someone to *believe.* And so it is necessary to defend the view that intentions and beliefs can be attributed to creatures which lack a language. Now, Bennett has sworn at the outset that he "shall never introduce any mentalistic concept without first displaying its behavorial credentials" (p. 3) and since "intention" is not only a *mentalistic* concept, but clearly a (perhaps *the*) *teleological* one, almost the first half of the book is devoted to refining a defensible behaviorally based account of teleological explanation. Bennett builds stepwise the behaviorally based concepts of an *instrumental* (as opposed to intrinsic) *property, registration* (a primitive ancestor of belief), and *preference* (for some courses of behavior over others), melding them finally into a schematic model of a *teleological law.* All this is in the service of launching "intention" and "belief" (with the help of some additional concepts, "educability" and "inquisitiveness"). These several chapters are quite detailed and demand to be scrutinized as a work in themselves, independently of the role they play in grounding a particular theory of language. One intriguing feature of this section is some pithy (and to my mind not entirely clear) attempts to "legitimize" teleological explanations as not in conflict with, and not exclusive of, but nonetheless irreducible to mechanistic ones (pp. 72-81; 93-95).

Throughout, Bennett maintains a style that glints with the vivacity of live philosophical debate, and with its own sort of elegance in the consistent economy of a startling (and sometimes dizzying) number of arguments. Scant window-dressing is to be found here; each page and paragraph advances aggressively through pertinent and lively argument which always moves the discussion along. There are numerous brief and incisive responses to important philosophers of language (Sellars, Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Chomsky, Ziff) on issues of major significance and no little controversy.

Readers with some knowledge of recent developments in the philosophy of language are perhaps best situated to appreciate *Linguistic Behavior.* Because of the rapid fire of relatively fine argument, total unfamiliarity with the theoretical background upon which Bennett's work takes shape could make this daunting reading for a true beginner. But the text is so lush in the sheer number and fascination of the issues broached that it could provide, with appropriate supplements, a rich and full course of work for advanced students. For anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of language, it shouldn't be missed.

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Consciousness and Reality: Hegel's Philosophy of Subjectivity. By Joseph L. Navickas. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a unique book in the history of philosophical writing both by reason of its subject matter and by reason of its intricacy and its complexity. There is hardly a history of philosophy that does not remark on its difficulty as well as its richness of thought. Just to tackle it in a systematic study is a task in itself. To bring the study to a completion is something almost monumental.

Navickas's is not a study of the *Phenomenology* as such, but rather, as his sub-title indicates, a study of Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjectivity.* Such a study could start from different parts of the *Encyclopedia,* such as the third part of *Logic* or the first part of the *Philosophy of Spirit.* But Navickas has chosen to approach the subject from the viewpoint of the *Phenomenology* and he is quite right in doing so. As a science of experience and a dialectic of the different forms of consciousness, the *Phenomenology* represents the whole of Hegelian philosophy in a peculiar way, in the form of an

introduction, in the very strong sense of that term, to the System as a whole, and in a way that insists precisely on the movement of consciousness in its relation to reality or of subjectivity in its relation to objectivity. Thus, while a study of Hegel's philosophy of subjectivity might conceivably have taken a wider scope, so as to include some of the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Spirit,* it could also concentrate uniquely on the *Phenomenology* as Navickas does and present a valid account of its subject.

Indeed, it seems that Navickas was bound to concentrate on the *Phenomenology* by reason of the meaning he attaches to the term, "phenomenology." For him the term seems to imply "philosophy of subjectivity," though not all philosophy of subjectivity is necessarily phenomenological. Descartes, Kant and Fichte were all philosophers of subjectivity, but none of them did a phenomenology in the way that Hegel did. Indeed it is with the *Phenomenology* that Hegel's peculiar importance for modern philosophy begins. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the most systematic and comprehensive attempt to show, or rather, to make manifest what other philosophers only use or presuppose more or less as a starting point. In this sense Hegel's *Phenomenology* can be viewed as a prototype or as the most elaborate presentation of a philosophy of subjectivity, one which begins in the most immediate forms of natural consciousness but which ends up in a form of absolute knowing mediated by a well articulated series or dialectic of intermediary forms of consciousness, both personal and social. This is why, in studying the philosophy of subjectivity in Hegel's phenomenology, Navickas has struck on a theme that is central to both Hegelian philosophy and to modern philosophy as a whole and he is quite right in asserting the originality of Hegel in this attempt to bring philosophy "back to the very origins of consciousness" (p. VII) and "to trace and make intelligible the gradual constitution" of the notions of subjectivity and objectivity (p. VIII). It is this itinerary which he follows in this work, not so much to paraphrase it, but rather to follow its rigorous architectonic, which to his mind "is not arbitrary but warranted by the dialectical growth of the subject" (p. VIII). Hence, more than just a summation or a historian's rehashing of Hegel's *Phenomenology,* Navickas's study is a philosopher's discussion of the dialectic of experience offered by Hegel, one that is impressed by Hegel's insight and virtuosity, but yet one that can also draw a line at Hegel's seeming leaps in places and tries to hold him for downs on what he claims to be doing. Navickas's is a work that is both sympathetic and critical of Hegel at the same time.

Hegel's *Phenomenology* is such a complex book that few works have ever managed to deal with it as a whole. There have been a number of works on the Preface or on the Introduction alone. There have also been works on isolated parts of it, such as Jean Wahl's well known piece on the Unhappy Consciousness, or Gadamer's on the Inverted World. And there also have been works on the first half of the *Phenomenology,* such as Kainz's recent work on what is somewhat dubiously referred to as Part I, a division that is not entirely justified in the structure of the *Phenomenology* itself. But there have been relatively few works on the *Phenomenology* as a whole and Navickas joins the distinguished ranks of these few, in the company of such notables as Kojève, Hippolyte, Labarrière and more recently Lauer. He takes us from the beginning, with the Preface and the Introduction, down to the last part, on religion. If he does not deal with the sections on revealed religion and absolute knowing, it is because of the nature of his subject, philosophy of subjectivity understood as phenomenology. Navickas breaks off at the point of revealed religion, because in his view revealed religion and the event of incarnation presuppose the self-revelation of God himself and a theological-metaphysical notion which are transphenomenal and therefore transcend the scope

of phenomenology. In this Navickas is clearly taking issue with Hegel's interpretation of Christianity, and one could argue as to the legitimacy of such a cut-off point in a philosophy of subjectivity, but Navickas is consistent with his entire reading of the *Phenomenology* in doing so.

In his work Navickas also takes a clear stand on two other issues in the interpretation of the *Phenomenology* that are often misleading in commentaries. First is the one already alluded to regarding the division of the *Phenomenology* into two parts and the characterization of these two parts as different from one another. There is some ground for such a division in the *Phenomenology* itself, but it has been exaggerated and distorted out of proportion. Navickas reads the *Phenomenology* as one continuous book, the way it was written by Hegel, without imposing upon it his own preconception of Hegel's original intention and what must have been the switch which occurred half-way through the writing. Secondly, there is also a tendency among commentators to identify the various forms of consciousness which Hegel analyses with historical figures and movements. While this is an interesting historian's exercise and is not without some justification in the text, it tends to detract from the actual architectonic of the book. Navickas successfully resists this temptation and insists rather on the dialectical movement of the work itself as something which should stand on its own merits. In this he brings out much more of the systematic nature of the work, rather than the kind of erudition which Hegel brought to it, something which Hegel himself surely intended and would have preferred much more.

It would be difficult to summarize Navickas's work point by point without going to excessive length here. Suffice it to say that he follows Hegel's analysis through the many forms of consciousness discussed in the chapters on "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness," "Reason," "Spirit," and "Religion." With each form he follows the description given from the viewpoint of both subjectivity and objectivity, or consciousness and reality. But most importantly he examines each transition most carefully as Hegel moves from one form of consciousness to the next, thus bringing out the dialectical nature of the development of consciousness and subjectivity. This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Hegel's work, as even Marx would have admitted, and Navickas is quite right in insisting on it. He does not always agree that every step along the way has been dialectically justified, but he does try to explain how Hegel moves from one point to the other and why it seems or does not seem to work, as the case may be. He does not bring out all that is going on in Hegel's text. To do so would require a book many times the length of Hegel's, which is already rather forbidding for its length as well as its difficulty. But Navickas does bring out the essential movement of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as it relates to his theme of subjectivity. In doing so he draws on all the well known commentaries on the *Phenomenology* and on some less well known German works from around the turn of the century, all of which makes for a rich and well informed work even as it insists primarily on Hegel's own text.

Finally, such a comprehensive work on such a subject could not but arouse some controversy both on the level of Hegelian interpretation and on the level of subjectivity itself as a substantive issue. One could question, for example, whether it is proper to speak of the "self-estranged subject" on the level of consciousness and not to speak of it on the level of spirit, where Hegel brings up the issue of alienation most emphatically and in a clearly systematic fashion. For Hegel alienation is much more a social phenomenon than would appear on the level of Unhappy Consciousness alone, where Navickas chooses to deal with it.

One could question also whether justice has been done to the dialectic of recognition in the emergence of self-conscious subjectivity. Navickas is quite right in recognizing that for Hegel subjectivity is clearly intersubjective. But he brings this up only on the level of spiritual subjectivity, as if it appeared only there for the first time. To be sure, it is only on the level of "spirit" that intersubjectivity comes into full view in the *Phenomenology,* but the notion has begun to appear much earlier, on the level of "self-consciousness" itself, where Hegel first talks of the concept of recognition as a key to understanding the passage from mere consciousness to *self*-consciousness and where he already begins to speak of the concept of spirit and of the *I* as a *We* and the *We* as an *I.* It is in self-consciousness that consciousness first finds its pivotal point (*Wendungspunkt*) on which to turn from the colorful appearance of sense here-and-now, on the one hand, and from the empty night of a supra-sensible beyond, on the other, toward the spiritual day of the present. Thinking, for Hegel, is intersubjective from its inception and the movement of recognition on which it is based, which culminates in the dialectic of evil and its forgiving, begins in the dialectic of the struggle unto death and of the master and the slave. The entire movement through the forms of self-consciousness, reason and spirit, from the viewpoint of intersubjectivity, only serves to bring out a concept that appears as a constitutive moment of self-consciousness itself. This is why the division between the two parts of the *Phenomenology* which divides the section on spirit from the section on reason can be so misleading. In rejecting this kind of division Navickas is quite right, but one wonders whether he should not revise his notion of intersubjectivity in function of that rejection. Hegel seems to have had a much more radical notion of intersubjectivity than Navickas or other contemporary phenomenologists seem to allow for.

The question of intersubjectivity touches on the substantive issue of the primacy of subjectivity itself. Navickas is careful to point out at the beginning that Hegel's notion of subjectivity is quite different from that of Descartes, Kant, or Fichte, and that Hegel is not an idealist in the same sense as Fichte can be called an idealist. But in the end one has to question whether Navickas has adequately overcome the idealist-realist dichotomy in his understanding of Hegel. This dichotomy can be viewed in purely oppositional terms, where each pole is viewed as fixed and absolute and one is forced to *choose* one or else the other or remain suspended between the two on the level of representation and understanding. Hegel's aim was to overcome this kind of opposition on the level of reason, so that he would not have to choose but could rather think the two poles together in their unity and so that he would not remain suspended between them, as Kant did in his view, but transcend their separation in a unity of thought and reality. It is this intention of Hegel which attracts Navickas to study his philosophy of subjectivity. Yet in the end Navickas continues to oppose a "metaphysical" outlook to Hegel's phenomenological outlook. Is this not a re-affirmation of the opposition between consciousness and reality, between the ideal and the real, or between subjectivity and objectivity? If so, then the further question arises: has Hegel simply failed in his intention or has Navickas failed to see how Hegel resolves these old antinomies? Clearly, there is no simple answer to this either/or question, but it is a question which Navickas leaves us with at the end of his book and which he raises himself when he asks: where do we go when we have completed the *Phenomenology of Spirit?* Back to the beginning of phenomenological science or on to a philosophical science of notions? To go forward as a mature subject in this science of metaphysical import one has to resolve the dichotomy between consciousness and reality.

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