REVIEW

Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary, by **Howard P. Kainz. "Studies in the Humanities No. 12,"** *Philosophy*; **(University, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1976), pp. 218 & bibliography, glossary, tables, indices.** CLOTH $10.00, PAPER $3.50.

Two kinds of remarks can be made on Kainz's book on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. First, there are those that pertain to it as an instrument to help in the reading of the *Phenomenology* itself and, second, there are those that pertain to the questions that Kainz's interpretation of the *Phenomenology* raises. Both of these issues deserve some attention in approaching Kainz's book and, in a sense, they cannot be separated, since any reading of a philosophical work is already an interpretation and this is especially true of a work like Hegel's *Phenomenology*. Indeed, the peculiarity of the *Phenomenology* as a philosophical work, which Kainz remarks upon along with many others, makes it very susceptible to a variety of interpretations, all of which could be called into question. In this regard the *Phenomenology* might be likened, not just to a novel, as Kainz suggests, but also to a poem, whose meaning cannot be strictly paraphrased but stands and falls with the language and structure of the work itself. This may be why, apart from the inherent difficulty and complexity of the *Phenomenology*, we have had so few commentaries on it, in comparison say to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, which itself is surely not lacking in difficulty. But it is not to say that the *Phenomenology* should not be analysed and commented upon. We do that even with the best of poems. It is only to say that there is no substitute for reading the *Phenomenology* itself, for its meaning grows out of the very creation of language which it represents and, in a sense, there is no other way of getting at its meaning than through its very movement leading to *Absolute Knowing*. If an analysis or a commentary can help to enter into this movement, so much the better. If they stand in the way or impede the movement, they must be set aside. For I am convinced that Hegel himself knew better than anyone else what he was up to in the *Phenomenology* and the way that he did it may well be the only way of doing what he wanted to do. This being said, however, in what follows I shall try to make comments on both the issue of instrument and the issue of interpretation in succession.

First, then, a mere description of Kainz's work shows it to be designed as an instrument to help in reading the *Phenomenology*. It is composed of three parts: a discussion of questions (ten, to be exact) relating to the *Phenomenology* as a whole (pp. 5-53), an analysis accompanied by a commentary by way of footnotes (pp. 54-160), and a conclusion discussing the division of the *Phenomenology* into two parts, its relation to the Kantian critique of metaphysics, and its relation to Hegel's own system. In addition to a well chosen "Select Bibliography," which includes a number of works not directly related to the *Phenomenology*, which, however, does not include Labarrière's important work on the structure of the *Phenomenology*, there follows also a 2-3 page glossary of some terms commonly used in the *Phenomenology*, giving the German along with the English rendition, a brief table of Hegelian opposites and of terms used to describe the reconciliation of opposites, a correlation of Kainz's divisions with those of the Baillie translation, and finally a systematic subject index as well as an author index. Both the glossary and the index quite understandably reflect Kainz's outlook on the *Phenomenology*, which is not entirely that of Hegel in this reader's eyes. The problem of interpretation affects even the relatively mechanical task of setting up a glossary or an index.

One thing should be noted, however: as the title indicates, the analysis and the commentary cover only what is referred to as Part I of the *Phenomenology*, i.e. up to and including the section on Reason, but leaving out the sections on Spirit, Religion and Absolute Knowing. The reasons for going only so far may well be considerations of space and time. To have done the entire *Phenomenology* would have required one more volume of at least equal proportions, if not more. In adopting this division of the *Phenomenology* Kainz seems to be following Hyppolite, as he seems to do also elsewhere in his general considerations at the beginning and in the detail of some of his analyses. But one could ask whether that division is as easily admissible as is presupposed. Labarrière has raised serious doubts as to the validity of that division starting from Hegel's summations at various stages of the *Phenomenology*, such as the one at the beginning of the section on Religion, for example. Kainz sees the division in terms of an adequate distinction between the individual (Part I) and the social (Part II) forms of consciousness (see pp. 17, 23, 31, etc.). But one could argue against this on the basis of the key role which the concept of recognition plays as early as the passage from the form of Consciousness to Self-consciousness and on the basis of the role which the concept of Ethical Life plays in the passage from the form of Observing Reason to that of Practical Reason. Kainz brings up these two concepts that are already operative in "Part I" of the *Phenomenology*, but he does not seem to think that they may cast some doubt on the validity of the division with which he is operating. One can also wonder whether an analysis of "Part II" might not lead to a rather different view of "Part I" than one initially had. Students of the *Phenomenology* have been perhaps too hasty in supposing that Hegel had to switch plans, or at least shift gears, half way through the work, in order to bring in dimensions that had not been originally envisioned. The shift which comes as a surprise to some as we enter into the realm of

Spirit is one that has been brewing in the text at least since the form of Self-Consciousness, with the concept of recognition, if not even earlier, from the beginning, in the form of Sense-certainty, with the "divine nature" of language and speech (Baillie, pp. 159-160). Even if we can stay with a two part division of the *Phenomenology*, it is less than clear that we can formulate the distinction simply in terms of individual and social forms of consciousness. In the conclusion (pp. 162-193, 180), Kainz adds another dimension to the distinction which makes it more questionable still. He speaks of the Forms of Individual Consciousness as pertaining to "an a-posteriori side" and the Forms of Social Consiousness as pertaining to "an a-priori side." Clearly, Kainz's division of the *Phenomenology* already entails a problem of interpretation, but before we pursue this issue further let us say a bit more about the book as an instrument for reading the *Phenomenology*.

The chief value of the work in this respect lies in the central and longest part of the book, the analysis and commentary. There Kainz tries to strike a happy medium between on the one hand a "Hegel Made Simple," which, he says, is out of the question for anyone who has read Hegel, and on the other hand something as ponderous and complex as the *Phenomenology*, which would sort of defeat the point of an instrument such as this. "This running analysis aspires neither merely to capture the form of the *Phenomenology* in summary fashion, nor to recapture the content in such elaborate detail that one might as well read Hegel himself. Its objective is to present a union of form and content in such a way as to supply a bridge to an understanding of Part I and of the *Phenomenology* as a whole" (p.3).

Kainz begins with a few pages on Hegel's Preface to the *Phenomenology* which are hardly adequate as a bridge for understanding this sweeping essay written *after* the *Phenomenology* was completed. Nor do they add much to the subsequent reading of the *Phenomenology* itself. But this is perhaps as it should be, for I do not agree with Kainz's suggestion that Hegel would not have wanted his Preface to be superfluous to the understanding of the *Phenomenology* in its scientific aspect (p.134). Most of Hegel's prefaces have this characteristic of standing outside the text and referring more to the historical context than to actual content of the work they are attached to, as a kind of "unscientific postscript." They make excellent grist for the mills of philosophy professors but can distract from the properly scientific nature of the work that is to follow.

It is with the Introduction that we enter properly into the movement of the *Phenomenology*. Here Kainz's analysis is as brief as on the Preface. He focuses on the dilemma or the contradiction in any attempt to examine the "instruments" of knowledge prior to any exercise of knowledge as such raised by Hegel at the outset. Then he turns immediately to the idea of a "consciousness of consciousness" itself as a way out of this dilemma, where the criterion for truth will not be something outside consciousness but rather "the internal criterion of its own psychic existence" (p.60). He does not go into Hegel's own more discriminating way of showing how the movement of consciousness itself solves this only apparent contradiction of the beginning as it breaks out of a purely static opposition between subject and object and always leads beyond any one of its particular forms. Rather he moves right into a presentation of the Forms of Consciousness, from Sense-certainty on down (or up, if one prefers) to Reason as testing laws or, as Kainz calls the latter form, "Subjective/Objective Individuality establishing Itself within the Spiritual Substance." This last paraphrase gives at least some indication of the kind of amplification on Hegel's dialectic that has taken place between the first and last form considered.

With Sense-certainty the treatment of the text becomes more detailed and attempts to show the systematic progression from one form of consciousness to the other. It is especially good with the more elaborate forms, such as Understanding and Observing Reason, but it is also good with the less complicated forms, such as Sense-certainty and Perception. The discussion is preceded by diagrams which are helpful in following the transitions, as long as they are not pushed too far and do not stand in the way of *thinking* these transitions. Gradually there is built up schematism based on the subject/object polarity which, depending on one's interpretation of the *Phenomenology*, may be deemed more or less in keeping with what Hegel had in mind, but which is certainly consistent and comprehensive enough as one way of representing the movement from Sense-certainty to and through Reason. Near the end, however, the schema seems to become too cumbersome and abstract. While it may be useful for the earlier Forms of Consciousness, it may not be so useful for the later ones and Kainz's final attempt to present the structure of the entire *Phenomenology* according to this schema (p.167) is surely a *tour de force*, but one wonders whether it has not been carried too far and whether it does not reintroduce into the unity of Absolute Knowing the kind of Absolute Opposition that Hegel has tried to overcome along the way.

With regard to the Forms of Self-Consciousness and the transition *to* Reason as well as *beyond* it, however, Kainz seems to this reader to be less good at bringing out what is in Hegel's text. This difficulty is connected with one already referred to in connection with the division of the *Phenomenology*. These are Forms where the social dimension of consciousness is already playing an important role in "Part I," but this is not brought out clearly or it is mentioned as almost an unwarranted complication that pertains more to "Part II," not as an integral part of the movement whether at the level of Self-consciousness or of Productive Rea-

son. The reason for this seems to be tied to Kainz's conception of the division of the *Phenomenology* and the kind of Kantian-Heideggerian philosophy on which it is based. Kainz both begins and ends with a discussion of the Kantian critique and, at key points in his presentation of Hegel (e.g. pp. 39-40, 43-44, 48-49, 145, etc), he refers to both Kant and Heidegger or else he borrows language from them to formulate problems and solutions. This Kantian-Heideggerian perspective does not exclude the social dimension *per se*, but it does not include it as constitutive of Self-consciousness as such, as Hegel seems to do with the concept of recognition at the beginning of the passage to Self-consciousness. Thus Kainz can present individual consciousness as running its own course by itself to a sort of absolute term and then have the social forms intervene as a kind of additional "a priori" to be considered. This may fit well into a Kantian-Heideggerian perspective, into what Hegel would have called a philosophy based only on reflection, but whether it does justice to the Hegelian philosophy, which sees recognition as more fundamental and as the basis even of reflection, remains to be seen.

With this reservation, however, let us add, immediately, that Kainz does not ignore the social aspects of consciousness. He spots them in the text and comments on them, but they do not become an integral part of his reading of "Part I." Let us add also that, apart from this reservation, Kainz offers many good insights into what Hegel is doing with each Form of Consciousness while giving a good sense of how the movement goes from one form to the other.

We have already anticipated some problems of interpretation, but let us turn to these now more directly. To do this is to come back primarily to the first part of Kainz's book and the ten questions dealing with the *Phenomenology* as a whole and then secondarily to go to the conclusion which gives greater determination to some of the answers given by Kainz. We shall not list the ten questions here. Suffice it to say that they deal with the general form of the *Phenomenology*, its logical structure, the kind of necessity on which it is based (needless to say, dialectical!), the notion of experience and consciousness from which it flows, and the kind of "phenomenology" which it presents. Let us review briefly how some of these questions are handled.

To bring out the peculiar form of the *Phenomenology* as a philosophical work Kainz draws an illuminating analogy with a novel constructed according to a flashback technique. The analogy shows how Hegel begins from consciousness in its present actuality and Kainz is careful to point out that, even though there is a certain *past* to the various forms that are examined, the progressive *Erinnerung* which takes place is not only a recalling out of the past but also, and more importantly for the purposes of the dialectic, a recognition of present constitutive factors. One could say that in examining each particular form and going beyond it through determinate negativity, consciousness is "inwardizing" itself toward a coincidence with the Absolute of Knowing. It does not shed forms along the way, as one might wish to shed parts of one's past, but radicalizes each one of them in its particularity and assumes it into a higher unity.

Once this analogy is set up, however, Kainz's use of it seems somewhat less felicitous. In discussing the "plot" of the *Phenomenology* Kainz falls back on the subject/object dichotomy. To be sure, he insists that Hegel's concern is with the "interaction between these two poles," but "interaction" hardly seems the term to characterize the kind of unity Hegel is aiming at or is even presupposing from the very characterization of consciousness as Sense-certainty. "Interaction" seems to leave the "poles" of the opposition intrinsically independent from one another, whereas the movement of each form of consciousness always shows that the content is already intrinsically beyond itself in the form and the form is already intrinsically beyond itself in the content in their dialectical unity. Even in dealing with dualistic consciousness, Hegel's treatment is not dualistic, as it might be for the novelist or for other forms of philosophy. The dialectic between form and content or between certainty and truth cannot be properly reduced to an interaction between subjectivity and objectivity.

Kainz pushes the dichotomy one step further, however, and sets it up in terms of *thought* and *being* that sound more Heideggerian than Hegelian. In fact, at a key point in his argument on p. 21, he quotes Heidegger rather than Hegel. Later on, in characterizing the meaning of "experience" in the *Phenomenology* (pp. 38-40), he falls back into the Heideggerian language of be-ing and in opposition to this "absolute" of experience draws a correlation between Kant's "transcendental ego," Heidegger's "absolute self," and Hegel's "pure subjectivity." Thus he is led to think of the dialectic in the *Phenomenology* in terms of an opposition between two "absolutes," "Absolute Being" that is external to the empirical ego and "Absolute Self" that is more intrinsic to the empirical ego than it is to itself, with the empirical ego serving as a "medium" between the two (see, for example, pp. 26 & 147).

This naturally raises the problem of a gap between consciousness and reality and consequently a problem of verification. In his search for a solution Kainz speaks of the Forms of Consciousness as a sort of "middle-term" (p.17), but in the end he is forced to admit that the propositions of the *Phenomenology* "defy express verification procedures either on the basis of an objective knowledge of factual reality, or on the basis of a subjective knowledge of the internal conditions of knowledge itself" (p.19). If there are no other kinds of verification than these, as the S—O dichotomy would seem to presuppose, then it would seem that the *Phenomenology* is left hanging high and dry. Kainz tries to get out of the impasse with what he calls the "pivotal concept of the dynamics of Absolute Spirit," but his account of that raises

as many problems as it solves.

Further on, in discussing how consiousness can be both measurer and measured, Kainz is forced to resort to a distinction between "extrinsic" process and "intrinsic" process which parallels the Kantian distinction between empirical ego and transcendental ego (p.40), and he interprets the *für uns* of the *Phenomenology* as a transcendental ego operating "as the unifying force in consciousness" (p.43), or again as "the unity of transcendental ego and the empirical ego" (p.44). All of this reminds one of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, to whom Kainz refers frequently, but it does not seem to represent accurately the movement of the *Phenomenology* itself nor that in which Hegel thought he was surpassing these philosophers. Hegel rejects at the outset what could be called the problem of "verification" of instruments of knowledge as a false problem, as one based on unwarranted or unexamined notions of knowledge, but he does not immediately leap into any suppositions about an "absolute self," transcendental or otherwise, as Schelling did, an intuition that would have constituted an absolute viewpoint from the beginning. All he assumes is a willingness to follow the path of consciousness itself examining itself critically and making the experience of its transcendence from one form to the other. It is only in the course of the movement that the Absolute appears and at the end the *für uns* and the final form of consciousness coincide as *Absolute Knowing*. There is no "absolute given" at the beginning, whether subjective or objective, nor was there any need to suppose or fix on any such "absolute." All that was necessary was to clear the way of any false assumptions impeding the movement of consciousness itself toward Absolute Knowing. The *Phenomenology* recognizes a distinction of subject and object at the beginning, but does not fix on it as an opposition. Rather it shows how they are radically one and proceeds to bring out this unity in every form of consciousness, so that the problem of verification as such never properly arises.

In spite of this fundamental difficulty, however, which runs throughout the interpretation and which at times gives surprising turns to a particular form of consciousness, as for example, when we are told "to take the transcendental ego as the primary analogate" for the Unchangeable in the Unhappy Consciousness (p. 149), Kainz's analysis and commentary remains an interesting and enlightening approach to the *Phenomenology*. There are many excellent comparisons made with Aristotle and Kierkegaard, for example, which we have not had time to discuss here.

Even while taking issue with a good deal of the fundamental orientation in the interpretation, this reader would readily confess that he learned a good deal about the *Phenomenology* in following Kainz. That is what the book is for. No doubt, others might also stand to learn a good deal from the book as well.

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NOTICE

Dear HSA Colleague:

I have recently been appointed Coeditor of a journal published on my campus, *CLIO: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Literature, History and the Philosophy of History*, with a view to expanding the journal's philosophy offerings. It is a position I accepted only on the understanding that I would be free to develop the journal as an English-language forum for the study, indisciplinary application and critical evaluation of the Hegelian philosophy.

CLIO is six years old, and currently has somewhat over 500 subscriptions including 320 library subscriptions. In the past *CLIO* has published essays on such figures as Collingwood, Ranke and Huizinga. Toynbee's last essay before his death appeared in its pages. An exchange between Hayden White and W.H. Dray (two *CLIO* Advisory Editors) was published in 1973. The editorial board, which already includes Henry Steele Commager, Arthur Danto and Mircea Eliade among others, has now expanded to include Professors H.S. Harris and Otto Pöggeler in order to reflect the new concentration on Hegel studies. It is anticipated that other names in Hegel scholarship will be added.

Beginning in the Fall 1977 issue *CLIO* will publish both original studies and translations of interest to Hegel scholars. The first issue under the new format will include Hegel's own *"On Some Characteristic Differences Between Ancient and Modern Poets,"* previously untranslated. The plan is to publish three philosophy essays on an average per issue, with two of them directly related to Hegel studies. These two Hegel articles are to be in the philosophy of history, art, religion or right rather than the intrieacies of the logic or philosophy of nature, since these last two areas are too technical for an interdisciplinary audience. (However, more technical papers of primary interest to Hegel specialists could be published in a *CLIO Supplement* which might one day be undertaken.)

If you believe as I do that an English-language journal with a concentration in the area of Hegel studies is needed, you can help in two specific ways. First, please send your curriculum vitae if you are interested in serving either as a book reviewer or referee for submitted manuscripts, in order to help me know to whom I should take recourse in any given case. And, secondly, please enter an individual ($6.00 a year for three issues) or institutional ($15.00) subscription as soon as possible. Please do not hesitate to make inquiries and offer your suggestions.

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