

QUALITY - CHAPTER 8

This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle “defines” quality and distinguishes its species. In the second, he considers the properties of quality. In the third, he returns to the connection of some qualities with toward something.

In the first part, Aristotle defines the Greek word for quality by its concrete correspondent, just as the Latins could define *qualitas* by *qualis*. This is difficult to imitate in English. It is as if we used the word *howness* for quality and defined *howness* as *that by which we are said to be how we are*. Then, Aristotle distinguishes four species or forms of quality. Finally, returning to the original definition, he points out that *how we are* is said denominatively from the above species.

The first species or form of quality is habit and disposition. Habits are more stable and longer lasting than dispositions. Reasoned out knowledge and moral virtues are habits, but health and sickness are dispositions. But a habit can also be called a disposition in the broad sense for by a habit we are disposed in some way. Thus the word *disposition* could be used in general for this species or genus of quality and then be kept for the disposition in particular that is easily movable while the other species, adding something noteworthy (stability and long lastingness), gets the new name of *habit*.

The second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability. Thomas puts the powers of the soul in this species.

The third species or genus of quality is undergoing qualities and undergoings. The latter are transitory and thus are something imperfect in the genus of quality. They are called undergoing qualities because the senses undergo them. Hence, some call these sensible qualities. But some are called undergoing because they are the result of those having them undergoing something. Thomas alludes to the distinction here of undergoing quality and undergoings in this text:

...nulla potentia passiva potest in actum exire nisi completa per formam sui activi per quam fit in actu; quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu.

Impressiones autem activorum possunt esse in passivis dupliciter. Uno modo per modum passionis, dum scilicet potentia

passiva est in transmutari; alio modo per modum qualitatis et formae, quando impressio activi jam facta est connaturalis ipsi passivo; sicut etiam Philosophus in *Praedicamentis* (c. 8, 9a 28) distinguit passionem et passibilem qualitatem.¹

The fourth species of quality is figure and form

When Aristotle has finished distinguishing these four species, he says there may be others; but these are the ones mainly spoken of.

In the third part of the first part, Aristotle states that *how one is* is said denominatively from the above.

In the second chief part of the chapter, Aristotle considers three properties of quality, the first two fitting only some species and the last being a property in a stricter sense.

The first property is to have a contrary, which Aristotle exemplifies, in the first and third species of quality. This is significant because the second and fourth species do not seem to have contraries. But not every species under the first and third have a contrary either. A connection between the first and third species is seen in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the fifth book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*) where these two senses are joined. Simplicius says that contrariety is found in other genera as they have something of quality in them.²

The second property is to be said more and less. Again, Aristotle exemplifies this in the first and third species. But the fourth species, he says, does not admit of more or less. One circle is not more or less a circle than another.

The third property is more a strict property. By its quality, a thing is like or unlike another thing.

¹*Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XIV, Art. 1, Solutio II

² Recall the question in lectio 11 of the first book of *Natural Hearing* whether there is contrariety in substance or not. Aristotle reasoning from both the affirmative and the negative. But on the side of the differences is found the contrariety and difference is said in *quale quid* or how it is what it is. Likewise, in quantity. And it is the relatives secundum dici that were contrary.

The third chief part of the chapter returns to the connection of quality with toward something. Some qualities are said to be toward another by their genus. Each science is knowledge *of* something. Nothing prevents these from being put in two highest genera. Although fundamentally in quality, the relation following upon them is in toward something

We can now try to penetrate more these points with the help of some texts from Thomas.

Quality is defined by how.³ The word *how* seems to signify the limit or determination of a thing. This can be seen when the word is used in combination as in quantity being called *how much* or *how many*. If I say many friends are coming for dinner or many students are coming to the party, and you (who have to prepare the food and drink for them) ask "How many are coming", you want me to limit them to some number. Likewise, when the difference is defined as signifying *how* something is what it is, it is limiting the genus to one or some of its species. Likewise, when we ask how is this done or made or known, we want the way to be determined.

The connection between how and limit can also be seen by the correspondence of the four meanings of *how* in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* and the four meanings of *limit* therein. Limit can also be connected with the species of quality through the senses of how. And the reduction of the senses of *how* to two in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, also points to the distinction of the first and third (and perhaps second) species of quality from the last.

By quality or howness, *how something is* is said. But this is how *simpliciter*, not how much or how many as by quantity or how towards another by relation or how something is what it is as in species-making difference. Cajetan in his commentary on the *Categories*:

Vel, et in idem redit, licet determinans potentiam substantiae secundum esse accidentale qualitas sit, quia tamen qualitatis ratio attenditur penes determinationem potentiae rei et solum genus hoc consistit in ipsa determinatione subjecti et distinguitur secundum quod diversimode subjecti potentiam determinat, ideo

³ . Cassell's *Latin-English*: qualis, -e (from quam, as talis from tam) quam (acc. of quae, analogous to tam) *how, in what way*

qualitatis sibi et rationem et nomen vindicavit, ita tamen quod, ut dictum est, omne aliud accidens ut determinat potentiam subjecti qualitatis rationem sapiat et nomen quodammodo habeat; et haec appropriatio nominis qualitatis fuit causa quare qualitas descripta est per *quale* simpliciter...⁴

Commentators are rightly puzzled by Aristotle's second statement in this chapter, that quality is among those things said in many ways. In the 5th book of *Wisdom (Metaphysics)*, he distinguishes four senses. How can three species of quality be three meanings of how? The species of quality seem distinguished more like the senses of a word than by opposites as in the division of a genus. This seems contrary to species which have one meaning in their genus. There seems more real diversity among the species or genera of quality. Quality seems to be less one genus than quantity. In his commentary on the senses of quality in wisdom, Thomas compares them with the species of quality in the *Categories*:

Hic distinguit modos qualitatis: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit quatuor modos qualitatis. Secundo reducit eos ad duos...

Dicit ergo primo, quod unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur "differentia substantiae", idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt. Et propter hoc dicitur quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid....Hunc autem modum qualitatis Aristoteles in *Praedicamentis* praetermisit, quia non continetur sub Praedicamento qualitatis, de quo ibi agebat. Hic autem agit de significationibus huius nominis, *qualitas*.

Secundum ponit....Dicit quod alius modus qualitatis vel qualis est secundum quod immobilia et mathematica dicuntur qualia. Mathematica enim abstrahunt a motu, ut in sexto huius dicitur. Mathematica enim sunt numeri et magnitudines; et in utrisque utimur nomine *qualis*. Dicimus enim superficies esse quales, inquantum sunt quadratae vel triangulares. Et similiter numeri dicuntur quales, inquantum sunt compositi...Dicuntur enim numeri quales ad similitudinem superficiei "et solidi", idest corporis....Hic autem modus qualitatis est quarta species in *Praedicamentis* posita.

⁴ Cajetan, *Commentaria in De Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, M.H. Laurent, O.P., pp. 172-173 ?

Tertio ponit....Dicit, quod etiam qualitates dicuntur passiones substantiarum mobilium, secundum quas corporas per alterationem mutantur, ut calidum, frigidum, et huiusmodi. Et hic modus pertinet ad tertiam speciem qualitatis in *Praedicamentis* positam.

Quartam ponit...Dicit quod qualitas sive quale dicitur quarto modo secundum quod aliquid disponitur per virtutem et vitium, vel qualitercumque per bonum et malum, sicut per scientiam et ignorantiam, sanitatem et aegritudinem, et huiusmodi. Et haec est prima species qualitatis in *Praedicamentis* posita.

Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in *Praedicamentis* inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continentur sub potentia, sicut supra posuit.

Deinde...Reducit positos modos ad duos; dicens quod quale dicitur aliquid fere secundum duos modos, inquantum alii duo de quatuor reducuntur ad alios duos. Horum autem unus principalissimus est primus modus, secundum quam differentia substantiae dicitur qualitas, quia per eum aliquid significatur informatum et qualificatum. Et ad hunc modum reducitur qualitas, quae est in numeris, et in mathematicis aliis, sicut quaedam pars. Huiusmodi enim qualitates sunt quasi quaedam differentiae substantiales substantiarum. Nam ipsa significantur per modum substantiae potius quam alia accidentia, ut in capitulo de quantitate dictum est. Sunt enim huiusmodi qualitates differentiae substantiarum "aut non motarum, aut non inquantum sunt motae"....

Secundus modus principalis est, ut passiones motarum inquantum mota, et etiam differentiae motuum dicantur qualitates. Quae quidem dicuntur differentiae motuum, quia alterationes differunt secundum huiusmodi qualitates, sicut calefieri et infrigidari secundum calidum et frigidum. Et ad hunc modum reducitur ille modus secundum quam vitium et virtus dicitur qualitas. Hic enim modus est quasi quaedam pars illius. Virtus enim et vitium ostendunt quasdam differentias motus et actus secundum bene et male. Nam virtus est, per quam se aliquis habet bene ad agendum et patiendum; vitium autem

secundum quod male. Et simile est de aliis habitibus sive intellectualibus, ut scientia, sive corporalibus, ut sanitas.

Sed tamen bene et male maxime pertinet ad qualitatem in rebus animatis; et praecipue in habentibus "prohaerisim" idest electionem. Et hoc ideo, quia bonum habet rationem finis. Ea vero, quae agunt per electionem, agunt propter finem. Agere enim propter finem maxime competit rebus animatis...⁵

We can see that the four senses of quality in wisdom do not correspond exactly to the four species of quality in the *Categories*. There is one in each that is not found in the other. Thomas explains why the second species of quality is not under the meanings of quality in wisdom:

Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in *Praedicamentis* inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continentur sub potentia, sicut supra posuit.⁶

The wise man is interested in the ways of being and ability or power more readily comes under the division of being into act and ability, or act and potency, than the division of being according to the figures of predication. Moreover, the second species is more a beginning than an end; and *how* signifies more a limit or end than a beginning.⁷ One might also note in passing that the reason given here for it being a species in the *Categories* - *propter modum denominandi* rather than *propter modum essendi* - is a sign of the priority of names over things in the skopos of the *Categories*. Moreover, this might also contain the clue to the logician's considering these things as having a common genus from their common way of denominating substance.

The sense of quality found in wisdom, but not in the genus of quality in logic, is that of the species-making difference. Clearly, this could not be a species of the genus quality in the *Categories* for it is found in every genus which is divided by differences and especially in substance. Moreover, no

⁵ In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, nn. 987-1000

⁶ In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, n. 995

⁷ Is this also the reason why the second species is exemplified more by something other than the mere ability (so that people wonder whether the powers of the soul belong there)?

difference is a species. Further, it does not signify simply *how something is* but *how something is what it is*.

How do we think out the division of *quality* into *four* species? Usually, a logical and understandable division is into two or three. We have seen how both Thomas and Albert distinguish the *ten* highest genera by dividing and subdividing them always into two or three, until they arrive at the ten of Aristotle. Likewise, when Aristotle distinguished five species of continuous quantity, he seemed to touch upon a distinction between the first three and the last two (time and place).

Is it by criss-crossing divisions into two as in the division of being in chapter two or by dividing and sub-dividing? Thomas gives a division into three:

Philosophus, in *Praedicamentis*, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, *dispositionem et habitum*...

Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, *super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit*:⁸ unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram.

Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per Philosophum in V *Metaphys.* ⁹

Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem vel passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem.

⁸ *figo*: to fix, fasten, make fast
praefigo: to fix in front, fasten before

⁹ Thomas: Lect. 16, n. 987

Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum suam rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni vel mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens.

Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia species qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, quod sit cito transiens vel diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali: quia motus et passionem non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem.

Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio: dicit enim Philosophus, in VII *Physic.*, loquens de habitibus animae et corporis quod sunt *dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam*. Et quia *ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid*, ut dicitur in II *Phys.*;¹⁰ ideo in prima specie consideratur bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.

Unde in V *Metaphys.* Philosophus definit habitum, quod est *dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male*. Et in II *Ethic* dicit quod *habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male*.

Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni: quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.

Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.¹¹

¹⁰ 198b, 13-16, Lectio II, n. 6; 194a, 21-29, Lectio IV, nn. 6-7

¹¹ *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, corpus

Why does Thomas use *modus* to distinguish the species of quality? If *modus* is determined by measure and the species of quantity are distinguished by measure (Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XV, n. 986: "Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*...distinxit species quantitatis secundum diversas rationes mensurae."), why should Thomas use the word *modus* to lead into the distinction of the species of quality? But it can also have the sense of boundary or limit.¹² Perhaps we are to understand *modus* in this way when trying to understand the species of quality. In the above text, Thomas uses the words *modus* and *determinatio* as synonyms.¹³ To be measurable, a quantity must also be limited. As Shakespeare says of mother earth in *Timon of Athens*: "Common mother, thou, whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast teems and feeds all."; the infinite or unlimited is immeasurable. And in the *The Winter's Tale*, Act II, Sc. 1:

With thoughts so qualified as your charities
Shall best instruct you, measure me

And in one edition, the note gives - qualified: moderated

And in *King John*, Act V, Sc. 1:

This inundation of mistemper'd humour
Rests by you only to be qualified.

[qualified: moderated in Yale Shakespeare note]

Modus also has the sense of *way*. Both words can be nouns corresponding to the word *how*. The *mode* or *way* of doing something is *how* you do it. The *mode* or *way* of knowing is *how* you know. Now the word *qualis* in Cassell's Latin dictionary is said to be derived from *quam* meaning *how*:

¹² Cassell's dictopnary:

modus: la: a measure, standard of measure

II Transf. A size, quantity length

B. 1. measure, bound, limit, boundary [hence determination ?]

2. moderation, control

C. order rule

D manner, mode, fashion, way, method

¹³ *determinatio*: boundary, end

determino: to bound, fix the limits of determine

termino: to bound, limit

quam: how, in what manner

qualis: (from *quam* as *talis* from *tam*): of what sort, what kind of

When we ask the quantitative questions "how much?" or "how many?", does the word *how* indicate limited and therefore measurable? If someone says that he expects *many* people or that it will take *many* days, we ask *how* many seeking a more precise answer, but also a determination or limit. It is curious to note that the limit of a continuous quantity is either not continuous or not continuous in the way that is of which it is the limit.

One could also divide the four into two. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when investigating the genus of virtue and vice, Aristotle asks which of three they are. These three are the first three species of quality. Thomas in his commentary explain what these three have in common

tria sunt in anima, scilicet passiones, potentiae et habitus...Nihil autem est in anima, quod est operationis principium, nisi aliquid horum trium.¹⁴

The fourth species is not a principle of any operation as is clear from there being no motion in geometry. Good and bad are used to get at the genus of virtue and vice. The first reason why virtue and vice are neither passion nor potency is in terms of good and bad which also separate the fourth species from the first.

There is a problem about the distinction of the species of quality which Thomas considers in a couple of objections and solves in replying to them:

1. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur *dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur dispositum*. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem: nam et secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.

2. Praeterea, Philosophus, in *Praedicamentis*, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia

¹⁴In *II Ethicorum*, Lectio V, n. 290

specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur *bene vel male*, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis.

Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones: nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a Philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.

Unde patet solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvitur ut Simplicius dicit, in *Commento Praedicamentorum*.¹⁵

We can compare here the four senses of *limit* or *end* with the four senses of quality in wisdom and with the four species of quality in the *Categories*. But first we give Thomas' exposition of Aristotle's text in wisdom on the word *limit*:

Primo ponit rationem termini; dicens, quod terminus dicitur quod est ultimum cuiuslibet rei, ita quod nihil de primo terminato est extra ipsum terminum; et omnia quae sunt eius, continentur intra ipsum. Dicit autem "primi" quia contingit id, quod est ultimum primi, esse principium secundi; sicut nunc quod est ultimum praeteriti, est principium futuri.

Secundo ponit quatuor modos, quibus dicitur terminus;

¹⁵*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, Utrum habitus sit determinata species qualitatis, Obj. 1 & 2 and Ad 1 & 2

quorum primus est secundum quod in quolibet specie magnitudinis, finis magnitudinis vel habentis magnitudinem, dicitur terminus; sicut punctus dicitur terminus lineae, et superficies corporis, vel etiam lapidis habentis quantitatem

Secundus modus est similis primo, secundum quod unum extremum motus vel actionis dicitur terminus, hoc scilicet ad quod est motus, et non a quo: sicut terminus generationis est esse, non autem non esse; quamvis quandoque ambo extrema motus dicantur terminus largo modo, scilicet a quo et in quod, prout dicimus, quod omnis motus est inter duos terminos.

Tertius modus dicitur terminus, cuius causa fit aliquid, hoc enim est ultimum intentionis sicut terminus secundo modo dictus est ultimum motus vel operationis.

Quartus modus est secundum quod substantia rei, quae est essentia et definitio significans quod quid est res, dicitur terminus.

Est enim terminus cognitionis. Incipit enim cognitio rei ab aliquibus signis exterioribus quibus pervenitur ad cognoscendum rei definitionem, quo cum perventum fuerit, habetur perfecta cognitio de re.

Vel dicitur terminus cognitionis definitio, quia infra ipsam continentur ea, per quae scitur res. Si autem mutetur una differentia, vel addatur, vel subtrahatur, iam non erit eadem definitio.

Si autem est terminus cognitionis, oportet quod sit rei terminus, quia cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam.

Concludit comparisonem termini ad principium; dicens quod quoties dicitur principium, toties dicitur terminus, et adhuc amplius; quia omne principium est terminus, sed non terminus omnis est principium. Id enim ad quod motus est, terminus est, et nullo modo principium est: illud vero a quo est motus, est principium et terminus, ut ex praedictis patet.¹⁶

¹⁶*n V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIX, nn. 1044-1049

And now a brief comparison of these four senses to the senses of how or quality in wisdom and to the four species of quality in the *Categories*.

The first sense of *limit* is connected with the second sense of *how*.

The second sense of *limit* is connected with the third sense of *how*.

The third sense of *limit* is connected with fourth sense of *how*.

The fourth sense of *limit* is connected with first sense of *how*.

The first sense of *limit* is connected with the fourth and last species of quality.

The second sense of *limit* is connected with the third and to some extent also the second species of quality.

The third sense of *limit* is connected with the first species of quality which involves the good and the bad, which are determined, by the end or purpose.

The fourth sense corresponds more to substantial quality in a definition. Note how the order is reversed.

There follows some texts on particular species of quality in particular.

We have already seen why the Philosopher place *potentia* in quality rather than in relation:

licet potentiae conveniat ratio principii, quod in genere relationis est, tamen id quod est principium actionis vel passionis, non est relatio, sed aliqua forma absoluta; et id est essentia potentiae;

et inde est quod Philosophus ponit potentiam non in genere relationis, sed qualitatis, sicut et scientiam, quamvis utrique aliqua relatio accidat.¹⁷

The word *natural* modifying ability is necessary. (Aristotle, *Categories*, 9a 15-17) For acquired abilities are in the first species of quality.

Thomas clearly places the powers of the soul in the second species of quality:

cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens; et est in secunda species qualitatis.¹⁸

¹⁷*De Potentia*, Q. 2, Art. 2, corpus

¹⁸*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 77, Art. 1, Ad 5

And another text from Thomas placing the powers of the soul in the second species of quality:

si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae (et manifestum est quod non sunt aliae substantiae), sequitur quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis, quae dicitur potentia vel impotentia naturalis.¹⁹

Three texts from Thomas on the third species of quality:

Omnis alteratio fit secundum qualitatem sensibilem, quae est tertia species qualitatis. Secundum illa enim alterantur corpora, quibus primo corpora ab invicem differunt; quae sunt sensibiles qualitates: ut gravitas et levitas, durities et mollities quae percipiuntur tactu.....Huiusmodi enim sunt quaedam passionες sub genere qualitatis contentae; et dicuntur *passiones*, quia passionem ingerunt sensibus vel quia ab aliquibus passionibus causantur, ut in *Praedicamentis* dicitur.²⁰

Huic enim generi alludit hoc commune nomen quod est *alteratio*: nam *alterum* solet dici quod differt secundum qualitatem. Loquimur autem nunc de qualitate, non secundum quod quale invenitur in genere substantiae, secundum quod differentia substantialis dicitur praedicari *in eo quod quale* sed de quali *passivo*, quod continetur in tertia specie qualitatis, secundum quod quale dicitur aliquid pati aut non pati, ut calidum et frigidum, album et nigrum, et huiusmodi.²¹

Philosophus in VII Physic. probet quod in prima et quarta specie qualitatis non est motus alterationis, sed solum in tertia, quae dicitur passio vel passibilis qualitas: et propter hoc forte signanter dixit quod alteratio est transmutatio in passionibus.²²

¹⁹*De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 11, C

²⁰*In VII Physicorum*, n. 910

²¹*In V Physicorum*, Lectio IV, n. 6679

²²*In I De Generatione et Corruptione*, Lectio X, n. 74

In this text on the fourth species of quality, Thomas also sees a distinction between form and figure:

dicit ergo primo, quod praeter qualitates sensibiles, maxime videtur esse alteratio in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, scilicet *forma* et *figura*; et in prima specie qualitatis, quae continet sub se *habitus* et *dispositiones*.

...considerandum est quod forma et figura in hoc ab invicem differunt, quod figura importat terminationem quantitatis; est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur: forma vero dicitur, quae dat esse specificum artificiato; formae enim artificiatorum sunt accidentia.²³

Appendix

Thomas uses the teaching of this chapter in theology when discussing the genus of grace. In this text, Thomas identifies grace as a quality and places it in the first species of quality:

3. Praeterea, gratia est qualitas quaedam. Sed manifestum est quod non est in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est *forma et circa aliquid constans figura* : quia non pertinet ad corpus. Neque etiam in tertia est: quia non est *passio vel passibilis qualitas*, quae est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII *Physic.*; ipsa autem gratia principaliter est in mente. Neque iterum est in secunda specie, quae est *potentia vel impotentia naturalis*: quia gratia est super naturam; et non se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut potentia naturalis. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in prima specie, quae est *habitus vel dispositio*. Habitus autem mentis sunt virtutes: quia etiam ipsa scientia quodammodo est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia est idem quod virtus.

Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis. Nec tamen est idem quod virtus: sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix.²⁴

²³In VII *Physicorum*, Lectio V, n.n 914-915

²⁴*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 110, Art. 3, Obj. 3 & Ad 3

And in another text where Thomas does the same, he notes that grace is a quality not known by the philosophers:

...gratia ad genus qualitatis reducitur, et ad primam speciem qualitatis; nec proprie tamen naturam habitus habet, cum non immediate ad actum ordinet; sed est velut habitudo quaedam, sicut sanitas se habet ad corpus. Et ideo dicit Chrysostomus quod gratia est sanitas mentis; unde non computatur nec inter scientias, nec inter virtutes, nec inter alias qualitates quas philosophi numeraverunt; quorum non fuit tractare nisi habitus naturales et acquisitos.²⁵

And a third text where Thomas also notes the difference of this quality which is grace from those known by the philosophers:

...gratia est in prima specie qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dici habitus, quia non immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spirituale quod in anima facit, et est sicut dispositio quae est respectu gloriae, quae est gratia consummata. Nihil tamen simile gratiae in accidentibus animae quae Philosophi sciverunt, invenitur: quia Philosophi non cognoverunt nisi illa animae accidentia quae ordinantur ad actus naturae humanae proportionatos.²⁶

Another interesting text of Thomas using this genus in theology is on character in the sacraments:

...characterem in sacramentis quibusdam imprimi, omnes Moderni confitentur; sed in modo ponendi ipsum in anima partim differunt, et partim conveniunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc quod omnes dicunt per characterem importari relationem triplicem. Est enim character signum distinctivum et configurativum....Differunt autem in hoc, quod quidam ponunt istis relationibus non subesse aliquod accidens absolutum, sed immediate in anima fundari istas relationes. Hoc autem esse non potest, quia signum per formam quam sensibus vel intellectui imprimit, facit aliquid in cognitionem venire. Similiter etiam nihil distinguitur ab alio nisi per aliquam

²⁵*Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest.I, Art. V, Ad 1

²⁶*De Veritate*, Q. 27, Art. 2, Ad 7

formam. Similitudo etiam est relatio super unitate qualitatis fundata, ut dicitur in V *Meta*. Unde patet quod quaelibet illarum relationum quam importat character, requirit aliquam formam substratam; et cum non sit forma substantialis, quia forma substantialis in sacramentis non datur, relinquitur quod forma substrata sit qualitas quaedam, cuius unitas consignificationis similitudinem facit.

Et ideo quidam dicunt quod non est in aliqua quatuor specierum qualitatis, et tamen est in genere qualitatis, innitentes illi verbo Philosophi in *Praedicamentis* (*Categ.* c. 8, 10a 25) *Fortasse*, inquit, *apparebunt alii qualitatis modi*.

Sed hoc est fuga quaedam, quia quamvis sint alii modi qualitatis, tamen omnes reducuntur ad has species: quod patet ex hoc quod nulla alia species inveniri adhuc potuit.

Et ideo dicunt alii quod est in quarta specie qualitatis, quia ipsa configuratio quam character suo nomine exprimit, importat unitatem figurae, quae est in specie quarta qualitatis. Et quidam dicunt hanc figuram esse crucem Christi.

Sed hoc non potest stare, quia aut figura proprie accipitur, aut metaphorice. Si proprie accipitur, sic importat terminationem quantitatis dimensionis quam constat in anima non esse. Si autem metaphorice dicatur, tunc oportet quod metaphora reducatur ad proprietatem, quia res non ponitur in genere per id quod de eo metaphorice dicitur: sicut non dicitur quod Apostoli sint in genere qualitatis, quia eis dictum est *Matt V, 14, Vos estis lux mundi*. Nec poterit aliquid in quarta specie qualitatis inveniri quod sit in anima secundum proprietatem. Unde character de quo loquimur non potest fundari supra qualitatem quartae speciei.

Et ideo quidam dicunt quod est in tertia specie qualitatis, eo quod sensui spirituali infert quandam mulcebrem passionem, inquantum animam ornat et decorat.

Sed hoc iterum non potest stare, quia sicut probat Philosophus in VII *Phys.* (244b 14 - 245a 5) tertia species qualitatis non est nisi in sensibili parte animae. Character autem a nullo ponitur in hac parte animae, sed in intellectiva. Et praeterea illae qualitates semper habent ordinem ad aliquam transmutationem corporalem, vel quam inferunt, vel a qua causantur.

Et ideo alii dicunt quod est in prima specie qualitatis, et est quasi media inter dispositionem et habitum. Inquantum est difficile mobilis, convenit cum habitu, inquantum autem non est ultima perfectio, sed ad gratiam disponit, cum dispositione convenit.

Sed hoc non potest stare, quia, secundum Philosophum in II *Eth. habitus est quo habemus nos ad passiones bene vel male*. Et universaliter consideranti haec apparet differentia inter habitum et potentiam, quia potentia est qua possumus aliquid simpliciter, habitus autem quo possumus illud bene vel male: sicut intellectus quo consideramus, scientia qua bene consideramus, concupiscibilis qua concupiscimus, temperantia qua bene concupiscimus, intemperantia qua male. Et similiter est de *dispositione*, quia dispositio nihil aliud est quam quidam habitus incompletus. Cum ergo character ordinetur ad aliquid simpliciter, non ad illud bene vel male, quia sacerdos potest conficere bene vel male, non potest esse quod qualitas supra quam fundatur relatio characteris sit habitus, sed magis potentia.

Unde relinquitur quod non sit in prima specie qualitatis; sed magis reducitur ad secundam, ut quidam alii dicunt. Et hoc sic patet. Sicut enim cujuslibet existentis in aliqua natura, sunt aliquae operationes propriae, ita etiam in spiritali vita regenerati, ut Dionysius dicit in 2 c. *Eccles. Hier.* Ubi cumque autem sunt operationes propriae, oportet quod sint principia propria illarum operationum. Unde sicut in aliis rebus sunt potentiae naturales ad proprias operationes, ita etiam renati ad vitam spiritualem habent quasdam potentias, secundum quod possunt illa opera...

Ad secundum dicendum quod reducitur ad secundam speciem qualitatis, et est aliud modus ab illo quem Philosophus ibi ponit; quia Philosophus non cognoscebat nisi operationes naturales, et ita non nisi potentias naturales. Constat autem quod apud nos oportet ponere potentias spirituales, sicut potentiam conficiendi et absolvendi et huiusmodi, et quod ad secundam speciem qualitatis reducantur: sicut habitus infusi in eadem specie qualitatis sunt cum habitibus naturalibus vel acquisitis.²⁷

²⁷*Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio IV, Quaestio I, Art. 1, Responsio & Ad 2

This text also is interesting because of Aristotle's remark that there might be other species of quality besides the four he has distinguished? How are we to understand *tropos* at 10a 25?²⁸ Thomas takes the division into four as complete in the above text on character.

Could understanding be also in the first species of quality?

DIVISION OF CHAPTER EIGHT: QUALITY

Quality in itself

The definition of quality (or howness)

The forms or species of quality (howness)

The four forms of quality

Habit and disposition

They are under one species of quality

Their difference shown

How one is called the other

Natural ability or inability

Undergoing qualities and undergoings

They are a third genus

Examples

Showing that they are qualities

Why they are called *undergoing* qualities

The distinction between undergoing qualities and undergoings

Figure and form

Are there other tropoi of quality?

How (poios or qualis) is said denominatively from the above

Quality in its properties

Have contrary (but not all) and they are in same genus

Said more or less (except especially figure)

Like and unlike (strict property)

Quality in comparison to toward something

Objection about quality and toward something

²⁸ This does not necessarily mean other species. See for example the two tropoi of habit, in the beginning of the *Parts of Animals*, 639a 2-3.

Reply to objection (genus and species and the rules of chapter 3)
Putting same in two genera.

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