

to it seems true, what is contrary seems false; the reason is that the customary is more known to us; what is more known to us, however, is the basis for further knowledge (1). Now, the customary is more known to us because custom in some way becomes another nature and so gives rise to an inclination according to the mode of nature. Now, because of a certain nature and a certain habit a person has a determined proportion or relation to one thing or another. Since for knowledge there must be a determined proportion between the knower and the object known, it follows that according to a diversity in nature and in habits there is a diversity in knowledge; accordingly, all men know first principles because the nature of the human intellect is proportioned to them and in the order of sense knowledge different men will enjoy tasting different things according to the disposition of their

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- (1) - *Acceptio cognitionis in nobis fit ex aliqua praeexistenti cognitioni. Non autem accipitur hic doctrina et disciplina secundum quod se habent ad acquisitionem scientiae tantum sed ad acquisitionem cognitionis cuiuscumque (In I Post. Anal., lect. 1, n. 9).*

*Immatum est nobis ut procedamus cognoscendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota in ea quae sunt magis not naturae (In I Phys., lect. 1, n. 6).*

*Cum ex notis oporteat in cognitionem ignotorum devenire ; omnis autem demonstratio adducitur causa notificandi aliud, necesse est quod omnis demonstratio procedat ex notioribus quo ad nos, quibus per demonstrationem fit aliquid notum (In De Anima, lect. 3, n. 245).*

*Cum enim omnis disciplina fiat per ea quae sunt magis nota addiscenti, quem oportet aliqua praecognoscere ad hoc ut addiscat, oportet disciplinam nostram procedere per ea quae sunt magis nota quo ad nos, quae sunt saepe minus nota secundum naturam ad ea quae sunt notiora secundum naturam, nobis autem minus nota (In VII Metaphys., lect. 2, n. 1301).*

tongues (1).

Now in these two passages are stressed the existence of the natural or quasi-natural inclination and custom, the origin of inclination from custom, and the signification of both inclination and custom by the word "mos". Now, since the student must believe, and since faith is an act of the intellect under the influence of the will, and since an inclination belongs properly to the will, we may speak of the intellectual mores of the student.

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- (1) - Auditiones contingunt in hominibus de his quae sunt secundum consuetudines. Ea enim, quae sunt consueta, libentius audiuntur et facilius recipiuntur. Dignum enim videtur nobis, ut ita dicatur de quocumque, sicut consuevimus audire. Et si quae dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimus audire, non videntur nobis similia in veritate his quae consuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus nota et magis extranea a ratione, propter hoc quod sunt inconsueta. Illud enim quod est consuetum est nobis magis notum.

Cuius ratio est quia consuetudo vertitur in naturam; unde et habitus ex consuetudine generatur qui inclinatur per modum naturae. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis habet talem naturam vel talem habitus, habet proportionem determinatam ad hoc vel illud. Requiritur autem ad quamlibet cognitionem determinata proportio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile. Et ideo secundum diversitatem naturarum et habituum accidit diversitas circa cognitionem. Videmus enim quod hominibus secundum humanam naturam sunt innata prima principia; et secundum habitum virtutis apparet unicuique bonum, quod convenit illi virtuti: sicut et gustui videtur aliquid conveniens, secundum eius dispositionem. Sic igitur, quia consuetudo causat habitum consimilem naturae, contingit quod ea quae sunt consueta sunt notiora (In II Metaphys., lect. 5, n. 331-332).

We apply this special name to this particular disposition of the student because this disposition is not contained under any other habit or disposition. Every disposition or habit receives its essential character from its object; the formal object determines the act, the act determines the habit, and the habit gives a particular determination to the intellect; in reverse, the intellect through its habit acts more easily and surely in reaching its object. For example, the object of an art gives the essential character to that art as in the art of medicine or the art of playing the piano; a person may be a capable or an incapable medical doctor or pianist, may grow in skill or lose his skill, but the art remains essentially the same. The same is true in moral virtues : temperance is determined by the moderation in use of pleasures, and justice in the rendering to others their due; one may be more or less temperate and just, but the essential character of the virtue remains the same. This is likewise true of dispositions and habits of the intellect.

An intellectual habit is formed essentially by its formal object : *id per quod recipitur id quod recipitur* (1) : the virtue of understanding by the connection of terms in a principle; the virtue of science by the connection of the conclusions with their principles; the virtue

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(1) - Cfr. *IIaIIae*, q. 1, a. 1.

of supernatural faith by the authority of God; the habitus of human faith by the authority of the speaker. The habit may extend to more objects known, may become more deeply rooted in the subject, but it remains essentially the same habit or disposition. Now because of its formal object the intellectual mores of the student are specifically different from the other intellectual habits and dispositions.

The intellectual mores are neither art nor prudence because they are in the speculative intellect; the end of learning is the consideration of truth and not the making or doing of something. Nor are they part of the three intellectual virtues - understanding, science and wisdom - because the student does not possess the evidence of the connection of terms or the conclusions with their principles. Nor are they completely like opinion; they may be called opinion in so far as they incline to one part of a contradiction but they differ from opinion because opinion may be based upon the thing known (*ratio rei*) whereas the knowledge proper to the intellectual mores is based upon word of the teacher and, therefore, depends on the will. "*Oportet addiscentem credere*" : the student accepts what he is taught not because of the evidence of the truth but under the influence of the will. We, thus, define the intellectual mores as the disposition of the intellect under the influence of the will whereby the student has a quasi-natural inclination to retain as true and as the measure of truth what he has been accustomed to hear.

Before entering into the explanation of the influence of the will on the intellect in this matter we shall indicate how important early education is considered because of the determination the intellect acquires at the beginning.

## II. - The Importance of the Intellectual Mores.

The fact and force of what one is accustomed to hear - "Ea enim quae sunt consueta libentius audiuntur et facilius recipiuntur. - Et si quae dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimus audire, non videntur nobis similia in veritate his quae consuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus nota et magis extranea a ratione propter hoc quod sunt inconsueta" (1) - are apparent in every walk of life and are uppermost in the minds of the authorities directing education. "Should religion be taught in schools ?",- "what history books are to be used ?", - "what authors in philosophy are to be followed ?", - "what political system is to be approved and what system is to be condemned ?" : all these questions and many more form the bone of contention between different educators, and give rise to cases which reach the Supreme Court. It is definitely recognized that education forms attitudes which govern one's entire life. From education come the influence to which can be applied the words of G. K. Chesterton :

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(1) - In II Metaphys., lect. 5, n. 331.

These are my ultimate attitudes towards life; - the soils for the seeds of doctrine. These is some dark way I thought before I could write, felt before I could think (1).

The influence of education in religion is apparent; it has given rise to the statement "cuius regio, eius religio", - one's religion depends on one's country or surroundings. The Catholic Church has always been most solicitous for the education of Catholic children; thus the Catholics in the United States have developed their system of primary and higher education at great cost and sacrifice.

While all governments have acknowledged the necessity of instilling the knowledge of and the love for the country in their young citizens, seldom has such control over education been exercised by government as in our time of totalitarian states : Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Of the Soviet Union, Walter B. Smith, United States Ambassador to Moscow, wrote :

The educational system is designed to insure the perpetuation in power of the Communist Party and the exclusion of all political thought except that dictated by the party line. - The teaching of nationalism is intimately connected with political education. Its purpose is to arouse a boundless devotion to the Soviet Union in its struggle to establish the Soviet regime. - From a very early age Soviet youth is placed in an atmosphere which develops his Socialist conscience. - Higher education is reserved for those who develop a political consciousness to a very high degree (2).

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- (1) - Orthodoxy. Unicorn Bks. Sheed and Ward, 1939, p. 101.
  - (2) - My Three Years in Moscow, J. B. Lippincott Co., Phila. and New York, 1950, p. 113-114.

In the teaching of history the outstanding example is Switzerland where, it is said, each of the twenty-five cantons has its own teaching of history. Likewise, throughout the world, within nations and between nations, national and racial outlooks and prejudices are kept alive by the teaching of history.

In philosophical circles, leaving aside the abysmal rift between Scholastic and non-Scholastic philosophies, there is a remarkable difference of opinion between the Thomistic, Suarezian and Scotist schools; in this difference cannot the early education of their adherents be clearly seen? The influence of early education, moreover, may be painfully experienced by anyone who, trained in one system of philosophy, later studies another; for example, an early teaching concerning the division of philosophy (which the student must accept on faith) which places Cosmology and Psychology as branches of Metaphysics so that "mobile being is studied as being" and "living being is studied as being", makes most difficult the conception of Natural Philosophy according to the doctrine of St. Thomas; or, again, one who has studied in a manual of Ethics (the first thesis) that God is man's final end, has a most difficult struggle to understand the Moral Philosophy of St. Thomas, - for St. Thomas, the mention of God as man's final end comes only after many pages and then only to note that this is a question of theology and not of philosophy. So the examples could be multiplied.

The following are examples given by St. Thomas. Laws are an indication of the force of custom as in them are many vain and frivolous regulations which men approve because they have heard of them from childhood, rather than because of the knowledge of truth (1). Another example refers to men trained in mathematics and who refuses to accept anything unless it be given them according to the method of mathematics. Others want everything proposed to them by means of an example taken from sense experience. Others think nothing worthwhile unless it is bolstered by a quotation from a poet or some fine writer. The last two examples, St. Thomas notes, are results either of custom or a naturally poor intellect (2). Other examples given by St. Thomas

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(1) - *Leges ab hominibus positae ostendunt per experientiam quantum vim habeat consuetudo : in quibus quidem legibus propter consuetudinem magis valent fabulariter et pueriliter dicta, ad hoc quod eis assentiatur, quam cognitio veritatis. — Quicumque invenerunt eas, aliqua quibus hominum animi retraherentur a malis et provocarentur ad bona secundum diversitatem gentium et nationum in suis legibus tradiderunt, quamvis multa eorum essent vana et frivola, quae homines a pueritia audientes magis approbant quam veritatis cognitionem (In II Metaphys., lect. 5, n. 333).*

(2) - *Hic ostendit quomodo homines in consideratione veritatis propter consuetudinem diversos modos acceptant : et dicit (Aristoteles) quod quidam non recipiunt quod ei sit dicitur nisi dicatur eis per modum mathematicum. Et hoc quidem convenit propter consuetudinem, his, qui in mathematicis sunt nutriti. — Alii vero sunt, qui nihil volunt recipere nisi proponatur eis aliquod exemplum sensibile, vel propter consuetudinem, vel propter dominium sensitivae virtutis in eis et debilitatem intellectus. Quidam vero sunt qui nihil reputant esse dignum ut aliquid eis inducatur absque testimonio poetae vel alicuius auctoris. Et hoc etiam est vel propter consuetudinem vel propter defectum iudicii (In II Metaph., lect. 5, n. 334).*

*Ex hoc autem moti sunt ut mathematica introducerent, quia erant nutriti in eorum studio. Et ideo principia mathematicorum credebant esse principia omnium entium. Consuetum est enim apud homines, quod per ea quae noverunt, de rebus indicare velint (In I Metaph., lect. 7, n. 120).*



are : Anaxagoras who accepted the common opinion of all the natural philosophers to be true; (1) the proof of the existence of God given by St. Anselm. He states that this proof comes partly from custom according to which men are wont from their childhood to hear and call upon the name of God; custom, he says, especially that which begins in childhood has the force of nature so that those things with which one is imbued from childhood are firmly held as though they were naturally and per se known (2).

Because, then, of the strong effect of early teaching St. Thomas often mentions the necessity of good training : speaking of moral virtues, he says that everything depends on whether a child is accustomed from his youth to do good or to do evil, because those things which are impressed on us in our youth we more firmly retain (3) - and

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(1) - Duo autem supposebat Anaxagoras, ex quibus procedebat. Quorum primum est quod etiam ab omnibus naturalibus philosophis supposebatur, quod scilicet ex nihilo fiat. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod Anaxagoras ex hoc videbatur opinari esse principia infinitas, quia accipiebat communem opinionem omnium philosophorum naturalium esse veram (In I Phys., lect. 9, n. 2).

(2) - Praedicta autem opinio (Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum) provenit partim ex consuetudine qua ex principio assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a puero, vim naturae obtinet : ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota (I Contra Gentes, c. 11).

(3) - Non parum differt, quod aliquis statim a inventute assuescat vel bene vel male operari; sed multum differt; quin potius totum ex hoc dependet. Nam ea quae nobis a principio imprimuntur, firmiter retinemus (In II Eth., lect. 1, n. 254).

this is applicable also to intellectual customs; again, he says that a person who is habituated to evil cannot easily be changed by words, just as in speculative matters he cannot be brought to the truth who firmly adheres to the contrary principles (1). A final statement by St. Thomas : right judgment consists in this that the intellect apprehends a thing as it is in itself; this results from the good disposition of the knowing power, as in a mirror which, if it is in good condition, reflects the forms of bodies as they are; if the mirror is uneven, then the images are distorted and misshapen; now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things as they are is due to nature fundamentally, but finally to exercise or a gift of grace; this is in two ways : on the part of the cognitive power, that it be not imbued with wrong conceptions but true and correct ones; on the part of the appetitive power that it has a good disposition so that a person will judge correctly concerning things to be desired (2).

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- (1) - Etiam in speculativis, non posset reduci ad veritatem ille qui firmiter adhaeret contrariis principiorum, quibus in operabilibus proportionantur fines (In X Eth., lect. 14, n. 211/2).
- (2) - Rectum iudicium in hoc consistit quod vis cognoscitiva apprehendat rem aliquam secundum quod in se est. Quod quidem provenit ex recta dispositione virtutis apprehensivae, sicut in speculo, si fuerit bene dispositum, imprimantur formae corporum secundum quod sunt; si vero fuerit speculum male dispositum, apparent ibi imagines distortae et pravae se habentes. Quod autem virtus cognoscitiva sit bene disposita ad recipiendum res secundum quod sunt, contingit radicaliter ex natura, consummative autem ex exercitio vel ex munere gratiae. Et hoc dupliciter : uno modo ex parte ipsius cognoscitivae virtutis, puta quia non est imbuta pravis conceptionibus, sed veris et rectis; et hoc pertinet ad synesim secundum quod est specialis virtus. Alio modo, indirecte, ex bona dispositione appetitivae virtutis, ex qua sequitur quod homo bene iudicet de appetibilibus. (IIaIIae, q. 51, a. 3, ad 1).

From the effect of early training and education the necessity of a good teacher is most apparent. Just as in the formation of the moral life of a child, the child must be trained to practise the moral virtues so that when he reaches the use of reason he will be well established in acts which are good and according to right reason, so in the formation of the intellectual habits he must be well established in truth so that when he has reached intellectual maturity, his intellect will already be in possession of those truths which now he can understand in their evidence. All students are travellers in a foreign land and they depend on others to be told what road to take for their destination; unfortunate are those who are misled and because of their good will and confidence finally find themselves far from their goal and lost and without either the time or means to retrace their steps and start anew; fortunate, on the other hand, are those who are guided aright and who at the end of their journey find their faith and confidence rewarded by the vision of their destination.

Since the intellectual mores are dispositions of the intellect under the influence of the will we shall now treat of the influence of the will on the intellect.

### III. - The Will and the Intellect.

#### 1) - The Will.

A) - The doctrine concerning the will is based on the general principle that following upon every form there is an inclination to something : "Aliqua inclinatio sequitur quamlibet formam" (1). Every being that has a proportion to something, whether intrinsic to the being or extrinsic, has an inclination towards that which is related to it; this inclination we call an appetite. Now as there are three forms, one natural and the other two cognitive, there are three inclinations or appetites : one is the natural appetite following upon the natural form; one is the sense appetite following upon sense knowledge; the third is the rational appetite following upon intellectual knowledge, and this appetite is the will.

In all natural beings the specific determination results from the form. Every natural being, then, has a determined inclination or appetite according to that form, so that the appetite rests in the perfection of the form if it is fully possessed or seeks its perfection if the form is directed to operation. Accordingly the eye has a natural inclination to see, the intellect has a natural appetite to know, and the will has a natural inclination towards good as good (1).

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(1) - In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio quae appetitus naturalis vocatur (Ia, qu. 80, art. 1).

Unaqueque potentia animae est quaedam forma, seu natura,

While the sense and intellect have their natural inclinations following upon their natural forms, they are cognitive faculties and so are able to receive the forms of other things in an intentional way. Following upon the existence of these forms in the knower, there follows or may follow an inclination to the object known in their reality; there is a sense appetite which desires, seeks and takes pleasure in the objects which perfect and give satisfaction to the senses; there is a rational appetites which loves, desires, seeks for, and enjoys the objects known by the intellect as truth, justice, kindness, devotion to others, temperance, etc. (1).

Characteristic of the appetite which is consequent to knowledge is that this inclination is for the good of the whole rather than for the particular good of any one faculty. This can be seen clearly in the case of man who is able to accept pain and privation for the good of his general being; he willingly undergoes the suffering of an opera-

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(1) - (continued) - et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu (Ibid., ad 3).

(1) - In habentibus autem cognitionem sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum : sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium. Et sic anima hominis fit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum. — Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea, quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali (Ia, qu. 80, a. 1).

tion for the sake of health; he foregoes the pleasures of drink and entertainment for the purpose of his intellectual or spiritual development. Thus the will is the appetite for the good of the whole man. It is this fact that makes it possible for a person to believe and is, thus, an important factor in the intellectual mores; the student accepts what he is taught even though the intellect does not have evidence of the truth; he consents to the truth because it is good for him to do so (1).

B) - The object of the will is the good presented by the intellect but it does not follow that everything presented by the intellect is desired by or pleasing to it. Now, in every natural appetite there is a "connaturality" of natural proportion between the natural appetite and its object; there is a connaturality between the sense of taste and food, between the eye and color, between the sense of touch and heat or cold, between the intellect and truth, and between the will and good. Likewise, there must be a certain connaturality and proper-

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- (1) - Supra quem (appetitum naturalem) est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem; quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione, qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote in visu ad videndum, et auditu ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali (Ia, qu. 20, art. 1, ad 3).

Non enim per voluntatem appetitur solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis: ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona (Ia IIae, qu. 10, a. 1).

tion between the will and the good presented by the intellect in order for the will to be inclined towards it. The object of the will is not only good but that which is good and proportioned to the will ; bonum et conveniens (1).

The reason for this is that everything is perfected by what is like to itself and in proportion to itself. The eye is harmed, not helped, by too bright a light; the stomach can digest only those foods which correspond to the state of health. Now, the will is related to a good as that which is moved is related to that which moves it; there must be a proportion between them. If, for example, in the order of studies, matter is presented to the student which far surpasses his capacity, there will be no effort on the part of the student to learn it; if, on the other hand, matter too simple is given to an advanced student, there will be no interest. So the will, which is moved by the good, must be in proportion to the good (2).

This proportion between the will and its object is recognized when the will is attracted towards the good desired or satisfaction

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- (1) - Amor importat connaturalitatem et complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est connaturale et proportionatum (IaIIae, qu. 27, a. 1).
- (2) - Appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum; passiva et mobilia distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum; quia oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo; et ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum (Ia, qu. 80, art. 2).

and pleasure in the good possessed. This is a matter of experience. Like things attract their like : simile simili. Men on the whole prefer the company of men to that of animals; men of the same race make friends one with the other more easily than with members of another race; citizens of the same nation and town and neighborhood feel greater bonds of union between themselves than they do with men of other nations or towns or neighborhood. There is, indeed, a likeness or similitude existing between the will and its object, or, in other words, a likeness of the object existing in the will.

This similitude in the will is not like that in the intellect. The intellect knows its object in so far as the object is in the intellect by its intentional form or species; the object is in the knower according to the nature of the knower; the intellect rests in that likeness of the object. The will, however, tends towards its object existing in reality; the similitude of the object, then, is in the will in the form of an attraction (1). This attraction is the sign that the

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(1) - Sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquod quo inclinatur in suum obiectum : cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam (IaIIae, qu. 50, a. 5, ad 1). Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc, quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio (ut ita loquor) rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. (Ia, qu. 37, a. 1).



object is both good and proportioned to the will : bonum et conveniens.

c) - Now the only object which is entirely good and proportioned to the will is happiness ; this is so, however, in that the will is not able to desire its opposite because it is the state which is perfect by the sum total of all goods; but in the present life man is free not to will to think about true happiness. Outside of complete or perfect beatitude there is no object which presents itself with such attraction that the will cannot be drawn to its opposite. Therefore, how is it that the will tends to one good rather than to another ?

St. Thomas answers by saying that this may be done in three ways. First, in so far as one good far outweighs the other and so the will is moved according to reason; for example, when a man chooses that which is useful for health and, by that fact, is useful for the will. Second, when one thinks of one particular circumstances without thinking of another; this happens most frequently through some occasion coming either from within a man's thoughts or from some external cause which brings about certain thoughts. Third, when the will is moved because of the disposition of the person, according to the principle : according to a person's dispositions so will one's good appear to him - "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei". Thus the will of an angry man is attracted differently than the will of a calm man or as

food attractive to a healthy person is repulsive to a sick one (1).

The appeal of what is good and proportioned depends on both the object and the subject; if the object offered is not good, a person will not be attracted to it; if the object is good but the person not attuned to it, again, there will be no attraction : the finest set of golf clubs is rarely an attractive gift to an octogenarian. Now it is the intellect which recognizes the relation of fitness between a good and one of the faculties in man; since these faculties are not always in the same disposition, the relation of fitness changes, and, likewise, the tendency of the will (2).- So it is that according to our dispositions and moods we act differently. Some days we enjoy talking; on other days we are taciturn. At times we want to be left alone; at other times we wish to be in the company of friends. There are periods when we enjoy study; at other periods study is tedious. Evidently, in all this there is no change in the matter of conversation, company or study - but there is a change on the part of ourselves : one day the-

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(1) - De Malo, qu. 6, a. un.

(2) - Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens ex duobus contingit : scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur ; unde ex utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut Philosophus dicit "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. (IaIIae, qu. 9, a. 2) (Quotation : qualis etc. is from III Eth., c. 7; St. Thomas, lect. 13, n. 516).

se goods are in accordance with our feelings; on another they are at variance with them.

Man, being comprised of body and soul, has dispositions accordingly. Thus the physical dispositions depend on the natural constitution of the body as, for example, dispositions differ in the man who is easily aroused to anger and in the one who is not easily excited. He, likewise, has dispositions in his soul which result from habits acquired by the intellect and will (1). The "*qualis unusquisque est*" refers, therefore, either to qualities in the sense faculties or to qualities in the intellect and will.

In reference, then, to the intellectual mores, the habits of the higher faculties have a great influence. A student with an admiration for his professor will easily accept what is taught; one with aversion for the teacher will do so with difficulty. Also, it is pleasant to hear things which accord with our established ideas; difficult to accept ideas contrary to our own accustomed ones. While it is always possible that one makes his choice according to reason - *secundum rationem* - as shown by those who change their religious creed, or-

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(1) - Considerandum est quod aliquis potest dici aliqualis dupliciter. Uno modo secundum dispositionem corporalem sive consequentem corporis complexionem sive consequentem impressionem caelestium corporum. --- Alia autem est dispositio ex parte animae : quae quidem est habitus ex quo inclinatur voluntas vel ratio in operatione (In II Eth., lect. 12, n.506).

dinarily one follows the line of his intellectual customs or dispositions by which he has a determination to one point of view - per modum naturae.

2) - The Will and the Act of the Intellect.

As the intellect and the will are immaterial faculties they are able to reflect and act on themselves and on each other, as well as upon the soul and its other powers. The intellect can know itself and its own acts; the will can move itself to act. The intellect can know the will and the acts of the will; the will can move the intellect to act (1).

For one faculty to act upon the other means that the one moves the other, bringing it from potency to act as, for example, my will directs my hand to make a gesture. Now, every faculty is in potency in two regards : to act or not to act; in acting, to do this or to do that. My hand may remain still or may move; in moving, it may play the piano or drum on a table. My eyes may remain closed or may see; in seeing, they may look at a man or a house. So the will has two determinations; the one is called that of exercise, - to act or not to act; the other, that of specification, - to will this thing or another.

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(1) - De Ver., qu. 22, a. 12.

In the order of specification, it is the intellect which moves the will. The will is the appetite of the intellect. As noted above, every appetite or inclination follows upon a form : a natural inclination upon natural forms; sense appetites follow upon sense cognition; the inclination of the will follows upon forms received in the intellect. Now, the act of the will is an inclination towards an end which is a proportionate and fitting good; the will, however, is attracted to nothing unless the good is presented by the intellect : *nihil volitum nisi cognitum*". Unless the intellect presents to the will the good of knowledge itself, the will cannot move the intellect in the effort to obtain knowledge; unless the intellect presents to the will the good of temperance, there can be no effort to acquire temperance, and so on for all the goods which man knowingly strives to possess. Therefore, the intellect moves the will in the order of final causality (1).

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- (1) - *Aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo per modum finis : sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem; et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis (Ia, qu. 82, a. 4).*

*Bonum est causa amoris per modum obiecti : bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus nisi prout est apprehensum; et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni, quod amatur. Visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi; et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis est principium amoris spiritualis; sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris ea ratione qua et bonum quod non potest amari nisi cognitum (IaIIae, qu. 27, a. 2).*

*Intellectus movet voluntatem per modum quo finis movere dicitur, in quantum scilicet praeconcepit rationem finis et eam voluntati proponit (De Ver., q. 22, a. 12).*

Let it be noted that this knowledge of the good is a condition for the good to be desired; the good as known is not the object of the will. The object exists in the intellect with an intentional existence; the will tends to the good, not as it exists in the intellect but as it is in its real, or apparently real, existence; the starving man does not want the thought of food as the satisfaction of his hunger but, rather, the real food. The intellect, then, moves the will in the order of specification and of final causality.

In the order of exercise, the determination comes from the will. Every agent acts for an end, and every end is a good; since the good is the formal object of the will, it follows that it belongs to the will to move both itself and all other potencies to act for the attainment of their end. As the object of the will is good in general, everything in man which has the aspect of good and which is not determined by nature falls under the object of the will. Thus, truth which is the good of the intellect is also the object of the will as a good; likewise, the act of the intellect is a good and, so, is a good of the will. The same is true of the objects and acts of the other faculties which are not determined by nature. Thus, the influence of the will on the act of the intellect is that of an efficient cause as "impellens impulsum". The will moves the intellect to its acts of understanding and

reason (1).

Not only the act of the intellect is a particular good which the will can desire but also truth, the object of the intellect, is a good. Thus, in this interplay between the intellect and the will whereby the intellect knows the acts of the will as truths, and will desires the acts of the intellect as goods, so also the intellect knows the good under the aspect of truth, and the will desires truth under the aspect of good (2). Therefore, the will has a certain power over truth itself. We shall now examine this influence.

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(1) - Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum; et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum et omnes animae vires. Cuius ratio est quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis illa potentia, quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares, et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. — Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi : quolibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquid bonum proprium sibi conveniens, sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativas partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur (Ia, qu. 82, a. 4).

(2) - Intellectus enim intelligit se, et voluntatem, et essentiam animae et omnes animae vires; et similiter voluntas vult se velle, et intellectum intelligere, et vult essentiam animae, et sic de aliis. (De Ver., qu. 22, a. 12).

Quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt; quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum (Ia, qu. 82, a. 4, ad 1).

3) - The Will and the Object of the Intellect.

A) - St. Thomas in answer to the question whether there is a virtue in the speculative intellect gives the following summary of the virtues and habits of the intellect (1). Virtue is spoken of in respect to the good so that virtue is defined as that which makes its possessor good and renders his actions good. Thus a habit is a virtue when it is directed to the good of the faculty. This ordering of a faculty to its good is formal when the habit is directed to the good under the aspect of good, material when directed to that which is good but not under the aspect of good. Now since good under the aspect of good is the object of the will, those habits, which are in the will or depend on the will, have in a special way the nature of virtue; to them belongs the first imposition of the word. Those habits which are not in the will nor depend on it, and which are directed materially to that which is good (their proper objects) are in some way called virtues.

Now, both the speculative and the practical intellects may be perfected by habits either as preceding the will or as following the will. Those habits perfecting either the speculative or the practical intellects as preceding the will may be called virtues, but not as properly as those which follow it. These virtues are understanding,

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(1) - De Virtutibus in Communi, qu. un., art. 7.



science and wisdom in the speculative intellect, and art in the practical. The habits which follow the will in either the speculative or practical intellects have more the nature of virtues in so far as a person is not only able of knowing how to act correctly but is also willing to do so. These virtues are faith in the speculative intellect (1), and prudence in the practical intellect.

B) - Concerning, then, the influence of the will on the object of the intellect, it is evident that the will plays no part in the determination of the object of the virtues of understanding, science or wisdom. Just as the will moves the eyes to look at a certain object but in no way determines what the eye sees, so it moves the intellect to act but does not affect the intellect in what it knows; the connection of terms in a principle or the deduction of conclusions from their principles are in no way dependent on the will; what the intellect knows in natural philosophy, mathematics, metaphysics, etc. is solely a matter of the intellect being conformed to reality. These virtues, then depend on the will only in their use.

Art is a virtue of the practical intellect. It is defined as the "recta ratio <sup>habitudinis</sup> agibilium" and is the virtue which enables the artist to do well the things he makes. Since this virtue is directed to the making of a good work of art, it depends on the will only in so far as

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(1) - St. Thomas is speaking of supernatural faith.

it belongs to the will to make the choice of what is to be made; the order to be followed and the correct means to be taken to attain that end is independent of the will. (1).

Prudence, likewise a virtue of the practical intellect, is defined as the "recta ratio agibilium" and it enables the intellect to take good counsel in choosing the correct means to attain an end. Prudence depends on the will in so far as it receives from the will its end; in other words, it presupposes a will which is rectified by the moral virtues so that the will chooses a good which is according to right reason; in choosing the correct end, the will also wishes to take the correct means to obtain that end. Now, the proper object of the virtue of prudence is the means for the end; in taking this counsel concerning what is to be done as means for the end, prudence is not dependent on the will; in other words the will does not enter into the object itself of prudence (2).

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(1) - Ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum facientium. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in hoc quod appetitus humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit, in se bonum sit. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, in quantum artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod facit (IaIIae, qu. 57, a. 3).

(2) - Prudentia vero est in intellectu sive ratione practica : non quidem ita quod ex voluntate determinetur obiectum prudentiae, sed solum finis; obiectum autem ipsa perquirat : praesupposito enim a voluntate fine boni, prudentia perquirat vias per quas hoc bonum et perficiatur et conservetur (De Virt. In Comm., qu. un., a. 7).

It is otherwise in the virtue of faith. Here the will enters not only in the use of the act of the speculative intellect, but in the very determination and specification of the object. The intellect gives its assent to a truth because of the command of the will.

It is at this point that we may return to speak directly of the intellectual mores. We have mentioned that the speculative intellect is determined either by the evidence of the object or by the will; we have seen that while the characteristic of the teacher is that he have evidence, the characteristic of the student is that he believe - and belief depends on the will. It is now our purpose to inquire into this specification of the object of the speculative intellect by the will.

G) - (a) - Although in faith the intellect is determined by the will, there is a previous reasoning on the part of the intellect which makes the consent given in faith reasonable. This consideration by the intellect concerns the motives why we should accept what we are told, why a given statement is credible; these are called the motives of credibility or the evidence of credibility. The greater these motives become, the more reasonable it is to accept what is said. At times this evidence of credibility is so strong that the fear of the statement's contrary is completely removed.

In divine faith the fulfilment of prophecies and performance of miracles are the motives of credibility which assure us that what

Christ said is worthy of belief. The scientific learning of a successful physicist or chemist is sufficient motive to accept his statements on physics or chemistry which surpass another's limited knowledge.

The opinion of a tried statesman carries great weight because his past achievements and experience inspire confidence that what he says is true.

When the experience and veracity of a narrator is so great, as for example of a reporter describing events in foreign countries of the course of a war, then the motives and evidence of credibility remove all possibility of fear that the opposite of his statements be true.

Thus, at the beginning of the intellectual mores, there is this act of reason which makes the acceptance of what we are told to be reasonable (1).

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- (1) - Evidentia de credibilitate horum infert necessario evidentiam quod assentiendum est illis non ut veris absolute sed ut veris credibiliter, absque formidine alterius partis in voluntate, non in intellectu. — Ex signorum evidentia non habebant evidentiam eorum quae sunt fidei, sed credibilitatis eorum. (Cajetan : *IIaIIae*, qu. 1, a. 4, n. 3).

In fide et opinione potest dari evidentia moralis et certitudo, non circa veritatem quam attingit, haec enim manet obscura et incerta et vocatur haec incertitudo intrinseca seu metaphysica, quia circa ipsam veritatem versatur; sed evidentia ista et certitudo versatur circa credibilitatem vel probabilitatem. Et quando tot accumulatur motiva quod reddunt evidentem credibilitatem, ita quod non remanet locus ad discredendum, tunc tollitur omnis formido extrinseca quia rationes motivae et inductivae ad fidem dicuntur extrinsecae ipsi assensui credendi. Ceterum circa ipsam veritatem creditam vel opinatam, quamdiu in seipsa non videtur, semper manet intellectus ab intrinseco inevidens et non satisfactus. — Quidquid autem vacillationis aut dubitationis esse potest in credendo vel opinando tantum tollitur vel minuitur, quantum crescunt motiva et rationes inductivae ad credibilitatem vel probabilitatem; et tantum possunt crescere in inevidentia, quod omnem istam formidinem excludant. (John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, t. I, p. 805, b 37 ff.).

This evidence, however, is extrinsic to the object of knowledge itself. In faith, the object remains intrinsically inevident and does not of itself determine the intellect.

b)--- In faith and in the intellectual mores we have the experience that we firmly adhere to what is told us without having evidence of what we are told (1). The cause of this firmness of adherence is none other than the will. In this case, however, the will is not merely the efficient cause of an act of the intellect but enters into the determination and specification of the object itself.

The intellect conforms itself to its object. Since, in this matter, the object itself is inevident, the intellect is not conformed directly to the object. The will then enters. While the will receives from the intellect the good which is to be loved and desired, it may love a good more than the intellect knows it. So it is that the intellect may present to the will a certain truth, which it does not understand, as a good; (every truth is a certain good as every good is a certain truth (2)). The will, then, can be attracted to this

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(1) - A student's faith may be either deliberate or unconscious. By deliberate faith a student explicitly accepts a doctrine on the authority of his teacher. By an unconscious faith he considers his acceptance of a statement as based on reality which is actually founded on the words of his teacher, examples of this are the opinions of students that there is no God and that man has no spiritual soul, - opinions which cannot be based in reality. The student who rejects all formal belief becomes more easily the victim of credulity.

(2) - Ia, qu. 82, a. 4, ad 1.

truth as a good so that there rises a proportion and union between the will and the truth as a good. Therefore, the truth is clothed with the affection of the will and, as such, is presented to the intellect. The intellect then conforms itself to this truth, not because it is known as true, but because it is known as a good in conformity with the will. Thereupon, the will moves the intellect to give its assent; thus the "goodness" enters into the very specification of the object; it does not make the object more manifest or evident but it adds to the object the note of fitness and suitability that it be accepted. The student says : "It is good for me to believe".

We shall give different texts of St. Thomas and John of St. Thomas showing that the affection of the will enters into the specification of the object whereby the object is received by the intellect not because it is true but because it is good. St. Thomas uses such expressions as "decens et utile", - the intellect accepts a doctrine because it is fitting and useful; the intellect gives its assent by a choice voluntarily accepting the determination of the object; the intellect accepts its object, not because it is sufficient to move the intellect, but because it is able to move the will; thus, the intellect is made captive, being held by determinations not proper to itself.

John of St. Thomas states that the object is received not because

it is seen but because it is pleasing and fitting; the will applies the object to itself and makes it enter into the will's deepest affections ("unit et inviscerat sibi"); there is a connaturality and proportion between the will and the truth; the affection of the will enters into the condition of the object.

The texts of St. Thomas are as follows :

Voluntas imperat intellectui, credendo, non solum quantum ad actum exequendum, sed quantum ad determinationem objecti. (De Virt. in Comm. q. un., a. 7).

Intellectus assentit alicui, non quia sufficienter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam (IIa IIae, qu. 1, a. 4).

Quando vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum sicut in principiis nec etiam virtute principiorum, sicut in conclusionibus demonstrativis est; determinatur autem per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter aliquid, quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quod videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire. Et ista est dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicuius hominis, quia videtur decens vel utile.

— Quantum enim est ex seipso (intellectu), non est ei satisfactum, nec est terminatus ad unum; sed terminatur tantum ex extrinseco. Et inde est quod intellectus credentis dicitur esse captivatus quia tenetur terminis alienis et non propriis. (De Ver., qu. 14, a. 1).

Texts of John of St. Thomas :

Unde obiectum cum tali privatione propositum (inevitentia et incertitudo) non est sufficiens ad convincendam potentiam et totaliter movendam; ideoque, cum non plane determinet illam, indiget affectione voluntatis inclinante intellectum sicut apparet in fide. Neque hoc facit voluntas superaddendo lumen intellectui, ut suppleatur motio obiecti obscuri; sic enim vel redderet obiectum evidens per istam additionem luminis vel relinqueret obscurum. Si redderet evidens, tolleretur fides per voluntatem; si remanet obscurum, manet sicut antea, et sic non suppletur lumen obscurum per additionem luminis. Sed intelligitur voluntas inclinare intellectum quatenus illi repraesentatur affectus ipse et adhaesio voluntatis ad obiectum tamquam ad convenientem, et ideo intellectus non propter maiorem manifestationem veritatis, sed propter convenientiam voluntatis non renuit quoque obiecto ipsi adhaerere, dummodo de falsitate illius ei non constet. Unde remota illa dispositione et affectu voluntatis remanet in ratione probabilis vel dubii. Et haec est ratio quare ad fidem requiritur imperium voluntatis, non solum quoad executionem actus in exercitio sed etiam quoad specificationem, id est quoad determinationem ex parte obiecti supplementem per propositionem convenientiae id, quod non potest determinare obiectum per evidentiam veritatis (Curs. Phil., t. I, p. 804 b 26 ff.).

Respondetur enim voluntatem non addere aliquid obiecto ex parte veritatis, ut possit sufficienter movere quod alias de se non poterat, sed addere aliquid ex parte convenientiae, quia id ad quod movet voluntas repraesentatur ut conveniens ipsi voluntati et ex hoc movetur intellectus ad assentiendum illi non quia visum, sed quia placens et conveniens : unde cum obiectum obscure propositum non sit sufficiens ad movendum convincendo et necessitando intellectum si tamen sufficiens ad movendum ad assensum voluntarium; voluntas movendo intellectum reddit illum dispositum ut sit mobilis ab illo obiecto obscure quoad veritatem, apparentem autem quoad convenientiam et complacentiam; saepe enim nobis placent res cognitae in confuso et in obscuro, unde voluntas duplici ratione pertinet ad specificativum fidei. Primo, quatenus reddit intellectum mobilem ab obiecto fidei secundum convenientiam rei propositae, licet non secundum visionem veritatis; secundo, quatenus ex parte obiecti addit aliquam repraesentationem, non quidem penetrando ve-



ritatem, sed convenientiam obiecti ut moveat ad assensum (Curs. Phil., t. VII, disp. 3, a. 1, n. 7, p. 79).

Quare dicendum est quod amor et affectus potest duplicem considerationem habere. Primo ut applicat se et alias potentias ad operandum et sic solum se habet affective et executive in ordine ad illas operationes, scilicet per modum applicantis ad agendum; secundo, ut applicat sibi obiectum et illud unit et inviscerat sibi per quandam fruitionem et quasi connaturalitatem et proportionem cum tali obiecto, et quasi experitur illud experientia affectiva, iuxta illud Ps. 33 'Gustate et videte'. Et sic affectus transit in conditionem obiecti, quatenus ex tali experientia affectiva redditur obiectum magis conforme et proportionatum et unitum personae, eique magis conveniens, et sic fertur intellectus in illud ut expertum et contractum sibi, et hoc modo se habet amor ut praecise movens in genere causae obiectivae, quatenus per tale experimentum diversimode proportionatur, et conveniens redditur obiectum (Curs. Theol., t. VI, disp. 18, a. 4, n. 11, p. 637).

bb) - The intellect accepting a truth, not because it is true but because it is good, sees the object clothed, as it were with the affection of the will. This affection is according to the dispositions of the will - "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei". Now, there are three dispositions which are in the will as in their subject. The first is love by which the will is drawn to and united to the object loved (1). The second is hope which follows upon love and is directed to an object not yet possessed (2). The third is justice by which the will is directed to give everyone his due (3). The three other moral virtues are not in the will as in their subject : prudence is in the

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- (1) - IIaIIae, qu. 24, a. 1.
  - (2) - IIaIIae, qu. 18, a. 1.
  - (3) - IIaIIae, qu. 58, a. 4.

intellect, fortitude is in the irascible appetite, temperance is in the concupiscible appetite). Therefore, the truth, which is accepted by the intellect as good, will be proportioned to the will either because of the affection which the will has for it or because it falls under the matter of justice.

Thus the truth becomes a good because that is said is pleasing to us, or is according to what we are accustomed to hear and therefore pleasant and pleasurable to hear, or because we like the person who says it, or because we see advantages to be gained by accepting the truth stated. In one way or another we love what is told us.

Otherwise, the intellect accepts the truth because it is a good falling under the object of justice. The particular part of justice here in question is obedience and respect. Now, just as adoration and obedience is owed to God, the supreme principle of all being and the ruler of the world, so respect and obedience is due to those who in some way partake in this divine weal. Thus devotion and respect are due to all those who have the dignity of being principles of our being and perfection. Devotion is due parents who are the principles of our being, our education, our moral training and all that pertains to our perfection; likewise, respect must be paid to our country and its rulers, since our country - the land on which we live and the government which protects and rules us - is a principle of our being and perfection; and, finally, respect must be given to those who have the

dignity of teachers, sharing in the rights of parents and country, who are the principle of our education (1). Not only are parents, country and teachers objects of respect and devotion because of their dignity, but they are also those to whom we owe obedience because they share and participate in the divine power of governing the world; for just as in natural things that which is inferior is subject and moved by that which is superior, so in human affairs the inferior is bound to follow the commands of those placed in authority (2). Just as it is an obligation on the part of the parents to educate and prepare their children for the requirements of human life, and on the part of the government to form good citizens (3), so on the part of the child and citizen there is the obligation to follow the commands and directives of their parents and the state authorities.

Accordingly, when a doctrine is taught a student who has the virtue of respect and obedience, the intellect may accept it, not because it sees the evidence of what it receives, but because it falls under the matter of obedience; in other words, the intellect, because the will is directed to obey, accepts the truth, not as true, but as fitting (*decens*).

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(1) - *IIaIIae*, qu. 102, a. 1.

(2) - *IIaIIae*, qu. 104, a. 1.

(3) - *Eiusdem est rem producere et ei perfectionem dare* (*Ia*, qu. 103, a. 5).

Therefore, the intellect accepts what it is told because the will is inclined to what is said through an affection for the speaker through an attraction to what is said, or through the habit of obedience (1).

cc) - As an example of the disposition of a person influencing his judgment we may give the case of a person making a judgment under the sway of passion. When a person is free from the passion of anger he can make a correct judgment that taking vengeance on another is contrary to reason and wrong. Then, another person, unpleasant and crude and unlikable, insults him in public; his anger is thus aroused and the desire to retaliate is provoked and the will tends very strongly to the satisfaction which will come from harming this person in return; there is a conformity, then, between the will and revenge - and this attraction is recognized by the intellect; thus, according to the present disposition of the will, the intellect judges that re-

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(1) - Quod vero attinet ad fidem ordinis naturalis dicimus posse considerari fidem, ut ex parte piæ affectionis in voluntate, quatenus inclinatur ad personam dicentem vel ad eius dicta aut ex parte assensus intellectus quatenus in vi auctoritatis dicentis movetur intellectus ad assentiendum huic parti. Quoad primum poni potest habitus in voluntate angeli sicut ponuntur aliae virtutes sicut enim datur inter virtutes amicitia, qua quis afficitur erga alterum, et observantiae, qua reveretur auctoritatem alterius, ita, et pia affectio potest nasci ex istis habitibus, quatenus aliquis afficitur ad personam per amicitiam aut aestimat et veneratur auctoritatem per observantiam. Et pia affectio non amplius importat quam aliquid istorum, scilicet vel amicabilem affectum vel venerationem ad personam et amorem ad id quod dicit vel promittit. (John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol., t. VI, (Vives), disp. 13, a. 2, n. 37).

venge is both good and fitting : "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei". This judgment does not destroy the previous proposition that revenge is not good and is not according to reason; however, under the force of passion, the attraction for revenge is so strong that it becomes uppermost in consideration and the previous judgment is relegated to the background, the good or revenge is presented to the will, the will tends towards it as towards its good, and the intellect judges that revenge is good (1). Thus because of the affection of the will towards an object, the intellect accepts as true what it had previously rejected as not true : the intellect is determined by a truth not as true but as good (*verum non ut verum sed verum ut bonum*).

Another example is that of St. Thomas in saying that a thing may be loved more than it is known as in the case of knowledge when a person likes what he knows in a general and confused way or in a summary manner; thus, a beginner in philosophy after a few introductory classes knows very little about philosophy but may like it intensely. St. Thomas also speaks of rhetoric to which a person may be greatly attracted because he enjoys winning people over to his point of view ((2)).

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(1) - Cfr. Cajetan, *IaIIae*, qu. 58, a. 5, n. 10.

(2) - Aliquid plus amatur quod cognoscatur. Sicut maxime patet in scientiis, quae aliqui amant propter summariam cognitionem quam de his habet : puta quod sciunt rhetoricam esse scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica amant (*IaIIae*, qu. 27, a. 2, ad 2).

A final example is taken from St. Paul's second epistle to

Timothy :

The time will come, when men will grow tired of sound doctrine, always itching to hear something fresh; and so they will provide themselves with a continuous succession of new teachers, as the whim takes them, turning a deaf ear to the truth, bestowing their attention on fables instead.

St. Thomas explaining this passage uses the following words indicating the influence of the will : they do not wish to hear useful things; your doctrine will be hateful; they wish inordinately to hear harmful things; this is according to their desires that one man wishes to this person and that man that person, so that they seek out different teachers. What is said here of the teaching of St. Paul is applicable to all teaching. If the teacher is liked or if the teaching is acceptable to the will, the intellect under the influence of the will accepts what is taught (1).

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- (1) - 'Erit enim tempus cum sanam doctrinam non sustinebunt, sed ad sua desideria coacervabunt sibi magistros prurientes auribus est a veritate quidem auditum avertent, ad fabulas autem convertentur'. - - Utilia nolunt audire, sed curiosa - - erit eis odiosa vestra doctrina, - - volunt inordinate audire curiosa et noxa, - - et hoc est secundum sua desideria quia unus vult audire unum, alius alium et sic quaerunt diversos magistros. - - Pruritus dicitur habere in pedibus qui non vult quiescere; in auribus, vero, qui semper audire vult nova, inaudita, et curiosa, et quandoque noxia - - et talia homines habentes in auribus pruritus, volunt audire (In II ad Timotheum, c. 4, v. 3, lect. 1).

c) - Since the intellect in faith receives its object under the aspect of good we are able to compare the acts of the intellect in faith with the acts in the other habits or dispositions. The acts we wish to compare are assent and consideration. To say that the intellect assents to a truth means that it has a distinct and most certain concept of one part of a contradiction (1). To say that the intellect considers a truth means that it is inquiring for the truth before it has arrived at the perfection of knowledge through the certitude of evidence (2).

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(1) - Sententia autem est conceptio distincta vel certissima alterius partis contradictionis; assentire autem a sententia dicitur (De Ver., qu. 14, a. 1).

(2) - Cogitatio tripliciter sumi potest : uno modo, communiter pro qualicumque actuali consideratione intellectus. Alio modo, dicitur cogitare magis proprie consideratio intellectus quae est cum quadam inquisitione antequam perveniatur ad perfectionem per certitudinem visionis - - ideo sumitur pro actu intellectus deliberantis. Tertio modo, pro actu virtutis cogitativae. Si cogitare sumatur communiter secundum primum modum, sic hoc quod dicitur cum assensione cogitare, non dicit totam rationem eius quod est credere : nam per hunc modum etiam qui considerat ea quae scit vel intelligit, cum assensione cogitat; si vero sumatur cogitare secundo modo, sic in hoc intelligitur tota ratio huius actus, qui est credere (IIa IIae, qu. 2, art. 1).