

LAST 6 CATEGORIES - CHAPTER 9

Chapter Nine is very brief and our text may be incomplete.

What Aristotle does first in the text we have is to point out how to act upon and to undergo admit of contraries and more and less. This shows the connection between to act upon and to undergo with quality. Since where and when and to be laid out are connected with place and time which are quantities, we can see one reason why they are placed before to act upon and to undergo. Having or to be outfitted has a likeness to both and is therefore placed rightly in the middle.

Then there is a reference to an earlier text where Aristotle says that the Greek word for *to be laid out* is said denominatively from position (like if we were to say to be positioned).

Aristotle then exemplifies where, when, and to have or to be outfitted.

Finally, Aristotle says that enough has been said about the genera laid down before (in Chapter Four).

Where is put before *when* because time is more extrinsic than place. But why is *to be laid out*, which is the order of parts in place, put after *when*? Since both where and to be laid out are connected with place (and when, with time), why is to be laid out not put next to where instead of after when. Perhaps the reason given by Thomas why there is no highest genus to when like to be laid out is to where gives us a clue. Since time is the number of the before and after in motion, order is more in the definition of time than in the definition of place. So there is another highest genus for the order of parts in place, but no other highest genus for the order of parts in time since this is already included in the understanding of time. Thus to be laid out is like where in that it is *in place* and like when insofar as it involves *an order* of parts. Hence, like in the division of beings in chapter two, where Aristotle enumerated universal substance first and individual accident second and then universal accident (which is like universal substance in being said of another and like individual accident in existing in another), so here he orders to be laid out after the two that it resembles. In a

similar order in the book *About the Poetic Art*, Aristotle defines beginning, and then end, and last middle. (He speaks there as if beginning and end are contrary.) This order of enumeration gives us a more distinct knowledge of what is being enumerated. This order could also be involved in the placing of *to act upon* and *to undergo* after where, when, to be laid out, and to outfitted if we follow Thomas' exposition in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* that these four are taken from something wholly outside and to act upon and to undergo from something partly inside and partly outside. To act upon and to undergo would then have something like quantity and quality and toward something and something like where and when and to be laid out and to be outfitted.

The last six highest genera do not seem to be accidents in the same way as quantity, quality and toward something. Consider this text of Thomas:

tempus comparatur ad unum tantum motum, sicut accidens ad subiectum; scilicet ad motum primi mobilis, quo mensurantur omnes alii motus.

Ad alios autem motus comparatur sicut mensura ad mensuratum;

sicut ulna comparatur ad virgam ligneam sicut ad subiectum, ad pannum autem qui per eam mensuratur, sicut ad mensuratum tantum;

et ideo non sequitur quod unum accidens sit in multis subiectis.¹

To be in time is to be measured by time, but is it something in the thing measured by time? Likewise, is to be in this room, something in me? And to be clothed, is that something in me? Consider this text of Thomas:

Ea enim quae habenti aliquam naturam adveniunt nec tamen pertinent ad integritatem naturae illius, vel accidentia esse videntur, ut albedo et musica; vel accidentaliter se habere ad ipsum, sicut anulus, vestimentum, domus, et similia.²

¹ *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 9, Ad 11

² *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Capitulum XLI

Thomas here seems to distinguish between what are *accidentia* and what *accidentaliter se habere*. Although both relation and the last six involve something outside of us, the *beginning* of toward something is *in* us while the beginning of the last six is outside of us. But to act upon and to undergo seem more to be in the thing. Consider this text of Thomas:

...actio ex hoc quod est actio, consideratur ut ab agente; in quantum vero est accidens, consideratur ut in subjecto agente...subtracta materia, tollitur calefactio, liceat maneat calefactionis causa.³

When we say that some quantities are from parts that have position, does *position* mean the same as when we say that sitting and standing are positions? There is a difference between the order of parts in a whole and the order of parts in place.

If acting upon and undergoing are the same as motion (if the water *becoming hot* is in some way the same as the water *being heated* or the *heating* of the water), then why is not motion the category rather than acting upon and undergoing?

Perhaps motion does not introduce a new mode or way of denominating a thing, especially as far as what there is of motion in act in things. And perhaps what is added by reason is not in things which the *Categories* is about. Thus what is becoming hot is now warm and this denominates a substance as quality does.

In what category would understanding and loving and sensing be found?

Surely not in acting upon as Simplicius seems to put them. Although Aristotle gives as examples here of undergoing to be pleased and to be pained, he may be using here examples from Plato. Could understanding and loving and sensing be placed under disposition as another tropos? In the *De Anima* and in the seventh book of *Natural Hearing*, sensing and understanding are distinguished from alteration. And since act and ability are in the same genus,

³ *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 9, Ad 7

the form by which reason knows can exist in full act when one actually understands and between full act and ability when possessed habitually. Does Thomas speak of this somewhere?

Appendix

Albert the Great, *Commentaria in De Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Tractatus VI. Caput I, Laval ed., p. 179:

Ad aliquid autem praedicat id quod est comparatum ad aliquid, qui modus immixtus est omnibus sex praedicamentis, et ideo ut principium ad alia praemitti debuit.

Habita etiam qualitate et qualibus, quae etiam generalem modum praedicandi in quale habent, qui quodammodo inest omnibus aliis.

Propterea etiam praemitti debuit, ut hic substantia praecederet ut omni subjectum, quantitas ut subjectum ad physicum, ad aliquid ut modus aliorum comparatus, quale autem et qualitas ut modum praedicandi dans residuis omnibus.

Restat autem dicere de his quae non habent res absolutas praedicare nec modum praedicandi habent ab illis absolutum: habent enim modum relationis et qualitatis, et addunt aliquid super utrumque per quod efficiuntur specialia praedicamenta.

Propter quod ipsa sex genera causantur ab aliis quatuor, quae praehabita sunt, et non causantur ab ipsis sicut inferiora causantur a superioribus, quia si hoc ita esset, containerentur in eis, sicut in suis generibus, sed causantur ex comparationibus supradictorum generum ad aliud....

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