

## Chapter XI

### THE SCHOOL OF DEWEY

This projecting of the Ego into infinite shadowy realms by such men as Pringle-Pattison, however, smacks far too much of the detested and dreaded "supernatural" to be accepted by the post-Kantian proponents of the Good Life, as chiefly represented by John Dewey. All such dreamy speculations confuse the issue and interfere with the business at hand which is getting the utmost for the individual in this life in the form of tangible values. To quote Professor Randall of Columbia: "As Mr. Costello insists and Mr. Lamprecht cogently argues, there is no room for any Supernatural in naturalism-- no supernatural or transcendental God and no personal survival after death." (Naturalism and the Human Spirit, New York, 1944, p.358)

Naturalism, in the happy possession of the assurance that none but the sunny human world exists, has no desire to jeopardize this hard-earned victory by peering beyond the grave. It is much more interested in being a live mouse than a dead lion. Its spirit consists in a protest against "all philosophies which allege that events require, for their occurrence or for their explanation, reference to transcendental grounds, orders, causes, purposes, Dinge an sich, and the like." (op.cit. p.359) It is

not concerned with how we got here, or whither we are going, but rather with bending all the riches of the universe to making every minute count here and now. Its center is obviously man, man living, not dead, man who must develop himself by all the means in his power. Religion, eternity, immortality, only enter in as pure forms in the mind which may have a certain human value though no objective content. In order to complacently enjoy materialism it is necessary to eliminate the immaterial, the moral law, and any other shackle. It might seem rather a high price to pay, but as the sales lady said to the good lady who seemed surprised at the high price and the rudimentary quality of the hat she was offered: "This one is frightfully expensive, because, you see, you are paying for restraint."

Thus while the more liberal "naturalist" are willing to discuss the possibility of a God or an immortal soul, they state that for such to be true it must be established by experimental verification. Such verification has not yet been produced. "Naturalism is opposed to all known forms of supernaturalism, not because it rules out a priori what may or may not exist, but because no plausible evidence has been found to warrant belief in the entities and powers to which supernatural status has been attributed. The existence of God, immortality, disembodied spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have been customarily interpreted by the great institutional religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they deny the existence of

fairies, elves and leprechauns." (John Dewey, op.cit. p.45)

In this way, "naturalism" is able to make a show of open-mindedness, by its willingness to accept what ever may be proved experimentally, while safe-guarding its materialism by arbitrariness refusing to accord any possibility of proof to that which it wishes to deny. Mr. Costello is more frank. He says quite plainly: "Philosophy must be partly reductionist or liquidationist thesis: There is no "supernatural." God and immortality are myths." (op.cit. p. 295)

Naturalism, especially in the person of Mr. Dewey, pays a great deal of attention to words. Just as it accuses its adversaries of finding objectivity for their concepts in fictitious images enclosed in words, so it also appears to feel that by redefining words it is possible to attribute odious connotations to those of the adversary and thereby render him ridiculous and impotent. This appears from the re-definition by Mr. Dewey of the word "natural" which permits him to froth at the mouth at all sorts of anti-natural tendencies. As long as words had a certain sacredness since they were supposed to be a sign of man's thought, with a common meaning, "natural" meant that which belonged to the essence of a thing, and could be applied equally well to material and immaterial essences. Consequently "anti-natural" or "supernatural" meant something which did not belong to the essence of the thing, which could not be derived from that essence. Mr. Dewey, having re-defined "natural" to mean that which agrees with his own personal

notion of the universe, can now inveigh against anyone who dares to disagree with his oracles as being "anti-natural". Those who are not aware that Mr. Dewey alone decides of the meanings of words, and labor under the illusion that they still retain the common meaning agreed upon by men in general, are therefore shocked at the terrible crimes and violence to nature those who disagree with Mr. Dewey are committing. This is an application of the successful communist tactic of secretly re-defining the word "fascist" to mean anyone or anything opposed to Soviet Russia's aims, which thereby permits much heroic extermination in the name of "democracy." Words, in representing concepts, are ultimately intended to represent the objective reality which measures these concepts. Their arbitrary transformation, therefore, stems immediately back to the fundamental thesis that it is the individual who creates the world.

Thus Mr. Dewey can rant and rave about the anti-naturalistic tendencies of his adversaries and predecessors of twenty centuries or so. But just exactly why Mr. Dewey's definition of the word should be substituted for that in common and immemorial usage cannot be explained except by postulating that it is Mr. Dewey who is, over and against the rest of men, the sole judge of these matters. He not only decides what a word means but also strictly defines the limits of its meaning. This is no less than tyranny since the meaning of words depends upon a convention among men, otherwise how is anyone going to know what anyone else is talking about? However,

Mr. Dewey is merciless on the subject. Even the unfortunate philosophers of centuries before do not escape abuse for not having employed the word "natural" as Mr. Dewey has decreed.

Despite all its display of democracy in philosophy, "Naturalism" is a very absolutistic system. It is all for accepting only the results of experience, but first of all, before approaching experience, it has very definitely decided what experience can and can not produce. Among the things experience is forbidden to give any proof of is God and the immortality of the soul. It definitely implies divine omnipotence and absolute power over the universe to dispose of them with a flip of the hand as naturalism does.

It is also a very deceitful system, since while re-defining secretly "natural" to mean only that small little corner of reality it is inclined to tolerate, and arbitrarily dismissing the rest, it is quite willing and very anxious to capitalise on the traditional sense of the word as that which belongs to the essence of a being and put itself forward as a philosophy which is all for accepting things as they are in themselves without resorting to pre-conceived subjective and un-objective notions.

This disregard for truth in the use of words, which have a great dignity and should be the object of reverence since they are the principal means of conveying that which is highest in man,

namely his thought, has consequences in keeping with the magnitude of the perversion. Today treaties involving the destiny of whole nations have thus been complacently circumvented to the disaster of a people, while the signatories wishing to perpetrate such acts stoutly wave the treaty as a justification for their acts. Thus Russia recently used its interpretation of the words "in the first instance" to continue the domination of a country, the liberation of which was the precise object of the document in question and in which the words "in the first instance" were commonly understood to guarantee this. Once words have lost their meaning mutual trust and understanding vanish.

To understand Mr. Dewey therefore, it is necessary to learn a new language if one does not wish to be misled. In learning these new meanings, one is also supposed to be learning a new world, since words, through concepts, are supposed to represent objective truth. It is a tribute to man's sublime confidence in himself when he thinks that by changing the meaning of words he is changing the world. But that is precisely what Mr. Dewey is doing. By changing the meaning of the word "natural" when referred to man, he is under the impression that he has changed the nature of man, or it would be better to say, created the nature of man, since any other concept on the subject is a pure illusion, or as he would say, a low view of nature. Thus Professor Woodbridge is quoted as stating the following concerning Dewey's answers to his questions : "Dewey

defined and distinguished and qualified, in such a maze of dialectic, that not only I did not get any answer, I didn't even know where my question went to. And do you know, when he gets that way, he thinks he is being empirical." (op. cit. p. 296)

As Professor Costello further says : "It has been contended by Professor John Dewey and others that the subject matter of the exact sciences, such as mathematics and formal logic, is of human invention, as are the symbols used. We define as we arbitrarily choose. We make these things." (op. cit. p. 312) If logic were merely a question of mental gymnastics in the vacuum, such an interpretation would be tolerable, but since these sciences are fundamentally designed to aid in the acquisition of truth, in a knowledge of what is, in an interpretation of reality, to consider them solely as independent creations is to cut oneself off from the world, to live in a world of one's own. This is bad enough, but when these same arbitrary creations are forcibly foisted upon a world which is unable to adapt itself spontaneously to the patterns woven by philosophers, it is disastrous. And let no one say that the "naturalist" philosophers are interested in pure speculation. They are definitely interested and intent upon impressing their "nature" upon the "anti-natural" world outside. As Professor Costello says: "... Aristotle was the empiricist. Modern science began with thought, not with observation..." (op. cit. p. 314)

If "naturalism" wished to observe a cautiously agnostic attitude towards the laws of objective reality, it would be less dangerous. But like all idealistic systems, it definitely intends to impose itself. It starts out with an apodictical concept of nature and proceeds to endeavor to force experience to prove its point. Contrary data are simply volatilized as "un-natural." This is where the use of words intervenes, since by arbitrarily and subjectively re-defining some objective reality, it is possible to somehow push and shove it into the "naturalist" mode under the ingenuous illusion that having changed the meaning of the word one has also changed the nature of the reality. One must have, as Professor Randall says : "faith in intelligence." Thus the system which magnanimously undertakes to make a clean sweep of all authoritarian cob-webs, comes up with that same authority in the very realm that is supposed to proceed along the lines of evidence. One must now believe that human intelligence can do all things, an attribute previously denied to the divinity, along with the divinity itself. It requires great docility to accept of a mind such as Mr. Dewey's what one is not allowed to accept of the universe.

But Mr. Dewey goes merrily on his way, remaking the world, and we hope he will be kind to it. Thus he writes : All religions "agree in one point : the necessity for a Supernatural Being and for an immortality that is beyond the power of nature." (John Dewey's Philosophy, edited by Joseph Ratner, New York, 1939, p. 1003) Is



it necessary to prove that immortality is beyond nature ? Not at all. This tedious process is painlessly eliminated by a simple decree of Mr. Dewey which limits nature to his own conception of it. Since there is no place therein for immortality, immortality has to go, and vanishes by the relentless "fiat" of Mr. Dewey. Truly a formidable weapon. Thus the concept of immortality becomes un-natural, unreal, imaginary, preposterous and disappears from the realm of existence.

However, Mr. Dewey, while banishing immortality and the "Supernatural Being" assimilates the goods and chattels of his victims. To the victor belong the spoils. Mr. Dewey therefore takes over religion and puts it to work for naturalism. A very broad-minded and generous attitude. First it is to be purified from the supernatural (read: What does not coincide with Mr. Dewey's notions of the natural). Then "I shall try to show that these derivations (from the supernatural) are encumbrances and that what is genuinely religious will undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from them; that then; for the first time (Oh, sublime modesty !), the religious aspect of experience will be enabled to develop freely on its own account." (op. cit. p. 1004)

Mr. Dewey's task is facilitated by his easy and erroneous understanding of what, for instance, the Christian religion is. Thus he writes of "the personal and loving Providence of

Christianity, omnipotent and limited by a corresponding evil power." (ibid. p. 1005) Where did he ever find that? In re-creating religion, we must ask: "what conception of unseen powers and our relations to them would be consonant with the best achievements and aspirations of the present." (ibid. p. 1007) In other words, the unseen powers are to be conceived in accordance with the best aspirations of the present, which of course coincide with Mr. Dewey's. Thus the divinity must wait breathlessly while Mr. Dewey decides whether it may exist or not.

It is really much better to speak of "religious" rather than "religion," because "religious" denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a system of beliefs (sic). Thus the "religious" may be made an adjunct of naturalism, in keeping with the principle that all is grist for the naturalist mill. The objective value of such concepts is carried over and made to ennoble and elevate the strictly self-centered purposes of naturalism. Thus, "the idea of invisible powers would take on the meaning of all the conditions of nature and human association that support and deepen the sense of values which carry one through periods of darkness and despair to such an extent that they lose their usual depressive character." (ibid p. 1013) This procedure reminds one of the wicked wolf who ate grandmother and then tried to lure innocent Red Riding Hood to her fate by appearing in grand-

mother's trimmings. Thus naturalism can beckon to the unsuspecting for whom religion still holds some significance with the promise of religion in naturalism, just as its whole edifice is reared upon the arbitrary assertion that it alone is the system which emancipates nature from all its antinatural perversions. For naturalism it is not a question of : "A rose by any other name is just as sweet," but rather of "A weed if called a rose is just as sweet." As Mr. Dewey says : "Instead of accomodating ourselves to conditions, we modify conditions so that they will be accomodated to our wants and purposes." (ibid. p. 1014)

Religion is a voluntary, not externally imposed, adjustment within ourselves and with the universe. "It is not a religion that brings it about, but when it occurs, from whatever cause and by whatever means, there is a religious outlook and function." (ibid. p. 1015) In this imagination plays a part, because, in Kantian fashion, "the limited world of our observation and reflection reaches the Universe only through imaginative extension." (ibid. p. 1016) The Universe is merely the totality of conditions with which the self is connected. (ibid.) Such is the nature of the individual's misconception that he finds himself in an ego-centric world, which is the creature of his imagination, all of which must pass for a horrible dream to anyone endeavoring to discern traces of genuine and truly natural grandeur in man and the world. But all

religion, all conviction, is the acknowledgment of some ideal end, going beyond evidence, and therefore a figment of the mind. (cf. op. cit. p. 1017) Thus religion, as a conception of supreme ends, becomes a tending towards an ideal, whether realisable or not, which is ultimately the fulfilment of the self.

In this way, the notion of "faith" may be taken over by the naturalists. "For all endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence to the actual. Nor does this faith depend for its moving power upon intellectual assurance or belief that things worked for must surely prevail and come into embodied existence. For the authority of the object to determine our allegiance and devotion is based on the intrinsic nature of the ideal." (op. cit. p. 1018) This idealism of action must exclude beliefs of any antecedent reality otherwise it will fall into supernaturalism. It must not allow fear to create the gods. It must rather cooperate with nature to bring conditions into greater consonance with that is humanly desirable. Faith in intelligence replaces faith in religion as understood by those who have the misfortune not to be "naturalists."

The one thing one is not allowed to have faith in is the identification of the ideal with a supreme Being, an aberration refuted by Feuerbach. As Mr. Dewey states succinctly: "What I have been objecting to, I repeat, is not the idea that ideals are linked

with existence and that they themselves exist, through human embodiment, as forces, but the idea that their authority and value depend upon some prior complete embodiment -- as if the effort of human beings in behalf of justice, or knowledge or beauty, depended for their effectiveness and validity upon assurance that there already existed in some supernal region a place where criminals are humanely treated, where there is no serfdom or slavery, where all facts and truths are already discovered and possessed, and all beauty is eternally displayed in actualized form." (ibid. p. 1023) Such an idea would be, by Mr. Dewey's definition, anti-natural, and therefore fantastic. The destructive powers of Mr. Dewey are truly incredible.

For the benefit of the un-enlightened the high-priest of the "naturalists" is willing to produce a God, to be defined as the active relation between the ideal and the actual. (ibid. p. 1025) Thus naturalism is prepared to offer a complete universe with a God to its adepts. Why be subject to someone else's God or live in someone else's universe? Own your own God. Make your own universe. Thus you can resist debasing atheism and irreligion, which like "supernaturalism, separate man from nature, and prevent the more intense realization of values that inhere in the actual connections of human beings with one another. This is a much more promising end than the supernatural. It is a fact of infinite potential religious significance. (ibid. p. 1036) Says Mr. Dewey, with

supreme modesty : "The opposition between religious values as I conceive them and religions is not to be bridged. Just because the release of these values is so important, their identification with the creeds and cults of religions must be dissolved." (ibid. p. 1037)

But will Mr. Dewey be left to peacefully cultivate his garden ? Having freed himself of the gods and immortality, will Mr. Dewey be left to make of the world a pleasant little suburb where everybody, thanks to Mr. Dewey's enlightened guidance, loves everybody ? In many ways the spirit of "naturalism" may be compared to the expression of the contemporary spirit of America : freedom for each to pursue his own life, develop his personality, and enjoy the society of his neighbors. But it is becoming frighteningly evident that this way of life is marked out as the prey of a new beast now devouring Europe and Asia and which promises mankind a more rigid and brutal slavery than any ever attributed to supernatural religions.

For it is not possible to consecrate the principle of revolt without that revolt ultimately turning against its authors. The idealism of action which emancipates man from God, also provides the grounds for man to assert his supremacy over the universe in a practical way, and as history abundantly show, man as the master of man is a far more cruel taskmaster than God. Thus we see man escaping God only to fall into the hands of man, denying immortality

only to find himself imprisoned in the world. In this struggle between man and God for the soul of man, whereas God endeavors to draw man up to a share in His divinity, man endeavors to draw man down to the sole realm which is truly his, namely, nothingness. As St. Thomas says : "Esse autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio; sibi autem relictæ in se considerata nihil est : unde prius naturaliter inest sibi nihil quam esse." (De Aeternitate Mundi, ed. Mandonnet, Paris, 1927, p. 25) Thus with relentless logic the forces which have endeavored to destroy God and the immortal soul, to reduce man to matter, are now intent upon the attempt to fulfil the final step, the reduction of man to nothing. As will be seen, even the omniscient Mr. Dewey is marked out for this reduction.

## Chapter XII

### TWILIGHT OF THE GODS

While not so long ago a humanitarian society in Greenwich Village, in whose settlement houses Mr. Dewey's doctrines are not unknown, awarded its yearly medal to Princess Elizabeth of England because she had promised that on her accession to the throne horses would not have to work on Sunday, one of the prisoners released from a concentration camp in Germany told of an inscription he had seen there scribbled on the wall : "Here a man comes in through the door and goes out up the chimney."

Thus while in certain sunny peaceful spots of the world people are engaged in treating animals like human beings, in a far greater portion of the world more determined characters are engaged in treating human beings as something a little less than an animal. Even side by side with particularly solicitous treatment of animals there is usually a painful spectacle of mistreatment of human beings. This, then is the exaltation of man, a world where society can lavish affection on a dumb animal and leave ragged human skeletons shivering in the cold while a dog rides by seated on a silk cushion, where horses and cattle are fed, but men are starved to death in filth.

But the evolution is not yet terminated. Mr. Dewey, after denying the gods, would like to curl up with a pleasant and comfortable



nature and live happily ever after. True, men would not be considered better than animals, but they both would be well fed. However, it is not possible to base a system on revolt and then guilelessly believe that it will lead to peace and plenty. To revolt against God, to put oneself out of his reach by proclaiming the emancipation of reason and denying the immortality of the soul, and then sit down to enjoy the good things of earth which He has provided, is a kind of weakening keenly perceived and resented by the arch-rebels. If man's greatest dignity consists in his being able to reject God, then to accept his gifts, to appreciate the beauty and majesty of the world, to love other human beings for the goodness that is in them, to endeavor to live in peace and comfort, is a kind of humiliation, a kind of surrender, a deep blow to pride.

Thus the most profound thinkers of the revolt, the most militant rebels, not content with a victory which is only apparent, with a victory which might one day permit a God to laugh at rebels who set out to destroy him but yet all their lives had loved and worshipped the very goods which he daily doled out to them, must necessarily strive to cut off from themselves all which could be said to belong to God. Therefore they must tend towards nothing, to annihilation, since the slightest atom of being is an involuntary admission of dependence upon God. But to cut oneself off alone

would be a lonely fate, a triumph for God since men would still walk upon the earth to worship him while the rebel was forgotten. No, all men must be turned away from God and plunged into the abyss of nothingness. Thus not only would all goods, all dependence upon the Creator, have been scorned, but the greatest earthly good, the very image of God on earth would have been destroyed. Man, whom God had bent down to save, for love of whom he had humbled himself in the person of his Son, would thus have the upper hand, since not only had he refused the goods of God, he had even refused the love of God. Thus, in league with the angel of darkness, the supreme rebels among men, profiting of the forbearance of God, are striving relentlessly to accomplish this final triumph of nothingness. Truly a plan terrifying by its all-embracingness, a plan worthy of the angels who resented God's love for men.

The achievement that causes Marx and Engels to regard Hegel as one of the greatest thinkers of all time, is precisely that he, for the first time, erected the revolt of man, as revolt, into a positive system. Hitherto, this emancipation, from Averroes to Kant, was conceived as a harmonious affair. God was not attacked, not denied, He was rather transformed into the benign leader of the revolt itself. The emancipation was disguised under the form of a correct understanding of the divine plan.

Naturally this led to contradictions. Thus the Aver-

reists and men of the Renaissance found themselves in the hypocritical position of holding a doctrine by reason while denying it by faith. Thus Kant found himself in the equivocal position of denying any possible knowledge of God and immortality by reason while proclaiming their existence through the dictates of the categorical imperative. Obviously these contradictions could not be eliminated without the laws of the universe changing to suit the emancipators, or the emancipators conforming themselves to the laws of the universe. The first could not occur and the second would not occur. The only solution was to make of contradiction the very core of reality, to identify being and non-being, truth and falsehood, good and bad. Thus the revolt of man against God could appear as a consequent, positive system. It would have a certain diabolical honesty about it, since the struggle of the creature against the Creator would now be set down for what it was in a philosophy expressly vowed to the accomplishment of contradiction. Thus the catastrophic consequences of such a suicidal task would no longer have to be explained away ; they could now be brought forth as the supreme ratification of the system. It is this metaphysical theory of Hegel which Marx and Engels have brought to full development in dialectical materialism. At long last, it is now possible to embark upon the flight from God and the destruction of man with utter consistency. It is now possible to proclaim openly that the true emancipation of man consists in his utter annihilation.

Since, however, the superficial tenets of dialectical materialism appear to aim at just the contrary, at a terrestrial deification of man, it is necessary to convince those whom the cosmic crimes of dialectical materialism have not already convinced, and who are, sad to say, a minority, that it is explicitly vowed to the destruction of man as the last triumphant step in the supreme revolt against God.

In his encyclical on the condition of the working classes, Pope Leo XIII wrote the following words : "Excludes the idea of futurity and forthwith the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay the whole scheme of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery." Did the Marxists deny this ? On the contrary, this was precisely what they were aiming at. At the same period Engels was writing that inexorably the time would come when "even the last trace of organic life will vanish, and the earth, an extinct frozen globe like the moon, will circle in deepest darkness and in an ever narrower orbit about the equally extinct sun, and at last fall into it. ...Only a cold dead sphere will still pursue its lonely path through universal space. ... Animals with a brain capable of thought (who) for a short span of time find conditions suitable for life (will be) exterminated later without mercy, ... matter... with the same iron necessity... will exterminate on the earth its highest creation, the thinking mind..." (Fr. Engels,

Dialectics of Nature. New York, 1940, pp. 20, 25) Thus do the Marxists welcome this "dark and unfathomable mystery" and the hoped for extinction of man by matter.

The records of primitive native tribes show their love of life and their resentment against death. The cessation of existence never ceased to astound them. The Greeks loved life and Homer causes Achilles to say : "I would rather be on earth as the hired servant of another in the house of a landless man with little to live, on, than be king over the dead." (Od. XI, 488-491) Christianity speaks of death as doing violence to the creature, recognizing the innate natural desire in man for eternal life. (S.T. I, q. 12, a. 1;)

But the dialectical materialists realize that man cannot love life and hate the author of life consistently. To be consistent in revolt, one must love death, at the opposite pole of being from the divine life of God. Thus the Marxists make death, not life the end of man. Hegel wrote in his Encyclopedia, I, : "... We say, for instance that man is mortal, and seem to think that the ground of his death is in external circumstances only... But the true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ of death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression." Commenting upon this Engels continues : "The dialectical conception of life is nothing more than this.

But for anyone who has once understood this, all talk of the immortality of the soul is done away with. ... Here, therefore, by means of dialectics, simply becoming clear about the nature of life and death suffices to abolish an ancient superstition. Living means dying." (Engels, op. cit. p. 164) Thus the end of man in revolt, the apogee of emancipation, is not life but death.

This, then is the end of the cosmic process : extinction, extermination. Such an attempt is quite consistent with itself, since only in nothingness can man be to himself alone. As long as he is possessed of any being, he is beholden to another than himself. But if the end of man is extinction, if only thus can he be snatched from God, why wait the millions of years for the cosmic process of extinction to accomplish itself ? It is quite logical to hustle humanity on its way to the abyss, since that is the end of nature anyway. Thus methodical destruction by force is integrated into dialectical materialism. In this scheme of things, this ultimate tendency towards zero, it is reasonable to start from that which has most life, and work down. God is considered as having been already criticized and liquidated. It is next a question of limiting the highest elements in humanity. An exemplification of this may be seen in the Communist purges which invariably and methodically start by wiping out the most intelligent and most cultivated individuals in any given group, since they are most susceptible of potential resistance against the reduction of all things to dialectical materialism.

Thus opposing nations are to be reduced to the rank of cattle and even within Russia itself chaotic materialism is promoted by the liquidation of those who show special intelligence and a reactionary tendency to resist their cosmic debasement. "Pride perversely imitates God, for it hates equality with others under him, but wishes to impose upon others its domination for his." (De civ. Dei, XIX, 13)

Of course, it would be easy to say that this is pure theory, that in reality dialectical materialism is striving for a happy, sunny idyll for the proletariat. Undoubtedly its propaganda for the masses is directed towards creating this impression. However, in reviewing some of its accomplishments from a factual point of view, Professor Kirkconnell was able to demonstrate that dialectical materialism was indeed remaining faithful to the principle that "living means dying." This is what it meant for three million Ukrainian peasants in 1933 who were under the illusion that dialectical materialism would let them go on living peacefully on their farms. In the schools the children are kept at a sufficiently low level of intelligence by the fact that "almost half of the teachers in the primary schools, and nearly one third of those in the intermediate schools are workers with a pedagogical preparation which does not exceed three years." (Kulturnoe Streitelstvo, 1935, quoted by Professor Watson Kirkconnell in "Communism and Christianity," Toronto Evening Telegram, May 26, 1945) This feat had been ac-

complished by liquidating the educated teachers as politically untrustworthy. This situation is being further improved by diminishing the number of school children permanently thanks to an edict of April 7, 1935, signed by Kalinin and Molotov, prescribing the death penalty for boys and girls, 12 years of age and up. (ibid.) This was followed by an editorial in Pravda, April 8, 1935, urging that the wayward little children be exterminated without mercy. On April 19, Vechernaia Moskva was able to announce that the first of such sentences had been pronounced and carried out on a minor. At the same time, Stalin was being photographed in his role of "Father of the Nations" kissing little children. Thus can Professor Kirkconnell rightly say of the savior of the proletariat that he is come that they might have death, and have it more abundantly. To one flirting with the smirking monster of Marxism, it would be well to recall the words of Bunyan : "It came burning hot into my mind, whatever he said and however he flattered, when he got me into his house, he would sell me for a slave." (Quoted by G.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, London, 1944, p. 27)

Thus while Mr. Dewey and others like him having accomplished their emancipation of reason and restriction of man to this earthly life, think they are going to be left peacefully to enjoy this triumph, they are mistaken. Man is emancipated not by life but by death. The beautiful verbal images of the Good Life, progress, prosperity, freedom, health, with which the Marxists deck



themselves out for the benefit of the "liberal" philosophers is merely a preliminary to the kiss of death. Should anyone doubt that this mortal embrace is a mere conjecture, he has only to pick up a map and see the relentless spread of the plague of dialectical materialism across the face of the earth, a spread enormously facilitated by inconsistency of the liberal philosophers who think that one can deny God and the soul and the natural law and then guarantee the well-being of society by an appeal to the dignity of man, a dignity which they themselves have completely destroyed. Far from the fullness of life to which they inconsistently aspire, they are building the road by their devaluation of all objectivity for the Leviathan who knows only the law of force and who will consign them defenseless to the silence of the tomb, the same ominous silence which lies over all the countries thus far engulfed by the monster. Then the emancipation of man will be complete.

Thus Mr. Howard Selsam, in his Socialism and Ethics, has already undertaken to begin the liquidation of Mr. Dewey, that great protagonist of the dignity of man, in terms of dialectical materialism. The main reproach to Mr. Dewey is that he is trying to bring about the millenium by intelligence rather than force. (op. cit. p. 104) Obviously, if matter is the basis of thought (ibid. p. 67), the line of action to be followed is force, which invokes the reality of concrete matter, rather than the interminable wranglings and indecision of reason. How can anything be accomplished by pure

reason when the work of reason is to follow the laws of matter which does not reason ? The primary object is the accomplished fact which matter posits. The work of the philosopher is to facilitate the fulfilment of the laws of matter. Whereas Mr. Dewey would readily agree that "belief in a future life is incompatible with a scientific approach to man and nature, (ibid. p. 150), he retrogresses in making man, the individual, his point of focus. The human individual is only a social product. (ibid. p. 126) If he would be saved, he must adjust man to the eternal law of matter.

It is not enough to deny all principles, to deny the soul and immortality. One must take refuge in the point farthest from God, in matter. One must lose oneself in matter, become dissolved and selfless in it. Matter has come to make man in its own image, and that image is nothing. As Hegel wrote : "Matter is the primary reality, the existing Being-for-itself...", the latent identity in space and time. (Naturphilosophie, E., p. 67, quoted by Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 343) What is its form, its end ? It is to be eternally changing while remaining eternally the same. What can this matter be which has no identity of its own but the realization of nothing ? As Engels writes, "Nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws according to which it changes." (Engels, op. cit. p. 24) How can matter have eternal laws that are other than matter ? Obviously the laws must

be the nature of matter it self. They cannot be purposeful laws, since only man, the highest product of matter, can act for a conceived end, and he is in turn exterminated by matter. Those laws can only be the projection into the universe of man's own proud bid for annihilation in his revolt against God. To matter is assigned the task of obliterating man and carrying him off into oblivion and nothingness where for all eternity he will be safe from the pursuit of an avenging Creator. Just as for the being to wish to cut itself off from the source of its being in order to be for itself alone is to invite annihilation, so also the cosmic theory representing this attempt in its fullest expression is a theory which postulates annihilation as its ultimate goal, for then alone will one be absolutely free of God, will one owe Him nothing. This nothingness, like evil, which cannot be in God, is therefore considered as a victory over God, as something which He cannot possess, as something eternally independent of him. This triumph can possibly be expressed in the words of Hegel : "the nothing of a something is a determinate nothing" (Engels, op. cit. p. 252), making its whole identity consist in the negation of that of which it is the negation.

Therefore there must be conflict in the world, for in the world there is in all beings a tendency to be and to be to the fullest extent, yet they must be brought to destruction and extermination. Dialectical materialism assumes this supposed inner

motion towards destruction into the very core of reality. It achieves the supreme negation of the negation in assimilating non-being into being and making the whole nature of being a tendency towards absolute non-being. Thus being is no longer limited by non-being, since it is itself the very being of non-being.

But evil and falsehood are precisely non-being that exists in being. To suppose that non-being can eventually swallow up the being in which it is, is to presuppose that nothing can swallow up something, that something negative can increase in the positive until by completely negating the positive it will become a real, existing, independent negative, a real nothing. Thus the Marxists can speak of the strength of weakness and the power of misery, and the creative powers of destruction.

The revenge of being upon such attempts is that the supreme evil must still exist in something good, the supreme definite non-being, (and the Marxists conceive necessarily of their non-being as a state of their being, a terminus ad quem, a conclusion that is the goal and fulfilment of their being), must exist in some being. Thus they will never achieve complete annihilation, complete destruction of themselves, but rather a state of being which has the greatest amount of non-being, a goodness that has within itself the greatest amount of evil. In other words, they will not achieve the goal of becoming an infinite nothing, but rather that of becoming a

minimum something, a something tortured by the very non-being and evil which it assumed into itself, since this non-being and evil fill that part of them which by all the strength of immutable nature cries out for being and good.

Thus it is true that there is conflict in the universe and a conflict which is appointed to assume cosmic proportions before the end. Yet it is not the triumph of non-being over being, of evil over good. It is not the fulfilment of destruction. It is rather the ultimate triumph of Him Who is. As it is written in the Book of Wisdom : For God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. ... (The wicked) have said, reasoning with themselves, but not right : ... We are born of nothing, and after this we shall be as if we had not been. Let us therefore lie in wait for the just, because he is not for our turn, and he is contrary to our doings, and upbraideth us with transgressions of the law, and divulgeth against us the sins of our way of life. Let us condemn him to a most shameful death, for there shall be respect had unto him by his words. ... These things they thought and were deceived. ... For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him. But the wicked shall be punished according to their own devices : who have neglected the just and have revolted from the Lord. (ch. 1 & 2) And in those days men shall seek death and shall not find it; and they shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them. (Apoc. 9 : 6)

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