

CHAPTER TWO

EQUALITY AND FRIENDSHIP

As similitude is most properly found in quality, so equality is first used to signify things which are one in quantity.¹ As we pointed out in the preceding chapter, those things which are one in quantity are called equal, those things which are one in quality are called similar, and what is one in substance is called the same. Now, as we shall see, the terms "one," "quantity," and "equal" in our definition are all linked with measure, so it is important to understand what measure means.²

It must first of all be understood that the notion of measure in itself implies no imperfection. The nature of measure is to manifest; hence one, which is the simplest unit of number, by its unity, indivisibility, uniformity and determination of measure, suggests by analogy that the simplest, best and most indivisible in any category can be used to manifest and certify the degree of perfection of the

¹Aristotle, Categories (McKeon ed.), ch.6, 6a27-35; ch.8, 11a15-19. Cf., In V Metaph., lect.XV.

²"De ratione unius est, quod sit mensura." See In X Metaph., lect.II, n.1960. Cf., Saint Thomas, Q.D. de Virtutibus Cardinalibus, q.1, a.3, c., in Quaestiones Disputatae, Vol.II: "Quantitates autem importat rationem mensurae."

other members: the more indivisible a thing is, the more certain it is.¹

In any genus what is simplest and most perfect is the measure of all the others, as white in colours and the heaven's revolution in movement: so, in proportion as anything is more perfect, so much the more does it approximate the first principle of its genus. It is therefore plain that the perfection of anything, in relation to which its measure is estimated, is from its first principle; so, too, its quantity; and this is why Augustine said in the eighth book of the Trinity that in those things which were great in other than material bulk, the better implied identity with the greater.²

Formally, measure is the foundation of a relation; antecedent to that relation, it implies only two things: that it is the most perfect and uniform entity in its genus and that it can be applied to, or else identified with the measured, equalling it.³ Its function is to make known the formal or virtual quantity of the measured in a perfect way, that is, by "proceeding from the more perfect, or less known to us, to the less perfect", as eternity measures the quantity

¹John of Saint Thomas, Cursus Theologicus (Solesmes ed.), T.II, disp.9, a.1, n.10, p.49a-b: "... Et perfectissimum seu magis indivisibile in uno genere, est mensura ceterorum; eo quod quanto est magis indivisibile, est magis certum: si quidem minus illi additur vel aufertur; et sic quod est simplicius in aliquo genere deservit pro mensura, quia ad mensuram pertinet certificare de suo mensurato."

²De Virt. Card., loc. cit.

³J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol., T.II, disp.9, a.1. n.22, pp.52b-53a: "At vero mensura, antedecenter ad relationem, non importat aliquam actionem emissivam et productivam mensurati sed solum importat duo; alterum, quod sit perfectissimum et uniformissimum in suo genere; alterum, quod possit applicari et conjungi vel identificari mensurato, adaequando illud."

of divine duration.¹ But this perfect or intrinsic measure, which measure by information, is less known to us than the extrinsic measure, which measures something outside of itself by application or by containing the measured, as a yard stick measures a table, or as the movement of Aristotle's outer heaven measured inferior movements.² The measured is imperfect when it is subjected to, or depends upon the measure, which then forms the term of a real relation. Intrinsic measure has a perfection of measure not unbefitting God; for it is identified with the measured by an information of it, "by which it renders it perfectly joined to itself and consequently perfectly measured."³ So eternity is in God as the perfect possession of interminable life;⁴ the *aevum* measures intrinsically the duration of the supreme angel in

¹J. of Saint-Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, T.II, disp.9, a.1, n.15, p.50a-b. See the translation of these passages in Sr. Mary Jocelyn Carey, O.P., "Measure in the Eternity of God and in Created Durations" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Université Laval, 1946), pp.17ff.

²*Ibid.*, n.14, p.50a: "Extrinseca est, quae mensurat aliquid extra se; et ideo per applicationem vel continentiam illius dicitur mensurare, sicut duratio et motus caeli mensurat motus inferiores... Intrinseca mensura est illa quae inest rei mensuratae; et ita non mensurat per applicationem sed per informationem; unde habet perfectionem mensurae, licet non relationem realem et imperfectionem dependentiae quae mensuratum dependet a mensura; sicut tempus, licet sit mensura extrinseca respectu nostri, intrinsece tamen mensurat ipsum motum caeli."

³*Ibid.*, n.22, p.55a.

⁴*Ibid.*, n.23, pp.55b-56a.

which it is and of the other angels extrinsically; and time, which was for Aristotle the intrinsic measure of the movement of the outer heaven, is extrinsic measure of the creatures of earth. Hence our most perfect example of measure is eternity, where "the measured is not only adequated to the measure but is identical with it".¹ Eternity is equal to or one in quantity with the duration of God; its notion implies such perfection that "eternal" is attributed to Him as one of His names. "Nor is He eternal only, but He is His own eternity; ... as He is His own essence, so He is His own Eternity."²

The quantity first known to us - predicamental quantity or the first accident of natural substance - likewise implies imperfection.³ Aristotle describes it thus:

Quantum means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a "one" and a "this". A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measureable. "Plurality" means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, "magnitude" that which is divisible into continuous parts; of magnitude, that which is continuous in one dimension is length, in two breadth, in three depth. Of these, limited plurality is number, limited length is a line, breadth a surface, depth a solid.⁴

¹J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol., T.II, disp.9, a.1. n.20, p.52B.

²Ia, q.10, a.2, c.

³In V Metaph., lect.XV, nn.977ff.

⁴Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch.13, 1020a7-a14 (McKeon ed.); cf., J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Phil., T.I, Pt.II, q.16, a.1, pp.540b30ff.

It is evident that such a quantity, which merely manifests that some material parts of a substance are outside of parts, could never be applied to a spiritual being. Hence, one of the objections to the doctrine of three equal divine Persons in the Trinity was that neither the continuous intrinsic quantity of size, nor the continuous extrinsic quantity of place or time, nor yet any discrete quantity of number could be ascribed to the divine.¹

Saint Thomas has been most explicit in his presentation of his doctrine on quantity, in answer to that very objection:

Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of bulk or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of virtue, which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form; to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more or less hot, inasmuch as it is more or less perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source - that is, by the very perfection of the form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things; just as we speak of great heat because of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says that in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better, for the more perfect a thing is, the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action; in regard to being, inasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, inasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so, as Augustine says, We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power.²

¹Ia, q.42, a.1, ob.1.

²Ia, q.42, a.1, ad I, Pegis translation. Cf., Cajetan's commentary as well as Ia, q.30, a.3, c.

That virtual quantity, which manifests the perfection of a form or nature in measuring the operations and effects of that form, is found in God, is no more inconsistent with His divinity than that the metaphysical or transcendental "one", which does not depend on matter, can be applied to him.¹ In man, because he has a material as well as a spiritual principle, there will be found both dimensive and virtual quantity. This distinction is important, for equality in virtual quantity implies likeness;² yet similitude may be found without such equality, and equality without similitude, as, for example, when things differ in size and yet are similar in colour, or when a black object is dissimilar in colour to a white object, but has exact equality in size. But Aquinas points out that equality in virtual quantity must not be confused with equality in dimensional quantity.

¹Ia, q.11, a.3, ad 2: "Dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non praedicatur de Deo, sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia. Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum, quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia. Et licet in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen secundum modum apprehensionis nostrae non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative dicta de Deo praedicari, sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus."

²Ia, q.42, a.1, ad 3: "Non recipitur conversio aequalitatis et similitudinis." Cf., Saint Thomas, In de Divinis Nominibus (Marietti ed.), c.9, lect.III, IV. Since we will frequently refer to this work in our subsequent chapters we will indicate as follows: IDN. will designate the Marietti text of the work: D., the text of Dionysius: T., the commentary: R. Roman numerals, the lecture, and A. Arabic numbers, the chapter as well as the precise passage. The translation appended will be numbered as in Marietti.

Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form, may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal, if one participates in the form more perfectly than another.¹

So, when we have an equal quantity of quality - as when two things are equally white, or equally virtuous - we have similitude as well. But when things partake, according to more or less, in a same form of whiteness or goodness, we have merely similitude. In other words, virtual quantity is a measure of quality, but the converse is not true.²

This brings us to the relation and yet contrast between similitude and equality. Let us not forget that "qualitas dicitur dispositio substantiae"³ and that "dispo-

¹Ia, q.42, a.1, ad 2. Cf., Cajetan, commenting on the same question, n.IV: "Album enim, ut habet rationem albi non excedentis nec excessi in perfectione ab alio albo, dicitur simile et aequale eadem relatione. Et idem est indicium de substantia per modum quantitatis sumpta. Semper namque aequalitas includit priorem relatione, et addit modum fundamenti." See too In I Sent., d.19, q.1, a.1, ad 3; d.31, q.3, a.1, ad 3.

²In X Metaph., lect. IV, nn.2010-2011.

³Ia, q.28, a.2. c: "Et in aliis quidem generibus a relatione utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum comparisonem ad subiectum; nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae."

sitio est ordo habentis partes;¹ likewise, that both quantity and quality concern an order of parts but diversely. For quantity merely unites material parts to extend them, but does not give the harmonious and perfect arrangement due the nature of the substance; whereas quality, rooted in the form, attains a substance deeply. As John of Saint-Thomas puts it: "Whatever is characterized by due measure and proportion, whether in the corporeal or spiritual order, whether within virtual or formal parts - that disposition I call quality."²

The greater and more perfect form is the root of greater operations, of greater virtues, of greater qualities. The corollary is that good qualities, as, for example, more perfect acts and operations, as well as the virtuous habits of such perfect acts, are indicative of the perfection of the form which is their root; that evil qualities such as evil acts, will entail a reaction of deterioration of a form,

¹J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Phil., T.I, p.610a35-b39. Cf., In V Metaph., lect.XX, n.1064; "...Dicitur habitus dispositio secundum quam aliquid disponitur bene et male; sicut sanitate aliquid disponitur bene, aegritudine male... Et non solum habitus dicitur dispositio totius, sed etiam dispositio partis quae est pars dispositionis totius; sicuti bonae dispositiones partium animalis, sunt partes bonae habitudinis in toto animali. Et virtutes etiam partium animae, sunt quidam habitus; sicut temperantia concupiscibilis, et fortitudo irascibilis, et prudentia rationalis.

²J. of Saint-Thomas, loc. cit., p.610b27-31.

even as the evil operations of Lucifer signify the substantial vitiation of the duration that once measured the angels.

So, when I say that a clod of earth weighing twenty pounds is equal in weight to a child who also weighs twenty pounds, I predicate a relation between them proper to predicamental quantity, a superficial insignificant unity of equality in bulk. It tells me that child and earth are linked to the extent that there is as much matter here as there; it manifests nothing of their characteristic mode of operation, nor of their essential tendencies. But if I say that the above-mentioned child A is musical, though not so musical as another child B, I posit a unity of quality between them, a likeness, even though an imperfect likeness. The disposition of one of the characteristic psychological parts of A has a unity of similitude with B, though not of equality, for one partakes to a greater, and the other to a less degree in musical aptitude or artistic habit. Even such a limited likeness may be a principle of love. But when I say that Mr. X is equal in virtue to Mr. Y, I state a relation that has a similitude of virtue as a principle; there is as much perfection here as there; there is unity or indivisibility of virtue. Such an equality of virtual quantity manifests that the disposition of characteristic spiritual parts of X is

not only similar, but perfectly similar to that of Y; that likewise the forms in which the virtuous operations are rooted have between them a unity of perfection; they are indivisible in quality, in virtual quantity, i.e. in quantity of quality, and as the innermost disposition of their essence, of their spiritual substance, is commensurate. Such equality, which includes similitude, such a unity which reflects a deeply embedded resemblance of their forms, is essential to the perfection of that most characteristic of human loves - friendship. As Aristotle's succinct epigram phrases it: "Aequalitas autem, et similitudo amicitia, et maxime quidem eorum quae secundum virtutem similitudo."¹

Properly human love, like the natural and the merely sensitive love, springs from the propensity of the appetite for a good, a propensity rooted in similitude of nature. But because the human will is not determined to any individual good, because the intellect can know the absolute good and present to the will all things under the ratio of the good, as a result of its comparative knowledge of end and means, the human will has choice. So man must superimpose an election upon the merely natural inclination before he has rational

¹See Aristotle, Ethic., VIII, ch.10, 1159b3 as quoted in VIII Ethic., Lect.VIII.

love, an elicited love that moves itself. Saint Thomas refers to it thus:

The expression "diligibile" determines a certain mode of love. For since love pertains to appetite, the order of loves follows the order of appetites. Now the most imperfect of appetites is the natural appetite without free choice. The highest appetite is the one with knowledge and free choice; for this appetite, in a way, moves itself. The love pertaining thereto is, accordingly, most perfect and is called dilection, in that what is to be loved is distinguished by free choice.¹

There are two species of human love variously distinguished by Aristotle and Saint Thomas. First, love is differentiated according to the subject: if a good is desired for the self, it is known as the love of concupiscence; if for another, it is termed love of benevolence and is found in its most perfect form in the mutual benevolence of friendship². It may also be distinguished according to the object loved; if we turn our love toward a subsisting good, that is, to a person, it is the love of friendship; if to an accidental good inhering in a substance, it is love of concupiscence.

¹IDM., c.4, T.IX, n.402: "Quod autem dicit: diligibile determinat quendam modum amoris. Cum enim amor ad appetitum pertineat, secundum ordinem appetituum est ordo amorum. Est autem imperfectissimus appetitum naturalis appetitus absque libera electione... Supremus autem appetitus est qui est cum cognitione et libera electione; hic enim appetitus quodammodo movet seipsum; unde et amor ad hunc pertinens est perfectissimus, et vocatur dilectio, inquantum libera electione discernitur quid sit amandum."

²In III Ethic., lect.V; Ia IIae, q.26, a.4, ad 1: "Nam ille proprie amicus dicitur cui aliquod bonum volumus; illud autem dicimur concupiscere quod volumus nobis."

Saint Thomas states:

Since the object of love is the good, and the good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from the *Ethics*,¹ a thing may be loved in two ways. First, it may be loved as a subsisting good, and secondly, as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we love for something else is loved as an accidental or inherent good. Thus, knowledge is loved, not wish that any good may come to it, but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been named concupiscence, while the first is called friendship.²

For the rational creature, friendship is love simpliciter, concupiscence is love secundum quid:

Now this division is according to prior and posterior. For what is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; but what is loved with the love of concupiscence, is not loved simply but is loved for another. Just as being per se simpliciter is that which has existence, being secundum quid is what is in another, so the good which is convertible with being, the good simpliciter, is that which has goodness in itself; but what is the good of another is good secundum quid. In consequence, the love by which something is loved in order that good may go to it, is love simply; but the love by which something is loved in order that it may be another's good is love relatively.³

¹ Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, ch. 6, 1096a19.

² Ia, q. 60, a. 3, c. Cf., *IDN.*, c. 4, T. IX, n. 404. "Tot modis contingit aliquid amari, quot modis contingit aliquid esse bonum alterius. Quod quidem, primo, contingit dupliciter; nam bonum dupliciter dicitur, sicut et ens: dicitur enim, uno modo ens proprie et vere, quod subsistit ut lapis et homo; alio modo quod non subsistit, sed eo aliquid est, sicut albedo non subsistit, sed ea aliquid album est. Sic igitur bonum dupliciter dicitur... Sic igitur dupliciter aliquid amatur. Uno modo sub ratione subsistentis boni; et hoc vere et proprie amatur, cum scilicet volumus bonum esse ei; et hic amor multis vocatur amor benevolentiae vel amicitiae, etc."

³ Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 4, c.

When we say that the love of friendship consists of wishing good to a friend for his sake, we do not infer that "for his sake should always signify the reason of the end for the sake of which, but it suffices that it express the reason of the end to which, that is, of the subject" to which we wish good.¹ Similarly, in concupiscence, we wish good to ourselves, not as to an ultimate end but as to a subject. Otherwise, when God sent His Son to earth for our sake, He would have been forced to make us His end "cujus gratia" from the mere fact that He loved us - a blasphemous impossibility. Likewise, if all love of concupiscence made the subject the ultimate end, hope could no longer be a theological virtue; for by hope we love God for the benefits He will give us, but with the final intention that He may become our end, not that we may become His end.²

But there is no sharp cleavage between the two loves of concupiscence and of friendship in man, as Saint Thomas,

¹J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol. (Vivès ed.), T.VII disp.8, a.1, n.6, p.409a.

²IIa-IIae, qq.17-22 inc. Cf., J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol., T.VII, disp.4, a.2, n.15, p.344a: "...Bonum concupitum non ordinari ad eum, cui concupiscitur, ut ad finem cuius gratia, sed tamquam ad subjectum, et finem cui, sic autem est perversus ordo, quod Deum amemus nobis, sicut Deus ipse: sic dilexit mundum ut Filium suum unigenitum illi daret, et tamen mundus non fuit finis ultimus ipsius Dei, sed subjectum, et finis cui."

John of Saint-Thomas and Cajetan have all pointed out; wherefore they further distinguish them according to the mode of loving, or the priority of love's movement. If the current of affection falls first upon the good desired for the self or another - it is the love of concupiscence; if it falls primarily on a person, it is the love of friendship.¹ For an accidental good is inadequate to terminate the love of a rational creature, hence there is an ulterior motive behind the love of concupiscence; the appetite deflects from the good to consubstantialize it in a subject for whom the good is desired. Or, to express it differently, there is a deviation from the order of final causality, which is love's proper sphere, to a realm shadowed by the influence of a formal cause, which strives to effect the union of a form with a substance. "Affectus amantis trahitur ad rem amatam per actum voluntatis, sed per intentionem affectus recurrit in seipsum."² The friendship based on such a love, the

¹Ia IIae, q.26, a.4, c: "Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi, vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum".

²IDN., c.4, TX, nn.429-430. The complete citation is: "Contingit autem quandoque quod etiam aliqua bona subsistentia amamus hoc secundo modo amoris, quia non amamus ipsa secundum se, sed secundum aliquod eorum accidens, sicut amamus vinum, volentes potiri dulcedine ejus, et similiter cum homo propter delectationem vel utilitatem amatur, non ipse secundum se amatur, sed per accidens. In utroque igitur modo amoris, affectus amantis per quamdam inclinationem trahitur ad rem amatam sed diversimode. Nam in secundo modo amoris, affectus amantis trahitur ad rem amatam per actum voluntatis, sed per intentionem affectus recurrit in seipsum, dum enim appeto justitiam vel vinum... unde talis amor non ponit amantem extra se quantum ad finem intentionis."

useful and delightful friendship, is a per accidens friendship for Aristotle and passing, although it will continue so long as each friend repays the useful for the useful, or delight for delight, or even the useful for the delightful in strict equality.¹ The friendship that is worthy of man, and that will prove stable, must be based upon the good of reason, that is, upon virtue, and accordingly involves choice: "for to return love, which pertains to the definition of friendship ... involves choice: it is found only between rational creatures."² There can be no return of love from wine or horse to man.

The love of choice that is friendship has been defined as a mutual love of benevolence between two or more persons, each of whom esteems the other as another self, and manifests that love in a reciprocated communication of affectionate services and operations, in a communication of life.³ So friendship adds to the natural love rooted in similitude a mutual choice, a sharing of goods, an association or communion of life, especially in the intellectual operations of a

¹In VIII Ethic., lect.III, lect.IV, especially nn.1565,1594. Cf., In de Div. Nom., c.4, lect.X.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.V, n.1603. Cf., In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.1, c: "Secundum autem quod invenitur in intellectiva parte, dicitur dilectio quae electionem includit quae ad appetitum intellectivum pertinet."

³In VIII Ethic., lect.I, n.1543; lect.II, n.1561: In IX Ethic., lect.X, n.1896.

virtuous life according to reason.¹ Only between these in whom virtue is so habitual that they are lastingly lovable do stable friendships develop.² Both habit and act of love are implied, but to love in act should characterize the friend, for the virtuous man must operate.³ And from the "conjunctione convenientis", as well as the knowledge that he is loved, added to the delight the virtuous man has in recognizing the goodness of his own good deeds mirrored in his other self, comes a profound happiness which both rewards and stimulates virtue, thus stabilizing the goodness of individuals and society.⁴ How should the good man love his friend? As he loves himself - that is, as he loves his proper self, his quasi-divine reason and its virtue - "in quantum appetit sibi id quod est simpliciter bonum".⁵ He

¹In IX Ethic., lect.XI, especially nn.1908-1912; cf., In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.1, and IIa IIae, qq.23-27.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.VIII, n.1650: "Et dicit quod similitudo, quae est amicitiae factiva et conservativa, maxime videtur esse inter virtuosos. Ipsi enim et permanent similes in seipsis, quia non de facili mutantur ab uno in aliud, et permanent etiam in amicitia adinvicem."

³In VIII Ethic., lect.V.

⁴In IX Ethic., lect.X, nn.1895-99; In VIII Ethic., lect.V, n.1605. Cf., In IX Ethic., lect.XIV, n.1951: "... Amicitia virtuosorum est bona, et semper bonis colloquiis in virtute coauectur. Et ipsi amici fiunt meliores in hoc quod simul operantur et seinvicem diligunt. Unus enim ab alio recipit exemplum virtuosum operis in quo sibi complacet. Unde in proverbio dicitur, quod bona homo sumit a bonis."

⁵In IX Ethic., lect.IX, n.1873.

measures his love for his friend by his love for that faculty whereby he resembles the separated substances: "Amans se habet ad amatum quasi ad seipsum vel ad id quod est de perfectione sibi."¹

Let us not forget that it is always virtue and the virtuous individual which measure a human being:

"...Virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the measure of each man. For in every genus the perfect in that genus should be taken as measure, in that all the other members are judged to be either greater or less according to their nearness or distance from the most perfect. Wherefore, since virtue is the proper perfection of a man, and the virtuous man is perfect in the human species, it is fitting that from him should be taken the measure of the whole human race."²

Accordingly, when the philosopher established self-love as a measure of friendly love, he implied the self-love of the virtuous for that faculty wherein his virtue is rooted. But "the cause and root of human good is the reason."³ So it is neither selfish nor sensual love that is meant, but a love for what is "fermale et completivum speciei humanae", a love indicated by continuous efforts to outdo his fellows in works

¹In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.1, c. Cf., In IX Ethic., lect.IX, nn.1868-1872; lect.XI, n.1909.

²In IX Ethic., lect.IV, n.1803. Cf., ibid., lect.XIV, n.1951.

³Ia IIae, q.66, a.1, c.

of virtue.¹

Naturally unity with the self is greater than the unity had by way of affection with a friend, but not according to the love of choice.² And it is under different aspects that man or angel loves with a natural and an elective love. Love of self is first known to each human since he is first aware of his close affection for his own substance with which he has identity; still, from love of choice, he can prefer to die for a friend out of love of virtue in preference to preserving the unity of his substance.³ That the intellectual creature loves another as himself denotes likeness, not equality.⁴ So, from a natural, first-known self-love he can learn to elect a preference for the common good over his proper good, and every man can choose an affectionate oneness in virtual quantity with a good friend, even at the price of his own physical destruction. Still, the "convivere" by way of good conversation and shared contemplation, especially proper to perfect friendship, suggests an equality in the

¹In IX Ethic., lect.IX, nn.1868-72.

²In IX Ethic., lect.XI, n.1909: "Major est enim unitas naturalis quae est alicujus ad seipsum, quam unitas affectus quae est ad amicum." Cf., Ia, q.60, aa.2,3,4.

³In III Sent., d.29, a.5, ad 3: "Tradere se morti propter amicum, est perfectus actus virtutis. Ideo virtuosus plus appetit amicitiam quam vitam corporalem."

⁴Ia, q.60, a.4, ad 2.

forms that are the root of the operations. Only those with some sort of equality of virtue can reciprocally terminate the mutual love of friendship: only the equally virtuous can have vital commerce in the good human intellectual, political or social operations of man. Love can unite only those proportioned for that union, and "amorem sive divinum, sive angelicum, sive intellectualem, sive animale sive naturale dicamus unitivam quamdam et concretivam intelligimus virtutem."¹ It would seem then that, as similitude is a principle of natural love, so equality, that is a oneness according to virtual quantity which includes likeness in virtue, is a principle of friendship. "Inasmuch as friendship is a certain union or society which can not be between those who are too far removed from one another, but should approach equality, it pertains to friendship, to make use of an equality already established."² But Aquinas mentions a double equality, one that is a principle, one a consequent:

Antecedent to friendship some kind of equality is required between persons mutually loving each other, and then a return must be made to each according to merit.³

¹IDN., c.4, D. n.180, with T.XII.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.VII, n.1632.

³In VIII Ethic., lect. VII, nn.1631,1633. Lectures III-XII inclusive should be read for a complete presentation of equality.

A multitude of texts could be brought forward to support the necessity of this "some kind of equality."¹ But how can such equality be had? How can a return be made "according to merit"? We can easily understand the friendship between the equally virtuous, or the imitation of friendship which exchanges usefulness or delight, but both Aristotle and his commentator insist upon the possibility of friendship between unequals.² In fact, it is the friendship between unequals which cements the peace of states and makes statesmen esteem friendship above justice.

In explaining how God made it possible for man to merit supernatural beatitude Saint Thomas divides equality and explains its species:

For equality is two-fold, viz, equality of quantity and equality of proportion. According to equality of quantity we do not merit eternal life "ex condigno" by acts of virtue; for there is not as much good in the quantity of an act of virtue as in the reward of glory which is its end. According to equality of proportion, however, we merit eternal life "ex condigno".

¹In IX Ethic., lect.VIII, n.1860: "Unam esse animam duorum amicorum. Et quod, ea quae sunt amicorum sunt communia. Et quod amicitia est quaedam aequalitas. Et quod, amicus se habet ad amicum sicut genu ad tibiam quae habent maximam propinquitatem. Per haec autem omnia datur intelligi, quod amicitia in quadam unitate consistit, quae maxime est alicujus ad seipsum." Cf., Ia., q.60, a.3, ad 2.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.VIII with Aristotle, c.10, 1159a38-b3: "Quare in quibus hoc sit secundum dignitatem, isti mansi amici, et talium amicitia. Sic autem utique et inaequales maximi erunt amici. Aequabuntur enim utique: aequalitas et similitudo amicitia."

For equality of proportion is understood when the first member of a pair is related to the second as a third is to a fourth. For God to accord us eternal life is not greater (in proportion) than for us to put forth an act of virtue. But, as the latter is proportioned to us, so is the former to Him; accordingly a certain proportion of equality is found between God rewarding and man meriting.¹

Not it is this equality of proportion which is required for friendship, an equality wherein love pays the debts as money settles deficits in economic matters,² an equalization wherein affection willingly bestowed on worth restores the distorted equilibrium between friends, as justice restores due measure of the rights of citizens to material things.³ The resulting "unio appetituum diversorum" brings about the concord of wills that furthers peace, and so facilitates the joint prosecution of a worthy operable good, the communication in a same function of life.⁴ The Ethics describes the adequation made by love when a due measure of affection is given as tribute to merit:

¹In II Sent., d.27, q.1, a.3, c.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.VI, n.1614. Cf., In III Sent., d.28, a.3, ad 3: "...Amicitia requirit aequalitatem proportionis, non autem aequiparentiae."

³In III Sent., d.28, a.6, ad 4; In VIII Ethic., lect.II, n.1559.

⁴IIa IIae, q.29, a.1, c: "Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem." Cf., In VIII Ethic., lect.IX.

And since each individual is praised according to his proper virtue, it follows that the virtue of him who loves is estimated by his love. Accordingly all such as are found to love their friends according to the proportion of their worth, continue to be friends and their friendship is enduring. For when they thus mutually love according to the merit of each, even those who are of unequal conditions can be friends, for they are thereby equalized, so long as the one of them who falls short in goodness, or in any excellence, loves proportionately the more; so a superabundance of love compensates for the defect of condition. And in this way, by means of a certain equality and likeness, which properly pertains to friendship, they become and remain friends.¹

So, when a superabundance of love is offered in return for the virtuous benefactions of a friend who excels in some way, though a return of love is owed with the rigour demanded in commutative justice,² the amount of love or honour expressed by the lesser friend for his superior in dignity wipes out the debt, and thus unequals can be friends. Friendships are most likely to endure, of course, when friends are absolutely equal in virtue, or even in usefulness or delight for one another, so long as that equality of communication continues; but the equality of perfectly virtuous friends is rare.³ Proportionate equality, which makes friendship

¹In VIII Ethic., lect.VIII, n.1649.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.II, n.1559.

³In VIII Ethic., lect.IV, all, especially n.1586.

between the unequal possible, is likewise found in distributive justice, the virtue whereby the ruler assures to each of his subjects a share in the common good proportioned to their contribution actual or potential thereto. Commutative justice, on the other hand, looks to the maintenance of legal justice between equals, and measures the debt according to absolute equality. It is with reference to man's ability to merit eternal beatitude that Saint Thomas points out the distinction of recompense in the two species of equality:

Commutative justice looks to arithmetic equality which aims at equality of quantity. Distributive justice, on the other hand, looks to geometric equality which is equality of proportion. In requiting merit with a reward, the form of distributive rather than commutative justice is kept, since it requites each according to his works. The fact that God receives nothing from us excludes equality of quantity.¹

In friendship between the unequal, then, it is the equality of proportion, of superabundance of love in return for superabundance of worth, that preserves friendship, and makes each friend grow in goodness and beneficence as the fingers in the human hand, which, though unequal in absolute size, grow in relative proportion to one another,² or as the virtues in a man grow equally, if considered with reference to the degree of participation by the subject.³

¹In II Sent., d.27, q.1, a.3, c.

²In III Sent., d.28, a.3, ad 3; cf., d.29, a.1, ad 2 and In VIII Ethic., lect.VII, n.1630.

³Ia IIae, q.66, a.2, c.

Now, while the same species of proportion is applied in friendship and in justice, that is, in distributive justice, in all other ways they would seem to differ. Justice strives to restore an equality that has been destroyed;¹ friendship presupposes a certain equality, and then repays the friend with love, first for his inner affection, and afterwards for his exterior gifts and services.² In the case of justice, the value of the service or the utility exchanged is the measure of the exchange to be made, a measure usually expressed in money; in the case of the friendship of the virtuous, the intention of the giver serves as measure for the quantity of love due, for intention and choice is what is principal in virtue.³ Justice equalizes by equalizing the exterior things possessed by men; friendship equalizes by way of a super-

¹In VIII Ethic., lect.VII, 1631-33.

²In IX Ethic., lect.I, n.1760: "...Recompensatio amicitiae attenditur secundum due. Primo quantum ad interiorum affectum amoris... Secundo fit recompensatio amicitiae quantum ad exteriora dona vel obsequia."

³In VIII Ethic., lect.XIII, n.1727, and especially 1743: "Est tamen in eis facienda recompensatio. Et in hoc electio vel voluntas conferentis beneficium habet similitudinem mensurae. Quia mensura uniuscujusque generis est id quod est principale in genere illo. Principalitas autem virtutis et moris consistit in electione. Et ideo in amicitia quae est secundum virtutem, debet fieri recompensatio secundum voluntatem ejus qui beneficium contulit etiam si parvum aut nullum auxilium ex hoc est aliquis consecutus."

abundance of love for the friend who excels in dignity, worth, or benefactions.¹ Even in the per accidens friendship based upon the usefulness of the friend, the measure of exchange should be the estimate of the value of the benefaction by the needy friend, rather than the measure of absolute quantity of the debt estimated according to the evaluation of the lender as in justice.² Finally, he who loves willingly accords his friend all he would desire for himself, for his friend is another self. Justice accords to each merely what is due. Friendship, accordingly, contains justice, but the reverse is not true. So statesmen prefer friendship even above justice in that the former is more conducive to the common good, although the latter is a virtue, whereas friendship is the companion of virtue,³ a companion which injustice kills. Again, while the unequal can be friends, there is a limit to the disproportion of extremes within which friendship can be found, for "*Amicitia est quaedam unio sive societas amicorum*,

¹In III Sent., d.28, a.7, ad 4.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.XIII, nn.1738-1742. However, Aristotle and Saint Thomas both point out that absolute equality of recompense in the useful and pleasant friendship is the best means of avoiding quarrels. Only in the case of the virtuous friendship can proportionate equality last, for the more excellent friend desires to do good to his friend, for the friend's sake alone.

³In VIII Ethic., lect.I, nn.1542-1543.

quae non potest esse inter multum distantes, sed oportet quod ad aequalitatem accedant."¹

What are the limits of this equality? For a right appreciation thereof is necessary for a reasonable approach to the conditions of equality requisite for peace in the political order, as well as for an adequate realization of our privileges in the order of grace, where God deigns to call us not servants but friends. Now Aristotle would sometimes seem to exclude the possibility of such friendships, alleging that there can be neither "convivere" nor "conversatio", nor can there be any adequate return or communication in a common good between the gods, rulers, and sages on the one hand, and the "common" man on the other.² Yet his whole political theory stands upon political friendship, a reciprocity of love among citizens, which recognizes, in order to unite, a fertile inequality of nature, so establishing that tranquility of order in the wills of ruler and subject which spells peace, the common good.

Aristotle and Saint Thomas both identify political

¹In VIII Ethic., lect.VII, n.1632.

²In IX Ethic., lect.I, nn.1767-1768; In VIII Ethic., lect.VII, nn.1634-1637.

friendship with concord.¹ Concord implies a union of wills, compatible with speculative differences of opinion, whereby a group of individuals or societies choose to direct their efforts to a useful and possible practical good, of a magnitude beyond the individual's power to obtain, a good or goods which will promote a better human life for the multitude, i.e. a common good in contradistinction to a proper good. As Aquinas points out:

Now concord does not consist in this that each should wish a good for himself, although that would appear to be a likeness of wills according to proportion, since each wishes himself a good. On the contrary, this is a cause of contention.²

Only the good are stable in their choice and in their works, and only in the good is the useful synonymous with the just, for justice has rectified their wills with regard to the rights of others.³ Since the elicited appetite moves

¹In IX Ethic., lect.VI, n.1836: "Ostendit qualiter se habeat concordia ad amicitiam politicam. Et dicit, quod amicitia politica, sive sit civium unius civitatis adinvicem, sive sit inter diversarum civitates, videtur idem esse quod concordia... Est enim amicitia politica circa utilia, et circa ea quae conveniunt ad vitam humanam, circa qualia dicimus esse concordia." Cf., n.1833: "Ostendit in speciali circa quae operabilia sit concordia. Et ponit duo. Quorum unum est, quod concordia attenditur circa ea quae habent aliquam magnitudinem... Aliud autem est, quod illa circa quae est concordia, sint talia, quae possint convenire utrique concordantium, vel etiam omnibus, sive hominibus, sive civibus unius civitatis."

²Ibid., n.1835. Cf., Aristotle, IX, c.6.

³Ibid., nn.1837-1839.

only to a good known; this implies that the citizen must have developed his reasoning to the extent that he recognizes the priority of the common over his proper good, and that his appetite is rectified to the extent that he can and will desire it. It presupposes, furthermore, that the intellectual and political mores have disposed man to accept the subordination of the individual to the common good in a given order, for mere legislation can not convey virtuous choice;¹ neither can the establishment of equality of rights by law guarantee the preservation of those same rights if there be no recognition thereof on the part of the citizens. Saint Thomas comments Aristotle in a realistic appraisal of the situation:

Bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, the philosopher says. For they fail to accord to the extent that each wants the lion's share of all advantages, but they want to evade, or rather, to have less than their share of the impending undertakings in communal labour, or in public service, that is, of whatever is assigned by lot or is compulsory. And while each wants a maximum of advantages and a minimum of disadvantages, he spies on his neighbour and blocks his chance of securing what he himself covets. In this way, so long as the common good - which is justice - is disregarded, the mutual unanimity of concord is destroyed. So they fall to contending, and one forces another to render him a just service, but that same individual himself refuses a

¹We presuppose a hierarchy of genera in both common and proper goods. For instance, no individual may jeopardize his spiritual proper good for the material, or even the political common good.

return of justice, yet he wants to swell the maximum of his benefits while shrinking the minimum of unpleasant duties; such conduct is contrary to the equality of justice.¹

Does this mean that man may not seek to obtain in society what he is impotent to achieve alone? If so, nature has left the rational animal impoverished in equipment for survival, in contrast to the lower animals. Saint Thomas himself, in the De Regno, has emphasized human dependance upon society from man's very indigence:

However, it is natural for man to be a social and political animal, to live in a group, even more so than all other animals, as the very needs of his nature indicate. For all other animals nature has prepared food, hair as a covering, teeth, horns, claws as means of defence, or at least speed in flight. Man, on the other hand, was created without any natural provision for these things. But, instead of them all he was endowed with reason, by the use of which he could procure all these things for himself by the work of his hands. But one man alone is not able to procure them all for himself; for one man could not sufficiently provide for life, unassisted. It is, therefore, natural that man should live in company with his fellows.²

Neither is one man's reason sufficient to discover for himself all the knowledge he needs, especially as he must

¹In IX Ethic., lect.VI, n.1839.

²Saint Thomas, I De Regno, (Lethiellieux, ed.), in Opuscula Omnia, T.I, c.2, n.2; translation as in Gerald B. Phelan, Ph.D., On the Governance of Rulers (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), ch.1, p.34. Any subsequent English citation of De Regno will be from the Phelan work.

laboriously build up his intellectual knowledge from a tabula rasa.¹ So there must be different individuals amassing different sciences and skills for the group, and, where there is a multitude, there can be no united effort toward the group good without a directing authority.² Yet each of these has a proper good which is not identical with the common good; as the De Regno likewise indicates:

Things differ by what is proper to each: they are united by what they have in common. For, diversity of effects is due to diversity of causes. Consequently, there must exist something which impels towards the common good of the many, over and above that which impels towards the private good of each individual. Wherefore, also in all things that are ordained towards a single end there is something to be found which rules the rest. Thus in the corporeal universe, other bodies are regulated, according to a certain order of divine providence, by the first body, namely, the celestial body, and all bodies are controlled by a rational creature. So, too, in the individual man, the soul rules the body; and among the parts of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by reason. Likewise, among the members of a body, one

¹I De Regno, c.2, n.3: "Homo autem horum quae sunt suae vitae necessaria naturalem cognitionem habet solum in communi, quasi eo per rationem valente ex naturalibus principiis ad cognitionem singulorum quae necessaria sunt humanae vitae pervenire. Non est autem possibile quod unus homo ad omnia huiusmodi per suam rationem pertingat.

²Ibid., n.4: "Si igitur naturale est homini quod in societate multorum vivat, necesse est in hominibus esse aliquid per quod multitudo regatur. Multis enim existentibus hominibus et unoquoque id quod est sibi congruum providente, multitudo in diversa dispergeretur nisi esset etiam aliquid de eo quod ad bonum multitudinis pertineret curam habens, sicut et corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis deflueret nisi esset aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore quae ad bonum commune omnium membrorum intenderet."

is the principal and moves all the others, as the heart or the head. Therefore, in every group there must be some governing power.¹

Three points are evident in the above citation. First, man cannot secure an adequate proper good by his individual exertions, so society is necessary and natural for the sufficiency of goods requisite for human life. Society is therefore first known to man as the means whereby he satisfies his proper needs, his need of goods that are desired by the love of concupiscence. Second, men are naturally united by what they have in common and differ by what is proper to each. Thence arises the third consideration: authority is necessary to order the good of the individual parts to the common good, "quod est melius et divinius quam bonum unius", and which contains individuals as well as the domestic and other social bodies.² Otherwise men would prefer their proper interests before the common good, would commit injustices and ruin the

¹I De Regno, c.2, n.4: tr., p.36.

²Saint Thomas, *In I Politicorum Aristotelis* (Laval ed.), lect.I, p.9a-b: "Ostendit quod illud bonum ad quod ordinatur civitas, est principalissimum inter bona humana, tali ratione. Si omnis communitas ordinatur ad bonum, necesse est quod illa communitas quae est maxime principalis, maxime sit conjectatrix boni quod est inter omnia humana bona principalissimum... Manifestum est autem quod civitas includit omnes alias communitates. Nam et domus et vici sub civitate comprehenduntur; et sic ipse communitas politica est communitas principalissima. Est ergo conjectatrix principalissimi boni inter omnia bona humana; intendit enim bonum commune quod est melius et divinius quam bonum unius."

commonweal as the concupiscible appetite, left to itself, would destroy the rule of reason in the body. The love of concupiscence breeds disintegration; political friendship unites society.

In the De Regno, Saint Thomas stressed the natural weaknesses of the individual in order that the ruler, for whom he wrote, might recognize his duty to offset the people's limitations by a just rule for his subjects', not his own benefit.¹ The Politics makes a different approach. It suggests that though man is a rational animal, his discursive mode of knowing does not give him an immediate grasp of the conclusions of his own principles, as does the angel's comprehensive knowledge. Virtuous habits in his intellect, as well as moral virtues in his will, are necessary before he reasons and chooses what is best in itself, rather than a good first known to him. Exercise and direction are likewise requisite before he can recognize the relation between proper and common good, before he can desire to subordinate his private well-being to the commonweal, before he is capable of political friendship, the friendship of the order of

¹I De Regno, c.2, n.6: "Si igitur regimen injustum per unum tantum fiat, qui sua commoda ex rigimine quaerat non autem bonum multitudinis sibi subjectae, talis rector tyrannus vocatur, nomine a fortitudine derivato, quia scilicet per potentiam opprimit non per justitiam regit."

natural perfection. Now man has a natural impetus for perfection as for the political order, but that aptitude, like his aptitude for science, must be fostered through familial education, until he is able to move himself by the election of friendship in place of blindly following the motions of a natural love of concupiscence.¹ The state arose from election, not the mere instinct of nature; it is an institution of human industry, and must be based on virtue, on that political friendship which is the concord or proportionate unity of wills for a common good:

Still, just as virtues are acquired by human practice, as is stated in the second book of the Ethics, so states are instituted by deliberate human purpose. The man who first instituted a state was the cause of the greatest of goods for man. For man is the best of animals if virtue, for which he has a natural inclination, is perfected in him. But if he is devoid of law and justice, man is the worst of all animals... For injustice is the more oppressive in proportion as it has more weapons, that is, more instruments of wrong-doing... But man is reduced to justice by the civil order... the order of a civil community.²

¹Ia, q. 60, a. 4, c. Cf., Q.D. de Caritate (Marietti ed.), T. II, q. un., a. 2, c: "Amare autem bonum alicuius civitatis ut habeatur et possideatur, non facit bonum politicum; quia sic etiam aliquis tyrannus amat bonum alicuius civitatis ut ei dominetur; quod est amara seipsum magis quam civitatem; sibi enim ipsi hoc bonum concupiscit non civitati. Sed amare bonum civitatis ut conservetur et defendatur hoc est vere amare civitatem; quod bonum politicum facit: in tantum quod aliqui propter bonum civitatis conservandum vel ampliandum, se periculis mortis exponant et negligant privatum bonum".

²In I Polit., lect. I, pp. 15b-16a.

In angels and men one must distinguish the inclination of nature from the deliberate love of choice. Man instinctively forms societies to get the goods of which otherwise nature deprives him.¹ With a love of concupiscence as principle and as first known, he unites with his like to seek a better proper good as well as the common good in which he will participate. Since there is a communication of rational nature between men as well as an aptitude for virtue, man may build above the social union based on mere similarity of species or of occupation the recognized and deliberate love of choice. So master and slave, though separated by the latter's natural economic insufficiency, may be friends as fellow-men and as good men, as also husband and wife may be united in love of each other's virtue as well as communicating in the natural functions of generation and domesticity.² But this demands the recognition of the difference in virtue and function of those who love, and an acceptance by the inferior of subordination to his better with the due return of greater love. In the political order, likewise, it demands a recognition of the greater virtue in the man naturally capable of authority, or in the wise, or in any other indi-

¹See again Ia, q.60, a.5.

²In VIII Ethic., lect.XI, n.1700; lect.XII, nn.1719-1725. Cf., In V Ethic., lect.XI, nn.1012-15.

vidual who has contributed more to the commonweal, to whom a greater need of affectionate honour is preferred;¹ it likewise demands that those in authority should rule - not for their own - but for the public good.² As John of Saint-Thomas expresses it;

In the friendship of excellence equality in the persons according to rank or office is not prerequisite, but it is sufficient that there be equality of correspondence, to the extent that the love of one is proportioned to the love of the other.³

This proportion is present when honour and glory is paid to the superior for the share of goods which he distributes or makes available to the inferior. So St. Thomas points out that the force of love turns inferior beings toward the superior beings, "convertendo se ad ea quia in eis habent suam perfectionem" as it moves the superior to love his inferiors "provisive, id est in quantum provident eis ut sub

¹IIa, IIae, q.27, a.1, ad.2: "...Homines volunt amari in quantum volunt honorari. Sicut enim honor exhibetur alicui ut quoddam testimonium boni in ipso qui honoratur, ita per hoc quod aliquis amatur ostenditur in ipso esse aliquod bonum; quia solum bonum amabile est. Sic igitur amari et honorari quaerunt homines propter aliud, scilicet ad manifestationem boni in amato existentis. Amare autem quaerunt caritatem habentes secundum se, quasi ipsum sit bonum caritatis."

²In V Ethic., lect.XI, nn.1009-1011. Cf., Ia IIae, q.100, a.5.

³J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol., (Vives ed.), T.VII, q.23, disp.8, a.1, n.16, p.412a.

se contentis."¹ In the political sphere such a reciprocal communication in civil life, based upon the dignity of virtuous worth, establishes and preserves the good order of the city. This is true political friendship, wherein the people recognize and accept the ordinance of authority to the public good for the sake of that good, rather than for the very real personal advantage ensuing upon the accretions of their share in the public good, for "to love the good of the state in order that it may be preserved and defended is to truly love the state; it ensures the political good".² When political friendship elevates and directs the individual's natural concupiscence for the richest share in the communal harvest of society, and educates him to prefer a virtuous beneficent service of the commonweal to the passive acceptance of social goods, we have a good human society which provides a sufficiency of all that is necessary for the individual to work out his natural perfection. In such an ideal milieu, possible only where citizens are formed to virtue, wherein a recognized hierarchy of honours

¹IDN., 6.4, T.IX, n.425: "Movet etiam virtus amoris superiora ad providendum inferioribus et collocat minus habentia, idest inferiora in superioribus inquantum convertit haec ad illa sicut ad proprium bonum quod habent in illis."

²Q.D. de Caritate, q.un, a.2, c: "Amare autem bonum alicuius civitatis ut habeatur et possideatur, non facit bonum politicum...quod est amare seipsum magis quam civitatem... Sed amare bonum civitatis ut conservetur et defendatur, hoc est amare civitatem; quod bonum politicum facit."

and duties spells the proportional equality of political friendship, man finds more easily the natural helps toward a love for his separated good - God.¹

Love between man and His separated good, God! What kind of love? For we have seen that there can be no friendship between a man and an irrational thing, since there must be similitude of natures between friends, to serve as the principle of that mutual love of choice which demands a sharing of life as a manifestation of the reciprocated goodness and love of each friend: the elicited appetite can move only to the good known. Because of the chasm between the divine and the created nature it would seem as impossible for friendship to exist in the natural order, even between God and an angel, as for fire to generate flesh.² Yet, on the other hand, the lowest of the intellectual creatures, man, has in his knowing faculty a similitude of the Trinity and, therefore, a natural proportion to God. So it would seem that he should instinctively love God as his end and accordingly should have a natural desire for the beatific vision.

¹In IIa IIae, qq.23-27, Saint Thomas frequently compares charity's information of the spiritual virtues with the vitalization that political friendship injects into the social order. From this we may recognize the impoverishment of the modern socialist and communist ideal of the social order in that it sees therein only an instrument of acquiring the maximum of private goods for the "common" man.

²Ia, q.62, a.1, c. Cf., Ia, qul2, a.1, obj.4 which denies any proportion between the created intellect and God.

Saint Thomas himself states:

Everything tends to a divine likeness as its own end. Therefore a thing's last end is that whereby it is most of all like God. Now the intellectual creature is especially likened to God in that it is intellectual, since this likeness belongs to it above other creatures, and includes all other likenesses. And in this particular kind of likeness it is more like God in understanding actually than in understanding habitually or potentially, because God is always actually understanding... Therefore the last end of every intellectual substance is to understand God.¹

To solve the difficulty we must distinguish proportions. The creature is related or proportioned to God, not as two quantities to each other, but as effect to its cause, as potentiality to act.² In this way man can know that God is, and that He created all things; so he can love God as his first cause.³ But even an angel cannot naturally know God's essence but merely His image refulgent in himself.⁴ Now no created image can represent God. Since, then, to see God in His essence is beyond the native power of every created intellect, there can be no natural movement of the will toward supernatural beatitude, no love of choice of God as He is

¹Contra Gentes, III, c.25; Pegis, T.II, pp.44-45.

²Ia, q.12, a.1, ad.4.

³Ia, q.62, a.2, ad 1.

⁴Ia, q.12, a.4, c and ad 1.

within Himself without the supernatural aid of grace implying faith.¹ The intrinsic common good of the universe itself demands merely that the creature be ordered to God as to his end in the natural mode.² Yet because the passive potency of the intellect, in that it is immaterial, is capable of elevation by way of grace and faith, even as the will can be raised by charity to love God as He is, the intellect has an aptitude for that transformation of grace, which brings in its train a growing capacity for the "lumen gloriae" as virtue stabilizes grace. So it may be said that the desire of the beatific vision is natural to man if grace be presupposed, even though it is difficult for him to reach that desire, because of the weight of his body, because it is beyond unassisted nature, and because of sin.³ By his humanity he is inclined to natural perfection: by merit, which comes about by the addition of grace to the human soul, he is inclined to the beatitude of the lumen gloriae,⁴ for by grace he participates in the nature of God.

¹Ia, q.62, a.2, c.

²IIIIa, q.1, a.3, ad 2: "Ad perfectionem etiam universi sufficit quod naturali modo creatur ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturae, ut creature uniatur Dei in persona."

³Ia, q.12, a.4, c, ad finem; Ia, q.62, a.2 with ad 1, 2,3. Cf., In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.3, ad 4; also IIIa, q.1 a.3, ad 3.

⁴Ia, q.62, a.5, c. Cf., Ia IIae, q.109, aa.1-5 inc.

Cajetan has developed the distinction between man's natural desire, taken absolutely, from his natural desire as ordered to grace.¹ He shows that of itself the intellectual nature tends only to desire to know God as cause of all that it knows, that is, as a perfection of the knowing faculty only. Now nature can not extend its inclination to what transcends its limits. A desire rooted in nature can not transcend that nature, for nature is the principle of the desire. Furthermore, nature gives to each being instruments proportioned to its nature to reach the perfection of that being. But to assert that we had a natural desire for the beatific vision would be to say that naturally we desired an end for which we had no means. Before the Divine essence, most intelligible in itself, our intellects are as blind as owls in strong sunlight,² and no created species can represent that Divine essence to us. So there is no "desiderium visionis Dei in se absolute."

But, presupposing the ordering of man to the supernatural order, that is, presupposing that the illumination of

¹Cajetan, In Iam, q.12, a.1. Cf., J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol. (Solesmes ed.), T.II, q.12, disp.12, a.3, pp.139-145.

²Aristotle, Metaph. II, c.1, b9 (Moerbeka) as in the Cathala ed. of the Metaphysics: "Sicut enim mysticorum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima."

faith has determined his intellect to that Divine object, believed in dark certitude because of the revealed "vision of Him believed",¹ man elicits a desire to see the nature that has caused all these particular effects of the divine essence, which revelation demonstrates of God. So it is natural for the soul elevated to the supernatural order to want to know God as supernatural cause, as it is then natural for the elicited appetite to seek the good of happiness of the whole of the human creature - beatitude. Likewise theological faith reveals divine means, made available by grace - no less than the Eternal Essence itself - which, by divine election, will unite itself in lieu of species with the intellect participating in the Creator's nature, that the creature may see - after his intellect has been made deiform by the light of glory - the Triune Goodness that is His end.² So, the Father, Who by grace makes men His sons, partakers in His divine nature, holds out to all men and angels the wonderful communication of that life that is Himself as beatifying, to found thereon the friendship that is charity with His creature. For the love of God towards His creatures is two-fold:

¹Ia, q.12, a.13, ad 3.

²Ia, q.12, a.4, a.5.

For one is common, whereby He loves all things that are,¹ and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the divine good; and according to this love He is said to love any one absolutely, since it is by this love that God wills absolutely the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature... He hath predestinated us into the adoption of children... unto the praise of the glory of His grace.²

But is it not rash to speak of a love of friendship between the infinite and the lowest of intellectual creatures, especially when the very nature of that creature has been vitiated by Adam's sin? How can the equality necessary for reciprocal election be found across the abysmal chasm between divine purity and the guilt-warped soul of the rational animal? The answer must be sought in the greatest attribute of omnipotence - the divine mercy - whereby God, from love of His own goodness, formed creatures to represent it, and willed that the return procession of corporeal beings toward Him should climax in a friendship between God and man. So He sent His Son to earth, that, by His passion, He should merit the grace of son-ship to make such friendship possible. Nor does God's nature lose one iota of its ineffable greatness by His condescension to His creature. All the requirements for the

¹Wisdom, xi, 25.

²Ia IIae, q.110, a.1, c. The italicized portion is from Ephesians, 1,5.

friendship of super-excellence are present.¹ There is the knowledge of God, of His goodness and His love by faith; there is the answering hope for a participation in that life by beatitude² - an imperfect love whose principle is our concupiscence for His gifts - which yet leads us to the love of friendship - the charity whereby we convert to God to love Him above all other things for Himself alone, and we love all other children for His sake.

These three supernatural virtues are infused into the creature along with His son-ship, his participation in the Divine nature conferred by grace, which in its turn establishes the similitude that can be a principle of the mutual love of benevolence. Now, in every friendship of super-excellence the will of the more excellent friend is the measure of the exchange of love. And God's election established, that His creature would be rewarded for all good and loving vital supernatural acts by way of a communication in His life by beatitude, merited after He had made that creature deiform by grace and charity.³ The formal object of this virtue of supernatural

¹IIa IIae, qq.23-27.

²Ia IIae, q.66, a.6, ad 2.

³In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.1, ad 9; a.2, c. Cf., J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol. (Vives ed.), T.VII, q.23, disp.8, a.1, n.12, p.411b: "...gratiam quae est forma justificans."

friendship is "bonitas Dei in se, ut per amicitiae communicabilis est."¹ By means of charity there is a conversion of the inferior to the superior as to its end, "quia amor facit amatum esse formam amantis,"² and the superior is moved to provide the means of eternal life for the inferior. So Aquinas explains Dionysius:

Amor virtus est unitiva et concretiva movens superiora ad providentiam minus habentium, idest inferiorum, coordinata autem, idest aequalia, rursus ad communicativam aeternam habitudinem subjecti, idest inferiora, ad meliorum, idest superiorum, conversionem.³

But we cannot equalize the inequality by way of excess affections from the creature in return for the benefactions of the supreme Lord of the Universe. Only in the bosom of the Trinity is God loved adequately, according to the measure of His goodness and beauty, and the very degree of charity which the creature has in His gift.⁴ Yet the equality of correspondence is saved, according to John of Saint-Thomas. We give the remainder of the reference to which

¹J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol. (Solesmes ed.), T.1, "Isagogue", p.182b15-16.

²In III Sent., dist.27, q.1, a.1, ad 5,9. Cf., Ia, q.62, a.2, a.3, for the three conversions usual in the soul's journey to its end.

³In III Sent., dist. 27, q.1, a.1, Cf., In de Div. Nom. (Mandonnet ed.), c.4, lect.XII, p.403, where Saint Thomas quotes the original text, with p. 406.

⁴Ia IIae, q.24, a.7, with Cajetan's commentary and q.27, a.5.

reference was made above:

In amicitia excellentiae non requiritur aequalitas in personis, aut statu vel officio, sed sufficit quod sit, aequalitas correspondentiae, ita ut sicut unus amat, alter amet. Eleganter Bernardus sermone LXXXIII in Cantica: "Si dominatur Deus, me oportet servire; si imperat, me oportet parere, et non vicissim a Domino, vel servitium exigere possum, vel obsequium; cum autem Deus amat, non aliud vult quam amari, quippe non aliud amat nisi ut ametur."¹

"Cum autem Deus amat, non aliud vult quam amari."

He who is beauty and goodness and desired by all has loved the intellectual creature with a love of predilection.² To preserve the equality of correspondence the intellectual creature must love Him with all his heart, his soul, his mind and strength. Having thus fostered the imperfect and obscure familiarity with Him which faith offers in this life, his servants may see achieved that higher proportion of equality which He elected for them in patria, when "Ipse Spiritus testimonium reddit spiritui nostro: quod filii Dei sumus."³

¹J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol. (Vivès ed.), T.VII, q.23, disp.8, a.1, n.16, p.412a.

²IDN., c.4, D.n.156: "Omnibus igitur est pulchrum et bonum desiderabile, et amabile, et diligibile." Cf., T.IX, nn.400-402.

³J. of Saint-Thomas, Curs. Theol. (Vivès ed.), T.VII, q.23, disp.8, a.1, n.17, p.412b.