

CHAPTER TWO OF THE CATEGORIES

The Second Chapter of the *Categories* contains two divisions or distinctions: the division of those said and the division of beings.

The division of those said in Chapter Two is necessary to separate the *Categories* from the *Peri Hermeneias*. The division of those said is into those said with intertwining and those said without intertwining. Aristotle gives two examples of those said with intertwining ("man runs" and "man wins"). Both are examples of a statement or enunciation which is the principal subject of the *Peri Hermeneias*. Those said without intertwining are exemplified here: "man", "ox", "runs", "wins. And in Chapter Four, Aristotle says that each of those said *without* intertwining signifies either substance or how much or how etc. which brings us to the ten highest genera, the principal subject of this book. This division is necessary then to see what the book is aiming at, those said without intertwining rather than those said with intertwining.

The first question about this division of those said is what is being divided, *the said*. What is said - words or thoughts or things? Clearly, it is words that are said here. This can be seen from the members of the division. One member is statement or enunciation, and this, we know from the *Peri Hermeneias* consists of words, of vocal sounds signifying by convention. Whatever is under the other member is said in Chapter Four to *signify* either substance or how much or how etc. But it is not things that *signify*, but they are signified. Nor does Aristotle speak of thoughts as signifying things, but rather as passions of things. Thus, for example, in the beginning of the *Peri Hermeneias*, he speaks of written words as signifying spoken words and the latter as signifying thoughts, but of thoughts as passions or likenesses of things because they are the result of reason being acted upon in some way by things.

There is a disagreement between Cajetan and the Greek Neo-platonic commentators on this division. Cajetan thinks it is more things that are said than words while the neo-Platonists say that it is words.

But there is a difference between calling this a division of *vocal sounds signifying by agreement* (as in the *Peri Hermeneias*) and a division of *those said*. For things are not *vocal sounds*, but things are in some way *said*. Thomas, for example, in the following passage, seems to speak as if things are in some way said:

Eorum enim, quae dicuntur voce, quaedam sunt in rebus extra animam, quaedam autem sunt in anima tantum. Album enim et nigrum sunt extra animam; sed rationes horum sunt in anima tantum. Posset autem aliquis credere quod verum et falsum sunt etiam in rebus sicut bonum et malum; ita quod verum sit quoddam bonum, et falsum sit quoddam malum: hoc enim oporteret si verum et falsum essent in rebus. Verum enim quamdam perfectionem naturae significat, falsum vero defectum. Omnis autem perfectio in rebus existens, ad perfectionem et bonitatem naturae pertinet, defectus vero et privatio ad malitiam. Sed ipse hoc negat; dicens quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, ita quod verum rationis sit quoddam bonum naturae, et falsum sit quoddam malum; sed "sunt tantum in mente", idest in intellectu...¹

But because in Chapter Four, Aristotle will take one part of this division (those said without intertwining) and say that they *signify* either substance or how much or how etc., it seem more correct to say with the Neo-Platonic commentators that *those said* are vocal sounds rather than things

The second question is about the meaning of *intertwining* (*sumploke*) used in the division. Aristotle's examples of those said with intertwining are both statements. Does he mean to exclude only the intertwining of natures found in a statement such as "man runs," or does he also mean to exclude from being in one category other kinds of intertwining of natures? Albert and Cajetan are surely correct in excluding not only "man runs" but also "white man" from any one category although their parts can be put into different categories. This is clearly in accord with Aristotle's distinction of accidental being from being as such in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (or the *Metaphysics*) since there *white man* is put with accidental being and the categories under being as such.

It should be noted, however, that Aristotle in Chapter Two says simply *without intertwining* while in Chapter Four when dividing this, he says *by no intertwining*. Hence, in Chapter Two, he is perhaps mainly concerned with separating what is placed in a highest genus from the intertwining found in statements. But after he has distinguished substance and accident in the division of beings, it is necessary to exclude what signifies an intertwining of substance and accident (whether by two words as in *white man* or by chance in one word like *negro* meaning a black man). Albert and Cajetan also would exclude the intertwining found in a definition, but this is not clear. But surely

¹ In VI *Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IV, nn. 1230-1231

those said with any intertwining of diverse natures cannot be placed as a species in or under one highest genus.

In the second part of this chapter, Aristotle gives a division or distinction of beings into four. Usually when we divide into more than three, we are combining more than one division. We may be giving the result of a division and a subdivision or we may be criss-crossing two divisions. Aristotle here seems to be criss-crossing two divisions by contradictories. One pair of contradictories is *said of another* and *not said of another*. The other pair is *exist in another* and *not exist in another*.

The order in which Aristotle enumerates the four is to give first what is said of another but does not exist in another. This could be called universal substance. Second he gives individual accident, what exists in another, but is not said of another. Third he places universal accident which is both said of another and exists in another. And last, he places what neither exists in another, nor is said of another – individual substances.

He follows this same order of enumeration of parts in the book *About the Poetic Art* (the *Poetics*) when distinguishing the parts of a plot (except there is no fourth part – the one with the two negatives). He gives first the beginning which is *before* something, but *not after* anything. Then the end which is *after* something, but *not before* anything. And last, the middle which is both *before* something and *after* something. (There cannot be a part of the plot which is neither before nor after anything.) Perhaps the reason for this order of enumeration is to see the distinction between the two which are to be affirmed and denied by giving those two cases where only one is affirmed and the other denied before the case where both are found (which comes for another reason before the case where both are denied in the *Categories*).

The reason for this is also that opposites along side each other or next to each other stand out more. And placing the opposites with one affirmative and one negative first help us to see the distinction between the two terms. This is especially important in the present division where *said of* and *exist in* might be confused by someone as meaning the same if at first both are affirmed or both negated. There is perhaps also a reason for the order within each pair of opposites and perhaps more than one reason. Logic is interested in the universal before the singular and it seems reasonable to place two affirmatives before two negatives. Thus universal substance and

individual accident come first and then universal accident and individual substance last.

The examples of each of the four are chosen by Aristotle with great care. For substance, he chooses man (for universal substance) and this man or that ox (for individual substances). The substantial unity of man is most known to us and even the substantial unity of an ox (or some other animal) is more known to us than that of a plant or a rock. For accidents, he chooses an example of one in the soul (science or reasoned out knowledge) and one in the body (color).

Two questions come to mind about this division. What kind of a division is this? And what is being divided?

It is not the division of a (composed) whole into its parts. It is not the division of a genus into its species. It is not the division of a subject by its accidents or of an accident by its subjects or of an accident by its accidents.

It seems closest to the distinction of a name into its meanings or senses. But if it is the distinction of a name, *being*, into its senses, then *being* should be in the singular rather than plural. Moreover, the distinction of the word *being* into its senses belongs to the wise man, the first philosopher. What is it doing in logic?

But the distinction of *being* into its senses does seem to be involved in this distinction of beings. For we distinguish between *being* in the sense of substance which does not exist in another subject and in the sense of accident which exists only in another subject. In this text, Thomas speaks of the division between substance and accident as between the division of the univocal and the equivocal:

...est duplex modus dividendi commune in ea quae sub ipso sunt, sicut est duplex communitatis modus.

Est enim quaedam divisio univoci in species per differentias quibus aequaliter natura generis in speciebus participatur, sicut animal dividitur in hominem et equum, et huiusmodi;

alia vero divisio est ejus quod est commune per analogiam, quod quidem secundum perfectam rationem praedicatur de uno dividendum, et de altero imperfecte et secundum quid, sicut ens

dividitur in substantiam et accidens, et in ens actu et in ens potentia: et haec divisio est quasi media inter aequivocum et univocum.²

Nevertheless, this division of beings is different from the distinction of the senses of the word *being* given in the fifth book of *Wisdom*. By criss-crossing a distinction in things (that between existing or not existing in a subject, or between substance and accident) and a distinction in our knowledge seen only by reason (the distinction between the universal and the singular or between what is or is not said of a subject), we get a distinction of things as they are in reason. And such a distinction is proper to logic.

The distinction of beings here is a distinction of beings or things as they are in our knowledge or reason. Now as Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. And Aristotle here distinguishes between universal substance, singular accident, universal accident, and singular substance. Thomas points out in regard to substance that the first philosopher does not consider universal substance to be substance, but the logician speaks thus for they do not consider things in the same way:

Dicit quod substantia dicitur, quae non est de subiecto: et dicitur universale semper de aliquo subiecto: ergo universale non est substantia.

Videtur autem ratio haec non valere. Dictum est enim in *Praedicamentis*, quod de ratione substantiae est, quod non sit in subiecto. Praedicari vero de subiecto non est contra rationem substantiae. Unde ponuntur ibi secundae substantiae quae praedicantur de subiecto.

Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis, dicit quod praedicatur "de subiecto", idest de substantia subsistente extra animam.

Sed Philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in

² *Scriptum In Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XLII, Quaest I, Art. III, Solutio

subiecto et de subiecto. Hic enim accipit dici de subiecto, quod est in se aliqua res et inest alicui subiecto existenti in actu. Et hoc impossibile est esse substantiam. Sic enim haberet esse in subiecto. Quod est contra rationem substantiae: quod etiam in *Praedicamentis* est habitum.³

Why does Aristotle call it a distinction of *beings*, rather than of *that which is in reason*? Perhaps the reasons are like those we give for why he begins from things in chapter one. Logic is ordered to knowing things and has a foundation in things and is about things insofar as they are in reason.

But when Aristotle distinguishes the senses of *being* in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, they can be reduced, as Thomas teaches us there, to four senses, of which substance and accident are the first and second senses. Why are the third and fourth senses not found in the distinction TWN ONTWN, the distinction of beings (or things) here in the *Categories*? And what does this do to the claim that logic is about all things in some way, just as reason is open to all of them? Answering these questions will cast light, not only on that ante-predicament which is the the distinction TWN ONTWN, but also on the post-predicaments of opposites and motion.

Does *subject* have one meaning in the four parts of this division? When we say that something is *said of a subject* and something *exists in a subject*, does the word *subject* mean the same? Surely the way the singular is under the universal and substance is under accidents is not the same.

What is meant by *said of a subject*? The examples given are examples of something said univocally in the narrow sense of chapter one. Accidents here are not named denominatively so they are not said of substance. *Man* is said of this man and the next man univocally and likewise *science*, of grammar

How does definition of *in subject* separate from all else? Cajetan sees the need for excluding the rest of the eight senses of *being in* distinguished in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*)?

Aristotle excludes from the sense here of being in a subject, the sense of part in whole and the sense of being in something one can exist apart

³ In VII *Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1575-1576

from. The second, third and fourth senses of *being in* refer to a part being in a whole and the first, seventh, eighth and somewhat the sixth are excluded by something being able to exist apart from what it is in.

Why is this division of beings between the two continuous divisions of those said (in the first part of this chapter) and of those said without intertwining by what the latter signify (in Chapter Four)?

The distinction of those said without intertwining as signifying either substance or how much or how etc. presupposes the division of beings. For the ten genera of categories are distinguished, as Thomas will teach us, by how something can be said of individual substances. And we distinguish individual substances from all other things in the division of beings.

The distinction of those said without intertwining presupposes the distinction between substance and accident given in the division of beings. For one of the genera is substance and the other nine are genera of accidents.

Moreover, when Aristotle adds without *any* intertwining or according to *no* intertwining, he perhaps wants to exclude not only the intertwining in a statement, but also that of substance and accident and of accident with accident.

Further, it is clear from the distinction of beings that accidents signified in the abstract (such as the words *color* or *justice*) cannot be said of substance univocally (in the narrow sense), but only denominatively. And this latter way of predicating must be used in distinguishing the highest genera of accidents by the ways they are said of substance (one as the measure of substance or how much; another as the disposition of substance or how it is etc.).

Further, the distinction between the universal and the singular in both substance and accident is necessary as a basis both for the rules of Chapter Three for placing the less universal under the more universal in a category until we reach the singular and also for the possibility through the rules of Chapter Three for reducing the signification of all those said without intertwining in a general way under the ten heads (the ten highest genera).

APPENDIX

In this text, Thomas distinguishes the senses of *substance* here and in the first chapter:

Unde patet quod fere eadem est divisio substantiae hic posita, cum illa quae ponitur in *Praedicamentis*. Nam per subiectum intelligitur hic substantia prima. Quod autem dicit genus et universale, quod videtur ad genus et species pertinere, continetur sub substantiis secundis.

Hoc autem quod quid erat esse hic ponitur, sed ibi praetermittitur, quia non cadit in praedicamentorum ordine nisi sicut principium. Neque enim est genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium.⁴

What are the "definitions" of substance and accident in this division as we have named the parts? Thomas, following Avicenna, gives an explanation in this text:

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut probat Avicenna in sua *Meta.*, per se existere non est definitio substantiae; quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed esse ejus. Et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus, quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse. Sed definitio vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse vel debetur non in alio. Et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio...et si aliquando hoc dicatur definitio accidentis, praedicto modo intelligenda est definitio dicta; quia aliquando ab auctoribus definitiones ponuntur causa brevitatis non secundum debitum ordinem, sed tanguntur illa ex quibus potest accipi definitio.⁵

This text of Thomas, following Avicenna is useful towards understanding better the distinction between the universal (esp. the genus or species) and the singular and less universal:

Respondeo dicendum, quod in divinis non potest esse universale et particulare. Et hujus ratio potest quadruplex assignari:

⁴ In VII *Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, n. 1275

⁵ *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad Primam Quaestionem, Ad 2

primo, quia secundum Avicennam, II parte *Logicae*, cap. II, ubicumque est genus et species, oportet esse quidditatem differentem a suo esse, ut prius dictum est [Distinctio VIII, Q. I, Art. I]; et hoc in divinis non competit;

secundo, quia essentia universalis non est eadem numero in suis inferioribus, sed secundum rationem tantum; essentia autem divina est eadem numero in pluribus personis;

tertio, quia universale exigit pluralitatem in his quae sub ipso continentur vel in actu vel in potentia: in actu sicut est in genere, quod semper habet plures species; in potentia sicut in aliquibus speciebus quarum forma, quantum est de se, possibilis est inveniri in multis, cum omnis forma de se est communicabilis; sed quod inveniatur tantum in uno, est ex parte materiae debitae illi speciei, quae tota adunatur in uno individuo, ut patet in sole, qui constat ex tota sua materia; et ista pluralitas est secundum numerum, qui numerus est simpliciter fundatus in substantiali distinctione: tres autem personae non numerantur tali numero, ut dictum est, et ideo essentia non habet rationem universalis;

quarto, quia particulare semper se habet ex additione ad universale. In divinis autem propter summam simplicitatem, non est possibilis additio, et ideo nec universale nec particulare.⁶

Some rather subtle distinctions in naming the singular (especially in the genus of substance) are contained in this text of Thomas:

Dicendum quod cum omne particulare habeat respectum ad naturam communem et ad proprietates, potest secundum utrumque respectum nominari, tum per nomen primae impositionis, tum per nomen secundae intentionis.

Hoc enim nomen, *res naturae*, est nomen primae impositionis, significans particulare per respectum ad naturam communem.

Hoc vero nomen, *suppositum*, est nomen secundae impositionis, significans ipsam habitudinem particularis ad naturam

⁶ *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, *Utrum in divinis sit totum universale*, Solutio

communem, inquantum subsistit in ea; particulare vero, inquantum exceditur ab ea.

Sed quia accidentia consequuntur naturam, ideo omne nomen designans particulare secundum respectum ad proprietates, designat etiam ipsum per respectum ad naturam communem.

Hoc ergo potest fieri dupliciter: - vel per nomen primae impositionis; et sic est *hypostasis* communiter in omnibus substantiis, *persona* vero in rationalibus substantiis; - vel per nomen secundae impositionis; et sic est *individuum* inquantum est indivisum in se, *singulare* vero inquantum est divisum ab aliis, unde singulare est idem quod divisum.

Est etiam alia differentia attendenda inter ista; quia quaedam istorum significant communiter particulare in quolibet genere, sicut *particulare*, *individuum* et *singulare*; quaedam vero tantum particulare in genere substantiae, sicut *res naturae*, *suppositum*, *hypostasis* et *persona*.⁷

DUANE H. BERQUIST

⁷ *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio I