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ON FRIENDSHIP:

Its Nature, Kinds and Effects in Human Life

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INTRODUCTION

PART I - THE NATURE OF FRIENDSHIP

INTRODUCTION

I. Importance of friendship

A. In classical Greek philosophy

Since "man is by nature a political animal (1)," any doctrine that claims to define goals and set up rules for the furthering of the good life among men, should pay special attention to the moral virtues upon which this good life is most dependent, namely, justice and friendship. As regards the latter, which is the subject of our thesis, it is well known that considerable attention was given to it in classical Greek philosophy, especially in the teachings of its two foremost representatives, Plato and Aristotle.

Plato discussed friendship extensively, though his teaching on the subject is scattered throughout his writings. In Letter VII, for example, he states that friendship is essential to the preservation of the state.

> For Darius trusted those who were not brothers and had not been brought up by him, who had only been his associates in the assault on the Mede and the eunuch, and distributed among them seven provinces, each larger than the whole of Sicily. In these men moreover he found faithful allies who neither attacked him nor each other, and in his career we see an ideal example of the character which the statesman and the good king must display, for the laws which he framed have been the preservation of the kingdom of Persia even up to now (332 a-b).

Plato praises the Athenians for the same kind of political wisdom. "Nevertheless they maintain their empire for seventy years, because they possessed in the various cities men who were their friends (332 c)." He states further that a narrow bond links friendship to virtue, "there is no surer sign of a man's moral character than

this, whether he is or is not destitute of such friends (322 c)."

The Republic expands upon this doctrine. The common life of friends best guarantees the solidarity of fellow citizens within the state.

> Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths? By all means, he said. But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants? Of course. And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as 'mine' and 'not mine,' and similarly with regard to the word 'alien'? Precisely so. That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way (462 b-c).

And again,

> Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke, It is mine that does well, or, It is mine that does ill. That is most true, he said. And did we not say that this conviction and way of speech brings with it a community in pleasures and pains? And rightly, too. Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common . . . But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, . . . (463 e - 464 b).

Furthermore, friendship offers the best safeguard for justice, "Then will not lawsuits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common (464 d)?" It protects us against injury, "And again, there could not rightly arise among them any lawsuit for assault or bodily injury (464 e)."

It fosters self-control, "and there will be the further advantage in such a law that an angry man, satisfying his anger in such wise, would be less likely to carry the quarrel to further extremes (465 a).", promotes harmony within the state, "Then in all cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together . . . And if these are free from dissensions among themselves, there is no fear that the rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another (465 b)." It shields against a variety of nuisances,

> But I hesitate, so unseemingly are they, even to mention the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to which are obvious and ignoble and not deserving of mention (465 c).

Aristotle agrees with Plato on the utmost importance of friendship as regards the unity of the state. "For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions; (Politics II, 1262 b 7)." It is precisely on these grounds that he rejects his teacher's communism.

> In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of that which good laws ought to have,.... Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father.' . . . Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection - that a thing is your own and that it is your only one - neither can exist in such a state as this (ibid. 1262 b 4 - 24)."

The fact that Aristotle's treatise on friendship accounts for about one fourth of the Nicomachean Ethics (Bks VIII & IX) is in itself a sign of the particular

importance he attached to it. Furthermore, some of the reasons he brings forth to justify the inclusion of a treatise on friendship in moral philosophy (Bk. VIII, c. 1) are directly concerned with showing the importance of this virtue for the good life. In the first place, friendship is indispensable to life. Indeed, it is, "most necessary with a view to living, for without friends, no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods (Ethics VIII, 1155 a 5)." Again,

> parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellow-men (ibid. 1155 a 16-21).

Again, "Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy (ibid. 1155 a 23-25)." Finally, "it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends (ibid. 1155 a 29-31)."

B. In the Middle Ages

The Middle Ages preserved the spiritual patrimony handed down to them from the Greeks by the Church Fathers. St. Augustin dominated the first part of this period. A preoccupation with the question of friendship permeates not only his writings but his private life as well.

> Much more than the impression of an extremely intelligent man, they (Augustin's works) leave

> us first of all that of a man gifted with a prodigious capacity for love, one sensible to all the intuitions of the heart. The words which return most often under his pen are those which express all the nuances of passion, love, and friendship, and one realizes that these words are used by one who speaks from experience (2).

The Doctor of Charity states his views on the subject in passages like the following: "Is not the unfeigned confidence and mutual love of true and good friends our one solace in human society (De Civ. Dei, XIX, 8, quoted in Sr. McNamara, op. cit. p. 234)?" Or again, "The bond of human friendship is admirable, holding many souls as one (Conf. II, 10)." Or again,

> if riches abound, if no bereavement befalls them, if they enjoy health of body and live securely in their own country, with evil men for their neighbors, men whom no one can trust, yet at whose hands, trickery, cheating, anger, discord, and treachery are to be met and feared, do not all those other goods become bitter and harsh, devoid of all joy and sweetness? Thus it is in almost all human affairs - they are not our friends if man is not our friend (Ep. 130, 4 to Proba).

Aristotle's doctrine on the subject was introduced to thirteenth century Europe by St. Albert. In his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics we read,

> Secundum igitur dicta ea quae bonorum est amicitia, maxime amici esse videtur amabile, et eligibile est, et etiam delectabile. Unicuique autem amabile et eligibile quod sibi delectabile: bonum autem bono propter ambo hujusmodi amabilis et eligibilis est, quia scilicet est bonum simpliciter, et sibi bonus (In Ethic. VIII, Tract. I, c. 5, no. 23).

St. Thomas incorporated this doctrine into his theology. For example, in the first article of his treatise on the theological virtue of charity, entitled "Utrum caritas

sit amicitia (II-II, q. 23 a. 1)," he quotes Ethics VIII five times.

The importance that the medievals gave to friendship is reflected in their vocabulary of moral theology which has become meaningless for our age.

> We may venture to assert that expressions like "calumny," "malign aspersion," "backbiting," "slander," "talebearing" are now in their proper meanings scarcely intelligible to most people - to say nothing of their essential flavor and expressiveness having long since grown stale and flat. What is "talebearing"? Our forebears understood by it: privately spreading evil reports about another, and to that other's friend, no less. And they maintained this was an especially grievous violation of justice, since no man can live without friends (3).

C. In modern times

From Descartes on, the problem fades out of sight. The topic disappears from textbooks and is mentioned only incidentally in the influential writings after him (4). The intellectual mores brought about an emphasis on epistemology and the prevalence of mechanistic philosophies all but eliminated issues that do not readily lend themselves to calculation. Understandably, "communication replaced communion, and organism was confused with organization (5)."

Only when this kind of thinking had permeated the mores, and "the many" had experienced the cruelty of loneliness and the inhumanity of engineered societies, did thinkers once again focus on the problem of human relations. Pieper states the case in the following manner:

> Communal life will necessarily become inhuman if man's dues to man are determined by pure calculation. That the just man give to another what is not due to him is particularly important since injustice is the prevailing condition in the world. Because

> men must do without things that are due to them (since others are withholding them unjustly); since human need and want persist even though no specific person fails to fulfill his obligation, and even though no binding obligation can be construed for anyone; for these very reasons it is not "just and right" for the just man to restrict himself to rendering only what is strictly due (6).

The empirical sciences must be credited with reviving the issue (7). Depth psychology, notably Eric Fromm with Man for Himself and Escape from Freedom showed the importance of friendship as a virtue and a need. The social sciences contributed with such descriptive titles as The Organization Man and The Lonely Crowd (8).

Among scholastics, the discussion on friendship was revived by Fr. Rousselot (9) and led to book-length discussions such as The Meaning of Love, by Fr. Robert Johann (10). Friendship, however, doesn't receive its due from scholastic writers. Either the topic is treated for the sake of, and therefore to the extent that it contributes to a theological discussion (11), or it suffers from the idealism of the Enlightenment and becomes a "metaphysics of intersubjectivity" (12). This method tries to "existentialize" idealistic presuppositions within an idealistic frame of reference. It doesn't attain its object.

Thinkers outside the scholastic tradition, though generally more sensitive to the problem, have for the most part worked from idealistic premises, not always wittingly, and/or floundered in abstruse phenomenological analyses that fail to achieve intelligibility (13).

Maurice Nédoncelle offers a fairly typical example of this method. He

states the problem of the knowledge of another person thusly, "la perception d'autrui comporte toujours un minimum d'abandon pour la nature, et elle se realise apparemment le mieux dans l'amour reciproque des consciences. . . . La perception reciproque est un acte discontinu dans la vie psychique. La conscience en est donnee de maniere irregulière, en de brefs instants. Son apparence est pulsative (Maurice Nédoncelle, La Réciprocité des consciences, Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1942)." He may be his own best critic when he writes,

> Communier, c'est avoir conscience de l'autre comme d'une singularité et c'est un même temps nous savoir identique à lui: paradoxe qu'aucune subtilité dialectique et qu'aucun effroi de l'entendement ne peuvent supprimer sans anéantir le donnée même à expliquer et sans se détourner systematiquement du fait principal (ibid. p. 39).

II. Justification of the present thesis

The foregoing considerations on the importance of friendship for the good life, and the inadequacy of its treatment by contemporary philosophers, is, we believe, sufficient proof that a restatement of Aristotle's doctrine on friendship, with a view to showing its relevance today, is not superfluous. This is what we propose to do in this paper. More precisely, we shall attempt to give an exposition of Aristotle's treatment of friendship in Bks VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. To that effect, we shall rely heavily on his most eminent commentator, Thomas Aquinas, both for interpretation and supplementation.

But before we begin our exposition of the letter of Aristotle, it may be well to recall that a discussion of friendship, as of all other moral virtues, properly belongs to moral philosophy, which is a practical, not a theoretical science.

Since a minute error at the onset leads to enormities (14), we must begin by delimiting the subject matter and discussing briefly the mode of procedure proper to this topic. The reasons given above to show the importance of friendship, situate our subject in the realm of moral philosophy.

The object of moral philosophy is operables, that is, the phenomena of human activity (15). We are concerned here not with the actuality (entelecheia) of an organism, except to the extent that ethics is rooted in psychology, but with activity (energeia), that is, the use to which a subject puts his powers.

This means, for example, that if we speak of certain human relations in terms of symbiosis, and the usage is classical (16), this term must not be understood to mean the abstract concept of life, i.e., the entelechy of an organism (17). The life with which we are concerned is the activity of an individual who must make decisions that take into account his nature, his history, and the circumstances in which he operates. The study of friendship viewed from this standpoint, consists in examining how one must act toward and in conjunction with another self. A difficulty arises from the fact that friendship is a kind of love and that love is an immanent act (18), therefore completed within the agent. But it is the love of another as such. How can an immanent act have for its object a person other than the agent? This is a challenge to the moralist, not a dispensation from the rules of proper procedure.

In this regard, the rather widespread use of the term "intersubjectivity" seems unfortunate, because it blurs a fundamental distinction. Subject connotes

substance, i.e. esse simpliciter, whereas the moralist concerns himself with the perfection of man, his bonum simpliciter: ". . . secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens: secundum vero ultimum actum, dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter (19)."

With this doctrine, we can identify precisely the central problem of Sartrian existentialism. It endeavors to answer the following question: How can man, starting from his given nature (20), (esse simpliciter but bonum secundum quid) acquire his attainable perfection, i.e. his bonum simpliciter. Since his inquiry purports to discover the requirements of human perfection, and "unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum (21)," this doctrine would gain by being expressed in terms of the good rather than of existence. A genuine metaphysics cannot explain contingents and idiosyncrasies, nor can ethics resolve in first principles of being as such. The "metaphysical" explanation seems intent on analysing some text rather than explaining moral facts. The difficulty disappears if we admit that we are dealing with an operable, and accept the inherent contingencies. In other words, we are not merely allowing for freaks, they occur even in nature, but recognizing that a cause sometimes produces an effect contrary to the one intended by the agent, and the agent's intention is not incidental to moral philosophy.

> One man desires to have abundant wealth,
> Which brings about his murder or ill-health;
> Another, freed from prison as he'd willed,
> Comes home, his servants catch him, and he's killed.
> Infinite are the harms that come this way;
> We little know the things for which we pray (22).

If the object is an operable, the science is practical or normative. We have a science since we seek a knowledge of the causes, and the object allows of some certitude (23). It is practical since a science is specified by its object (24).

Theoretical and practical sciences are distinguished by their ends, the former being directed to knowledge for its own sake, the latter to the guidance of action (25). The method of a science is determined by its object, not by subjective considerations. Metaphysics can never become a practical science methodologically. A practical science must take into account every principle that has a bearing on the case under investigation.

> Quando autem consideratur res per intellectum operabilis distinguendo ab invicem ea quae secundum esse distingui non possunt, non est practica cognitio nec actu nec habitu, (neither completely nor essentially practical), sed speculativa tantum; sicut si artifex consideret domum investigando passiones ejus, genus et differentias, et hujusmodi, quae secundum esse indistincte inveniuntur in re ipsa. Sed tunc consideratur res ut est operabilis, quando in ipsa consideratur <u>omnia</u> quae ad ejus esse requiruntur <u>simul</u> (26).

Theoretical sciences proceed "resolutorie" or "analytically." The object under consideration is stripped of its incidentals, superficial differences are reduced to more basic similarities, and we know the object when we have reduced or "resolved" it into one or a few simple, universal principles.

Ethics studies human activity which is always exercised on a singular concrete object and steeped in contingency. To be consistent, a metaphysics of intersubjectivity would have to reduce friendship to one or a few universal principles, eliminating in the process everything about friendship that is worth examining

(27).

Most writers of this school sense this, if they do not see it explicitly, and try to "concretize" their analysis by means of phenomenology. Fertile and indispensable though this dialectic may be, it is not doctrine. Over and above the inconsistencies inevitably sired by the unwarranted fear of abstracting, to the extent that phenomenology is retained, the discourse is condemned to mere description, intelligibility has been sacrificed.

How do we explain phenomena whose main interest stems from their contingent aspects? By way of composition (28). In the compositive or "synthetic" mode, we use a simple universal principle to shed whatever light it can on the object under investigation. We then use another to manifest aspects left in the dark thus far, and the process goes on. As a result, we have a complex explanation, not very satisfying to a mathematical mind it is true, but objective and adequate. A dissatisfied philosopher would do well to recall that

> a well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits; it is obviously just as foolish to accept argumenis of probability from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from an orator (29).

St. Thomas points out that a science can be called practical in three ways: radically, essentially, and completely (30). The first is a theoretical science which furnishes the basis for a practical one, the second is a science which is normative in structure though the knower did not acquire it for that purpose, the third is a practical science in a given knower; it is normative in fact (31). A

treatise in ethics is essentially practical. Whether it becomes completely practical depends on the reader's decisions in his own daily life.

A final word on the principles of a moral science. The intellect, here as in every science, not only perceives its various objects, but does so in a determinate order. In ethics, not unlike natural philosophy, the intellect proceeds from more universal and remote principles of action to the more particular and concrete, not by a mere concatenation of syllogisms, but by a number of fresh inductions (32).

A moral explanation must be sought (a) in experience, where the intellect together with the cogitative sense discovers and accumulates ethical facts (33) and, (b) custom, the corporate prudence of one or several groups of people that expresses nature's reliable judgment (34) on the morality of the actions under consideration or similar ones (35). The ultimate judgment concerning an individual act is the function of prudence, and lies beyond the scope of any science (36).

III. Plan of this dissertation

This paper proposes to restate Aristotle's doctrine on friendship with a view to showing its relevance today. It relies heavily on St. Thomas Aquinas both for interpretation and supplementation.

It consists of three parts: I. The Nature of Friendship, which analyzes mainly Aristotle's definition; II. The Kinds of Friendship, which considers his principles of social philosophy; III. The Effects of Friendship, which examines the activities that follow upon the relationship under study.

PART I - THE NATURE OF FRIENDSHIP

Chapter I - The Problem

I. Subject matter

A. Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate (1155 a 33)

Some people tell us that "birds of a feather flock together," while others insist that "opposites attract." The word 'friend,' or its equivalents like 'buddy' and 'comrade,' denote almost anyone with whom one has dealings and whose presence is not diagreeable. Moving to a new neighborhood or even to a different department in the same factory involves making new friends. Yet friendship, when its possibility is not denied is generally agreed to be rare and unusual.

B. On this question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes (1155 b 2)

Aristotle singles out Euripides, Heraclitus and Empedocles. The vocabulary of modern science has changed but the outlook is similar. The concepts of chemical bonds and valences do not differ essentially from Empedocles' "love and strife." But contemporary equivalents of this kind of reasoning are attempts to resolve in first philosophy. A 'metaphysics of intersubjectivity' illustrates the kind of discourse Aristotle refers to here.

II. Our concern: The physical problems we may leave alone (1155 b 8)

Theoretical sciences cannot give the proximate causes in our inquiry. We

are concerned with human problems involving virtue and passion. We will therefore consider problems like whether everyone is capable of friendship, whether any two persons can become friends, whether we are speaking of one kind or a variety of relationships.

III. Aristotle's definition

A. "The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love" (1155 b 16)

We have dislikes as well as likes, therefore everything is not lovable. We want only the good, pleasant or useful. We want some things merely because they are a means of obtaining what we really want. It would seem then, that only the good and pleasant are in themselves objects of desire.

Does one desire the good or what seems good to him? We must inquire whether an evil can be loved and whether we love the good or the good as we see it. The first element, therefore, of Aristotle's definition is the object of friendship.

B. "of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for...nor is there a wishing of good to the other" (1155 b 29)

Any concern one might have for his wine or his horse reflects self-interest, whereas the good that we wish for a friend, we wish for his sake. The second element of the definition is the kind of love that characterizes friendship, namely, goodwill.

C. "But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated" (1155 b 32)

Each must care for the other, and this, Aristotle tells us is friendship. The third element, therefore, is reciprocity.

D. "or, must we add 'when it is recognized'?" (1155 b 34)

Two people who love one another but are unaware of each other's love are not friends. The final element to be considered is awareness.

We must examine each of these points in order to appreciate Aristotle's definition: "To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons." (1156 a 4).

Chapter II - The Object of Love: the Good

I. Definition of the good

Not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable. (1155 b 17)

The object of love is a good, for the good consists formally in desirability, "ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile: unde Philosophus in I Ethic. (c. 1, 1094 a 3), dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt (1)."

Since all things seek their own perfection, "nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem (2)," the good must be one's perfection or whatever contributes to it. An object of love is such because it perfects the subject.

In order to determine how one being can perfect another, we must distinguish between the "ratio speciei" or formal quiddity of a thing, and the "ipsum esse" or existence in things by means of which it subsists in a given species. The object which perfects a subject by means of its "ratio speciei" only, perfects as truth, and therefore exists only in the mind,

> . . . aliquod ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale (3); verum enim est in mente (4).

However, a being may perfect another not only by means of its form, but also through its existential reality or being in things, and this mode of perfecting is that of the good. "Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc

modum est perfectivum bonum (5)." We find this perfection in the things themselves, "Bonum enim in rebus est (6)." The good signifies an existing thing that attracks, hence a final cause. It is also said of whatever provides, preserves or follows upon the end (7).

The foregoing passage already indicates that we cannot prescind from the subject in any discussion of the good. If the term expresses a relation, we must keep both terms in mind in any valid discussion. It further appears that we cannot abstract from reality completely since a good is a good precisely in virtue of its esse.

Far from ignoring being, this explanation defines in a precise manner its proper causality, i.e. "perfectiveness" because:

> Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile: unde Philosophus, in I Ethic, (1094 a 3), dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum: nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei, . . . (8)

and the mode of its causality, i.e. attraction, since "Inquantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur (9).

II. Kinds of good

> And this (the lovable) is good, pleasant, or useful. (1155 b 20)

A. The pleasant

Various kinds of objects can contribute to the perfection of a subject. Firstly, there is pleasure.

The term pleasant can be interpreted in several ways. In a very broad sense, any act whereby we obtain a chosen object is pleasant, ". . . communitas (delectationis) est ex parte ipsorum rerum, de quibus est delectatio: consequitur enim ad omnia quae cadunt sub electione (10)." It is the finishing touch of an act done in conformity with the power eliciting it (11). In this sense, all three kinds of good are pleasant: the good of excellence because of its fittingness to human nature, "Honestum enim est delectabile homini secundum quod est conveniens rationi (12)," the useful because of the anticipation that it motivates, "utile autem est delectabile propter spem finis (13)," as well as the pleasurable in the strict sense, ". . . aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens animali secundum apprehensionem: sicut cum aliquis apprehendit aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in ipso (14)."

Pleasant objects in the strict sense are those that satisfy a desire "originating in the body (15)," the objects of the sensible appetite, the good of man qua animal (16).

Generally, the kind of pleasure a subject can experience is determined by its specific form, ". . . cum delectatio sit operationis perfectio, sequens est, quod sicut operationes differunt specie, ita etiam et delectationes differre videantur (17). Heraclitus' ass will prefer fodder to gold, because it wants food which it sees in the

fodder and not in the gold (18).

Man is an exception to this rule (19). Because human acts follow upon reason and its appetite which are indetemined, "one man's meat is another man's poison (20)." Hence, de gustibus non disputandum, and Montaigne's explanation of his attachment to la Béotie, "parce que c'était lui, parce que c'était moi." Different natural endowments, i.e. those rooted in bodily dispositions, account for different tastes.

All pleasures, however, are not of equal value. The superior pleasures will be those that accompany the operations which characterize noble and happy men (21).

The norm is the decisions of people of good judgment who have applied themselves to the problem, just as a wholesome sense of taste will decide what is good eating. If we can truthfully say that excellence is the standard by which we must measure all human values, if for man something is good to the extent that it is reasonable, true pleasures will be those enjoyed by the virtuous man, objects of genuine delectation will be those judged to be so by men of prudence (22). Recreation must be evaluated in the light of this doctrine.

Recreation consists in a vacatio from work. The kind of activity involved is chosen freely, but is not gratuitous for all that. The fact that most people spend their leisure time this way (i.e. time that is not occupied with production) does not change the nature of the activity. As we saw above (pleasure in the strict sense), it produces delectation of the senses, both internal and external. Some forms of recreation can easily pass for leisure because of the proximity of the internal senses

and the intellect. Recreation is part of the world of production. Man needs it to recuperate from toil, both physically and mentally. Its justification rests on the fact that it prepares the worker for a more efficient output afterwards. This holds true for the prolonged vacation as well as for the coffee-break (23).

B. The useful

A good is said to be useful when it is ordered to an end other than itself, "utile autem importat ordinem alicujus in alterum (24)," "utile videtur esse id per quod pervenitur ad bonum honestum et delectabile (25)." Its value is essentially relative, "Utile autem est amabile propter alterum, sicut id quod est ad finem (26)."

The useful considered morally can fall into two categories : (1) that which is the means of procuring an end, (2) that which is part of a whole, or an element of the end, ". . . aliquid dicitur utile dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut quod est in via ad finem: . . . Alio modo, sicut pars est utilis ad totum, ut paries ad domum (27)." This distinction should be kept in mind when considering a friendship in which persons complement each other, e.g. for Aristotle, the husband-wife relationship as such is a friendship of utility.

Whereas we find pleasure in a merely sensual act, intelligence always shares in the pursuit of utility, and goods of excellence. Since this good is rational, "utile autem importat ordinem alicujus in alterum, ordinare autem proprium est rationis (28)," the question arises whether a useful good can ever be immoral. The following statement from St. Thomas might give pause: ". . . honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem: ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit

bonum (29)."

The point is that whereas pleasure can be amoral, as when it does not follow upon a voluntary act, utility is necessarily moral in character, since it requires the use of reason. Its rational character does not prevent the useful good from being immoral when it is sought in view of an evil end. Cajetan explains the foregoing passage as follows:

> Ad hoc dicitur quod hic est sermo de bonitate morali: et quod bonum utile est secundum se rationi consonans. Cum enim dicis bonum utile, dicis aliquid consonum rationi, sicut cum dicis pascere esurientem. Et in hoc differt utile a delectabili, ut in littera dicitur, quia utile significat aliquid consonum rationi, delectabile vero consonum appetitui. Bonum autem et malum morale constituitur ex consonantia et dissonantia ad rationem, et non ad appetitum. Et ideo utile non abstrahit a bono et malo morali, sicut delectabile, sed est bonum morale. -- Nec per hoc sequitur nullum bonum utile esse malum moraliter. Quoniam sicut pascere esurientem potest esse malum moraliter, ut si fiat propter adulterium etc.; ita multa bona utilia possunt mala fieri, dum ordinarentur ad malum (30).

The moral value of a useful good is determined by the end it is meant to obtain and by its contribution to the possession of that end.

It becomes apparent why a philosophy that prizes reason more than intellect would produce a utilitarian ethic. Utilitarianism is a form of hedonism; pleasure is an end in itself. However, for the purpose of arriving at a moral decision, this doctrine proposes a calculus, most suited to a discursive mind.

This kind of good governs the world of work. Work is characterized by action, toil, and social function, i.e. utility (31). Contrary to the receptivity of

the man of contemplation, who is open to all of reality and receives, the worker is the active principle in his contact with the world. As agent, he determines what he will relate to in reality, what will change and how. He measures all things. The divine has been eliminated. The world of total work expresses itself in a philosophy of humanism.

It is a world of toil, a concept best understood by reexamining the dichotomy servile arts-liberal arts. The expenditure of energy looms large in this world and we are but one step removed from identifying effort with excellence.

Finally, it resides completely within the realm of means. It is justified by its defined (or at least definable) role in the market place. The answer to the "what for" is utilitarian, a good in a life where man is the measure of all things.

C. The good of excellence

Finally, there is the good of excellence, or noble or virtuous good. With regard to human activity, it is the good purely and simply. This is the bonum honestum of the scholastics, so called because it is honorable in itself (32).

All excellence or virtuous goodness proceeds from a twofold ordination, that of right reason and of a rectified will, "omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis (33)." Because it concerns reason itself, this good is the first and most important of the goods of man, its privation, man's greatest evil (34).

In this context, the term good assumes all its amplitude, and is identical with the object of virtue or of the good life. It subsumes the useful and pleasurable,

not in that they are formally identical, but in the sense that they are components of human excellence. This guarantees the moral value of the other two (35).

In contemporary terms, we are addressing ourselves to the question of leisure. With de Grazia (36) we must distinguish leisure from leisure time which was discussed above. (1) The first requirement of a capacity for leisure is receptivity. We recognize this capacity in a man by his serenity and inner silence (i.e. silence of the internal senses). It enables him to contemplate reality in its totality, as opposed to empirical sciences where the student is active (observation as opposed to contemplation) and specialized. This kind of seeing, "the knowledge of the gentleman" as Cardinal Newman put it (37), gives the man of leisure a knowledge of all things in principio. This has become particularly difficult in a philosophical tradition that identifies virtue with action.

(2) Leisure retains the form of its religious origins (culture grows out of cult), it has the earmarks of a celebration. It is the opposite of both idleness and toil. A comparison of the liberal and the servile acts, where the former means primarily mental activity and the latter, bodily strain illustrates this point. We can apply here what St. Thomas says of merit. Because of our imperfection, the acquisition of the habit of contemplation requires effort, but the nature of the act doesn't. Leisure is liberal, the supreme liberal art being philosophy. It provides a doctrinal understanding, i.e. the capacity to teach.

(3) Finally, leisure stands in opposition to the active life. It has no function in society as such, though no healthy society can exist without men of contem-

plation (38). It engages the whole man and has no purpose other than to perfect him (i.e. bonum honestum). St. Thomas' analysis of ratio and intellectus makes the point well (39). Whereas we must undertake the chores of discourse (ratio) in order to learn, we really seek the insight (intellectus) of the wise man. This is what living is all about. The expression "intellectual work" (40) can lead to equivocation, and rather than contribute to our emancipation from the world of work, seems a dangerous capitulation to the spirit of that world. "The first principle of action is leisure. Both (work and leisure) are required, but leisure is better than occupation and is its end (41)." This activity coincides with that of the Philosopher's definition of happiness (42).

And Aristotle continues, "But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will love so, but in so far as something divine is present in him (43)." This explains the difficulty of such an achievement, and that man cannot sustain this activity continuously and alone; he needs the help of others.

We recognize in leisure the qualities that Aristotle predicates of wisdom, namely, it is all encompassing (in universali), most difficult, the most exact (it knows by the causes, therefore, can teach) and an end in itself(44).

D. Compared: Now these reasons differ from each other in kind. (1156 a 6)

These three kinds of good relate differently to the subject, in other words, this division is analogous. It is the noble good or good of excellence which is a human good in an unqualified sense. It appeases an appetite in conformity with the

exigencies of right reason, hence it perfects man. The pleasant object also gratifies the appetite and is therefore a good, "delectabile autem, . . . quietat appetitum (45)." However, it can do so to the detriment of other powers of the soul, especially superior ones, and consequently be harmful to the subject, "Non tamen omne delectabile est honestum: quia potest etiam aliquid esse conveniens secundum sensum, non secundum rationem; sed hoc delectabile est praeter hominis rationem, quae perficit naturam ipsius (46)." The useful is a good only in a mediate way. It is a means for the acquisition of one of the other two, not desired for its own sake, "honestum non ex aequo se habent, sed sicut quod est secundum se et secundum alterum (47).

This threefold division of the good is based not only on the observation of human behavior, it is the essential division of the good: ". . . haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius at communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est (48)." Here we are concerned with the object of love which is the good as such. This point of view interests the moralist above all. Cajetan comments as follows on the article in the Summa which justifies this division:

> ... In corpore duae conclusiones: altera secundum communem opinionem; altera propria. Prima est: Haec divisio dicitur proprie esse boni humani. Secunda est: Haec divisio proprie est boni in eo quod bonum.
>
> Probatur utraque sic. Terminus corporalis motus convenienter dividitur per eo quae sunt proportionalia honesto, utili et delectabili. Ergo terminus motus appetitivi bene dividitur in honestum, utile et delectabile. Ergo et bonum. -- Antecedens declaratur ex divisione termini motus in secundum quid et simpliciter: et rursus termini simpliciter, in ipsam rem terminantem, et quietem

> in ea. Consequentia vero prima probatur: quia terminus motus appetitivi ex terminatione motus corporalis innotescit. Secunda vero: quia bonum est id quod appetitur (49).

III. Evil as object of appetite

> Do men love, then, the good or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. (1155 b 21)

An appetite never intends an evil as such, only incidentally, "impossibile est quod aliquod malum, inquantum hujusmodi, appetatur... . Sed aliquod malum appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum (50)." Evil, being a privation, presupposes an existing subject. The being of the subject is a good, "bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem (51)." The evil object attracts in virtue of the good it contains (52). It nevertheless remains an evil because of the privation. The good is perfect, "bonum ex integra causa," moral evil is a partial good (53).

It follows that moral evil can attract, "Voluntas autem a suo objecto movetur, quod est bonum vel malum (54)." This occurs when one good impedes the attainment of another, "sic habere quaedam quas homo vult, non pertinet ad beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam inquantum hujusmodi habita impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult: sicut etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione veritatis (55)," or when the subject intends an inferior good, "Perfectio autem hominis est ut, contemptis temporalibus, spiritualibus inhaereat; ... . Imperfectorum autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant (56)."

The object does not perfect him.

The reason for this is the complexity of man's nature. He needs a number of goods, "plura hominis bona, scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum (57)," for survival, but especially for the good life. Since he is one substance, an organism, his needs are subordinated in an hierarchy that is ordered by his supreme good, the good of reason. ". . . humanorum operum principium primum ratio est: et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, quodammodo rationi obediunt, diversimode tamen (58)." Consequently, appetites may conflict, or an inferior appetite may act to the detriment of the whole.

IV. Real and apparent good

Each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good. (1155 b 25)

Natural appetites move infallibly because they seek their good in things. Animal appetites and the will are moved by a good as perceived. For this reason, the will can pursue a good that is either real or apparent (59). We are concerned only with choices that are morally reprehensible. This excludes (1) the choice of the lesser of two evils, or (2) a mistake of fact. (1) In the case of a moral dilemma, the choice of a lesser evil constitutes a good for the subject since it enables him to avoid a greater privation. The good thus obtained, however, is always preferred to the one that is relinquished for its sake (60). (2) In a mistake concerning facts, the morality of the act is specified by the good that the agent thought he was pursuing. For example, if someone wants to drink grape juice but takes what is in fact ink,

the morality of this act is that of drinking grape juice. The same applies to an act which is objectively wrong but done is good faith, i.e. a prudential judgment deduced from a false premise. In neither case is the error induced by a disordered appetite.

> Et ratio hujus est, quia in appetibilibus illud est per se ad quod refertur intentio appetentis. Bonum enim, inquantum est apprehensum, est proprium objectum appetitus. Illud autem quod est praeter intentionem, est per accidens. Unde ille qui intendit eligere mel et eligit fel praeter intentionem, per se quidem eligit mel, sed per accidens fel. Sit ergo aliquis qui falsam rationem aestimet veram: puta si quis aestimet hoc esse verum quod bonum est fornicari. Si ergo immaneat huic rationi falsae putans eam esse veram, per se quidem immanet verae rationi, per accidens autem falsae. Intendit enim versae immanere (61).

A morally bad choice, however, remains possible because reason governs its own act, "quis ratio supra seipsam reflectitur, sicut ordinat de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu suo (62)," as will be explained later. This amounts to seeing as a "bonum simpliciter" an object which is merely a "bonum secundum quid" (63). It happens when (1) one doesn't know better, or (2) one acts against one's better judgment, "For the one is led on in accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure; while the other does not think so, but yet pursues it (64)." (1) Ignorance of one's true nature may dictate the pursuit of apparent goods, sex or wealth for instance (65). Though this may resemble the choice that was excused in the previous paragraph, it differs from it in that it is radically wrong, i.e., it is rooted in an inordinate love of self (66). (2) The second case is that of the incontinent man described by Aristotle in

VII Ethics.

> Further, since there are two kinds of premises, there is nothing to prevent a man's having both premises and acting against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premise and not the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done. And there are also two kinds of universal terms; one is predicable of the agent, the other of the object; e.g., 'dry food is good for every man', and 'I am a man', or 'such and such food is dry'; but whether 'this food is such and such', of this the incontinent man either has not or is not exercising the knowledge (67).

Chapter III - Goodwill

I. Love

A. Friendship is a kind of love

Friendship is a form of love as the name "friend" indicates. It stems from the root "prei" (1) meaning to love or to take pleasure in, subsequently, to spare. From the Sanscrit "prinati," "to gladden" through the pre-Teutonic "prizo," "dear," and the Old-Teutonic and Middle English verbs "to love," it conveys the notion of object of affection, or something to be prized (2).

The "goodwill" of the aristotelian definition ("To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reason," i.e. for a lovable quality: good, pleasant, or useful Ethic. 1156 a 3-5), means a kind of love, that will be discussed shortly, and not merely the act of will that goes by the same name, but does not imply attachment to the other person.

Friendship, being a form of love, is specified by a good. This is why Aristotle tells us that "The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love (3)."

B. Notion of love

1. The object is an end

We saw above that a good perfects a subject. It does so by mode of final

causality. A good must be an end not merely in the sense of a result, but as a goal. "Praeterea, omne quod agit, agit propter finem, ut patet per Philosophum in II Meta. Sed quod agit propter aliquid, appetit illud. Ergo omnia appetunt finem et bonum, quod habet rationem finis (4)."

2. Love is a tendency

This calls for a determination on the part of the subject, whereby it is ordered to that good. The determination in a subject, the principle of the tendency which terminates in the good, we call love, ". . . amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum (5)."

Love, like knowledge, can be examined by the natural philosopher. He will see in it a quality which modifies a substance. "Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendit in eam; et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea (6)." He concerns himself with the entitative order. But to understand the specific nature of the tendency, which is love, we must situate ourselves in the intentional order (7).

3. A determinate tendency

Love is the principle of a subject's tendency towards its good, "amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum (8);" it is the connaturality whereby a subject responds to the attraction of the end. It corresponds to the weight of a stone which accounts for the gravitational pull exercised upon it by the earth, "amor meus, pondus meum (9)."

This love is a determination of an appetite, "amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens: cum utriusque objectum sit bonum (10)," whose function it is to draw the subject to its good, "Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum (11)." This ordination is the basis, in the subject, of its relation to a particular good.

The mere presence of an object does not establish it as a good, each term must offer a basis for the relation. Appetite accounts for it in the subject.

> Si enim essent omnia inclinata in bonum sine hoc quod haberent in se aliquod principium inclinationis, possent dici directa in bonum: sed non appetentia bonum; sed ratione inditi principii dicuntur omnia appetere bonu, quasi sponte tendentia in bonum:...(12).

C. Kinds of love

1. Principle of division

But only intellects can establish a relation. Consequently an appetite requires intellectual knowledge, "Intendere autem finem impossible est, nisi cognoscatur finis sub ratione finis (13)." This law suffers no exceptions (14). Otherwise, the only alternative to denying the existence of the universe, would be to ascribe all natural effects to the necessity of material and efficient causality. In other words, our world would not be a machine among other things, it would be nothing but a machine (15).

A world without the good, a.v. without ends of values, would be nothing more than a confused, (nauseating) agglomeration of chance occurrences.

> As regards what is "of necessity," we must ask whether the necessity is "hypothetical," (i.e. of the final cause), or "simple" (i.e. of the material cause) as well... . Whereas, though the wall does not come to be without these (i.e. necessities of the material cause), it is not due to these, except as its material cause: it comes to be for the sake of sheltering and guarding certain things. Similarly in all other things which involve production for an end; the product cannot come to be without things which have a necessary nature, but it is not due to these (except as its material); it comes to be for an end. For instance, why is a saw such as it is? To effect so-and-so and for the sake of so-and-so. The end, however, cannot be realized unless the saw is made of iron. It is, therefore, necessary for it to be of iron, if we are to have a saw and perform the operation of sawing. What is necessary then, is necessary on a hypothesis; it is not a result necessarily determined by antecedents. Necessity is in the matter, while "that for the sake of which" is in the definition (16).

a. Determination

If we can plainly see that our world is organized, a.v. that natural agents act for an end, we can see as easily that most beings that make it up are not endowed with intellect, without which no appetite can exist, as was just shown. But the ordering of a thing may be imposed upon it by an external agent, and we have a passive inclination; or it may originate in the subject itself, and we have an active inclination, both of which are natural. "Inclinatio rei naturalis est ad duo: scilicet ad moveri et ad agere (17)."

In the first case, a subject can be directed wholly from the outside, i.e., it may move without contributing in any way to the change, such as the arrow which is shot at a specific target. In this case we have "violence," i.e., compulsion, coercion.

> Quandoque enim id quod dirigitur in finem, solummodo impellitur et movetur a dirigente, sine hoc quod aliquam formam a dirigente consequatur propter quam ei competat talis directio vel inclinatio; et talis inclinatio est violenta, sicut sagitta inclinatur a sagittante ad signum determinatum (18).

However, a thing may be moved by an external agent acting upon a natural inclination in the subject. Thus, a stone falls because its own weight makes the gravitational pull possible; ". . . in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains within itself the source of motion - not of moving something or of causing motion, but of suffering it (19)." It is acted upon by an external agent, but contributes to its state of fall or rest by means of its own weight.

> Et per hunc modum omnia naturalia, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata, habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cujus eorum inclinatio naturalis, est, ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et non solum ducantur in fines debitos. Violenta enim tantummodo ducuntur, quia nil conferunt moventi; sed naturalia vadunt in finem, in quantum cooperantur inclinanti et dirigenti per principium eis inditum (20).

This intrinsic principle of perfectibility, we called appetite (21). In subjects like the stone, which have no knowledge whatever, we call the appetite natural.

The subject's natural cause accounts for this. It produces a twofold effect in the recipient: (1) the essence or structure of the thing which enables us to classify it in a given species, (2) its nature or dynamism, "a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute (22)," i.e. its proper inclination. The good operates in the same manner. It produces (1) an adaptation or connaturality in

the appetite, from which originates (2) the pursuit of that good. Love is the first impression made on the appetite by the object of desire, which is a congruence with or a conformity to the object.

> Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiente: nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. ... Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis (23).

b. Self-determination

Higher forms, i.e. animals and men, determine themselves. In order for a subject to do so, it must be endowed with knowledge, "Per se quidem in finem dirigi non possunt nisi illa quae finem cognoscunt. Oportet enim dirigens habere cognitionem ejus in quod dirigit (24)."

The need for self-determination follows upon the complexity of the subject. Being more complex, its perfection makes more demands on the subject. Animals, and men a fortiori, require a broader scope of activity in order to acquire and preserve their good. If they possess the principle of the determination of their appetite they are freed from the necessity of nature characteristic of any subject that is ordered by an external agent.

> . . .quia animalia nata sunt participare divinam bonitatem eminentius ceteris inferioribus rebus, inde est quod indigent multis operationibus et auxiliis ad suam perfectionem; sicut qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem multis exercitiis, est propinquior sanitati quam ille qui non potest percipere nisi modicam sanitatem, et ob hoc non indiget nisi modico exercitio, secundum exemplum Philosophi in II Coeli et mundi.
> Et ideo, cum appetitus naturalis sit determinatus ad unum, nec possit esse multiformis, ut in tot diversa se extendat quot animalia indigent; necessarium fuit ut animalibus superadderetur appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, ut ex multitudine apprehensorum, animal in diverso feratur (25).

It follows that an object moves an appetite not simply as a good, but as a good qua perceived. For a subject to be self-determining, it must have the power to perceive its good, "...the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved... .(26)" The cause must be proportional to the effect, and a passion is nothing more than the effect of an agent in the receiver; "passio est effectus agentis in patiente (27)." Applied to our problem, the principle means that love is the configuration impressed upon the appetite by the appropriate knowing power. The knowing power relates to the appetitie as agent to changeable subject:

> Activum oportet esse proportionatum passivo, et motivum mobili. Sed in habentibus cognitionem vis apprehensiva se habet ad appetitivam sicut motivum ad mobile: nam apprehensum per sensum vel imaginationem vel intellectum, movet appetitum intellectualem vel animalem (28).

2. Corollaries

a. Distinct power

The appetite in a self-determining subject is a distinct power:

> If any order of living things has the sensory it must also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus of which desire, passion, and wish are the species; now all animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it, and wherever these are present, there is desire, for desire is just appetition of what is pleasant (29).

As we saw above, (30) an inclination follows upon a form. This form in subjects capable of knowledge is superior to that of subjects which lack knowledge. Where a natural form determines the subject ad unum, a knowing being has a form capable of receiving the forms of other things. Thus the animal can receive the species of all the sensible objects that fall within the pale of the senses it possesses.

> ...quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio: sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. ...In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum: sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium...(31).

To the superior mode of existence of these forms in the knower corresponds a superior mode of inclination which follows upon the forms. The inclination is the function of the appetite. Whereas the natural appetite is pre-determined, the inclination of the animal can intend any of the objects perceived. With each distinct object, we have a different power.

> Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam

> animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam (32).

This power can be identified neither with (a) the nature of the animal, nor with (b) the power which receives the sensation. (a) A nature is self-contained, so that when a subject can extend itself to objects other than itself, it must be in virtue of something other than its essence. "Et quod non sit eorum natura, apparet ex hoc, quod natura vel essentia alicujus rei intra ipsam rem comprehenditur: quidquid ergo se extendit ad id quod est extra rem, non est rei essentia... Sed inclinatio ad aliquid extrinsecum, est per aliquid essentiae superadditum:. . .(33)."

(b) The cognitive power cannot account for the inclination. A cognitive power intends objects other than the knower, but the term of its operation is a perception which is in the knower. The object is perceived because the knower assimilates it. "Nam cognitio fit per hoc quod cognitum est in cognoscente: unde ea ratione se extendid ejus intellectus in id quod est extra se, secundum quod illud quod extra ipsum est per essentiam, natum est aliquo modo in eo esse (34)."

On the other hand, an appetite intends an object in the latter's existence for as we saw, a good perfects a subject by means of its esse. Since the immaterial form of an object in a knower differs from that form as it exists in the thing, we have formally distinct objects and consequently different powers. "Voluntas vero se extendit in id quod extra se est, secundum quod quadam inclinatione quodommodo tendit in rem exteriorem. Alterius autem virtutis est, quod aliquid habeat in se quod est extra se, et quod ipsum tendat in rem exteriorem (35)."

b. Natural appetite of powers

Not only inanimate bodies and plants have a natural appetite, but each power of the soul, whereby it automatically seeks its object.

> ...amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativas, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus: quia, ...cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturem (36).

This applies equally to appetitive powers. Since they have a nature, there follows a natural inclination, a principle of self-preservation, ". . .unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma per natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit objectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu (37)." The appetitive power differs from this in that it seeks not only its own good, but that of the whole animal, "Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum hujus vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali (38)."

3. Natural and Elicited Appetite

Every inclination of the appetite presupposes knowledge. The natural appetite differs from the elicited, the one that is a distinct power, according as the knowledge is part of or distinct from the subject. "Sed omnis operatio et motus cujuscumque tendentis in finem est ex cognitione dirigente, vel conjuncta, sicut in agentibus per voluntatem, vel remota, sicut in agentibus per naturam (39)."

Each inclination will operate according to a different mode.

a. natural

The natural appetite, being blind, "Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam...(40)," responds to its end in virtue of a natural disposition of the subject, and not of a distinct power. "Quaedam enim inclinatur in bonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis (41)," towards a concrete object steeped in matter in a pre-determined manner. It operates with the necessity of matter, "Res ergo materiales, in quibus est, quidquod eis inest, quasi materiae obligatum et concretum, non habent liberam ordinationem ad res alias, sed consequentem ex necessitate naturalis dispositionis (42)."

The principle of operation accounts for this. An agent acts (energeia) inasmuch as it is in act (entelecheia), which act is its form. The mode of being of the form determines the mode of the activity. In purely natural beings, the form of the appetite, i.e. the particular configurations in virtue of which it tends towards a particular good, is imposed from the outside. The agent having no part in the orientation is completely determined by another, hence necessitated:

> Principium cujuslibet operationis est forma per quam aliquid est actu: cum omne agens agat inquantum est actu. Oportet igitur quod secundum modum formae sit modus operationis consequentis formam. Forma igitur quae non est ab ipso agente per formam, causat operationem cujus agens non est dominus (43).

Stones and plants are limited to this kind of activity (44). We make this point because no matter how other appetites may differ from this one, they retain this character of inner urgency, "semper prius salvatur in posteriori (45)." If we lose sight of this, the analysis that follows can easily be taken for a mechanistic explanation. This answers the existentialist "How does this explain me?" by manifesting the workings of the viscera of a personality, without recourse to a mystifying intuition of being.

b. elicited

Knowing subjects, because they present the object to their own appetite, are not so immersed in the material, and consequently not bound by the necessity of matter. The autonomy of these agents varies with the quality of the knowledge of which they are capable, and must be examined separately.

> Substantiis vero immaterialibus et cognoscibilibus est aliquid absolute non concretum et ligatum ad materiam; et hoc secundum gradum suae immaterialitatis; et ideo ex hoc ipso ordinatur ad res ordinatione libera, cujus ipsae sunt causae, quasi se ordinantes in hoc ad quod ordinantur (46).

There are two remarks, however, that apply to all elicited appetites. Firstly, actions result from a series of related causes. The final cause, i.e., the end and the good, moves the others; the end result depends ultimately on this one. Matter is informed only under the influence of a pre-existing agent, because nothing can reduce itself from potency to act. But for an agent to cause, it must be determined to act this way rather than that, and the end gives this determination.

> Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatorum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cujus ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam, nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente: nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud: ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis (47).

But the final cause has priority in the order of intention only, "Finis autem aliquis invenitur qui, etiam si primatum obtineat in causando secundum quod est in intentione, est tamen in essendo posterius (48)." Therefore, a self-determining subject must necessarily be capable of perception.

Secondly, when we say that the object of an appetitive power is the good as perceived, we mean that the cognitive power is the agent that informs the appetite. However, the good, i.e., a thing in its being, remains the term of the tendency. The species of the object begins the motion of the subject which through the medium of the informed appetite, terminates in the attainment of the real object, a.v., Aristotle's circle, "that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide (49)."

4. Sensuality

a. Object

In a self-determining subject, the characteristics of the appetite are derived from the nature of the perception in question (50). The sense appetite,

polarized by the perception of a particular object, will be limited to this kind of object.

> Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit dulce et album et aliquid hujusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus (51).

Animals are captives of the spatio-temporal world, "Nam, cum anima sensitiva non apprehendat nisi hic et nunc, impossible est quod apprehendat nisi hic et nunc, impossible est quod apprehendat esse perpetuum. Neque ergo appetit appetitu animali (52)."

The active principle, at least in the higher animal forms, is the estimative sense. Since an object attracts inasmuch as the subject finds its perfection in it, the animal appetite will be ordered by the beneficial or harmful quality of the object perceived, hence the need for this sense, "appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus (praeter hominem) natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet (53)." The sensual appetite, like the estimative sense, approaches the perfection of the intellectual nature in that it can desire objects that are not physically present, "Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus (54)."

The sensual appetite is therefore specified by an immaterial object, but conditioned by matter, "...operatio animae non pertingat ad ipsam materiam, sed solum ad materiae conditiones, sicut est in actibus potentiae sensitivae; in sensu enim recipitur species sine materia, sed tamen cum materiae conditionibus (55)."

The object is a good, but not grasped as such since the subject cannot perceive essences or universal principles, "procedit ex cognitione finis sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis et proportio ejus quod est ad finem, in finem ipsum; et iste est appetitus sensitivus (56)."

The fundamental characteristic, the one that explains all the properties of sensuality is this, that the object is a good but not seen as such. We must recall that there are two aspects to an end. The end may refer to the object in which the appetite rests, or to the subject's enjoyment of the object, "The phrase 'for the sake of which' is ambiguous; it may mean either (a) the end to achieve which, or (b) the being in whose interest, the act is done (57)."

b. Movement

When we refer to love as a connaturality, a congruence, and so forth terms, we are defining it as an attraction. It produces both desire, when the object is absent, and enjoyment, when the end is attained. This determination of the appetite remains unchanged in either state. We are merely distinguishing two aspects of the one good: in itself, and as it relates to the subject, "finis dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, ipsa res; alio modo, adeptio rei. Quae quidem non sunt duo fines, sed unus finis, in se consideratus, et alteri applicatus (58)."

The key to the understanding of sensual love is that it intends formally a pleasure and not the end as such, "appetitus vero sensibilis haec res inquantum est conveniens vel delectabilis: sicut aqua, in quantum est conveniens gustui, et non in quantum est aqua (59)."

Pleasure is the perfection or finishing touch of an activity that was performed successfully, "Cum ergo provenit bonum in quod appetitus tendit vel cum vitat malum, quod refugiebat, sequitur delectatio (60)." This occurs whenever the animal appetite rests in the attainment of an object which benefits the subject, or in the exercise of a particularly suitable sensation.

> Sic ergo sensualitatis proprium objectum est res bona vel conveniens sentienti: quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est conveniens ad ipsum esse sentientis, sicut cibus et potus, et alia hujusmodi; alio modo quia est conveniens sensui ad sentiendum, sicut color pulcher est conveniens visui ad videndum, et sonus moderatus auditui ad audiendum, et sic de aliis (61).

The main features of sensual love reflect the nature of the form that determines the appetite,

> Principium cujuslibet operationis est forma per quam aliquid est actu: cum omne agens agat inquantum est actu. Oportet igitur quod secundum modum formae sit modus operationis consequentis formam (62).

Sensuality, being a moved mover, will retain some of the necessity of natural love; being self-determining in a sense, will approximate the freedom of spiritual love.

We say the animal moves its appetite because it possesses the phantasm which sets the appetite in motion. It is the same good, in the intentional order, which terminates the motion in the real order. "...finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu: quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem (63)."

An animal does not produce its phantasm however, hence it is moved. It receives its phantasm from external objects whose beneficial or harmful qualities are judged by a natural instinct. The animal moves itself to the extent that one power moves another, but it does not impart the motion on itself. This comes partly from external sensate objects, partly from nature. Once the appetite is determined it moves the limbs, hence the superiority of animals over lifeless things and plants.

> In animalibus etiam brutis formae sensatae vel imaginatae moventes non sunt adinventae ab ipsis animalibus brutis, sed sunt receptae in eis ab exterioribus sensibilibus, quae agunt in sensum, et dijudicatae per naturale aestimatorium. Unde, licet quodammodo dicantur movere seipsa, inquantum eorum una pars est movens et alia est mota, tamen ipsum movere non est eis ex seipsis, sed partim ex exterioribus sensatis et partim a natura. Inquantum enim appetitus movet membra, dicuntur seipsa movere, quod habent supra inanimata et plantas;...(64).

The animal's determination is subject to its environment in another way, pointing out the tenuousness of its emancipation from matter. The physical impact of an external agent on the bodily organs can modify them to the point of determining their connaturality or congruence.

> ...motus animalis novus praevenitur quidem ab aliquo exteriori motu quantum ad duo. Uno modo, inquantum per motum exteriorem praesentatur sensui animalis aliquod sensible, quod apprehensum movet appetitum: sicut leo videns cervum per ejus motus appropinquantem, incipit moveri ad ipsum. Alio modo, inquantum per exteriorem motum incipit aliqualiter immutari naturali immutatione corpus animalis, puta per frigus vel calorem; corpore autem immutato per motum exterioris corporis, immutatur etiam per accidens appetitus sensitivus, qui est virtus organi

> corporei; sicut cum ex aliqua alteratione corporis commovetur appetitus ad concupiscentiam alicujus rei (65).

c. Properties

There follow certain properties which relate to our problem, sensuality is necessitated and instantaneous, subjective and amoral. The animal appetite operates out of necessity, except in man, where a superior power can inhibit it, "Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsum appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex judicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis: qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi (66)."

More precisely, the animal has no control over the kind of act it performs, its powers are purely corporeal (67), but it may or may not tend towards a given good at a particular moment. Being unaware of its ordering to an end, it is necessitated by an external agent. Being endowed with an elicited appetite, it answers only to the actual representation of a good as desirable here and now.

> Sed inclinatio appetitus sensitivi partim est ab appetente, inquantum sequitur apprehensionem appetibilis, unde dicit Augustinus quod animalia moventur visis; partim ab objecto, inquantum deest cognitio ordinis in finem, et ideo oportet quod ab alio cognoscente finem, expedientia eis provideantur. Unde ad ea naturali inclinatione moventur. Et propter hoc non omnino habent libertatem, sed participant aliquid libertatis (68).

The nature of the subject accounts for the freedom of exercise. The animal being purely corporeal, is necessitated in this order. The object specifies an act. Because the object of the animal appetite is a good perceived, its appetition

is not merely natural, but because it receives rather than produces its phantasm, it is not free, it merely approaches freedom.

> Secundo considerandum est quod potentia aliqua dupliciter movetur: uno modo ex parte subjecti; alio modo ex parte objecti. Ex parte subjecti quidem, sicut visus per immutationem dispositionis organi movetur ad clarius vel minus clare videndum; ex parte vero objecti, sicut visus nunc videt album nunc videt nigrum; et prima quidem immutatio pertinet ad ipsum exercitium actus, ut scilicet agatur vel non agatur aut melius vel debilius agatur: secunda vero immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus, nam actus specificatur per objectum (69).

It follows also, that the animal appetite acts instantaneously, here again except for man. "In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus, sicut ovis timens lupum statim fugit: quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet. Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus superior (70)."

Passions do not allow of choice, even in man, since they precede deliberation. "Passiones autem adveniunt nobis sine electione, quia interdum praeveniunt deliberationem rationis quae ad electionem requiritur (71)."

In the animal, execution follows immediately upon the proper perception, "Non enim movet anima brutalis nisi per sensum et appetitum. Nam virtus quae dicitur exequens motum, facit membra esse obedientia imperio appetitus...(72)." As we rise to higher forms of life, the appetite becomes more complex.

It follows also that the animal appetite is essentially subjective, i.e. its

scope is co-extensive with the individual's physical well-being.

> Cum delectationes operationes perficiant, ut patet per Aristotelem in X Ethic., ad hoc ordinatur operatio cujuslibet rei sicut in finem in quo sua delectatio figitur. Delectationes autem brutorum animalium omnes referuntur ad conservantia corpus; non enim delectantur in sonis, odoribus et aspectibus, nisi secundum quod sunt indicativa ciborum vel venereorum, circa quae est omnis eorum delectatio. Tota igitur operatio eorum ordinatur ad conservationem esse corporei sicut in finem (73).

This appears from the fact that the perfection which defines pleasure differs from the one contained in the notion of the good. Perfection can mean (1) the state of an existing thing, or (2) the means whereby this state is established, preserved, or whatever contributes to its goodness as a specific thing. For example, the perfection of a house can signify (1) its state of completion in such a way that it fulfills its function well, i.e. it is a good dwelling. This perfection is its end. Or, (2) perfection can refer to what accounts for the excellence of the dwelling, like a good foundation, the disposition of the room, the quality of the material and the beauty of the finish. Perfection in this sense is not the end or purpose of the house. On the contrary, it is the sum of the means that will assure the perfection of the house in the first meaning of the term.

Applied to activity, perfection in the first sense refers to the proper activity of a subject, its raison d'etre which is its end. Perfection in the second sense refers to the accessories a subject must dispose of in order to perform well. They are means, not the end or perfection of the subject. Pleasure is the perfection of an activity in the second sense. Its purpose is to insure the perfection of the subject

in the first sense. It is ordered, therefore, to something other than itself. The pleasures of the table guarantee the preservation of the individual as such, those of sex, his proper functioning as an instrument of the preservation of the species (74).

The difficulty comes from the fact that pleasure resembles the first kind of perfection. Pleasure fulfills its function by becoming the motive of a given activity. Psychologically therefore, it plays the role of end. Because an activity is pleasing, it will be done and it will be done well (75), but possibly only with a view to the individual regardless of the nature of the activity. This is the meaning we give to 'subjective' here.

Finally, pleasure cannot be the criterion whereby we judge the morality of an act. Right reason, i.e. the nature of an action considered together with the pertinent circumstances determines the morality of an act, and on the level of motivation, pleasure and purpose can be independent as we just saw. Hence, pleasure is not the proper norm of behavior. "...delectatio non habet quod sit optimum ex hoc quod est delectatio, sed ex hoc quod est perfecta quies in optimo. Unde non oportet quod omnis delectatio sit optima, aut etiam bona (76)."

5. Will

a. Object

1) object

The principle of the activity proper to man is his intellect with its attendant appetite, the will, "Hoc autem activum sive motivum principium in

hominibus proprie est intellectus et voluntas (77)." The end of an inclination relates to it as form does to matter, "Finis autem comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam (78)," and the form determines the mode of the ensuing inclination (79). Contrary to material forms, individuated by matter, and consequently determined ad unum, or sensate forms, intentional but retaining the features of matter because they are subjected in a corporeal organ, intellected forms are universal. The form, having been completely abstracted from matter, is free of the limitations imposed by the latter.

> Non autem potest dici similiter sensum pati a sensibili sicut patitur intellectus ab intelligibili, ut sic sensire possit esse operatio animae absque corporeo instrumento, sicut est intelligere: nam intellectus apprehendit res in abstractione a materia et materialibus conditionibus, quae sunt individuationis principia; non autem sensus. Quod exinde apparet quia sensus est particularium, intellectus vero universalium. Unde patet quod sensus patiuntur a rebus secundum quod sunt in materia: non autem intellectus, sed secundum quod sunt abstractae (80).

Consequently, the intellect is indetemined, in fact, allows for the assimilation of opposites, "And each of those (rational potencies) is alike capable of contrary effects (81)." We can best observe this in the artisan's concept. Having understood the nature and properties of a house, he may or may not build one, and if he does, he has countless possibilities.

> ...sed forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendi; unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa: sicut si artifex concipiat formam domus in universali sub qua comprehenduntur diversae

> figurae domus, potest voluntas ejus inclinari ad hoc quod faciat domum quadratum vel rotundam, vel alterius figurae (82).

The intellectual perception differs from the sensual not only quantitatively, the two attributes just mentioned follow upon its nature, but it is of a specifically distinct kind. The difference consists in the fact that the intellect grasps the essence of things, and of goodness itself, thereby producing a new kind of object. "Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus (83)."

Though the object of the will is universal, it tends towards real, particular goods. The fittingness of the object is perceived in the light of the nature of goodness. "...appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum (84)."

Instead of merely perceiving the fittingness of an object, as happens with animals, man knows the nature of goodness and sees a given object as a particular instance of this. He acts for a reason. He desires the good generally, and for the same reason, immaterial objects like science and art. "Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia hujusmodi (85)."

However, just as the imagination could not move the appetite without the estimative sense which perceives the fittingness of a given object, so the will tends towards an object only on condition that it be perceived as a good, i.e. as contri-

buting to the subject's perfection. The practical therefore, and not the theoretical intellect moves the will.

> Further, neither can the calculative faculty or what we call 'mind' be the cause of such movement; for mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable, it never says anything about an object to be avoided or pursued, while this movement is always in something which is avoiding or pursuing an object. No, not even when it is aware of such an object does it at once enjoin pursuit or avoidance of it; e.g., the mind often thinks of something terrifying or pleasant without enjoining the emotion of fear (86).

This follows from the fact that a given human act is always performed with a view to a concrete singular end.

> Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since every one who makes, makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation) - only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this (87).

2) distinct power

The will differs from the intellect for the same reason that sense powers differ from the sense appetite, namely, the formally distinct character of an intentional object and a real one, "...oportet unam potentiam animae esse cujus sit appetere, condivisam contra eam cujus est cognoscere (88)."

It differs from the sense appetite because each is specified by a different kind of good. Sensation and understanding are different orders of knowledge, as

we just saw. Since the formal object of an elicited appetite is a good as perceived, distinct kinds of knowing are the reason why and not merely the antecedent of distinct appetites.

> ...appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit; nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum. Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria objecta (89).

This distinction will be useful, not only in order to define the human good but also to manifest the difference between love and friendship.

b. Movement

1) indetermined

Since love is the inclination of an appetite that follows upon its configuration to a good, or object, both the subject and the object are movers with regard to the act of the will, as is the case with all powers, "potentia aliqua dupliciter movetur: uno modo ex parte subjecti; alio modo ex parte objecti (90)." The subject determines the quality of the perception, as the physical condition of a sense organ accounts for the quality of the perception, "Ex parte subjecti quidem, sicut visus per immutationem dispositionis organi movetur ad clarius vel minus clare videndum (91)," and for the very existence of the activity, "et prima quidem immutatio pertinet ad ipsum exercitium actus, ut scilicet agatur vel non agatur aut melius vel debilius agatur (92)."

The will, being the rational appetite, has all of the indetermination of reason, i.e., its object is universal. Compulsion occurs in a given power when the agent completely overcomes the passivity of the power,

> ...movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota ejus possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universali et perfecti, non subjicitur ejus possibilitas toto alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo (93).

The object of the will, i.e. the agent that can completely overcome the power's passivity, is the universal good. A perception, as such, including the perception of the summum bonum, is never more than a particular good for the will, and consequently not compelling, "cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa (94)." With regard to exercise, therefore, the will is indeterminate.

The object specifies the appetitive act, again as it does with regard to perception. Whether I see white or black depends upon what I look at, "secunda vero immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus, nam actus specificatur per objectum (95)." Because the object of the will is the universal good, no finite object can ever be irresistible, since whatever it lacks is a privation as compared to the universal good, and to that extent is undesirable.

> ...bonum est objectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illus tendet, si aliquid velit; non enim poterit velle oppositum. Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod objectum quod non secundum quamlibet

> considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. -- Et quia defectus cujuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle: quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona: et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes (96).

We cannot want to be unhappy, "Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaeret ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo (97)." Concretely, however, all deliberations and choices bear on particulars, "Cum autem consilia et electiones sint circa particularia, quorum est actus, requiritur ut is quod apprehenditur ut bonum et conveniens, apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in particulari, et non in universali tantum (98)." So, from the point of view of specification also, the will is indetermined.

2) how the will is determined

There are three ways in which the will can be determined: (1) by the objective value of the alternatives, (2) by the circumstances in which the selection is made, (3) by the disposition of the subject (99).

Firstly, the real value of one object, which excels that of the alternatives, can determine the will, a.v. a reasonable and knowledgeable choice. "Uno quidem modo in quantum una praeponderat, et tunc movetur voluntas secundum rationem; puta, cum homo praeelegit id quod est utile sanitati, eo quod est utile

voluntati (100)." The principle by means of which we may judge the relative value of goods will be discussed in the next section.

Secondly, the choice can be more or less arbitrary, the determination being contingent upon the complex of circumstances, external and internal, within which the choice is made. "Alio vero modo in quantum cogitat de una particulari circumstantia et non de alia; et hoc contingit plerumque per aliquam occasionem exhibitam vel ab interiori vel ab exteriori, ut ei talis cogitatio occurrat (101)." The external circumstances are of special interest to the moral philosopher and the theologian.

The internal circumstances, which generally account for one's decisions made against one's better judgment, are distraction, passion, and physical dispositions such as the effects of drugs or alcohol, all of which may prevent a subject from considering some aspects of the case at hand (102). Aristotle illustrates well this kind of decision making in his analysis of the incontinent man's deliberation. The whole text, VII Ethics, 1146 b 30 to 1147 b 3, should be pondered. Aquinas summarizes and illustrates the doctrine thusly:

> ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad conclusionem pervenire: sed assumit sub alia universali, quam suggeret inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales: quarum una est rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima: unde ea durante, assumit et concludit sub secunda (103).

Passion in this case, influences a decision by means of diversionary tactics. It can falsify one's moral judgment in two ways: (1) by diverting, or (2) by interfering (104). The latter refers to the third way in which the will may be determined. Human acts require a minimum of attention. An impulse of the sensual appetite can be such that it absorbs the subject's attention, thereby allowing for action without regard for the dictates of reason. "Cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur (105)." This distraction can be complete, thereby commanding completely irrational behavior; or partial, in which case the will can overcome the solicitation (106).

Thirdly, the disposition of the subject can determine what the intellect will present as a fitting object, "Tertio vero modo contingit ex dispositione hominis; quia, secundum Philosophum, qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei (107)."

a) movers of the will

This possibility arises from the fact that an object attracts on condition that it be seen as both good and fitting, i.e., suitable to the subject. The fittingness, being a relation, depends on both terms of that relation, namely, the condition of the object, and that of the subject. That is why tastes change with changing dispositions.

> Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione ejus quod proponitur, et ejus cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur: unde ex utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod

> gustus deversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens (108).

In this case, the appetite plays a role that it did not have in the second mode of determining the will. Whereas above, the will commands the intellect to present a good, e.g. fornication, in the light of one principle rather than another, here, the appetite becomes a condition of the object. It does not offer an alternative, but determines the perception. We noted the difference above with regard to passion. Where in the second mode, it prompted the will to divert the intellect, in this case, it intrudes by emphasizing some particular quality of the object.

Because the will can move the intellect (109) which presents it with its object, whatever modifies the will can, through the latter's agency, modify the intellect's judgment concerning the suitability of a given object, "id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti (110)."

The first of these is the bodily disposition of the subject.

> Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum, potest esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione corporearum causarum: quae non possunt in intellectivam partem imprimere, eo quod non est alicujus corporis actus. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis videtur ei: quia ex hujusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum (111).

The second is passion: "Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti; sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto (112)."

Because they inform bodily orgrans, they can alter the physical complexion of the subject. Furthermore, and for the same reason, they can disturb the subject's sense perception, thus affecting his judgment.

> ...illud quod est inferius voluntate, ut corpus vel appetitus sensibilis, non immutat voluntatem quasi directe in voluntatem agendo, sed solum ex parte objecti. Objectum enim voluntatis est bonum apprehensum; sed bonum apprehensum a ratione universali non movet nisi mediante apprehensione particulari, ut dicitur in III de Anima, eo quod actus sunt in particularibus.
>
> Ex ipsa autem passione appetitus sensitivi cujusdam potest esse interdum complexio corporis, vel quaecumque impressio corporalis: quia ex hoc quod appetitus ille utitur organo, impeditur et interdum totaliter ligatur ipsa particularis apprehensio, vel id quod ratio superior dictat in universali, ut non applicetur actu ad hoc particulare. Et sic voluntas in appetendo movetur ad illud bonum quod sibi nuntiat apprehensio particularis, praetermisso illo bono quod nuntiat ratio universalis (113).

Depth psychology has sufficiently established the emotional character of most of the psychic disorders.

Since the intellect abstracts from phantasms, and can judge singulars only by means of sensual perceptions (114), a cause that modifies sensations will by that fact influence the reasoning about the objects concerned, "judicium rationis intercipitur passione (115)." More precisely, it distorts the phantasm from which the intellect abstracts, "Impeditur enim judicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et judicium virtutis aestimativae: . . .(116)." The passions alter a decision, not by acting upon the appetite directly, but by modifying or functioning as the object (117). We will examine the

mechanics of this process more closely in the section on awareness, where the same capacity serves man well.

Finally, habits also dispose the subject in such a way as to modify the appetite, "Habitus vero proprium est ut inclinet potentiam ad agendum quod convenit habitui inquantum facit id videri bonum quod ei convenit, malum autem quod ei repugnat (118)." They initiate a less impulsive but much more stubborn attitude than the passions, and are consequently more difficult to overcome:

> ...quod hoc vel illud sub ratione beatitudinis et ultimi finis desiderat, ex aliqua speciali dispositione naturae contingit (119). Quandoque autem disponimur ad desiderium alicujus finis boni vel mali per aliquem habitum: et ista dispositio non de facile tollitur, unde et tale desiderium finis fortius manet (120).

The most common case is that of professional deformation.

b) practical truth

Practical truth, which is the object of the prudential judgment, depends upon the will in a special way. Where the will merely commands the intellect to act in the search for theoretical truth, it also attaches to the object in the case of practical truth.

The practical intellect must make a judgment on the fittingness, or lack of it, of a good with regard to a particular act. Therefore it concerns itself with particular objects, ". . .omnis faciens, puta faber aut aedificator, facit suum opus gratia hujus, idest propter finem, et non propter finem universalem; sed ad aliquod particulare... . ...mens practica est gratia hujus finis vel facti vel actionis... (121)."

Since the end of an action is a good, and since it is the conformity of the appetite to the object that makes of it a good for a given subject, it follows that the perception of an object will not move the subject to action unless that object is seen as conforming to the subject's appetite.

A good is a true good when it conforms to a rectified appetite, i.e. an appetite measured by reason. One attains practical truth, therefore, when he judges a particular good to be a moral good because of the disposition of his appetite. "Sed bonum practici intellectus non est veritas absoluta, sed veritas 'confesse se habens', idest concorditer ad appetitum rectum (122)."

We are not caught in a circular argument here, i.e. the appetite is rectified because it is measured by reason, and the reason is right because it is measured by a rectified appetite. The appetite tends towards an end and towards means. Nature determines the end, reason determines the means.

> ...appetitum est finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem: finis autem determinatus est homini a natura... . Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non sunt nobis determinata a natura, sed per rationem investiganda (123).

With regard to the end, the rectified appetite measures the practical intellect, in the order of means, the practical intellect measures the appetite.

> Sic ergo manifestum est, quos rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica. Et secundum hoc determinatur veritas rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum rectum. Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicae est regula rectitudinis appetitus, circa ea quae sunt ad finem (124).

Since, however, man pursues an end not by nature, but as he sees it, "homines operantur referendo ad finem non a natura, sed qualitercumque eis videtur (125)," we must conclude with St. Thomas that rectified appetite follows upon right reason. "Et ideo secundum hoc dicitur appetitus rectus, prosequitur quae vera ratio dicit (126)."

c. Properties

1) free

To be free means to be causa sui, and as Aristotle says, "The man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's (127)."

Man is free because his proper appetite is indetermined. The will is indetermined with regard to all of the causes of its operation, (1) the actuation, (2) the object, (3) the ordination to the end.

> Cum autem voluntas dicatur libera, inquantum necessitatem non habet, libertas voluntatis in tribus considerabitur: scilicet quantum ad actum, in quantum potest velle vel non velle; et quantum ad objectum, in quantum potest velle hoc vel illud, et ejus oppositum; et quantum ad ordinem finis, in quantum potest velle bonum vel malum (128).

To have dominion over one's activity requires of the subject that he have within him the causes of this activity. It means ultimately the power to provide one's own motives, since the various causes interact one with the other, and that the other causes depend upon the end or final cause. "Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima substrahatur, necesse est alias substrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cujus ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam, nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente: nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis (129)." Because he produces the determination in each of the orders of causality, we say that man is perfectly free.

Freedom is a property of the person, i.e. the individual subject of an intelligent nature. From this point of view, a subject is free or is not, it allows of no degree. We can, however, speak of a person being more or less free. Varying degrees of knowledge and rectitude account for the difference.

> ...Liberum arbitrium nobiliori modo est in superioribus angelis, quam in inferior-

> ibus, sicut et judicium intellectus. Tamen verum est quod ipsa libertas, secundum quod in ea consideratur quaedam remotio coactionis, non suscipit magis et minus: quia privationes et negationes non remittuntur nec intenduntur per se, sed solum per suam causam, vel secundum aliquam affirmationem adjunctam (130).

The terminology is justified by the fact that, though a privation does not admit of degrees, if its opposite does, the extension of the term is legitimate, "licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et minus, tamen secundum quod ejus oppositum recipit magis et minus, etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus (131)."

Today, difficulties on this point stem, to a great extent, from the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre. In his view, man is freedom, not free. Existence, i.e., pure subjectivity, precedes essence, there is no human nature (132), "I am not what I am," "I am my transcendence (133)." On this we agree, that one's character results from his choices (134), and that man's indetermination follows upon the fact that he is the most perfect being in nature (though not in existence), "...voluntas dicitur movens motum, secundum quod velle est motus quidam, et intelligere; ... quia talis motus est actus perfecti, ut dicitur in III de Anima (135)."

Self-movement characterizes living beings, and the greater the autonomy, the more perfect the form of life, "...cum vivere dicatur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita (136)." The rational animal possesses the most perfect form of earthly life, because of his intellect which gives him a high degree of autonomy. "Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent

intellectum: haec enim perfectius movent seipsa (137)." He possesses the principles of his operations to the point of being the master of his activity, and this is the definition of freedom. "Liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus: quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum (138)."

We disagree, however on two points. Firstly, man does not determine himself on every level of his being. He desires happiness naturally, i.e. he is determined ad unum in this respect. Man can exercise free choice with regard to all objectives with this reservation. "Similiter in voluntate finis hoc modo se habet, sicut principium in intellectu, ut dicitur in II Physic. Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum: omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem (139)." It appears therefore, that man is free, but he is not freedom. This quality is a property, not his essence.

A principle leaves its mark on what follows, "semper prius salvatur in posteriori (140)," and the prior is a principle with regard to the rest of a series, "semper id quod pertinet ad prius, habet rationem principii (141)." Now nature is prior to intellect, and natural appetite precedes the will. Nature means determined to one, and so there will be a basic determination of the will, its proper mode of activity, a.v. freedom, notwithstanding (142). In fact, we distinguish natural love over against the elicited in that the former is a natural inclination only, whereas the latter is equally of nature, but an inclination that flows from a nature to which was added the perfection of sensation or understanding, "intellectualis amor dividitur contra naturalem qui est solum naturalis, inquantum est naturae quae non addit supra rationem naturae perfectionem sensus aut intellectus (143)."

We might note that contrary to reason which must understand one thing by means of another because of its weakness as an intellect, the will loves one thing for the sake of another because of the vigor of the appetite. The perfection of the love makes choice possible.

> ...cognitio intellectus fit secundum quod res cognitas sunt in cognoscente. Est autem ex imperfectione intellectualis naturae in homine, quod non statim ejus intellectus naturaliter habet omnia intelligibilia, sed quaedam, a quibus in alia quodammodo movetur. -- Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est, converso, secundum ordinem appetentis ad rem. Quarum quaedam sunt secundum se bona, et ideo secundum se appetibilia: quaedam vero habent rationem bonitatis ex ordine ad aliud, et sunt appetibilia propter aliud. Unde non est ex imperfectione appetentis, quod aliquid appetat naturaliter ut finem, et aliquid per electionem, ut ordinatur in finem (144).

This points to a determinate orientation of man which is more profound than the level of his freedom. Knowledge, which reveals this basic order, and compliance to it are indispensable to the bloom and vigor of human freedom.

Secondly, freedom does not preclude the influence of a superior cause. Man can be free, but within the compass of human behavior. Man has a fundamental determination consequent upon his given nature, which he receives from a superior cause. His freedom is perfect, not in the sense that it is unlimited, but in the sense that it is complete within the limits of its object.

> Sed quanvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia, circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quam non potest non velle. Unde,

> licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur (145).

This is not incompatible with freedom. "Supremus autem appetitus est qui est cum cognitione et libera electione: hic enim appetitus quodamodo movet seipsum, unde et amor ad hunc pertinens est perfectissimus et vocatur dilectio, inquantum libera electione discernitur quid sit amandum (146)." The explanation is that the first cause, the Author of nature, respects the mode of operation which is proper to each of His effects. "Nam tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est: sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa ejus (147)."

N.B. The capacity to do evil is not freedom, it merely indicates that we are free, "...velle malum nec est libertas, nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum (148)."

2) appetite of the subject

There is a sense, however, in which the person can be identified with the will. Whereas the other powers in man seek their own good, the will tends toward the good of the subject, i.e. its own and that of the other powers, the inferior appetites (149) and the intellect as well (150).

> ...voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus: utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particulari bona: semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam

> pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei (151).

The will governs, however, but does not elicit the acts of the other powers, "...voluntate recte vivitur et peccatur sicut imperante omnes actus virtutum et vitiorum; non autem sicut eliciente (152)." To stress the correspondence between freedom and person compounds the difficulties inherent in interpersonal relations.

D. Human Love

1. Complex

Friendship is a specifically human love, so moral philosophy is not immediately concerned with the natural appetite. We included it in our analysis because it seems to be the best answer to the accusation sometimes heard that the teachings of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas lack realism, that they ignore the inwardness and impelling character of friendship. Man is defined by reason, so reason is the standard by which we measure things human. "Cum autem homo sit homo in quantum rationalis est; oportet hominis bonum esse ejus quod est aliqualiter rationale (153)." We can identify human love with the movement of the will provided we bear in mind that the will is the power of the subject. Therefore, it subsumes sensuality which participates in the life of reason, "There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul (other than the natural and the vegetative)