientiam, inquantum apprehenditur ut verum. Et ideo in operatione apprehensivae semper est delectatio, in operatione autem affectivae est delectatio et tristitia. Et sic etiam tristitia magis proprie adhuc dicitur passio, sicut in affectu sensibili dictum est..²²

LOVE IS A FORMING-OVER, A TRANSFORMATION OR METAMORPHOSIS

Following upon an understanding of love as an undergoing of the heart, we can see that love is a forming-over, a transformation or metamorphosis of the heart.

Proteus, in love with Julia, contrasts himself with his friend, Valentine. He says that Juliet has transformed him:

He after honour hunts, I after love.
He leaves his friends to dignify them more;
I leave myself, my friends, and all, for love.
Thou, Julia, thou hast metamorphos'd me;
Made me neglect my studies, lose my time,

²² *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XV, Q. II, Art. I, Sol. II, nn. 64-75

War with good counsel, set the world at nought;
Made wit with musing weak, heart sick with thought.²³

But later, when Valentine also falls in love, his servant, Speed, says to him that he can hardly recognize him since he has also undergone a metamorphosis:

and now you are metamorphosed with a mistress, that, when I look
on you, I can hardly think you my master.²⁴

But when Proteus sees Silvia, the form of his heart from Julia begins to be lost, as he notes:

She's fair; and so is Julia that I love, -
That I did love, for now my love is thaw'd,
Which, like a waxen image 'gainst a fire,
Bears no impression of the thing it was.²⁵

Likewise, the Duke says the form impressed upon his daughter Silvia's heart by Valentine will start to disappear as they are separated by his banishment:

This weak impress of love is as a figure
Trenched in ice, which with an hour's heat
Dissolves to water and doth lose his form.
A little time will melt her frozen thoughts,
And worthless Valentine shall be forgot.²⁶

Because love is a transformation of the heart, the heart that is apt to love is metaphorically said to be soft and that slow to love is said to be hard. Thus it is said that women's hearts are as wax:

How easy is it for the proper-false
In women's waxen hearts to set their forms!²⁷

²³ Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1

²⁴ *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 1

²⁵ *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 4

²⁶ *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III, Sc. 2

²⁷ Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act II, Sc. 2

And Olivia, unable to get the one she loves to return her love says:

I have said too much unto a heart of stone.²⁸

Benedick playfully attributes his not being in love to the hardness of his heart:

it is certain I am loved of all ladies, only you excepted: and I would I could find in my heart that I had not a hard heart, for truly I love none.²⁹

When one's heart is transformed with the excellent, there is a certain pride:

His heart, like an agate, with your print impress'd,
Proud with his form, in his eye pride express'd.³⁰

The knowing powers play a role in this transformation:

As love is full of unbefitting strains;
Form'd by the eye, and, therefore, like the eye,
Full of straying shapes, of habits and of forms,
Varying in subjects, as the eye doth roll
To every varied object in his glance.³¹

O spirit of love! how quick and fresh art thou,
That, notwithstanding thy capacity
Receiveth as the sea, nought enters there,
Of what validity and pitch soe'er,
But falls into abatement and low price,
Even in a minute: so full of shapes is fancy,
That it alone is high fantastical.³²

²⁸ *Twelfth Night*, Act III, Sc. 4

²⁹ Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act I, Sc. 1

³⁰ Shakespeare, *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act II, Sc. 1

³¹ *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act V, Sc. 2

³² Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act I, Sc. 1, Orsino

In the following text, Thomas unfolds the reason why the heart or desiring power is transformed by love as a result of its undergoing:

Love pertains to the desiring power which is an undergoing ability. Whence the Philosopher says in the third book *On the Soul* that *the desirable moves as an unmoved mover, but desire as a moved mover*.

But everything undergoing is perfected as it is formed by the form of what acts upon it and its motion ends and rests in this.

Thus, the understanding, before it is formed through the form of the understandable, inquires and doubts; but when it has been informed with this, the investigation ceases and the understanding is made firm in this; and then the understanding is said to adhere firmly to that thing.

Likewise, when affection or the desiring power is entirely filled with the form of the good which is placed before it, it is in agreement with it and adheres to it as made firm in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a transformation of the affection into the thing loved.³³

LOVING AND GIVING

Since the good is in things (while truth is primarily in the mind), as Aristotle teaches us in the sixth book of *Wisdom* (the so called *Metaphysics*), the lover is said *to give* his love or heart to the beloved.

In the garden scene, Juliet speaks of her being able to give love without end:

Juliet: What satisfaction canst thou have tonight?

Romeo: The exchange of thy love's faithful vow for mine.

³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Q. I, Art. I

Juliet: I gave thee mine before thou didst request it;
And yet I would it were to give again.

Romeo: Wouldst thou withdraw it? for what purpose love?

Juliet: But to be frank, and give it thee again.
And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep; the more I give to thee,
The more I have, for both are infinite.³⁴

In the following reading, Thomas notes how spiritual things can be given and yet retained:

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod Pater dans substantiam suam Filio, ea sibi non retinuerit, quia sic Pater desiisset esse divina substantia.

In corporalibus enim quod datur, non retinetur; sicut qui dat equum, non retinet ipsum. Sed in spiritualibus simul datur aliquid et retinetur: sicut qui communicat alii scientiam, retinet ipsum.³⁵

Juliet says that the more she gives, the more she has to give. Rosalind also speaks of this infinity of love:

O coz, coz, coz, my pretty little coz, that thou didst know how many fathom deep I am in love! But it cannot be sounded; my affection hath an unknown bottom, like the Bay of Portugal.³⁶

And even Antony of his love as endless:

Cleopatra: If it be love indeed, tell me how much.

Antony: There's beggary in the love that can be reckon'd.

³⁴ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2

³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio Super Secundum Decretalem*, n. 1197

³⁶ Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act IV, Sc. 1

Cleopatra: I'll set a bound how far to be beloved.

Antony: Then must thou needs find out new heaven, new earth.³⁷

And Helena, in her confession of love for Bertram (who is above her in his state of life) to Bertram's mother, speaks of lending and giving where she is sure to lose:

Then, I confess,
 Here on my knee, before high heaven and you,
 That before you, and next unto high heaven,
 I love your son.
 My friends were poor, but honest; so's my love:
 Be not offended, for it hurts not him
 That he is loved of me: I follow him not
 By any token of presumptuous suit;
 Nor would I have him till I do deserve him;
 Yet never know how that desert should be.
 I know I love in vain, strive against hope;
 Yet in this captious and interminable sieve
 I still pour in the waters of my love,
 And lack not to lose still.....
 Let not your hate encounter with my love
 For loving where you do: but, if yourself,
 Whose aged honour cites a virtuous youth,
 Did ever in so true a flame of liking
 Wish chastely and love dearly, that your Dian
 Was both herself and Love, O! then, give pity
 To her, whose state is such that cannot choose
 But lend and give where she is sure to lose,
 That seeks not to find that her search implies,
 But riddle-like, lives sweetly where she dies.³⁸

She speaks of *lending* because she wants Bertram to return her love. When we *lend* someone something, we expect it to be returned to us.

When Thomas explains why the Holy Spirit (who proceeds by way of love) is called the *Gift of God*, he brings out that love is the first giving:

³⁷ Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc.1

³⁸ Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 1

Gift, as it is understood to refer to a person in God, is a proper name of the Holy Spirit. In evidence of which, it should be known that a gift is properly a *giving not to be returned or given back* according to the Philosopher, that is, which is not given with the intention of being returned; and thus it implies a gratuitous giving. But love is the reason for a gratuitous gift. For we give something *gratis* to someone because we wish good to him. The first thing then we give to him is the love by which we wish good to him. Whence, it is clear that love has the aspect of a first gift through which all gratuitous gifts are given. Whence, since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, as has been said, he proceeds as the first gift. Whence, Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On The Trinity*, that "through the Gift which is the Holy Spirit, many private goods are distributed to the members of Christ."³⁹

Having considered the nature of love, we can now come to the first two distinctions of love. One distinction is between the love that is an emotion and the love that is an act of the will, between what might be called sense love and chosen love. The second distinction is between the love of wanting and the love of wishing well.

TWO KINDS OF LOVE: SENSE LOVE AND CHOSEN LOVE

Since we name things as we know them, the order in naming follows the order in knowing. Hence, the word *love* first seems to name the emotion. And since romantic love is called love by antonomasia (just as the romantic lover is called a *lover* by antonomasia), love is said to be without reason. Thus in two famous passage in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*:

to say the truth, reason and love keep little company together
now-a-days⁴⁰

³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 38, Art. 2, c.

⁴⁰ Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 1

Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
 Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
 More than cool reason ever comprehends.
 The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
 Are of imagination all compact.⁴¹

But Hamlet has a chosen love for his friend Horatio as he tells him:

Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice
 And could of men distinguish, her election
 Hath seal'd thee for herself; for thou hast been
 As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,
 A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
 Hast ta'en with equal thanks; and bless'd are those
 Whose blood and judgment are so well co-mingled
 That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
 To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
 That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
 In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart
 As I do thee. Something too much of this.⁴²

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 3, Whether *amor* [love or sense love] is the same as *dilectio* [chosen love]

One proceeds thus to the third. It seems that *amor* [sense love] is the same as *dilectio* [chosen love].

For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names* that *amor* [sense love] and *dilectio* [chosen love] are to each other *just as four and twice two, rectilineal and having straight lines*. But these signify the same. Therefore, *amor* [sense love] and *dilectio* [chosen love] signify the same.

Moreover, the motions of the desiring power differ by their objects. But there is the same object of *dilectio* and *amor*. Therefore, they are the same.

Moreover, if *dilectio* and *amor* differ in something, they would seem most of all to differ in this, that *dilectio should be taken in the*

⁴¹ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Sc. 1

⁴² *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

good, but amor in the bad, as some say as Augustine narrates in the fourteenth book of the *City of God*. But they do not differ in this way because, as Augustine also says in the same place, each in Sacred Scripture is taken in good and bad. Therefore, *amor* and *dilectio* do not differ, just as Augustine himself in the same place concludes that *it is not different to say amor and to say dilectio*

But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names* that *to some of the saints the name amor seems more divine than the name dilectio*.

I answer that it should be said that four names are found in some way pertaining to the same: to wit, *amor* [love or sense love], *dilectio* [chosen love], *charity* and *friendship*. They differ however in this, that friendship, according to the Philosopher in the eighth book of the *Ethics*. *is as a habit*; *amor* however and *dilectio* signify by way of act or undergoing; *charity* however can be taken in either way.

Act however is differently signified by these three. For *amor* [love] is more general among them. For every *dilectio* or *charity* is a love, but not the reverse. For *dilectio* adds above love a choice preceding, as its name sounds. Whence *dilectio* is not in the concupiscible, but in the will only, and it is in only in a reasonable nature. *Charity* however adds above love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is estimated to be of great worth, as the name itself indicates.

To the first therefore should be said that Dionysius speaks of love and chosen love as they are in the reasonable ability to desire. For thus love is the same as chosen love.

To the second it should be said that the object of love is more common than the object of chosen love because love extends to more than chosen love, as has been said.

To the third should be said that love and chosen love do not differ by the difference of good and bad, but as has been said. In the understanding part however love is the same as chosen love. And thus Augustine speaks there about love. Whence a little afterwards he adds that *a rectified willing is a good love and a perverse willing is a bad love*. Because however the love which is a concupiscible

passion inclines many to the bad, hence they had an occasion who assign the foresaid difference.

To the fourth should be said that therefore some maintain that even in the will the name of love [amor] to be more divine than the name of chosen love [dilectio] because love [amor] implies a certain passion, especially as it is in the sensible ability to desire while chosen love presupposes the judgment of reason.

The love which is an emotion follows upon sense knowledge or the imagination while the love which is an act of the will follows upon an act of reason. The love which is an emotion is partly a bodily movement while the love which is an act of the will is immaterial as is universal reason.

The distinction which can be made between pain and sadness (or between pleasure and joy) shows that pain is even more material and bodily than sadness.

Thomas, in the following reading, distinguishes in three ways pain and sadness:

...in dolore et tristitia duo inveniuntur: scilicet contrarietas contristantis et dolorem inferentis ad contristatum et dolentem, et perceptio ejus; et quantum ad haec duo tripliciter differunt.

Primo quantum ad contrarietatem; quae quidem in dolore attenditur quantum ad ipsam naturam dolentis quae per laesivum corrumpitur; sed in tristitia quantum ad repugnantiam appetitus ad aliquid quod quis odit

Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus, ut dictum est; in tristitia autem secundum apprehensionem interiorem.

Tertio, quantum ad ordinem istorum duorum, quia dolor incipit in laesione et terminatur in perceptione sensus, ibi enim completur ratio doloris; sed ratio tristitiae incipit in apprehensione et terminatur in affectione

Unde dolor est in sensu sicut in subjecto, sed tristitia in appetitu.

Ex quo patet quod tristitia est passio animalis, sed dolor est magis passio corporalis.

Quandoque tamen tristitia, large loquendo, dolor dicitur. Unde Augustinus *in psalm XLII*, distinguit dolorem animae secundum se qui proprie dicitur tristitia, et dolorem animae per corpus qui proprie dicitur dolor.⁴³

Thomas notes after the last reading that in the same way joy and pleasure can be distinguished:

Impressio vero relictā in concupiscibili ex praesentia boni, dicitur delectatio vel gaudium; sed ex praesentia mali dicitur tristitia vel dolor.

Qualiter autem tristitia et dolor differant, supra 15d, dictum est. Eodem modo differunt delectatio sensibilis et gaudium.⁴⁴

Thomas here notes another place where Augustine makes the same distinction between pain and sadness:

...tristitia et dolor hoc modo differunt: quod tristitia est quaedam passio animalis, incipiens scilicet in apprehensione nocimenti, et terminatur in operatione appetitus, et ulterius in transmutatione corporis; sed dolor est secundum passionem corporalem. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV *de Civitate Dei*, cap. VII, in fine, quod dolor usitatus in corporibus dicitur; et ideo incipit a laesione corporis, et terminatur in apprehensione sensus tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente.⁴⁵

TWO KINDS OF LOVE - LOVE OF WANTING AND LOVE OF WISHING WELL

The distinction between the love of wanting (called *amor concupiscentiae* in Latin) and the love of wishing well (called *amor amicitiae* in Latin since a friend should wish well to his friend) is more a distinction of the love which is an act of will than of the love which is an emotion or passion. For the latter seems to be

⁴³ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XV, Q. II, Art. III, Sol. II

⁴⁴ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVI, Q. I, Art. III, n. 43

⁴⁵ *De Veritate*, Q. 26, Art. 3, Ad 9

as such always a love of wanting and this is true especially as it is a love of sense pleasure for this is the good of the lover. But the love which is an act of will may be either a love of wanting or a love of wishing well.

We love ourselves by the love of wishing well for we wish well to ourselves. We love food and wine and money by the love of wanting for we do not wish well to them, but they are goods that we want for ourselves. But for another person, we may have only the love of wanting or also the love of wishing well.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 4, Whether love is suitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of wanting.

It is moved forward to the fourth thus. It seems that love is not suitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of wanting.

1. For *love is a passion, but friendship is a habit*, as the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics*. But habit cannot be a part dividing passion. Therefore, love is not suitably divided by the love of wanting and love of friendship .

2. Further, nothing is divided by that which is numbered with it: for *man* is not numbered with *animal*. But wanting is numbered with love as another passion from love. Therefore, love cannot be divided by wanting.

3. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in the eighth book of the *Ethics*, friendship is threefold - the useful, the pleasant and the honorable. But the useful and pleasant friendships have wanting. Therefore, wanting ought not to be divided against friendship.

But against this: some things we are said to love because we want them, just as someone is said to love wine on account of the sweetness which he wants in it, as is said in the second book of the *Topics*. But to wine and other things of this sort, we do not have friendship, as is said in the eighth book of the *Ethics*. Therefore, the love of wanting ought not to be divided against the love of friendship.

I answer that it should be said, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Rhetoric*, that *to love is to wish good to someone*. Hence, the movement of love tends thus to two things: to the good which someone wishes to someone, either himself or

another; and to the one to whom he wishes the good. To that good therefore which someone wishes to another is had the love of wanting; but to the one to whom one wishes the good is had the love of friendship.

This division is according to before and after. For that which is loved by the love of friendship is simply and through itself loved. But what is loved by the love of wanting is not simply and by itself loved, but is loved for another. For just as being simply is what has existence and being in some respect, what is in another; so also the good which is convertible with being, is simply what has goodness, but what is the good of another is good only in a limited sense. And consequently the love by which is loved something so that good might be for it is love simply; but the love by which something is loved that it might be the good of another, is love in some respect.

To the first, therefore, it should be said that love is not divided by friendship and wanting, but by the love of friendship and of wanting. For the one to whom we wish some good is properly called a friend, but what we wish for ourselves, we are said to want.

And through this is clear the solution to the second.

To the third it ought to be said that, in the friendship of the useful and the pleasant, one does wish some good to the friend; and in this regard the definition of friendship is kept there. But since that good is brought back further to one's own pleasure or utility; hence it is that the friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is drawn to the love of wanting, falls short of the definition of true friendship.

Another short reading from Thomas on these two kinds of love:

...cum objectum amoris sit bonum, dupliciter aliquis tendere potest in bonum alicujus rei.

Uno modo, ita quod bonum illius rei ad alterum referat, sicut quod bonum unius rei, optet alteri, si non habet; vel complaceat sibi, si habet; sicut amat quis vinum inquantum dulcedinem vini peroptat [praeoptat], et in hoc gaudet quod eo fruatur, non quod vinum ipsum habeat; et hic amor vocatur a quibusdam *amor*

concupiscentiae. Amor autem iste non terminatur ad rem quae dicitur amari, sed reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonum illius rei.

Alio modo amor fertur in bonum alicujus rei ita quod ad ipsam rem terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei; et hic est *amor benevolentiae* qui est principium amicitiae, ut dicit Philosophus in IX *Ethic*.⁴⁶

In this other reading on the two loves, Thomas teaches us that by the love of wishing well or friendship, we more love another; and by the love of wanting another, we more love ourselves:

Super Ioannem, Caput XV, Lectio IV, 2036:

Dicendum, quod duplex est amor: amicitiae scilicet et concupiscentiae, sed differunt: quia in amor concupiscentiae, quae sunt nobis extrinseca, ad nos ipsos trahimus, cum ipso amore diligamus alia, inquantum sunt nobis utilia vel delectabilia; sed in amore amicitiae est e converso, quia nosmetipsos trahimus ad ea quae sunt extra nos; quia ad eos quos isto amore diligimus, habemus nos sicut ad nosmetipsos, communicantes eis quodammodo nosmetipsos.

Unde in amore amicitiae similitudo est causa amoris, non enim sic diligimus aliquem nisi inquantum sumus unum cum eo: similitudo autem est unitas quaedam.

Sed in amore concupiscentiae, sive sit utilis, sive delectabilis, similitudo est causa separationis et odii. Cum enim isto amore aliquem diligam inquantum est mihi utilis vel delectabilis, quidquid est impeditivum utilitatis seu delectationis, habeo odio contrarium. Et inde est quod superbi iurgantur adinvicem, inquantum unus usurpat sibi gloriam quam alius amat, et in qua delectatur; figuli etiam, inquantum unus trahit ad se lucrum, quod alius pro se volebat.

Sed sciendum, quod amor concupiscentiae non est rei concupitae, sed concupiscentis: propter hoc enim quis hoc amore aliquem diligit,

⁴⁶ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXIX, Art. III, Resp. , nn. 35-36

inquantum est sibi utilis, ut dictum est. Et ideo magis diligit in hoc se quam illum: sicut qui diligit vinum quia est sibi delectabile, se potius quam vinum diligit.

Sed amor amicitiae est potius rei amatae quam amantis, quia diligit aliquem propter ipsum dilectum, non propter ipsum diligentem. Sic ergo, quia in amore amicitiae similitudo causa est amoris, dissimilitudo causa odii, inde est quod mundus odio habet quod suum non est et sibi dissimile, et diligit, idest dilectione amicitiae, quod suum est. Sed de dilectione concupiscentiae est e converso, Et ideo dicit *Si de mundo fuissetis, mundus quod suum erat diligeret*, scilicet amore amicitiae.

In the following two readings Thomas teaches us about these two loves in our love of God:

Caritas autem ordinat actum voluntatis in Deum; non solum sic quod homo bono divino fruatur, hoc enim pertinet ad amorem qui dicitur concupiscentiae; sed secundum quod bonum divinum est in ipso Deo, quod ad amorem amicitiae pertinet.⁴⁷

culpa separat a Deo separatione quae opponitur unioni caritatis, secundum quod quis vult bonum ipsius Dei, secundum quod in se est; poena autem separat a Deo separatione quae opponitur fruitioni, qua homo fruitur bono divino; et sic separatio culpae est peior quam separatio poenae.⁴⁸

A short reading touching upon these two loves said of God:

...quamvis nos non diligamus creaturas inanimatas amore benevolentiae, quia eorum bonum non est a nobis; Deus tamen eas diligit amore benevolentiae, quia per hoc quod eis bonum vult, sunt et bonae sunt. Tamen Deus quamvis non amet aliquid concupiscendo sibi, amat tamen concupiscendo alteri...⁴⁹

⁴⁷ *De Malo*, Q. I, Art. 5, corpus

⁴⁸ *De Malo*, Q. I, Art. 5, Ad 3

⁴⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXXII, Art. II, Ad 2, n. 28

Duane H. Berquist
