

CAUSES OF LOVE

FIRST CAUSE OF LOVE - SOMETHING GOOD

Benedick speaks of his resistance to loving a woman until every human good (the good of the soul, the good of the body and even exterior goods) is found in her:

One woman is fair, yet I am well; another is wise, yet I am well; another virtuous, yet I am well; but till all graces be in one woman, one woman shall not come in my grace. Rich she shall be, that's certain.¹

Bassanio also touches upon all these goods in the ascending order in the most loveable Portia and adds that she seems to encourage him to pursue her:

In Belmont is a lady richly left,
And she is fair, and, fairer than that word.
Of wondrous virtues: sometimes from her eyes
I did receive fair speechless messages:
Her name is Portia; nothing undervalu'd
To Cato's daughter, Brutus' Portia:
Nor is the wide world ignorant of her worth,
For the four winds blow in from every coast
Renowned suitors; and her sunny locks
Hang on her temples like a golden fleece;
Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strand,
And many Jasons come in quest of her.²

The fact that there is so much good in Portia is why there are so many suitors from the four corners of the world.

¹ Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act II, Sc. 3

² Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act I, Sc. 1

The citizen's clever proposal of a possible marriage of the Dauphin with Blanch likewise touches upon these three kinds of human good:

That daughter there of Spain, the Lady Blanch,
Is near to England: look upon the years
Of Lewis the Dauphin and that lovely maid.
If lusty love should go in quest of beauty,
Where should he find it fairer than in Blanch?
If zealous love should go in search of virtue,
Where should he find it purer than in Blanch?
If love ambitious sought a match of birth,
Whose veins bound richer blood than Lady Blanch?
Such as she is, in beauty, virtue, birth,
Is the young Dauphin every way complete.
If not complete of, say he is not she;
And she again wants nothing, to name want,
If want it be not that she is not he.
He is the half part of a blessed man,
Left to be finished by such as she;
And she a fair divided excellence,
Whose fulness of perfection lies in him.³

There is also the good of the whole of which Blanch and the Dauphin are possible parts.

The above three examples touch upon the distinction of all the goods of man into the goods of the soul, the goods of the body and the outside goods. Socrates and the Athenians disagreed about which are better (as we learn in the *Apology*), a disagreement which Aristotle also discusses in the seventh book of the *Politics*. But of course, love does not require all of these goods. Thus the disappointed suitor of the beautiful woman says:

Kindness in women, not their beauteous looks,
Shall win my love: and so I take my leave.⁴

³ Shakespeare, *Life and Death of King John*, Act II, Sc. 1

⁴ Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act III, Sc. 4

Kindness or sweetness in a woman seems even more essential than beauty. Thus Jane Austen says:

sweetness...makes so essential a part of every woman's worth in the judgment of man, that though he sometimes loves where it is not, he can never believe it absent.⁵

And perhaps women are especially attracted to courage in a man so that Othello's account of how he and Desdemona came to love each other touches upon the characteristic goods of man and woman:

She lov'd me for the dangers I had pass'd,
And I lov'd her that she did pity them.⁶

Although one can be moved to love someone for some particular good that one finds in them, love is more aroused by finding every good in them. Thus Ferdinand says about Miranda:

Admir'd Miranda,
Indeed the top of admiration, worth
What's dearest to the world: full many a lady
I have ey'd with best regard, and many a time
Th' harmony of their tongues hath unto bondage
Brought my too diligent ear; for several virtues
Have I lik'd several women, never any
With so full a soul, but some defect in her
Did quarrel with the noblest grace she ow'd
And put it to the foil. But you, O you,
So perfect and so peerless, are created
Of every creature's best.⁷

There is the same knowledge of opposites. Richard sees himself as unlovable because his body is ugly:

⁵ Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park*, Chapter XXX

⁶ Shakespeare, *Othello*, Act I, Sc. 3

⁷ Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act III, Sc.1

Why, love forswore me in my mother's womb:
 And, for I should not deal in her soft laws,
 She did corrupt frail nature with some bribe,
 To shrink mine arm up like a wither'd shrub;
 To make an envious mountain on my back,
 Where sits deformity to mock my body:
 To shape my legs of an unequal size;
 To disproportion me in every part,
 Like to a chaos, or an unlick'd bear-whelp
 That carries no impression like the dam.
 And am I then a man to be belov'd?
 O monstrous fault! to harbor such a thought.⁸

When peace comes after war, Richard thinks that he cannot turn to love because of his body's ugliness:

Now is the winter of our discontent
 Made glorious summer by this sun of York;
 And all the clouds that lour'd upon our house
 In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.
 Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths;
 Our bruised arms hung up for monuments;
 Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings;
 Our dreadful marches to delightful measures.
 Grim-visag'd war hath smooth'd his wrinkled front;
 And now, - instead of mounting barbed steeds,
 To fright the souls of fearful adversaries, -
 He capers nimbly in a lady's chamber
 To the lascivious pleasing of a lute.
 But I, that am not shap'd for sportive tricks,
 Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass;
 I, that am rudely stamp'd, and want love's majesty
 To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
 I, that am curtail'd of this fair proportion,
 Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
 Deform'd, unfinish'd, sent before my time
 Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,

⁸ Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part III*, Act III, Sc. 2

And that so lamely and unfashionable
 That dogs bark at me, as I halt by them;
 Why I, in this weak piping time of peace,
 Have no delight to pass away the time,
 Unless to see my shadow in the sun
 And descant on my own deformity:
 And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover,
 To entertain these fair well-spoken days,
 I am determined to prove a villain,
 And hate the idle pleasures of these days.⁹

Helena is not ugly. But when the man she loves does not return her love, but instead loves Hermia, she doubts her own beauty in comparison to Hermia:

O! I am out of breath in this fond chase.
 The more my prayer, the lesser is my grace.
 Happy is Hermia, where soe'er she lies;
 For she hath blessed and attractive eyes.
 How came her eyes so bright? Not with salt tears:
 If so, my eyes are oftener wash'd than hers.
 No, no, I am as ugly as a bear;
 For beasts that meet me run away for fear;
 Therefore, no marvel though Demetrius
 Do, as a monster, fly my presence thus.
 What wicked and dissembling glass of mine
 Made me compare with Hermia's sphery eyne?¹⁰

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 1 - Whether something good is the cause of love

It seems that not only the good is the cause of love.

1. For the good is not a cause of love except because it is loved.
 But it happens also that the bad is loved, according to that in Psalm
 10, v. 6: "Who loves iniquity, hates his own soul." Otherwise, all

⁹ Shakespeare, *Richard III*, Act I, Sc. 1

¹⁰ Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

love would be good. Therefore, the good is not the only cause of love.

2. Moreover, the Philosopher says, in Book Two of the *Rhetoric*, that "we love those who say something bad about themselves." Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love.

3. Moreover, Dionysius says, in the fourth chapter *On the Divine Names*, that not only the good, but also "the beautiful is lovable to all."

But against this is what Augustine says in the eighth book *On the Trinity*: "Surely nothing is loved except the good." Therefore, only the good is the cause of love.

I answer that, as has been said before, love pertains to the desiring ability which is an ability that is acted upon. Whence its object is compared to it as the cause of its motion or act. It is necessary therefore that what is the object of love be properly the cause of love.

But the proper object of love is the good because, as has been said, love implies a certain natural fit or agreement of the lover with the loved; and what naturally fits or agrees with something and is proportioned to it, is good for it. Whence it remains that the good is the proper cause of love.

To the first therefore it ought to be said that the bad is never loved except under the notion of the good; to wit, insofar as it is in some way good and is grasped as simply good. And thus some love is bad insofar as it tends toward what is not simply a true good. And in this way, man loves iniquity, insofar as he attains some good by iniquity, as pleasure or money or something of this sort.

To the second, it ought to be said that those who say what is bad about themselves, are not loved because of those bad things, but on account of this, that they say these bad things; for to say what is bad about oneself can be considered good insofar as it excludes lying or pretense.

To the third, it ought to be said that the beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in definition. For since the good is what all desire it belongs to the definition of the good that desire rests in it; but it belongs to the definition of the beautiful that desire rests in the sight or knowledge of it. Whence also those senses especially regard the beautiful which are most knowing - to wit, sight and hearing which serve reason. For we call sights beautiful and sounds beautiful. In the sensibles of the other senses, however, we do not use the name of beauty - we do not call smells or odors beautiful. And thus it is clear that beautiful adds above good a certain order to a knowing ability, so that is called good which simply agrees with desire, but that is called beautiful of which the knowledge itself is agreeable.

The first part of the body of the article leads to concluding the major premise of the chief syllogism (the object of love is the cause of love). And the second part of the body of the article states the minor premise of the chief syllogism (the good is the object of love) first and then backs it up with a prosyllogism. The contrary orders in the two parts enables the reader to see the two premises of the chief syllogism together in the middle.

As regards the major premise of the chief syllogism, one could also manifest it by the other passions of the soul and their objects. The object of my anger is also a cause of my anger and the object of my fear is also a cause of my fear and the object of my sadness is also a cause of my sadness.

SECOND CAUSE OF LOVE - KNOWLEDGE

Shakespeare quotes Marlowe when Phebe says

Dead shepherd, now I find thy saw of might:
"Whoever lov'd that lov'd not at first sight."¹¹

¹¹ Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 5; Marlowe, *Hero & Leander*, 1.176

One might ask whether true love is always at first sight or can it be at a later sight? But whatever the answer, it is at some sight. The poet likes to represent it at first sight. Thus Ferdinand to Miranda:

.....Hear my soul speak!
The very instant that I saw you did
My heart fly to your service, there resides
To make me slave to it.¹²

Juliet understands that looking can move us to liking:

Mother: Speak briefly, can you like of Paris' love?

Juliet: I'll look to like, if looking liking move.¹³

And Romeo addresses his sight about Juliet as responsible for a unique love:

Did my heart love till now? forswear it sight!
For I ne'er saw true beauty till this night.¹⁴

And the Duke in this conversation speaks of the first time that he did see Olivia:

Curio: Will you go hunt, my lord?

Duke: What, Curio?

Curio: The hart

Duke: Why, so I do, the noblest that I have.
O! when mine eyes did see Olivia first,
Methought she purg'd the air of pestilence;
That instant was I turned into a hart,
And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds,
E'er since pursue me.¹⁵

¹² Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act III, Sc. 1

¹³ Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 3

¹⁴ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 4

Antony is also in love with Cleopatra at first sight:

Upon her landing, Antony sent to her,
Invited her to supper: she replied,
It would be better he became her guest,
Which she entreated. Our courteous Antony,
Whom ne'er the word of "No" heard speak,
Being barber'd ten times o'er, goes to the feast,
And for his ordinary pays his heart
For what his eyes eat only.¹⁶

And Fr. Laurence says that young men's love lies not in their heart, but in their eyes since they cause it:

Holy Saint Francis! what a change is here!
Is Rosaline, that you didst love so dear,
So soon forsaken? Young men's love then lies
Not truly in their hearts but in their eyes.¹⁷

And in the words of a song, fancy (meaning love) is said to be engendered in the eyes:

Tell me where is fancy bred,
Or in the heart or in the head?
How begot, how nourished?
Reply, reply.
It is engendered in the eyes
With gazing fed.¹⁸

Even when Shakespeare represents magic potions that cause people to fall in love, he represents them as acting through the eyes. Listen to the words of Oberon, the king of the fairies:

¹⁵ Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act I, Sc. 1

¹⁶ Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 2

¹⁷ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2, Fr. Laurence to Romeo

¹⁸ Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 2, song:

.....Having once this juice
 I'll watch Titania when she is asleep,
 And drop the liquor of it in her eyes:
 The next thing then she waking looks upon,
 Be it on lion, bear, or wolf, or bull,
 On meddling monkey, or on busy ape,
 She shall pursue it with the soul of love:
 And ere I take this charm off from her sight,
 As I can take it with another herb,
 I'll make her render up her page to me.¹⁹

And after Oberon anoints Titania's eyes with the magic juice, he says:

What thou seest when thou dost awake,
 Do it for thy true-love take;
 Love and languish for his sake:
 Be it ounce, or cat, or bear
 Pard, or boar with bristled hair,
 In thy eye that shall appear
 When thou wak'st, it is thy dear.
 Wake when some vile thing is near.²⁰

Puck is also sent on a similar mission to the Athenians where he notes the flower (from which the magic potion is derived) will show its force through the eyes:

Through the forest have I gone,
 But Athenian found I none,
 On whose eyes I might approve
 This flower's force in stirring love.²¹

Oberon corrects Puck who places the love-juice on the wrong eyes:

What hast thou done? thou hast mistaken quite,
 And laid the love-juice on some true-love's sight:

¹⁹ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 1

²⁰ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

²¹ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

Of thy misprision, must perforce ensue
Some true-love turn'd, and not a false turn'd true.²²

Oberon expands on the effect of this magic potion on one of the Athenians through his eyes:

Flower of this purple dye
Hit with Cupid's archery,
Sink in apple of his eye.
When his love he doth espy,
Let her shine as gloriously
As the Venus of the sky.
When thou wak'st, if she be by,
Beg of her for remedy.²³

Lysander, unaware of the magic juice acting upon his sight, thinks that it is by reason that he now loves Helena:

Content with Hermia! No: I do repent
The tedious minutes I with her have spent.
Not Hermia, but Helena I love:
Who will not change a raven for a dove?
The will of man is by his reason sway'd,
And reason says you are the worthier maid.
Things growing are not ripe until their season;
So I, being young, till now ripe not to reason;
And touching now the point of human skill,
Reason becomes the marshal to my will,
And leads me to your eyes; where I o'erlook
Love's stories written in love's richest book.²⁴

But Hamlet has a chosen love for Horatio as expressed in his words to him:

Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice
And could of men distinguish, her election
Hath seal'd thee for herself; for thou hast been

²² *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 2

²³ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 2

²⁴ *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,
 A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
 Hast ta'en with equal thanks: and blest are those
 Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled,
 That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
 To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
 That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
 In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart,
 As I do thee.—Something too much of this.²⁵

This is a love or friendship whose cause is the knowledge of reason.

FIRST TWO CAUSES OF LOVE

Since the cause of love is the good as known (by the senses or by reason), knowledge is often spoke of as a cause with the good on the side of the object and not by itself.

Capulet urges Paris to use his senses to see which lady is the most desirable:

At my poor house look to behold this night
 Earth-treading stars that make dark heaven light.
 Such comfort as do lusty young men feel
 When well-apparel'd April on the heel
 Of limping Winter treads, e'en such delight
 Among fresh fennel buds shall you this night
 Inherit at my house - hear all, all see,
 And like her most whose merit most shall be:
 Which, on more view of many, mine (being one)
 May stand in number though in reck'ning none.²⁶

²⁵ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

²⁶ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 2

Likewise, Benvolio urge to the disappointed lover Romeo to look elsewhere at other beauties to forget the one that has rejected him:

Romeo: She hath forsworn to love, and in that vow
 Do I live dead that live to tell it now.

Benvolio: Be rul'd by me, forget to think of her.

Romeo: O teach me how I should forget to think.

Benvolio By giving liberty unto thine eyes,
 Examine other beauties.....

Romeo: Farewell, thou canst not teach me to forget.

Benvolio: I'll pay that doctrine or else die in debt.²⁷

And further in their conversation, one can see how the good as known is the cause of love:

Benvolio: Tut man, one fire burns out another's burning,
 One pain is lessen'd by another's anguish,
 Turn giddy and be holp by backward turning,
 One desp'rate grief cures with another's languish.
 Take thou some new infection to thy eye
 And the rank poison of the old will die...
 At this same ancient feast of Capulet's
 Sups the fair Rosaline, whom thou so loves,
 With all th'admired beauties of Verona.
 Go thither and with unattainted eye
 Compare her face with some that I shall show,
 And I will make thee think thy swan a crow.

Romeo: When the devout religion of mine eye
 Maintains such falsehood, then turn tears to fires,
 And these who, often drown'd, cold never die,
 Transparent heretics, be burnt for liars.
 One fairer than my love? th'all-seeing sun

²⁷ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 1

Ne'er saw her match since first the world begun.

Benvolio: Tut, you saw her fair none else being by,
Herself pois'd with herself in either eye.
But in that crystal scales let there be weigh'd
Your lady's love against some other maid
That I will show you shining at this feast,
And she shall scant show well that now seems best.

Romeo: I'll go along, no such sight to be shown
But to rejoice in splendor of mine own.²⁸

And Juliet says she will have to look at the good qualities of Paris to see if she can like or love him:

Mother: What say you, can you love this gentleman?
This night you shall behold him at our feast,
Read o'er the volume of young Paris' face
And find delight writ there with Beauty's pen,
Examine every married lineament
And see how one another lends content,
And what obscur'd in this fair volume lies
Find written in the margent of his eyes...
Speak briefly, can you like of Paris' love?

Juliet: I'll look to like, if looking liking move,
But no more will I endart mine eye
Than your consent gives strength to make it fly.²⁹

And Romeo's words about Juliet when he first sees how beautiful she is and begins to love her reveal the moving power of the good or beautiful as seen to cause love:

O she doth teach the torches to burn bright.
It seems she hangs upon the cheek of night
As a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear -

²⁸ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 2

²⁹ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 3:

Beauty too rich for use, for earth too dear.
 So shows a snowy dove trooping with crows
 As yonder lady o'er her fellows shows.
 The measure done, I'll watch her place of stand,
 And touching her make blessed my rude hand.
 Did my heart love till now? forswear it, sight!
 For I ne'er saw true beauty till this night.³⁰

Romeo thinks he never truly loved until he saw such beauty.

And Olivia catches the “plague” of love when the youth’s perfections (and therefore good qualities) creep into her eyes:

How now!
 Even so quickly may one catch the plague?
 Methinks I feel this youth's perfections
 With an invisible and subtle stealth
 To creep in at mine eyes. Well, let it be..

I do I know not what, and fear to find
 Mine eye too great a flatterer for my mind.
 Fate show thy force: ourselves we do not owe;
 What is decreed must be, and be this so.³¹

Lorenzo, in understanding his love for Jessica, combines three good things in her with his knowledge of them:

Beshrew me, but I love her heartily;
 For she is wise, if I can judge of her,
 And fair she is, if that mine eyes be true,
 And true she is, as she hath prov'd herself;
 And therefore, like herself, wise, fair, and true,
 Shall she be placed in my constant soul.³²

Proteus, when tempted to abandon Julia for Silvia, speaks of both his knowledge of her and her goodness or excellence:

³⁰ *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 4

³¹ Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act I, Sc. 5

³² Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, Act II, Sc. 6

Even as one heat another heat expels,
 Or as one nail by strength drives out another,
 So the remembrance of my former love
 Is by a newer object quite forgotten.
 Is it mine eye, or Valentinus' praise,
 Her true perfection, or my false transgression,
 That makes me reasonless to reason thus?
 She's fair; and so is Julia that I love, -
 That I did love, for now my love is thaw'd,
 Which like a waxen image 'gainst a fire,
 Bear no impression of the thing it was...
 'Tis but her picture I have yet beheld
 And that hath dazzled my reason's light;
 But when I look on her perfections,
 There is no reason but I shall be blind.³³

Proteus also uses the word *object* in describing the cause of his new love.

And when Lucentio tells Tranio of his sudden love for Bianca he speaks of the good he saw in her, thus joining the second cause of love to the first:

Tranio: I pray, sir, tell me, is it possible
 That love should of a sudden take such hold

Lucentio: O Tranio! till I found it to be true
 I never thought it possible or likely.
 But see, while idly I stood looking on,
 I found the effect of love in idleness,
 And now in plainness do confess to thee,
 That art to me as secret and as dear
 As Anna to the Queen of Carthage was,
 Tranio, I burn, I pine, I perish, Tranio,
 If I achieve not this young modest girl....

Tranio: Master, you look'd so longly on the maid
 Perhaps you mark'd not what's the pith of all.

³³ Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 4

Lucentio: O yes, I saw true beauty in her face,
Such as the daughter of Agenor had,
That made great Jove to humble him to her hand
When with his knees he kiss'd the Cretan strand.

Tranio: Saw you no more? mark'd you not how her sister
Began to scold and raise up such a storm
That mortal ears might hardly endure the din?

Lucentio: Tranio, I saw her coral lips to move
And with her breath she did perfume the air.
Sacred and sweet was all I saw in her.³⁴

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 2 - Whether knowledge is a cause of love.

It seems that knowledge is not a cause of love.

1. It results from love that something is sought. But some things are sought that are unknown, as the sciences. For since in these, "it is the same to have them as to know them," as Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-Three Questions*; if they are known, they are had, and are not sought. Therefore, knowledge is not a cause of love.

2. It seems to amount to the same that something unknown is loved and that something is loved more than it is known. But some things are loved more than they are known; as God, who is able in this life to be loved through himself, but not to be known through himself. Therefore, knowledge is not the cause of love.

3. Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, love could not be found where there is no knowledge. But love is found in all things, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *On the Divine Names*. Knowledge however is not found in all.

³⁴ Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 3:

But against this is what Augustine proves in the tenth book *On the Trinity* that "no one is able to love something unknown."

I answer that it ought to be said, as has been said, that the good is a cause of love by way of an object. The good, however, is not an object of desire except insofar as it is grasped. And therefore love requires some grasping of the good that is loved. And because of this the Philosopher says in the ninth book of the *Ethics*, that bodily sight is the beginning of sense love. And likewise, contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Thus therefore knowledge is a cause of love for the same reason as the good which is not able to be loved unless known.

To the first therefore, it ought to be said that he who seeks a science is not entirely ignorant of it; but he foreknows it in some way, either in general, or in some effect of it, or through this that he hears it praised, as Augustine says in the tenth book *On the Trinity*. To know it thus however is not to have it, but to know it perfectly.

To the second, it ought to be said that something is required for the perfection of knowledge that is not required for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to reason of which it is proper to distinguish between those that are joined in the thing, and to put together in some way those which are diverse, by comparing one to the other. And thus for the perfection of knowledge, it is required that man know one by one whatever is in the thing, as parts, powers, and properties. But love is in the desiring ability which regards the thing as it is in itself. Whence it suffices for the perfection of love that the thing be loved insofar as it is grasped in itself. On account of this therefore, it happens that something is loved more than it is known; because it is able to be perfectly loved, even if it is not perfectly known - as is most clear in the sciences which some love because of some slight knowledge which they have about them; as that they know rhetoric to be the science through which a man is able to persuade, and they love this in rhetoric. And one ought to speak likewise about the love of God.

To the third, it ought to be said that the natural love which is in all things is also caused from some knowledge, not existing to be sure

in the natural things themselves, but in the one who instituted the nature, as has been said above.

THIRD CAUSE OF LOVE - LIKENESS

When Lorenzo praises Portia for urging her new husband to go to the rescue of his friend, the merchant of Venice, whom she has never met, she reasons that he must be like her husband since they love each other so much. She reasons from the effect (love) to the cause (likeness):

Lorenzo: Madam, although I speak it in your presence,
 You have a noble and a true conceit
 Of god-like amity; which appears most strongly
 In bearing thus the absence of your lord.
 But, if you knew to whom you show this honour,
 How true a gentleman you send relief,
 How dear a lover of my lord your husband.
 I know you would be prouder of the work
 Than customary bounty can enforce you to.

Portia: I never did repent for doing good,
 Nor shall not now: for in companions
 That do converse and waste the time together,
 Whose souls do bear an equal yoke of love,
 There must be needs a like proportion
 Of lineaments, of manners, and of spirit;
 Which makes me think that this Antonio,
 Being the bosom lover of my lord,
 Must needs be like my lord. If it be so,
 How little is the cost I have bestow'd
 In purchasing the semblance of my soul
 From out the state of hellish cruelty.³⁵

³⁵ Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 4

Richard, when killing Henry, says that there can be no love between him and other men because he is not like them:

If any spark of life be yet remaining [stabs again]
 Down, down to hell; and say I sent thee thither,
 I, that have neither pity, love, nor fear.
 Indeed, 'tis true, that Henry told me of;
 For I have often heard my mother say
 I came into the world with my legs forward.
 Had I not reason, think ye, to make haste,
 And seek their ruin that usurp'd our right?
 The midwife wonder'd, and the women cried
 "O! Jesus bless us, he is born with teeth."
 And so I was; which plainly signified
 That I should snarl and bite and play the dog.
 Then, since the heavens have shap'd my body so,
 Let hell make crook'd my mind to answer it.
 I have no brother, I am like no brother;
 And this word "love", which greybeards call divine,
 Be resident in men like one another
 And not in me: I am myself alone.³⁶

But those who are most like one another in the same art or occupation may come into conflict because of competition for the same honor or customers (as in the rivalry of Dickens and Thackeray). Hence, those who are like, but not so much as to be in competition, may be more sincere friends than those whose likeness brings them into competition:

There are no friendships among men of talents more likely to be sincere than those between painters and poets. Possessed of the same qualities of mind, governed by the same principles of taste and natural laws of grace and beauty, but applying them to different yet mutually illustrative arts, they are constantly in sympathy and never in collision with each other. A still more congenial intimacy of the kind was that contracted by Goldsmith with Mr. afterwards Sir Joshua Reynolds. The latter was now about forty years of age, a few years older than the poet, whom he charmed by the blandness and benignity of his manners and the

³⁶ Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part III*, Act V, Sc. 6

nobleness and generosity of his disposition, as much as he did by the graces of his pencil and the magic of his coloring. They were men of kindred genius, excelling in corresponding qualities of their several arts, for style in writing is what color is in painting; both are innate endowments, and equally magic in their effects. Certain graces and harmonies of both may be acquired by diligent study and imitation, but only in a limited degree; whereas by their natural possessors they are exercised spontaneously, almost unconsciously, and with ever-varying fascination. Reynolds soon understood and appreciated the merits of Goldsmith, and a sincere and lasting friendship ensued between them.³⁷

And because two men can be like a third in different ways, they may not be inclined to like each other, as Boswell unfolds:

My desire of being acquainted with celebrated men of every description, had made me, much about the same time, obtain an introduction to Dr. Samuel Johnson and to John Wilkes, Esq. Two men more different could perhaps not be selected out of all mankind. They had even attacked one another with some asperity in their writings; yet I lived in habits of friendship with both. I could fully relish the excellence of each...Sir John Pringle, "mine own friend and my father's friend," between whom and Dr. Johnson I in vain wished to establish an acquaintance, as I respected and lived in intimacy with both of them, observed to me once, very ingeniously, "It is not in friendship as in mathematics, where two things, each equal to a third, are equal between themselves. You agree with Johnson as a middle quality, and you agree with me as a middle quality; but Johnson and I should not agree."³⁸

Fanny thinks that mutual love between herself and Mr. Crawford is impossible because they are so dissimilar. She speaks strongly to him in this vein:

She told him, that she did not love him, could not love him, was sure she never should love him: that such a change was quite

³⁷ Washington Irving, *The Life of Oliver Goldsmith*, Chapter XIV

³⁸ Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, observation by Boswell in 1776

impossible, that the subject was most painful to her, that she must intreat him never to mention it again, to allow her to leave him at once, and let it be considered as concluded forever. And when further pressed, had added, that in her opinion their dispositions were so totally dissimilar, as to make mutual affection incompatible; and that they were unfitted for each other by nature, education and habit.³⁹

But when she discusses her relation to Mr. Crawford with Edmund, he is not so sure:

"We are so totally unlike," said Fanny, avoiding a direct answer, "we are so very, very different in all our inclinations and ways, that I consider it as quite impossible we should ever be tolerably happy together, even if I *could* like him. There never were two people more dissimilar. We have not one taste in common. We should be miserable.."

"You are quite mistaken, Fanny. The dissimilarity is not so strong. you are quite enough alike. You *have* tastes in common. You have moral and literary tastes in common. You have both warm hearts and benevolent feelings; and, Fanny, who that heard him read, and saw you listen to Shakespeare the other night, will think you unfitted as companions? You forget yourself; there is a decided difference in your tempers, I allow. He is lively, you are serious; but so much the better; his spirit will support yours. It is your disposition to be easily dejected, and to fancy difficulties greater than they are. His cheerfulness will counteract this. He sees difficulties nowhere; and his pleasantness and gaiety will be a constant support to you. Your being so far unlike, Fanny, does not in the smallest degree make against the probability of your happiness together: do not imagine it. I am myself convinced that it is rather a favourable circumstance. I am perfectly persuaded that the tempers had better be unlike: I mean unlike in the flow of the spirits, in the manners, in the inclination for much or little company, in the propensity to talk or to be silent, to be grave or to be gay. Some opposition here is, I am thoroughly convinced, friendly to

³⁹ Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park*, Chapter XXXIII, Fanny to Mr. Crawford

matrimonial happiness. I exclude extremes of course; and a very close resemblance in all those points would be the likeliest way to produce an extreme. A counteraction, gentle and continual, is the best safeguard of manners and conduct.⁴⁰

Boswell attributes a temporary irritation of Johnson with him to a dissimilarity between them:

Coll called me up, with intelligence that it was a good day for a passage to Mull; and just as we rose, a sailor from the vessel arrived for us. We got all ready with dispatch. Mr. Johnson was displeased at my bustling and walking quickly up and down. He said it did not hasten us a bit. It was getting on horseback in the ship. "All boys do it," said he; "and you are longer a boy than others." He himself had no alertness or whatever it may be called; so he may dislike it, as *Oderunt hilarem tristes*. [Horace: "Gloomy people hate a merry fellow.]"⁴¹

Thomas speaks of love as founded on likeness in his exposition of St Paul's *Epistle to the Ephesians*:

Dilectio enim fundatur super similitudine. Unde dicitur *Eccli.*, c. XIII, 19: *Omne animal diligit sibi simile*. Filius autem est per naturam suam similis patri, et ideo principaliter et per se dilectus est, et ideo naturaliter et excellentissimo modo est patri dilectus. Nos autem sumus filii per adoptionem, inquantum scilicet sumus conformes Filio eius, et ideo quamdam participationem divini amoris habemus.⁴²

And in his exposition of St Paul's *Epistle to the Galatians*, Thomas speaks of union and likeness as the beginning of love:

Sed dubitatur hic, utrum liceat plus unum diligere, quam alium.

⁴⁰ Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park*, Chapter XXXV

⁴¹ James Boswell, *The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson*, LL. D, Wednesday, 13 October 1773

⁴² Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Ephesios*, I, Lectio II, n. 16

Ad quod sciendum, quod amor potest dici maior vel minor dupliciter. Uno modo ex objecto; alio modo ex intensione actus. Amare enim aliquem, est velle ei bonum. Potest ergo aliquis alium magis alio diligere, aut quia vult ei maius bonum, quod est obiectum dilectionis, aut quia magis vult ei bonum, id est ex intensiori dilectione.

Quantum ergo ad primum, omnes aequaliter debemus diligere, quia omnibus debemus velle bonum vitae aeternae. Sed quantum ad secundum, non oportet quod omnes aequaliter diligamus: quia cum intensio actus sequitur principium actionis, dilectionis autem principium sit unio et similitudo, illos intensius et magis debemus diligere, qui sunt nobis magis similes et uniti.⁴³

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 3 - Whether Likeness is a cause of love.

One goes forward to the third thus. It seems that likeness is not the cause of love,

1. For the same is not a cause of contraries. But likeness is a cause of hate: for it is said, *Proverbs*, Chapter 13, v. 10, that "there are always disputes between the proud"; and the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics* that "potters quarrel with each other." Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

2. Moreover, Augustine says in the fourth book of the *Confessions* that "someone loves in another what he would not want to be; as a man loves an actor who would not wish to be an actor." This however would not happen if likeness were the proper cause of love; for thus a man would not love in another what he himself had or wished to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

3. Moreover, each man loves what he needs, even if he does not have it; as the sick love health and the poor love wealth. But insofar

⁴³ Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Galatas*, VI, Lectio II, n. 364

as he needs and lacks them, he has an unlikeness towards them. Therefore, not only likeness, but also unlikeness is a cause of love.

4. Moreover, the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Rhetoric* that "we love those who have done well to us in matters of money and safety; and likewise, all love those who preserve friendship towards the dead." All however are not such. Therefore, likeness is not the cause of love.

But against this is what is said in *Ecclesiasticus* Chapter 13, v. 19: "Every animal loves what is like itself."

I answer that likeness properly speaking is the cause of love. But it should be considered that likeness can be found between things in two ways. In one way from this, that both have the same in act; as two having whiteness are said to be alike. In another way from this, that one has in ability and in a certain inclination what the other has in act.; as if we say that a heavy body existing outside its place has a likeness with a heavy body existing in its place. Or also as ability has a likeness to act itself; for act is in ability itself in some way.

The first way of likeness, therefore, causes the love of friendship or well-wishing. For from this, that any two are alike as having one form, they are in some way one in that form; as two men are one in the form of human nature and two whites, in whiteness. And therefore, the affection of one tends toward the other, as in something one with itself; and therefore, it wills the good for the other, just as for itself.

But the second way of likeness causes the love of wanting or the friendship of the useful or the pleasant for there is a desire for its act in each thing existing in ability as such, and it delights in reaching this if it is sensing and knowing.

It has been said above, however, that in the love of wanting, the lover properly loves himself when he wills that good which he wants. However, one loves himself more than another because he is one in substance with himself; but to another, in the likeness of some form. And therefore, if from this, that another is like him in partaking of a form, he is himself impeded from reaching the good

he loves, the other is made hateful to him, not insofar as he is alike, but insofar as the other is impeding his own good. And because of this "potters quarrel with each other", because they impede each other in their own profit; and "there are disputes among the proud", because they impede one another in their own excellence which they want.

And through this is clear the response to the first.

To the second, it should be said that in this also, that someone loves in another what he does not love in himself, there is found the likeness according to proportionality; for just as the other is toward what is loved in him, so the man himself is towards what he loves in himself. For example: if a good singer loves a good writer, there can be noted there a likeness of proportion, according as each has what belongs to him according to his art.

To the third, it should be said that he who loves the very thing he lacks, has a likeness to that which he loves; as what is in ability, to act, as has been said.

To the fourth, it should be said that according to the same likeness of ability to act, the one who is not liberal loves him who is liberal, insofar as he expects from him something that he wants. For on both sides there seems to be a friendship of usefulness.

Or it ought to be said that, although all men do not have virtues of this kind according to complete habit, they have them nevertheless according to seedlike things of reason whereby he who does not have virtue, loves the virtuous as conformed to his natural reason.

APPENDIX TO THE THIRD KIND OF CAUSE - LIKENESS

In the following text, Thomas gives a reason why one desires the like and turns away from the diverse, but also why by happening the reverse is also possible:

Est ergo prima conceptio, quod *omnis diversitas est discors, et similitudo est appetenda.*

Circa quod considerandum est, quod discordia importat contrarietatem appetitus: unde illud dicitur esse discors quod repugnat appetitui. Omne autem diversum, inquantum huiusmodi, repugnat appetitui: cuius ratio est, quia simile augetur et perficitur suo simili. Unumquodque autem appetit suum augmentum et perfectionem, et ideo simile inquantum huiusmodi est unicuique appetibile: et pari ratione diversum repugnat appetitui, inquantum diminuit et perfectionem impedit.

Et ideo dicit, quod *omnis diversitas est discors*, idest ab appetitu discordans; *similitudo vero est appetenda*.

Contingit tamen per accidens quod aliquis appetitus abhorret simile et appetit diversum sive contrarium. Nam sicut dictum est, unumquodque primo et per se appetit suam perfectionem, quae est bonum uniuscuiusque, et est semper proportionatum suo perfectibili, et secundum hoc habet similitudinem ad ipsum. Alia vero quae sunt exterius, appetuntur vel refutantur inquantum conferunt ad propriam perfectionem: a qua quidem deficit quandoque aliquid per defectum, quandoque autem per excessum. Nam propria perfectio uniuscuiusque rei in quadam commensuratione consistit: sicut perfectio corporis humani consistit in commensurato calore; a quo si deficiat, appetit aliquid calidum per quod calor augetur: si autem superexcedat, appetit contrarium, scilicet frigidum, per quod ad temperamentum reducatur, in quo consistit perfectio conformis naturae.

Et sic etiam unus figulus abhorret alium, inquantum scilicet aufert ei perfectionem desideratum, scilicet lucrum.⁴⁴

In the following text, Thomas distinguishes three ways in which by happening the unlike can be the cause of love and likeness the cause of hate:

amoris radix, per se loquendo, est similitudo amati ad amantem, quia est ei bonum et conveniens.

⁴⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Hebdomadibus*, Lectio II, n. 37

Contingit autem per accidens dissimilitudinem esse amoris et similitudinem esse odii causam tripliciter.

Uno modo, quando affectus amantis non sibi complacet neque quiescit in conditione vel aliqua proprietate sui ipsius, sicut cum quis aliquid in se ipso odit. Et tunc oportet quod diligat ipsum qui est sibi in hoc dissimilis, quia ex hoc ipso quod sibi est dissimilis in conditione, efficitur similis affectui suo et e contrario odit illum qui sibi similatur et affectui non similatur.

Secundo, quando aliquis ex ipsa similitudine impedit amantem ab amati fruitione. Et hoc invenitur in omnibus rebus quae non possunt simul a multis haberi, sicut sunt res temporales. Unde qui amat lucrum de aliqua re vel delectationem, impeditur a fruitione sui amati per alium qui sibi vult similiter illud appropriare. Et hinc oritur *zelotypia* quae non patitur consortium in amato, et *invidia* inquantum bonum alterius aestimatur impeditivum boni proprii.

Tertio secundum quod dissimilitudo praecedens facit percipi amorem sequentem. Quia enim sentimus in hoc quod sensus movetur, quae quidem motio cessat quando sensibile jam effectum est forma sentientis, ideo ea quae consuevimus non ita percipimus; sicut patet de fabris quorum aures plenae sunt sonis malleorum. Et propter hoc amor magis sentitur, quando affectus de novo per amorem ad aliquid transformatur. Et ideo etiam quando aliquis non habet praesentiam sui amati, magis fervet et arctatur de amato, inquantum magis amorem percipit, quamvis apud praesentiam amati non sit minor amor, sed minus perceptus.⁴⁵

And in the following reading, Thomas explains why likeness is more a cause of love in the love of friendship or wishing well and less so in the love of concupiscence or wanting:

...duplex est amor: amicitiae scilicet et concupiscentiae, sed differunt: quia in amore concupiscentiae, quae sunt nobis extrinseca, ad nos ipsos trahimus, cum ipso amore diligamus alia, inquantum sunt nobis utilia vel delectabilia; sed in amore amicitiae est e converso, quia nosmetipsos trahimus ad ea quae sunt extra

⁴⁵ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Quaestio I, Art. I, Ad 3

nos; quia ad eos quos isto amore diligimus, habemus nos sicut ad nosmetipsos, communicantes eis quodammodo nosmetipsos.

Unde in amore amicitiae similitudo est causa amoris, non enim sic diligimus aliquem nisi inquantum sumus unum cum eo: similitudo autem est unitas quaedam.

Sed in amore concupiscentiae, sive sit utilis sive delectabilis, similitudo est causa separationis et odii. Cum enim isto amore aliquem diligam inquantum est mihi utilis vel delectabilis, quidquid est impeditivum utilitatis seu delectationis habeo odio contrarium. Et inde est quod superbi iurgantur adinvicem, inquantum unus usurpat sibi gloriam quam alius amat, et in qua delectatur; figuli etiam, inquantum unus trahit ad se lucrum, quod alius pro se volebat.

Sed sciendum, quod amor concupiscentiae non est rei concupitae, sed concupiscentis: propter hoc enim quis hoc amore aliquem diligit, inquantum est sibi utilis, ut dictum est. Et ideo magis diligit in hoc se quam illum: sicut qui diligit vinum quia est sibi delectabile, se potius quam vinum diligit.

Sed amor amicitiae est potius rei amatae quam amantis, quia diligit aliquem propter ipsum dilectum, non propter ipsum diligentem.

Sic ergo, quia in amore amicitiae similitudo est causa amoris, dissimilitudo causa odii, inde est quod mundus odio habet quod suum non est et sibi dissimile, et diligit, idest dilectione amicitiae, quod suum est.

Sed de dilectione concupiscentiae est e converso.

Et ideo dicit *Si de mundo fuissetis, mundus quod suum erat diligeret*, scilicet amore amicitiae.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ *Super iohannem*, XV, Lectio IV, n. 2036

FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF LOVE

One could raise the question whether the good or likeness is a greater cause of love. In *Wuthering Heights*, Emily Bronte has represented a woman drawn to two men, one because of the good in him and the other because he is like her. In this conversation between Ellen (Nelly) and Catherine, Bronte seems to represent likeness as the stronger cause:

"I'm very far from jesting, Miss Catherine," I replied. "You love Mr. Edgar, because he is handsome and young, and cheerful, and rich, and loves you. The last, however, goes for nothing: you would love him without that, probably; and with it you wouldn't, unless he possessed the four former attractions."

"No, to be sure not: I should only pity him - hate him, perhaps, if he were ugly, and a clown."....."If I were in heaven, Nelly, I should be extremely miserable."

"Because you are not fit to go there," I answered. "All sinners would be miserable in heaven."

"But it is not for that. I dreamt once that I was there."

"I tell you I won't hearken to your dreams, Miss Catherine! I'll go to bed, " I interrupted again. She laughed and held me down; for I made a motion to leave my chair.

"This is nothing," cried she: "I was only going to say that heaven did not seem to be my home; and I broke my heart with weeping to come back to the earth; and the angels were so angry that they flung me out into the middle of the heath on the top of Wuthering Heights; where I woke sobbing for joy. That will do to explain my secret, as well as the other. I've no more business to marry Edgar Linton than I have to be in heaven; and if the wicked man in there had not brought Heathcliff so low, I shouldn't have thought of it. It would degrade me to marry Heathcliff now; so he shall never know I love him: and that, not because he's handsome, Nelly, but because he's more myself than I am. Whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same; and Linton's is as different as a moonbeam

from lightning, or frost from fire...My great miseries in this world have been Heathcliff's miseries, and I watched and felt each from the beginning: my great thought in living is himself. If all else perished, and *he* remained, I should still continue to be; and if all else remained, and he were annihilated, the universe would turn to a mighty stranger: I should not seem a part of it. My love for Linton is like the foliage in the woods: time will change it, I'm well aware, as winter changes the trees. My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath: a source of little visible delight, but necessary. Nelly, I *am* Heathcliff! He's always in my mind: not as a pleasure, anymore than I am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being."⁴⁷

But a love which is based on both goodness and likeness has more to recommend it (as Elizabeth notes) between Jane and Bingley:

Elizabeth, who was left by herself, now smiled at the rapidity and ease with which an affair was finally settled that had given them so many previous months of suspense and vexation. "And this," she said, "is the end of all his friend's anxious circumspection! of all his sister's falsehood and contrivance! the happiest, wisest, and most reasonable end!

In a few minutes she was joined by Bingley, whose conference with her father had been short and to the purpose. "Where is your sister?" said he hastily, as he opened the door. "With my mother upstairs. She will be down in a moment, I dare say."

He then shut the door, and coming up to her, claimed the good wishes and affection of a sister. Elizabeth honestly and heartily expressed her delight in the prospect of their relationship. They shook hands with great cordiality; and then till her sister came down, she had to listen to all he had to say of his own happiness, and of Jane's perfections; and in spite of his being a lover, Elizabeth really believed all his expectations of felicity to be rationally founded, because they had for their basis the excellent

⁴⁷ Emily Bronte, *Wuthering Heights*, Chapter Nine

understanding and super-excellent disposition of Jane, and a general similarity of feeling and taste between her and himself.⁴⁸

FOURTH CAUSE OF LOVE - ANOTHER EMOTION OR ACT OF THE WILL

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 4 - Whether any other emotion can cause love.

To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that some other emotion is able to be the cause of love.

1. For the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics* that some are loved because of pleasure. But pleasure is a certain emotion. Therefore, some other emotion is a cause of love.

2. Moreover, desire is a certain emotion. but we love some because of the desire of something that we look for from them; just as appears in every friendship which is on account of usefulness. Therefore, some other emotion is the cause of love.

3. Moreover, Augustine says in the tenth book *On the Trinity*, "either one loves lukewarmly or one does not love at all that thing which one has no hope of obtaining, even though one sees how beautiful it is." Therefore, hope also is a cause of love.

But against this is that all other affections of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the City of God*.

I answer that it should be said that there is no other emotion of the soul which does not presuppose some love. The reason for this is that every other emotion of the soul implies motion to something or rest in something. But all motion to something or rest in

⁴⁸ Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, Chapter LV

something, proceeds from some kindredship with, or fitting with, which pertains to the notion of love. Whence it is impossible that some other emotion of the soul is the cause universally of all love.

It happens, however, that some other emotion is the cause of some love, just as one good is the cause of another.

To the first therefore, it should be said that, when someone loves something because of pleasure, that love is caused by pleasure. But that pleasure is again caused from another preceding love; for no one takes pleasure except in a thing in some way loved.

To the second, it should be said that the desire of some thing always presupposes the love of that thing. But the desire of one thing is able to be the cause that another thing is loved; just as he who desires money, loves, because of this, him from whom he receives money.

To the third, it should be said that hope causes or increases love both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure, and also by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire - for we do not so intensely desire that which we do not hope for. Nevertheless, hope itself is also of some good loved.

Here is another passage where Thomas speaks of the priority of love over other passions of the soul:

...inter alias affectiones animae amor est prior. Amor enim dicit terminationem affectus per hoc quod informatur suo objecto. In omnibus autem hoc invenitur quod motus procedit a primo immobili quieto. Quod quidem patet in naturalibus; quia primum movens in quolibet genere est non motum illo genere motus, sicut primum alterans non est alteratum. Similiter patet in intellectualibus; quia motus rationis discurrentis procedit a principiis et quidditatibus rerum, quibus intellectus informatus terminatur.

Cum ergo affectus informetur amore et terminetur, sicut intellectus principiis et quidditatibus, ut prius dictum est; oportet quod omnis motus affectivae procedat ex quietatione et terminatione amoris.

Et quia omne quod est primum in aliquo genere est perfectius, sicut intellectus principiorum in demonstrabilibus, et motus caeli in naturalibus; ideo oportet quod amor inter alias affectiones etiam sit vehementior, ut patebit per singula.⁴⁹

St. Augustine speaks of the influence of hope upon love (as Thomas has just done in the reply to the third objection):

For what he sees in the light of truth is one thing, and what he desires within his own faculty is another thing. For in the light of truth, he realizes how great and how good it is to understand and speak all the languages of all countries, to hear no language as foreign, and to be heard in every language that no one may detect him as a foreigner. The splendor of such knowledge is already seen in his thoughts, and is loved by him as something known; and it is so seen and so arouses the zeal of learners that they are spurred into activity on account of it. They yearn for it in all the labor which they expend in acquiring this faculty, so that they may also embrace in practice what they already know in theory.

And so the closer he comes to this faculty in hope, the more ardently he is inflamed with love. For he devotes himself more intensely to those sciences when he does not despair of being able to master them; while one who is not buoyed up by the hope of acquiring something either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, though he may perceive how beautiful it is. Consequently, since almost all despair of knowing all languages, each one strives to become particularly proficient in that of his own people.⁵⁰

Shakespeare speaks of hope as a lover's staff:

Hope is a lover's staff; walk hence with that
And manage it against despairing thoughts.⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XXVII, Q. I, Art. III, Resp., n. 57-59

⁵⁰ *On the Trinity*, Bk. X, Ch. 1, n. 2

⁵¹ *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III, Sc. 1

And the difficulty of getting what we love seems also to increase our love. Thus Bertram says:

She knew her distance and did angle for me,
Madding my eagerness with her restraint,
As all impediments in fancy's course
Are motives of more fancy.⁵²

And Prospero says about the sudden love of Ferdinand and Miranda:

They are both in either's power! But this swift business
I must uneasy make, lest the light winning
Make the prize light.⁵³

APPENDIX TO THE CAUSES OF LOVE

Special mention should made of the cause of love which is being aware of being loved. Even if this can in some way comes under good and likeness (for it is good to be loved especially by the love of wishing well; and when someone wishes well to us, they are like us who love ourselves in this way), this cause of love is so important that it deserves special consideration.

St. Augustine has an excellent discourse on this cause of love:

Moreover, what greater reason could there be for the Lord's coming than that God might manifest His love, ardently recommending it in our persons; because "when as yet we were enemies, Christ died for us"?

And for this reason, that, inasmuch as love is the "end of the commandment" and the "fulfillment of the law", we also may love one another, and even as He laid down His life for us, so we also may lay down our life for the brethren.

⁵² Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act V, Sc. 3

⁵³ Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2

And with regard to God Himself, inasmuch as He first loved us and spared not His only Son, but delivered Him up for us all, even if at first we found it irksome to love Him, now at least, it should not prove irksome to return that love.

For there is nothing that invites love more than to be beforehand in loving: and that heart is overhard which, even though it were unwilling to bestow love, would be unwilling to return it.

But if we see that, even in the case of sinful and base attachments, those who desire to be loved in return make it their one concern to disclose and display by all the tokens in their power how much they love; if they also strive to counterfeit genuine affection in order that they may, in some measure, claim a return of love from the hearts which they are designing to ensnare; if, again, their own passions are the more inflamed when they perceive that the hearts which they are eager to win are also moved now by the same fire; if then, I say, both the hitherto callous heart is aroused when it is sensible of being loved, and the heart which was already aflame is the more inflamed the moment it learns that it is loved in return, it is obvious that there is no greater reason either for the birth or growth of love than when one, who does not yet love, perceives that he is loved, or when he who loves already hopes that he may yet be loved in return, or actually has proof that he is loved.

And if this holds good even in the case of base passions, how much more so in friendship? For what else do we have to be on our guard against in an offense against friendship than that our friend should think either that we do not love him, or that we love him less than he loves us? And if he believes this, he will be cooler in that love which men enjoy by the exchange of intimacy; and if he is not so weak that this offense causes him to grow cold in his affection altogether, he yet restricts himself to that form of affection which has as its object, not enjoyment, but utility.

But again, it is worthwhile to observe how, although even those that are superior desire to be loved by those who are inferior and are pleased by the eager deference these give them - and the more they become sensible of his affection, the more they love them - yet, with how much love is one who is inferior fired when he

discovers that he is loved by him who is superior. For love is more welcome when it is not burnt up with the drought of want, but issues forth from the overflowing stream of beneficence. For the former springs from misery, the latter from mercy.

And, furthermore, if the inferior person has been despairing that even he could be loved by the superior one, he will now be unspeakably moved to love if the superior one deigns of his own accord to show him how much he loves one who could by no means venture to promise himself so great a blessing.

But what could be higher than God when he judges, and what more helpless than man when he sins? - than man who had so much the more submitted himself to the custody and dominion of insolent powers which cannot make him blessed, as he had the more despaired of the possibility of becoming the care of that power which wills not to be exalted in wickedness, but is exalted in goodness.⁵⁴

Thomas also speaks of this cause:

Since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the enjoyment of God, it was necessary that the affection of man be disposed to the desire of the enjoyment of God. The desire of enjoying some thing however is caused by the love of that thing. It is necessary then that man, tending to perfect beatitude, be induced to love God.

Nothing however leads us to love someone as the experience of the same towards us.

The love of God for men, however, can be shown in no way more efficaciously to man than through this, that he will to be united to man in person; for it is a property of love to unite the lover with the loved so far as it is possible.

⁵⁴ *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, Chapter Four

It was necessary therefore for man tending in perfect beatitude that God become man.⁵⁵

Why does someone loving us, and especially by a love that is not self-seeking, move us to love them in return? Here it seems that we are not so much loving a good in that person (although their love may be a good), but the return of love itself is seen to be good. To love seems itself to be good in this case. Returning love (at least a non-selfish one) seems to be just. Hence Augustine's words *rependere*. And in *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 3 "lend and give". In one way we owe everyone some love. St. Catherine tells us to pay the "debt" of love we owe our neighbor. But if someone gives us a special love, do we not owe them a like love? We speak of returning someone's love as if the original was, as it were, lent.

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⁵⁵ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book Four, Chapter 54