no evidence to show that they are at all concerned about whether or not they are in accord with St. Thomas on the point. It is certainly impossible to claim that they have proved they accept the Thomistic teaching without qualification.

From this point of view, at least, Mercier is far superior to any of the others of his school. It can be asserted in his favor that he at least quotes St. Thomas' definitions of certitude. One of his followers might go on from there to say that, if his explanation of these definitions and his exposition of their meaning is somewhat lengthy, the reason is not at all that he has any least wish to change the Thomistic concept of certitude or to defend such a change, but merely that the true Thomistic doctrine has been for so long lost sight of that it has become extremely confused and so hidden under a mass of extraneous accretions that it needs an adequate and proper restatement. Thus, Mercier's special and personal contribution to the advancement of modern Thomism would be that he once more brings into the light the real meaning of St. Thomas, just as it would be the finest evidence of his genius that he alone of the Scholastics has sufficient insight to appreciate how effectively this newly polished weapon disarms modern Scepticism.

But, if this is proposed as an answer to the charge of procedural error, the difficulties which stand in the way of accepting it as satisfactory are insurmountable. It rests entirely on the naive presupposition that the mere quoting St. Thomas is by itself ample

evidence that Mercier accepts the Thomistic doctrine without modification. Against it stand the objections which have here been raised to Mercier's interpretation of St. Thomas' two definitions of certitude, as well as to his defense and applications of that interpretation. Whatever be the proper explanation of St. Thomas' doctrine, it is clear that to attribute to St. Thomas what Mercier makes of it is unthinkable. His distinction between the two definitions is so obviously wrong, his basic assumption of the uniquely privileged position of reflection is so patently unjustified and unsupported by St. Thomas and even contradictory of his own principles, his conclusions are on so many points in direct opposition to St. Thomas' clearly expressed opinion, that it would be utterly ridiculous to ascribe such a botchpotch to him.

The only defense left Mercier, then, is that his error is unconscious and indeliberate, inasmuch as he does not perceive how [illegible] his deviations from the Thomistic position. In this sense, he is certainly blameless, though he might have avoided these difficulties completely had he considered just one implication of his position, the brief examination of which will conclude this short study of Mercier's doctrine on certitude.

It has been noted above (133) that Mercier spares no pains to make it clear that the doubt which he advocates is only a methodical doubt, not a real one. He further makes it plain, in his critique of Descartes (134), that he considers the expression, "universal, methodical doubt" contradictory. The reason why this is so is, according to

him, that methodical doubt supposes an habitual and latent assent, despite the fact that it also implies at the same time an actual and explicit doubt. In other words, methodic doubt is what he describes as a complex intellectual state, in which the intellect doubts actually and explicitly without leaving go of its habitual and latent assent to the proposition which is doubted methodically (135). Universal doubt, on the other hand, leaves room for no certitude at all, even for only habitual and latent certitude or assent. It extends to all human knowledge without exception, and embraces immediate as well as mediate propositions. It is, therefore, a real doubt, which Mercier describes as a simple state of the intellect, in opposition to the complex state which is methodical doubt. In real doubt, there is no determined adhesion of the intellect at all, while in methodical doubt there is the habitual and latent adhesion.

It seems, however, that the precise point of opposition between methodical and universal doubt is, in Mercier's terminology, that methodical doubt has reference only to mediate propositions, while universal doubt includes immediate propositions, too. Methodical doubt implies a limitation in its very definition, which universal does not. Thus universal and real doubt would appear to be identical and both of them opposed to methodical doubt.

The consequence of these distinctions is that the universal doubt which Mercier defends is only a relatively universal doubt. It is universal in the sense that it is applicable to all mediate propositions.

But it is relative, because it cannot be extended beyond mediate propositions to include immediate propositions. It has been explained above (136) that what Mercier defends with regard to immediate propositions is only an attempt to doubt them, not a doubt about them.

There are several difficulties which arise from this terminology. He seems to proceed on the assumption that, since immediate propositions cannot be doubted at all, but the most one can and is obliged to do is to attempt to doubt them, then a fortiori they can not be subject to even a methodical doubt. Still, it does not appear to be clear why one could not entertain with regard to them only a methodical doubt, that is, nothing stronger in the line of doubt than a methodical doubt. Since methodical doubt demands nothing more than an habitual and latent assent, there seems to be no reason why one could not retain an habitual and latent assent about immediate propositions at the same time that he doubted them.

Perhaps the answer to this is simply that, if one tries to doubt such an immediate proposition, he sees immediately and clearly that it can not be doubted (137).

But Mercier seems also to equate this attempt at doubt with reflection (138). Further, he has defined reflection as a voluntary act (139), an identification for which de Tonquedec has severely criticized him (140). But, taking his equations for granted, it would seem that, if reflection depends entirely upon whether or not one wishes to reflect, one could just as easily as not choose not to reflect on his attitude toward immediate propositions at all. By doing so, he would preclude the possi-

bility of attempting to doubt such propositions. But the doubt he would not attempt would appear to be the explicit and actual doubt which characterizes methodical doubt. He would, therefore have an habitual and latent certitude without an explicit and actual doubt. Thus he would seem to have some kind of state of mind which would be intermediary between real and methodical doubt. Consequently, real and methodical doubt do not seem to cover all the possible cases.

The only answer which it would seem possible to make to this argument would be that they are not intended to cover all possible cases. They are applicable only to cases of mediate propositions, and it is unfair the ask them to do more than Mercier intends they should do.

It is immediately obvious that this answer is not at all satisfying, because Mercier himself has identified, or at least equated, real and universal doubt in his criticism of the Cartesian universal, methodical doubt. That means that he himself has applied the terminology of real and methodical doubt to immediate propositions.

Perhaps the true answer can be gathered from a statement which he makes about reflection when he is showing how St. Thomas' use of the method of proposing a question in the Summa, before he goes on to answer it, is a methodical doubt and, therefore, is an argument in favor of his position. It would seem possible to point out several inconsistencies in this argument, such as his repeated emphasis on what St. Thomas wants to do, when one wonders, in the first place, how he knows what St. Thomas wants to do and, in the second, how this fits in with his own explicit statement that Descartes

intentions are not a matter of discussion for criteriology, but for moral science -- whatever the latter remark may mean. It is more important, however, to notice a remark which he here makes about reflection. In view of his general doctrine that it is reflection which justifies and controls spontaneous certitude, it may seem strange to hear him say now that reflection also produces doubt, methodic doubt. Yet, if one keeps in mind the equations just made between (attempt to doubt), reflection, and voluntary act, this statement will sound somewhat less bizarre.

He is explaining that St. Thomas knows the answers to the questions he asks either by his Christian faith, or from anterior demonstrations. Thus he discusses a first judgment about them which is certain:

> "... als à côté de cette disposition de l'intelligence, il s'en reduit, par reflexion, une autre: abstraction faite des considérations qui déterminent son assentiment certain.... le saint Docteur veut délibérement se comporter à l'égard de ces verités comme si elles etaient douteuses; ce second état intellectuel est formellement défendant de la volonté; saint Thomas veut faire abstraction de ses croyances acquises par ailleurs, il veut examiner le pour et le contre....cet état complexe est le doute méthodique..." (141)

If one leaves aside the matter of faith, which, because it is supernatural, has no direct bearing on the immediate discussion, it would seem from this example that there can be no question of methodical doubt unless there is first a certitude which, though now only habitual and latent, was originally reflex. The same impression is conveyed by the example of the theorem of Euclid which he discusses just before he comes to this point, when he is describing the differences between methodical

and real doubt (142). The only difference between the two examples would seem to be that the faith mentioned is in one case supernatural and, in the other, natural.

If, then, there can be a methodical doubt about only such matters as were originally actually certain, and if one can be actually certain of such matters only after reflection, and, if reflection is always a deliberate process -- granted all these conditions, the man who deliberately chooses not to reflect on his attitude toward immediate propositions can never fulfill the conditions which are first of all requisite before he can have a methodical doubt about them. Since actual certitude can be attained only by deliberate choice by means of reflection, and since, on the other hand, he does not reflect, so long as he does not reflect he cannot have actual certitude and, consequently, he can never have habitual certitude either. If he can not have habitual certitude, he cannot abstract from it deliberately and put the immediate proposition in actual doubt. Therefore, he can not have a methodical doubt about an immediate proposition.

This is, admittedly, another strange situation, however. It seems to be complicated in three directions. If, in the first place, the man who assents spontaneously to an immediate proposition does not choose to reflect on that proposition at all, then he can never have even a latent and habitual certitude about it. At the same time, and this is the second consideration, he is spontaneously certain of it, even though his certitude can not be called even latent. Thirdly, immediately that he reflects upon the

immediate proposition, he sees that he can not doubt it at all under any circumstance. If he attempts to doubt it -- which he can do, apparently, even though he can not do so within the meaning of methodical doubt, which implies that he has an actual certitude of it first -- the mere attempt reveals the truth of the proposition to him so clearly that his assent to it is forced.

This final consideration would seem to explain why he can never do more than attempt to doubt the immediate proposition. In order to attempt to doubt, he must reflect and, just as soon as he reflects, he sees that the proposition is so true that he can not doubt it.

But the difficulty still remains about how his attitude toward the immediate proposition is to be described, if he chooses not to reflect. In such a contingency, according to Mercier, the man would be in the absurd position of being certain without being certain. That is, he would have a spontaneous certitude, but that certitude would not be legitimate. Nor could it be legitimate until he decided to reflect upon it.

Thus, once more, is evidenced the essential role that reflection plays in Mercier's theory. No matter how certain the man is with a spontaneous certitude, he is not really certain until he freely elects to make himself certain by reflecting on his spontaneous certitude. If this seems strange, it appears more strange still that Mercier does not admit that, anterior to this reflection, the man is in a state of real doubt.

The reasons for thinking that he is are two-fold. First, no matter how certain he is, his certitude is not legitimate until he reflects upon it.

But, if his certitude is not legitimate, he is, in Mercier's theory, not really certain. His certitude is a psychological state at best.

Further, if the only distinction between real and methodical doubt is that methodical doubt requires a legitimate certitude in the first place, then every certitude which is not legitimate is the same as a real doubt. That the certitude which is required to make the distinction between real and methodical doubt must be a legitimate certitude seems clear from the examples of methodical doubt which he gives, as also from the fact that, if it can be an illegitimate certitude, there would seem to be no adequate distinction between real doubt and methodical doubt.

It seems necessary, therefore, to equate illegitimate certitude and real doubt. But, since every spontaneous certitude is, according to Mercier, an illegitimate certitude, even spontaneous certitude with respect to immediate propositions would be the same as a real doubt.

One way of getting around this reduction might be to insist that the important description of the simple intellectual state which is one of real doubt is that it is a state in which there is no determined adhesion. One could then point out that there is a determined adhesion in spontaneous certitude and that it is, therefore, not a real doubt at all.

There are, however, two difficulties with this explanation. The first is that Mercier also describes a real doubt as one which is not formally dependent upon the will, but which depends upon the intellect, in the sense that it is imposed upon it (and, therefore upon the will, too), and presumably because of the lack of objective evidence (143). Since,

according to him, there is no knowledge of the objective evidence until the basis of the spontaneous certitude has been reflected upon and since no knowledge of evidence is the equivalent of no evidence, the spontaneous certitude, even if an immediate proposition, would seem to meet the requirements of his description of real doubt. In other words, it does not seem possible to hold that the determined adhesion of spontaneous certitude has any better status from the intellectual point of view than does real doubt.

In the second place it seems to destroy his distinction of spontaneous + reflex certitude completely, for one holds that spontaneous certitude is not the equivalent of real doubt but it would seem he must also admit that it is a legitimate certitude because it is only legitimate certitude which makes it possible to distinguish real from methodic doubt. Obviously, once the spontaneous certitude is given the status of a legitimate certitude from the outset + without reflexion, Mercier's whole theory falls.

If his principles are maintained and this implication also admitted, it seems that his initial spontaneous certitude is a real doubt, and that it is impossible to bring this tendency to a halt when it reaches the point of a new attempt to doubt immediate propositions.

The end result of the original distinction between spontaneous and reflex certitude seems, then, to be a complete and irreversal scepticism from which deliverance by way of reflection is impossible.

It should, however, be most carefully noted that, whether or not the foregoing reasoning is justified as a statement of what Mercier's principles necessarily entrain, its conclusions are not capable of being directly attributed to Mercier himself. Though Jeanniere, for example, is willing to admit that even immediate propositions are subject to a real doubt at the start of scientific inquiry, his position is certainly not Mercier's. The only value which attaches to an attempt at exhausting the implications of Mercier's principles is to show the difficulty there is in reconciling them with St. Thomas' doctrine.

In the light of this criticism of Mercier's interpretation of the two Thomistic definitions of certitude, and despite its many undeniable, it is possible to see that Mercier can hardly be taken as a safe guide for the understanding of St. Thomas' teaching. But the mere refutation of Mercier's theory offers little positive information about the meaning of the definitions. It is to supplying for that deficiency that the rest of this brief essay is devoted.

CHAPTER TWO

The Correct Interpretation of the Two Thomistic Definitions

I. The Difference between the Definitions:

At the same time that the foregoing critique proves Mercier's interpretation of the two Thomistic definitions of certitude (1) completely false, the rejection of his theory involves the loss of a facile explanation of the difference between the definitions and thus appears to complicate the resolution of the problem which that difference presents. If the distinction between the two certitudes is so great that neither one, when considered formally, is reducible to the other, then it is rather obvious that the difference in their definitions is absolutely necessary and, on that ground, readily understandable. But since the arguments which have here been marshalled against Mercier's explication of the meaning of the definitions furnish the clearest possible evidence (short of the direct demonstration to which this chapter is almost entirely devoted) that what St. Thomas intended to define in both definitions was basically and essentially the same thing, it seems extremely strange and not easily explicable that he stated them so differently.

The "propria" of the second definition seems deliberately intended to call attention to the fact that it, and not the first, is the correct definition. This impression is reinforced by the express mention

of cognitive faculty and cognoscible object (the repetition, cognitive-cognoscible, cannot be without significance) in the second, which are in direct contrast to the comparative generality and simplicity of the first.

Nonetheless, and despite these apparently incontrovertible indices in favor of the second as the better definition, one should not be at all hasty in coming to any such conclusion. It would seem to be a sound rule of method that, before settling finally on so extravagant an explanation, every other possibility should first be thoroughly explored and exhausted. And much as this obligation would appear to be binding on one who would be content with saying simply that one was a better definition than the other, though admitting that both were definitions of the same thing, it would appear to be all the more heavily incumbent upon a man like Mercier, who seems to take these definitions as the starting point (at least as far as his attempt at justifying his position from St. Thomas is concerned) of an otherwise unqualifiedly novel and extraordinary theory of certitude, to exercise the greatest caution before committing himself definitively and irrevocably to a stand which might, because inconsiderately assumed, easily become very embarrassing.

It would seem, further, to be an elementary law of procedure that a text must be interpreted in the light of its context. It has already (2) been pointed out how little this principle is observed in this whole affair of certitude by the proponents of the universal doubt, so that there is no

reason for being surprised that Mercier gives absolutely no evidence whatsoever of having respected it here in the matter of the definitions. One might have expected that he would at least have mentioned alternatives to his own theory and, if he found them unsatisfactory, that he would have shown why, and all this based on the relationship between the definitions and their contexts-- one might have looked for some such thing, that is, were he unfamiliar with Mercier's technique. Once acquainted with it, all one can do is to bemoan the fact that he has totally ignored what might well have saved him from serious error, since the contexts of these definitions appear not only to eliminate the possibility of interpreting them as definitions of different things, but also to forestall the dangers implicit in regarding one as an absolutely better definition of the same certitude which the other defines.

When they are read in their contexts, it would seem that the verbal fulness of the second definition, far from proving that it is the more precise and accurate and that the first is vague and inexact, serves only (but extremely effectively) to bring out clearly that each of them is designed to point up a different aspect of the same one certitude and that it is in the light of its different purpose that each of them must be understood. If they are each thus properly integrated in its own background, the difference in the terms in which they are expressed should present no difficulty. And, as might have been expected, the advantage of simplicity which gave Mercier's explanation of the difference an added

attractiveness is in no wise lost with the rejection of his theory and the attainment of the truth.

Nor does one have to go very deeply into the context of the definitions to appreciate the difference between them. The first definition is given as the principle upon which rests the solution to the objection that "... the act of faith has a lesser certitude than does the act of science" (3), while the second is stated in answer to the difficulty that "It seems that hope does not have certitude in its act" (4).

It is obvious at once from the most superficial consideration of the questions in connection with which the definitions are formulated -- and, therefore, all the more remarkable that Lercher completely ignores the fact -- that the first difficulty is wholly and exclusively concerned with virtues which are resident in the intellect, while the second includes in addition a reference to the will, in which faculty hope is subjected (5).

In view, then, of the different implications of the two questions, there is no occasion for surprise that St. Thomas does not stress the point of cognitive faculty and cognoscible object in the first definition as he does in the second. To do so would be rather obviously pointless. This emphasis can be presumed without very deep reflection as intended to set up an opposition between what it defines and something else which is not so immediately related to cognition. From this aspect, there is clearly no opposition between faith and science. But it is equally plain

that at least a certain opposition can be found between faith and hope, in the sense that the intellect, which faith perfects, is itself a cognitive faculty while the will, which is the subject of hope, is not.

Even without going any more deeply into the question than this rather amateur excursus, it would seem that the difference in the wording of the two definitions is easily explicable. It comes down quite simply to the fact that, however much they may be shown later to differ in other respects, both the certitude of faith and the certitude of science are alike in that they are both certitudes of the intellect, while the certitude of faith differs from the certitude of hope at least in this, that the former is a certitude of the intellect and the latter is a certitude of the will. The fact that the second question is concerned with hope makes it much more than likely that it is the difference between the certitude of faith and the certitude of hope which St. Thomas wishes to underline in the second definition. Thus his specifying, in the second definition, the firmness of adhesion which is peculiar to the cognitive faculty makes perfect sense.

There still remains, however, the question of the "proprie" in the second definition. If what has just been said is true, it would seem that this normally very significant word is here utterly meaningless, and this is most unlikely.

Once again, it is only when the two definitions are taken entirely out of their contexts and read in isolation that one can be led to think that St. Thomas uses the "proprie" to contrast one with the other.

Before giving the second definition, St. Thomas first mentions a theory which certain theologians have proposed as an explanation of the difference between the certitude of faith and that of hope. According to them, the certitude of faith is universal and absolute, whereas the certitude of hope is particular and conditional.

He finds this theory defective, because the difference between universal and particular are not enough to constitute an essential difference or to make for different habits. The consequence of this distinction would be that faith would not be a different habit from hope, nor would they be in different potencies. This conclusion is, as he says, entirely false.

He then proposes his own explanation of the difference between the certitude of faith and the certitude of hope in opposition to the theory which he has just rejected and it is upon the proper notion of certitude, as distinct from the false notion he has just mentioned, that he bases his answer. Thus he says:

> "Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod certitudo proprie dicitur firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae in suum cognoscibile..." (6)

The difficulty caused by the "proprie" is as easily resolved as that. It does, indeed, make a contrast, but the contrast is between his theory of certitude and the inadequate concept of other theologians, not between the first and the second definitions (7).

When the two definitions are thus merely held up against their proper settings in order to get just an approximate idea of how a more

exact fitting will make them look, the possibility of accepting Mercier's reading of them is completely eliminated as based upon a preconception of their difference which is not only otherwise indefensible but which is also completely unsupported by their contexts. It becomes clear at once that the two are parallel definitions of the same intellectual certitude. Aside from the "propria", which has been shown to be without significance in a comparrison of the two and which can, therefore, be left out altogether in an attempt at correlating them, their terms are seen to correspond in the following way:

determinatio.....firmitas adhaesionis

intellectus.....virtutis cognitivae

ad unum.....in unum co nocibile

The fact that the terms in the second are somewhat more explicit than those in the first has already been explained on the ground that they are intended to emphasize the fact that certitude in the proper sense is an affair of the cognitive faculty as opposed to the wider meaning which it has when it is attributed to the will.

One should not fail to notice, further, that Mercier's explanation of the two definitions not only does them serious violence by imposing on them a burden which they cannot sustain because St. Thomas never intended them to support it, but loses a large measure of their real significance, since it tries to make very determinate what St. Thomas quite deliberately leave indeterminate. In St. Thomas' statement of the definitions there is no slightest hint of a distinction within the area of

intellectual certitude. Both are perfectly applicable to every kind of intellectual certitude without exception.

When Mercier tries to twist the two definitions to fit his own preconceived notion of their meaning, he states that the first makes no mention of the cause of certitude, while the second does, and that this is what constitutes the difference between them. It has already been shown (3) that this interpretation cannot possibly be defended and that its falsity is apparent even without reference to the contexts of the definitions.

When the definitions are now read in their contexts, it becomes possible to appreciate the additional fact that explicit mention of the cause of certitude is exactly the thing which St. Thomas very deliberately avoids in both definitions. He consistently maintains this indefiniteness even in the second definition, in which he is comparatively more express than in the first so that he can emphasize the proper concept of certitude and make a "clear-cut" distinction between it and the improper concept. It is especially instructive to notice how he preserves this fact of specification, all the while that he is sufficiently specific for the needs of each case.

The reason for St. Thomas' precise indefiniteness here is not at all hard to understand. What he needs as the foundation of his solution to the first of the two problems with which he is faced is the most general possible definition of intellectual certitude. This is so because the whole range of intellectual certitude is involved in the question

concerning science and faith and their relative certitude. Obviously, then, he must define intellectual certitude here in all its amplitude. A more restricted definition would be the definition of a specific type of certitude and would, therefore, be useless as the starting point of his resolution.

The second question which he is called upon to answer is somewhat more delicate from the point of view of intellectual certitude. The principle of his resolution here must be the proper concept of certitude as opposed to the improper concept. But the proper concept means intellectual certitude exclusively. At the same time, of course, it also means intellectual certitude in all its extension. Thus, he must here formulate a definition which will stress the thoroughly intellectual character of the proper concept in order to make confusing it with the improper concept impossible, and he must accomplish this without wording it in such a way that any kind of intellectual certitude could be excluded from the definition.

One might even go so far as to say that St. Thomas' primary and immediate concern in stating the first definition is not so much to emphasize the intellectual character of the certitude with which he is there engaged. No one would deny that both the certitude of faith and that of science are intellectual certitudes. His interest is rather in arriving at a definition of certitude which will include every type of

intellectual certitude so that no objection can be made to using it as the principle of his solution of the question. So, he begins with the most universal and all-embracing concept of intellectual certitude possible.

In the second definition, on the other hand, his attention is occupied first of all by the proper notion of certitude and his desire to insist on its intellectual character. Thus, it is only secondarily that he adverts to the fact that his statement of this definition must not fail to make room for every kind of intellectual certitude. But, even if this latter consideration is only secondary, it is nonetheless extremely important, because any carelessness about it would result in a misstatement of the proper concept.

Whatever the truth in the matter of the order of these considerations be, the important thing is that in both cases St. Thomas frames the widest possible definition of intellectual certitude consistent with the solution of each of the questions he is treating here. How well he succeeds in making even the second definition equally general with the first is evident from the comparison of the elements of both definitions made above.

If, on the other hand, the "unum" of the first definition and the "necessibile" of the second are taken to stand for the object which causes the certitude defined, then there is no possibility of admitting the certitude of faith into these definitions. The reason is, of course,

that the certitude of faith is not caused by the object, but is imperated by the will (9). Thus, in Mercier's interpretation, there is placed on these definitions the very limitation and restriction which St. Thomas is bound to shun, since it makes them absolutely useless for the resolution of the problems with which he is dealing.

It is, in fact, the noncommittal character of the "unum" and the "cognoscibile" which makes the two definitions capable of being applied to both the certitude of faith and to the certitude of understanding and of science. Both certitudes are alike in that they are determinations of the intellect. They are also alike in that they are determinations to one thing, or firmness of adhesion to a cognoscible object. But to go beyond that and make of the "unum" and the "cognoscibile" an actually known object which determines the intellect is to destroy the universality of the definition of intellectual certitude, and to totally misunderstand St.Thomas' whole point and purpose.

II. The Subject of Certitude in the Proper Sense:

The foregoing discussion of the contexts of the two Thomistic definitions of certitude and, more particularly, the examination of the meaning of the "proprie" of the second definition have already made it clear that certitude in the proper sense refers exclusively to intellectual certitude. It follows immediately from this insistence upon the proper sense of the word that there must also be an improper sense, which would include other certitudes than those of the intellect.

There is, however, no need of depending upon this kind of inference, however legitimate it is, in order to justify the attribution of a distinction between proper and improper senses to St. Thomas. In the course of resolving the second problem, which is concerned with the question of whether there is certitude in the act of the virtue of hope and in connection with which he states the second of the two definitions of certitude, St. Thomas considers the objection that certitude does not pertain to *hope*, because certitude pertains to cognition, while hope does not. This is the first of the four objections of the article and, in *replying to it*, St. Thomas makes an *extremely* important *distinction*. He says that certitude is primarily and principally in cognition, but that it is also in the works of nature and of virtue by way of similitude and participatively:

> "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod certitudo primo et principaliter est in cognitione; sed per similitudinem et participative est in operibus naturae et virtutis." (10)

This is exactly the same distinction as the one he makes when he is once more explaining the certitude of hope in the Summa Theologica:

> "Respondeo dicendum quod certitudo invenitur in aliquo duplicifer, scilicet essentialiter et participative. Essentialiter quidem invenitur in vi cognoscitiva; participative autem in omni eo quod a vi cognoscitiva movetur infallibiliter ad finem suum...." (11)

There would seem to be no possibility of missing the meaning of the distinctions between essential and participated certitude which

St. Thomas makes so clear in these texts. Yet, Regis uses the text last quoted as evidence that St. Thomas transfers the notion of certitude to the will without any restriction:

> "Non seulement saint Thomas distingue dans la certitude divers éléments dont l'un relève de l'appetit beaucoup plus que de l'intelligence, mais il transporte la notion de certitude dans le domaine volontaire, et cela sans aucune restriction...." (12)

Not only does he quote the text just given above, but he italicizes the words "Essentialiter....in vi cognoscitiva; participative...". More astounding still, he goes on immediately to say, in support of his theory, that there is a text in St. Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences which says that the subject of the certitude of faith is, not the intelligence, but the will.

> "....Nous trouvons une application, avant la lettre, de ce principe dans les Sentences où il nous dit que la certitude de foi a comme sujet la volonté et non l'intelligence: 'Scientia et intellectus habent -- certitudinem -- per id quod ad cognitionem pertinet, scilicet, evidentiam ejus cui assentitur. Fides autem habet certitudinem ab eo quod est extra genus cognitionis, in genere affectionis existens." (13)

The text from which Regis quotes here follows immediately upon the one in which the first definition of certitude is given. It occurs in direct connection with the question whether the will is the subject of faith, and is given in answer to the second objection to St. Thomas' resolution of that question (14).

The main body of the response to the principal question has already made it perfectly plain that the intellect is the subject of faith and that the function of faith is to make the intellect readily obedient to the will in matters which are above reason.

This much is settled before the objections are taken up at all. The whole response from which Regis quotes the two sentences given above is made up of only three sentences. The last one is:

> "....Et ideo scientia et intellectus est sicut in subjecto in eo a quo habet certitudinem, non autem fides."

Even without the additional sentence, which makes the point that science and intellect differ in their certitude from faith in that they are subjected in the same faculty from which their certitude derives, while faith is not subjected in the faculty from which its certitude derives, there should be no reason for mistaking the fact that, in the two sentences which Regis gives, St. Thomas is discussing the cause of the certitudes of faith and of science and understanding. What he says is, not that the will is the subject of faith, but that the cause of its certitude is outside the genus of cognition.

It remains true, then, that there is a serious restriction on the use of the word certitude in connection with anything else than the certitude of the intellect. When so used, it is always participated certitude which is intended.

Thus, in the development of the second definition of certitude, St. Thomas says that names which pertain to cognition are transferred to natural operations, so that nature is said to operate wisely and infallibly and to have a certitude in its tendency to its end. The thing which justifies this attribution of qualities which properly belong to the intellect to irrational operations, such as those of nature,

is, as he explains, that the determination of nature comes from the divine Wisdom. In this sense, the works of nature are like works of art, insofar as nature tends to its end by determined means (15). The determination of nature is, then, an effect of the divine art, which directs natural things to their ends. This brings to mind at once the famous definition of St. Thomas' Commentary on the Physics (16).

If the sense of "certitude" can thus be extended to effects which follow upon knowledge, it is no less true that St. Thomas also used the word as the equivalent of the perfection of things:

> ".... nomen essentiae....Dicitur etiam forma, secundum quod per formam significatur perfectio, vel certitudo uniuscujusque rei, sicut dicit Avicenna in III Metaphysicae suae...." (17)

The importance of noticing this point is due, of course, to the fact that the determination of the thing is the cause of the certitude of science and understanding which derives from things.

St. Thomas even goes beyond that to say that the word "certitudo" is itself derived from the relation of cause and effect which exists in the real order when a cause produces its effect infallibly:

> "Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est certitudo: scilicet cognitionis, et ordinis. Cognitionis quidem certitudo est, quando cognitio non declinat in aliquo ab eo quod in re invenitur, sed hoc modo existimat de re sicut est; et quia certa existimatio habetur de re praecipue per causam rei, ideo tractatum est nomen certitudinis ab ordine causae ad effectum, ut dicatur ordo causae ad effectum certus, quando causa infallibiliter effectum producit..." (18)

Now, there appears to be a contradiction between this text and the one referred to above, in which St. Thomas says that terms which

refer properly to intellectual certitude are transferred to operations which depend for their direction upon the intellect. In the present instance, he seems to be saying just the opposite, that is, that the very word "certitude" is originally applied to the infallibility of the relationship between cause and effect in the objective order of things and then applied to the knowledge which gets its certitude from an acquaintance with this relationship.

The difficulty does not, however, seem to be impossible of resolution. Reference has already been made to the fact that the certitude of things is attributed to them by reason of the fact that they are directed to determined ends by determined means in accordance with the divine Wisdom. It goes without saying, of course, that the things here being considered are natural and not artificial things, though, from the point of view of God, they are operables (19). Thus, from this primary and fundamental point of view, the certitude which things have is theirs by derivation from the divine Art and is in them intrinsically by reason of their form or essence, as indicated in the text quoted above from the De Ente et Essentia. All the attributions of certitude in the line of certitude of order seem, from the examples he uses, to be confined to natural things, whether inanimate beings, or irrational beings, or the faculties of man which are other than the faculty of cognition itself.

The essential point is that the certitude of things which is the cause of our intellectual certitude is only an improper and participated certitude. The formal notion of certitude, in other words,

is not found verified in them. It cannot be, if by definition the formal and proper notion of certitude is intellectual certitude, and it has already been shown that this identification is expressly made in the second definition of certitude. The problem resolves itself, then, into whether there is any inconsistency in holding that improper certitude can be the cause of proper certitude.

The question seems to depend for its answer on the same principle with which St. Thomas solves a like question about truth. He says that, even though the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, there is no necessity that the formal notion of truth should be found first in the thing:

> "....licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causatur, non tamen oportet quod in re prius inveniatur ratio veritatis... et similiter esse rei, non veritas ejus, causat veritatem intellectus..." (20)

There would seem to be no difficulty in making the same distinction for certitude as for truth. Just as the being of the thing, and not its truth, is the cause of the truth of our intellect, it would appear perfectly right to say, in the first place, that the form or the essence of the thing is the cause of whatever certitude we have about what the thing itself is. Since, further than that, causes always have a reference to the existence or becoming of things (21), our knowledge of the relationship between the thing and its cause or effect can, like the knowledge of its truth, be said to be dependent upon its "esse".

It is well known that the formality of truth is not found in things, but only in the intellect, for the reason that the thing is

adequated to the human intellect only when it is known by that intellect in such a way that it causes the intellect to make a true estimation of it (22), which can be done only within the intellect itself, since its action is wholly immanent (23).

If this is true of the formality of truth, it is all the more true of the formality of certitude, since certitude is considered to be the very first of the formalities of truth by John of St. Thomas (24), who also says that the mere relation of adequation is not by itself enough to constitute truth as the ultimate perfection of the intellect, but that this perfective aspect of the truth must also include its foundation and the certitude and the evidence with which it is attained (25).

The main point of the preceding discussion is the vindication to intellectual certitude alone -- and in the face of whatever claims the certitude of the will and of things might appear to have -- of the right to be called certitude in the proper sense. The arguments which have been briefly suggested in defense of that right also serve to make somewhat more evident what might have been clear enough from the mere fact that certitude has both a proper and an improper sense, that is, that the concept of certitude is an analogous concept. (26).

Its analogous character is clear from the fact that it is predicated primarily of intellectual certitude and only secondarily of the other types of certitude, which others are, in fact, designated certitude solely because they somehow participate this primary

and essential certitude. These other certitudes are related to intellectual certitude either because they are its cause — as is the case for the objects which the human intellect knows, without their being dependant upon it — or because they are its effect — as is the case for those operables of whatever kind which derive their certitude from the human intellect which guides their production or directs them properly to their right end.

It must not be thought, however, that the problem of the attribution of the concept of certitude to the various subjects of which it might be predicated is in any sense exhausted by what has already been said about it here. It is obvious, of course, that so thoroughly superficial an exposition as the foregoing can hardly even pretend to be adequate, so that the principal intent of this warning is not at all to draw further attention to its glaring deficiencies. Rather, its purpose is to indicate that there is another whole series of questions, which lie roughly in the same line as the ones already touched upon and which now suggest themselves in connection with them. These, too, are questions about the subject of certitude in the proper sense. There is this difference, however, between the problems already treated and those now coming up for discussion that, while the former related entirely to the possibility of the verification of the proper concept of certitude in things which are in themselves non-intellectual, those immediately present and awaiting solution are all concerned with subjects which are wholly within the area, if not of the intellect, at least of knowledge.

These problems suggest themselves for different reason and in different ways. One can think, for example, of Mercier's theory of certitude as having its whole basis in a specification of the act of reflex judgment alone as the subject of certitude and then ask what is to be thought of his theory from this point of view.

It is also possible to think that the mention of cognitive faculty in the second of the two Thomistic definitions of certitude should include the senses, since they certainly are instruments of knowledge and since, beyond that, St. Thomas speaks very explicitly of the certitude of sense knowledge and compares the senses on the basis of the certitudes they yield (27). If, then, the senses are to be understood as included in this reference to cognitive faculty in the second definition, how is one to reconcile it with the first definition, which would appear to forbid such an extension because of its exclusive mention of "intellectus"?

Further than that, it is well known that the intellect comprises three principal operations; simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning (28). There would seem at first sight to be no reason why all three of these operations should not be embraced by the definitions, especially since both of them are interested -- whether directly or indirectly makes little difference -- in giving the broadest possible meaning to intellectual certitude. If this is to be the interpretation of the definitions by what right to all the modern writers take the second as <u>the</u> definition of certitude and understand its "firmness of adhesion" as having reference

to the act of judgment, without giving any explanation of why "cognitive faculty" does not include at least simple apprehension, if not sense knowledge (29)?

Perhaps the simplest way of answering these questions is to point to the fact that St. Thomas says absolutely nothing about the certitude either of the senses or of simple apprehension in his discussion of the two definitions. That alone should be enough to indicate that they are to be excluded from the proper concept of certitude.

It must be admitted, however, that the mere omission of these certitudes does nothing to explain why they have no place in connection with a consideration of the proper concept of certitude. One might even go so far as to say that, since the second definition has as its purpose the clarifying of the distinction between proper and improper certitude, he should have given at least some hint in connection with that definition of why these certitudes are not certitudes in the proper sense.

Such a statement would be without justification for two reasons. In the first place, the question which St. Thomas is treating in the place at which he introduces the second definition is the certitude of hope. In order to answer this question satisfactorily, all he need do is to make the distinction between proper and improper certitude and to show how hope falls under the concept of improper certitude. To go beyond that is not in any sense necessary for his purpose.

In the second place, he rather obviously presumes that neither the senses nor simple apprehension can create any serious difficulty in relation to the two definitions. He has, in fact, already clearly dis-

tinguished the first and second operations of the intellect and given some slight attention to the certitude of the senses in the first "Solutio" of the very same article as that in which the first definition of certitude occurs. But his basic assumption is that the student is acquainted with a very important and fundamental doctrine which would seem to eliminate any possibility of including the certitude of the senses and of simple apprehension in the proper concept of certitude.

He states that doctrine in several places in connection with the problem of truth. If one remembers that certitude is a formality of truth (30) there would appear to be no objection to applying what he says of truth to certitude.

Even before leaving the texts of the Commentary on the Sentences to which reference has already been made, it is possible to find at least one answer to the aspect of the problem which is concerned with the certitude of sense knowledge. In the response to one of the objections to his solution of the question of the certitude of hope, St. Thomas makes a distinction between the certitude of cognition and the certitude of order, which consists in the fact that the certitude of cognition never fails, while the certitude which is found in natural things can fail accidentally:

> "....Et ideo certitudo cognitionis numquam deficit, sed certitudo naturae deficit quidem non per se, sed per accidens...." (31)

The thing to observe here is that, when St. Thomas says that the certitude of knowledge never fails, he seems to be laying down a universal

principle, to which there can be no exception. If there could be exception made to it, the distinction he makes here between the certitude of order and that of cognition would appear to be utterly useless. Thus, it seems possible to say that the permanence of its certitude is a peculiar and particular characteristic of the certitude of knowledge in the proper sense, so that even the certitude of a cognitive faculty would not be proper intellectual certitude, if it admitted the possibility of being lost.

If, now, this statement is compared with what he says in the first "Solution" mentioned above (32) about the way in which the certitude of the sense is effected, it becomes rather clear that it is impossible for that certitude to meet the requirement of permanence which is demanded for the proper concept of intellectual certitude. What he says there (33) is that the determination of the judgment of the senses is due to the fact that the sensible object is actually present to the senses:

> "....et similiter determinatur judicium sensitivae partis ex hoc quod sensibile subjacet sensui..."

Because St. Thomas' immediate interest in this passage is simply to compare the way in which both the intellect and the sense are made certain by the determination which come to them from the fact that their respective objects are present to them, the full significance of these remarks might be lost unless one also remembers that, once the object of the sense ceases to be actually present to it, there can no longer be any certitude about the existence of that object:

> "....Hujusmodi autem certitudo, quod scilicet non possit aliter se habere, non potest esse circa contingentia aliter se habere. Tunc enim solum potest de eis certitudo haberi cum cadunt sub sensu. Sed quando fiunt extra speculari, idem quando desinunt videri vel sentiri, tunc latet utrum sint vel non sint..." (34)

This text from the Commentary on the Sentences may, however, appear to complicate the question for the act of simple apprehension at the same time that it gives at least some answer with respect to sense knowledge. Granted, from what is said here, that sense knowledge cannot be included in the proper concept of certitude because its certitude is only temporary, the same cannot be said of the certitude of simple apprehension, because the quiddities which are known by it are universal and therefore eternal (35). At least simple apprehension, then, would seem to be eligible for inclusion in the proper concept of certitude, since it meets the requirement of permanence.

For a satisfactory solution of the question of whether the act of simple apprehension should not be counted among the subjects in which the proper concept of certitude is verified, it seems necessary, then, to turn aside from this consideration of the object of its act to an examination of the nature of the act itself in its relationship to truth. It will be seen at once that this solution is a further argument against the possibility of finding the proper concept of certitude verified in sense knowledge.

It has already been noted (36) that the primary notion of truth is verified in the intellect, and not in the things. It now becomes

necessary to specify this further and to say that, since it is the truth as known which is the perfection of the intellect, the primary notion of truth is verified only in the second operation of the intellect, in which operation it composes and divides. The reason for this is that the intellect does not know its conformity to thing in the first operation of simple apprehension. It knows and enunciates the truth for the first time only when it judges its conformity to the thing known (37).

Since truth means an adequation between the intellect and the thing and since there can be an adequation only between things which are different, the adequation which truth requires cannot be found in the act of simple apprehension or in sense knowledge. The reason for this is that neither the intellect which apprehends simple quiddities nor the sense, which is purely receptive of the sensible species, has in it anything else than the similitude of the things they know. It is only when the act of judgment is performed that the intellect has in it anything which is properly its own and which does not exist in the object which it knows. In the act of simple apprehension and in the act of sense knowledge, therefore, there is just no possibility of a comparison of two terms in order to know their adequation. Therefore, there can be in them no knowledge of the truth or, the truth as known is not in them (38). Obviously, then, their truth cannot be the truth which is the perfection of the intellect and which is implied in the very notion of truth itself.

This does not mean, however, that the intellect is not true when it apprehends quiddities, or that the sense is not true when it knows its

object. What it does mean is that the truth which is in them is in them in the very same way in which the truth is in any other thing, that is to say, that in knowing their objects as they do they are conforming to the divine idea of what they should be as faculties of knowledge, in the same way that other things are conformed to the divine idea of what they, too, should be by being what they are (39). Thus the truth is in them simply as in a thing, and without any special reference to the act that they are faculties of knowledge:

> "....Veritas igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera....proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente; non autem in sensu neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est...." (40)

The only way, then, in which there can be truth or falsity in the first operation of the intellect which forms quiddities or in the apprehension of the sense -- apart from the judgment which the latter can make on its object -- is in virtue of its relationship to the act of judgment operated by the intellect following upon these acts of apprehension:

> "....In intellectu autem primo et principaliter inveniuntur falsitas et veritas in judicio componentis et dividentis; sed in formatione quidditatum non nisi per ordinem ad judicium quod ex formatione praedicta consequitur; unde et in sensu...non est ibi veritas et falsitas proprie, sed solum secundum ordinem ad judicium quod ex formatione praedicta consequitur; prout scilicet ex apprehensione tali natum est sequi tali judicium..." (41)

If it is possible to speak of truth as being properly in the sense, it is only because it is not simply apprehending its object, but judging it (42).

But it would seem that no such exception can be made for the act of simple apprehension, since there is no judgment whatsoever in that act.

It is extremely interesting to read, in the light of these texts, the one Noel (43) recalls in which St. Thomas speaks of the intellect's making a kind of comparison between the thing and its quiddity in the act of simple apprehension:

> "....Intellectus tamen incomplexus, intelligendo quod quid est, apprehendit quidditatem rei in quadam comparatione ad rem; quia apprehendit eam, ut hujus rei quidditatem..." (44)

It would seem that the important point of this text is that the comparison which the intellect makes here is between the thing apprehended and its quiddity, not between the quiddity as known and the quiddity in itself. Since this is so, it is impossible that this be such a comparison as can yield any knowledge of the truth -- and it is not at all clear that Noel tries to say that it is. The only case in which it could be of any use for a knowledge of the truth is exactly the case to which St. Thomas applies it, that is, to God, Who, in the supposition of the argument of St. Thomas, would then know the truth because he would know His quiddity as His own -- presumably because His intellect is identical with Himself.

Finally, with respect to the truth's being in the sense, it is especially important to observe the serve limitation which St. Thomas makes in connection with his admission that there is truth in the sense properly speaking. First of all, he grants it only for the case in which, as already noted (45), the intellect makes a judgment about its object.

It has no application at all to the case in which the sense merely apprehends its object without judging it. It seems that the consideration which leads him to admit that the truth is properly in the judgment of the sense is the sole fact that the truth is properly in the intellect when it judges.

It would appear to be a serious mistake, however, to conclude from this that he means to say that the truth is in the judgment of the sense in the same way that it is in the judgment of the intellect. He has made it clear (46) before he comes to this discussion at all that, though the judgment of the sense is a true judgment so long as its judgment is in conformity with the thing which it judges -- and it need not be in the case of its judging on the basis of common and accidental sensibles (47) -- nonetheless it does not know the truth:

> "....Sed veritas est in sensu sicut consequens actum ejus; dum scilicet judicium sensus est de re, secundum quod est; sed tamen non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu: si enim sensus vere judicat de rebus, non tamen cognoscit veritatem, qua vere judicat; quamvis enim sensus cognoscat se sentire, non tamen cognoscit naturam suam, et per consequens nec naturam sui actus, nec proportionem ejus ad res, et ita nec veritatem ejus...." (48)

He also makes clear in the same place as the one from which the text just quoted is taken that the truth is in the intellect as known. Thus, the intellect and the sense are alike in that the truth is in both of them as a consequence of their respective acts, that is to say, since in both cases the judgment made is actually conformed to the reality on which their

judgment is made. They differ, however, in that the truth is in the intellect as known, while it is not in the sense as known.

Thus, when he admits that the truth is properly in the judgment of the sense which is conformed with reality, he does not thereby mean to say that the perfection of truth is in it.

In addition to being able to make a judgment, a faculty which is to possess the perfection of truth must be able to know its conformity with reality. This only the intellect can know, because it alone is capable of that complete return upon itself which is required in order that it know that its nature is to be conformed to things (49). Thus, because it can judge and when it does actually judge correctly, the truth in the proper sense of the word is in the sense. But, because the sense is incapable of complete reflection, it can never know its own nature and the conformity of that nature with the object, nor can it ever possess the perfection of truth.

It would be extremely profitable to take time here to examine the modern commentaries made upon this text of article nine of the first question of the De Veritate, and to attempt an evaluation of such different interpretations of it as Boyer's and de Tonquedec's. To do so, however, would throw little light upon the problems here being discussed so that they will be passed by. It may be noted nonetheless that the disagreements about this text in no way affect what has been said here, since their concern is quite different from what is presently at issue. It should be observed,

furthermore, that Mercier's restriction of reflection to a voluntary and deliberate act of judgment is no where hinted at by St. Thomas when he talks of the reflection by which the intellect knows its own nature. It would seem, in fact, that the better interpretation is that he means quite the opposite.

What has been said thus far would appear to eliminate both sense knowledge and the act of simple apprehension from consideration as subjects of certitude in the proper sense. If neither the sense nor the first act of the intellect attain the perfection of truth, it would seem to follow necessarily that they do not attain to the perfection of certitude.

Still, there seems to be a serious difficulty with this conclusion. In the first place, it is a well-known and generally accepted Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrine that the senses are inerrant with regard to their proper objects (50) and that the intellect is likewise infallible with respect to its apprehension of the quiddities of sensible things (51). It is clearly impossible to deny that these certitudes are certitudes of knowledge.

In the second place, the sense of the second of the two definitions of certitude would seem to be simply that it opposes the certitude of knowledge to the certitude of operations which are directed by knowledge, and that it shows the latter is a derived certitude, since whatever certitude it has come from the certitude of the knowledge which directs it:

"....certitudo cognitionis est ex seipsa; certitudo autem naturae est ex alio ordinante in finem..." (52)

Now, it cannot be claimed that the certitudes of sense knowledge and of simple apprehension are nothing more than certitudes of operation. They are certitudes of knowledge and, as such, seem to fall directly into the class of certitudes which are opposed to the certitudes of operation in St. Thomas' exposition. This is the same thing as saying that they belong to that class of certitudes which are called such "proprie".

Finally, though the "intellectus" of the first definition clearly excludes sense knowledge, it does not seem to warrent excluding the knowledge of simple apprehension. The intellect is a faculty of knowledge and it is just as truly such in its first as in its other operations. If this first definition intends to define the certitude which belongs to the intellect as a faculty of knowledge -- and it can hardly be talking about the intellect in any other sense -- then it would seem that the intellectual act of simple apprehension should be included in it, and even with better right than the acts of judgment or reasoning, since it appears to be more certain than either of them.

The intention of this objection is, of course, to circumvent the argument which is based on the fact that certitude is a perfection of the truth (53). It would seem to be impossible to attack that argument directly. Understanding that the truth here spoken of is formal truth (54), that is, the truth which is defined with reference to the intellect which

it perfects (55), its own perfection, in turn, demands, first of all, that it be known as such (56) and, secondly, that it be certain. A sign that it must be certain to be perfect is, as John of St. Thomas points out (57), the fact that, if truth and falsity are taken only as relations, they can be present in or absent from a judgment entirely by chance or by accident. Thus, if the fact on which a judgment is based changes without the knowledge of the one who makes the judgment about it, that judgment becomes false. This would seem to establish clearly enough that certitude as defined by St. Thomas, that is to say, intellectual certitude, is a perfection of formal truth and that it can be found only where the truth as such, that is, the truth as known, can be found. Since it is incontrovertibly true that St. Thomas teaches that the truth as known is not found in either the sense or in simple apprehension, but only in the judgment, the only way of avoiding the same conclusion about certitude is to try to make a distinction between the certitude of truth and the certitude of knowledge in such a way that one could then claim that St. Thomas is defining the certitude of knowledge, not the certitude of truth, and that his insistence that the truth as known is found only in the judgment is, therefore, beside the point for the certitude of knowledge.

The foundation of this objection is, however, an equivocation. It assumes that every faculty of knowledge is such indifferently and the falsity of this assumption is already evident from what has been said. One does not get at the very bottom of an understanding of what the intellect

is until he appreciates the fact that it is, not simply a faculty of knowledge, but that it is a faculty which can know the truth, and that knowing the truth constitutes its perfection, and that this perfection is the truth as known:

"Perfectio autem intellectus est verum ut cognitum." (58)

and:

> ".....Sicut ergo bonum et malum designant perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus: ita verum et falsum designant perfectiones cognitionum..." (59)

It is obvious, then, that the consideration of the intellect as a faculty of knowledge leads to the very same conclusion as does the consideration of the truth. Certainly, in defining certitude, St. Thomas is not defining an imperfection of the intellect. Granted, then, that he is defining a perfection of it, it is inescapably true that that certitude cannot be found in simple apprehension or in the senses.

Further than that, to talk about the certitude of cognition as if it could be in any way separated from the certitude of truth betrays a complete misunderstanding of the clearly expressed Thomistic doctrine that knowledge is an effect of truth:

> "....Hoc est ergo quod addit veritatem supra ens, scilicet conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus...." (60)

These considerations seem to make it perfectly clear that any attempt to insinuate sense knowledge or the act of simple apprehension

into St. Thomas' two definitions is wholly illegitimate. It may be added, further, that is is hardly good procedure to take advantage of the lack of precision of the "virtutis cognitivae" in the second definition as the foundation for such an objection as the one just discussed. As already pointed out (61), the purpose St. Thomas has in mind in that definition is not at all to make an exact specification of the meaning of proper certitude, in the sense of indicating directly what is to be included in that term, but simply to make the distinction between the certitude of knowledge itself and the certitude of being and operation which is due to the direction or ordering of certain knowledge and which is to be excluded from the first.

It seems necessary, then, to admit that the senses and the first operation of the intellect are certain with the certitude of things, in the same way that they are true with the truth of things. Further than that, because their certitude is due essentially to the fact of their being naturally determined in their operation, as will be shown almost immediately (62), it would seem that there is no necessity for including them in the certitude which St. Thomas calls proper. If anything, it would appear that their certitude is improper and, to that degree, opposed to proper certitude.

A further objection to this conclusion might seem to be possible on the basis of an admission that St. Thomas makes for truth. It will be recalled (63) that, even though he makes it clear that the truth as known cannot possibly be in the sense faculty, he nonetheless grants that truth in the proper sense is in the true judgment of the sense faculty. The reason why he allows this proper truth to the judgment of sense is, on the one hand,

that it is a judgment and, on the other, that the truth can be known as such only by an act of judgment. It is, then, in the fact that they are both judgments that the true judgment of sense and the judgment which knows the truth as such coincide. This coincidence is enough to allow that truth in the proper sense is in the true judgment of sense.

Because of the parallel between certitude and truth which has been established in the preceding discussion, perhaps it will be thought that the same concession for certitude is warranted. It might seem that one could make this same distinction between certitude in the formal sense and certitude in the proper sense and then attribute certitude in the proper sense to the judgment of sense. It would not, of course, be claimed that the same thing is true of the simply representative act of sense knowledge or for the simple apprehension of the intellect, since neither of these are judgments.

If this were true, it would lead to a rather anomalous situation with regard to the second definition of certitude. It would mean that the judgment of sense was to be included in the definition of certitude, while both its simply representative act and the act of simple apprehension were to be excluded from it. This would appear to be a rather strange alignment of cognitive faculties. The only possible pretext for attempting to prove the truth of this strange situation would be that it might serve to underline the importance of judgment for the definition of certitude.

The attempt to do so fails, however, because here there is no longer a parallel between truth and certitude. Granted that the knowledge of the truth, that is, truth in the proper sense, is wholly dependent upon the ability to form a judgment, the case for certitude is entirely different. The sense is not certain in its judgment because it makes a judgment. In fact, if judgment is taken absolutely to mean a true judgment, the sense can make a judgment only because it is certain. The reason why it is certain is that its operation is naturally determined in such a way that it simply cannot be defective when it makes a judgment about its proper object — so long, of course, as the faculty of sense itself is not corrupted. Thus, the relationship between the certitude of sense and its judgment is just the reverse of the relationship between the proper sense of truth and the judgment of sense. Obviously, then, there is no ground here for a comparison between certitude and truth.

As might have been expected from what has been said, however, the relationship between certitude and judgment, on the one hand, and truth and judgment, on the other, is maintained in the case of the second operation of the intellect. Just as the formality of truth is dependent upon the fact that there is a judgment made, so neither is there any certitude in the proper sense apart from a judgment.

This is perfectly clear from what has already been said, but it may be well to quote a short passage from John of St. Thomas, in which he comments upon St. Thomas' statement (64) that one known that every whole is

greater than its part immediately he knows what a whole and part are, and that this knowledge belongs to man by reason of the very nature of his intellectual soul. John of St. Thomas is immediately interested in this text as an argument to prove that simple apprehension alone is not enough for the generation of the habit of first principles, but that the formation of a proposition and assent to it is also required. But what he says here about the necessity of judgment is perfectly applicable to the question of the still more general relationship between certitude and judgment:

> "Haec conclusio quantum ad primam partem, quod non sufficit simplex apprehensio terminorum sine judicio, sumitur ex D. Thom, qui in Quaestione LI, articulo primo dicit, quod ex nature animae intellectivae convenit homini, quod cognito quid est totum, et quid est pars cognoscat quod omne totum est majus sua parte. Illa autem cognitio partis, et cognitio totius est simplex apprehensio, sed illa cognitio: Omne totum est majus sua parte, est compositio et judicium, ut de se patet....ergo prima principia non in sola terminorum apprehensione consistunt, sed judicio, et assensu, et compositione." (65)

St. Thomas himself is but little less explicit, though he seems rather to presume that the determinations he has already made are sufficient, in such a passage as the following:

> "Potest enim uno modo considerari intellectus noster secundum se. Et sic determinatur ex praesentia intelligibilis, sicut materia determinatur ex praesentia formae. Et hoc quidem contingit in his quae statim lumine intellectus agentis intelligibilia fiunt, sicut sunt prima principia quorum est intellectus; et similiter determinatur judicium sensitivae partis ex hoc quod sensibile subjacet sensui..." (66)

This statement has already been referred to (67) for what it says about the determination of the sense. But that reference should

not cause one to lose sight of the fact that, before coming to this comparison at all, he has already discussed the question of the act of simple apprehension and has made it clear that he is here discussing judgment. Such texts could be rather easily multiplied in favor of the fact that judgment is an essential condition of certitude in the proper sense of intellectual certitude, but there would be little point in doing so. It is already sufficiently plain that composition of and judgment on the terms first simply apprehended is the necessary condition for the certitude of the intellect. Thus, when the opposite relationship between certitude and the judgment of sense is understood, it is clear that a distinction between formal and proper certitude and the extension of the meaning of proper certitude to include the judgment of sense, on the analogy of judgment and truth, is impossible.

From the point of view, then, of the derivation of the certitude of the judgment of sense, the improper sense of certitude is the only one which can be allowed for it. As already indicated (63), the reason for this is that the second of the two Thomistic definitions of certitude makes a clear distinction between proper certitude and the certitude which natural operations enjoy by reason of God's infallibly directing them to their ends.

It is worth while seeing how much St. Thomas insists upon this aspect of the comparability of the operation of the senses and of the act of simple apprehension to natural operations. Thus:

> "Nam primo (sensus) quidem circa propria sensibilia semper verus est aut modicum habet de falsitate. Sicut enim potentiae naturales non deficiunt in propriis operationibus, nisi in minori parte, propter aliquam corruptionem; sic etiam sensus non deficiunt a vero judicio propriorum sensibilium, nisi in minori parte, propter aliquam corruptionem organi...." (69)

What he here states as a comparison, he makes explicit as a principle of demonstration in the following text after he first notes the validity of the comparison:

> "Respondeo dicendum quod Philosophus comparat quantum ad hoc intellectum sensui. Sensus enim circa proprium objectum non decipitur....Et hujus ratio est in evidenti: quia ad proprium objectum unaquaeque potentia per se ordinantur, secundum quod ipsa; quae autem sunt hujusmodi, semper eodem modo se habent. Unde, manente potentia, non deficit ejus judicium circa proprium objectum. Objectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei: unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur...." (70)

When, then, the senses and the intellect in its act of simple apprehension have their objects applied to them there is no further indetermination in the faculties themselves which has to be overcome before they can know those objects. They are one whole step closer to their objects, as it were, than is the intellect in its operations of judgment and reasoning. In this connection, it is worth remarking how St. Thomas compares the senses which an animal has when it is born to the knowledge which man acquires by science. Thus, the senses are a kind of habit:

> ".....Cum autem animal jam generatum est, tunc hoc modo habet sensus, sicut aliquis habet scientiam quando jam didicit...." (71)

It might here be observed in passing that, when St. Thomas notes (72) that there is no habit which perfects the speculative intellect with regard to contingents, one could also add that it has no need of such habits, entirely apart from the fact that it is not concerned with contingents. Even if this were not true, the senses and the act of simple apprehension could very well be considered as supplying whatever the speculative intellect might be conceived as wanting to know about contingents.

These arguments would seem to dispose adequately of whatever difficulties might be raised against the exclusion of sense knowledge and the act of simple apprehension from the two Thomistic definitions of certitude.

It should be carefully noted, however, that the certitude of natural operation which characterizes the sense faculties and the act of simple apprehension is also verified in all the potencies of the soul, the intellect included:

> "Sic ergo dicendum est quod appetitus naturalis inest omnibus potentiis animae et partibus corporis respectu proprii boni..." (73)

From this point of view, there is no distinction at all to be made between the intellect and the senses:

> "....intellectus quidem naturaliter appetit intelligibile ut est intelligibile; appetit enim naturaliter intellectus intelligere, et sensus sentire..." (74)

There are several very interesting aspects to this doctrine that there is in the intellect itself and in all its operations a share in the improper certitude of natural operation and that this certitude is by no means confined to the act of simple apprehension. Thus, it would be very well worth while to discuss Rousselot's theory (75) that the intellect is formally specified by a desire and the consequences for that idea of the text last quoted above and which he cites in his favor, though apparently without adverting to the force of the "non est intelligibile".

More immediately important, however, is the necessity of emphasizing that this natural determination of the intellect is no such guarantee of the intellect's attaining the truth as it is that the senses and the act of simple apprehension attain their proper objects. The experience of error, even for those who are competent in the speculative or practical sciences, is too common to allow of any deception in that sense. It is apparently upon this well-attested failure of the intellect to gain the truth to which it is naturally directed that St. Thomas bases one of the two proofs he gives to show that the intellect differs from the senses:

> "Probat quod intelligere non sit idem quod sentire, per duo media. Quorum primum tale est. Intelligere contingit recte et non recte. Recte quidem contingit intelligere secundum scientiam, quae est speculabilium et necessariorum, vel secundum prudentiam quae est recta ratio contingentium agibilium, vel secundum opinionem veram, quae se habet ad utrumque, et non determinate ad alterum oppositorum, sicut scientia et prudentia, sed ad unum cum formidine alterius. 'Non recte autem' contingit intelligere, secundum eorum contraria, idest secundum falsam scientiam, et

"secundum imprudentiam et secundum opinionem falsam. Sentire autem non contingit nisi recte, quia sensus circa propria sensibilia semper verus est; ergo sentire et intelligere non sunt idem." (76)

There is, then, no possibility of confusing the second and third operations of the intellect with its first operation on the ground that all three are naturally certain in the same way. Neither does it deny that there is a natural determination in all three operations. Of course the problem now is to see in what sense the act of simple apprehension can be distinguished from the senses and be shown to be a truly intellectual act, in spite of the strong emphasis which has so far been placed on their resemblance.

The comparability of the senses and of the act of simple apprehension with respect to their being so naturally determined to their respective objects that they cannot possibly misrepresent them should not be the occasion of forgetting that the act of simple apprehension also has the character of an intellectual operation, and that this belongs to it essentially. The difference between it and the senses here is very clear. While the senses are severly limited to the particular conditions of the objects which they represent and judge, this determination is not imposed on the act of simple apprehension:

"Sciendum est igitur, quod secundum virtutem medii cognoscendi, cognitio ad multa vel pauca se extendit; sicut similitudo quae recipitur in visu, est determinata secundum particulares conditiones rei, unde est ductiva in cognitionem unius rei; sed similitudo rei accepta in intellectu, est absoluta a particularibus conditionibus, unde cum sic elevatur, est ductiva in plura...." (77)

Neither is this in any sense to be taken as denying that the senses are faculties of knowledge. It is, indeed, true that they do not represent their object as free of its material conditions. But they receive their species without matter:

> "....sensus autem recipit species sine materia, sed tamen cum conditionibus materialibus; intellectus autem etiam a conditionibus materialibus denuratas recipit...." (78)

In his commentary on the passage in the De Veritate from which this last text is taken, John of St. Thomas points out that the immateriality of which St. Thomas there speaks in connection with intellectual knowledge is to be understood as meaning something a good deal more significant than the mere negation or lack of matter. It has reference primarily to the fact that the representative species, in its formality as representative, does not determine the faculty of knowledge entitatively. And it is precisely this ability to receive the intelligible species or form, without being entitatively determined by it in its formality as species, which characterizes every faculty of knowledge and which makes all knowledge possible:

> "....Et quia cognoscentia debent habere istum modum peculiarem recipiendi seu essendi alia extra se, ideo dicitur quod immaterialitas est quasi radix cognoscendi..." (79)

Though it is surely necessary to recognize the fact that both sense knowledge and the knowledge of simple apprehension are thus truly knowledge, it is much more important that the distinction between them and its implications for certitude be made clear. Since, as already

indicated, sense knowledge is determined to the particular conditions of its object, it is completely lacking in the universality which its freedom from those particular conditions gives to the knowledge of simple apprehension. Granted that there is an essential dependence of intellectual upon sense knowledge (80) and that the nature of a material thing cannot be known completely and perfectly except insofar as it is known in its particular existence (81), it is nonetheless true that the knowledge which is proper to the human intellect as such is the universal knowledge of material forms and not the knowledge of those forms as they exist in their particular matter (82). This is, of course, the same thing as saying that the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of material things (83).

The close dependence of sense knowledge on the material conditions of its object has, then, the result that it is an indeterminate and uncertain knowledge. The individual sensible matter which is the principle of individuation of material beings is in itself a principle of indetermination, rather than of determination, so that the knowledge of the senses is incomparably inferior, from the point of view of certitude, to that of the intellect (84).

The essences or quiddities of material things which the intellect attains without error in the act of simple apprehension are not, however, subject to this incertitude. The reason is, of course, that they are universal. As such, they are free from the variability and

changeability which attaches to individual sensible matter. And it is because the senses cannot make abstraction from this individual matter and its incertitude that they are right in their judgment only when their object is actually present to them.

This is not to say that matter is not a part of the essence of a material thing. But the matter which enters into the definition of material beings is, not individual, but common sensible matter (85). It is also to be distinguished from the common intellibible matter which enters into the consideration of mathematics (86). But this common matter, as a part of the universal essence of the material thing which the intellect knows, shares the immobility and the certitude of the essence itself (87) and is itself knowable by the intellect (88).

These points have been sufficiently developed elsewhere (89), so that there is need here only to call them once more to mind. At the same time, it should not be allowed to pass without remark that it would seem to be because of their inadvertence to the necessarily universal character of intellectual knowledge as such that modern Scholastic writers, without apparent exception, accept the division of certitude into metaphysical, physical and moral (90). It is worth noting, furthermore, that the assignment by Van Steenberghen (91) of the medieval classification of the sciences to an aesthetic principal is rather startling evidence of unfamiliarity with this doctrine, and more particularly with the forty-fourth lesson of the first book of St. Thomas' Commentary on the Posterior Analytics in which it plays so important a part.

The foregoing discussion should be enough to make it clear that the subject of certitude in the proper sense is the intellect in its operations of judgment and reasoning. This precision of the subject of certitude is necessary, since the proper subject of an accident must be placed in its definition (92). It may be noted incidentally that, since it is certitude in the abstract which is defined in the two Thomistic definitions, its subject is mentioned in the genitive case rather than in the nominative (93).

Since the intellect apprehends the naked quiddities of material things (94) in such a way that it is naturally free of error, it might be thought that the other intellectual operations were thereby automatically guaranteed the same inerrancy. It might seem that a process which was so well begun could not be deficient in its ulterior developments.

This would, indeed, be true if it were a matter of apprehending uncomposed immaterial things, the substance of which is the same as their essence. In that case, the judgment of the knowledge about their substance would add nothing to the knowledge of their essence as simply apprehended (95). But material things are not the same as their essence (96) and their essence is itself composed (97). It is one thing to know the quiddity of material things without error and quite another thing to know all that that quiddity contains. That simple apprehension truly attains and correctly represents as much of the

quiddity as it does reach is all that is assured by its natural certitude. There is no such warrant for the perfect accuracy of what escapes it. Cajetan has made this distinction very plain:

> "....nota quod aliud est cognoscere quiditatem seu cognitio quiditatis, et aliud est cognitio quiditativa seu cognoscere quiditative. Cognoscit enim leonis quiditatem quicunque novit aliquod ejus praedicatum essentiale. Cognoscit autem quiditative non nisi ille qui omnia praedicata quiditativa ad ultimam differentiam novit..." (98)

There is, therefore, a wide field of indetermination in human knowledge which remains unaffected by the natural certitude of simple apprehension. It seems important to observe, further, that this indetermination extends even to the relationship between quiddities and their essential predicates, because failure to realize this might lead to a complete misunderstanding of the reason which St. Thomas gives (99) for the necessity of judgment and reasoning in human knowledge. A careless reading of that text could very well leave the impression that simple apprehension implied a complete and total seiziure of the quiddities of material things and that judgment and reasoning were necessary only to arrive at a knowledge of their accidents. In the same way, neglect of Cajetan's distinction would have the effect of making it impossible to obtain a proper understanding of the fact that science is a means of arriving at conclusions in which proper passions are predicated of their subjects (100), and that this is accomplished through the medium of the definition of both the subject and the proper passion (101).

Once this determination of the subject of certitude has been made, it would seem simple enough to conclude directly that the "unum" of the first definition and the "cognoscibile" of the second have reference to the propositions which are the object of the acts of judgment and reasoning. It would seem to be impossible to interpret these terms as standing for an individual material object in its singular existence, since all that has been said up to this point of the nature of intellectual knowledge makes it fairly obvious that the intellect is concerned only with universals.

At the same time, however, it is also true that the practical intellect takes into account the individual moral act or the singular work of art in their contingency. Since this is true, it is necessary to consider briefly the possibility that these moral acts and works of art are included in these definitions.

Now, there is no question of the fact that St. Thomas teaches that there is certitude in the practical intellect (102). It is also noticeable that, in the text quoted above (103) in evidence of the difference between the intellect and the senses, that he speaks of prudence, as well as of science, as being determined to one of a pair of opposites. Thus, the authority of St. Thomas himself would appear to justify the inclusion of practical certitude in the two definitions.

Yet there seem to be serious difficulties with this interpretation. Without entering into the difference between the certitude of art as distinguished from that of prudence, which would be itself

adequate matter for separate treatment, it is legitimate to consider them as one from the point of view that the knowledge which they involve is the knowledge of contingent things as such, that is, in their contingency. From this aspect, they are, of course, clearly distinguishable from the scientific consideration of contingents, which abstracts from their singularity (104).

It would seem, then, that, though the practical intellect can and does attain certitude, it is a certitude which is quite different from that which is proper to the speculative intellect. St. Thomas seems to say this expressly, when he points out that the knowledge of contingents cannot be such or have such certitude that it completely eliminates the possibility of falsehood:

> "Est autem considerandum quod quia contingentium cognitio non potest habere certitudinem veritatis repellentem falsitatem, ideo quantum ad solam cognitionem pertinet, contingentia praetermittuntur ab intellectu qui perficitur per cognitionem veritatis....." (105)

This is not, of course, the same thing as saying that the practical intellect has no interest in truth. If that were true, it simply would not be an intellect. But its interest in the truth is subordinated to the fact that the work itself is its end:

> ".....Theorica, idest speculativa, differt a practica secundum finem: nam finis speculativae est veritas: hoc enim est quod intendit, scilicet veritatis cognitionem. Sed finis practicae est opus, quia etsi 'practici', hoc est operativi, intendant cognoscere veritatem, quomodo se habeat in aliquibus rebus, non tamen quaerunt eam tamquam ultimum finem. Non enim considerant causam veritatis secundum se et propter se, sed ordinando ad finem operationis, sive applicando ad aliquod determinatum particulare, et ad aliquod determinatum tempus...." (106)

Cajetan has something extremely important to say here, too, when he remarks that the perfection of the intellect must be distinguished. For the speculative intellect, perfection consists in knowing the truth. The perfection and truth of the practical intellect, however, is found in its directive act and it is in this line of direction that it is infallible:

> "....necesse est ad intellectum digredi eius perfectio: ac per hoc, veritas non consistat in cognoscere, sed in alio actu, qui perfectus verusque infallibiliter circa contingentia esse possit. Talis est autem intellectus practicus, ut sic: quoniam eius perfectio et veritas in actu dirigendi consistit, quae directio infallibiliter est vera circa contingentia, si consona sit appetitui recto praecedenti...." (107)

These texts seem to make it plain enough, not only that the practical intellect is not primarily concerned with truth as such, but also that the certitude which it does have is not such that it can ever entirely eliminate the possibility that the alternative which it does not choose is in actual fact the true one.

Another way of saying the same thing would be to point out that, with the exception of supernatural faith, the certitude of the speculative intellect, wholly derives from what pertains to cognition, while the certitude of the practical intellect does not. The fact that the rectification of the virtue of art does not depend on the moral virtues, is nonetheless no reason for forgetting the essential relationship to the good will which is implied in beauty (108).

In addition to these arguments against granting to the practical intellect that perfection of certitude which is found in the speculative intellect, there are also to be considered the texts in which St. Thomas makes explicit mention of assent as the determined acceptance of one part of a contradiction. Thus, in both the Commentary on the Sentences (109) and in the De Veritate (110), he quotes the definition of a certain Isaac, which makes "sententia" include the choice of a contradiction. The definition is somewhat more strongly worded in the De Veritate (where he attributes it to Avicenna, too):

> "....Sententia autem, ut dicit Isaac et Avicenna est conceptio distincta vel certissima alterius partis contradictionis..."

It is clearly impossible for practical knowledge to meet the requirements of this definition because, as has just been pointed out, the certitude which is had with reference to contingents does not absolutely exclude the possibility of falsehood (111).

It would appear that the only questionable feature of the application of these texts to the definitions of certitude is that they are not taken from the immediate commentary which St. Thomas makes on these definitions. However, if one keeps in mind the fact that in that commentary his attention is confined to the habits of understanding, science, and faith and that it is these same habits with which he is concerned in the places in which he defines assent in terms of contradiction, it seems that the better interpretation of

the "unum" and "cognoscibile" of the two definitions of certitude is to take them as referring to one part of a contradiction.

III. The Causes of Certitude:

According to a remark made by St. Thomas when he is distinguishing the value of the certitude engendered by faith from that which attaches to the intellectual virtues (II2), the essential judgment of certitude is to be made on the basis of its cause. It is hardly legitimate, then, to omit entirely any reference to the causes of certitude, even in so sketchy and incomplete an exposition of the Thomistic doctrine as this. It might be noted, further, that there is surely a reference to the causes of certitude implied in the two definitions, if faith is excepted from them, and that it is contained in the "unum" of the first and the "cognoscibile" of the second.

Immediately after he states the first of the two definitions of certitude, St. Thomas lays down the principle that certitude is the greater to the degree that the cause of the determination is the stronger. Then he distinguishes three ways in which the intellect is determined to the acceptance of one or the other alternative of a contradiction. In the case of the habit of understanding, the determination is caused by the fact that to which the intellect is determined can itself be seen so clearly by the intellect that its assent is necessitated. The determination effected by science comes from the fact that the conclusions known by science are resolved by

the discursive process of reason into self-evident principles. Finally, there is the determination of faith, which is due to the fact that the will commands the adhesion of the intellect, even though the latter cannot see the intrinsic evidence of the proposition to which it assents.

In the considerations which are to follow here, no further reference will be made to faith and, of the intellectual virtues, the emphasis in these few concluding remarks will be entirely on the virtue of understanding, since it is upon the certitude of this virtue that the certitude of science normally depends (113).

In his consideration of the intellectual virtues (114), John of St. Thomas points out two things at the very outset. The first, which applies equally to the virtues resident in the will and to those those subject to the intellect, is that these virtues must perfect the potencies in which they inhere, not simply in any way whatsoever, but with relation to the complete and perfect operation of these potencies. This has its basis in the very notion of a virtue as a perfect quality of the mind and the ultimate perfection of the potency. From this it follows that no one can be said to act virtuously if he acts in such a way as to produce imperfect and defective works (115). Further, since the speculative intellect has as its end the knowledge of the truth, the perfection which the intellectual virtues give to it is certitude, for, when it is certain, falsehood is excluded (116).

In the second place, a clear distinction must be made between the virtues which perfect the speculative intellect and the intelligible species. The intellectual virtues are not representatives, or substitutes for the object known. They are qualities which give the intellect a certain ease and facility in ordering its species properly so that they can manifest the truth. It is in this sense that the intellectual virtues are called intellectual light. This term, when applied to the intellectual virtues, is not to be understood to mean that they are the light which renders the object proportionate to the knower in such a way that it can be known. Rather, they actuate the potency itself and so perfect it that it can know a determinate object by putting the species in their proper relationship. The basic reason for this necessity of properly ordering the species is the fact that the intellect itself is indifferent not only to every science, but even to the species. However strange this may appear to be, it is nonetheless true and the explanation of it will be seen in a moment. It should also be observed that these habits are not innate, as are the potencies themselves, and so they must be acquired (117).

Turning now to the more particular consideration of the virtue of understanding, the first question to be asked about it is whether it really exists as a distinct quality from the faculty of intellect itself (118). John of St. Thomas answers that it is a distinct habit,

and for two reasons. The first argument he uses is that, even after the terms of first principles are known and explained, there still remains some difficulty in eliciting assent to them. The second, which is rather a sign than an argument, is that repetition of the acts which are concerned with first principles makes it easier to assent to them (119).

The fundamental reason for the difficulty which the intellect experiences in assenting to first principles opens up a whole wide vista on the essentially objective character of knowledge, as compared with the subjective nature of the will. While the intellect has of itself no determined inclination to one truth rather than to another — and this holds even for the case of a truth which is per se known — the will has a natural determination to its proper formal good. This is due to the fact that between the will and its proper object there is a "convenientia" which is lacking between the intellect and its object. By reason of this "convenientia", the object of the will is in some degree a part of the will itself. The object belongs to the will and the will finds itself in its object in such a way that, without the necessity of any additional formality, the will is endowed with the necessary inclination toward its object.

Truth, however, is not attained by way of inclination. It is seized only when it is illumined and manifest, so that, if the intellect is left to itself, that is to say, without this illumination

and manifestation of the truth, it remains completely indifferent to that truth. The first stage of this illuminative process is the information of the intellect by the species of its objects. And, since truth as such is attained only by composition and division, there is necessary a second illuminative operation. This consists in the proper ordering and composition of the species, so that the intellect can make its judgment about them (120).

Both these operations, that is, both the operations of simple apprehension and of judgment, require rectification. But they are rectified in different ways. The process of simple apprehension considered in itself — that is, insofar as there is in it no admixture of composition and division — needs rectification only from the side of the object, as Cajetan notes in the Prologue to his Commentary on the Predicaments (121). The act of judgment, however, demands rectification by its very nature, and this is furnished to it first of all by the habit of understanding. It is to perfect the intellect in knowing these first principles that a habit which has them for its object is necessary (122).

It is also extremely important that the function of induction be properly understood and that it be made clear that the habit of understanding is not generated by induction. In his discussion of how the habit of understanding is acquired, John of St. Thomas points out that Aristotle's mention of induction in connection with sense

experience has been taken by some, among whom he includes Vasquez, as the basis for asserting that the habit of the principles of natural science is acquired by induction and the enumeration of singulars (123).

John of St. Thomas is very careful to make it plain, in the first place, that simple apprehension alone is not enough for the generation of the habit of understanding. The reason is that a knowledge of first principles implies both judgment and assent, and these are missing from the act of simple apprehension. Thus, the truth as such cannot be known by simple apprehension, even in the case of first principles. This doctrine has already (124) been explained and the authority of John of St. Thomas invoked in support of it.

The main point of interest here, however, is the emphasis that John of St. Thomas places on the fact that the habit of understanding cannot be generated by induction alone. He admits that induction is a condition of assent to first principles, but denies that it is the formal reason of this assent. His argument here is based, first of all, on the fact that induction, though a true discourse, is neither necessary nor efficacious, but fallible. The intellect, however, assents to immediate propositions with greater certitude and evidence than it does to conclusions, so that such propositions cannot be considered as the product of any discursive reasoning (125).

In the second place, when the intellect assents to an immediate proposition, it does so as assenting to a universal proposition. However, since it is impossible to enumerate all the singulars, it cannot be precisely on the basis of an inductive enumeration of the singulars comprised by the universal that the universal character of the intellect's assent is based (126).

The consequence of this refusal to admit that induction is the formal reason for the intellect's assent to immediate propositions is the recognition of the fact that there are two aspects of immediate propositions which must be most carefully distinguished. The first is the mode of the proposition, that is, its universality, which pertains to its quantity. The second is the formal reason of the assent given to the proposition, that is, the intellect's seeing the connection between the subject and the predicate. Induction can prepare the way for the requisite universality and it is also necessary for a full and perfect knowledge of the relationship between the terms, which knowledge is the formal reason for the assent (127). But it is the understanding of the immediate connection of the terms which provides the evidence of the necessity on which the universality of the proposition is based (128).

It seems that it is simply because he assumes that this doctrine is generally understood that St. Thomas makes no mention of induction in his brief explanation of how immediate propositions are known in

the seventh lesson of the first book of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (129). It is scarcely necessary to add that it is in the light of these distinctions that one must read such statements as that in induction a universal is concluded from singulars (130), or that it is by induction that the first universal principles are known (131).

After considering the existence of the habit of understanding as related to its necessity, and after seeing that induction cannot generate the habit, it is important now to advert briefly to the question of its unity. Whether a principle is a first principle in the sense of a most common principle or in the sense that it is the principle of a particular science, all speculative principles are known by the same one habit of understanding. The basic reason why this is so is that the cause of the assent to all speculative principles is the same. No matter how much difference there is in the material objects of these principles, or however different the immateriality of the objects with which they are concerned, in the case of each and every one of them the formal reason for the assent given to it is the fact that the necessary connection between the subject and predicate of the principle is evident. Since the formal reason of the assent is thus identical in each case, the principles differ only materially or presuppositively. This means simply that there may be a greater or lesser difficulty involved in grasping the meaning of the terms of which the principles

are composed. But, from the point of view of the assent, there is no distinction to be made between them (132).

On the other hand, synderesis, or the habit of practical principles, is specifically different from the habit of speculative principles, since the formal reason for the assent differs in the two types of principle. Practical truth is not determined by what is or is not in reality, as is the case with speculative truth. Its determination comes from the good which is the object of the appetite rectified by right reason. Thus, there is a special and peculiar difficulty in eliciting assent to practical principles, which is absent from speculative principles. The fact that the habits of these principles differ specifically is not, therefore, surprising (133).

Since the certitude of immediate principles is caused by the evident connection between their subject and predicate, since this evident connection is the formal reason of the assent given them -- however much must be presupposed in the way of induction to come to an understanding of the meaning of the terms themselves -- it is necessary to say a word about the nature of evidence.

Quite obviously, "evidence" is derived from the Latin "videre". Its use in connection with intellectual knowledge is another example of the many instances in which terms which refer first to the sense of sight are, because of the nobility of that sense, transferred to the intellect (134).

St. Thomas says that those things are said to be "seen" which of themselves move our intellect or senses to know them (135). He further points out that the use of vision in this transferred sense applies not only to the genus of knowledge, but to the very mode of knowledge, so that there is a three-fold division of evidence. This division corresponds to the operations of simple intelligence, of the judgment of first principles, and of the scientific discourse in which conclusions are resolved into first principles and, therefore, "seen" (136).

John of St. Thomas stresses the fact that, in this division, evidence is attributed, not only to what can be immediately and intuitively seen in itself, but also to conclusions which, by scientific demonstration, can be reduced to what is immediately evident. The reason for the extension of evidence to cover the latter case is that whatever is connected in a necessary way with what is itself immediately evident remains illuminated by that immediately evident principle, so that it is as if it were itself seen immediately. He goes on to say that the sign of evidence is the conviction of the intellect by the object itself, without the necessity of the intervention of any extrinsic agent which would supply for the deficiency of the object (137).

He adds that some call the evidence by which the thing is known immediately in itself "intuitive", while they use the term "abstractive" to designate the evidence of a thing which is not attained directly but

through science (138). In view of St. Thomas' doctrine on the matter of evidence, it is clear that all abstractive evidence is in necessary dependence upon intuitive evidence, so that the distinction is one only of precise terminology.

The intellect, then, is necessitated to the predication made in an immediate principle when it possesses the evidence that the predicate is of the very reason of the subject (139). This, in turn, necessitates that it know the quiddity of that subject. If this knowledge is lacking, the intellect can never make such a necessary prediction, no matter how true it may be in fact that the predicate belongs to the very quiddity of the subject (140).

In one place (141), St. Thomas talks as if the causes of the lack of the knowledge necessary for an essential predication were two-fold. He speaks of the case in which the species does not adequately represent its object because the thing itself exceeds the intellectual species by which it is known. Then he mentions the case in which the thing known exceeds the capacity of the intellect, though it does not exceed the species itself.

It seems clear however, that he has in mind here the case in which God Himself is the species of our knowledge of Him.. In that knowledge, the object known, which is God Himself, does not exceed the species, because He is the species. At the same time, of course, He exceeds the capacity of the human intellect.

Outside this case, however, it seems absolutely necessary to say that the species is limited in its representative capacity in direct proportion to the capacity of the agent intellect which abstracts the impress species from the phantasm. Thus, any being which exceeds the capacity of the human intellect is also necessarily incapable of being represented by the intellectual species. This is the case with immaterial substances, which are, therefore, incapable of being known quiuditatively by the human intellect (142).

The further fact that the human intellect is in the last place in the order of intellectual substances necessitates there being a separate species for each thing which is known distinctly (143). This is, in fact, the reason why the human soul is united to a body (144). Otherwise, its knowledge would be extremely confused. It is only when there is a separate species for each essence which it knows that the intellect can know an essence with any kind of clarity:

> "....Manifestus est autem quod cum intellectus noster nihil cognoscat, nisi per aliquam speciem ejus, impossibile est quod per speciem rei unius cognoscat essentiam alterius: et quanto magis species per quam cognoscit intellectus, plus distat a re cognita, tanto intellectus noster imperfectiorem cognitionem habet de essentia rei illius, ut puta, si cognosceret bovem per speciem asini, cognosceret ejus essentiam imperfecte, scilicet quantum ad genus tantum: magis autem imperfecte, si cognosceret per lapidem, quia cognosceret per genus magis remotum. Si autem cognosceret per speciem alicujus rei, quae nulli bovi communicaret in genere, nullo modo essentiam bovis cognosceret..." (145)

It is clear that, if the intellect does not possess such a species as will adequately represent the essence of the thing which it knows, it

is impossible for it to make an essential predication about that thing. A development of this aspect of the doctrine of evidence would lead once more to the consideration of the degrees of formal abstraction under the particular aspect of their being distinct degrees of immateriality and scibility (as opposed to simple cognoscibility) and distinct illuminative principles making for specifically distinct sciences (146).

There is, however, no need of carrying this analysis of the two definitions of certitude any further, since what has already been said is sufficient to provide at least the beginning of an understanding of how beautifully they summarize the whole Thomistic doctrine. An exposition which would be worthy of being called a proper representation of St. Thomas' complete teaching on certitude would clearly be too vast a thing for any such essay as one of this type.

In order that there may be no confusion on the point, it should be emphasized that the more important aspects of the Thomistic doctrine on certitude are the ones which have been least developed here. In a very real sense, then, the only value which can possibly attach to such an essay as this is that it may help to eliminate some misconceptions which stand in the way of the understanding of the Thomistic doctrine.

The chief of these misconceptions is, of course, Mercier's interpretation of the two definitions, to which so much space has here been devoted. The reason why it has been given such careful attention is that it does not seem to have been at all appreciated how much Mercier depends upon what he claims to see in the definitions by way of justification for his theory.

This concentration on Mercier's theory is not, however, to be understood as implying that there are not other serious errors among some of the modern Scholastics in the matter of certitude. The reason why Mercier's has been selected for special consideration is simply that it is directly and immediately related to the Thomistic definitions. It would be equally interesting, for example, to trace the whole line of Jesuit manuals from Pesh to Donat, including Clarke and Richaby, which maintain the division of certitude into metaphysical, physical, and moral and to see in detail how that division is ultimately rooted in Suarez' doctrine of natural contingency. In the same line, it would be worth seeing the relationship which Palmieri has with this doctrine of Suarez by reason of his denial of that division and his insistence that the true division is that of absolute and hypothetical necessity.

Finally, one could start with Rousselot and his attempt to reconcile the Thomistic doctrine with the position of Bergson and his followers, and work out from there to a consideration of the relationship between these men and Dewey and the whole school of modern writers outside the Scholastic circle.

Perhaps the most significant thing of all, however, is that each time these men have attempted to find in the Thomistic doctrine itself a justification for the modern Sceptical theories there seems to have been an inevitable perversion of St. Thomas' teaching. There are a good many lessons to be gathered from this observation but the most important

would seem to be that no mere desire to be a Thomist can ever supply for a thorough-going knowledge of St. Thomas' position. There is here no question of practical certitude.

FOOTNOTES

I. Introduction:

(1) Cf. F.-J. Thonnard, et al., Précis d'Histoire de La Philosophie, Desclée & Cie., Paris, 1946, p. 939. Thonnard lists Balmes (1810-1848) as the first of the precursors of the modern Thomistic restoration which can be dated officially from the appearance of the Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" of Pope Léon XIII on August 4, 1879.

(2) J. Balmes, Philosophie Fondamentale, trans. Ed. Manec, Lardinois Liège, 1852, Tome 1er. Livre 1er, Chap. 1er, p. 15, #1.

(3) Fernand Van Steenberghen, Epistémologie, Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain, 1945, p. 19, Italics his.

Van Steenberghen's principal interest seems to be in building a system and he criticizes the modern Thomists for not having been sufficiently concerned to show that Thomism is a true philosophical system. Thus, in ft. nt. 1, p. 18, he says: "....Les auteurs de la renaissance thomiste actuelle n'ont pas toujours le souci de montrer que le thomisme comporte une véritable philosophie, un système philosophique. Or, tant qu'on n'a pas établi l'existence au moins virtuelle d'un organisme de ce genre dans le thomisme, on n'a rien opposé de sérieux aux puissantes synthèses de la philosophie moderne, et le thomisme demeure, aux yeux de nos contemporains, une mosaique de fragments philosophiques plus ou moins coordonnés entre eux sous l'influence extrinsèque de la théologie." (Italics his.)

This preoccupation of Van Steenberghen should be compared with such statements as the following, which Mercier places almost at the beginning of his Critériologie: "L'accord des psychologues est unanime sur ce point: L'âme humaine a une tendence naturelle à unifier les caractères représentatifs de la réalité....Il est donc naturel que nous nous efforcions de totaliser les résultats fragmentaires de nos premières abstractions. L'âme n'a de cesse qu'elle ne les ait unifiés; l'état d'âme que l'on appelle certitude, l'attachement a un objet, est ainsi subordonné à un travail d'unification; tant qu'il est inachevé, la dubitation tiraille l'âme, le repos est impossible ou n'est point définitif..." — Le Cardinal D. J. Mercier, Critériologie Générale ou Traite Générale de la Certitude, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain, 8ème éd., 1923, pp. 8-9, #7. (Italics his.)