

CHAPTER ONE OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The first chapter of the *Categories* contains three definitions. These three definitions are not parts of one division or distinction, but the first and second definitions could be regarded as making a distinction between two ways that things can have a name in common. But the third definition (if it can be called a definition) is not distinguishing another way that things can have a name in common. Rather it is considering a distinction between a name such as *healthy* and *health* or between *virtuous* and *virtue*.

Things can have the same name in common *equivocally* or *univocally*, we learn from the first two definitions.

When they have the same name in common equivocally, the definition of what each is according to the name is other. When the same name is said of them equivocally, the definition of what is meant by that name is not common, but there is a definition private to each of them.

When they have the same name in common univocally, the definition of what each is according to the name is the same. When the same name is said of them univocally, the definition of what is meant by that name is common to both.

We should note that the sense of *univocal* here is more narrow than in the beginning of logic. Things are named *univocally* here when the definition of their substance, or what they are, is the same; not just in general when the meaning of the word is the same.

In the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, genus, difference, species, property and accident are all said univocally of many things. But only genus and species signify the same *what it is* when said of those many things (although difference signifies how they are what they are). Aristotle takes univocally in this more narrow sense here because he intends chiefly the ordering of genera and species under their highest genera.

Aristotle uses the *same* name (the Greek word for animal whence we get our words *zoo* and *zoology*) to exemplify both ways in which things can have a name in common (distinguished in the first two definitions). Why does he do this?

One can begin to answer this question by seeing the distinction between a name *being equivocal* and a name *being said equivocally of many things*. A name is equivocal (either by chance or by reason) because it has more than one meaning or sense. But such a name can be said of many things univocally when it is said of them by only one of its meanings. The word *bat*, for example, is an equivocal word for it can mean the wooden tool used by the baseball player to hit the ball or it can mean the flying rodent. When it is said of both of these, it is said equivocally of them. But when it is said of a number of baseball bats, it is said univocally of them. For it is said of them according to only one of its meanings. Most words said univocally of many things are in fact equivocal words. Names of the genera and species ordered under their highest genera in the *Categories* can be equivocal words (that is words having more than one meaning). But they are ordered insofar as they are said univocally of many things. *Body* in one of its meanings is placed under substance as a species and it is also a genus of living body and non-living body. But *body* is also in another of its meanings placed under continuous quantity as a species.

We can also ask why Aristotle takes two substances (man and ox) as examples of things named univocally rather than two accidents. Perhaps it is because we see *what it is* in substance before in accident. One of the meanings of *substance* is *what it is*. And a sign of this is the speech used to refer to this as the *logos of ousia* or *substance, the definition of what it is*. Hence, we learn in the seventh book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics*) that either there is definition only of substance, or if of accident, only in some secondary way.

In the first two definitions of Chapter One, Aristotle is pointing out two ways in which *things* can have a name in common. Since we have asserted that the *Categories* is chiefly about names signifying things through thoughts, the question arises why does Aristotle begin with things rather than from names.

Some of the Greek Commentators (who also assert that the *Categories* is about names) answer this question by saying that the signification of names can be known only in reference to things. Although the latter statement is true, it does not show why Aristotle begins from things, but only that reference to things must be brought in when discussing names. Aristotle could also have made use of things if he had defined *name said equivocally of many things* rather than *things named equivocally*. Why then does he begin from things?

The basic reason is that logic is ordered to knowing things. Hence, if things were not named, the consideration of names would not be a chief part of logic. Hence, Aristotle begins from things to show that the consideration of names belongs to logic.

It does not follow from Aristotle's beginning with things that the *subject* of the *Categories* is more things than names. The goal of a science may be more known than its subject and a middle term for showing what its subject is. The goal of wisdom (to know the first cause), for example, is more known to us than, and is a middle term for showing, the subject of wisdom (being and the one). In the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle shows that wisdom aims at causes and more precisely at the first causes, but it is not until the fourth book that he shows through this that its subject is being as being.

Moreover, logic and the *Categories* is about things in some way. It is about things insofar as they are in reason or known by reason; as Thomas Aquinas explains:

...secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione.¹

Things are named insofar as they are in reason or known by reason. Therefore, since we name things as they are known (by reason), to speak of things as named is also to speak of them insofar as they are in reason. Things are placed in or under the categories insofar as they are named in some way. He begins from things since things are before names. The *Categories* is also about the first placing of names: the placing of names upon things.

Moreover, thoughts that have no foundation in things have no place in a reasoned out knowledge. The reason why some things can be named univocally and others, only equivocally is founded in those things. Unless there is a remote foundation in things for the way they are named or the ways names are said of them, logic could not be a sure guide. To use Aristotle's examples, there is a foundation in man and the ox for their being named univocally by the name *animal* (for their having not only a name in common, but the definition of what it is being the same when that name is said of each). Likewise, there is a foundation in the man and the image

¹ In *VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1576

(whether a painting or a statue)) for the word *animal* (the Greek word can mean not only an image of an animal) being said equivocally of them.

A comparison to something Aristotle does in the beginning of the eighth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* may be useful here. When Aristotle is giving the reasons for considering friendship in ethics and political philosophy, he gives as one reason that it is *natural*. Someone might say that this is a reason to consider it in *natural* philosophy rather than in ethics and political philosophy. But if there were nothing naturally good or bad, there would be no ethics and political philosophy. Although ethics and political philosophy are not about the natural as such, but about what is by choice and custom, nevertheless the judgment of what is good or bad in the things that are by choice and custom is founded on what is by nature good or bad. By virtue and vice, one is disposed well or badly with respect to one's nature as an animal with reason and to one's natural end as such an animal.

The first two definitions of Chapter One and the distinction involved in them would seem to be ordered most of all to the distinction and ordering of genera and species under their highest genera. Hence, we are interested in those things named univocally or the names said univocally of many things. But there are also things named equivocally in the *Categories*. Substance and accident are called *beings* or *things* equivocally. They have the name *being* or *thing* equivocally. And in the post-predicaments, we distinguish senses of words equivocal by reason.

The third definition of Chapter One has a much different purpose than the first two. Things are named *denominatively* so they can be said of another thing. We cannot say truly that Socrates is *virtue* or *justice* and that a dog is *health*. But we can truly say that Socrates is *virtuous* or *just* and that a dog is *healthy*. When Aristotle first distinguishes the nine genera of accidents in the Fourth Chapter, he will speak *denominatively*. And this is necessary, for as we shall see there, the ten genera are distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances. And accidents can be said of individual substances only denominatively. But when he orders genera and species of accidents under their own highest genera, there is no need to speak denominatively. We can place courage, moderation and justice as species under virtue and likewise we could place courageous, moderate and just under virtuous. But only the latter could be said of Socrates.

What is denomination and what is it to be named denominatively?

Perhaps the first thing to be considered is the difference between logical and grammatical denomination or what denomination means in these

two arts. And before this difference, there is another one as regards the nature of things or what they are. In a text which Msgr. Dionne first called to my attention, Thomas Aquinas pointed out a likeness of logic and natural philosophy in distinction from grammar. The former are about the nature of things while the latter is more concerned with the words themselves. In talking about passion or undergoing, the logician and the natural philosopher, in distinction from the grammarian, consider undergoing as regards the nature of the thing. Here is the text:

passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat, et hoc modo non oportet omnem poenam passionem esse, sed quamdam poenam, scilicet poenam sensus; vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout grammaticus considerat, et sic illud passive dicitur quod a verbo passivo derivatur.²

As Albert the Great teaches us, logical denomination is not the derivation of one word from another, but from the name of the nature itself. In the Chapter on things named denominatively, St. Albert distinguishes between denomination in grammar and in logic:

Quamvis secundum grammaticam justitia derivetur a justo, tamen secundum naturam et rationem denominationis et denominati, a justitia formatur justus. Grammaticus enim nominum modos et formas attendit: et quia in declinatione sic declinatur justus, justus, addita tia fit justitia: ideo dicit justitiam formari vel derivari a justo: hoc enim modo justum a justitia formari non potest. Natura autem denominationis e contrario est: quia denominans est alienam naturam informans: et ideo nomen illius naturae praeintelligere oportet.³

Albert explains that three things are necessary for denomination as the word is used in logic:

In denominatione ergo haec tria necessaria sunt, scilicet natura aliena, subjecto extrinsecus aptata et circumposita, in principali et denominativo eadem res significata, et diversi modi significandi.⁴

² *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist XXXV, Q. 1, Art. 1, Ad 5

³ *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14a

⁴ *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14b

The *from something* of the definition touches upon the alien nature, the *differing in case or ending* that they do not differ in their principal signification but in the mode of signifying only, and the last part *are called according to the name* that the alien nature is brought to the subject in some way.

Thomas states that denomination strictly speaking is according to how an accident is toward a subject when explaining that the *loved* is not a denomination from *love*, but as its object:

denominatio proprie est secundum habitudinem accidentis ad subjectum. Sic autem dilectum non denominatur a dilectione, sed magis sicut objectum.⁵

Thus denomination is from what is like a form, but as Thomas explains elsewhere it does not have to be really a form:

illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.⁶

However, when the nine genera of accidents are signified denominatively in the *Categories*, they signify only accidents for the reason Thomas gives when rejecting the position of Avicenna. Consider this more at length.

What do names like *colored* and *virtuous* signify? And can they be placed in a Category? What is the difference in meaning between *colored* and *color*? (Or between *virtuous* and *virtue*?) It is a mistake to think that *color* means the quality and *colored* the substance that has this quality. Or that *virtue* means the quality and *virtuous* the substance that has the quality. This is the error of Avicenna as Thomas explains:

Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidunt, sicut hoc quod dico *album* et *musicum*. Nam *album* ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen *album* significat subiectum ex consequenti,

⁵ *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XVII, Q. I, Art. V, Ad 2

⁶ *De Potentia*, q. 7, Art. 10, Ad 8

inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. *Albedo* enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentaliter non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.⁷

The difference between *colored* and *color* (or between *virtuous* and *virtue*) is thus not in what they chiefly signify because they both signify the same quality. They differ in that *colored* (or *virtuous*) signifies this accident *per modum accidentis* while *color* signifies this accident *per modum substantiae* (as does *virtue*). From the above text, it can also be seen that *colored* is placed in a category. (If one examines the above text carefully, one will also see that it confirms the position that the *praedicatum* which is the subject of the *Categories* is a *nomen* or name.)

If *colored* signified a substance with a color, it would be accidental being in the sense of the fifth book of *Wisdom* (Or *Metaphysics*). Accidental being there does not mean accident as distinguished from substance, but accidental as distinguished from as such or per se. The distinction of being according to the figures of predication, the ten highest genera, is one of the two main distinctions of being as such or through itself.

We have said that Chapter One contains three definitions while Chapter Two will contain two divisions: the division of those said and the division of beings. This is also the way Cajetan speaks in his commentary on the *Categories*.⁸ This seems correct because in Chapter Two he begins with what is to be divided and then gives the division into parts

But since division and distinction are before definition, is there some division or distinction implied in the definitions of Chapter One?

There seems to be two distinctions implied in Chapter One. The three definitions do not correspond to one distinction or division. They are not parts of one division.

⁷In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 894

⁸Cajetan, *De Praedicamentis* ed Doyon, p. 13B: "diffinitionibus tribus praeponendis iam completis, divisiones inchoat."

The first two definitions imply a distinction which can be made with one name or two names. Things can have a name in common with or without the same definition of what it is that is meant when that name is said of each of them. The baseball bat and the bat in the belfry have the name *bat* in common, but the definition of what it is for each to be a bat is not the same. The square and the oblong have in common the name *quadrilateral* and the definition of what it is for each to be a quadrilateral is the same. In these examples, we used two different names, *bat* and *quadrilateral*. But in Aristotle's examples, one name, *animal*, was used (but with different things having that name).

But the third definition corresponds to a distinction between two names, one of which *in meaning* is derived from the other. This is, for example, the distinction between *healthy* and *health* or between *virtuous* and *virtue* or between *wise* and *wisdom* or between *good* and *goodness*. In the first two examples, the first word is derived from the second. But in the last two examples, the second word seems to be derived from the first. However, as far as the *meaning* of these words is concerned (and the logician is concerned with words only insofar as they *mean* something), the first word is derived from the second in all four examples. For to say that the body is *healthy* means that it *has health*. And to say that Socrates is *virtuous* means that Socrates *has a virtue*. And to say that Aristotle is *wise* means that he *has wisdom*. And to say that someone is *good* means that they *have goodness*.

The distinction of these two names is important for the logic of the *Categories*, for the logic of definition, for natural philosophy, and for theology; but in different ways.

In the logic of definition, there is a distinction between the definition of the concrete such as *healthy* and the abstract such as *health*. The subject of an accident is found diversely in its definition when the accident is taken in abstraction and concretely. The subject is a difference when the abstract is defined. One might define health as the good condition of the body. But if we defined healthy, body would be a genus. For the healthy is a body in good condition. Thomas explains:

accidens dupliciter potest accipi.

Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subiectum non ponitur in definitione accidentis ut

genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: Simitas est curvitas nasi.

Alio modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subiecto; unde sic non assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus.⁹

The natural philosopher wants to understand change. And following Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle, he discovers that change is between contraries. But when the natural philosopher considers that change is between contraries, he sees an important difference between the contraries health and sickness and the contraries healthy and sick. Health never becomes sickness, or sickness, health. But the healthy can become sick, and the sick can become healthy. For the healthy involves health and what has the health (the body) and the latter can lose its health and become sick. Likewise, the sick signifies sickness in a body which can lose that sickness and acquire the opposite health. Hence, in some way, at least by happening, if not as such, the healthy can be said to become sick, and the sick can become healthy. The natural philosopher sees that if the body was its health, it could never become sick. And if the body was its sickness, it could never become healthy. Thus change is between composed things, things composed of the pure contrary and its subject.

The theologian finds the limitation of our words and thoughts in speaking of God who is good and wise, but altogether simple. Since God is completely simple, He is whatever He is said to have. When we say that God is good and wise etc., we seem to admit in our way of speaking, some composition in Him. And to avoid this, we say that God is goodness itself and wisdom itself. But when we say this, we seem to be saying that he is that by which something is good and wise etc. rather than being good and wise Himself. Hence, we must also say that He is good, wise etc. Neither way of speaking, derived from our understanding of material things (where form and what has it are not the same) is adequate to speaking about God.

But the logician in the *Categories* considers this distinction because the abstract name cannot be *said of* substance, but the denominative can. And the genera of categories are distinguished by how something can be *said of* individual substances. But when the logician considers a genus of accidents by itself, he can use the abstract name of a genus or species.

⁹ *De Veritate*, Q. 3, Art. 7, Ad 2

Further, the logician in the *Categories* takes the denominative as signifying only the accident *per modum accidentis* and not also its subject when he is distinguishing the ten highest genera.

Aristotle in Chapter One, with marvelous brevity,¹⁰ shows the three ways things are named that are relevant to the treatise of the *Categories*. Some of the Greek Commentators at this point bring in other ways that things are named, But Aristotle (*brevitati studens*) defines only those ways things are named that are necessary for understanding the *Categories*. As happens many times, three is enough.

To see fully the necessity of these three definitions for the *Categories* and their order requires a long discourse. As one proceeds, one perceives that these three definitions are necessary for the rest of the ante-predicaments and that the order in which they are given in Chapter One corresponds somewhat to their use in the remaining ante-predicaments.

But before entering into this longer discourse, one can perhaps indicate briefly the necessity and order of these three definitions by comparison to the skopos or aim of the *Categories*. We name things as we know them. But we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. Hence, we first name things equivocally calling them things or beings before we separate them under highest genera which involves naming them univocally. And the names of the highest genera are also said univocally of what is below them while things in some genera (the genera of things that exist in another subject) are said denominatively of first substances.

An understanding of things named equivocally or of names said equivocally of many things is necessary for understanding well the division or distinction of beings. Things such as substance and accident are said *to be* equivocally, or *being* is said equivocally of substance and accident.

The division of those said is necessary for determining the skopos or the subject of the *Categories* (those said without intertwining) and distinguishing it from the subject of the *Peri Hermeneias* (something said with intertwining, the statement or enunciation). Substance and accident can be said with or without intertwining.

¹⁰"*brevitati studens*" to use the phrase of Thomas in his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*, n. 53

The second definition of Chapter One is clearly relevant to the three rules of Chapter Three. These rules are concerned with placing species under the highest genera and dividing genera by appropriate differences so as to see how species and differences are ordered under diverse highest genera. This is by an order of univocal predication and hence the second definition of Chapter One is relevant here. The highest genera are said with one meaning of the species below them and, if these species have species below them, they are also said univocally of them. Likewise, the differences are said univocally of the species below them.

The third definition of Chapter One, the definition of things named denominatively, is necessary for understanding the division of the meaning or signification of those said without intertwining according to ten highest genera or for distinguishing those ten highest genera themselves. The reason for this is that accidents (which we already know to exist in a subject, substance, from the division of beings) must be named denominatively before they can be said of substance; and the highest genera can be distinguished in logic only by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. Hence, the nine genera of accidents must be named denominatively before they can be distinguished from substance and each other by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. This is why when Aristotle distinguishes them in Chapter Four; he names them denominatively, (but when he considers each genus of accident by itself, he may speak univocally, but not denominatively.)

In the definitions of things named equivocally and univocally, Aristotle does not merely say that the *logos* according to the name is the same, but he adds *of the substance (ousia)*. In Latin, this is translated *ratio substantiae*. What is the meaning of this addition?

Cajetan is correct, I think, in saying that this addition restricts univocal to the essential or what pertains to the nature. Here, we see the *univocal* is taken more strictly or in a more limited way than in the *Isagoge*. In the *Isagoge*, we say that every name said of many things univocally signifies either their genus or difference or species or property or accident. *Univocal* here means with the same meaning or thought in mind. But the first three (genus, difference and species) signify something inside the nature or substance of the things and the last two (property and accident) signify something outside the nature (even though property signifies something following upon the nature). But here in the beginning of the *Categories*, *univocal* is limited to genus, difference and species. Or perhaps it is even limited to genus and species which signify substance or what it is (Difference

signifies *how* a thing is *what it is*.) This is the way Aristotle uses *univocal* in the chapter on substance¹¹ where he refers to this definition. Thomas Aquinas sometimes takes *univocal* in the broad sense as in the case of the disjunctive argument of the *Summa contra Gentiles*¹² and sometimes in the strict or narrow sense as in explaining a passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*:

quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicentur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative.

Non est ergo intelligendum, quod substantia actu existens (de qua hic loquimur) de materia praedicetur praedicatione univoca, sive quae est per essentiam. Iam enim supra dixerat, quod materia non est quid, neque aliquid aliorum. Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur.¹³

The reason why Aristotle takes *univocal* in the restricted sense here is that he is aiming at the ten highest genera and what can be placed under them and ordered by univocal predication, the species and in some way differences. Species are placed more directly under genera than are differences. (If we wish to place matter under the genus substance, the above text from the *Metaphysics* indicates that it would not be by univocal predication as here understood, but by denominative predication.)

By way of summary, we can give some questions and their answers.

What is the reason for the first two definitions?

The logic of the first act of reason is ordered to knowing what things are. Since we begin to know what things are by knowing their genus, we need to know how to place things in their genus. Things are not placed in a genus (or species) insofar as they are named equivocally. Rather things are placed in a genus insofar as they are so named univocally. Hence, we see the need

¹¹*Categories*, Chapter 5, 3a 15 and 3a 33-3b 9

¹²Bk. I, Ch. 32

¹³*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, nn. 1288-1289

for the first two definitions to find how things as named can or cannot be placed under some genus

Why does he define things named equivocally before those named univocally?

The division of beings must come before the distinction of the genera of categories because the latter will be distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances and the latter is arrived at by the division of beings. Substance and accident are called *being* equivocally. But things will be placed under one of the ten highest genera insofar as they are named univocally.

What is the reason for the third definition?

When he distinguishes the Categories, the genera of accidents are named denominatively, but not when each genus is divided into its species. Diverse genera of accidents are distinguished by diverse way of denominating substance. Hence, there is a need to speak of denomination in the antepredicaments.

Why is the third definition last?

In the division of beings, accident is not said denominatively. Accidents are first said denominatively when the ten genera are distinguished.

APPENDIX

What is meant by the *logos of the ousia* in the first two definitions? Perhaps *logos* is more universal than definition in the strict sense. Consider Thomas' teaching here in the Latin word for *logos* which is *ratio*:

...ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio, secundum quod Philosophus dicit, IV *Metaphy.*, text. 11: "Ratio quam significat nomen est definitio." Sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et

qualitas, et huiusmodi, quae non definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. Et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas. Unde non refert, utrum illa quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem.¹⁴

If the species immediately under a highest genus have a name common to them univocally, but a genus that is not a species cannot be defined in the strict sense, then we would have to understand *logos* not as the definition of what it is, but as the same thought of what it is

And what is the meaning of *ousia* or *substance* in the first two definitions of chapter one? The following text of Thomas gives the two meanings of *substance* in the ante-predicaments:

...substantia dupliciter dicitur, ut ex V *Metaphysicorum*, text. 15, patet.

Uno enim modo dicitur substantia, secundum quod significat rationem primi praedicamenti: et hoc est vel forma, vel materia, vel compositum, quod per se in genere est.

Alio modo dicitur substantia illud quod significat quid in omnibus rebus, sicut dicimus quod definitio significat rei substantiam: et hoc modo quidquid positive dicitur, in quocumque genere sit, substantia est vel substantiam habet.¹⁵

Why does Aristotle gives examples from substance in the definition of things named univocally? But does this mean that accidents cannot be named in this way? Thomas explains Aristotle's teaching in the seventh book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*:

...dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non est accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est.

Ipsam enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum

¹⁴ *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio II, Quaest I, Art. III, Solutio

¹⁵ *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia huiusmodi talia.

Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, "aliis autem alio modo", idest secundum quid.

Quod enim "aliquo modo", idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in aliis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum in quibus est quod quid est.

Non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis.

Cum enim quaero quid est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam.

Sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. Et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. Et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia.

Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter sed quia non ens est non ens. Et similiter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.¹⁶

¹⁶ In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 1331-1334

This sense of substance is also found in the sense of *how* which is that of the species-making difference. Thomas repeats the teaching of Aristotle in the fifth book of *Wisdom*:

....unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur "differentia substantiae," idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae.¹⁷

Is the example of things named equivocally an example of things named purely equivocally? Consider this text of Thomas:

hoc nomen *animal* imponitur non ad significandum figuram exteriorum, in qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum naturam, in qua pictura non imitatur; et ideo nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen *scientiae* convenit creaturae et Creatori secundum id in quo creatura Creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.¹⁸

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¹⁷ *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, n. 987

¹⁸ *De Veritate*, Q. 2, Art. 11, Ad 8