

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN – TO HAVE

In this chapter, Aristotle distinguishes seven or eight ways<sup>1</sup> in which *to have* is said. Having shown how something can be placed under one of the ten highest genera or led back to one of them in chapters ten through fourteen, he now shows how the genera of accidents can be led back to substance which is said *to have* them. That this is the main purpose of this chapter can be seen from the order in which Aristotle gives the seven or eight ways.

The first three ways given by Aristotle are ways in which substance is said to have an accident. The first way is to have a quality, such as a habit or disposition. The second is to have some quantity or size. The third way is the one used by Aristotle to name one of the ten highest genera. He does not exemplify with the other genera because substance is denominated from them as from something exterior to substance (or towards something exterior) more than from something a substance has.

Substance is said to have a quality or quantity or an outfit (and perhaps, in general, an accident, or what exists in it as a subject). But it more has a quality or a quantity than a coat or ring. Although quantity is closer to substance than qualities (at least, the sensible ones and shape), Aristotle gives having a quality here before having a quantity. For quality is more like a form than quantity; and substance having accidents is in general having a form.

The fourth and fifth ways seem to be almost the same. These are the senses in which one is said to have a part or a part in a whole. Substance and quantity are the genera which especially are said to have parts. Aristotle's example is more from substance.

The sixth sense of *to have* is the way in which the container is said to have what it contains. This sense of *to have* corresponds to the sense of *being in* in which something is said to be in its place. Perhaps to this sense can be led back the way in which time has some things.

The seventh way is to have a possession, as to have a house or field.

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<sup>1</sup> The fourth and fifth ways are almost the same.

The fourth through the seventh ways of having something are the ways in which substance is *not* said to have accidents. Substance does not have accident as a part, or have it as something able to be without substance, as the wine can be without its container or the house without its owner.

The eighth and last way is one of reciprocal having. A husband is said to have a wife; and the wife, a husband. Likewise, a father is said to have a son and the son, a father.

The last sense is perhaps the only one of *reciprocal* having, which is especially found in those toward another. This could be found not only in real relations, which are in the genus of towards something, but also in genus and species. (For a genus always has species and a species always has a genus.)

The order in which Aristotle gives these ways of having seems to be dictated by the purpose of this post-predicament which is to lead accidents back to substance as their subject. But notice the reverse order in this text in which Thomas touches in general upon most of the senses given by Aristotle:

Sed notandum, quod *habere* dicimur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut possessionem; alio modo sicut quod in nobis est, puta vel sicut forma, vel sicut pars.<sup>2</sup>

He gives the seventh sense of Aristotle first and then touches in general upon the first five senses; for in the first three senses, we could be said to have a form and in the next two senses to have a part. Thomas is giving these more in the order in which they are known by us,<sup>3</sup> but Aristotle is giving first the senses that help us to lead the accidents back to substance which is said to have them, as an accidental form, not as a part or something able to be in separation, like a possession.

There are, at least, four or five other ways in which something is said *to have* which are very relevant to the *Categories*, but not to the end of this post-predicament. However, these four ways have some likeness to the ways distinguished by Aristotle.

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<sup>2</sup> *Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura*, Caput XVI. Lectio IV, n. 2110

<sup>3</sup> Hence, we speak of the “haves” and the “have nots”.

Aristotle does not consider the way in which a genus is said to have species (plural) or a species is said to have a genus (and differences). This pertains more to what has gone before when species are placed under the genus which has them.

Genus and species would also seem to exemplify reciprocal having just as they are said to be in each other and a part of each other (by other senses of *being in* and *part*). Aristotle does not unfold that genus and species are said to have each other reciprocally, because that is not the end of this post-predicament.

Two closely related ways of having also important for the *Categories* are the ways in which a thing is said to have a name (or things are said to have a name in common), or to have a definition. These ways were considered somewhat in the first chapter of the book. Although a thing is said to have a name, a name is not said to have a thing. Likewise, a thing is said to have a definition, but the definition is not said to have a thing.<sup>4</sup> The name or definition is like a possession of the thing whence we speak of the name or definition as belonging to the thing. And we also speak of a definition as a *property* and the *proper* name of a thing.

A name, however, can be said to have senses or to have meanings. This is somewhat like the way in which a place or jar contains something.

Since the genus in one sense is a part of the species and in another sense the species is a part of the genus, there is some likeness to the fourth and fifth ways of having here when we speak of a genus having a species or a species having a genus. But they are also like husband and wife in that they are relative to each other as Porphyry teaches us.

Aristotle also distinguishes the senses of the word *to have* in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*). We should consider that distinction and compare it with that in the last chapter of the *Categories*. Thomas lays out the text of Aristotle thus:

Hic ponit quatuor modos eius, quod est habere:

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<sup>4</sup> Someone might object that the definition contains the thing or its nature.

quorum primus est, secundum quod habere aliquid est ducere illud secundum suam naturam in rebus naturalibus, aut secundum suum impetum in rebus voluntariis. Et hoc modo febris dicitur habere hominem, quia homo traducitur a naturali dispositione in dispositionem febrilem. Et hoc modo habent tyranni civitates, quia secundum voluntatem et impetum tyrannorum res civitatum aguntur. Et hoc etiam modo induti dicuntur habere vestimentum, quia vestimentum coaptatur induto ut accipiat figuram eius. Et ad hunc modum reducitur etiam habere possessionem, quia homo re possessa utitur secundum suam voluntatem.

Secundus modus est, prout illud in quo existit aliquid in proprio susceptibili, dicitur habere illud; sicut aes habet speciem statuæ, et corpus habet infirmitatem. Et sub hoc modo comprehenditur habere scientiam, quantitatem, et quodcumque accidens, vel quamcumque formam.

Tertius modus est, secundum quod continens dicitur habere contentum, et contentum haberi a continente; sicut dicimus quod lagena "habet humidum", idest humorem aliquem, ut aquam vel vinum; et quod civitas habet homines, et navis nautas. Et secundum hunc modum etiam dicitur quod totum habet partes. Totum enim continet partem, sicut et locus locatum. In hoc enim differt locus a toto, quia locus est divisus a locato, non autem totum a partibus. Unde locatum est sicut pars divisa, ut habetur in quarto *Physicorum*.

Quartus modus est secundum quod aliquid dicitur habere alterum, ex eo, quod prohibet ipsum operari vel moveri secundum suum impetum; sicut columna dicitur habere corpora ponderosa imposita super eas, quia prohibet ea descendere deorsum secundum inclinationem...Differt autem hic modus a primo. Nam in primo habens, habitum cogebat sequi secundum suum impetum, et sic erat causa motus violenti. Hic autem habens, prohibet habitum moveri motu naturali, unde est causa quietis violentæ. Ad hunc autem modum reducitur tertius modus quo continens dicitur habere contenta; ea ratione quia aliter contenta suo proprio impetu singula separentur abinvicem, nisi continens prohiberet; sicut patet in lagena continente aquam, quæ prohibet partes abinvicem separari.

Dicit autem in fine, quod esse in aliquo similiter dicitur sicut et habere; et modi essendi in aliquo consequuntur ad modos habendi.

Octo autem modi essendi in aliquo in quarto *Physicorum* positi sunt; quorum duo, scilicet secundum quod totum integrale est in partibus et e converso, et alius modus secundum quod locatum est in loco, consequuntur ad tertium modum habendi, secundum quod totum habet partes, et locus locatum.

Modus autem secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo, ut in efficiente vel movente, sicut quae sunt regni in rege, consequitur primum modum habendi ici positum.

Modus autem essendi in, secundum quod forma est in materia, reducitur ad secundum modum habendi hic positum.

Modus autem quo aliquid est in fine, reducitur ad modum habendi quartum hic positum; vel etiam ad primum, quia secundum finem moventur et quiescunt ea quae sunt ad finem.<sup>5</sup>

#### Comparison of *to have* in *Categories* and in *Wisdom*

The first two ways in the *Categories* correspond to the second way in the *Metaphysics*.

The third and seventh ways in the *Categories* correspond to the first way given in the *Metaphysics*.

The fourth, fifth and sixth ways in the *Categories* are reduced to the third way in the *Metaphysics*.

The sixth sense in the *Categories* could also correspond somewhat to the fourth way in the fifth book of *Wisdom*, as Thomas explains.

The eighth way in the *Categories* does not seem to reduce to any way in the fifth book of *Wisdom*. This is perhaps in accord with Aristotle calling it the *strangest* way.

The correspondence Aristotle and Thomas see between the ways of *having* and the ways of *being in* are useful, among other reasons, for seeing how the first five senses here correspond to the senses in which accidents are, and are not, said *to be in* substance. For the first two senses especially

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<sup>5</sup> In *V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XX, nn. 1080-1084

correspond to the senses in which accidents are said *to be in* substance which *has* them. And the fourth and fifth senses and the sixth and seventh to the senses in which accidents are not said *to be in* substance and substance is not said *to have* them.

Following Thomas, we can put in a table a comparison of the modes or senses of *to have* in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (*Metaphysics*) and the modes or senses of *being in* in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the so-called *Physics*) can be put in some correspondence.

<i>Wisdom</i>	<i>Natural hearing</i>
1st to have clothes to have possessions fever has a man tyrant has a city (causa motus violenti)	(7) in power of mover or agent
2nd bronze has form of statue body has sickness substance has accidents have a form (matter?)	(5) form in matter
3rd container has contained jar has wine, bottle has wine whole has parts	(1) in place (2) part in whole
4th column has heavy body placed upon it	(8) in the end or loved (or also to first, those which causa quietis violentae) what are for the end are moved and rest by the end

Thomas does not give the obvious correspondence between

species has genus	(3) genus in species
genus has species	(4) species in genus

But we do not readily say that the parts have a whole, which would correspond to the sixth sense of *in*.

We are more apt to say that a whole has parts or a part than that a part has a whole or parts have a whole.

Perhaps there is a reason for considering the senses of *to have* more in wisdom and logic and the senses of *being in* in natural philosophy.

The first sense of *being in* is in place to which is attached being in time. And the consideration of place and time is most proper to natural philosophy as can be seen in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*).

But having is especially tied to form:

...et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu; qui vocatur *intellectus agens*, et est sicut habitus quidem.

Huius autem verbi occasione, quidem posuerunt intellectum agentem idem esse cum intellectu qui est habitus principiorum.

Quod esse non potest: quia intellectus qui est habitus principiorum, praesupponit aliqua iam intellecta in actu: scilicet terminos principiorum, per quorum intelligentiam cognoscimus principia: et sic sequeretur, quod intellectus agens non faceret omnia intelligibilia in actu, ut hic Philosophus dicit.

Dicendum est ergo, quod habitus sic accipitur secundum quod Philosophus frequenter consuevit nominare omnem formam et naturam habitum, prout habitus distinguitur contra privationem et potentiam, ut sic per hoc quod nominat eum habitum distinguat eum ab intellectu possibili, qui est potentia.<sup>6</sup>

The reason for considering *to have* in logic and *in* in natural philosophy is proportional to the reason for defining the continuous in logic by its wholeness and in natural philosophy by its divisibility into parts:

Circa primum considerandum est quod *continuum* invenitur a Philosopho dupliciter definitum.

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<sup>6</sup>Thomas Aquinas, *In III De Anima*, Lectio 10, nn. 728-729

Uno modo definitione formali, prout dicitur in *Praedicamentis* quod continuum est *cuius partes copulantur ad unum communem terminum*: unitas enim continui est quasi forma ipsius.

Alio modo definitione materiali, quae sumitur ex partibus, quae habent rationem materiae, ut dicitur in II *Physics*: et sic definitur hic, quod continuum est *quod est divisibile in semper divisibilia*. Nulla enim pars continui potest esse indivisibilis: quia ex indivisibilibus non componitur aliquod continuum, ut probatur in VI *Physic*.

Et satis convenienter haec definitio ponitur hic, alia autem in *Praedicamentis*: quia consideratio naturalis versatur circa materiam, consideratio autem logici circa rationem et speciem.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps the chief end of this post-predicament is to lead accidents back to substance, not as to a genus in which they belong per se and properly or through another, but as their subject. Thus the first five senses of *to have* give us the distinctions necessary for leading back accidents to the substances which have them and in which they (the accidents) are. This would seem to be the reason why these senses are put before the others, not because they are more known.

The distinction of the fourth and fifth senses from the first three corresponds to the distinction in the division of beings where accidents are said to be in a subject, but not as a part in a whole. For an accident is not in substance as a part is in a whole. And a substance does not have an accident as a whole has a part.

Hence, the first senses pertain to substance having an accident, as a quality or a quantity. These two genera of accidents involve intrinsic absolute denomination. A quality more clearly exists in a subject as a form in matter than does quantity, which is easily confused, with substance. And the third sense which pertains to one highest genus, which in Greek is called *to have*.

Just as when he explained in Chapter 2, that accidents are in a subject, not as a part in a whole and or as something that can exist apart from that subject or are incapable of existing apart from that subject, so he also gives

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<sup>7</sup>In I *De Caelo et Mundo*, Lectio II, n. 9



the senses of *to have* which correspond to those senses on the side of substance which is said *to have* accidents, but in a different way or sense from that in which a whole is said have a part (Aristotle's fourth and fifth ways) or a container the contained (Aristotle's sixth sense) and the possessor the possessed (Aristotle's seventh sense). The latter two are senses in which the *had* can be without the haver and vice-versa.

The last sense given by Aristotle is that where *to have* is reciprocal. The other senses of *to have* that are not-reciprocal and that pertain to the leading back of accidents to substance which is said to have accidents in one or two senses and not to have them in three senses.

Aristotle's last sense or way of having is one in which the having is mutual or reciprocal. Here is a fundamental text of Thomas unfolding the distinction between mutual having and a having that is not mutual or convertible:

Contingit autem ab eodem plura haberi secundum diversos modos, in quibus tamen omnibus semper quod est principalius, habere dicitur: quod autem minus principale, haberi.

Habet enim totum multas partes, ut homo manus et pedes; non autem dicimus e converso, quod manus vel pedes habeant hominem.

Habet etiam unum subiectum multa accidentia, sicut pomum colorem et odorem, et non e converso.

Habet etiam homo aliqua exteriora sicut possessiones et vestes, non e converso.

In solis autem illis quae sunt partes alicuius unius essentielles, aliquando aliquid dicitur habere et haberi ut anima corpus, et corpus animam.

Et similiter inquantum vir et uxor in matrimonio coniunguntur, dicitur vir habere uxorem, et uxor virum.

Et similiter in his quae quae per relationem uniuntur, sicut dicimus quod pater habet filium et filius patrem.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>*De Rationibus Fidei*, Caput 6, n. 987

In the above text, Thomas divides *to have* into two. In the first part, one of two things is (more) said to have the other, but not vice-versa.

Under the first he gives three havings in which one has, but the other is not said to have.

The first is that in which a whole is said to have a part (or parts). This is the fourth and fifth senses or ways of Chapter Fifteen.

The second is the sense in which one subject has many accidents. This corresponds especially to the first and second ways of Chapter Fifteen, and perhaps to the third.

The third sense is that in which one (a man) is said to have possessions or clothing. These correspond to the seventh and third senses of *to have* in the Fifteenth Chapter.

The second part of *to have*, which is a reciprocal having, has three examples, but only one of them is exemplified by Aristotle: husband and wife. The other two examples of Thomas refer to relations and to matter and form perhaps in the genus of substance

Thomas gives two groups of senses of *to have* in this text. The first group contains those where to have is *not* reciprocal and the second group where to have is reciprocal.

Aristotle has all of Thomas' senses in the first group (but not in the same order) and more. (Perhaps, Thomas would put container has contained with whole has parts, just as he has put to have possessions and to have clothes together.)

But Aristotle gives only one of the three Thomas has in the second group. But one could go from Aristotle's example or sense to both of Thomas' other senses in that husband and wife are relative and are like soul and body

In the above division by Thomas, where would we place the ways in which a genus is said to have species and the species is said to have a genus?

If genus and species are something like matter and form and are relative to each other, like father and son, they would belong to Thomas' second group.

Moreover, the reciprocal having of genus and species can be understood not only by the two corresponding senses of *in* being together, but also by there being two kinds of whole for the genus is in the species as a part in an integral or composed whole and the species is in the genus as a particular in a universal whole. (This also helps us to understand how the fourth sense of *in* is like those before and after it in different ways.) And this helps us also to see why the whole having a part is not a reciprocal having for the whole being in its parts is in no way like a part in a whole.

This also clearly shows that accidents are not led back to substance as parts to a whole.

Where would we put the way a thing is said to have a name or a definition?

A thing said to have a name or definition, but not the reverse, so that a thing having a name or definition belongs to the first group.

But a name or word is said to have senses or meanings, but it does not seem the reverse. Is this like place having bodies in it?

In the following text, Thomas sees *to have* as a post-predicament because it is common to more than one genus, and gives yet other distinctions or divisions of having, and illumines why to have a quality is here the first sense of *to have*.

...hoc nomen *habitus* ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur: uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.

Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde Philosophus inter postpraedicamenta *habere* ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt *opposita*, et *prius et posterius*, et alia huiusmodi.

Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens and id quod habetur: sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium.

Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio: sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.

Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum: unde Philosophus dicit, in V *Metaphysicorum*, quod *habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti*, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum Habitus: de quod dicit Philosophus, in V *Metaphysicorum*, quod *inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius*.

Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est: de quo Philosophus, in V *Metaphys.*, dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, *ut sanitas habitus quidam est*. Et sic...habitus est qualitas.<sup>9</sup>

This text gives a distinction between the first two ways or senses of *to have* in this chapter and the third sense. Moreover, it explains why one quality is named *habitus*.

The following text of Thomas helps to distinguish between the way a first substance has a nature and the way it has accidents. It is also important in considering the way in which a species or genus has the *formale principium*. The had is either outside the nature of the haver or not.

cum recipere terminetur ad habere, sicut ad finem; dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse recipiens, sicut dupliciter est habens.

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<sup>9</sup> *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus

Habet enim uno modo materia formam suam, et subiectum accidens, vel qualitercumque habitum est extra essentiam habentis;

habet autem alio modo suppositum naturam, ut hic homo humanitatem; quae quidem non est extra essentiam habentis, immo est eius essentia. Socrates enim est vere id quod homo est.

Genitus ergo in humanis etiam non recipit formam generantis sicut materia formam, vel sicut subiectum accidens, sed sicut suppositum vel hypostasis habet naturam speciei...<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *De Potentia*, Q. 2, Art. 1, Ad 2