

solum agit actione propria sed actione superioris agentis...

Ratio autem et voluntas sunt quaedam potentiae operativae, sed invicem ordinatae. Et absolute considerando, ratio prior est, quamvis per reflexionem efficiatur voluntas prior et superior in quantum movet rationem. Unde voluntas potest habere duplicem actum:

1) unum qui competit ei secundum suam naturam in quantum tendit in proprium objectum absolute; et hic actus attribuitur voluntati simpliciter ut velle et amare, quamvis ad hunc actum praesupponatur actus rationis;

2) alium vero actum habet qui competit ei secundum id quod ex impressione rationis relinquitur in voluntate. Cum enim proprium rationis sit ordinare et conferre, quandoque in actu voluntatis apparet aliqua collatio vel ordinatio, talis actus erit voluntatis non absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem. Et hoc modo intendere est actus voluntatis... (1)

The will, then, has essentially only the power of willing, but because of a certain participation in the intellect, it can will, after comparing

(1) De Ver., q. 22, a. 13; Cf: Ia-IIae, q. 17, a.1.

the possible alternatives. For example, the act of election proceeds from the will after it has compared and chosen one possibility in preference to another; or again, the act of intention has reference to the end in so far as this latter is compared to the means. Ordering and collating are proper to the intellect and hence, when they are found in the will, they exist there by participation. A similar instance of this kind of participation is observable in the intellection of the angels. The light which a superior angel has can strengthen and perfect the intellective potency of an inferior angel that the latter may know more clearly its object. It accomplishes this by placing before the lower angel an object illuminated in a higher mode by the superior intellect, and thus communicates to the inferior angel a mode of understanding more perfect than its proper mode.

Sic igitur unus angelus dicitur illuminare alium in quantum ei veritatem quam ipse cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit quod "Theologiplane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ordines a supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias."

Cum autem ad intellectum duo concurrant in ejus operatione, scilicet virtus intellectiva et similitudo rei intellectae, secundum haec duo unus angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest.

1) Primo quidem fortificando virtutem intellectivam ejus; sicut enim virtus imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situationali propinquitate perfectioris corporis, ut calidum crescit in calore ex praesentia magis calidi, ita virtus intellectiva inferioris angeli confortatur ex conversione superioris angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim facit in spiritalibus ordo conversionis quod facit in corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis.

2) Secundo autem unus angelus alteri manifestat veritatem ex parte similitudinis rei intellectae. Superior enim angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione ad quam capiendam inferioris angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit ut ab inferiori capi possit et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit.

Although the superior power perfects the inferior, it does not communicate this superior

(1) Ia, q. 106, a. 1.; Cf: Quodlib. IX, q. 4, a. 5; De Ver., q. 9, a. 1, c. et ad 2.

mode with the same perfection with which it is found in the superior, but according to the capacity of the inferior. Thus, when an inferior angel is illuminated by a superior, it does not receive another light of the same excellence as it is found in the higher angel, but, by the illumination of the superior, it attains a proportionate object, now presented with greater clarity and distinction. In this way the intellect of the lower angel can penetrate and understand that object with a greater intensity and distinction than it could achieve by itself.

Unus angelus illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae, vel gratiae, vel gloriae, sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae et gratiae et gloriae. (1)

Et ideo superiores semper remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister quam discipulus qui ab eo addiscit. (2)

(1) Ia, q. 106, a. 1 ad 2.

(2) Ia, q. 106, a. 4.

Ita ergo philosophandum est in fide, (1) for faith, compared to natural science is a superior light. Just as the lower angel is strengthened in his knowledge because of the illumination of the higher angel and thus knows more perfectly than he would by his own proper light, so the demonstration of the Christian philosopher, by reason of the fact that his science is joined with faith, has a greater perfection in that he has not only the certitude proper to the scientific act, but also a superadded, more intensive certitude imparted by faith. This conclusion, it should be noted, does not revert to that position already denied, that the same intellect can elicit acts of faith and science in regard to the same truth. Nevertheless, though it is impossible to have faith about a truth evidently known, there is no inconsistency in holding that the intellect which has a demonstration of a particular truth also knows that the same truth is contained virtually and

(1) Joannis a St. Thoma, Curs Theol., In IIam-IIae, disp. 2, a. 1, (Vivès: Paris, 1885), n. 24, p. 33.

implicit in other truths about which it makes directly an act of faith. Considered in this way, the habit or act of faith does not extend directly to the particular truth evidently known, but only indirectly and accidentally in so far as the same truth is known to be contained virtually and implicitly in other truths which are immediately and directly revealed. Thus, there is no incompatibility in such a concurrence of faith and science because the intellect is not strengthened in its natural demonstration by the addition of another assent, but simply by the knowledge that the truth which is demonstrated falls also under the light of faith which is recognized as more certain and infallible than reason. And although the intellect does not elicit an act of faith in that truth itself--that would be incompatible with the evident knowledge of it--nonetheless it perceives that since the truth falls implicitly under the testimony of God, the intellect can partake of another certitude for exceeding any certitude conferred by natural reason. And by the very fact the intellect recognizes that the same truth also under an infallible light

superior to reason, it is reinforced in its assent to adhere more strongly than before. In this way, the Christian philosopher is strengthened in his natural demonstration by the superadded certitude conferred by faith. (1)

This superadded certitude which the natural demonstration receives from faith is not the certitude of a formal act of faith, but it participates in the certitude of faith. In the illumination of the angels, the new light by which the lower angel is perfected in its understanding is not formally the intelligible light of the superior angel but a participation in that light because the "confortatio ex conversione superioris angeli ad ipsum" (2) does not effect a change of the lower angel into the higher but a perfection which is proportioned to the capacity of the inferior. (3) Similarly, the certitude which science receives from the higher

(1) Cf: Salmanticenses, Curs. Theol., De Fide, Trac. 17, disp. 3, dub. 3, sect. 2, nn. 84-86.

(2) Ia, q. 106, a. 1.

(3) Cf: Ia, q. 106, a. 4.

light of faith is not communicated to it in every respect but only in so far as science is capable of receiving it. Now, the evident act of demonstration precludes a simultaneous obscure act about the same object, as has been shown. Hence, science is not capable of receiving the obscurity of faith but only the certitude it offers.

On this Capreolus says:

Ex toto illo processu non aliud concluditur nisi quod auctoritas divina et medium necessarium possunt concurrere ad causandum unum et eundem assensum clarum et evidentem. Et hoc conceditur. Tamen, in illo casu assensus ille evidens non erit actus fidei proprie dictus, scilicet creditivus, sine evidentia, sed scientiae. Cujus ratio est quia medium illud evidens et necessarium tollit formalem rationem objecti fidei cum faciat illud enuntiabile quod concludit esse apparens et visum. Actus autem fidei non cadit super illud ubi non salvatur ratio sui objecto. (1)

Even though this added certitude does not appertain to faith formally but only participatively,

(1) Capreolus, Defensiones, in III Lib. Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, ad arg. contra 2am concl., ad 2.

it is not for that reason inferior in ratione firmitatis. If it were inferior in this respect, it would not be of equal firmness, as would be the case if it were not taken immediately and precisely from faith but only derived from it by a natural discourse as in a theological conclusion. But, this participated certitude which Christian philosophy has from faith is not communicated to a natural demonstration by way of inference and discourse. It arises rather in this way: once the certitude of faith is presented and proposed to the intellect proceeds in the demonstration fortified by a greater security and adherence to its object. Hence, the certitude derived from faith still remains supernatural, not natural and thus is in no wise inferior as certitude, but is the certitude of faith itself.

An explanation of some of the terms used to describe this added certitude may help to clarify its nature. This certitude is said to be "participated" (1) because it does not accompany a

(1) Joan. a Sto Thomas, Curs. Theol., in Ilam-IIae, disp. 2, a. 1. (Laval, 1948), p. 88, n. 314.

formal act of faith but partakes of the perfection of faith in so far as it participates in the greater firmness of adherence of faith without sharing in the obscurity. It is also called "accidental" (1) because it does not arise from the evidence of the demonstration and therefore does not belong essentially to it but is communicated accidentally to it from faith. This certitude may also be called "extrinsic", (2) provided this signifies that it does not originate in the scientific act but is superadded to it and derived from the testimony of God. It connotes also that the testimony of God is an extrinsic measure of the greater certitude of the assent. With equally good reason this certitude may be called "intrinsic", inasmuch as this added certitude can truly be called a quality of this demonstration, and the habitus can be said to be strengthened by the new certitude which it has. The fact the added certitude is communicated accidentally

(1) Ibid., n. 314.

(2) Cf: Salmanticenses, Curs. Theol., Tract. 17 De Fide, disp. 3, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 85.

from faith does not make it extrinsic, any more than 'this whiteness' (hoc album) would be extrinsic to man, simply because whiteness is an accident. As is evident, neither the term intrinsic nor the term Extrinsic does much towards clarifying the certitude in question, because both must be so qualified by what is already known about this superadded certitude, that they do not explain but are rather explained by the certitude in question. John of St. Thomas also calls this a certitude based "suppositively and causally" on faith (" praesuppositivae et in sua causa"), because it is not founded on God testifying formally and proximately but follows as an effect of the formal assent of faith, participating in the certitude but not in the obscurity of faith. Finally, this added certitude may even be called "secondary" (1) not to indicate an inferiority in ratione firmitatis, but to signify that this added certitude accompanies

(1) Cf: Capreolus, Defensiones, in III Lib. Sent., dist. 25, q. 1. a. 3, ad arg. contra 2am concl. ad 3; Conet, Clypeus Theol. Thom., Tract. 10, disp. 1, art. 6, sect. 2, n. 186 (Vivès, 1876) V, p. 145a.

the assent to the particular truth which is given primarily because of the medium of the demonstration, which perfectly convinces the intellect and moves it to adhere.

The sum up then, the act of the philosopher demonstrating is an evident and certain act and therefore formally an act of science. The certitude conferred by faith on the natural demonstration is not formally and proximately the certitude of the authority testifying, but suppositively and causally. In this way, the certitude of faith, but not the obscurity is communicated because in the act of demonstrating is no formal assent of faith but something participated in from that assent. And, if it be asked: of what species is this added certitude? is it natural? or is it truly supernatural so that it renders the philosopher's demonstration unquestionably?-- there is no doubt but that this participated certitude from faith is of the same species as faith itself, not formally but reductively, in so far as it is not elicited by faith, but follows from faith. The strengthening of the assent, although

not formally and immediately a judgment of faith, is, nevertheless, derived from and regulated by the testimony of God. It is precisely by this regulation that the intellect is reinforced in its assent so that it adheres more firmly. Thus, the certitude communicated by faith, while leaving the natural demonstration unchanged and in its propria ratione specifica, at the same time renders it more infallible in its assent by the addition of a greater certitude.

There still remains a difficult objection. How can it be said that faith communicates certitude about a particular truth such as God exists, unless it elicits some act or assent concerning that truth? If there is no assent of faith to it, there is no certitude of faith, and a fortiori no certitude to communicate. Now, faith (which is always obscure) is prohibited from eliciting such an assent because of the evident act of demonstration. It seems, therefore, that it is also prohibited from communicating any certitude.

The reply to this difficulty is contained

implicitly in what has already been explained. Faith does not communicate certitude to science about the truth God exists through an act of believing elicited about that particular truth already known through demonstration. But there is no reason why the certitude of faith must be restricted solely to the particular elicited act. Beyond that there may follow a certain effect, that is, a judgment which will "re-present" the certitude, but not the obscurity of faith. This is not the formal assent of faith, but a subsequent judgment participating in the certitude of that assent. It suffices simply that the act of faith precede the scientific knowledge, or even, once the truth has been demonstrated, that the act of faith follow in regard to other truths, and that among these is known to be contained implicitly the truth Deus est. It sometimes happens that before one has certitude through demonstration concerning this truth Deus est, he makes an act of faith concerning it, or even after he has had the demonstration, he begins to have faith, not about that particular truth but about another in which that truth is contained, for example, that God is triune and

one. In doing this, he knows, at least reflexively, that the truth known by demonstration is contained among the truths of faith. For example, since faith tells him that God is triune, a fortiori he is certain that God is, by a certitude greater than the certitude of his demonstration.

In arriving at this, the intellect forms a double judgment about the truths of faith. These judgments are not acts of believing, but something remaining over from the act of believing and formed as effects of it. The first is an absolute judgment in which it is judged that the truth Deus est is one of those contained in faith, and hence, since it falls under the certitude of faith, cannot be other than it is in a much more definitive way than can be shown by natural reason. This is the judgment made reflexively on faith in which the certitude, but not the non-evidence of faith is "re-presented." The second is a comparative judgment in which a man judges that he must not cling to sensible things and to his natural reason to such an extent that because of these he would judge divine things to be false. In this judgment, the heart is purified from error,

and this purification, as St. Thomas teaches, is an effect of faith.

Fides etiam informis excludit
quandam impuritatem sibi oppositam
scilicet impuritatem erroris, quae
contingit ex hoc intellectus hum-
anus inordinate inhaeret rebus se
inferioribus, alium scilicet vult
secundum rationes rerum sensibili-
um metiri divina. (1)

It is evident that these two judgments are not the act of faith itself, but the effects of faith, since through them what is certain and not what is obscure in faith is re-presented. Fortified by the certitude which accompanies these two judgments, the natural science is so perfected that it can proceed more securely and without danger of error, because it not only possesses the certitude of its own proper light, but it also participates in the higher certitude of the infallible light of faith. In this way the natural science of the philosopher who is Christian is perfected by this higher, superadded certitude communicated from

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 7, a. 2 ad 2.

faith; and, this to extent his philosophy can truly be called Christian philosophy.

III. A Reply to the Opinions of Modern Scholastics.

The aim of the present chapter will be to reconsider the positions of the modern Scholastics on the problem of Christian philosophy set forth in Chapter I in the light of the solution given in Chapter II. Since there is almost total disagreement with every position, the Scholastics' opinions should be considered in regard to the solution given here as objections to which a reply must be given. In discussing these, the order of reply will follow the order in which the positions were stated: first, the arguments against Christian philosophy will be answered; secondly, the position of those who favored Christian philosophy will be reconsidered.

1.

A Reply to Those who Denied Christian
philosophy.

The first argument against the possibility of Christian philosophy was based on the reason that philosophy is autonomous and radically independent of revelation. If philosophy were to be Christian, the argument maintained, it would have to admit faith into its process and would consequently lose its rational character and name of philosophy.

The argument may be admitted to the extent that it asserts that the natural sciences and the science based on the principles of faith are distinct sciences. Moreover, it is true that the natural sciences are not subalternated to faith or theology, because there is no continuity between these either on the part of the subject, which in every case of the natural sciences is completely distinct from the subject of faith and theology, or on the part of the principles, because the natural sciences have their

per se nota principles in the first principles of their respective sciences. The argument fails in this, however, that it contests a notion of Christian philosophy which was never true in the first place, and ignores the true sense in which philosophy is called Christian. It can be readily granted without argument that the principles of philosophy are "autonomous," provided this is understood to mean that they receive no new light from the formal object or principles of faith or theology, and that they are in no way dependent on faith or theology for the evidence of their principles,. Nevertheless, it is true that the certitude of these natural principles--and, a fortiori, the certitude of the conclusions deduced from them--is inferior to the certitude given by faith about the same truths. Here, the problem only begins, for then the question must be asked: if the same person has both faith and scientific knowledge, can he have both in regard to the same object, and can the greater certitude of faith perfect his natural knowledge? This is the true problem of Christian philosophy which this argument totally ignores.

A further observation might be made in regard to the way that this opinion uses the word rational. In the argument it was assumed that the principal point of opposition between philosophy and faith was the fact that the philosophy was "rational" and that faith was not, as if rational could not in any way be applied to faith and theology. The term rational may be taken in two ways: 1) according to a common acceptance to signify intellectual. Thus understood, it is said of the cognitive power and acts of any intellectual nature. In this way, man, the angels, and even God can be called rational in so far as the term denotes a nature whose cognitive powers are not immersed in matter.

Deus potest dici rationalis
naturae secundum quod ratio non im-
portat discursum, sed communiter
intelligibilem naturam. (1)

2) Strictly and properly, rational is said of an intellectual nature which does not know the truth

(1) Ia, q. 29, a. 3 ad 4.

immediately, but arrives at it only per inquisitionem et discursum. Taken in this way, rational is a mixed perfection, found formally in man, but eminently and virtually in God and in the angels. According to either acceptation, the term should be applied to an intellectual nature, or to the powers or acts of that nature, or to the knowledge which is proper to that nature. But in whatever sense rational is used, it does not distinguish the purely natural sciences from faith and theology. Rational may be opposed on the one hand to sensitive knowledge, or, on the other hand to the immediate knowledge of truth by understanding, but not to knowledge through faith, because rational is not opposed as evident to non-evident. If it be said of human knowledge inasmuch as this is acquired less perfectly, i.e., per discursum, it can be applied to theology as well as to the natural sciences. The opposition would have been better stated between natural demonstration as an evident knowledge of sensible quiddities known ultimately through the senses, and the non-evident knowledge of faith.

The second objection (page 17) argued against the notion of Christian philosophy, because the formal objects of philosophy on the one hand, and the formal objects of faith and theology on the other hand are different, and therefore, the two cannot be united to form one body of knowledge. And, this is true. However, the objection does not really differ from the preceding one, but merely states the same argument in different terms. Hence, when it is said that sciences are distinguished by diverse principles or by different formal object, these two reasons are not opposed, but explain the same thing by different formalities. Sometimes the sciences are said to be distinct because they proceed from different principles.

Dicit enim quod una scientia est altera ab aliis quarum principia sunt diversa, ita quod nec unarum scientiarum principia procedant ex aliquibus principiis prioribus nec principia unius scientiae procedant ex principiis alterius, quia sive procederent ex eisdem principiis sive alia ex aliis, non esset diversa scientia. (1)

(1) St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lec. 41, n. 10;
Cf: St. Thomas, in VI Meta., lec. 1.

In a science the conclusions demonstrated proceed from diverse definitions or rather modes of definition, which are the principles of scientific knowledge. Thus, in so far as the definitions, the principles in a demonstration, differ, in ratione scibilitatis, that is, are distinct in causing and manifesting the truth by means of an inference, the conclusions known through these principles will be different, not merely in any material way, but in ratione scientiae. But, sciences are also said to be distinguished by reason of their formal objects:

Cum autem distinguuntur
scientiae ut sint habitus quidam,
oportet quod penes objecta disting-
uantur, id est, penes res de quibus
sunt scientiae... (1)

A difference of objects does not mean here objects considered merely materially and entitatively, in esse rei, but objects in so far as they are proportioned to a potency or habitus in formalitate objecti. Because all habitus are specified according to their objects in quantum sunt objecta, so the

(1) St. Thomas, In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.

unity and diversity of the scientific habits are specified by the diverse objecta scibilia, in so far as these known according to a certain formal abstraction or, illuminated by certain mode of definition. Thus, to say "sciences are distinguished by their diverse principles, "and sciences are distinguished by their different formal objects," is to express the same truth, but according to different formalities. While it is true that the formal objects of faith and theology are not attained through abstraction from matter, but according to a participation in the light of divine science itself, nevertheless, the truth is the same. Therefore, if philosophy and theology are distinct in their principles, they are also distinct in regard to their formal objects. However, once again it should be noted that the objection is valid only against the opinion that philosophy is Christian because it somehow could have an object which would be composed of the object of faith and the object of a natural science--which is obviously impossible. And the argument is not valid against the notion of Christian philosophy as explained above, in which

the certitude of faith is communicated to the natural demonstration.

The third objection against Christian philosophy (page 18) denied that the influence of Christianity on the progress of philosophy argued to the existence of a Christian philosophy. This will be considered at length in the next section when the confortationes objectivae which faith is usposed to offer to philosophy are discussed.

The final objection (page 20), namely that the term Christian philosophy, even if to a certain extent legitimate, should be avoided because adversaries of the Church would accuse Catholic philosophers of enslaving reason by religious authority, is scarcely an objection in the order of doctrine. An objection in the form of a misunderstanding of the use of the term can best be met by explaining its right signification. While it cannot be expected that unbelievers will accept the conclusion that faith and theology perfect philosophy with an added certitude, nevertheless it can be shown

even to them that the position involves no contradiction.

11.

Discussion of Those (unions Which Favored
a Christian Philosophy.

The arguments set forth in favor of a Christian philosophy because of certain confortati-
ones objectivae (page 23) are insufficient for establishing the point. The argument, it will be recalled, was as follows: the union of philosophy to faith and theology is an indispensable condition for the development of philosophy. From the viewpoint of the object of philosophy, there is no obstacle to the progress of philosophy without any recourse to revelation. However, in the present fallen state of human nature, progress in philosophy cannot actually be achieved in man unless his intellect, now suffering from the vulnus ignorantiae of original sin, is elevated to a participation in divine life. This imperfection of ignorance is corrected in the Christian philosopher by reason

of the fact that his faith proposes, or draws his attention to truths of the natural order, truths, which absolutely speaking, reason could know of itself, but which in the present state it cannot attain with certitude and without error. Moreover, these revealed doctrines, because of their infallible source, are not mere suggestions for consideration on the part of the philosopher, but are infallible truths towards which he directs his inquiry as to an end. The argument raises three questions which will be considered in order:

1) Is the intellect in the present state of man insufficient for knowing speculative truth? (for, if it is a question of the philosophical sciences, the sufficiency of the speculative, not the practical intellect is at stake). To what extent, if any, has the vulnus ignorantiae affected the speculative intellect? And a correlative question: what restoration, if any, has grace made in the philosopher who is Christian?

2) In any case, can it be said that philosophy receives confortations subjectivae from faith

and theology?

3) Can the infallible truths of faith be said to be an end towards which the Christian philosopher directs his inquiry?

1) Original Sin and Philosophy. Before undertaking the discussion of the relation of original sin to philosophical truths, certain terms must be clarified. First of all, the truths under discussion are natural, not supernatural truths. Natural truths are not all those that are not supernatural, but, as St. Thomas teaches, those of which man can have knowledge per sensibilia or which can be deduced from first natural principles.(1) And about these the question is asked: can they be known without the aid of grace? Secondly, it must be presupposed that question concerns speculative, not practical truth. Hence, the question will involve the necessity of grace for the intelligence as such, and not for the intelligence which attains truth through a conformity to right appetite.

(1) Cf: Ia-IIae, q. 109, a. 1; III Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 5.

The teaching of St. Thomas on this is: original sin did not affect intrinsically the speculative intellect. Hence, in knowing any one speculative truth, the intellect, beyond the general concursus, needs no special grace.

St. Thomas defines original sin as:

*Quaedam inordinata dispositio
proveniens ex dissolutione illius
harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio
originalis iustitiae. (1)*

The whole ordering or original justice consisted in the subjection of man to God and the consequent right disposition of man's powers, one to another. The subjection of man to God was affected first and foremost through the will which, since it is the faculty of the subject itself, has the power to dispose all the other parts to their ends. When the will through original sin was turned away from God, all the other parts were thrown out of the proper order to their end. Thus, the privation of original justice, the root of original sin, which

(1) Ia-IIae, q. 82, a. 1.

resulted in the dissolution of this harmony, is not found indiscriminately in any part of the soul, but first of all in the highest part, that is, in the privation of the subjection of the will to God and secondly in the other parts of the soul which, tending to their own proper goods, cause a lack of harmony in man. However, what is said of the will which was wounded intrinsically by original sin, inasmuch as it lost that supreme love of God, ultimate end of man and first principle of human acts, must not be applied directly to the speculative intellect. That the speculative intellect was not wounded intrinsically by original sin is the teaching of St. Thomas as well as of the commentators.

Per justitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires; et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subjecta. Haec autem originalis justitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis, sicut jam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem; et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur.

Sunt autem quattuor potentiae animae possunt esse subjecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est; scilicet

ratio in qua est iustitia; irascibilis in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine bonum est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur ordine suo ad arduum est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae. Sic igitur ista quattuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis.(1)

The effect of original sin which is pertinent here is the vulnus ignorantiae and, it is to be noted that St. Thomas places it in the ratio in qua est prudentia, in other words, in the practical, not in the speculative intellect. Again, in reply to the question: Can man without grace know any truth? he says:

Unaquacque autem indita rebus creatis a Deo habet efficaciam respectu alicujus actus determinati in quem potest secundum suam proprietatem. Ultra autem non potest nisi per aliquam formam superadditam, sicut aqua non potest calefacere nisi ca-

(1) Ia-IIae, q. 85, a. 3.

lefacta ab igne. Sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum intelligibile lumen quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda, ad ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire....

Sic igitur dicendum est quod ad cognitionem cujuscunque veri homo indiget auxilio divino ut intellectus a Deo moveatur ad suum actum. Non autem indiget ad cognoscendam veritatem in omnibus nova illustratione superaddita naturali illustrationi...⁽¹⁾

Thus, given only that aid from God call general concursus an natural form can efficaciously elicit determinate acts proportionate to it. Therefore, the human intellect, with the general concursus alone, has sufficient power through the lumen intelligibile to elicit acts proportionate to itself. But the knowledge of any separate natural truth capable of being known through the senses is an act proportionate to the intellect. If this would not be so, the intellectual potency would be the most imperfect of all forms, since any other form is able

(1) Ia-IIae, q. 109, a. 1.

to elicit proportionate acts. Therefore, in order to know any natural truth, man does not need any new light given by grace. That St. Thomas is speaking of the general concursus and not of the aid of grace when he says: ad cognitionem consuecunquae veri indiget homo auxilio divino, is evident from the fact that he equates the intellectual form with the forms of all creatures. That he is referring to the speculative and not to the practical intellect is clear from the order of the articles. A solution to the question whether the practical intellect can know truth without grace presupposes the articles which follow where the necessity of grace in regard to the will is treated. This is also the teaching of the great commentators on this text. For example, Capreolus says:

Ex quibus potest formari talis ratio. Ad ea in quae potest homo per lumen naturale cum motione primi motus non est necessaria gratia habitualis, sed in cognitionem veritatum naturaliter ex sensibus deducibilium, potest homo per lumen naturale intellectus, supposita notione Dei. Igitur. (1)

(1) Capreolus, Defensiones, In II Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 1, T. IV, p. 283b.

Cajetan affirms the same more definitely:

Ad hoc dicitur quod quia vulnus ignorantiae est in ratione ut est subjectum prudentiae, ut ex praeallegato loco accipio, et ratio non absoluta, sed ut nota a voluntate est subjectum prudentiae, consequens est ut vulnus ignorantiae destituat rationem ab ordine ad verum spectans ad prudentiam, quod non in sola cognitione, sed in voluntate consisti, quoniam verum intellectus practici ut dicitur in VI Ethic. est confesse se habens appetitui recto. Unde dicendum est quod sermo litterae est de cognitione pura ipsius veri, obiectio autem de cognitione cum appetitu. Propter quod ex puris naturalibus, etiam in hoc statu, possumus cognoscere non solum speculative, sed moralia, quamvis in hoc statu non possimus ex eisdem esse prudentes. (1)

John of St. Thomas affirms the same doctrine:

Et fundamentum est quia per peccatum non est magis diminuta virtus intellectus ad speculative cognoscendum quam erat in pura natura, quia peccatum non opponitur lumini intellectivo, sed ordinationi rectae ad finem. Imo stat augeri peccatum propter maiorem cognitionem speculativam ut patet in illo qui peccat ex malitia. Ergo peccatum quatenus peccatum

(1) Cajetan, In Iam-IIae. q. 109, a. 1, n. 2.

non minuit cognitionem speculativam etiam ipsius peccati.

Confirmatur quia peccatum non magis debilitet lumen intellectus in anima quam in Angelo, cum in utroque habeat easdem vires peccatum et eadem oppositionem cum intellectu, scilicet tanquam malum morale, non naturale. Sed in Angelo virtus naturalis et lumen intelligendi non est diminutum per peccatum, ut ex Dionysio docet D. Thomas. Ergo etiam in homine post peccatum non mansit lumen intellectus magis diminutum ad speculandum quam sine peccato. (1)

The Salmanticenses likewise teach the same:

Intellectus autem non fuit laesus per peccatum in lumine principiorum naturalium; sed hujusmodi lumen mansit integrum, et intactum. Quare cum in virtute illius contineatur sufficienter quaelibet veritas naturalis, quantumvis difficilis, poterit intellectus ad illius notitiam absque ulla gratia devinire. (2)

From this it is clear that: the intellect is sufficient in itself for knowing any truth that

(1) Joan. a Sto. Thoma, Curs. Theol., In Iam-IIae, disp. 19, a. 2, nn. 27, 28.

(2) Salmanticenses, Curs. Theol., Tract. 14, De Gratia Dei, disp. 2, dub. 1, 2, n. 10, T. 9, p. 144a.

can acquired through sensible things; hence, any natural truth can be known by man whether he is in the fallen state or not, provided there be no physical impediment; hence, the intellect is not wounded by original sin intrinsically and has no need of grace for the knowledge of natural truths. There is no better evidence of this than the fact that if grace were needed for knowing some natural truths, it would be especially required for knowing the most difficult among natural truths, namely knowledge of God--that He is, that He is one, eternal, etc. However, everyone recognizes that these truths can be known without the special aid of grace. And the reason why grace is not necessary is, as John of St. Thomas says, because original sin is not opposed to intellectual light but to the right ordering to the final end. In both the sin of the angels and original sin, the sin committed had the same relation to the intellect. So, just as the knowledge which the angels had per naturam was not taken away or diminished by their sin, so in original sin, the intellect of man was not wounded intrinsically.

A text of St. Thomas from the Prima Pars is sometimes cited to show that the human intellect even in the knowledge of natural things cannot arrive at the truth with certitude and without error unless through the ministrations of grace:

...ad ea etiam quae de Deo
ratione humana investigari possunt
necessarium fuit hominem instrui
revelatione divina...(1)

From the objectors' point of view there is perhaps an even stronger text in the Secunda Secundae where in answer to the question: "Is it necessary to have faith about those things which can be proved by natural reason?" St. Thomas says:

Necessarium est homini accipere per modum fidei non solum ea quae sunt supra rationem, sed etiam ea quae per rationem cognosci possunt... Ratio humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens. Cujus signum est quia philosophi de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes in multis erraverunt, et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt. Ut ergo esset indubitata et certa cognitio

(1) Ia, q. 1, a. 1.

apud homines de Deo oportuit quod
divina eis per modum fidei trade-
rentur quasi a Deo dicta qui men-
tiri non potest. (1)

In neither of these texts, however, nor in any other text where he expounds this doctrine (2) does St. Thomas support the position of the objectors. For, he is not proving that faith is necessary for philosophers if they are to bring their science to a perfectum opus rationis (as the objection maintains), nor is he trying to prove that because of the weakness of the human intellect, faith is necessary for the discovery of natural truths. On the contrary, he is showing that, since the knowledge of God is the most perfect, though most difficult, knowledge, and most necessary for all men because the ultimate end of life, happiness, demands a full knowledge of divine things, faith is not only superior to reason for attaining this, but necessary quoad humanum genus. Because of the numerous

(1) IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 4.

(2) Cf: III Sent., dist. 24, a. 3, q1a 1; I Cont. Gent., c. 4; De Ver., q. 14, a. 10; De Trin., q. 3, a. 1.

difficulties--the profundity of the matter, the feebleness of the human intellect, the large amount of prerequisite knowledge, the indisposition of most men for such high truths, the many occupations and distractions of everyday living, the long time required--difficulties which attend the knowledge about God through natural means, and because all men are ordered to salvation, therefore a knowledge of God through faith is necessary. But, it should be noted, these difficulties are extrinsic to a natural knowledge of God, and furthermore, they do not prevent at least some men from attaining that knowledge.

That St. Thomas:

Cum igitur finis humanae vitae sit beatitudo quae consistit in plena cognitione divinorum, necessarium est ad humanam vitam in beatitudinem dirigendam statim in principio fidem divinorum habere, quae plene cognoscenda expectantur in ultima perfectione humana. Ad quorum quaedam cognoscenda plene possibile est homini pervinere per viam rationis in statu viae; et horum quaecumque possit haberi scientia et a quibusdam habeatur, tamen necessarium est habere fidem propter quinque rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses ponit.

(and the Vatican Council) is not referring to the necessity of faith in order to know natural truths for the intellect as such, but for all men taken singly, is evident from the constant use of such terms as necessarium ad humanam vitam (1) homini-
bus (2) apud homines (3)

Cajetan recognizes this when he says:

Ad hoc dicitur quod ratio naturalis ad naturalia hujusmodi sufficit et non sufficit humano generi, diversimode considerando humanum genus. Si enim sit sermo de humano genere secundum singulos homines, constat quod ratio naturalis non sufficit ad hujusmodi, ut patet in multis ineptis et mulieribus, et propter multas occupationes rationabiles. Si autem loquamur de genere humano secundum ipsius communitatem, sic dicendum est quod ratio naturalis sufficit ad haec. Distributum quippe est ut et contemplationem sapientiae, illi ad agriculturam, alii ad alia nati sunt. Sicque ut humano generi ratio sufficiat ad hoc quod sapientia ceteraque adsint, quamvis non cunctis singulis.

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ia, q. 1, a. 1.

(3) IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 4.

Et quoniam auctor de cognitione
divinorum necessaria humano generi
secundum singulos loquebatur quia
singuli singillatim salvandi vel
damnandi sunt. Ideo verum dixit
quod ratio naturalis humano generi
non sufficit ad cognitionem divino-
rum scibilium. Et ideo eorum difes
non superflua, sed necessaria est
valde multis. (1)

In showing, then, that original sin did
not wound intrinsically the speculative intellect,
the basis on which the whole objection rests is
destroyed. Therefore, it may be concluded that the
speculative intellect is sufficient for knowing any
natural truth; that grace in the Christian philosopher
has made no "restoration" of the powers of the specul-
ative intellect; and that faith is not necessary for
the discovery of new truths or the general advance
of philosophy.

2) Confortationes objectivae. Granted that
grace is not necessary for the knowledge of any
speculative truth, could it be true, despite that
fact, that faith can offer to the philosophical
sciences certain confortationes objectivae ?

(1) Cajetan, In IIam-IIae,. q. 2, a. 4.

Without entering into a discussion of particular truths--person and nature, essence and existence, creation, etc.--but restricting the argument solely to a question of the possibility of such a confortatio, it must be affirmed that such a confortatio by faith is not possible, at least if it is considered apart from the strengthening which the demonstration receives by reason of the added certitude from faith.

The reason for this can be seen from the following argument. Let it be supposed, for the sake of argument, that faith has revealed some truth which could have been demonstrated from self-evident, naturally known principles, but which de facto was not proposed until faith revealed it. Now such a truth, considered solely as a proposition (and apart from any firm adherence to it on the part of the intellect) could be the object of philosophical inquiry for the non-Christian philosopher equally as well as for the Christian philosopher. For, if that proposition should be discovered by the non-Christian philosopher in the Scriptures or in a book reporting revealed truth, it could be said that faith has proposed

it to him. However, no one would maintain that merely because he happens upon a new subject for his philosophical inquiry in revelation that he is thereby a Christian philosopher. If that were true, any philosopher, pagan or christian, whose philosophical inquiry was occasioned by what was revealed, could by fact be called a Christian philosopher. To the extent that faith "offers" objects in this way, it does not differ from any other presentation or discovery which might offer to the philosopher an occasion of arriving at a new truth. The discovery of a new fact in the world of nature or the proposal of a new explanation of the workings of natural things might be the occasion through which the philosopher would make further distinctions, penetrate more profoundly what hitherto he knew only in an indefinite way, and arrive at new truths. Because of this fact, however, there is no new species of philosophy; philosophical knowledge has simply advanced in a normal way by the cumulative efforts of many, each contributing a part to the advance of truth. So, whether the proposition is given by faith or by the discovery of a

new fact, or even by theory or opinion (since the object is being considered now only materially), the effect is the same: truth is advanced but philosophy is not changed. Particular as regards the truths proposed by faith, the fact that faith would propose them in this way does not entitle the philosopher who uses them to the name of Christian philosopher.

It might be objected, then, that the case of the philosopher who is not a Christian is entirely different from the case of the philosopher who is Christian. The philosopher who is not Christian does not accept these propositions as true, but admits their truths only when he has proven it by his science. The philosopher who is Christian, on the other hand, does not merely consider the truths which faith reveals as so many material objects to be examined and judged in the light of his philosophy, but, from the first, believes them to be true, that is, accepts what they affirm with the infallible certitude of faith. And this is precisely the point that disengages the confusion in regard to the confortationes objectivae. The truths which faith presents, be they

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old or new, known previously or unknown, are a confortatio for the Christian philosopher but not for the non-Christian philosopher precisely because of this: the Christian philosopher adheres to them firmly because of the certitude received from faith. Fortified (confortatus) with the certitude of faith, the Christian philosopher can then proceed in his natural demonstration with a greater security and adherence to the object.

Ergo per fidem corrigitur deficientia rationis naturalis ne habeat periculum errandi sicut in philosopho gentili; ergo, si ipsa ratio naturalis firmatur per fidem in iis quae de Deo assequitur, etiam demonstratio procedens a ratione naturali sic firmata certior erit et perfectior quam si procederet a naturali ratione nuda.

Certitudo ista de qua loquimur non communicatur demonstrationi naturali a fide per discursum et illationem ortam ex fide; sed per solam representationem et propositionem certitudinis fidei ipse intellectus exit in suam demonstrationem cum maiori securitate et adhaesione ad illud objectum. (1)

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(1) Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Theol., In IIam-IIae, disp. 2, a. 1. (Vivès, 1885), n. 18 et n. 25.



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This, it may be noted, is precisely the solution reached in Chapter III of this discussion: philosophy is Christian in so far as it has a super-added certitude communicated to it from faith. And, indeed, there can be no confortatio of the natural demonstration in any way but this. As has already been shown, one science can be superior to another either by reason of the dignitas materiae or by reason of the quality which is certitude. But faith cannot perfect a natural science by communicating the formal object of that science to the philosopher, or some new formal object; faith does not and cannot add any new light on the part of the object to the natural demonstration. Nor would it in any way change the case if, for example, faith would reveal not only a truth but also the middle term formally as such. What advantage would there be in this for the philosopher? For the non-Christian philosopher, this could be a source of progress only accidentally in so far as faith (it could as well have been any other kind of knowledge) has turned his consideration towards this object. But the demonstration of the conclusion and the certitude with which he adheres to it, in



other words, whatever of science there is in it, will come from the evidence and not from faith. And even though the Christian philosopher knows infallibly that this is the middle term, he is certain that it is by faith. But, non-evident faith, though it gives certitude that this is the middle term, does not supply the evidence by which the conclusion is seen to follow from the middle term. Thus, the Christian philosopher, as well as the non-Christian philosopher, must still make a demonstration of that truth. If he who knows the truth is to be called philosopher, it will not be because he accepts this truth by the light of faith, but because he sees it by the light of the natural science. The great advantage which the Christian philosopher has is this: in knowing that the truth (or the middle term) is already guaranteed by faith, the deficiency of his natural reason is corrected and he is prevented from falling to the errors which, as experience shows, so frequently beset the non-Christian philosophers.

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The confortatio which faith gives to the Christian philosopher, then, is purely in the line of certitude, not by way of the formal object of the philosopher's science.

As a final word on the confortationes objectivae, it might be noted that the term is ill-chosen. It is simply not true to say that philosophy receives any confortatio from faith ex parte objecti, for the reasons already given, but only ex certitudine communicata a fide. Even those who put forth the position, unknowingly recognize this by the very words which they employ: "Christian philosophers knew them more perfectly because faith, by affirming them, gave confirmation of their truth" (page 23); "the acquisition of philosophy....even in regard to purely natural truths, is made easier and more certain because faith proposes to reason objects..." (page 26); "The Christian philosopher has this advantage...he will be guarded from error and be more surely directed towards the truth..." (page 27).



3) Finally, what can be said of the proposition: the infallible truths of faith are as an end towards which the philosopher directs his inquiry (page 26)?

Obviously, the truths of revealed faith are not the end of any natural science. The end of a science is the complete knowledge of the subject of the science.

Et ideo oportet quod unitas scientiae consideretur ex fine sive ex termino scientiae. Est autem cujuslibet scientiae finis sive terminus, genus circa quod est scientia, quia in speculativis scientiis nihil aliud queritur quam cognitio generis subjecti. (1)

Confortationes subiectivae. This position is somewhat more difficult to comment on than the others, for two reasons: instead of being opposed to the conclusions reached in Chapter III, it apparently agrees with them; secondly, actually there is much in the opinion that is false. At least this

(1) S. Thomas, In I Post Anal., lec. 41, n. 7.



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