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ON LOVE

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

### PART I

#### THE PRINCIPLES

Chapter I.	SIMILITUDE AND LOVE .....	1
II.	EQUALITY AND FRIENDSHIP .....	39

### PART II

#### HOW GOD IS CALLED LOVE

III.	UTILITY, INTENTION AND ORDER OF THE <u>BOOK OF THE DIVINE NAMES</u> .....	84
IV.	HOW GOD IS CALLED LOVE .....	133

### PART III

CONCLUSIONS .....	170
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### PART IV

APPENDIX:	TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE ON LOVE IN SAINT THOMAS' COMMENTARY ON THE <u>BOOK</u> <u>OF THE DIVINE NAMES</u> BY DIONYSIUS, CHAPTER 4, LESSONS VIII-XII.	
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Lesson VIII.	The Causality of the Beautiful and Good .....	2
Lesson IX.	On Love .....	14
Lesson X.	On Ecstasy and Jealousy .....	38
Lesson XI.	How God is Named Love and Lovable .	50
Lesson XII.	Quotations from Hierotheus on Love	58
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....		69

## INTRODUCTION

This study was undertaken to learn, and to make available for English readers, the doctrine of Saint Thomas and Aristotle on love. With the same purpose we have translated the treatise on love found in Aquinas' commentary on the De Divinis Nominibus of Dionysius. We compared the Piana, Vivès and Mandonnet texts of the above work, but abandoned them for the recent Marietti edition (1950), partly because it may be easily procured by Thomistic students, partly because its numbered divisions make reference thereto easy.

In the first part of our work, since we refer to a number of Thomistic texts to which the beginner in philosophical study may not always have access, we have given most of our references in translation. In the second part we have increasingly cited the Latin text, for two reasons: first, the field of reference is narrower, the texts may be readily obtained, and even beginners in philosophy must become familiar with the original texts themselves; secondly, we found it difficult to solve the word-problem, for, because the English vocabulary is wanting in this field, the word love is accepted to mean the genus including what we call love and charity, with no express reference to the sensitive appetite, which is actually first and best known

to us. We believe that it would be well for English-speaking students of philosophy to become at least aware that there is a love that moves itself, as well as a love that is passion, and that many of our contemporary human problems are rooted in that duality of loves. We hope that our work will contribute in some small way to that awareness.

We wish to thank the Mediaeval Institute of Ottawa for the loan of their Piana manuscript, and the Humanities Research Council of Canada for their aid toward our research; but we especially wish to express our gratitude for the help and counsel of Doctor Charles De Koninck, whose wisdom and linguistic competence were of immeasurable assistance in our study.

ON LOVE

PART I

THE PRINCIPLES

SIMILITUDE AND EQUALITY IN LOVE

## CHAPTER ONE

### SIMILITUDE AND LOVE

Being is the first concept known by the intellect. The notion of division follows, and then the mind forms the idea of "one", that it may better comprehend being. Three notions, that of identity whereby things are called the same, that of similitude whereby they are called like, and that of equality, whereby they are called equal, are linked with "one". The same is defined as one in substance, the like as one in quality, the equal as one in quantity.<sup>1</sup>

To be one, that is, one by nature, means to be undivided or indivisible in movement or in concept. So the naturally continuous, the whole, the individual or the universal is called one. From the one that is a principle of number the mind takes the concept of indivisibility to use it as a means of manifestation in all the genera of being. One, thus understood, can even be applied to God, in that, by negating multiplicity, it manifests His simplicity.<sup>2</sup> "To be one", according to Aristotle, "means especially to be the

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<sup>1</sup>Saint Thomas, In X Metaphysicorum, Lect.IV, (Cathala ed.), n.1999.

<sup>2</sup>Saint Thomas, Ia, q.11, a.3, ad 2; Cf., In X Metaph., lect.III, n.1967.

first measure of a kind"; so it is first said of quantity and secondly of quality.<sup>1</sup> The first in each genus is the measure of the other members of that genus.<sup>2</sup> For we seek in every category of things a unit, simple and indivisible in quantity or quality, as a principle of comparison and knowledge, to such an extent that, if all existing beings were colours, our unit would be the basic colour - white.<sup>3</sup>

The same, or one in substance, gives rise to no difficulty of understanding. You have identity of being, that is you are one with yourself in form and matter.<sup>4</sup> In the field of mathematics, since the objects of the science are considered only in their quantified aspects, that is, abstracted from sensible matter and movement, equality will coincide in meaning with identity. Two equal straight lines, two equal squares are mathematically identical; but if the same squares or straight lines were considered as existing in matter, they could not be identical, for their matter would be different.<sup>5</sup> There is diversity of matter in the similar

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, ch.1, 1052b18-1053b4 as in Richard McKeon, Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1947).

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, Metaph, X, ch.1, 1052a15-1053b36.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 1052b1; cf., as far as ch.2, 1054a19.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., ch.3, 1054a30-b2.

<sup>5</sup>In X Metaph., lect.IV, n.2006: "Et quia usus est aequalitate quasi unitate in substantia." Cf., n.2009.

also - so how can the similar be one, that is undivided?  
To understand, we must first know quality.

Quality is expressed as qua dicimur quales, a disposition of the substance or a mode of being presupposing measure, which "ennobles" the potentiality of its subject.<sup>1</sup> Quality determines what quantity extended, terminating or proportioning toward action the virtual perfections of the substance, as quantity orders the material parts. It has four species: first, habits and dispositions disposing a nature well or ill in its own nature and likewise towards that nature's end, as health, illness, science, virtue, or, in the spiritual order, grace: second, intrinsic principles of action, as the intellect, or an impotency of the nature, as weak sight; third, alterable and stable qualities (passio et <sup>habilis</sup> possibilis qualitas), referring especially to sensible alterations, emotional states, or organic changes. One who pales from emotion has an alterable quality, but an invalid whose pallid colour is usual has a qualitas passibilis: fourth, the quality according to quantity, of form, figure or shape.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>John of Saint-Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus (Reiser Ed.), T.I, q.18, a.1, pp.609a-610b39.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp.610b42-621a29; In V. Metaph., lect.XVI; Metaph., V, ch.14, 1020a33-1020b25. For the controversy over the divisions, see J. of Saint-Thomas, op. cit., a.2, pp.610bff.



But these can be reduced to two. First, there is the proper or primary sense of quality, or that according to which a difference of the essence is said qualitas, for through it something is signified as informed or qualified. The differences of the essence of unmovable mathematical objects fall in this class. So surfaces can be termed triangular or square in quality, a circle is qualified as without angles, composite numbers differ from the simple, and 9 is a determination of 3. This same species of quality is applicable to the mobile but not qua moving. One may say that man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse because it is four-footed.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, there are the modifications of things that move, qua moving, and the differences of their movements. Alterations according to the contraries of hot and cold, light and heavy etc. come in this category, as also vice and virtue; for they indicate differences in movement according to which things in motion act or undergo action well or badly. So good and evil predicate quality in the animate, especially in the rational animal, for he has choice.<sup>2</sup> In view of this

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<sup>1</sup>In V Metaph., lect.XVI, nn.987-1000; Metaph., V, ch.14, 1020b13-25.

<sup>2</sup>In V Metaph., lect.XVI, nn.998-1000; Metaph., V, ch.14, 1020b16-25.

distinction Aquinas comments as follows on Aristotle's first references to similitude:

Now he establishes three modes of similitude. For he agrees that one in quality causes the like. But passion is close to quality due to the fact that passion is most likely to occur in the change of quality that is alteration. So one species of quality is an alterable and unstable quality. Therefore similitude occurs not only according to resemblance in quality but also according to resemblance in passion. The latter can take place in two ways. Either as regards the passion or the passion's term.<sup>1</sup>

The "one in quality" refers to the first or proper sense of quality indicating a difference in the essence; the resemblance in passion refers to the second, the modifications of the mobile - with the further division of the alterations into those which occur within the alteration or at its term.

The examples cited are in line with the above distinction:

So things are alike in three ways. In one way, because they undergo the same passion, as two burning sticks can be called like. In a second way, things are called like from the sole fact that they undergo any combination of passion, either identical or diverse; as two men are said like in suffering when one is beaten, the other jailed. In a third way, those things are called like whose quality is one, as two white objects and two stars in the sky with a like beauty or brightness.<sup>2</sup>

The four modes of likeness mentioned in Book Ten of the Metaphysics likewise reduce to either of the above two

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<sup>1</sup>In V Metaph., lect.XII, n.918.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., n.919.

groups. To share equally in the accidental form of whiteness means to be similar. To share unequally in such a form, that is to be more or less white than the compared object, is to be like.<sup>1</sup> Any oneness in shape, appearance or proportion spells the like, so the large square is similar to the small square, and unequal straight lines are also like to one another but non secundum totam rationem speciei.<sup>2</sup> Several likenesses in common will increase the similitude as in the resemblance of tin to silver, or gold to fire,<sup>3</sup> especially when the similitude is in the essential group of qualities:

Since there are several contrarieties, according to which alteration takes place, that thing which is like another according to more than one of these contraries is more properly called like. Just as garlic, which is hot and dry, is more properly called like to fire than bamboo juice, which is hot and moist. Likewise, when two things are like a third according to one quality only, that one which resembles a third according to its most characteristic quality is more properly called like to it, as air is more properly like to fire than to earth. For air is assimilated to fire in heat, a quality more proper to fire than dryness, in which earth is assimilated to air.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Metaph., X, ch.3, 1054b4ff. Cf., In X Metaph., lect.IV, nn.2006ff. Here Aristotle and his commentator are disproving the Platonic and Pythagorean doctrine of subsistent universals - the one has a separate existence for Plato - and of separated mathematical forms according to which the number 3 is the form of triangle. This accounts for the difference in approach to similitude.

<sup>2</sup>In X Metaph., lect.IV, n.2009.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., n.2012. Cf., Aristotle, Metaph., X, ch.3 1054b11-14.

<sup>4</sup>In V Metaph., lect.XII, n.920.

The above examples of sensible similitude are as easily recognized as the resemblance of two trees. The assimilation of air to fire - that is the process of a patient becoming or being made one in quality with an agent - implies in the case cited that the material disposition of air to its form is made similar to that of fire by the action of heat. Its matter is assimilated or made like.<sup>1</sup> But our own experience offers a more interesting if less simple kind of a similitude wherein an assimilation takes place according to form without matter, as the wax receives the seal's form but not its gold or bronze.<sup>2</sup> This second assimilation is that linked with the forma cognoscibile in the knowing process.

Knowledge is, in a certain sense, the bringing within the knower of things other than himself to order that he may be assimilated to the object and thus may know, even

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<sup>1</sup>Saint Thomas, In II de Anima (Pirota ed.), lect. XXIV, n. 552. "Licet enim illa et eadem materia numero quae est agentis, non fiat patientis fit tamen quodammodo eadem, in quantum similem dispositionem materialem ad formam acquirit ei quae erat in agente. Et hoc modo aer patitur ab igne, et quicquid patitur passione naturali."

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., nn. 553-554. See especially: "Assimilatur enim cera aureo sigillo quantum ad imaginem, sed non quantum ad dispositionem auri. Et similiter sensus patitur a sensibili habente colorem aut humorem... Assimilatur enim sensus sensibili secundum formam, sed non secundum dispositionem materiae", in n. 554.

when the object he would know is himself.<sup>1</sup> Experience tells us that the stone we see does not actually pass into our eyes, the electrical current known by its effects does not electrify our mind; the assimilation takes place according to the mode of the recipient, of the knowing faculty, not according to the mode of existence of the thing known. By its very nature, the sense must become its object in order to know, but the becoming takes place in the intentional, not the entitative order; the same is true of the intellect. The knower differs from the non-knower in that he is not limited to the existence that is his in virtue of his form; he can be, in a way, all other things; that is, all the things that he can know to the extent that he can know them; and all these the knower is in virtue of similitudes which are called intentional forms.<sup>2</sup> So the senses and the intellect are veritable treasure-houses of similitude. It is not the stone but the phantasm - a similitude of the stone - which is in the pupil of the eye and ultimately in the intellect. Knowledge is rooted in such immaterial images; because of them Aristotle says Omina ea, quae sunt, quodam-

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<sup>1</sup>Abbé Stanislas Cantin, D.Ph., Précis de Psychologie Thomiste (Québec: Editions de l'Université Laval, 1946), p.56, an interpretation of In II de Anima, lect.II.

<sup>2</sup>In III de Anima, lect.XIII, all but especially nn.789-791.

mode est anima.<sup>1</sup> To realize their importance we must investigate the knowing process.

Before the eye sees, it must receive from the tree or other object within range of its vision, a sensible species, which is no other than an image or similitude of the object, its form without its matter. Saint Thomas explains it thus:

The air, changed by colour, likewise modifies the pupil, i.e. renders it of a certain quality, impressing on it a species of colour; and the pupil itself, when so changed, changes some third thing, viz, the common sense.<sup>2</sup>

Now an operation follows every form; made one in quality with the object to which it is united by the received species or form, the sense operates in second act - it sees. But by its very nature every knowing faculty tends to express to itself what it knows in images, which in the case of the senses, are phantasms, that is, immaterial similitudes of

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<sup>1</sup>In III de Anima, in Aristotle's appended text, ch.8, 431b20. Cf., St. Thomas, ibid., n.790: "Et similiter anima data est homini loco omnium formarum, ut sit homo quodammodo totum ens, in quantum secundum animam est quodammodo omnia, prout ejus anima est receptiva omnium formarum. Nam intellectus est quaedam potentia receptiva omnium formarum intelligibilium, et sensus est quaedam potentia receptiva omnium formarum sensibilium."

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., lect.XII, n.773: "Dicit ergo primo, quod aer immutatus a colore, facit pupillam hujusmodi, id est facit eam aliqualem, imprimens in eam speciem coloris; et ipsa, scilicet pupilla sic immutata immutat alterum, scilicet sensum communem; et similiter auditus..."

particular, individual objects with their sensible, individuating and material notes retained, and these in turn can be stored in the memory and imagination to REPRESENT the thing known to the knower.<sup>1</sup> We can continue to imagine and to love the absent friend. And these representations are not merely instrumental signs as are pictures: rather they are the objects themselves existing intentionally in the knower, in a mode proportioned to the knowing faculty. So, when man has knowledge, his soul has the objects of that knowledge within itself, by way of similitudes, for consideration at will - a multitude of objects rich in their manifold variety.<sup>2</sup>

Yet valuable as they are, and necessary in that they are prerequisite to move the intellect from potency to act, the phantasms can only present to us the world of the singular and the contingent; they make available the qualities of things, not their natures.<sup>3</sup> If limited to them we would be barred from science.

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<sup>1</sup>In III de Anima, lect.XIII, especially nn.791-792.

<sup>2</sup>In II de Anima, lect.XII, n.375.

<sup>3</sup>In III de Anima, lect.XII, n.772: "Sicut sensus non potest sentire sine sensibili, ita anima non potest intelligere sine phantasmate." Cf., Saint Thomas, De Unitate Intellectus, as in Opuscula Omnia (Lethiellieux ed.), T.I, c.1, n.9, as well as In III de Anima, loc. cit., nn.766-770.

But the agent intellect can abstract from the phantasms the similitudes that will actualize the possible intellect & similitudes that are impressed species of the specific nature or quiddity of the object. The abstracted likeness has been made immaterial, spiritual, universal, and, accordingly, proportioned to the intellect to such an extent that it can move it to act.<sup>1</sup> Assimilated to its object, the possible intellect operates in virtue of the new form which the species impressed upon it and knows in act. The intellectual faculty itself is immaterial, i.e. determined by no corporal nature and accordingly assimilable to all corporal natures; its similitude is a universal, by means of which likenesses of all created being can be represented to the faculty; in consequence, it can be both knower and known, so that even the rational animal, the lowest of the intellects, can remedy his limited perfection to the extent of containing within himself a likeness of the perfection of the whole universe.<sup>2</sup> He can do more: he can go beyond the things of

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<sup>1</sup>In III de Anima, lect.XII, nn.770-772. Cf., Saint Thomas, Q.D. de Veritate, q.2, a.2.

<sup>2</sup>"Unde ut huic imperfectioni aliquod remedium esset, invenitur alius modus perfectionis in rebus creatis, secundum quod perfectio quae est propria unius rei, in altera re invenitur; et haec est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens, quia secundum hoc a cognoscente aliquid cognoscitur quod ipsum aliquo modo est apud cognoscentem... Et secundum hunc modum possibile est in una re totius universi perfectio existat...ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi, et causarum eius." See De Ver. q.2, a.2, c. Cf., Ibid., a.1, c.



time, to know, if imperfectly, what transcends the world of matter, to represent to himself at least negatively, through the instrumentality of the perfect and immaterial image which he contemplates, separated substances and even God. His intellect, too, tends to conceive a likeness of what he knows, to utter that similitude in a mental verb that will represent to himself the known, and terminate his act of knowing. So, in its ability to absorb, in a way, the perfection of the universe, in its power to conceive expressed species of all being, the human intellect imitates in its feeble manner the perfection of that intellect in whose likeness it was created - the perfection of the Trinity, wherein the Father conceives the Verb that is a Person, equal and similar to the Father in all things, the Creator of the actuality which the creature's similitudes represent.<sup>1</sup> It is no wonder that the ancients, with only man's reason to guide them, concluded that the ultimate end of the human being consisted in the full and perfect operation of this most far-reaching of his faculties.

Similitude plays a role in another field also. Experience teaches us that all natural things have an inclination toward the perfection that is proper to their nature,

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<sup>1</sup>Saint Thomas, Ia, q.34, a.1. For the function of similitude in the knowing process compare Ia, q.14, a.2, ad 3 and Cajetan, In Ia, q.79, a.2.

a perfection wherein they rest when it is had, to which they tend when it is absent.<sup>1</sup> The plant seeks sunlight, the animal seeks the food that is appropriate to his needs; he likewise instinctively generates his like and so perpetuates his species. Further, as we have pointed out, an operation follows every form. The consequence is, that, when the knower is made cognizant of new and possible perfections already his intentionally, for their intentional forms are impressed upon his faculty, there is born within him a desire for the good of which he is newly aware. In the irrational animal such an inclination is evoked in the presence of each new good that he senses is suitable to him.<sup>2</sup> For the good is id quod omnia appetunt: materially it is identical with what the cognitive faculty knew; formally it represents a perfection proportioned to the subject and hence desirable.<sup>3</sup> And it is to the existing good or to the actuality of what is as yet merely potential that this inclination turns, not to the similitude existing only in the knowing faculty. The dog desires to eat the meat his hunger craves, and so does

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.25, a.1, c.n.2 Cf., q.22, a.1, ad 11.

<sup>2</sup>Ia, q.78, a.1, ad 3, ad 4: cf., q.80

<sup>3</sup>For the Thomistic doctrine on "Bonum est id quod naturaliter omnia appetunt", see Saint Thomas, In I Ethicorum (Pirotta ed.), lect.II, n.21; likewise Ia, q.5, a.1 and q.6, a.3, c.

the hungry man, for this is a good suitable to the whole animal, not just to a single faculty as colour is suited to the eye. By this inclination, termed the elicited appetite, the knower is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, to a good which becomes the principle of his intention, his desire, his motion or operation toward effective union with the good to which his appetite is drawn as to something perfective in that it is in act. All appetite represents a relation between potency and act, a relation which is a similitude.<sup>1</sup> Let us examine the process of appetite.

The good awakens the appetite to act, to generate desire, to form an intention of seizing means to realize a real union with the appetible.<sup>2</sup> That first attraction of the appetite by the good, a soliciting of the affections that are passively coapted to the object, which is known as the causality of the end or final causality, is a passion, the effect

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.22, a.1, ad 3: "Et sic, secundum quod aliquid habet in se formam finis et boni in potentia, tendit in bonum vel in finem et appetit ipsum."

<sup>2</sup>"Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem sunt duo genera potentiarum animae; unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum omne animal movetur." See Ia, q.78, a.1. c.; cf., J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Phil. T.III, q.12, a.1, "De Appetitu et Locomotivo", pp.378bff.

of the act of an agent - the object - on a patient.<sup>1</sup> Because of it the animal is impelled to find means of realizing union with the desired object, which thus becomes both a principle of movement and a term. As evidence of the reality of the inclination, nature, who never labours for a vain purpose, has evolved the locomotive power to provide the animal with a means of response to the appeal of the distant good proposed by imagination or memory. And since sense knowledge is only of singulars, since it can not compare one good with the other except for the quasi-comparative knowledge of the estimative, the sensitive appetite is necessarily moved by the object, once it is apprehended as delectable or good for the animal.<sup>2</sup> The bodily organs and emotions are instinctively set in motion to delight in the appetible thing, possessed as yet only intentionally and effectively, for they are the only agents subject to the senses. The dog's mouth waters at the sight of the meat for which he hungers, and so does the man's, for in both cases it is a sensitive appetite, which in man is subject to the higher

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<sup>1</sup>Saint Thomas, Summa Contra Gentes. (Leonine ed.), III, ch.3, p.229b: "Quod autem movetur cum sit in potentia, tendit ad actum, et ita ad perfectum et bonum: per motum enim exit de potentia in actum."

<sup>2</sup>Ia, q.82, a.2, ad 3; cf., De Ver., q. 25, a.1, c., and q. 26, a.4, c.

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rational appetite or will. We will see the superiority of the intellectual over the sensitive appetite when we examine the passage wherein Saint Thomas distinguishes them:

The object ... of the sensible appetite is this thing in that it is suitable or delectable; viz, water inasmuch as it suits the taste and not in that it is water; the proper object of the will is, of course, the absolute good itself. And the apprehension of the senses and of the intellect differ in the same way: for it is characteristic of the senses to apprehend this coloured object, characteristic of the intellect to apprehend the very nature of colour.<sup>2</sup>

Because the intellect can grasp natures, universal being, universal goodness, and present it to the appetite, the will has as adequate and proper object universal goodness - i.e. complete happiness. So it can refuse to act in answer to the appeal of any finite good. Even when it acts, it can always substitute another means for the currently offered object that is a means to the absolute good. For it is attracted primarily by the common ratio of the good in any given desirable object, and only secondarily to this object in that it possesses a measure of that universal good.<sup>3</sup> It is because of these two liberties of contrariety

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<sup>1</sup>1a. q.82, a.2, ad 3. Cf., In III de Anima, lect. XIV, XV; Ia q.19, a.1; Saint Thomas, In III Sententiarum (Lethiel-leux ed.). d.26, q.1, a2; John of Saint-Thomas, Cursus Theologicus (Vives ed.), T. VI, q.22 "De Passionibus", pp. 194ff.

<sup>2</sup>De Ver., q.25, a.1, c. The whole article should be read

<sup>3</sup>1a. q.80, a.2; q.82, aa. 1,2,5. Cf., In III de Anima, lect. XIV, CV, and Ia, q.19, a.1.

and contradiction that the human person has the power to elicit a voluntary, and perfectly voluntary act of love in answer to the good's appeal, an act that is distinct from, and immeasurably superior to the first movement of the affections caused by the action of the good object. Yet the principle in both loves is identical - it is the object as an affective weight in the appetite, a similitude of proportion whereby the object exists in the affections of the subject. As Saint Thomas puts it:

In each of these appetites, that which is the principle of the motion tending to the beloved end is called love.<sup>1</sup>

So the first change of the appetite caused by the appetible is called love, and it is nothing but a complacency in the appetible object. . . . Thus it is evident that, since love consists in a certain change in the appetite made by the appetible, love is a passion, and quite properly so, to the extent that love is in the concupiscible . . . .<sup>2</sup>

Or, as John of Saint-Thomas has expressed it:

The metaphoric weight, by which the end is said to truly be a cause, is the first love of the end as it depends passively upon the appetible object, not as it is actively elicited by the will.<sup>3</sup>

But in the intellectual appetite the faculty, once fecundated by the affectionate weight of the object as a

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<sup>1</sup>Ia IIae, q.26, a.1: "In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum."

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., a.2

<sup>3</sup>J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Phil., T.II, p.278a23. The whole of q.13, "De Fine", pp.270-287 is important in this context.

co-aptation within it, can proceed to freely deepen its own proportioning, to interiorize and intensify its impulse. As, in knowing, the intellect expressed what it knew in a word, so, by a single act involving a double formality, the tending faculty proportions itself and elicits its act of appetite - a spiramen or breathed love. The inclination or relation of loving faculty to loved object under the impact of the good, a similitude of proportion, is its principle, from which the will can launch itself toward effective union with its object. But the weighting inclination has already united the object affectively with the will, to point the quality of its impulsion. "Pondus meus amor meus, eo feror quocumque feror."<sup>1</sup> So the human being can move himself toward a good end, whereas the animal is moved by the apprehended good, and the human act of love is distinguished from the merely sensitive passion of love - common to man and beast - by free and deliberate choice.<sup>2</sup> This

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<sup>1</sup>St. Augustine's words quoted by J. of Saint-Thomas in his treatment of love as passion and love as freely elicited. See ibid., p.279a17ff.

<sup>2</sup>"Ad secundum respondetur bruta non agere propter finem, quia etsi alliciantur a bonitate finis absoluta, deficit tamen illis electio et intentio tam formalis, ad quam se moveant, quam radicalis, ex qua se moveant, quia carent voluntate initiante intentionem." See ibid., p.287a24; cf., Ia, IIae, q.26, a.3.

distinction must be always kept in mind in estimating the role of similitude as cause of love.

Let us repeat. The love of the sensitive appetite is a passion but the intellectual appetite, after a preliminary passion, can evoke a deliberate act of love in reply to the solicitation of the good known. Man, in that he has both sensitive and intellectual knowledge, is capable of both loves, but the second characterizes him as man and should dominate the lower sensitive love. There is a great difference in the assimilation involved in the introduction of the object within the knowing faculty, and the proportioning of the appetite that is the principle of the human love of choice. In the appetite, the motion begins with the good, the end existing as an affectionate weight in the faculty, a pull attracting the faculty to the good itself in real existence outside the will.<sup>1</sup> This love that is principle is so hidden, its motion metaphoric rather than real in that it entices the efficient cause into action, that it can be easily confused with the efficient cause. The appetite is subject in regard to this passive love, the inclination or intention to the end; it is not subject as regards the good.

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<sup>1</sup>J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Phil., T.II, pp.278b29-279.





The fundamental act of the will is to be drawn, to go toward, to desire that which is in act and accordingly calls to the potency in that it is perfective.<sup>1</sup> Matter desires the form to make it its own; appetite tends to something extrinsic which will awaken its potency. Never can the appetite itself seize the good it seeks. Just as the hand must grasp the material good which the appetite desires, so either the knowing faculty or a nature ultimately possesses what the will loved, the end to which the rational animal oriented himself by choosing his love. The role of the appetite is to direct that wherein it is found to its appropriate good, a good naturally befitting it, a good that will conserve and perfect its being and so is its end, or a good that will give it being in act if it is as yet only potential. Saint Thomas has the following significant texts in this regard:

To the extent that one being is perfective and conservative of another according to its "esse", it has the nature of an end for that which is perfected by it; that is why all who rightly define the good put in its definition something relevant to the end. For this reason the Philosopher says in the First Book of the Ethics, that they best define the good who say that the good is what all desire.<sup>2</sup>

When it is said that all things desire the good, the good should not be determined to this or that good;

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<sup>1</sup>J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol., T.VI, qq.23-25, tertio, n.6, pp.198-199.

<sup>2</sup>De Ver., q.21, a.1. c.

but should be understood in its commonality inasmuch as each thing desires the good naturally suited to it. If, however, it were determined to any one good, that one good would be being. That is equally true if all things have being, for they desire its continuance; and what has being in act in one way, has being in potency in another way, as air is air in act, and fire in potency; accordingly what does not have being in act, desires to be in act.<sup>1</sup>

In anything, to be in act, is the good of that thing.<sup>2</sup>

Even in things devoid of knowledge there is found that directive tendency whereby each being naturally and necessarily desires its natural form and perfection, so tending to a good end.<sup>3</sup> The tree forces its way through a rocky barrier to the light; fire rises and propagates; air is apt for assimilation to fire; the human will, as well as the other powers of the soul, is likewise a form or nature, with a natural appetite for the absolute good which alone can terminate it.<sup>4</sup> Matter's desire for the form that will actualize it proves that this inclination follows even an imperfect nature;<sup>5</sup> in the completely constituted nature it follows the form, and in the unconscious being implies only

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.22, a.1. ad 4. Cf., Ia, q.5, a.2.

<sup>2</sup>Contra Gentes, I, c.38.

<sup>3</sup>Ia, q.80, a.1, c. Cf., De Ver., q.22, a.1.

<sup>4</sup>Ia, q.80, a.1., ad 3.

<sup>5</sup>Cajetan, In Ia, q.19, a.1, n.6.

a mode of operating and existing in accordance with that form. The elicited appetite follows from an apprehended form, and the form of a habit can be engrafted upon the human will, so that it desires an evil in the guise of a seeming good.<sup>1</sup>

All things of which we have experience, then, are by their natures ordered to the good. But order always indicates an intelligence at work; furthermore, nothing can be ordered to an end unless both thing and end is known by some intellect. Since material principles can not know or order their own effects, there must exist an intellect extrinsic to natural things, which, by means of their forms, implanted in them an inclination that is a quasi-participation of reason, so that each being, as well as the sum of individual beings which go to make up the Universe, should be oriented to a common good, and, by their own tending, to the good. The natural appetite for the good originates immediately

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"Sed considerandum est quod cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem; appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quo tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quo tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni... finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum." See Ia IIae, q.8, a.1, c.

in the nature of each thing, but its ultimate author is God, the source of each and all natures.<sup>1</sup> In that same source we find the explanation for the animal's tending to the object it senses as good, as well as for the human will's power to choose among all things that reason presents under the ratio of the good.

But another conclusion follows from the ubiquity of appetite. If all things naturally desire their good in that it is perfective, the mere fact that the appetible can perfect that which desires it, indicates a similitude between the subject and object of appetite, a mutual similitude according to the natures of appetite and appetible, not merely according to intentional existence.<sup>2</sup> For the perfective perfects to the extent that it is in act, or to the extent that it can communicate its act; that desiring perfection is perfectible or capable of further actualization,

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.2, a.3, c: "In rebus autem naturalibus invenimus naturalem appetitum, quo unaquaeque res in finem suum tendit; unde oportet supra omnes res naturales ponere aliquem intellectum, qui res naturales ad suum finem ordinarit, et eis naturalem inclinationem sive appetitum indiderit.

Sed res non potest ordinari ad finem aliquem, nisi res ipsa cognoscatur simul cum fine ad quem ordinanda est; unde oportet quod in intellectu divino a quo rerum naturae origo provenit et naturalis ordo in rebus, sit naturalium rerum cognitio..." Cf., De Ver., q.22, a.1, c. and Ia IIae, q.8, a.1.

<sup>2</sup>De Ver., q.22, a.1, ad 3.

of assimilation to the more perfect, only to the extent that it has a capacity, a potency for that perfection, that is, in that it already possesses it, at least in potency. It is the relation of potency to act; one must be proportioned to the other.

Saint Thomas points out the likeness between agent and operation in the following pertinent texts:

Since every agent acts to the extent that it is in act, it is fitting that what is operated by the agent, should be in some way in the agent; and that is why every agent acts in its own likeness.<sup>1</sup>

... To communicate itself as much as possible is the nature of any act. Accordingly each and every agent acts to the extent that it is in act. To act is really only to communicate that through which the agent is in act, to the extent possible.<sup>2</sup>

Every agent tends to assimilate the patient to it, to the extent possible.<sup>3</sup>

This determination on the side of form in a created being to produce an act formally like itself, and to assimilate to itself that upon which it acts, is balanced by appetite's corresponding determination to desire what perfects, that is, what is like to it. All passion is received according to the mode of the recipient, so the patient is in potency for

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.2, a.3, c.

<sup>2</sup>Saint Thomas, Q.D. de Potentia, q.2, a.1, c, as in Quaestiones Disputatae (Marietti ed., revised 1949), Vol. II.

<sup>3</sup>De Ver., q.5, a.9, ad 8.

perfection or assimilation only from what is like or similar. If the act of the elicited appetite is like the agent, so must its object be, for the act is specified by the object. Hence "Omne quod appetit aliquid appetit illud in quantum habet aliquam similitudinem cum ipso."<sup>1</sup> The texts might be multiplied indefinitely. We quote only one of the most emphatic:

... That which desires another shows that it is naturally like that which it desires, because, namely, it has a natural inclination for that which it desires. This natural inclination sometimes follows from the very essence of the thing, as the heavy tends downwards according to its essential nature; but sometimes it follows from the nature of some supervening form, as when any one has an acquired disposition, he desires that which is agreeable to him according to this disposition.<sup>2</sup>

The form of the good must be similar to the form of the appetite; the form of the good must be in the appetite in some way, not completely, according to perfect act (or the appetite would rest in its enjoyment), but incompletely and in potency. Saint Thomas expressed it thus:

So, to the extent that anything has within it the form of the end and the good in potency,<sup>3</sup> it tends toward the good or the end and desires it.

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.22, a.1, ad 3; cf., Ia IIae, q.8, a.1, c: "Nihil autem inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens."

<sup>2</sup>Saint Thomas, Expositio de Hebdomadibus, Opera Omnia (Mandonnet ed.), T.I, opuscula IX, c.2, p. 178. Translation by Sister Verda Clare.

<sup>3</sup>De Ver., q.22, a.1, ad 3.

Wherefore it (the appetite) is not completely devoid of the good, but of that good which it desires: still it has that good in potency and is accordingly assimilated to it; just as the apprehensive faculty is in potency to the species of its object.<sup>1</sup>

Appetite, then, can be described as a tendency to what is proportioned, that is similar, to that which desires. "Appetere nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere, quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum."<sup>2</sup> The similarity may be had in a remote way, with reference to the object specifying it in common, or in a proximate way with the individual object to which the individual appetite tends. For example, the human will is by its nature determined to the absolute good; by nature it is remotely apt to pursue a particular good, and hence there is a kind of proportion or similitude for such a good, but it is not yet vital. But when the object, apprehended as good, proportions it, the will acquires within it a similitude to this good, and can vitally desire it. Because it was so evident that "omne animal diligit simile sibi,"<sup>3</sup> many philosophers, both ancient and modern, became convinced that similitude was the proper cause of love. Some have even cited Saint Thomas himself to prove their theory, instancing such texts as the following:

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<sup>1</sup>De Ver., q.22, a.1, ad 8.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., q.22, a.1, c.

<sup>3</sup>Ecclesiastes, xiii, 19.

Dicendum est quod similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris.<sup>1</sup>

Omnis diversitas discors; similitudo vero appetenda est.<sup>2</sup>

Omne autem diversum, inquantum hujusmodi, repugnat appetitui; cujus ratio est, quia simile augetur et perficitur suo simili. Unumquodque autem appetit suum augmentum et perfectionem; et ideo simile, inquantum hujusmodi, est unicuique appetibile.<sup>3</sup>

Cajetan's commentary on the questions dealing with love, as well as Saint Thomas' own commentary on the De Hebdomadibus, have clarified the difficulties regarding the function of similitude.<sup>4</sup> The good is always the proper object of appetite, the proper cause of love in the object desired. But as knowledge is a condition necessary for the appetite to desire, in that the good must exist and be applied to it by apprehension, so is similitude a condition that the individual subject may recognize an object as good for it. The appetite desires the good in order to be perfected, to be assimilated to what is more actual, and hence more perfectible. But for the creature, the like is increased and perfected by the like.<sup>5</sup> So, in desiring its own perfection,

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<sup>1</sup>Ia IIae, q.27, a.3, c.

<sup>2</sup>De Hebd., p. 177.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., cf., In X Ethic., lect.VII, n.2042: "Quidlibet natum est augeri per id quod est sibi simile et conforme."

<sup>4</sup>Ia IIae, q.27, a.2. Cf., Ibid., aa.1, 2, 4 and the commentary of Cajetan on a.3, as well as De Hebd., pp.177-178.

<sup>5</sup>De Hebd., p.177: "Quia simile augetur et perficitur suo simili."



each created thing desires what bears a likeness to its own being, and repels the unlike as discordant with that perfection:<sup>1</sup> for the root of the appetite's desire, as we have said above, is the likeness of a potency for its proportioned act, a likeness that is merely incipient before the act is had, as when the stingy man loves the liberal because he hopes for alms, or as the unfaithful friend loves a faithful friend in that the imperfect has the seeds of the other's virtue in his rational nature.<sup>2</sup> The like is per se desirable because normally it is perfective; if per accidens the like proves an obstacle to the subject's real or seeming good, the appetite shuns it, as when the human body desires a disproportionate warmth after a chill, when children quarrel over an inheritance, or the potter hates his rival.<sup>3</sup> But this dislike is not because the object hated is similar, but because it impedes the desired perfection of the subject.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, though likeness is a root of love, the subject formally desires not the likeness but the goodness of the object, even though goodness for the

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<sup>1</sup>De Heb., p. 177: "Omnia diversitas discors; similitudo vero appetenda est."

<sup>2</sup>Ia IIae, q.27, a.3, ad 3, 4.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., c. and ad 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ia IIae, q.27, a.3, c: "Efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impedivitus."

subject entails similitude. Cajetan summarizes the role of similitude:

Just as the good is not lovable unless it is known, so the good for this is not lovable unless known as good for this. However the good for this and the similar good seem to be identical in meaning, if the name similitude is extended. For what is similar in act is good for this as if it were the same as itself; what is similar according to inclination or potency, is good for this in that it is proportioned to it.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, having explained the importance of the condition "quod bonum, inquantum bonum, sit amabile; sed inquantum bonum simile sit amabile huic",<sup>2</sup> he concludes: "Ex parte subiecti similitudo est propria cause amoris."<sup>3</sup> Each thing must have in it some similitude from and with the absolute good to tend to whatever good it seeks; each appetite must have commensuration or similitude with this good object as a necessary condition for it to vitally begin to love; accordingly the subject of the elicited appetite recognizes the similar good as perfective. Hence normally "Omne animal diligit simile sibi," for similitude is a necessary condition and principle of love.

We have pointed out that each appetite tends to a good; that the act of every created agent, which is rooted in

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<sup>1</sup>Cajetan, In Iam IIae, q.27, a.3, part II, tertio.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., part III.

appetite, tends to a good and wherein the appetite will rest when it is had; that the fact of appetite implies a similitude between appetite and good, agent, act, effect and end. It would seem that this similitude is the principle of an order, by means of that appetite, to each thing's perfection and thereby to a common good end. Hence the end of both appetite and act in all creatures must be an ultimate good - pure act - which, as we have likewise pointed out, is also the first mover or agent, the author of that similitude which conditions the universal tendency to the good in created things.<sup>1</sup> Now there is only one supreme good - God; and what is supreme in any genus is cause of all in that genus. He causes the goodness in all good things, the causality in the created cause, the finality in each secondary end; for whatever is an end is so in that it is good, and all things are ordered in their varying degrees of goodness to that one supreme good, "for the last end of every maker is himself".<sup>2</sup> Saint Thomas insists upon the importance of this ordering, and the good order resulting therefrom:

Order among ends is consequent on the order among agents. For just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so all the ends of second agents must be directed to the end of the supreme agent, since

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<sup>1</sup>Contra Gentes, III, cc. 16-20.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., c. 17.

whatever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are ordered by the first agent to its own end. Now the first agent in all things is God... And His will has no other and than His own goodness, which is Himself... Therefore all things, whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are ordered to God as their end. But this applies to all things, for... there can be nothing that has not its being from Him.<sup>1</sup>

It was from love of His own goodness that God willed to multiply images of that essential goodness in creatures;<sup>2</sup> "Propter hoc enim Deus creaturas vult esse, ut in eis sua bonitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, saltem similitudinis participatione in plures effundatur."<sup>3</sup> Saint Thomas is most precise in explaining how the divine universal in causando formed the universe:

... God by His essence is the cause of things; accordingly the whole plurality of things is reduced to a simple principle. But His essence is not the cause of things except inasmuch as it is known, and as a consequence inasmuch as it is willed to be communicated to the creature by way of assimilation; wherefore things proceed from the divine essence by an order of knowledge and will; and so by providence.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Contra Gentes, III, c.17, as translated by Anton C. Pegis, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York; Random House, 1944), Vol.II.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., I, c.75: "Vult ergo Deus rerum similitudinem ex hoc quod suam essentiam et perfectionem vult et amat."

<sup>3</sup>De Ver., q.23, a.1, ad 3.

<sup>4</sup>De Ver., q.5. a.2, ad 4.

God knew His essence and recognized its goodness; He made creatures in its likeness because His own essence could not be repeated, that in their variety and multiplicity of goodness, His goodness might be less inadequately represented than was possible to the limitations of even the highest intellectual substance in that universe. And, by giving them a measure of likeness to His goodness, He implanted in them the appetite or tendency which would cause each to tend to its perfection, and hence the universal whole would be impelled to Him as to its end:

All created things are, in a way, images of the first agent, i.e. God: for every agent acts in his own likeness. But the perfection of an image is to represent its exemplar through its likeness to that exemplar: the image is constituted for that purpose...

But from the very fact that they are acquiring the divine goodness, created things are constituted in the likeness of God. So if all things tend to God as to their ultimate end that they may acquire Him goodness, it follows that the ultimate end of things is to be assimilated to God.<sup>1</sup>

Even in matter, in that it is a potency for the form that will give it act, there is a propensity for that image, a quasi-resemblance to the Author of life. Once a creature is constituted in being, by reason of its form alone, even prescinding from the actual possession of the perfection due

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<sup>1</sup>Contra Gentes, III, c.19.

its nature, it bears an incipient similitude of its maker. When it has acquired in act its due perfection, the likeness is more profound, for it is by actuality rather than by potentiality that the creature most resembles God. So the process of perfection of each creature involves an assimilation to God.

We would stress the two points Saint Thomas repeats: because God knew and loved the goodness of His essence, He willed to multiply images of it; His providence likewise intended that that goodness should diffuse itself to things, and so by their own appetite they should tend to Him. Hence His divine art was deeply implanted in them:

Since every agent intends to imbue its effect with its likeness to the limit of the effect's capacity to receive it, the agent's success is in direct proportion to its perfection; for it is evident that in proportion to its own heat is the intensity of the heat anything causes; and the greater the artist, the more perfectly does he stamp an artistic form into his matter. Now God is the most perfect of agents. So it pertained to God ( as God ) to implant his likeness in created things as perfectly as possible, to the extent proper to the created nature. But creatures can not attain a perfect similitude of God by means of a simple species of creature; because, as the cause exceeds its effect, what is in its cause "simpliciter et unite" is found in its effect "composite et multipliciter", unless the effect should pertain to the species of its cause; but in our example this can not be asserted, for the creature can not be equal to God. So multiplicity and variety were fitting in creatures, that there might be found in them a similitude of God that was perfect according to their mode.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Contra Gentes, II, c.45.

But God willed to communicate not merely a likeness of His essence, but also of His goodness. It is for that reason that he orders them to Him as an end - that they may resemble Him whose will has no other end than His own goodness:

It has been demonstrated that God by his providence orders all things to His divine goodness as to an end (cap. 64), not because thereby any addition can be made to His goodness, but that a similitude of his goodness, to the extent possible, should be impressed upon things. Since every created substance necessarily falls short of the perfection of the divine goodness, in order that a similitude of divine goodness should be communicated to things, it was fitting that there should be diversity in things, in order that what can not be perfectly represented by any one being, can be represented by a variety of beings in manifold ways in a more perfect mode. Man, too, when he finds that he cannot adequately express an idea by one word, multiplies his words in a variety of ways that he may express his idea in diverse phrases. Herein, likewise, we can consider the eminence of the divine perfection, since perfect goodness, which in God exists in a united and simple manner, cannot be in creatures otherwise than in many ways and in many subjects.<sup>1</sup>

So it must be stated, that from one first source the multitude and variety of creatures proceeded, not on account of the necessity of matter, nor because of the limitation of potency, nor because of the goodness (of the creature) nor because of any obligation to that goodness; but according to the order of wisdom, that the perfection of the universe should consist in the diversity of creatures.<sup>2</sup>

But it was not mere multiplicity, but the order in that multiplicity that best represented the divine goodness.

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<sup>1</sup>Contra Gentes, III, a. 97.

<sup>2</sup>De Pot., q. 3, a. 16, c.

Saint Thomas is most explicit: "Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura."<sup>1</sup> This good order is what God cares for most in things, for it is closest to his own goodness:

Anything which intends a given end cares more for what is nearest the ultimate end, for it is likewise an ultimate for the other ends. But the last end of the divine will is God's goodness, which is most closely approximated among created things by the goodness of the order of the whole universe; for to it as to an end is ordered every particular good of each individual thing just as the less perfect is ordered to that which is more perfect; for the same reason each part is found to exist for the sake of its whole. Accordingly in created things the order of the universe is what God cares for most, consequently He governs it.<sup>2</sup>

This good order of the universe is, in effect, a common good intrinsic to the universe, to which are ordered the particular goods, "for the being of the part is for the sake of the being of the whole."<sup>3</sup> God is the ultimate extrinsic end, the "finis cuius gratia", but the greatest good - a common good - within the universe is this good order which

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<sup>1</sup>Ia, q.47, a.1.

<sup>2</sup>Contra Gentes, III, c.64. Cf., Ia, q.22, a.4, c: "Post bonitatem autem divinam, quae est finis a rebus separatus, principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens, est perfectio universi."

<sup>3</sup>Contra Gentes, III, c.17: "Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem; esse enim partis est propter esse totius (cf., I Polit., II, 6; 1254a); unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis (I Ethic., II, 8; 1094b)."



will orient each creature by that order toward assimilation to divine good. Again we quote Saint Thomas:

The good, in that it is the end of anything, is twofold. For there is an end that is extrinsic to that which exists for the end, as if we should say that the place is the end of that which is moved to the place. There is also an end within it, as the form is the end of generation and alteration, and when the form is achieved, there is a certain good intrinsic to that of which it is the form. However, the form of any whole, which is one through a certain ordination of the parts, is its order: therefore the conclusion is that it is its good.<sup>1</sup>

... The universe has its good and end in both ways. For there is a separated good which is the first moving agent, from whom depends the heavens and the whole of nature, as from its end and appetible good, as has been exposed. And since it is fitting that all things whose end is one should converge in order to their end, some order must be found in the parts of the universe; and so the universe has both a separated good and a good of order.<sup>2</sup>

... The separated good, which is the first mover, is a better good than the good of order which is in the universe. For the whole order of the universe is on account of the first moving principle, that, in order that what is in the intellect and will of the first mover should be manifested in the ordered universe.<sup>3</sup>

But if, within creation, there is an intrinsic common good which represents, as perfectly as creation can, the ultimate divine common good, and if, on the other hand, there can be no appetite for any thing except in so far as there exists

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<sup>1</sup>In XII Metaph., lect.XII, n.2627.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., n.2629. Cf., Charles De Koninck, "In Defence of Saint Thomas," Leval Théologique et Philosophique, I,2 (1945), pp.18ff.

<sup>3</sup>In XII Metaph., lect.XII, n.2631.

within the desirer a kind of similitude of the desired, then, in each thing that is part of the universe, there must be found a similitude of the whole. "Est aliqua affinitas et ordo unius ad alterum", as Aquinas puts it.<sup>1</sup> Some parts exist for the good of other parts, as plants for animals, animals for man; some species of beings seem to be ordained in all their operations to serve the common good - "communicant ad totum" - for they are closer in their intensive perfection to the common good; such are the heavenly bodies, which, to Aristotle, were eternal, and the separated substances, which in themselves by their proper perfection, most closely resemble absolute perfection.<sup>2</sup> But even these separated substances vary in perfection. So, as the good householder rules his household that each part may reach its proper and its common good, the similitude of the final cause existing in each nature sets it moving to the common good by way of its proper good. This capacity for the good, this similitude to the good, even more than the similitude in essendo whereby each thing by its form represents its first cause - a necessary condition for the similitude of relation which is appetite, as we have pointed out - forms

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<sup>1</sup>In XII Metaph., lect. XII, n. 2632.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., nn. 2635-2637.

an ascending gradation of perfection that is complemented by a corresponding appetite; this is the force that sets both parts and whole of the universe tending to the perfection of order that is its good. It explains matter's tendency to form; it explains the blind tending of the natural appetite of material things to their proper perfection; it explains the animal's desire for the object he knows by his senses to be good; it explains the intelligent creature, who can deliberately order himself to the good, seeking among the manifold goods, which he can be intentionally, for his proper good. He alone can choose to orient himself to a proper good which is not the common good of the universe.

Similitude, in fact, is the principle of the operations whereby each creature tends to the good order of the universe. For since similitude is the proximate condition or principle of love, and since all operations spring from appetite, similitude is the principle that sets things moving to their last end, who "since he is the first immobile mover, moves in that he is loved."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In XII Metaph., Lect.VII, n.2529.