

absence (even granting that "notion" might be a legitimate translation of *Begriff*, one wonders if "concept" might sometimes be called for, if only to translate *Vorstellung*, any translation of which is absent from the list). Other significant terms are left out of the list: "ego" (*Ich*), "finite" (although "infinite" does make an appearance), "law," "moment," "self-consciousness," "spirit" (!), "subject." More than that, not infrequently the definitions assigned to terms that do appear are not very revealing. For example, after "consciousness" we read "as distinct from the soul or the sub-conscious" (at the very least misleading); "idea" is "nothing more than a logical abstraction"; "ideality" is most confusing, as is "reality"; "substance" gives scarcely an inkling of what the term means for Hegel.

In the light of what precedes there seems little need to comment *in extenso* on the translation. I have made for myself a rather random list of twenty-nine instances where the translation is tendentious (11, 20-23), or misleading (49, 30), or obscuring (27, 1-6), or not backed up by a clarifying (or justifying) note (47, 33), or not making the point that Hegel is clearly making (79, 34-36), or makes no sense at all (67, 30). By the same token there is no need to undertake an extensive commentary on the notes—very frequently the absence of notes relating to crucial passages or crucial translations is more revealing than is the presence of the notes which do appear; frequently, too, the notes have little or no philosophical import. There is no question that the notes are for the most part very erudite, but one frequently has to question whether the erudition really contributes to an understanding of the text. The conclusion to which the reviewer is forced to come is that one has to wonder whether the hope expressed in the Preface has been fulfilled: "It is to be hoped that the introduction and notes prepared for the present edition will prove helpful to both teachers and students" (p. xii). I doubt it.

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## REVIEW

*Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind: Analysis and Commentary.* By C.V. Dudeck, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981. Pp. 286. \$10.75 ISBN 0-8191-1407-3 paper.

This is another in the growing list of studies on Hegel's *Phenomenology*. More specifically, it is designed for "the beginning student" and purports "to offer a reading which is less confusing than Hegel's own text" and therefore uses "very little of Hegel's terminology or style of writing" (p.1). After a brief introduction in which the general nature of Hegelian philosophy and some of its key ideas are presented, it goes on to discuss both the Preface and Hegel's "Introduction" somewhat more critically before going on to deal with the successive sections of the

*Phenomenology* from "Sense Certainty" to "Absolute Knowledge" somewhat more exegetically, as the author herself puts it (p.18). After the section on Reason and before that on Spirit, a special chapter on "The State" is inserted, which discusses a number of topics from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* by way of introduction to subsequent parts of the *Phenomenology*. Three chapters are then devoted to the section on Spirit, followed by two relatively short chapters on "Religion in General" and "Absolute Knowledge." A brief bibliography is added which includes only a few of the better known works on Hegel, but none of these sources seems to have influenced Dudeck much in her reading. This is very much her own work on the *Phenomenology* and it has to be viewed as such. Whether one likes it or not, agrees with it or not, will depend on one's own reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and one's own interpretation of its method.

It would be impossible to go into every detail of the *Phenomenology* in a book of less than 300 pages, but Dudeck does attempt to deal with every section of it. Her exegesis is generally rather loose and tends to zero in only on scattered texts. This is no doubt part of her strategy of using "very little of Hegel's terminology or style of writing" and it works fairly well for some parts of the *Phenomenology*, especially the later, more complicated ones on Reason and Spirit. Dudeck proves to be a competent reader in many respects and shows good insight into what Hegel was driving at in various sections. But her own substitute method often betrays the precise point Hegel was trying to make in his own way or else it makes the point seem purely dogmatic. In leaving aside Hegel's terminology, Dudeck may also have abandoned a good part of Hegel's critical procedure.

In reading Hegel's *Phenomenology*, one should always bear in mind that part of the effort consists precisely in constructing a language, a terminology and a style of writing, that will enable the reader as well the writer to rise to the point of absolute knowing. It is, in other words, truly a phenomenology of spirit, a passage toward a higher outlook, and any oversimplification of language may cut the passage short. This is not to say that every word or every page of the *Phenomenology* must be taken wholly as it stands. Not even Hegel would make such a claim, since he recognized himself that parts of it were overlaid with detail and would have to be redone. But it is to say that one cannot play fast and loose with Hegel's language with impunity. Much of it is an integral part of the dialectic being elaborated. The comment that it is often confusing may be more a reflection on one's own state of mind than on Hegel's procedure. It could be a sign that one is stuck in some form of consciousness or other that Hegel criticizes along the way and that one is trying to judge the whole from the viewpoint of that particular form.

It is not that Dudeck is totally indifferent to Hegel's language. As she states herself, "At various points key terminology is explained or discussed" (p. 1). Thus, for example, the ideas of "dialectic" and "Absolute Spirit" are brought up in Dudeck's introduction and keep reappearing later as key points of reference. In connection with

Hegel's introduction the "basic meanings" of such terms as *an sick, für sich, für anderes, für uns* are listed quickly (pp. 57-58) in such a way that what seems clear enough, though difficult, in Hegel's text becomes hopelessly confused to any but those already familiar with the text and the method being proposed by Hegel. Dudeck is also given to listing dictionary meanings of such terms as *Geist* (p. 15), *aufheben* (p. 41), *meinen* (p. 81), or *Sache* (p. 163), but this hardly serves to clarify the precise point Hegel may be making at any given time in the dialectic even as he plays on a diversity of meanings for a given term. Dudeck's discussions of terminology tend to be too generic and divorced from the text which is presumably at issue and they often presuppose conceptions of historical figures such as Descartes or Spinoza or Kant which the beginning student may not have or may not exactly reflect Hegel's or everyone else's conception of those same figures.

But what may constitute the most serious difficulty with Dudeck's book lies in the initial chapters on Hegel's Preface and Introduction, which she characterizes as critical in nature. The difficulty lies, not so much in the fact that she is critical, since any philosophical reading of a philosophical text is bound to be critical, but rather in the manner in which the criticism is undertaken. To begin with Dudeck tries to explain and settle too many things at the outset, such as the notion of "Absolute Spirit" or that of "Science" and "Dialectic," the full appreciation of which can only emerge as the work of phenomenology proceeds. Dudeck tries to do as if everyone had a clear and set understanding of such notions from the beginning, especially the notion of "knowing," whereas Hegel's point in the *Phenomenology* is precisely to examine all such notions or forms of consciousness and to cut through them so that a true sense of "absolute knowing" may emerge in the end, and in the end only. In other words, Dudeck has fallen into the trap of preface-writing which Hegel warns against even as he comments on Hegel's Preface, which, it must be remembered, was written *after* the *Phenomenology* was completed. Even the idea of inserting a chapter on the *Philosophy of Right* half way into the dialectic before going into the section on Spirit in the *Phenomenology* could be viewed as part of this same difficulty. There is, of course, a connection between these two parts of Hegel's thought and Dudeck does bring up some relevant material for a full appreciation of Hegel's thinking on "Spirit and its world," but the insertion interrupts the phenomenological movement of thought at this point and presents as a presupposition something which is only in the process of development at this stage of Hegel's thought.

But this tendency to anticipate results as if they were presuppositions is only part of the difficulty with Dudeck's approach. Even if one does indulge in preface-writing, as Hegel himself did, one should be critical of one's approach and not take for granted notions which may well be in question. Dudeck is at pains to give a general presentation of Hegel's concept of philosophy, quoting from the *Encyclopedia* and the *Greater Logic* as well as from the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, but the concept that emerges, in the eyes of this reader, is not true to Hegel's

concept. It is more in the nature of a straw man, which Dudeck then proceeds to demolish with the peculiar model of knowledge which he takes for granted, a model which Hegel would perhaps have characterized as *observing reason*. Though Dudeck tries to make much of dialectical thought, she tends to think of it formally in rather fixed oppositional terms. For her mediation is a matter of contextual relation, more a matter of observation than of rational process, as her use of the master/slave relation to illustrate a dialectical relation clearly shows. It is interesting to note that her term for the reflecting consciousness referred to as *uns* by Hegel is the "philosophical observer" as distinct from the "phenomenological consciousness." All this indicates a severe restriction in the notion of "knowing" which this reader at least cannot take for granted and which Hegel probably would have rejected as one-sided and unfit for a true appreciation of philosophical knowing.

It must be said, however, in conclusion, that this seeming shortcoming on the level of conceptualization and method has not prevented Dudeck from getting a true insight into the movement of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. Her characterization of the work as an examination of a succession of thought experiments, each with a distinctive method of approach and incorporating particular assumptions and concepts on p. 29, for example, is quite apt and her appreciation of many of these diverse experiments as analysed by Hegel is, for the most part, quite good, though somewhat succinct. It is only in the end, on the level of absolute knowing, and in some of the transitions that the misconception about Hegel's intention and dialectical thinking in general interferes with the interpretation.

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## NEW BOOKS

**Hegel and the Sciences.** eds. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky. Boston: D. Reidel, 1982. n.p. Cloth ISBN 90-277-0726-X; Paper ISBN 90-277-1239-5.

**From the publisher:** This collection of papers, including major contributions from Dietrich von Engelhardt, Gerd Buchdahl and Michael Kosok, attempts an assessment of Hegel's thinking on the sciences at several levels of analysis.

Part I, from the differing perspectives of its contributors, contemplates the implications for the various sciences in Hegel's work while Part II undertakes a number of analyses of the philosophy and methodology of science from an Hegelian perspective; the concluding section deals with Hegel, dialectics and logic.