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"MODUS"

LATIN WORD

of the

THE PRIMARY MEANINGS

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THE PRIMARY MEANINGS OF THE LATIN WORD MODUS

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#### PROPOSITIONES

1. Dicit magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitione ignotorum dupliciter.
2. Phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis permanens ut quoddam fundamentum intellectus operationis.
3. Genus est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid est praedicatur.
4. In scientia moralis oportet procedere verisimiliter.
5. Ad primum philosophum et ad naturalem pertinet considerare hoc nomen Natura.

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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to discover the order among the primary impositions of the word modus in Latin in order to justify its extensive use in philosophy. In Chapter One an important principle concerning the role of quantity in the way that man imposes names is discussed with relation to grammar and logic. In Chapter Two certain philosophical and even theological problems that depend upon an accurate understanding of the meanings of the word are enumerated so that the gravity of the issues at stake may be appreciated. In Chapter Three the etymology of the word is discussed in some detail; furthermore, the English word 'size' is suggested as the translation of modus; finally, the characteristics of the first imposition are delineated. In Chapter Four the elements implied in the first imposition are submitted to a rigorous analysis. In Chapter Five other meanings are seen to be proportional to the first meaning. In a short conclusion the results of the research are summarized.

The findings of this thesis are presented as probable. Nobody, to my knowledge, has ever undertaken the task of following the order of the meanings of the word modus with a view to justifying its necessary place in philosophy. It must be remarked that the task is properly metaphysical, for the meanings involved extend far beyond the subject-matter of logic, philosophy of nature, mathematics, or grammar.

Because of the difficulties involved, I submit the results of the research pursued so far in order to profit from the knowledge

and criticisms of others. For it seems apparent that an exhaustive study of modus would extend well over a thousand pages of text accompanied by an untold number of footnotes. Such a task cannot prudently be undertaken alone.

To make an adequate number of acknowledgements of my intellectual debts is to relate the history of the thesis. To Father D. J. McMahon, O.P., I am indebted for the initial introduction to such problems as subsistence and the modal distinction through geometrical designs and colored chalk; to Father T. U. Millaney, O. P., for lectures on modus in his courses on De Christo and De Sacramentis; to Father R. R. Masterson, O. P., for hours of discussion on the modal character of sacramental grace; to Mr. Roch Valin, director of the Laval Institute of Linguistics, for his enthusiastic and learned lectures on language theory and for his kindness in reading the first chapter of the thesis; to Mgr. Maurice Dionne, dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, for his intellectual perspicacity and his logical acumen which have saved the thesis from many an error; finally to my director, Father Jasmin Bouley, who also directed my licence thesis (a chronological study of the Thomistic texts concerning modus) for the wise counsels animated by his exemplary fidelity to the letter and doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, for his enlightening observations concerning many of the complicated aspects of the meanings of modus, and for his continuous encouragement not to be in a hurry.

#### CHAPTER ONE

#### QUANTITY AND THE PROCESS OF NAMING

Beings exist; beings are known; beings are named. Another way of expressing the same trilogy is to assert that things may be considered from the viewpoint of their way of existing, of being known, or of being named. <sup>(1)</sup> The foundation of this exhaustive division is not the nature of things, but something external to their nature; for whether a thing exists, is known, or is named, it is still the same in nature. This external something has often been referred to by the word 'mode'. Indeed, for centuries philosophers have spoken of the mode of being, the mode of knowing, and the mode of signifying.

(1) "Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus; sed modum essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est." St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 2. "Modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi." *Ibid.*, q. 15, a. 2, ad 2. When these two texts are compared with "modus cognitions sequitur modum naturae rei cognoscentis" (q. 12, a. 11, c.), the foundations are laid for distinguishing an active and a passive mode of knowing as well as an active and a passive mode of signifying. This distinction is based on the opposition between the knower and known as well as that between that which actually signifies and the signified. The mode of being of things cannot be distinguished into active and passive. These divisions became the groundwork for placing the role of language with relation to logic and philosophy at the beginning of the speculative grammars of the Middle Ages. Cf. the most excellent example, *Grammatica Speculativa* of Thomas de Exfort (circa 1350), found in Vol. I of the *Opera Omnia* of Duns Scotus, Paris, Louis Vives, 1891, pp. I-50. Reprinted by Librairie Philosophique M. Doyon, Québec, 1962.

In the order given here, these three modes are listed according to their importance; natural beings exist before they are known by us, and they are known before they are named. They must also be considered in a reverse order, namely, the order of teaching. (1)  
By using words or names, the teacher reveals the knowledge that he has already acquired, and by this knowledge he leads his students to the reality of things. (2)

(1) "Alius est ordo servandus in accipiendo cognitionem, et tradendo. Accipiens enim cognitionem procedit de signis ad signata, quasi modo resolutorio, quia signa magis sunt nota quoad ipsum; sed tradens cognitionem signorum, oportet quod res ante signa manifestet, eo quod signa sumuntur per similitudinem ad res : unde oportet praecognoscere res ad cognitionem signorum, ad quarum similitudinem sumuntur." St. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Sententias Magistri Petri Lombardi, I, d. 1, expositio textus.

(2) "Discendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles; sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exteriùs." Ibid., S. I, I, q. 117, a. 1, ad 3. "In discipulo describuntur formae intelligibiles, ex quibus scientia per doctrinam accepta constituitur, immediate quidem per intellectum agentem, sed mediate per eum qui docet. Proponit enim doctor rerum intelligibilium signa, ex quibus intellectus agens accipit intentiones intelligibiles, et describit eas in intellectu possibili : unde ipsa verba doctoris audita, vel visa in scripto, hoc modo se habent ad causandum scientiam in intellectu sicut res quae sunt extra animam ; quia ex utrisque intellectus intentiones intelligibiles accipit, quoniam verba doctoris propinquius se habent ad causandum scientiam quam sensibilia extra animam existentia, inquantum sunt signa intelligibilium intentionum." De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 11.

The problem of naming things as we know them is of no minor importance in philosophical considerations. This problem faces each individual and the human race as a whole, because no man can search after truth alone. (1)  
Not only must man pursue truth in community but he must also do so with the proper tools, among which language certainly holds a primordial position. (2)  
Since, for the most part, man must content himself with a posteriori arguments, it is by analyzing the process of naming, an effect of the process of knowing, that man has made progress in his search after wisdom. Nor must we forget that the process of knowing is an effect consequent upon the existence of things.

Man is a compound of matter and form : more properly, of body and of soul. In the light of their substantial union, the psychology of knowledge can be explained, for the nature of man's intellectual ability to abstract the essences of material things from the imagination is determined by the relationship that exists between his imagination and intellect. In the light of his profound grasp of the way that the human intellect is dependent on the internal sense powers, St. Thomas Aquinas has enunciated a very important

(1) "... no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed." Aristotle, Metaphysics, 993 a 31 - b 3. (tr. by W. D. Ross).

(2) "Language is the most important instrument we possess." G. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 1947, p. 242.

principle which may be cited here without necessarily receiving all of the proof of its veracity. This principle will be illustrated in the following thesis by the study of the history and the first meanings of the Latin word modus.

Following Aristotle, St. Thomas constantly insists that all of man's intellectual knowledge, obtained under natural conditions, finds its necessary starting point in the internal and external senses. Going on to note that the imagination and sense cannot transcend continuous quantity, he draws conclusions that touch even the way that the Christian must speak about the Holy Trinity. In justifying the use of the word 'procession' of the Second and Third Persons from the Father, he lays down as the principle of solution that man transfers names from elements which are first found in what is continuous to everything that is grasped by the human intellect.

*Respondedo dicendum, quod cognitio intellectiva in nobis sumit principium a phantasia, et sensu, quae ultra continuum se non extendunt; et inde est quod ex his quae in continuo inveniuntur, transsumimus nomina ad omnia quae capimus intellecta (1).*

This rarely cited text from De Potentia is a source of admiration, if not stupefaction, for two closely related reasons. Firstly, it asserts as inevitable that the human intellect depends upon quantity, in spite of the fact that the human intellect is not itself a knowing power that depends intrinsically upon a material organ for

(1) - De Potentia, q. 10, a. 1, c. Cf. q. 3, a. 19; also De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2.

the exercise of its proper operation. Secondly, quantity, (specifically, continuous or dimensive quantity) is stated to be a universal principle in the process of giving names. No process of naming can be completely dissociated from quantity, because never in his process of knowing can man detach himself from his imagination, the starting point of understanding. Elsewhere, St. Thomas has made clear that, in a special way, the imagination is a principle of human intellectual activity; it is not a passing or transient condition of knowledge but rather a permanent foundation of intellectual operations. The phantasms are related to the intellect as objects in which the intellect sees all that it sees. <sup>(1)</sup> The intellect sees everything in the imagination by means of a perfect representation or by means of denying the perfection of the representation.

If that branch of the philosophy of nature, which is now commonly called psychology, can guarantee the validity of the principle stated above, one has acquired an extraordinarily valuable principle of methodology with which to begin looking for the etymologies and impositions of those terms which have become unavoidable means of communicating ideas in philosophy. Looking for the initial etymology and the various successive impositions of a particular word should rigorously involve two phases showing:

(1) how the word implies something quantitative, and (2) how the word is made more useful by neglecting or emphasizing certain

(1) Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 2, ad 5, (ed. Decker).



aspects of quantity. These points will become clear later on in the treatment of the history of the word modus.

Reference has already been made to the fact that psychology is entitled to analyse the activity of giving names insofar as it is related to the activity of knowing. <sup>(1)</sup> It would not be out of place to ask the following question directly: who has the right to discuss the naming process considered in itself?

At first sight, it would seem that the naming process is necessarily identified with the history of language. The argument for this position would maintain that, even though language is related to man's search after truth, this search as a process is something historical and therefore inevitably resolves in something contingent. Furthermore, man seems to create words because he lives in society; carried to its logical conclusion, this position would imply that language is only a social custom, a sociological relationship which, being mutable, can be resolved to something accidental <sup>(2)</sup> to man.

- (1) Just as Aristotle indicates in the first chapter of the Peri Hermeneias that certain considerations presupposed to the subject of logic are treated in the De Anima, so too certain psychological considerations are considered prior to the subject of grammar, or to use a modern term, linguistics.

- (2) "Language is primarily a social phenomenon." This statement is asserted to be the "first law of language" by Mario Pei, who may be taken here as a representative of the overwhelming positivistic influence which dominates many, if not most, linguistic discussions. Cf. his Language for Everybody, p. 106.

To identify the naming process with either the history of language or even something sociological appears both specious and superficial. Such a position can be refuted by maintaining that language - for after all, languages are complexly elaborated naming processes - has been created for two roles. <sup>(1)</sup> More obviously, an individual creates a means of expression of his needs, desires and thoughts, in order to communicate with, or become one with, his fellows. Secondly, each man is obliged also to create words in order to speak or to communicate with himself, that is, to clarify and to advance his own thought. An order can be perceived between these two roles: an individual needs words for his own sake prior to the needs of society. Thus language cannot be properly understood if reduced exclusively to the contingent or historical, and the accidental or sociological. It is to be developed completely, the proof concerning the proper subordination of the two roles of language would make clear that the opinion that words are first ordered to society implies ultimately the destruction or non-existence of speculative knowledge. <sup>(2)</sup> However, here is not the place

- (1) "Tali autem sermone (secundum quod sic significativus est concepti) utitur homo ad seipsum et ad alium." St. Albert the Great, De Praedicabiliibus, Tr. 1, c. 4, p. 9 a-b. (Ed. Doyon).

- (2) As an example of the extreme importance of a correct notion of the purpose of language, the following passage from a book defending democracy against communism is enlightening.

"The issue here involved may be clarified by asking whether we are to consider man only as homo-fabricans or whether as homo-linguans also. Which is of first significance in the life of man; his power of speech or

to undertake a defense of the reality of speculative knowledge and the way it entails, in man, words and language.

Still, even if words receive their dignity from their subordination to speculative knowledge, it would seem that the naming process is to be identified with the history of language. Naming different things, even naming the same thing in different ways, implies movement. The history of language records the changing of names as man has grown in knowledge; too, it records the destruction of different languages and cultures, for time involves both the development and destruction of things. Even if it be true that the development of a given people to a particular degree of civilization is due in great measure to the successful means of communication<sup>(2)</sup> developed; even if one type of language enables its users to discover certain truths more readily while in contrary fashion it makes other truths more difficult, if not impossible, of access; even if, in particular much of the success of the Greek people in art and

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his power of fashioning new instruments of production? Put speech first, and we still retain all that is of value to him in the second aspect, but put the economic in first place and the essential significance of speech is denied; words become not the vehicles of a living truth but the mere fabricated counters of social communication. This is the real issue as between the two sides of the Iron Curtain. Not only does Marx explicitly affirm the all-supremacy of homo-fabricans; but on our side it is precisely the primacy of the word that is enshrined in the constitutions of our constitutional democracies." J. Farthing, Freedom Wears a Crown, pp. 153-154.

- (1) "Tempus per se impetis est causa corruptionis quam generalitatis". St. Thomas, In Octo Libros De Physico Auditu, lib. IV, l. 22, no. 1197, cf. no. 1161, (ed. Pirotta).
- (2) "In fact most of the great cultures of the world seem to

philosophy is to be accredited to the peculiar structure of their means of communication, the Greek language, still any language, because it implies time, is historical.

The protagonists of such a position would maintain that the naming process is a subject-matter to be discussed in "grammar". Here the traditional word 'grammar' is intended to include everything that the word 'linguistics' suggests in this modern era. Yet, this position would go on to reduce the grammarian to the mere function of recording social phenomena and their history.

Besides diminishing the traditional role of the grammarian, this position would go further to deny the logician any right to discuss the naming process and to lay down universal canons for it. As an example, the definitions of univocal, equivocal, and denominative names with which Aristotle opens his first logical work, The Categories, would not seem to pertain to the subject-matter of logic; for they are definitions concerning words, whereas logic treats of things precisely as they are known. If he does in some way have the right to treat of words, then the logician becomes involved in history in such a way that he no longer is capable of analysing abstract thought and is obliged to study the logic peculiar to a particular language. Whether or not logic is necessarily engaged in the analysis of a particular language is of great importance today, because the validity of the universal

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have been developed by civilizations which attached the greatest importance to the study of language and choice pieces of writing." Charlton Laird, The Miracle of Language, p. 232.

character of the logic of Aristotle is called into doubt since it does not apply to the Chinese language. If the Chinese language uses a naming process or a mode of signifying which is incapable of logical analysis, then logic, in the Aristotelian sense of the word, is not capable of laying down universal canons regarding words.

This brings us to the problem of Chinese logic which is based on the Chinese conception of truth. Truth, according to the Chinese, can never be proved; it can only be suggested... truth cannot be proved although it may be grasped by the mind in a "dialectics without words" (Chuangtse) (1).

Indeed, if truth can be grasped without words, then Aristotle made a catastrophic error in orienting his entire logical corpus by beginning with definitions concerning words.

The entire response to this position which is extremely critical of the traditional role assigned to grammar and logic in

(1) Lin Yutang, My Country and My People, p. 88.

(2) "If Aristotle had spoken Chinese or Daoctan, he would have had to adopt an entirely different logic, or at any rate an entirely different theory of Categories." Maunier, *Kritik der Sprache*, Vol. III, p. 4. This is later authors also write: "Maunier, after a detailed argument to show that the Aristotelian doctrine of the Negative and the Categories made the extant forms of speech the objects of a superstitious cult, as though they had been actual deities," remarks that Aristotle is dead because he was, more than perhaps any other notable writer in the whole history of Philosophy, superstitiously devoted to words. Even in his logic he is absolutely dependent on the accidents of language, on the accidents of his mother-tongue."

Western culture lies upon one important distinction. This distinction is even more fundamental than the one which has already been made concerning the double role or purpose of language. The naming process is never to be identified with the history of language, even though a knowledge of history is needed to grasp profoundly the nature of the naming process. Indeed, language is not to be identified with the history of language. The distinction to be proposed here concerns the relation not only of logic but also of grammar to the naming process. In the field of modern linguistics, Ferdinand De Saussure made the proper distinction when speaking of the synchronic and the diachronic viewpoint on language.

(1) Unfortunately, though most modern linguists admit this distinction, some have failed to grasp its full impact. Stated in other terms, the nature of the naming process must be carefully distinguished from the exercise of the naming process, exactly as the nature of writing must be distinguished from any particular instance of writing, or again, as the cooking pan in the kitchen must be distinguished from the thousand and one times that it is put to use. For the conditions of the nature of a thing are not identical with the circumstances of any particular realization or use of it, e.g. whether one writes with ink or pencil, he is still writing.

It must also be pointed out that the nature of language is to be discovered by starting to analyse the exercise of language,

(1) Cf. Ferdinand De Saussure, Cours de Linguistique générale, p. 117.

just as the nature of any instrument in all of its fullness is discovered by analysing the use we make of it. In this way, the history of language is necessary to the discovery of the nature of language since by an analysis of the extent and subtlety implied by the exercise of an instrument, the comprehension of the need prompting the invention of the instrument is attained. Since no particular use of language can adequately reveal the total power or the complexity of this instrument, only an adequate comparison of various uses can reveal the nature of that which lies behind and gives existence to each and every use.

- (1) "Sed quia principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus; unde Philosophus dicit in III Coel. et Mundi, quod complementum artis et naturae est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis iudicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethic. (c. 8), quod sensus sunt extremi sicut intellectus principiorum; extrema appellans illa in quae fit resolutio iudicantis." De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 2. "Proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilibus. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinet cognoscantur; et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Dicit autem Philosophus, in III de Caelo, quod sicut finis facilitat scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum; faber enim non quarerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non quarerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum. Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret; et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in presenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales." S. T., I, q. 84, a. 8.
- From this we can gather that no grammatical theory or rule is worth more than the evidence given by the proper analysis of spoken or written language.

- (2) "loqui est a natura, sed loqui sic vel sic est ad plactum." St. Albert the Great, Quaestiones de Animalibus, p. 142, 60 (Vol. 12, Omnia Opera, ed. Cologne).

(1) Language is a manifestation. Each act of speaking has been and is an attempt to name and reveal what the speaker is talking about. Since language is not merely the use of language, we begin to realize the nature of language when we observe that there exists an abyss or gap that the speaker has to bridge between his experience or knowledge of reality and his actual expression of this experience. Each act of speaking bridges this gap, and, in doing so, reveals something about the speaker. That St. Albert the Great was extremely conscious of this point is indicated when he observed that a word is not only a symbolum rei, but also a symbolum loquentis (a sign manifesting not only the thing but also the speaker). (3) In order to communicate with himself or with others, the speaker has had to use something which nature did not provide, namely a means of expression. Man, a being endowed with reason and skill, has had to use and develop his innate skill in constructing a system of representation and expression. In other words, man, using his practical intellect (4)

- (1) "Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare." St. Thomas, S. T., I, q. 107, a. 1. Cf. II, Sent. II, part. 2, a. 3; De Veritate, q. 9, a. 4; I Cor. c. 13, 1. 1.
- (2) According to the adage, operatio sequitur esse; what a language is "doing" at a given moment is consequent upon what it can do.
- (3) St. Albert, De Sensu et Sensato, tr. 1 (Vol. 9, Omnia Opera, Borgnet ed.).
- (4) "Et sic ipsa formatio vocis est artificialis, prout est ad plactum diversorum quia propter diversos conceptus exprimendos diversae formantur voces." St. Albert, De Animalibus, p. 142, 47-50 (Vol. 12, ed. Col.).

(that is, intellect working under the efficient causality of the will to make something) has had to organize his imagination and his physical organs of sound production in order to express his thoughts, desires, and experiences to himself, and to transmit them to others. (1)

(1) After showing that man can create new instruments because by his will he can choose the most fitting matter to obtain an end, e.g. to make a knife that cuts well, man imposes the right form on iron or steel and not on gold or lead. Cajetan goes on to illustrate the basic reason why man can create language. "Non enim omnis anima collativa est, sed rationalis tantum. Isti igitur actus animae de quibus est sermo, scilicet enuntiare, manifestare, et representare, exiguunt in primis haec duo, scilicet signum et signatum. Nam oportet enuntiantem aliquo signo enuntiare, et similiter manifestantem, et representantem. Et exiguunt deinde collationem signi ad signatum. Alioquin non assumeretur magis unum quam aliud signum ad significandum tale quid. Concurrentibus autem ad manifestationis rationem duobus extremis, scilicet signo et signato, et collatione eorumdem, ut in littera dicitur, spectandum est quod inter bruta et rationalia haec est differentia in proposito quod brutis convertit manifestare affectus suos per signa; sic quod non conferunt signa signatis. Unde non eligunt ad significandum aliquid, magis unum signum quam aliud sed iuxta naturae instinctum quodlibet illorum signum profertur sui affectus manifestativum. Homines autem per signa sic manifestant quae in ipsis sunt, ut conferta ut quod sit idoneum signum ad tale quid significandum, nunc huc et tunc etc. Et propterea bruta affectus suos manifestant executive tantum. Autotum signa ad signata. Homines autem manifestant quae in ipsis sunt imperatively et directive. Et haec est differentia in littera intentio. Cum ergo dicitur, quid intelligit per ly intendunt, respondetur quod intelligit appetere animaliter: et quod manifestare eodem modo appetitur a brutis quo illis natum est convenire. Et quia non convertitur ab eis nisi executive, ideo non appetitur manifestatio actus nisi materialiter: quoniam de ratione manifestationis in actu exercito est collatio in actu exercito quae a brutorum cognitione et appetitu aliena est. Manifestant igitur bruta per signa affectus suos sicut naturalia operantur propter finem. Et quia non conferunt signa signatis, sicut nec naturalia media ad finem, ideo dicitur non appetere appetitu animali manifestare

As a practical test of the successful development of the means of expression, only success in transmitting ideas to others is capable of direct observation. The idea is transmitted if among the parts of the system of communication there is sufficient unity or coherence. Once the system becomes coherent, it reveals the quality of being a permanent institution, that is, an instrument which is supposed to suffice for an indefinite number of uses.

(1) In spite of the fact that permanence is a quality of language, man normally does not create immediately a perfect instrument. When experience and knowledge are limited, and the understanding of ends and the variety of means is foreshortened, it is only by a process of trial and error that any invention can be developed to a high degree of efficiency. So too, it is true that, historically, language as an artifact has gone through various radical changes as man has grown in knowledge and has struggled to express this knowledge

formaliter sicut nec unquam possunt manifestare formaliter." Comm. In S. T., II-II, q. 110, a. 1 (ed. Leon.). Thus as regards animal language, it is used by, but not created by the individual animal; the individual can speak only the language given by the species. The individual human does not use a language imposed by the species, but he forges his instrument by living in community.

(1) Even in speaking about the analogical speech of angels, St. Thomas distinguishes between the actual expression of ideas (locutio) and the power of expressing them (virtus exprimendi dicitur lingua). Cf. II Sent., d. 11, q. 2, a. 3. Language is opposed to the use of language in a way proportional to the distinction between a permanent habit and the intermittent operation which proceeds from it. This opposition, lost sight of in language research for several centuries after the Grammar of Port Royal, was reasserted by De Saussure in the terms langue-parole (cf. op. cit., p. 112). The opposition langue-discours

more and more effectively. By being improved, language has become more and more what it ought to be.

Since, in material things, organized complexity is a sign of <sup>(1)</sup>greater perfection, language has had to reveal its own perfection

by developing a more coherently rationalized organization of the elements of the system - both from the viewpoint of the imagination, which is the appropriate instrument of representation, and from the viewpoint of the physical organs of speech which are the appropriate instruments of expression.

Two of the signs of the perfection of an instrument are its readiness for use, and the ease of automatic or unconscious operation that it provides. For example, a good dancer never thinks about his feet when dancing, for too much consciousness of these instruments would interfere with the perfection of his performance. So, too, it must not be assumed that one who can speak a language is thereby

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(tongue-speech) proposed by Gustave Guillaume seems more satisfactory. (cf. Roch Valin, *Petite Introduction à la Psycho-mécanique du langage*, pp. 32-39).

- (1) As Aristotle pointed out in *III De Anima*, c. 13, 435 a 11, no simple body can be a living being. Material complexity is necessary for the existence of life. The complexity of matter is subservient to the power of the form. For more detailed discussion, cf. *II De Caelo*, c. 12, and St. Thomas, 1. 18. Also, S. T., I, q. 76, a. 5; *II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5; De Malo, q. 5, a. 5. St. Albert, *Q. de Animalibus*, pp. 78-80 (ed. Col.). "Universitas organorum necessaria est animali. Huius ratio est, quia quanto forma est perfectior, tanto in pluribus potest operationes." Organized complexity is the sign of a more perfect, more powerful and yet simple form. Cf. also De Ver., q. 8, a. 3, ad 12; S. T., I, q. 47, a. 1.

equipped to reflect consciously upon, and delineate readily, the conditions required to make his speaking possible; for language is an extremely complicated affair which can achieve many effects readily and delicately.

Among these conditions of language the organization of the imagination is the most necessary, and perhaps the one that the average person is least conscious of. As has already been pointed out, the imagination cannot go beyond or transcend quantity. If then the imagination has a special role to fulfill in the nature and functioning of language, <sup>(1)</sup>quantity as a condition of the imagination is thereby a necessary condition in the construction of language as the instrument by which a person knows how to say what he already

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- (1) For Aristotle, *vox est...* "cum imaginatione aliqua" 420b 31 (trans. Moerb.). Imagination is necessary for meaningful sounds uttered both by brutes and by man. But, if we apply the universal principle that *quod est in prius, servatur in posterius*, then it becomes clear that the role of the imagination in human speech is not to be neglected. Indeed the creative activity of the practical intellect will control the imagination. "Species ergo conceptae interiorius... secundum quod ordinantur ab intelligentie ut manifestandae alteri, habent rationem verbi, quod dicitur verbum cordis; secundum autem quod aptantur, et quodammodo ordinantur signis exterioribus apparentibus, si quidem sunt signa ad visum, dicuntur nuntius; si vero ad auditum, dicuntur proprie locutio vocalis" (*II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3). This adaptation and organization of concepts to be expressed by gestures or words involves an element of fiction; yet, since "fictio pertinet ad rationem; fingere enim est representare, quod est ratio[n]is solius, ut dicit Philosophus in sua *Poetria*" (De Malo, q. 8, a. 3, obj. 10), the practical intellect can form the external sounds called words only by using, and submitting to, the conditions of the imagination.

known. To give an immediate illustration of this, even though the full value cannot be completely obvious at this point: the axiom of geometry concerning whole and part finds a contracted application in the relationship which exists between the whole of speech and the parts of speech. The need for the contracted application of quantity is so great that when the grammarian begins to look for the genus and the differences by which to define nouns, verbs, adjectives, and so forth, he discovers that the genus is "part of speech". (1)

A sentence, or a speech (oratio, in Latin) is the whole which is more known than any of its parts; too, it is a whole whose nature is clearly revealed by division. All grammatical analysis takes as its proper starting pointing a whole, confusedly recognized, which can be known more clearly by dividing it into its parts. But the knowledge of whole and part comes from the imagination and senses. (2)

Furthermore, as already indicated above, the intellect must see all the meanings of whole and part in the imagination according to a perfect or imperfect representation. Ultimately, the need for the

(1) Logicians during the Middle Ages pointed out that the grammarian had to define the noun and verb by beginning with parts or relations as the genus, if the grammarian wanted to remain faithful to the method of defining proper to grammar. In logic, however, the noun and verb are defined with the expression *vox significativa*. Cf. St. Albert, *Comm. in Perihementas*, I. 1, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 12 b (Ed. Doyon).

(2) This is to state the obvious since all first principles come to man's intellect from the senses. Cf. S. T., I-II, 51, 1, where this particular principle is used as an example of the doctrine of Aristotle contained in the final chapters of the *Posterior Analytics*.

relation of whole and part is necessary not only for the grammatical analysis of language but also for the very development of language, prior to any scientific reflection on it.

At this point, one is in a position to realize that, just as a continuous whole exists prior to any of its individual constituent parts, so too a sentence, "a complete sentence", existed historically prior to any distinct part of speech. The order of being, by which a confused whole must exist prior to the independent actuality of any distinct part, is not to be refuted by the assertion that, analytically, from a distinct knowledge of the parts, we attain to a distinct knowledge of the whole. Historically, neither the noun nor the verb came first; since these parts of speech are parts, it is impossible that either could have existed prior to the sentence. (1) Both parts had to be preceded by the existence of a sentence which first contained them confusedly. No cook, for example, would ever bake only a piece of pie; he would bake a whole pie and then divide it into distinct parts; so too for language.

Thus, the history of language may be reduced to its essential aspects by saying that man, in creating language, had to struggle from the very beginning to succeed in the manipulation of whole sentences which, only subsequently, could be analyzed into their proper parts. It is redundant to speak of "whole sentences", for

(1) Noun and verb had to congenerated in a manner similar to the congeneration of matter and form in the generation of a composite.

a sentence is by nature a whole, something complete. The proper way to analyze language is not from the viewpoint of signification, but from the way of signifying. <sup>(1)</sup> The discovery of the proper parts into which the whole was to be divided was not an easy task. <sup>(2)</sup> The major radical steps exhibited in the development of language in terms of quantity - whole and part - seem to be three: 1. that of dividing sentences into syllables so that the monosyllable becomes the ultimate element of speech, and identifying function with syntactic position, such as the Chinese did with the ideogram playing an important role;

- (1) "Rationes significandi active, seu modi significandi activi, per se, et primo, ad grammatice pertinent, tanquam principia considerata in Grammatica", *Grammatica Speculativa*, p. 2 b. "Grammaticus circa signa principia litter versatur, non propter res quas significatur, sed De Usuris (the famous spurious opusculum) 73 formerly attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas), p. 140 of Part 2 of Vol. 17 of the Roman Edition of the *Opera*, 1570. "Quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non significantes substantiam, quantum ad modum significandi quem Grammatici considerant dicentes, nomen significare substantiam cum qualitate...", St. Thomas, *I Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2.

- (2) In the last one hundred years or so, linguists have been trying to classify and correlate languages according to certain recognized devices for changing the form and composition of words: inflection, agglutination and polysynthesis. Being more phonetic aspects of language than proper grammatical considerations, "they are closely related, and not always distinguishable" (Charlton Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 132). The manner of dividing languages that is outlined here has been proposed by Gustave Guillaume, who seems to have discovered the proper grammatical or linguistic criteria for explaining what is known to be the historical order in the development of the diverse sorts of languages. Most of his writing have not yet been published.

2. that of opposing consonants to vowels in order to contrast meaning and morphology (with syntax as an effect of morphology), as is characteristic of the Semitic languages; <sup>(1)</sup> 3. or, that of contrasting, without immediate reference to the oral aspect of language, meaning to grammatical function in such a way that function must be subdivided into parts of speech having respective functions. This latter is peculiar to the Indo-European languages, and from this basic viewpoint, it may be said that they are all equally perfect in <sup>(2)</sup> structure.

Language necessarily exists before it can be analyzed reflectively. Yet language exists because men had to reflect on their experience and knowledge to some degree in order to construct a system of representation which would enable men to communicate.

In other words, the history of the creation of language is the story of man acquiring experiences, thoughts, and desires about real things including himself and of his more or less adequate efforts in representing all of these. Philosophy, properly speaking, as well as logic can begin only when language has been sufficiently ordered to permit a consciously reflective knowledge and an expression of reflective knowledge. This last assertion is true because philosophy

- (1) For a brief exposé of Arabic as a model of the Semitic languages, see Roch Valin, *op. cit.*, p. 52-54. The rest of this essay deals with an analysis that is more proper to Indo-European.

- (2) It is impossible to insist too much on the little known truth that what constitutes the unity of Indo-European and gives it its strength is the discovery of the parts of speech, in the proper sense of the word.



as a science implies certitude not only about what we know but also about the fact that we know what we know. (1)

Before man can reflect on his knowledge of reality to assert that he knows with certitude, he must also reflect on his way of knowing to analyze the very conditions of his knowing and the very conditions of things as known. (2) Before man can reflect on the logical conditions of knowledge, he must be able to analyze with a certain degree of clarity his instrument, language, which because

(1) "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is." Aristotle, Post. Anal., 71 b 8 - 12.

(2) "Huius autem signum est, quod huiusmodi sapientiae et distinguentes scientiae repertae sunt postea, quam omnes artes ad utilitatem existentes et omnes scientiae administratae ad instructionem iam fuerunt partitae sive inventae, quoniam nisi artes civilitatem conservantes inventae fuissent, non fuisset habitum otium et libertas inquirendi, deficientibus necessariis vitae. Et nisi fuissent inventae scientiae administrantes ad instructionem, non fuisset habitus proprius inquirendi modus, et ideo illis non ante partem inutilem fuisset administrantis studium et inquirendi investigatio." St. Albert, In libro Metaphysicorum Primo, p. 15, 59-70 (Vol. 17, Ed. Col.).

(1) sensible is more easily known. Furthermore, since speech is an effect of man's unscientific grasp of reality, it exists prior to, and is a condition of, his attainment of science. The analyzing of speech is the only and proper starting point for the discovery of logic which alone makes it possible for man to possess scientific knowledge. Thus language and knowledge of language are conditions sine qua non of the human possession of science and wisdom.

The second objection is now answered: The nature of the naming process and of language is something non-temporal, though its exercise is temporal. Language is not the use of language; history will record its use. The grammarian attempts to discover the nature of language as revealed by its exercise. The logician accepts language as a starting point to discover the laws of thought that are canons of things as known.

(1) St. Albert mentions explicitly that logic does not accept certain definitions from grammar, the preceding science; cf. footnote (1), page 20. Note also that in the scientific sermocinales, the sciences that deal with words: grammar, logic, rhetoric and poetics, grammar is the first to be studied and opposes the other three because it does not treat directly with the meanings of words but only with the way the meaning is conveyed. Cf. St. Albert, In De Praedicabilibus, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 10 a-b (Ed. Doyon). From the viewpoint of the meaning of words, poetica est infima doctrina; cf. St. Thomas, S. 1., I, q. 1, a. 9, obj. 1. Though the spurious opusculum De Usuris (cf. footnote (1), page 22) asserts that Logicum nominamus qui de sermonibus et scriptis qualitercumque considerat, it does not seem clear that St. Thomas intended to include grammar in his expression scientific logic in his Expositio in Metaphysicorum, nos 32, 57. Nevertheless the Greek source of Logicals may be translated by sermocinales.

Thus it is seen how language goes beyond history and is of proper interest to the grammarian and the logician. Once it is observed that language has to be analyzed prior to the very existence of logic as a science, it is easy to see what the logician accepts from the grammarian. A particular language is an actualized means of signifying or expressing knowledge, for the simple reason that, being coherent, it works more or less well according to the degree to which the mode of signifying is explicitly developed. Only by developing this point extensively could it be shown that the incompatibility between the Chinese language and Aristotelean logic is due to an extreme vagueness regarding the parts of speech so that the Chinese language cannot properly present an argument in syllogistic form. As an analogy, it might be noted that an infant possesses reason but not the use of reason and consequently the logic of Aristotle is not applicable to his inadequate state of intellectual development. Aristotelean logic can be applied only in a language system where the parts of speech are explicitly developed; this is not a weakness of logic but rather of the language system.

The grammarian, knowing that his own science of grammar has limitations, can analyze this or that particular language in the light of proper principles intrinsic to the mode of signifying; he can provide proper definitions of such things as noun and verb and can give a limited number of demonstrations regarding their proper passions, e.g. the grammarian can show from the proper definition of a substantive noun that it possesses as a proper passion the ability to be modified by an adjective. The logician, on the contrary, can

analyze the mode of signifying in the light of principles that are proper to the mode of knowing. Another way of stating this contrast is as follows: the grammarian analyzes the relationships between words insofar as words involve an arbitrary and artificial union between the vocal sign and what it signifies; the logician is interested in the relationships which exist between words as signs of the necessary relationships between ideas; he uses words to discover these relationships. Because of a relationship of cause and effect, the logician can reason from the effect in language to a sufficient and necessary cause in knowing. <sup>(1)</sup> The grammarian himself cannot analyze language as an effect; consequently, the mode of knowing as a cause of language is not a proper interest to him.

As a corollary to this discussion, it can be seen that logic is independent of grammar in the way that a cause is independent of its effect; logic is prior in the order of being. <sup>(2)</sup> Further, in the way that grammar is dependent upon logic, logic itself is dependent on the mode of being; that is, in as much as it is subsequent to the mode of being, the mode of knowing is related as effect to cause. Once again, it is seen that, since the mode of knowing is an effect, its adequate analysis is a necessary preliminary step to the philosophical analysis of reality. But the philosophical analysis of reality itself is achieved by the theoretical sciences which are

(1) "Omnis virtus signi est ex virtute significati secundum quod huiusmodi". St. Albert, *De Sacramentis*, p. 163, 91 (Vol. 26, Ed. Col.).

(2) "Modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi". Cf. footnote (1), page 3.

## CHAPTER TWO

### PLACING THE PROBLEM OF THE WORD MODUS

The Latin word modus seems to be a rather nebulous term;

perhaps the English and French equivalents are still greater mysteries. In certain philosophical problems, its very vagueness leads to abuse.

Nevertheless it is an extremely opportune word, and those who study philosophy find themselves constrained to use it constantly. The frequency of its appearance is sufficient reason to justify a careful study of its earliest usages. This thesis presents an evaluation of the implications of some of its uses, which were employed up to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. As to be expected, its occurrence in his works cannot be divorced from the stream of thought and the stream of language which had preceded him.

Several passages from St. Augustine, St. Albert, St. Thomas, as well as from a few modern writers need to be presented in order to focus the attention of the reader sharply on the variety of philosophical problems implied by this word.

First should be noted the brief definition of modus which

is found in the scarcely doubtful opusculum De Propositionibus Modali-  
libus :

Quia propositio modalis a modo dicitur, ad sciendum quid sit propositio modalis, oportet prius scire quid sit modus. Est autem determinatio ad-

jacens rei... (1)

This definition, literally translated as "a determination which lies next to a thing", seems to be simple and straight forward; but it does not reveal the clear, vivid meaning and sentiments which would have been felt by one whose mother tongue was Latin as spoken in the time of Plautus or Cicero.

What does this brief definition seemingly have to do with the fifth question asked in the Prologue of the Scriptum Super Sententias Magistri Petri Lombardi : utrum modus procedendi sit artificialis, and the answer of St. Thomas Aquinas, which begins with this observation : modus cuiusque scientiae debet inquiri secundum conditiones materiae.

Even though the word was used extensively in the era of pagan Latin, it cannot be overlooked that one of the most important influences which intensified its use in the works of Christian writers was the following passage in the Old Testament (Book of Wisdom, XI, 21) :

(1) Listed by Père Mandonnet, O.P., as an opusculum viæ dubium in his collection Opuscula Omnia, vol. IV, pp. 505-507. Vernon J. Bourke, Thomistic Bibliography 1920-1940, p. 9, accepts it as authentic and lists it first in the chronological list of St. Thomas' works with the date : 1244-45 ? However, in the 1962 French edition of Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Angelus Walz, O.P., places it as late as 1272-73. I have never seen the critical edition by Boehmsd, O.P., published in 1945.

*Sed et sine his uno spiritu poterant occidi, persecutionem passi ab ipsis factis suis, et dispersi per spiritum virtutis tuae, sed omnia in mensura, et numero, et pondere dispositi.*

In commenting on this passage, St. Augustine explained the trilogy of mensura, numerus and pondus by the three words modus, species and ordo, along with the trinity of verbs terminare, formare and ordinare. In doing so, he established a way of speaking that was extensively discussed throughout the Middle Ages.

*Secundum id vero, quod mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit, ille primus et veraciter et singulariter ista est, qui terminat omnia, et format omnia et ordinat omnia.* (1)

Discussing the question of how traces of the Trinity are found in creatures, Peter Lombard replaced the word modus by unitas :

*Haec enim quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt, et speciem, et ordinem.* (2)

In passing, it may be noted that here may exist the possible source for a difficult statement made in the second objection of the sixth article of De Veritate and accepted by St. Thomas as true in the response : ratio unius consistit in modo, the notion of unity consists in mode.

- (1) St. Augustine, IV de Genesi ad litteram, c. 3, n. 7. Omnia Opera, Vol. 7, p. 113 (Ed. Firmin-Didot).

- (2) Found in the text of Pierre Lombard, Dist. 3 of Book One of the Sentences, heading St. Thomas' Commentary, p. 145, Vol. 9 (sec. Ed. Ven.).

In explaining the traces of the Trinity, St. Thomas himself tells us that the word mensura pertains to the terminationem principiorum sub esse creati . . . ; ita quod in ista terminatione sumatur et terminatio in esse et in operari et in omnibus aliis...

In this context the notion of mensura is included in the notion of modus, which pertains to the principia determinata sub esse principii... Further on St. Thomas notes that the notion of modus itself is implied in the notion of unity which pertains ad suam determinationem prout ex principiis constituta est... (1)

At this point, it is not implied that these passages are easy to understand; rather these few citations show that even in his earliest writings St. Thomas accepted centuries of tradition in his acceptance and use of the word modus. Writing his Summa Theologiae later in his career, St. Thomas maintained the word with equal consistency and gravity. It is impossible to speak of creaturely goodness without using the word modus :

*In eundem quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, in quantum est perfectum; sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur : ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et ea, quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexistit autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam : hoc significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit.* (2)

- (1) St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 3, q. 2, a. 2.

- (2) S. T., I, q. 5, a. 5. Cf. De Ver., q. 21, a. 6.

One might ask how much the meaning of the word modus has been affected by its long association with a particularly theological tradition. What justifies the tradition? Was it a mere whim, a supernatural theological reason, or the normal, natural meaning of the words used that enabled St. Augustine to equate mensura to modus?

The effort to justify the use of the word modus by transliterating it into English or French by the word mode is futile, because the literary borrowing is colorless. The English word (or French) is meaningless except to the degree that it is associated as a synonym with 'manner', 'fashion', and 'way'. 'Manner' is derived ultimately from manus, consequently a characteristic way of using one's hands; 'fashion' comes from facere, consequently a particular way of making something; 'way' is derived from the same root as the Latin verb vehor, veli vectus sum, and the noun via; consequently, it implies the way of attaining a destination. None of these three synonyms is of great help in showing why modus is related to the notions of 'measure' and 'unity'. To the degree that in the texts cited above modus is transliterated by 'mode', one cannot assume that they have been properly comprehended.

It is proposed in this thesis that all the intellectual light needed for these passages can be obtained by translating the word modus with the English word 'size'. This word 'size' is pregnant with meaning for the English mind because it is a word that belongs to every phase of speech including even childhood vocabulary. It contains all the notions necessary to justify the equation of modus to mensura. Size implies measure.

However, there are other passages which seem less apt to allow the translation of modus by 'size'. What does St. Thomas mean when he writes:

aliquid dicitur modificari aliquo dupliciter. vel formaliter, et sic res dicitur modificari suo modo, qui in ipsa est. Vel effective et sic omnia modificantur ab eo qui modum rebus imponit; et hinc est quod Deus dicitur effective, modus omnium rerum. (1)

Again, the word modus sometimes refers to the circumstances of the human act in general and at other times to some circumstances in particular. In the following passage, St. Thomas speaks of a proper and non-proper acceptance of the word:

Discendum quod modus rei est in ipsa re consequens substantiam ejus. Et quia quaedam circumstantiae sumuntur ab eo quod est extra rem, quaedam vero ab ipsa specie actus - quae duo ad modum non pertinent - ideo in modo non includitur omnia alia circumstantia, si modus proprie accipitur. (2)

Even for these texts it is maintained that the meaning intended by St. Thomas can be accurately and clearly understood only by a proper understanding of an analogy implied by the English word 'size'. The fact that the analogical meaning of 'size' has remained relatively unexploited has given rise to much unjustifiable mystery about the texts of St. Thomas. Yet, because it may be difficult to appreciate the possibility of an analogy, it must not be assumed that an analogy

(1) I Sent., d. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.

(2) IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 4.

did not exist and was not utilized by the Latin people with the word modus.

Though both men admitted that the word modus implied mensura, St. Thomas and St. Albert could rationalize certain uses in different ways. In considering the virtue of modesty and the reason for its name, the two doctors assign the denomination from different viewpoints. On the one hand, St. Thomas explains :

*Dicendum quod nomen commune quandoque appropriatur his quae sunt infima, sicut nomen commune angelorum appropriatur infimo ordini angelorum. Ita etiam et modus, qui communiter observatur in qualibet virtute, appropriatur specialiter virtuti quae in minimis modum ponit. (1)*

The name of the genus is reserved for the lowest species when its meaning is relatively imperfect in comparison with the names of the higher species. So according to this, it must be assumed that the word modus contains some imperfection which allows it to name the inferior species of temperance. On the other hand, for St. Albert the word modus seems to designate that which constitutes temperance itself.

*Sed quarto modo [modus] dicit modificationem eius quod difficillimum est modificare, et ibi habet rationem specialis virtutis. Omnis enim virtus habet determinari a difficillimo suae materiae sicut fortitudo a periculo mortis. Unde sic modus singulariter coverit temperantiae, et a difficultate ultima, scilicet modificandi in delectabilibus,*

(1) S. T., II-II, q. 160, a. 1, ad 1.

*temperantia habet rationem virtutis, quia virtus est ultimum potentiae in re, cuius est virtus... (1)*

Are these positions contradictory, or is there some way of conciliating these two explanations ?

Another problem which involves the word modus is that concerning the nature of the modal distinction. Most modern textbooks written *ad mentem Sancti Thomae* fail to give any satisfactory reason for the word modalis. Even a rapid reading of such an article as  Suarez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction Between Essential Being and Existential Being,<sup>(2)</sup> gives the impression that if greater pains had been taken to distinguish more carefully the various meanings of the word modus, the relationship and distinction between essence and existence might have been more easily grasped during the centuries that have elapsed since the time of St. Thomas.

One Dominican noted this need for a study of the word itself :

Despite the importance of modes in speculative thought and the validity of their existence, there still remains to be set forth by scholastic philosophy a universally accepted treatment of their nature and origin. (3)

- (1) St. Albert, *De Bono*, p. 119, 28-36 (Vol. 28, Ed. Col.).
- (2) By Norman J. Well, *The New Scholasticism*, Vol. 36, 4 (1962), pp. 119-1111.
- (3) Robert Reginald Masterson, O.P., "Sacramental Graces : Modes of Sanctifying Grace", *The Thomist*, Vol. 18 (1955), p. 333.

With this remark, it can be seen that Father Masterson judges even the chapter on modes written by the famous Père Hugon as inadequate. (1) He further maintains that

in part the lack of such a doctrine... has impeded the development and evolution of any clear exposition regarding the influence of sacramental causality on the ensuing effect.... (2)

Because of the limits of his own thesis, the author of Sacramental Graces : Modes of Sanctifying Grace does not present an exhaustive treatment of modality. He merely proposes an exposition hoped to be "adequate to render acceptable the solution" which he proposes. From a series of various texts he synthesizes the following explanation :

A mode is a determination of a form, which determination implies a transcendental relation to its extrinsic causes, namely material and efficient, and though the mode is identified with the thing it modifies, it is formally distinct. (3)

No initial attempt was made by Father Masterson to decide if the

- (1) Edvard Hugon, O.P., Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, Vol. III, Metaphysica, De Accidente modali, p. 543-548. Even Thomas Harper, S.J., The Metaphysics of the School, Vol. I, pp. 70-73, Vol. II, 726-729, did not realize the importance of retracing the meaning of the word modus. Assuming that everything knew the meaning of the word, he goes on to analyze the reality involved. This work first published in 1888 was reprinted : New York, Peter Smith, 1940.

(2) Masterson, Ibid.

(3) Ibid., p. 342.

word had various impositions; as such, his method of attaining the above definition is inaccurate, that is to say, unscientific. Even though he acknowledges the all important fact that he was attempting to delimit an analogical term, there was no statement of the proper notion and of the other derivative meanings. For analogy is primarily a question of the meanings of one word and is always a question of the prior and posterior meanings. (1) Is the above definition a proper or common notion ? If neither, what is it ? What distinguished the proper from the common ? Because of this neglect to distinguish, his theological discussion lacks a proper logical presentation. Only his faith in the texts of St. Thomas saves him. Furthermore, by using the expression 'transcendental relation', he jeopardizes the clarity of St. Thomas thought by using a non-Thomistic way of speaking definitively accepted by John of St. Thomas. (2) By anticipating the solution presented in this thesis, it can be advanced here that certain analogical uses of the word modus as found in the works of St. Thomas cannot be explained by speaking of "transcendental relations". Distinctions must be made on the basis of real or rational relationships, and relativa secundum esse et secundum dici.

- (1) "Quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. S. T., I, q. 16, a. 6.

(2) The principal contentions held by A. Krempel, La Doctrine de la Relation chez Saint Thomas, seem valid. They indicate one of the main weaknesses of John of Saint Thomas, who often asserts as univocal words which are analogical, e. g. signum.

The doctrine of modus penetrates the thought of St. Thomas so thoroughly that even texts wherein the word itself does not appear must be subject to close logical analysis before their proper interpretation is assured. The following text, which does not use the word, is essential to any discussion of the modal nature of grace :

*Discendum quod ratio sacramentalis gratiae se habet ad gratiam communiter dictam sicut ratio speciei ad genus. Unde sicut non aequivoce dicitur animal communiter dictum et pro homine sumptum, ita non aequivoce dicitur gratia communiter sumpta et gratia sacramentalis. (1)*

A different and more recent discussion than that of Father Masterson's has brought modus into current philosophical and theological literature in relation to the works of St. Thomas.

In an article "Created Personality", the Dominican, Father Mulaney, (2) tries to harmonize the position of Capreolus on personality with that of Cajetan who utilizes the term modus. Since he has space only for an abbreviated study of modus, his lack of proper logical procedure in dealing with the analogy of the term endangers the truth of the solution that he presents concerning the explanation of personality as a mode and the analogy of personality between God and creatures.

(1) S. T., III, q. 62, a. 2, ad 3.

(2) Thomas U. Mulaney, O.P., "Created Personality", The New Scholasticism, Vol. 29, (1955), p. 369-403.

In reply, the Jesuit, Father Reichman published "The Created Person". (1) He criticizes Father Mulaney's synthesis and denies the identity of the two positions and, in doing so, claims that Cajetan has introduced an alien notion of modus into the discussion of personality. However, not realizing the need for correct logical procedure, Father Reichman does not take sufficient pains to clarify the meaning of modus nor to determine if a doctrine of modus might be implicit in certain problems without the word itself actually appearing in context; too he does not question the expression 'transcendental relation' :

In neither St. Thomas nor Capreolus is there any evidence that in writing on the problem of created person the terms "mode" or "transcendental relation" were used. (2)

This rapid survey of a few texts from St. Thomas and of several problems which the great commentators and certain modern Thomists have tried to solve in the light of some remarks on modus by St. Thomas reveals that his doctrine is not so clear as might be first assumed from a casual reading of the more important texts. Wherein lies the greatest difficulty in discovering his thought? It should now be evident that the principal defect made in most of the recent studies lies in the general lack of organization of the various meanings of the word modus according to an order of the first and most known sense in the Latin language.

(1) James B. Reichmann, S.J., "The Created Person", The New Scholasticism, Vol. 33 (1959), p. 1-31, p. 202-230.

(2) Ibid., p. 228.



It must be kept in mind that when notions are related as a genus to a species, man knows the genus before he knows the species. In the case where the genus and species are designated by different names, such as 'animal' and 'man', the two words have each a proper notion used univocally. And even in the case where the same name is reserved for the genus and one of the species, such as 'animal', the genus and 'animal' the inferior species, the proper notion of the genus is known first. Yet the proper notion of the genus must not be confused with the community of the genus.

On the contrary, when one word, such as ars, is analogical, the passage from the common to the proper does not apply. The proper notion has to be distinguished first, and then various other impositions may be seen to decline from this starting point. The only way to recognize the common notion (which is not the community of a genus) is to observe its discord with an already known proper notion. It is the element of discord between the first and second impositions that is important; until it is recognized, a word is assumed to be univocal.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that, even though it does most of the time, the Latin expression multipliciter dicitur does not necessarily imply an analogical term. The opening lines of the chapter on Qualities in Aristotle's Categories are the principal example: Qualitatem autem dico, secundum quam quales quidam dicuntur. Est autem qualitas eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur. St. Albert, following the strong comments of Boethius, interprets

the expression as referring to a univocal term. The problem arises in this context because the genus of quality is immediately divided into four species, and not two.

Est autem qualitas secundum quod sic in communi accipitur ut praedicamentum, de numero eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur. Non autem sic dicitur multipliciter, ut aequivocum, vel analogum quod per prius et posterius dicitur, sed est multipliciter dictum ut genus, quod per diversas differentias in ea dividitur quae sunt sub ipso aequaliter, ita quod aequae exeunt ab ipso, et non unum per aliud. Sic enim sunt quatuor genera vel species qualitatis, quorum nullum per alterum participat qualitatis praedicationem, et ideo species qualitatis ab hoc communi quod est qualitas exeunt ut multitudo. (1)

This passage is important because elsewhere the word qualitas can be used analogically; in which case this term covers only the first, third and fourth species of quality. The word quality is multipliciter dictum in both senses of the word: first, each of the four

- (1) St. Albert, Comm. in Praedicamenta, tr. 5, c. 2, p. 142 a-b (Ed. Doyon).

Note also Boethius: "Proponit qualitatem multipliciter dici, quae res traxit aliquos in errorem, ut eis suspicio nasceretur Aristotelem credere qualitatem aequivocè nominari. Nam si omnis aequivocatio multipliciter dicitur, qualitas autem secundum Aristotelem ipsa quoque multipliciter appellatur, secundum Aristotelem nomen qualitatis aequivocum est. Nos vero defendimus multipliciter dici, esse non una tantum significatione nominari. Dicitur enim aliquid multipliciter dici, cum et aequivocè dicitur, et diverso modo de suis speciebus multipliciter praedicatur. Et communis est multiplex appellatio, etiam in his nominibus quae veluti genera de speciebus dicuntur, velut aequivoca de subiectis. Namque et animal multipliciter dicitur. Nam si multae sint species quae animalia subiectae sunt, ipsum quoque multipliciter quodammodo nominatur. Istam autem multiplicationem, non ad aequivocationem retulisse Aristotelem, sed potius ut qualitatem genus esse proponeret, illa res monstrat, quod ait, et una quidem species qualitatis habitus affectioque dicitur." In Categorias Aristotelis, liber III, col. 241, Vol. 64, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Paris, Migne, 1891.

species of quality is a quality univocally, because there is no prius and posterius; secondly, there are instances where a prius and posterius must be considered. Thus we see that the expression multipliciter dictum indicates something analogical only where there is a prius and posterius to be found. (1)

This enables us to state a fundamental law of the proportional use of terms. According to St. Thomas, although the parts of a univocal division are coequal according to the notion of the genus, one may precede the other in reality; on the other hand, in the analogical or proportional parts of a division, one always precedes another both according to the notion and according to reality. The precedence or priority according to notion indicates a priority in the order of knowledge, both in the order which exists between the senses and the intellect and the order which exists within the intellect itself. (2)

Among the present day-writers who have discussed modus, only Father Guy Picard, S.J., has approached the word by attempting to discover the proper order among the various meanings. In commenting on St. Thomas' delineation of quality as a mode of substance, he writes :

- (1) In beginning his commentary on the word quale in the Metaphysics (1020a 33), St. Albert notes : "Quale igitur hoc modo communi sumptum dicitur multipliciter per analogiam;" see Ihb. 5, tr. 3, c. 6, p. 264-266; also the commentary of St. Thomas, lect. 16.
- (2) Cf. S. T., I-II, 61, 1, ad 1; 2 Sent., d. 42, 1, 3, c.; 3 Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1; q. 1, ad 2; De Malo, q. 7, 1, ad 1.

Cette définition du mode est tirée de saint Augustin : "mensura omni rei modum praefigit". Elle n'est pas facile à traduire. Nous dirions : "Le mode, c'est ce que la mesure prétermine". Le mot mode, au sens premier, paraît désigner la mesure elle-même, une mesure concrète, un étalon matériel (v.g. le pied-de-roi). Il semble donc que saint Augustin soit allé plus loin, qu'il se soit rendu compte que cette mesure était elle-même mesurée par une loi positive, par une convention, par la nature... Bref, le mode est une mesure à son tour mesurée par autre chose; "quem mensura praefigit". (1)

Father Picard is mistaken, as shall be seen, in his conjecture on the order of usage which this word actually underwent. Nevertheless, he has recognized that, before determining the more abstract usage of a word, it is important to trace its basic usage in common language.

The problems cited in this chapter are only a few of the many which will continue to be discussed fruitfully until an accurate study of the history of the word modus has been made and understood. All attempts to use this word without a comprehension of its everyday Latin meaning are charged with danger because the word, extremely vague to us, constantly offers promise of great depth of meaning. The danger can be surmounted only when we justify this vagueness as

- (1) Guy Picard, S.J., "Puissance Naturelle et Qualité Passible", Sciences Ecclésiastiques, Vol. 9, (1957), p. 129-145.

(1) arising from a solid core of meaning.

(1) "A terminology is useful exactly because it is fluid at the edges, no less than because its centre is clear and definite." (italics in the original text). This interesting observation by a modern author reviewing the history of Analytical Philosophy states precisely the value and necessity of the analogical or proportional use of words. Cf. "Analytical Philosophy" by Dr. John Hollaway, p. 35, in The New Outline of Modern Knowledge, edited by Alan Pryce-Jones. London, Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1956.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### ON THE HISTORY OF THE WORD MODUS

##### 1. - Glancing at a few dictionaries

A rapid glance at a few of the available Latin-English dictionaries will reveal the vagaries encountered. Scanlon and Scanlon in their Second Latin, which is an introduction to philosophical and theological texts, give only the word 'manner' as a translation of modus. This sort of dictionary is too brief to be useful.

(2)

John T. White in his Latin Dictionary states that the Latin word is probably akin to the Sanskrit root \*Mā-, which signifies metri. For him, it refers immediately to the 'measuring thing'; hence its first proper meaning is a 'measure' or 'standard' by which anything is measured. The second meaning by metonymy includes the notion of : 1. 'measurement', 'extent' and 'size'; as well as 2. 'quantity'. In its application the word can refer to the 'rhythm', 'time', 'quantity' of words; the 'notes', 'tunes', 'melody', 'strains' of music; the 'measure', 'meter', or 'verses' of poetry. Finally, it has the sense of 'moderation', a 'proper' or 'due measure', 'bounds' or 'limit'. Consequent upon these meanings, the word can also signify a 'way', 'manner', 'method'; 'sort' or 'kind'.

(1) Cora Carroll Scanlon and Charles L. Scanlon, Second Latin, p. 254.

(2) John T. White, A Complete Latin-English and English-Latin Dictionary, p. 384.

The various senses are all given in the above listing, but the essential question to be asked is whether the proper meaning and the meaning by metonymy are correctly stated? Has Mr. White truly detected what the word first meant to the Latin mind?

Harper's Latin Dictionary is an older but still standard

translation of Freund's Latin-German Lexicon (the source of Thell's Latin-French Lexicon in three volumes), it correctly recognizes the root \*MED -. It goes on to assign to it the meaning as a 'measure with which, or according to which, any thing is measured'. As for the word modus, the dictionary gives two first meanings without distinction: the 'measure of' and 'the size of' the things measured. Is this interpretation superior to that of White where 'size' is a significant only by metonymy? Does Harper give a truer picture of the initial meaning of the word? His listing of all the secondary usages need not detain us here.

In the old edition of the famous Latin Lexicon by Forcellini, the word modus was stated to be a nomen Latentis originis. Following his personal opinion that the word modus might come from the Greek word ὁδός, 'way or road', Forcellini gives the four following principal senses :

- 1) Modus proprie et universim est ratio, via, forma, qua fit aliquid; modo, manera, foggia, guisa.

(1) Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A New Latin Dictionary : Harper's Latin Dictionary, p. 1156.

- 2) Modus est etiam mensura, quantitas, misura, quantitas; qui sensus a quibusdam primarius putatur.
- 3) Modus est item finis, terminus, intra quem si consistas, medicritas servatur; terminus, fine, regola, medicritas, moderazione.
- 4) Modus vel modi verborum apud Grammaticos sunt diversae eorum inclinationes, per quas varios animi affectus significamus, ut indicativus, imperativus, optativus, etc... (1)

In this work, the meanings of measure and quantity are put in second place even though the Renaissance Latin scholar has taken pains to mention that others disagree with him. It is curious to observe

that the vaguest meaning of the word has been put in first place.

Forcellini would not have been conjectured such an etymology if he had known that the rough aspirate in Greek is frequently the remnant of an initial sigma that has been lost. Actually the Greek word *ὄσος* comes from a root, \*SED-. Modern linguists know also that, if a word is common to Latin and Greek, the initial m is conserved in both languages, e.g. *mater* - *μήτηρ*.

- (1) *Aegidius Forcellinus, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon* (Ed. 1875),  
T. IV, p. 154-155.

Another famous early dictionary gives us the translation of modus in eight languages: Calpurnius, *Dictionary of Latin*, Vol. II, p. 70a: "Modus, di, Temperatio, modocritas, ratio. 丁 丁 derach, 丁 tielok, mamach 丁 me-ndatath 丁 丁 moov, Fal. moyen, manière, & façon, mesure, règle, fin. Ital. Modo, misura, regola. Germ. Mass. Hisp. Manera, medida. Angl. a manner, fashion or measure."

In the edition of 1711 the following sentence is added: "Scalliger censet esse a μέσσην curro." Modern Linguistics knows that there is a relation between the two words, but the Latin word does not come from the Greek word. Cf. Iaddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, (9th Ed.), under μέσσην.

The most discouraging of dictionaries is the untidy Lexicon of St. Thomas. Though it is true that the editors have devoted three and a half columns to a synopsis, the citations are arranged according to five major significations which overlap so much that one can readily believe that the foundation for the division is non-existent :

- 1) measure, quantity
- 2) a way, manner, method, according to which something is or happens, synonym of ratio and processus.
- 3) scientific manner or method, scientific procedure, modus sciendi seu procedendi, see under 1, synonym of processus, ratio, and via.
- 4) Mod or mode in the grammatical sense, e.g., a form of the verb.
- 5) manner in the realm of logic. (1)

It is hard to perceive any profound differences between sections three and five since it pertains to the realm of logic to teach scientific procedure. Certainly in English it is wrong to restrict the word 'mode' merely to a grammatical sense, as suggested in section four. Furthermore, St. Thomas uses the word modus in such ways that it can readily be translated by 'limit', 'bounds', 'due measure', 'moderation' and 'capacity'. It is out of the question that the editors would have thought of the word 'size'. Finally, if any degree of genuine clarity is to be had, some distinction should have been made between 'measure' and 'quantity', listed as synonyms in section one.

(1) R. J. Deferrari, Sister M. Inviolata Barry, Ignatius McQuinn, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, III, 696 sq. St. Thomas employs nineteen derivatives from modus besides many compounds.

Citing one Latin-French dictionary, that of Felix Gaffiot, will be sufficient to show that the same difficulty is presented to French students. In this book, the first meaning assigned is "mesure [avec quoi on mesure quelque chose]". The second is "mesure, étendue, dimension". The famous French dictionary by André Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie is of no value in trying to arrive at a meaning of the word mode primarily because it maintains as one of its basic principles the refusal to give any consideration to the etymologies of words. (2) Paul Foulquié's Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique derives the French mode from its Latin source modus, stating that the latter has four meanings : 1. mesure de surface; 2. mesure à ne pas dépasser, modération; 3. manière de se conduire; 4. manière, façon de faire. (3) But even here perhaps the first meaning cited maintains the hidden equivocation that is at the very roots of the mystery of the word modus.

Up to this point, reference has been only to that sort of

- (1) Felix Gaffiot, Dictionnaire illustré latin-français (1934), p. 967. (The new edition was not available for comparison).
- (2) André Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie. Cf. its introduction as well as the introduction of the work given in the next reference.
- (3) Paul Foulquié (with the collaboration of Raymond Saint-Jean), Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique, p. 445. This author does not list the TLL in his bibliography; hence he seems to neglect its extreme importance.

dictionary which may be consulted by the student of philosophy in an average American or Canadian college. The purpose of choosing this particular starting point has been to reveal the inadequacies of the ordinary intellectual tools at hand. Greater attention, as this thesis tries to make clear, must be paid to the scholarly research made available by such specialized intellectual instruments as the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* by Ernout and Meillet. The fact that this sort of work cannot be read intelligently without a special initiation should not be a deterrent, for this dictionary illustrates marvelously how the names and terms employed in philosophy are constantly derived from sensible reality. Another dictionary which puts to admirable use the knowledge of Indo-European is the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, whose first fascicle was published in 1900 and whose latest fascicle containing research on modus appeared in 1958. It is only in this latter dictionary that there is found an adequate treatment of the historical order of the first meaning of modus. Its scholarly survey covers nearly seventeen columns (each eighty-five lines long) of citations bearing on the usage of this word in early, classical and silver Latin. What is important is the fact that the first meaning does not refer to the measure, but rather to the object measured. This first meaning, it seems, can only be adequately rendered by the English word size. Emphasis must be placed on the absence of any precise synonym of size in German, French, Italian, or Spanish; nor does Greek, either classical or modern, contain such a term.<sup>1</sup> The lacuna left in these languages

may be the explanation of the equivocation found in so many dictionaries, including even that of Ernout and Meillet.

The use of modus in Latin and size in English is at once so simple and elementary, and so vast and complicated, that, unless one grasps the elements essential to distinguish the different senses, the possibility of correctly organizing the many senses is slight.

It can safely be assumed here that for the average English speaking person the meaning of 'size' is so obvious that in his eyes it never needs to be carefully defined; in fact, it is strange that the word is used in a large variety of situations and yet those who use it are never at a loss to know what they are talking about. Neither its simplicity nor its complicated usage seems to endanger the certitude and precision with which it is used. A similar situation seems to have been true for the Latin word modus.

The first definition given by the TLL is extensio metiendo definita, 'the extension of something as completely known by measuring.'<sup>(1)</sup> Before an analysis of this definition can be presented, a systematic outline of the mass of valuable evidence by the TLL is imperative; then, for the rest of the thesis, quotations which best illustrate the various meanings can be used with less danger of misinterpretation. The abundance of the source material does not render any easier the organization of the impositions that are

(1) *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, Vol. 6, Fasc. 6, p. 1252-1280. It will be referred to by the letters TLL. The proofs of the section on modus were kindly sent to me by the editors of TLL before the normal publication date.

important to philosophy; nevertheless an attempt can be made to satisfy the needs of the metaphysician when he scrutinizes the meanings of word in approaching the subject of his science. (1)

### Outline of the Meanings of *Modus*

Caput Prins : idem quod mensura.

#### I. notione primaria

- A. sensu strictiore idem quod extensio metiendo definita (non ubique certe distinguitur a sensu latiore.)
  1. proprie de locorum vel corporum spatii :
    - a. respicitur potius notio extensionis :
      - I) de spatiis porrectis :
        - I) pertinet ad areas :
          - A) de agris, terris.
          - B) de caeli spatii, sideribus.
        - II) pertinet ad longitudoines : Variarum rerum.
          - generatim.
          - specialiter de distincta.
      - potius idem quod finis.
    - β. pertinet ad res, quae vasis mensurantur :
      - I) ad liquoros (interdum fere idem quod quantitas).
      - II) ad frumenta.
      - III) in praecceptis medicorum de quantitate specierum sive liquidarum sive aridarum, sive vasis sive ponderis mensuratis.
  - b. respicitur potius notio definiendi mensuram fere idem quod circumscriptio quantitatis, quae mensurantur :
    - α. generaliter.
    - β. specialiter :
      - I) pertinet ad spatia porrecta :
        - A) pertinet ad ambitum rerum et longarum et altarum :
          - B) pertinet ad areas : de agris.
          - C) pertinet ad longitudoines.
        - II) pertinet ad liquoros.
        - III) pertinet ad res, quae vel vasis vel pendendo mensurantur.
2. Translate de spatiis cogitatis (interdum vergit ad sensum latiore) :
  - α. pertinet ad rationes artis musicae :
    - α. de vocum modulatione idem quod μέλος vel de tonorum constitutionibus. (non ubique certe distinguitur a notione rhythmici).
    - β. de tonorum intervallis.

(1) It is not to be forgotten that Book Five of the *Metaphysics* is a necessary part of the approach to the subject of *Metaphysics* which is not properly reached until Book Eight.

- b. pertinet ad tempus :
  - α. de certis temporis intervallis identidem voce vel motu notatis :
    - I) in poesi et arte rhetorica de ordine longarum breviumque syllabarum idem quod ῥυθμός vel metrum, interdum fere idem quod versus, metonymice id quod carmen, idem quod sonus.
  - II) in aliis rebus
- β. de temporis spatiiis :
  - I) generatim
  - II) fere idem quod finis
- c. pertinet ad pecuniam, rem familiarum fere idem quod summa :
  - d. pertinet ad hominum (daemonum) multitudines fere idem quod numerus (de copia rerum)
  - e. pertinet ad pondus.
- B. sensu latiore notione metiendi plus minus evanida pertinet ad res, quae taxantur vel aestimantur :
  1. pertinet ad ea, quae sensibus animadvertuntur :
    - a. de gradu incrementi vel remissionis actionis, motus :
      - α. generaliter
      - β. specialiter de animalium corporibus :
        - c. de quantitate :
          - α. liquorum
          - β. rerum solidarum idem quod quantitas vel copia.
      - a. generaliter :
        - β. pertinet ad incorporea :
          - a. generaliter :
            - b. specialiter fere idem quod gradus :
    2. pertinet ad incorporea :
      - a. generaliter :
        - β. pertinet ad longitudoines :
          - I) generaliter.
          - II) specialiter de librorum sim. modo iusto, saepe fere idem quod finis.
      - γ. pertinet ad ambitum rerum et longarum et latarum et altarum.
  2. translate de spatiis cogitatis :
    - a. pertinet ad tempus, sc. de temporis spatiiis iustis et opportunis, interdum fere idem quod finis.
    - b. pertinet ad pecuniam, rem familiarum, fere idem quod summa iusta et opportuna.

II. notione aucta accedit significatio approbandi, restringendi, obligandi, ut sit idem quod modus iustus vel opportunus, quem supergredi, vel infra quem remanere non licet.

### III. idem quod mensura, qua metimur.

- c. pertinet ad multitudines, fere idem quod numerus :
    - a. animalium.
    - β. rerum.
  - B. sensu latiore pertinet ad res, quae taxantur vel aestimantur :
    - 1. pertinet ad corpora :
      - a. ad quantitates :
        - α. de cibi portionisque quantitate iusta vel opportuna.
        - β. de aliis quantitatibus.
      - b. pertinet ad spatia :
        - α. fere idem quod magnitudo certa, restricta, solita.
        - β. fere idem quod finis restringens.
    - 2. pertinet ad incorporea :
      - a. generaliter (saepe idem quod finis : interdum vergit ad notionem moderatioris)
      - b. spectatim :
        - α. idem quod moderatio.
        - β. idem quod vitae condicio modestior.
- B. translate :
  - 1. pertinet ad incorporea :
    - a. spectatim
      - α. de sensuum facultatibus.
      - β. de spatii cogitatis : pertinet ad tempus. ad artem metricam ad numeros
    - b. generatim.
  - 2. pertinet ad homines, idem quod norma, νόμος.
- Cepit Alterum : idem quod ratio et via vel habitus, genus.
- I. pertinet ad actiones, de ratione agendi, idem quod ratio et via :
- A. in univ. :
    - 1. in artibus et disciplinis :
      - a. in arte dicendi :
        - α. pertinet ad rationem dicendi (interdum fere idem quod habitus, forma, genus.)
        - β. pertinet ad rationem facti.
      - b. in philosophia :
        - a. generaliter : 1

- b. spectatim :
  - α. de rationibus concludendi.
  - β. de ratione agendi, quae propositionis praedicatum restringit.
- 3. in arte grammatica (saepe vergit ad notionem habitus) :
  - a. generaliter :
    - α. ad tempora.
    - β. ad genera verbi.
    - γ. ad qualitates verbi.
    - δ. idem quod ἔρμηνεία
  - 4. in scientia iuris :
    - a. generaliter de ratione, qua quid legitime agatur, fere idem quod forma.
    - b. spectatim :
      - α. fere idem quod condicio.
      - β. idem quod dationis, sc. sive donationis sive legati sive venditionis, restrictio quaedam, qua is, cui datur, aliquid faciendi officio oneratur.
  - 5. addē in arte amandi (salvandi) idem quod, figura, positio, ὄψις.

### II.

- pertinet ad qualitatem rerum vel animalium, idem quod habitus, proprietas, status, genus :
  - A. spectat ad res :
    - 1. incorporeas :
      - a. generaliter :
        - β. specialiter pertinet ad vocabulorum notionem idem quod significatus, notio, sensus.
      - 2. de rebus corporeis.
    - B. spectat ad animalia :
      - 1. de forma, figura corporum.
      - 2. de habitu morum, ingenii. (τρόπος, mos).

#### 2. - Concerning the word 'size'

The definition given by the TIL as the primary notion in its stricter sense : extensio metiendo definita, 'extension known, defined or ascertained by the activity of measuring' seems to be so far removed from the English or French word 'mode' and so close to the English word 'size' that it is imperative that immediate attention be paid to these three words before undertaking the analysis of the Latin term itself.



Though the word 'mode' is to be found in written records in English only as far back as 1520, its influence goes back at least another four hundred and fifty years to the Norman invasion in 1066.

<sup>(1)</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary states that in documents dating back to 1267 the Anglo-Saxon word 'mood' was already being confused with various meanings of 'mode'. This was the result of the bilingual and even trilingual confusion of the period as the French of the court and the Latin of the monasteries and universities came into contact and conflict with Anglo-Saxon, the mother-tongue of the majority of the common people.

In 1532, 'mode' referred to 'grammatical modes' and then the 'logical modes'; also to a 'tune', or 'air', and the 'modes of church music'. Written records from 1667 indicate the sense of a 'way or manner of doing something'; from 1645, the meaning of a 'prevailing fashion' or 'custom', 'practice' or 'style'. In brief, the word was adopted into English with all the senses that French had conserved from Latin.

The French word is twofold: le mode and la mode. Both words were borrowed from Latin as mots savants, erudite words not belonging to the everyday language of the common people. In the fourteenth century, the feminine form was used in the sense of manière and also as a term in grammar and music. All the various meanings belonged to the feminine noun until the seventeenth century when

(1) The Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol. 6, pp. 567-568. (Abbreviated OED).

the original Latin masculine gender was reborrowed to designate all technical and philosophical senses, such as the 'modes of being'. <sup>(1)</sup>

The literary borrowings succeeded in suppressing a word which until the eighteenth century pertained to the French of the common people. This word neuf was native French and derived from modus phonetically as the new Romance language grew out of Latin. <sup>(2)</sup> Prior to the fourteenth century it was the only word known outside of the Latin of the monasteries and universities. In the works of Rollin, it was used with the spelling moëuf. These two words record the phonetic changes which Latin suffered as it was transformed into French. As the Latin accusative is the source of most French, modum gave the form modu with a short -ō-. The voiced -d- was replaced by a voiceless -f-, (which according to Bourciez rarely happened). <sup>(3)</sup> The short -ō- became a labialized diphthong (such as is heard in French Canadian cheuf for chef. In Provençal, modu became mo; in Rheto-Romanic, mied. The only recorded meaning for the French form neuf refers to grammatical meanings.

In borrowing the word mode both French and English adopted only the abstract meanings of the word. They severed it from its everyday concrete meanings upon which the abstract usage had been

(1) Cf. Albert Dauzat, Dictionnaire Étymologique, p. 480.

(2) Cf. Grandsaignes D'Hauterive, Dictionnaire D'Ancien Français, p. 424. Also, Oscar Bloch and Walther von Wartburg, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Française, (3rd ed.), p. 392.

(3) E. Bourciez, Précis de Phonétique française, p. 150, remark 3.

superimposed. They lost sight of the very image that the sound of the word would have brought to the mind of any ordinary Roman living at the time of Plautus, Cicero or Augustine, a period covering over six hundred years. In fact, since the French language had no special word for the first concrete sense of modus, it had to cover the difficulty by using an implicit equivocation: the word measure has to refer to the instrument of measuring and the size of the thing measured. But no French dictionary seems to dissipate the equivocation.

Before the word 'size' is discussed, it should be noted that the English word 'measurement' presents itself for consideration as a translation. Defined by the O.E.D.: "1. the action or an act of measuring; mensuration. 2. A dimension ascertained by measuring; size or extent measured by a standard. 3. A system of measuring or measures." Here the second meaning of 'measurement' is a synonym for 'size' and is an acceptable translation of modus, for 'measurement' indicates the relationship and dependence of the measured upon the measure. At times, measure is a synonym of measurement; the nuance might be conveyed by saying that modus is not 'the measure', but 'a certain measure', that is, 'a measurement'.

However, the English word that conveys readily the proper nuance is 'size', for, e.g., the expression 'the size of a hat' is more current than 'the measurement of a hat'. In the first meaning of the word the modus of a thing is the 'size' of a thing.

(1) O. E. D., Vol. 6, p. 281.

Strangely enough, the etymological development of the two words contains parallels; they both have referred to the activity of judging, proper to law-courts. Here, however, a few salient details about the word 'size' are in order. 'Size' is an aphetic form of 'assize'; that is, the word has been formed by the gradual and unintentional loss of an initial short unaccented vowel. It comes from Old French sise or cise, aphetic forms derived from l'assise being apprehended as la sise.

As related to the English law term assize (1266), meaning a 'sitting' of a consultative or legislative body, it has retained in some British dialects its first usage referring to legal proceedings of the nature of inquest or recognitions, certain sessions in England administering civil and criminal justice by judges acting under special commissions, and trials by jury.

Noteworthy in all these details is the fact that 'size' has its origins in juridical procedures where the act of judging is dominant. The act of sitting (asseoir, s'asseoir, assis in French from Latin, assidere) was the concrete activity which slowly came to designate the intellectual activity of making legal decisions. In other words, the physical position of the judges and jury came to signify the appropriate mental activity of rendering binding decisions, measuring out the law on the matter presented for judgment.

A second sense of 'size' is that of an ordinance fixing the amount of a payment of tax (1733). A third sense, used

particularly at Cambridge University, is that of a 'quantity or portion' of bread, ale, and other food given to poor scholars.

These three senses are grouped in the O.E.D. <sup>(1)</sup> A second group of meanings is given as follows. In late Middle English, 'size' was used to refer to the magnitude, bulk, bigness, or dimensions of anything. In 1667, it was used abstractly as a synonym with magnitude. More restricted uses include: 1) a particular magnitude or set of dimensions, especially one of a series in manufactured articles, as boots or gloves (1591); 2) as far back as 1530, that of magnitude, extent, rate, amount, etc., as a standard of immaterial things; 3) the mental or moral qualities, rank or position of persons: hence, class, kind, degree, order (1679).

The noun has given rise to a verb meaning in general 'to regulate or control, in relation to a fixed standard' (1771).

Other more precise meanings noted by the dictionary are: 'to make of a certain size; to give size to; to adjust in respect to size' (1609); again, 'to classify or arrange according to size' (1635); finally, in American colloquial speech, usually with up, 'to take the size or measure of; to regard so as to form an opinion of, to make an estimate of' (1884).

A few examples indicating the vigorous influence of the word 'size' in English thought and speech in the last four hundred years are not out of place.

(1) Cf. O.E.D., Vol. 9, pp. 123-125.

In January, 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President of the United States of America, was quoted as saying: "What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight. It's the size of the fight in the dog." <sup>(1)</sup>

In a similar vein, Hervey Allen in Anthony Adverse wrote: The dog, a small, lean animal whose capacity for clamour seemed out of all proportion to its size, was tied to a pillar of the veranda, straining at its leash. <sup>(2)</sup> And again, "Vincent Nolte was, as McNab once remarked, "a little too large for his size." <sup>(3)</sup>

"We're both of a size", is an observation of one of the characters in the novel Arundel by Kenneth Roberts. <sup>(4)</sup> The inference is that the persons referred to are of the same height and build. In another passage someone remarked that "Arnold's room was size-able." <sup>(5)</sup>

In a biography, Voltaire, written in 1886, John Morley <sup>(6)</sup> wrote: "There are things to be said of Voltaire's moral size."

- (1) Cited in Time magazine, Feb. 2, 1959, p.
- (2) p. 557.
- (3) p. 20.
- (4) p. 208.
- (5) p. 357.
- (6) Cited in O.E.D.; cf. footnote, page 62.

A modern poet, Marianne Moore, uses the word effectively in the following lines :

If I, like Solomon, ...  
could have my wish --  
my wish . . . O to be a dragon,  
a symbol of the power of Heaven -- of  
silkworm  
size or immense; at times invisible.  
Felicitous phenomenon ! (1)

Here the nature of the silkworm is the measure of a desired size.

One of the most idiomatc uses of size is found in the phrase 'shapes and sizes'. For example :

Around the atom which now comes in almost all shapes  
and sizes, the U.S. now deploys a versatile force --  
Army, Navy and Air Force... (2)

This expression seems to capture perfectly the entire nuance of the Latin expression used in logic figurae et modi syllogismorum. Perhaps logical doctrine could be taught more clearly and easily if mention were made of the 'shapes and sizes' of the syllogism instead of its 'figures and modes'.

In Chapter Two of this thesis a text of St. Thomas was cited indicating that modus est commensuratio. The following passage coordinates the terms 'to size up' and 'to commensurate' :

About the big issues I was clear, but confronted  
by the petty details of life I was bewildered.  
I had to witness this same bewilderment on a

- (1) Cited in Time magazine, Sept. 21, 1959, pp. 90-94.  
(2) Time, Feb. 25, 1957, p. 20.

colossal scale before I could grasp what it was all about. Ordinary men are often quicker in sizing up the practical situation : their ego is commensurate with the demands made upon it : the world is not very different from what they imagine it to be. But a man who is completely out of step with the rest of the world is either suffering from a colossal inflation of his ego or else the ego is so submerged as to be practically non-existent. (1)

The O.E.D. cites a passage from Burnett : "He understood well the size of their understanding."

As final evidence for the well-established relationship between the word 'size' and the English way of speaking, the poet Shakespeare provides us with a passage that is perhaps more eloquent than the writings of any modern author. In Hamlet (Act 3, Sc. 2), there is a play given by travelling players called The Mousetrap. Love and fear are spoken of as quantities; each can be the measure of the other and can impose some sort of limit on the growth of the other. The Play Queen, who has poisoned her husband, hides her treachery as she addresses her dying spouse :

.....  
But, woe is me, you are so sick of late,  
So far from cheer and from your former state,  
That I distrust you. Yet, though I distrust,  
Discomfort you, my Lord, it nothing must;  
For women's fear and love holds quantity;  
In neither ought, or in extremity.  
Now, what my love is, proof hath made you know;  
And as my love is siz'd, my fear is so :  
Where love is great, the slightest doubts are fear;  
Where little fears grow great, great love grows there.

- (1) Henry Miller, Tropic of Capricorn, p. 319.

This passage brings to minds the famous phrase of St. Bernard : causa diligendi Deum, Deus est : modus, sine modo diligere. (1)

Perhaps the latter part can be clearly translated : "the size of our love of God is to love God without any size to our love."

Other citations from many sources could be given; but the essential point at issue is established : the word 'size' is part and parcel of the ordinary language which constitutes typical English. The fact that the public speaker, the poet and the writer can use it effectively and still be easily understood leads one to the observation that it appears strange that the word 'size' has not been used to greater advantage in philosophical discussions. Perhaps intellectual laziness is the only excuse for translating modus by 'mode'.

### 3. - The etymology of the word modus

In the sixteenth century an Italian, Sassetti, found in India a language which strangely resembled Italian. Two centuries passed before an Englishman, William Jones, realized that Sanskrit also resembled Latin and Greek and thus raised the important question of a possible common origin. Slowly Latin, Greek and Sanskrit along with other languages were proved to be sister-languages. Thanks to those countless others who followed, there developed a splendid use of dialectical reasoning, now known as

(1) Cited in the S. T., II-II, q. 27, a. 6, it is from the first chapter of his liber de Diligendo Deum, Migne P.L., pp. 973-1000.

the comparative method, which led to the discovery of a language for which no written records can exist (because the speakers could not write). The mother-tongue or common source of nine fairly distinct language groups is now usually called Indo-European.

In recreating this common source through long tedious comparisons of many languages and words, linguists have been able to verify elements which concern both the 'meanings' of the stems as well as of the inflections which constitute morphology and condition syntax. It is curious to find a high number of stems which refer to intellectual activity and contain two common sounds \*-ME-. Of four radicals which need to be mentioned at this stage : \*-ME-, \*-MEN-, \*-MED-, \*-MEN-<sup>(1)</sup>, the latter three signify intellectual activity.

According to the present state of linguistic research, the last of these radicals (\*-MEN-, used to indicate the 'movements of the mind') is not directly relatable to the other three; however, Emile Benveniste, one of the foremost scholars in the field of Indo-European, has been developing new hypotheses which may some day lead to a proof of a connection

Though the first radical : \*-ME- does not refer to intellectual activity, it is related to the second radical, the source of the Latin word metior. \*-ME- refers to the particular

(1) J. Pokorney, Indo Germanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Vol. I, 703-727.

activity of cutting which is harvesting or reaping. It has survived in the German word for 'knife': messer; in the English word meadow, which means the 'field where the hay-to-be-cut grows'; and finally in a series of Latin words which signify 'reaping' or 'harvesting': meto, metere, messum : messis : messio.

The second radical \*-ME- is seen under such forms as \*-ME-, \*-MET-, \*-MENO-, \*-ME-TI-, \*-ME-TO. This radical referring to the activity of measuring appears in metior, metiri, mensus. Ernout and Meillet note that the -N- in the stem of the perfect participle is difficult to explain; however this problem is not a major one.

From mensus was derived the noun mensura, whose first meaning is the 'action of measuring'. This meaning will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. From mensura was derived the denominative verb mensuro, mensurare, mensuravi, mensuratus.

## (1)

Pokorney, along with Ernout and Meillet are of the opinion that the verb metior is related to the third radical \*-MED-

\*-MEDOS-, \*-MED-, which implies the activity of 'measuring' and 'medical care'. It is under this root that Grandsaignes D'Hauterive lists the ideas of 'thinking', 'judging', 'measuring',

## (2)

A. Ernout and A. Meillet, Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Latine, 4th ed., pp. 108-109. Cf. also p. 392, where it is pointed out that Isidore, Or. 4, 21. observed the relationship between modus and medeor : medeor a modo, id est, a temperamento. This would indicate that the Middle Ages were in contact with the right etymology.

(2) R. Grandsaignes D'Hauterive, Dictionnaire des Racines des Langues Européennes, pp. 119, 120.

'caring for the sick', and 'governing'. The Latin words derived from this third source are : 1) mederi, 'to care for the sick'; medicus, 'doctor'; medicare, 'to care for the sick'; medicamen, medicamentum, 'medicament'; medicinus, 'medical'; medicina, 'medicine'; re-medium, 'remedy'; re-mediare, 'to hear'. 2) With the idea of measuring, Latin has modus, 'measure of surfaces', etc.; quo-modo, 'how'; modo, 'recently'; from this latter, modernus, 'modern'; modulus, 'a small measure'; 'rhythm'; modulare, 'to modulate'; modicus, 'measured'; modificare, 'to modify'; modius, measure of dry goods; modiolus, 'a small measure'. Also : commodus, 'appropriate'; commoditas, 'advantage'; commodare, accommodare, 'to adapt'. Finally, moderare, 'to moderate'; moderatio, moderatio; modestus, 'possessed of the quality of what observes the measure'; modestia, moderation

3) With the idea of thinking, Latin has meditari, 'to apply the mind to'; 'to meditate'; meditatio, 'exercise'; 'meditation'; præmeditari, 'to exercise ahead of time', 'to premeditate'.

Linguists feel that the second and third radicals are related because of the close connection of meaning, 'the physical and mental activity of measuring'. Even if the linguistic proof for the relationship of the stem is only probable, it is sufficiently strong to be useful in manifesting a connection between the physical activity of 'marking off' an object and knowing 'intellectually' its quantity with precision. Grandsaignes D'Hauterive suggests as one translation of metior, parcourir ('to run through, to go through and come to the end of something');;

his suggestion has the happy advantage of manning the close connection between knowledge and physical activity.

To go a step further: whether or not the words 'measure' (from the second stem) and 'mind' (from the fourth stem) are etymologically related in a common ancestor spoken over five thousand years ago, the psychologist is certain that measuring is a proper activity of mind. To the degree that measuring is a distinctive and specific intellectual activity (for every judgment is a measuring, a marking off), the psychologist would have no difficulty in admitting that measuring may well have been one activity that was used to name the basic knowing power itself (the mind).

The cursory review of all these words provides a needed background in order to approach the precise first meaning of modus. Emilie Benveniste has written an absorbing essay showing how the word modus reveals the existence of a medical doctrine among our Indo-European ancestors. A résumé of his research is imperative since it reveals how an important advance in civilization has been recorded in a single word.

It would seem that if it were necessary to prove "the existence of medical treatment properly speaking" by the use of one word, there might be

- (1) "Hindicare vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum". S. T., I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4. St. Thomas accepted the opinion of St. John Damascene given in objection 4, "mens dictur a metiendo".

room to doubt the existence of "medicine" among our ancestors who spoke Indo-European. Yet the comparative proof rests upon the concordance of the Latin medeor, medicus, etc., with the Persian (Avestic) vi-mad, 'to care for a sick person'. Nevertheless, the forms of this root med show in other contexts senses that are strikingly different; Oscan meddis, 'a judge'; Greek medomai, 'to care for', 'to worry about'; medon 'chief'; in Old Irish midur, the same as the Latin word 'iudico', 'co-rito'; in Gothic mitan, 'to measure'; in Armenian mit (medi) 'thought'. Some fundamental signification must be looked for that can take its origin in some meanings that are as diverse as 'to judge, to govern, to heal'.

The first bit of evidence that will be found to unite these diverse senses is the word modus, the nominal form of the root \*med-. We have here the notion of measure but other than conceived in the words metior, mensura. It is a measure imposed on things and which supposes knowledge, reflection, authority; not a measure of mensuration (as in mensis), but a measure of moderation. (cf. modus: moderor), applied with reference to that which violates or ignores the rule. This is why modus has a moral sense which is clearly seen in its derivative modestus, at the same time that it has a sense of 'reflection' as proved by the frequentative meditor and has the value of authority which is apparent in the verb moderari.

The Greek words already cited are grouped around the idea of taking authoritative measures appropriate to a particular situation. Likewise, the Oscan word for judge med-dis, indicates the one who announces the measures to be taken. Here the word med- corresponds to the Latin ius seen in iudex, the one who speaks or announces what is right. The Gothic mitan is but a weakened form of the same notion of measure; us-mitan means to behave according to a standard already adopted. The notion of decision and judgment are found in the Old Irish and Armenian forms.

Treating a sick patient medically is a restricted form of measurement. It is apparent that Indo-European medicines suppose reflection, competence and authority. The treatment of diseases calls into play the same capacities and requires the same 'prudent measures' as the government of men and the decisions of judges. This is totally different from the medicine of primitives. At the level of

culture where this lexical analysis places us, the doctor is no longer a witchdoctor, but a thinker. (1)

From this splendid analysis it should be easy to perceive certain relationships between modus and size. The Oscan word for 'judge', med-diss (Lat. mus-dics, index), 'the one who speaks or indicates what is right', recalls to mind the juridical origin of size.

Or again, the medical aspect of modus suggests that the doctor has to size up both the patient and the remedy to be applied. The rightness of the result (health) can be achieved only by the right use of medicine.

Yet when Benveniste distinguishes between a measure of mensuration and a measure of moderation, his terseness does not allow one to grasp easily the full value of the opposition.

Furthermore, though he points out that the radical \*-MED- has three completely diverse values : 1) to judge, 2) to govern, 3) to heal, from which a common fundamental signification could be induced, his attempt to see if there is any order from one notion to the next is not as clear as could be desired. It seems plausible, however, that the notion of 'to heal' is last, because witch-doctors become doctors when their herbs and incantations are replaced by the careful measuring of the relationships of proper means or remedies to proper effects or the curing of disease. The witch-doctor establishes a remedy, but has he discovered the relationship of the

(1) Emile Benveniste, "La Doctrine Médicale", *Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, Tome 130 (1955), pp. 5-12.

remedy to the disease ? The doctor has to discover the remedy and apply it. The discovery and application of the remedy are two qualities of the doctor which reveal his position as 'governor' and 'judge'; 'governing' seems to involve the right to discover or establish a law or rule, or measurement while 'judging' involves the right of applying the rule or measurement already decided upon. Perhaps then the first meaning of the radical \*-MED- is the notion of measuring as best seen in the notion of 'judging' which presupposes the measure as existing and sees that it is applied; the second meaning would be the notion of measuring as found in 'governing' which emphasizes the privilege of establishing a measure, and the third meaning is one that embraces these two elements and contracts them to the particular matter of sickness and health.

This conjecture — plausible or implausible — concerning the order between the three notions is not as idle as it might appear because its chief value here is to make obvious the complexity of the problem of measure.

#### 4. - The signification of the word modus

It has not been forgotten that the etymology of a word is not the meaning of a word. (1) A Roman living at the time of Plautus

(1) Varro seems to be the first Latin to have borrowed the distinction from the Greeks : "quoniam uniuscujusque verbi naturae sint duae, a qua re et in qua re vocabulum sit impositum..., priorem illam partem, ubi, quor et unde



or Cicero would not have felt any relationship between the word modus and medicina.<sup>(1)</sup> The TLL, which presents the best outline of its various meanings, gives as the primary notion a meaning completely detached from medicine: 'the extension as ascertained by measuring'. That

is to say, the word refers more to an extended measured object than to the measure involved. Some of the citations must now be looked at:

1. Agri reliquit ei non magnum modum. (Plant. Aut. 13).  
[He did not leave him a large size field].
2. De aestimatione, ut scribis, cum agere cooperimus etsi nihil scripsit nisi de modo agri. (Cic. Att. 13, 33, 2).  
"We will do as you say about the valuation when we commence the negotiations though hitherto he has mentioned in his letters nothing but the extent (acreage) of the property."<sup>(2)</sup>

The authors of the translation have attained the right nuance of the word modus with the word 'acreage', for the acreage is the size of the field as measured.

sint verba, scrutantur, Graeci vocant, ἐνυπόστροφον, ἴλλαν alteram nepi συναινομένην.... De Lingua Latina, c. 1 (Ed. Firmin-Didot).  
Cf. St. Thomas: "aliud est etymologia nominis, et aliud est significatio nominis. Etymologia attenditur secundum id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, nominis vero significatio secundum id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur." II-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2.

- (1) Cf. Ernout and Meillet, Op. cit., p. 409 b.

- (2) English translation by Tyrrell, Purser, The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero, Vol. V, p. 112 (2nd ed.).

3. Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus.  
(Hor. Sat., 2, 6, 1).  
"C'était mon vœu: un domaine dont l'étendue ne serait pas trop grande". (1)

The only comment here is a question: would the average French speaking person consider une étendue as a synonym of une mesure?

4. Neque quicquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios. (Caesar, De Bel. Gal., 6, 22, 2).  
[Nor did anyone have his own field with determined size or limits.]
5. Earum (navium) modum formamque demonstrat.  
(Ibid., 5, 1, 2).  
[(Caesar) indicates the size and the shape of the ships (to be constructed).]

At this point a reference to the learned Lexicon Caesarianum reveals<sup>(2)</sup> that Meusel did not grasp the subtle nuances of Caesar's vocabulary when he tried to organize all uses of the word under two divisions, the first as a synonym of μέτρον and the second as a synonym of ἔρμενος.

These few quotations from the multitude found in the TLL show beyond the shadow of a doubt that St. Augustine was within the classical tradition when he provided the definition which became the touchstone of the Middle Ages: mensura omni rei modum praefigit. For it is now clear that the first meaning implies quantity and measurement.

- (1) French translation by François Villeneuve, Horace, Satires, p. 190.
- (2) Vol. II, p. 630.