The Philosophy Curriculum at Thomas Aquinas College

Philosophy is studied in both semesters, in each of the four years of the course of study at the College. Classes meet for three hours a week.

These courses are not an historical survey of the opinions of philosophers, but are doctrinal in intention. The aim is to give the student a good beginning in discovering and judging the fundamental questions that concern a lover of wisdom. Accordingly, the order followed is the natural order of learning, beginning with logic, the common method of all sciences (in the first year), and proceeding to natural philosophy (in the second year), then, ethics and political philosophy (in the third year), and finally, metaphysics (in the fourth year).

In these courses, tutor and students read, study, and discuss almost exclusively the relevant works of Aristotle. This is in keeping with the College’s discipleship to St. Thomas Aquinas, for whom Aristotle was “the Philosopher.” But since the students read extensively the works of other philosophers in the Seminar, and study the experimental sciences in the Laboratory courses, class discussion and assigned papers often involve references these other sources, and consideration of the questions and difficulties they raise.

Philosophy Curriculum for the Freshman Year

The freshman year is devoted to a study of Aristotle’s Organon, the first and best treatise on the art of logic. Here logic is conceived as the method common to all the sciences. Thus it is concerned largely with definition and argument, which are ways of proceeding common to and necessary for all the sciences. (When one now speaks of “scientific method,” one usually means something particular: the method or methods proper to the experimental parts of natural science.) Each class meeting lasts an hour and a half.

However, before beginning the Organon, ten classes are devoted to the study and discussion of six of the dialogues of Plato: Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. These are intended as an introduction to philosophy in general, as well as to logic in particular. Through the representations and arguments in these dialogues, one is made explicitly aware of the supreme good of searching for and living by the truth, and of coming to true knowledge, rather than being satisfied with plausible opinions. Also, in these same dialogues, several significant philosophical issues are discussed in a preliminary way. As regards logic, one comes to see the importance of disagreements in helping the understanding to grow, the difference between knowing the meaning of a name and the nature of the thing named, and some of the basic requirements for good definition. Furthermore, in his discussions, Socrates illustrates many helpful dialectical procedures, including what Aristotle will later name ‘places’.

The Organon begins with Categories, which is a consideration of the ten most general genera, the beginnings of definitions. This is preceded by Porphyry’s Introduction (‘Isagoge’), which treats of the five universals: genus, species, difference, property, and accident, which are the five ways in which a universal predicate may relate to a subject. Within Categories, there are discussions of equivocal, univocal, and denominative naming, being in a subject and being said of a subject, the ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, suffering, when, where, position, and ‘having’), the kinds of opposites, and before and after. The first four categories are considered in detail. Together with Porphyry’s Introduction, the study of the categories takes about thirteen classes.

The next part of the Organon to be studied is On Interpretation, the subject of which is the statement (enunciation). Almost all of this book is read—Chapters 1-9, 11-12.  Here one considers the elements of statement (noun & verb), the definition of statement (speech which is either true or false), simple and compound statements, opposition of affirmations and negations, and modal propositions. The problem of the truth or falsity of statements about future possibilities is examined. About six classes are given to the study of this book

After On Interpretation, the Analytics are studied. These treatises concern argument or reasoning. Prior Analytics is about the syllogism, the principal form of deductive reasoning. Thus, there is a consideration of (i) the premise and the term; (ii) the definition of the syllogism; (iii) the convertibility of premises; (iv) the three figures (of the syllogism) and the moods within those figures; and (v) the valid moods in each of the figures. There is also a consideration of how the valid moods of the second and third figures may be reduced to more evident moods of the first figure.

From the second book of Prior Analytics, there is a consideration of errors in reasoning. Then, finally, a brief consideration of other forms of reasoning: induction, example, and enthymeme. Altogether, about nine classes are given to the study of parts of Prior Analytics (Book I, Chapters 1-7; Book II, Chapters 21-27).

Next comes the study of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle’s treatise on demonstration, the syllogism that gives scientific knowledge. After a preliminary discussion of the knowledge presupposed to demonstration, there is a consideration of what scientific knowledge and demonstration are, and the premises required. The kinds of demonstrative principles are distinguished, and certain conditions are determined and explained—that the principles be necessary, primary, and causes of the conclusion, and that they be the commensurately universal causes of the properties demonstrated. Demonstration of this sort, through the cause of some attribute, is distinguished from demonstration in a secondary way, which something is established about a cause from its effects. These are the principal concerns of Chapters 1-14 in the first book of Posterior Analytics, and about eleven classes are devoted to them.

The second book of Posterior Analytics is largely concerned with how the middle term in a demonstrative syllogism becomes known. Four kinds of questions are distinguished (is it so? why is it so? is it? what is it?), and it is explained how each of these questions looks for a middle term that is the definition of the thing to be known. There follows a dialectical discussion of whether the definition can be demonstrated. These considerations are from Chapters 1-4, and three classes are usually given to them. Then, from Chapters 8-10, there is a resolution of the question of how the essence can become know, and when and in what way it becomes evident through demonstration.  Three classes are given to this.  Finally, one class is give to the question of how the first principles (‘axioms’) become known, from Chapter 19.

In the current syllabus, only one class is given to reading and discussion of Aristotle’s Topics, which concerns dialectical argument—how to argue reasonably from probable premises. This allows only time enough for a consideration of Chapters 1-3 of the  first book, which define the art of dialectic, and distinguish it from demonstration (on the one hand) and  from sophistical argument (on the other hand). When time has allowed, the rest of the first book has been read.

The last class of the year is devoted to a discussion of St. Thomas Aquinas’ proemium (preface) to his commentary on Posterior Analytics, where he defines the art of logic, divides it into its principal parts, and distinguishes it from and compares it to rhetorical and poetical discourse.

Philosophy Curriculum for the Sophomore Year

The sophomore year is devoted to an introductory study of natural philosophy. The object here is to make a good beginning in the methodical study of nature, considering questions of a general kind that can be resolved from common experience, without hypotheses and experiments. The principal readings studied are Aristotle’s Physics and De Anima. Each class meeting lasts an hour and a half

The first book of Aristotle’s Physics gives a general solution to the problem of becoming. After considering the proper order of determination (in Chapter 1), Aristotle examines the opinions of early Greek philosophers on the principles of changeable things. Here the opinions are distinguished and ordered, and significant general agreements are noted, and supported with dialectical arguments. (Chapters 4-6) Fragments of their writings that have survived, and are relevant, are read and discussed. Then Aristotle’s general solution to the problem of becoming is read, and discussed at length. (Chapters 7-9) About fourteen classes are devoted to this study.

Next, Book Two of Physics is read and discussed in detail. This book has two concerns: to determine rightly the subject of natural science, and to distinguish the most general kinds of causes involved in natural things and processes. Accordingly, there is first a consideration of what ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ mean, of whether the matter or the form is the nature of the natural thing, and of how natural science differs from mathematics and metaphysics. (Chapters 1-2) Then the four most general kinds of cause (matter, form, agent & end) are distinguished, along with the modes of each (universal & particular, per se & accidental, simple and composite). (Chapter 3)

There follows a consideration of certain general questions and difficulties that arise concerning causality in nature.  First, luck and chance are examined and defined. (Chapters 4-6) Secondly, it is argued that natural science must concern itself with all four kinds of causes. (Chapter 7) Thirdly, objections to the view that there is purpose in nature are examined and resolved. (Chapter 8) Finally, the kinds of necessity to be found in nature are distinguished and explained. (Chapter 9) About nine classes are devoted to this study.

The first semester is concluded with a general consideration of motion or change, the property that defines the natural as such. The first three chapters of Book Three of Physics, which concern the definition of motion, and its relation to the mover and the mobile, are read and discussed at length. Four classes are given to this.

The second semester is given to an introductory study of the soul. Most of Aristotle’s De Anima is read and discussed. The word ‘soul’ is taken here in its original sense: “the first principle of life within the living thing.” The procedure is to begin with this understanding, and, following Aristotle, to investigate in a general way what this principle is, and what its chief parts and powers are.

The first book of De Anima, after a preliminary account of the value, the difficulties and the order of this investigation (Chapter 1), is concerned with the opinions of the Pre-Socratics and of Plato about the nature of the soul. The opinions are first distinguished and ordered (Chapter 2), and then critically examined in detail. (Chapters 3-5) Greatest attention is given to the two most evident properties of the living, self-movement and knowledge, and to what these properties seem to indicate about the nature of the soul. As in the first semester, the principal concern is with the general types into which the various accounts fall. About seven classes are given to this study.

The second book of De Anima has three concerns: to determine and demonstrate the essential definition of the soul (Chapters 1-2); to consider the parts or powers of the soul in general (Chapter 3); and to consider these same parts in particular, as far as the vegetative powers and the external senses (Chapters 4-12). As regards the last, Chapter 4, about the three acts of the vegetative soul, Chapters 5 and 6, about sensation and the principal distinctions among its objects, and Chapter 7, about the visible and sight, are read and discussed at length. Finally, the definition of sensation and its distinction from alteration are considered. (Chapter 12) About six classes are devoted to this study.

The third book of De Anima is about the internal senses (Chapters 1-3), the understanding (Chapters 4-8), the power of self-movement (Chapters 9-11), and the interrelation of the parts of the soul. (Chapters 12-13) In the reading and discussion of the first three chapters, particular attention is given to the common sense (Chapter 2), and to the dialectical arguments distinguishing opinion and understanding from the imagination. (Chapter 3) The possible understanding is then considered: arguments showing its spirituality and impassivity are first examined, and then its proper object is determined. (Chapter 4) Next in order is a consideration of the agent understanding, and Aristotle’s brief resolution of a question raised at the beginning of De Anima—whether the rational soul is separable from the body. (Chapter 5)  This brief treatment is supplemented by a reading and discussion of St. Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Chapter 5, and Chapters 49, 50, 55, 66, 67 and 79 of Book II of his Summa Contra Gentiles. About twelve classes are given to this study.

In the rest of the third book of De Anima, there are considerations of the power of self­ movement (Chapters 9-11), and the interrelation of the parts of the soul. (Chapters 12-13) About three or four classes are given to these.

Philosophy Curriculum for the Junior Year

The junior year is given to an introductory study of moral and political philosophy. The readings are taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics. Almost all of the former and substantial portions of the latter are read and discussed. Each class meeting lasts an hour and a half.

First to be considered is Aristotle’s preface to the Ethics, in Chapters 1-3 of the first book. Here he discusses the intention of his treatment, the method to be followed, and the dispositions required in the learner. St. Thomas Aquinas’ preface to his commentary may also be read. There follows a general discussion of the highest of all goods, or the ultimate end (“that for the sake of which”), which all agree in naming ‘happiness.’ The common opinions on what constitutes happiness are examined critically, along with the unique account given by Platonists. (Chapters 4-6) Then Aristotle gives his own account, in general terms, and shows how it fits with what is commonly said about happiness. (Chapters 7-8) Next, there is a consideration of the causes of happiness (Chapter 9), a resolution of certain difficulties (Chapters 10-11), and a brief discussion of the distinction between the praiseworthy and the honorable. (Chapter 12) The final chapter of the book begins the consideration of virtue (‘excellence’), which is formal in the definition of happiness. About five class meetings are given to the reading and discussion of this first book of the Ethics.

The second book of the Ethics is a general consideration of moral virtue: what causes it (Chapters 1-4), what it is (Chapters 5-8), and how it is acquired (Chapter 9). About four class meetings are given to the reading and discussion of this book.

Since moral virtue has been defined as a habit of choosing, the third book of the Ethics begins with an extended consideration of the voluntary and the involuntary.  (Chapters 1-5) The causes of the involuntary—violence and ignorance—are distinguished, as well as the differences between acting from ignorance and in ignorance, and between the violent simply and the violent in a particular respect.  The consideration of the voluntary involves an account of choice, deliberation, and will. Finally, in this part of the book, these distinctions are applied to the vices and the virtues, with particular attention given to the opinion that no one is voluntarily wicked.  About four class meetings are given to a study of these matters.

The remainder of the third book, and the fourth and fifth book, are given to a consideration of particular moral virtues. Bravery and temperance, and the contrary vices, are first to be considered; then, in the fourth book, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, gentleness, and the like, and the contrary vices, and the quasi-virtue of shame; finally, in the fifth book, justice and injustice. About thirteen class meetings are given to study of these matters, with seven devoted to justice in particular.

The treatment of justice in the fifth book first distinguishes legal (general) justice from particular justice, and divides and explains the principal species of the latter: distributive and commutative. (Chapters 1-2) Next comes a consideration of the how the mean (the ‘equal’) is found in distributive and commutative justice. (Chapters 3-5) Then the distinction between doing the unjust, acting unjustly, and being unjust is investigated, and certain difficulties are resolved. (Chapters 6-9) This investigation requires a consideration of political justice, and its division into natural and legal (‘positive’) justice. (Chapter 7) Finally comes a comparison of equity with legal justice (Chapter 10), and a consideration of whether a man can be unjust to himself. (Chapter 11)

The sixth book of the Ethics is concerned with intellectual virtue. For since virtue has been defined as a habit of choosing the mean, as determined by right reason, it is also necessary for the moralist to determine about intellectual virtue. After a brief return to the distinction of parts within the soul, and a division of the reason into the theoretical (scientific) and the practical (deliberative), the rest of the book is devoted to the consideration  of particular intellectual virtues, and (finally) of their usefulness.  About five classes are given to the study of these matters, three of them in the first semester, at the other two at the beginning of the second semester.

After the introduction (in Chapters 1-2), the five principal intellectual virtues are distinguished and discussed: science (in Chapter 3), art (in Chapter 4), prudence (in Chapter 5), understanding (in Chapter 6), and wisdom (in Chapter 7). There follows a discussion of the species of prudence, and of the virtues joined to prudence (Chapters 9-11).  Finally, there is a consideration of the usefulness of intellectual virtue, and of the mutual dependence of the moral virtues and prudence. (Chapters 12-13)

The seventh book of the Ethics concerns continence, which is a sort of imperfect virtue, for most men must become continent before they become virtuous. Thus, continence is first distinguished from human virtue and heroic virtue, as incontinence from vice and bestiality, and certain probable assumptions are made. (Chapter 1) Difficulties are then raised (Chapter 2), and discussed at length. (Chapters 3-10) The chief difficulty was raised by Plato. How can anyone knowingly do wrong? Or, how is it possible for passion to overcome right reason? Finally, there is a consideration of pleasure and pain, which are the matter of continence and incontinence. (Chapters 11-14) In class discussion, the first four chapters, which deal with the principal difficulty, are discussed, along with the treatment of pleasure and pain in the last four chapters. About two or three classes are given to these matters.

The eighth and ninth books of the Ethics are concerned with friendship, which is an effect of virtue and, in a way, a part of happiness. In the eighth book, there is first a consideration of why the moralist should consider friendship, of what friendship is, and of the kinds of love that are the bases for friendship. (Chapter 1) Next, there is a consideration of the three principal forms of friendship: those of utility, of pleasure, and of virtue. Such friendships among equals are discussed first (Chapters 3-6), then those among unequals. (Chapters 7-12) How complaints and quarrels arise in friendships is discussed in the last chapters of the book. (Chapters 13-14) In the classroom, every chapter except the last two is discussed. About four classes are given to this study.

The ninth book is concerned with how friendships are preserved and dissolved (Chapters1-3), the effects of friendship (Chapters 4-7), and certain difficulties that arise concerning friendship. (Chapters 8-12) In the classroom, only three chapters are read: 4, 8, and 9. Here, discussion is directed chiefly to the relation between self-love and friendship, and the good man’s need for friends. Only one class is given to this.

Since happiness was defined as virtuous activity, and the particular virtues have been considered in detail, the last book of the Ethics is concerned with the end of virtue—that for the sake of which one strives to acquire the virtues. The treatment begins with a fuller consideration of pleasure, which some have taken to be happiness, while other have condemned as destructive of happiness. After given the reasons why pleasure should be considered here (Chapter 1), Aristotle first examines and criticizes the opinions of others (Chapters 2-3), and then gives his own account of the nature of pleasure (Chapter 4) and its kinds. (Chapter 5) Two classes are given to this study.

In the remaining chapters of the book, Aristotle determines that happiness consists chiefly in the exercise of the contemplative virtues. (Chapters 7-8) Finally (in Chapter 9), there is a bridge to the Politics, since man, being a social animal, can achieve happiness only as part of a political community. About four classes are devoted to the study of these matters.

The rest of the semester (about seventeen classes) is devoted to an introductory study of political philosophy. The readings are from Aristotle’s Politics.

The first four books are read and discussed in their entirety. In the first book, after a brief statement concerning the end of a political community, and the need to distinguish such a community from others (Chapter 1), Aristotle proceeds to discuss the household and the simple communities that make it up. (Chapters 2-13) This includes a consideration of property and the getting of wealth. (Chapters 8-11) About four classes are given to these matters

In the second book, Aristotle examines and criticizes both what has been proposed and what has been done by others with respect to political communities. First he considers the opinions of the learned, notably Plato (Chapters 1-8), and then some of the constitutions and laws of actual states and those who founded them. (Chapters 9-12) About two classes are given to these matters.

In the third book, Aristotle begins his own account, considering first what a citizen is (Chapters 1-5), and then distinguishing among the various constitutions, both those which are right and just and those which are disordered. (Chapters 6-10) This is followed by an extended discussion of who ought to be the ruling power in a political community. (Chapters 10-13) Finally, the different kinds of kingship are considered. (Chapters 14-18) About four classes are given to these matters.

In the fourth book, Aristotle determines what sorts of constitutions are the best in themselves, or in a given situation, or in most situations. This requires a detailed consideration of good and bad constitutions (Chapters 2-10) and of what is (for the most part) the best sort of constitution, and how it can be realized. (Chapters 11-16) About three classes are given to this.

The fifth book (on revolutions) is not discussed, and one class is given to discussing the sixth book, which concerns the founding of democracies and oligarchies.

The seventh and eighth books are about the best constitution, simply speaking. After a brief reconsideration of the best way of life, Aristotle considers the size of the population, the territory, and the character of the citizenry in the best of states. He then considers the education suitable to such a political community. Chapters 1-8 and 13-17 from the seventh book, and Chapters 1-7 in the eighth book, are read and discussed. Three or four classes are given to this.

Philosophy Curriculum for the Senior Year

The senior year is devoted to an introductory study of metaphysics. But it should be noted that ‘metaphysics’ is not conceived here (as it so often is) as a set of a priori and unverifiable assumptions about things in general, but as a universal and very difficult science that presupposes a thorough study of the particular sciences. This is how it is understood by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, and indicated by the traditional understanding of its name. (“Meta-physics” = “after physics”)  Accordingly, the first semester is occupied with necessary preliminaries, and only in the second does one begin with metaphysics proper. Readings for the first semester are from the later books of Aristotle’s Physics, while those for the second semester are from his Metaphysics and from St. Thomas’ De Ente et Essentia. Classes meet three times a week, and each one lasts an hour.

First to be considered are questions about place and time, and the divisibility of motion and the mobile. Readings are from the fourth and the sixth books of Physics, and class discussions of these readings are correlated with the views of Galileo, Descartes and Newton, which are familiar to the students from their studies in the junior year.

The investigation of place involves a dialectical examination of difficulties concerning whether it is and what it is (Chapters 1-2), a determination of what place is, the different ways of being in something (Chapters 3-4), and the resolution of the difficulties. (Chapter 5) The investigation of time follows a similar path: a dialectical examination of difficulties about whether time is and what it is (Chapters 10-11), a determination of what time is and what the instant (the ‘now’) is and how things are in time (Chapters 11-13), and a resolution of difficulties. (Chapter 14) About six classes are given to the study of these matters.

The divisibility of motion and the mobile is then investigated. Readings are from the sixth book of Physics. First comes a consideration of whether any continuum is indivisible, or can be divided into indivisibles (Chapters 1-2), and of whether there can be motion in an instant, and whether a mobile must be divisible. (Chapters 3-4) There follows a discussion of how motion and rest are divided. (Chapters 4-8) Finally, certain difficulties are resolved, notably, the paradoxes of Zeno. (Chapters 9-10) About thirteen classes are given to these matters.

The last two books of Physics concern movers and mobiles.  In the seventh book, there is a simple but difficult argument that there must be a first, immobile mover.  (The premises for this are taken chiefly from the sixth book.)  The argument is first proposed and clarified (Chapter 1); then one of its premises is defended at length (Chapters 2-3).  Finally, there is a discussion of a related issue: the quantitative comparability of different motions. (Chapters 4-5) Four classes are given to these matters.

The eighth and last book of Physics begins with an extended argument that motion must be everlasting. (Chapter 1-2) This is followed by arguments that there must be a first mover, immobile and everlasting, and a first motion, also everlasting. (Chapters 3-6). Then comes a determination of the nature of the first motion (Chapters 7-9), and of the nature of the first mover, as well as can be established from the most general consideration of the natural. (Chapter 10) The conclusion that the first mover is immobile, everlasting, of infinite power, and incorporeal completes this part of natural philosophy. About twenty-two classes are devoted to the study and discussion of these matters.

The second semester is given to the study of metaphysics. Substantial parts of Aristotle’s Metaphysics are read and discussed, and St. Thomas Aquinas’ De Ente et Essentia is read and discussed in its entirety. About twenty-seven classes are given to the former, and eighteen to the latter.

First to be considered is what this science is about and what its defining characteristics are. This involves a consideration of the kinds and levels of human knowledge, and a preliminary determination of what wisdom is, and what it is about. (Chapters 1-2 of the first book) Accordingly, since it belongs to the wise man to know the most universal causes of things, the rest of the metaphysical enquiry is directed to this end. In the rest of this first book, Aristotle begins this enquiry with a critical examination of what earlier philosophers have thought about the causes of things. (Chapters 3-10) About six classes are devoted to these matters.

In the second book of Metaphysics, Aristotle considers how man is related to the truth, why this science is most of all knowledge of the truth, and how it is to be studied. As St. Thomas explains, these considerations bear upon the mode or method appropriate to metaphysics. All three chapters of this book are read and discussed. Three classes are given to this study.

The third book of Metaphysics is devoted to a dialectical consideration of the many difficulties that must be resolved in this science. After an account of the necessity of examining the difficulties beforehand (Chapter 1), the difficulties themselves are proposed and discussed at length. (Chapters 2-6) Some of these regard the mode and scope of the science, while others regard the realities that it considers. It has been customary to select several of these for detailed examination. About five classes are given to this.

In the fourth book of Metaphysics, Aristotle begins to determine the questions raised in the third book. Here it is established that the subject of the science is being as such, and that its scope extends to such common predicates as ‘one’ and ‘many,’ and ‘same’ and ‘other,’ as well as to the most universal axioms of human thought. (Chapters 1-3)  The balance of the book (Chapters 4-8) is an extended dialectical defense of the first of all axioms, the principle of contradiction. These chapters are generally not discussed in class. Thus, only three classes are given to the study of this book.

After this consideration of the mode of the science, in the fifth book Aristotle proceeds to determine about the things that are the concern of metaphysics. He begins by distinguishing and ordering the meanings of the names of the things to be studied, for, as St. Thomas explains, these names “are said in many ways.” First, he considers the names that signify causes (Chapters 1-5), then those that signify the subject of this science and its parts (Chapters 6-15), and finally those that signify the properties of that subject (Chapters 16-28). About six classes are given to a study of this book.

In the sixth book of Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses how this science differs from other sciences in the consideration of being, and determines what modes of being are to be examined in this science. In the first chapter, which is usually the only one discussed in class, Aristotle distinguishes metaphysics from the two other principal theoretical sciences—natural science and mathematics. Two classes are given to this.

The next four books of Metaphysics consider the subject of the science—being as such—and its properties. But given the great length and difficulty of the readings, as well as significant textual problems, it is customary to study and discuss St. Thomas’ De Ente et Essentia instead. This treatise deals with the same matters in some detail, but more clearly, and in a way more proportioned to beginners.

After a brief prologue, where he indicates the importance of this study, St. Thomas distinguishes the meanings of ‘being’ and ‘essence,’ and compares them with the meanings of related names. (Chapter 1) Three classes are given to this. Next comes a consideration of essence in things composed of matter and form, and how this relates to the logical intentions of genus, species and difference. (Chapters 2-3) About six classes are given to this. There follows a consideration of essence in separated things (spiritual substances), and a summary account of the three ways in which things have essences. (Chapters 4-5) About six classes are devoted to this. Finally, there is a determination of the way in which accidents have essences.  (Chapter 6) Three classes are given to this.

The last two classes of the year are devoted to parts of the twelfth book of Metaphysics that concern the absolute first principle. First it is argued that there must be an eternal, immaterial, immobile being whose substance is actuality. (Chapters 6-7) Then his proper activity is considered (Chapter 9), and it is determined that he is most perfectly understanding, and understandable, and desirable -that for the sake of which all things move and act. (Chapter 10)