NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING TWELVE

In Readings Twelve and Thirteen, Aristotle does something like what he has done in the Tenth and Eleventh Readings. He follows again the advice of Heraclitus to become strong in what is common to all. Like in those previous Readings, he finds a common thought or understanding about change or becoming and then goes through a number of steps to become strong in that common understanding.

But there are a number of very essential differences between these two findings of a common understanding and the becoming strong in it.

In the Tenth and Eleventh Readings, he found a common basis among all the natural philosophers. But in Reading Twelve, Aristotle will find a common understanding among all men.

A second difference is that there was some probability in the way he became strong in Ten and Eleven. But in Reading Thirteen, he will try to become strong with complete necessity. And hence, he will correct a little what was said in the Tenth and Eleventh Readings.

A third difference is that he is trying to understand more how there can be change even of substance.

Perhaps a fourth difference can be noted. In Ten and Eleven, he was more trying to find what is within every *change*. In Twelve and Thirteen, he is more trying to find what is within every *becoming.* The words *becoming* and *change,* if they are speaking of the same, are perhaps looking at it differently. The word *becoming* is looking at what is coming to be in a change. But *change* is as much, if not more, looking at what the change is from.

Although Aristotle found that there were three things in every change, just as he finds three things in every becoming here, he is more explicit here that only two of these are causes *as such* of what comes to be.

Aristotle begins from the ways all men speak about becoming and finds in those ways of speaking signs that they know in some confused way at least that

there are three things involved in every becoming. Men not only say that this becomes that, but they use two names for the this that becomes that. When the butter is put in the refrigerator, we could say that the butter becomes hard or that the soft becomes hard or we could say that the soft butter becomes hard. And then Aristotle points out that men use the preposition *from* with one of the names of the this that becomes that, but not with the other. We might say that when the soft butter is put in the refrigerator, it goes from soft to hard. But we would not say that it goes from butter to hard.

Likewise, when the wet cloth is hung out to dry, we might say it goes from wet to dry, but not from cloth to dry.

And when a sick man becomes healthy, he goes from being sick to being healthy, but we would not say that he goes from being a man to being healthy.

Then after looking at the ways we all speak about becoming, Aristotle looks at the things named by the two names we give to the this that becomes that. One he sees is the name of something that remains in the becoming and the other is the a name of something that is lost in the becoming. In the examples already given, *butter* is the name of something that remains when the soft butter becomes hard while *soft* is the name of something that is lost in that becoming. Likewise, when the wet cloth becomes dry, *cloth* is the name of something that remains and *wet* is the name of something that is lost in that becoming. Likewise when the sick man becomes healthy, *man* is the name of something that remains while *sick* is the name of something that is lost in that becoming.

Now if we compare this difference in things with that difference in the way we speak (of using the word *from* with one name and not the other), we see a correspondence. Men tend to use the word *from* with the name of what is lost in becoming and *not* with the name of what remains. In the above examples, we use the word *from* with *soft, wet* and *sick* which are the names of what are lost in those three becomings and not with the words *butter, cloth* and *man* which are the names of what remain in those three becomings. This is a sign that, in using two names for the this that becomes that, men are somewhat aware of the difference in what they are naming. For they use the word *from* with the name of what is lost rather than with the name of what remains. And the preposition *from* seems to imply that which is left behind or lost.

Aristotle then considers how many things are found in every becoming. Now when this becomes that, there is of course this and that. But since this in one way remains and in another is lost, there must be three things in every becoming. Further a sign that the two names of the this are not mere synonyms is that we use the word *from* with one and not the other.

Now it should be noted that in determining how many *things* are in every becoming, Aristotle first reasons from a difference seen in things, that when this becomes that, something of this remains and something is lost. Clearly what remains and what is lost cannot be the same. Then he gives a sign that they are not the same which is drawn from our use of the word *from*. The reason for this order is clear. Clearly the main reason for saying that butter and soft cannot be the same thing in reality is that one remains and one is lost in the becoming. That we use the word *from* with the name of one and not the other is, at best, a sign of this truth. The main reason for what is found in things must be drawn from them and not from our way of speaking.

But in the beginning of this Reading, Aristotle started from our way of speaking because he was looking for a sign of our common thinking or understanding of becoming and our ways of speaking about becoming reveal a common understanding.

After showing that three things are found in every becoming, Aristotle manifests something that he presupposed somewhat. And to see better what he is doing, we should distinguish three truths about becoming and how they are to our reason.

One truth is that in every becoming something comes to be. The second truth is that *what comes to be* comes to be from something. And the third truth is that this something from which it comes to be is twofold, involving something that remains and something that is lost in the becoming.

Now the first of these truths is altogether obvious. There is no becoming if nothing comes to be, just as there is no motion if nothing moves. So Aristotle in no way tries to manifest or show this truth. (Just as in the second book, he will not try to show that nature exists.)

The second truth Aristotle presupposed since all the Greek natural philosophers agreed that one cannot get something from nothing. But as a kind of afterthought, he does now manifest it by two inductions. For it is not as obvious as the first truth and there are some, even in modern times, who speak as if one could get something from nothing.

He mainly upfront tried to show what people might not see right away, that what something comes to be from is twofold, in part remaining and in part being lost.

The two inductions, by which he shows that all becoming starts from something, differ in that the first is taken from the things that come to be and the second from the ways they comes to be. The thing that comes to be is either an accident or a substance. Since accidents exist only in substance, one must have a substance before an accident can come to be. And even substances seem to come to be from something, as a plant or animal from a seed of some sort. Likewise, it is clear from the common ways that things come to be that one does not start from nothing. If one molds a statue, it is out of clay or some material. If the mighty river comes to be by the addition of streams running together, we do not get something large by adding nothing to nothing. If something comes to be by abstraction, as the statues of Michelangelo, he did not chip away at nothing, but at a slab of marble. If something comes to be by being together as a house, we do not nail nothing to nothing. If we want make tea, we alter the water from cold to hot, we do not alter nothing to hot, or heat up nothing.

Thus Aristotle concludes that there are three things found in every becoming: the subject or matter which remains throughout the becoming, what it becomes or the form added to this, and the contrary or opposite which is lost in the becoming.

In the following text, Thomas indicates how we can say that this comes to be that and this comes to be *from* that:

> sicut patet in I Phys., "hoc fit hoc", dicimus in permanentibus, per se, sed in non permanentibus, per accidens.

> Sed "ex hoc fit hoc", dicitur proprie in non permanentibus. Dicimus enim: "Ex non albo fit album."
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> Et si aliquando dicatur aliquid fieri ex permanente, hoc est inquantum intelligitur cum permanente aliquid non permanens, sicut cum dicitur "Ex aere fit statua", intelligitur ex aere infigurato.
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> Et sic patet quod haec locutio: "Hoc fit hoc", exprimit identitatem subjecti.
>
> Haec autem locutio: "Ex hoc fit hoc", principaliter exprimit ordinem terminorum adinvicem, et sic per consequens quandoque unitatem subjecti. Unde quandoque importat tantum ordinem sine hoc quod importet subjectum, ut cum dicitur: "Ex mane fit meridies", idest post, ut dicitur in II Meta."[1]

Something of this same teaching is found in the following passage of Thomas:

> dupliciter dicitur aliquid fieri ex aliquo: scilicet ex privatione et ex subiecto, quod dicitur materia...Dicitur autem magis aliquid fieri ex privatione quam ex subiecto, sicut magis dicitur aliquis fieri sanus ex laborante, quam ex homine.
>
> Sed hoc fieri hoc magis dicimus in subiecto quam in privatione. Magis enim dicimus proprie quod homo fit sanus, quam quod laborans.[2]

When you say, for example, that you are *going* home and your mother says that you are *coming* home, both of you are speaking of the same trip or voyage. But you are looking at your trip from the point of view of the point of departure while your mother is looking at it from the end-point or point of arrival. Hence, you call it *going home* and your mother calls it *coming home*. In the following text, Thomas sees *mutatio* or *change* as naming the motion more from the

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum* , Dist. XI, Q. II, Art. I, Ad Tertiam Quaestionem, C.

[2] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 1415

removal of what was the starting-point of the motion and becoming, as we have said, from that to which the motion tends or its end

> ...mutatio imponitur pro remotione ejus a quo est motus, sed fieri pro adeptione ejus ad quod motus terminatur:
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> a Deo autem nullo modo aliquid removetur, et si adveniat habitudo aliqua secundum rationem; unde etsi dicatur fieri aliquid, non debet dici mutari in illud.[3]

And in another text, he teaches this more succinctly:

> ...mutari proprie dicitur per remotionem a termino a quo; fieri autem dicitur per accessum ad terminum ad quem.[4]

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[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. I

[4] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Tomus III, Distinctio VII, Quaest. II, Art. I, Ad 1