

## NOTE FOR SIXTH BOOK OF WISDOM, READING ONE

Aristotle distinguishes wisdom in this reading from all other forms of reasoned out understanding (or reasoned out knowledge) in general and in particular from the other forms of theoretical or looking reasoned out understanding.

In the second book of *Natural Hearing* (customarily called the *Physics*), he had distinguished between natural philosophy and mathematics and between nature and art.

Underlying these distinctions being where they are is an important principle or beginning which can be stated thus: it belongs to the higher knowledge and that which is more like wisdom and which more knows itself to distinguish between itself and the lower knowledge and to show any order there is between them.

Since wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason, and it belongs to reason to distinguish and order things, this must belong to wisdom most of all and to other forms of knowledge as they are more like wisdom.

And inductively this can be seen.

The distinction between sensing and understanding must be made or seen by reason which alone can understand this distinction. This distinction also includes the distinction between a knowledge of the singular and a knowledge of the universal (what is common to many and said of many). The distinction between a knowledge of the singular and a knowledge of the universal is found only in our universal knowledge. And wisdom is more a knowledge of the universal than a knowledge of the singular. And reason can know itself, but the senses and the imagination do not even ask what they are.

Likewise the distinction between imagining and thinking or understanding is made or seen only by reason which can think out and understand this important distinction.

And the order of sensing and imagining to thinking and understanding is known only by reason which can think out and understand this order.

The distinction between the looking knowledge of reason and the practical knowledge of reason is made or seen in our looking knowledge. And looking knowledge is more like wisdom than practical knowledge as was seen in the Proemium to Wisdom. Thus, Aristotle in natural philosophy (in the second book of *Natural Hearing*), when determining the subject of natural philosophy, distinguishes between nature and art. And here, he distinguishes between nature and both art and choice.

And the distinction between knowledge expressed in proper words and statements and knowledge expressed in metaphors and other figures of speech and knowledge expressed in symbols and equations can only be found in the first (that is, knowledge expressed in proper words and statements). One can state in words what a statement or a word is and also what is a metaphor or a symbol or an equation. But one cannot say in metaphors what a metaphor is or write an equation or symbols that will tell us what an equation is or what a symbol is. Wisdom is expressed in proper words and statements rather than in figurative speech or in symbols and equations.

In the second book of *Natural Hearing*, Aristotle distinguishes between natural philosophy and mathematics for natural philosophy is more like wisdom than mathematics. But it is only in the sixth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*, the sixth book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*, that he distinguishes between wisdom and both natural philosophy and mathematics.

Perhaps the first distinction between our looking knowledge and our practical knowledge is by their ends. And hence, already in the second book of *Wisdom* (and to some extent also in the *Proemium to Wisdom*), we saw Aristotle so distinguishing them. But since every reasoned out understanding is a knowledge of the causes of something, Aristotle here distinguishes the kinds of reasoned out understanding by the causes they know or by the cause of their subject.

But although there are three forms of looking reasoned out understanding, each with its own causes, he distinguishes in general looking reasoned out understanding from making or doing reasoned out understanding by separating just the cause *nature* from the causes *art* and *choice*. Why can he separate in general looking reasoned out understanding from making or doing reasoned out

understanding by separating the cause only in natural philosophy from art and choice.

The reason for this is the proximity of natural things to the things by art or by choice. All three seem to involve motion or doing of some kind so, if natural things are other than artificial things and human acts, even more so will be mathematical things (which are defined without motion and matter) and wisdom (which is about things that do not depend upon matter or motion for their existence).

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