- one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle (154)." Aristotle gives three reasons for this. (1) The continent and especially the virtuous man show that we have a non-rational principle of action that obeys reason.

> Now even this (sensuality) seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle - and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle (155).

(2) All irrational powers do not act in the same manner.

> Therefore the irrational element also appears to be twofold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the appetitive, and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account' of one's father or one's friend, not that in which we speak of 'accounting' for a mathematical property (156).

(3) The validity of praise, admonitions and the like in matters of temperance and bravery postulates the participation of the sensual appetite in the act of reason. "That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation (157)."

Reason governs the sense appetite politically and not despotically as Aristotle points out, "At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetities with a constitutional and royal

rule (158)." The irascible and concupiscible appetites, even in their submission to the intellect and will, retain their proper activity, and can offer resistance to the superior powers (159).

The irascible and concupiscible are organic, and from this point of view dependent upon bodily dispositions. In a sudden reaction, reason does not intervene and the sensual act is merely an act of man, i.e. not under the control of reason, "Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis: (160)." Furthermore,

> we praise the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed to the rational principle. For exactly as paralyzed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it (161).

The sense appetite, therefore, has a life of its own.

The animal appetite, however, is an elicited appetite, i.e. moved by a perception, that of the cogitative sense. This power operates in conjunction with the imagination and external sense which can work at cross purposes with reason,

> Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, ...ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare,

> per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit (162).

This does not exclude submission, "non excluditur quin ei obediat (163)," hence the political governance of the superior powers.

The cogitative sense, or particular reason, perceives a good as a singular conclusion inferred from a universal proposition, the consideration of which can modify passions.

> Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine,...vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveriet dirigi secundum rationem universalem: unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit (164).

By means of this 'discourse,' reason can intensify or abate the animal appetites.

> - Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui. - Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso: applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid hujusmodi, vel etiam instigatur (165).

The will also, exercises some control over sensual movements. Since in a series of agents, the second is always moved by the first, in man, the inferior

appetite moves under the aegis of the will.

> ...at times wish acts thus (i.e. overpowers) upon appetite , like one sphere imparting its movement to another, or appetite acts thus upon appetite, i.e. in the condition of moral weakness (though by nature the higher faculty is always more authoritative and gives rise to movement) (166).

2. The Morality

A person may find enjoyment in an object that is shunned by the virtuous man. This can be the result of innumerable deviations or disorders that beset human nature and which pervert reason and the appetite. So, the objects which a virtuous man avoids are delectable not purely and simply, but only for an ill disposed subject. Pleasures which are universally condemned as degrading will attract only corrupt men (167).

Morbid pleasures, whether they be experienced because of unnatural transitory affections, immoral habits or organic deformations (168), will fall short of the good (bonum honestum) in the degree in which they impede the attainment of the good life as exemplified in the wise man. In this regard, we must not confuse moral good with moral responsibility. An unnatural disposition may reduce or eliminate imputability, it remains an impediment to happiness. That an act be excusable does not make it right. There is such a thing as efficiency in living just as there is in the exercise of any particular skill.

It follows that enjoyment, sensual or spiritual, cannot serve as a criterion with which to determine the morality of a good. "Delectabile autem dicitur

secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendid quod non est conveniens rationi. Et ideo non omne delectabile est bonum bonitate morali, quae attenditur secundum rationem (169)."

The norm of good behavior is, then, the judgment of right reason (which necessitates rectified appetite) measuring an act with the standard which is the good of excellence. To apply the useful good would be opportunism; and the pleasant, hedonism.

II. Goodwill

goodwill...to each other, for one of the aforesaid reasons (1156 a 5)

A. loving and not being loved

My friend is a person who loves me. This was unequivocally taught in the Lyceum. "Friendship...is a virtue or implies virtue (170)," and the Eudemian Ethics state explicitly, "friendship itself is the habit from which such choice (i.e. active love) springs. For its function is an activity, and this is not external, but in the one who feels love, but the function of every faculty is external (171)."

Also, in the same work we read, "Loving rather than being loved, depends on lovingness; being loved rather depends on the nature of the object of love. And here is proof. The friend or lover would choose, if both were not possible, rather to know than to be known, as we see women do when allowing others to adopt their children, e.g. Antiphon's Andromache. For wishing to be known seems to be felt on one's own account and in order to get, not to do, some good; but wishing to

know is felt in order that one may do and love (172)."

Again we are told, "But the need of active loving also prevents one from being at the same time a friend to many; for one cannot be active towards many at the same time (173)."

Ethics, Book VIII, c. 4 explains that perfect friendship can exist only between equals because in all friendships an equality must be maintained, as we will see later. When one person is superior, the other must keep the relationship in balance by an excess of love equivalent to the other's superiority. The superior, not being expected to love much, is not expected to be much of a friend. Obviously, then, friendship is conceived of as being active.

Aristotle infers that friendship is to be praised because it is characterized by loving (174), a view that persisted if we recall that "a friend in need is a friend indeed."

B. Love of another

1. love has a twofold object

There is a difference between a friend and a lover. It is not subjective or one of degree as is sometimes heard (175). In what does it consist? The inclination we call love comprises a twofold object, a thing and a person. "Motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, ...et in illud cui vult bonum (176)." As Cajetan points out, this is a division of loveable objects rather than one of love. "...Distinctio amoris in amorem amicitiae et concupiscen-

tiae non est tam divisio amoris, quam amatorum: seu, et in idem redit, non est divisio amoris secundum se, sed secundum diversimode amata (177)."

We love the object intended with a need-love, we experience gift-love towards the person whom it will benefit. "Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae (178)."

Need-love (amor concupiscentiae) is not to be confused with desire or concupiscence, any more than gift-love (amor amicitiae) is to be identified with friendship of which it is but one element. "...Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus: illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis (179)."

The perfect love is the tendency that comes to rest in the object that has its own goodness, love per prius is gift-love, love per posterius is need-love, the tendency towards the object wanted for another, a.v. the object whose goodness lies in another.

> Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur: quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio: ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quos autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum

alterius, est amor secundum quid (180).

If the end of the imperfect love can be a thing, "Imperfectus quidem amor alicujus rei est (181)," the perfect love always terminates in a person, "...est amor perfectus, quo bonum alicujus in seipso diligitur (182)." This must be, because only a person can 'have' anything either to enjoy or to use. "Non autem proprie possum bonum velle creaturae irrationali: quia non est ejus proprie habere bonum, sed solum creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono quod habet per liberum arbitrium (183)." That person can be oneself or another, "bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii (184)."

Though, strictly speaking, the term gift-love could apply to the subject also, we readily understand why usage restricts it to the love of another person. Love is not essentially an act of reflection. Though the subject is one term of the relation, his attention focuses on the object. If he is the beneficiary, he naturally concentrates on the thing, hence the designation 'need-love.' If he wants the thing for the sake of another, he keeps the end of the act of love in mind, i.e. the other person, whence the term gift-love.

> Et si quandoque invenias diversos esse amores, sane interpretare; et denominari amorem quandoque a concupiscentia, quandoque ab amicitiae, scito, propter objectum de quo est sermo. Ut patet cum est sermo de amore ad irrationabilia, vel delectabilia, vel utilia: in his enim a concupiscentia amor denominatur. Cum vero de amore parentum aut filiorum, ab amicitia denominatio fit amoris, qui tamen eis concupiscit bonum vitae, etc. (185).

2. The person

On the one hand, all love is love of self since a good is fitting to the extent that it is a bonum suum, "Ex hoc igitur aliquid dicitur amari, quod appetitus amantis se habet ad illud sicut ad suum bonum (186);" on the other hand, in the case of perfect friendship at least, we love another man "because of his character or because of virtue (187)." Are we faced with a contradiction?

In both need-love and gift-love the subject benefits: ...by the object in need-love, by the fact that another benefits in gift-love. St. Albert gathers under four headings the ways in which another's good as such can be our own. They are the motives for wanting another self, and apply obviously only to the virtuous man. (1) A friend is a mirror in which one contemplates himself. By acting on behalf of a friend, a man will perform deeds worthy of himself because only a noble friendship can inspire this kind of conduct. (2) It is difficult to maintain a life of good actions alone. A friend provides the assistance required to assure the best for oneself. (3) The society of such people provides a continual stimulus. As a result of acting together and seeing each other, each will emulate the other. (4) A beneficiary of one's virtuous acts will become another self. His constant company is the best means of acquiring one's bonum simpliciter (188). The author of the Eudemian Ethics concurs, "He must also be not merely good absolutely but good for you, if the friend is to be a friend to you (189)."

3. The concept of person

The loneliness and frustration mentioned in the introduction that is so common today come not from a lack of love, but from a misguided love, due to a faulty conception of person. The solution to the problem lies in an ordered will (190). An understanding of what went wrong requires a fairly distinct notion of person.

A person is the individual substance of a rational nature (191). This definition does not coincide with that of individual. An individual is a singular substance in a given species existing in virtue of quantified matter (192). The peculiarities and idiosyncracies of Tom, Dick or Harry are rooted in their bodily dispositions, and must be seen in that light. "Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio, sit materialis, non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et multiplicata per principia individuantia: et ita non poterit cognosci natura rei in sua communitate (193)."

A person is specifically an individual of the human species. (We are not denying personality in God and angels, merely prescinding from it.) The person has a dignity not to be found in the individual as such, "persona dignitatem importat" (194), and must be appreciated for its true value, i.e. its rational nature, "persona non invenitur nisi in rationali natura (195)." To develop our personality means to cultivate those elements in us which we share with all the other individuals of the species, not the peculiarities that set us apart.

For the moralist, life means life in second act (196). Man builds his

character by growing in knowledge and love, which acts are steeped in contingency. He has a history (197). But knowledge and love are the acts of powers, i.e. "an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other (198)." Since acts are specified by their objects, a person is known by his views and preferences, i.e. by objects distinct from the person itself.

We agree with Sartre that man is free and makes himself to be the kind of person he is (morally). We agree with Marx that man is an historical being and that the norm of his perfection is given by nature. Against the former, however, we maintain that man's perfection is not to be found within his person, and against the latter we defend the intrinsic value of the human individual. With regard to the various mechanistic views, the third philosophy that has shaped contemporary thought, we answer with the doctrine on appetite proposed above, or more precisely that things are ordered to an end and tend towards it naturally, i.e. thanks to an intrinsic principle of motion.

C. Another as another self

1. Likeness: cause of love

Love is the response to an object that is good and fitting, "id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti (199)." Since we are dealing with a relation, there must be a basis for it in each of the terms. "Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione ejus quod proponitur, et ejus cui proponitur (200)."

We saw above that the object is a term in virtue of its perfection or its capacity for perfecting, "primo et principaliter dicitur bonum ens perfectivum alterius (201)." This does not suffice. The difference between hating and not loving indicates the need for a disposition on the part of the subject. "Non amari tamen potest: quia non habet unde adaequat appetitum (202)."

Likeness disposes the subject with regard to a given object, making it not only good but fitting, i.e. suited to this subject, "similitudo ad bonum sit propria causa amoris, ut propria dispositio ex parte subjecti (203)."

Likeness can be of two kinds: (1) two objects that have the same quality in act, as two white objects are said to be similar; (2) one has in potency and by mode of inclination what the other has in act, as an athlete on the bench is a football player like the one on the field. According to the latter member of this division also, a potency resembles its act, for the act is contained in the potency in a certain way (204).

The first kind of likeness causes gift-love. The other person being like us, we feel the same way towards him as we do towards ourself.

> Primus ergo similitudo modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa: ... . Et ideo affectus unius tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult si bonum sicut et sibi (205).

The second kind causes a need-love, or the love proper to useful friendships or friendships of pleasure. We will see later that these friendships are imperfect precisely because the love for the other is not unadulterated gift-love.

> Sed secundum modus similitudinis causat amorem concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis. Quia unicuique existenti in potentia, inquantum hujusmodi, inest appetitus sui actus: et in ejus consecutione delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens (206).

The proper cause of love is likeness, that participation in a form that makes of the good a fitting object for the subject and a means of intensifying or conserving the latter's perfection. "Unumquodque autem appetit suum augmentum et perfectionem, et ideo simile, inquantum hujusmodi est unicuique appetibile (207)."

2. Likeness proper to friendship

a. General

We have seen that a person is the result of living, i.e., it is distinct in virtue of the forms that it has acquired through knowing and loving. "Personarum enim distinctio, etiam in rebus humanis, non attenditur secundum essentiam speciei, sed secundum ea quae sunt naturae speciei adjuncta: in omnibus enim personis hominum est una speciei natura, sunt tamen plures personae, propter hoc quod distinguuntur homines in his quae sunt adjuncta, naturae (208)." A person is defined by what he knows and loves.

A friend is a person whom we love because of a good, "bearing goodwill... for one of the aforesaid reasons(209)." At least in a perfect friendship we love a man for his intrinsic value, "because of his character or because of virtue (210)." The good that motivates our love for him also motivates his activity. This is what it

means to love another as a person (211).

Now, the proper cause of love is likeness. This means that an end becomes a good for me when I participate in the form of that end (likeness) which makes it fitting and congruous for me. Another person will be drawn to the same good because he has the same configuration, i.e. because he participates in the same form. If I love him because of this configuration, I am his friend. C.S. Lewis has found an apt analogy, "Lovers are normally face to face, absorbed in each other; Friends, side by side, absorbed in some common interest (212)." Since we are both configured by the same good, we resemble each other and since this configuration is the motive of my love, this likeness is the cause of friendship, friendship being this same love reciprocated, "And a man becomes a friend when he is loved and returns that love, and this is recognized by the two men in question (213)."

b. Particular

Friendship can be motivated by any of three kinds of goods, as we have seen. Each of these will give rise to a different kind of relationship, all of which are called friendship, but analogously. "There must, then, be three kinds of love, not all being so named for one thing or as species of one genus, not yet having the same name quite by mere accident (214)." Because of the differences, likeness will not play the same role in all friendships.

We saw above that the good (bonum honestum) and the pleasant are wanted for their own sake. Since they are ends in themselves, what was just said concerning likeness as the cause of friendship applies as such. "So thus the like is friendly,

because the good is like; but it may also be friendly because of pleasure; for those like one another have the same pleasures (215)."

Such is not the case with a friendship based on utility. The object of love is one's own good, which in moral matters consists of "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us (216)." If I cultivate a friendship in order to help me achieve the mean, which is not yet mine, the good that binds me to this friend is not wanted for itself. This friendship is remedial. As Aristotle suggests, "We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent (217)." If I am overindulgent, I decide to become abstemious. To this end I choose a friend because we are opposites on this point. Opposites do attract, but only incidentally. "Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only incidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good (218)."

We saw above that a useful good can be either a means to an end or part of a whole. If I choose a friend to complement me, i.e. if the good that motivates my love for him is something which I need in order to act effectively, I love him because he has it and I do not. Here again opposites attract.

This may apply also to friendships of pleasure, though it need not. The attraction of opposites is based on need which is essential in a friendship of utility. This may or may not be the case in a friendship of pleasure. This attraction is possible, however, because this friendship is based on a good other than the intrinsic value of the other person, so the similarity of persons is incidental (219). Since,

however, opposites are loved incidentally, i.e. for a good other than the person himself, we must conclude that the like likes like.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, the friend is another self. Who expressed it better than the sensitive and articulate St. Augustine? Aching at the death of a friend he moans,

> For I wondered that others, subject to death, did live, since he whom I loved, as if he should never die, was dead; and I wondered yet more that myself, who was to him a second self, could live, he being dead. Well said one of his friend, 'Thou half of my soul'; for I felt that my soul and his soul were 'one soul in two bodies': and therefore was my life a horror to me, because I would not live halved. And therefore perchance I feared to die, lest he whom I had much loved should die wholly (220).

Chapter IV - Mutual Awareness, i.e. Intimacy

> These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? (1156 a 1-2)

I. to live is to know oneself.

A. to know

To live means to know. We are concerned here with life in second act. Where to live means to perceive for an animal, for man it consists in conscious activity, the actuation of his intellect. The Eudemian Ethics goes so far as to identify life with knowledge purely and simply, "living must be regarded as a kind of knowledge (1)."

B. to know oneself

One desires most of all to know one's self, "For we must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable, and also the good (2)." This seems to mean that firstly, "life is desirable," i.e. we naturally seek activity, and especially knowledge which constitute our perfection. Secondly, because "and also the good (is desirable)," we will want to become good, i.e. perfect or determined, hence more knowable. We acquire perfection, and therefore knowability by knowing, and nobility by the quality of our perceptions. But knowability implies potency, so ultimately we want to be known. Hence, living consists in knowing and in being known. The complete text runs as follows, the 'nature of the determined' refers to the Pythagorean series of pairs:

> For we must take two things into consideration,

> that life is desirable and also the good, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as belongs to them. If, then, of such a pair of corresponding series there is always one series of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined, ...so that to wish to perceive one's self is to wish oneself to be a certain definite character, - since, then, we are not in ourselves possessed of each of such characters, but only by participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing-for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way and in that respect in which he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way - therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known (3).

We are good because of our knowledge (theoretical and practical). Since love follows upon not only the good, but the fitting or connatural, what greater good is there for a person than a virtuous knowing self.

C. a clarification

A great deal of contemporary thought accepts the existentialist translation of Brentano's intentionality. As a result, some thinkers confuse consciousness with self-consciousness, i.e. one's awareness of his primary being (esse simpliciter but his bonum secundum quid). This is an impediment to both self-perception and friendship. By 'being conscious of one's self,' we mean being aware of one's "bonum simpliciter," one's activity, a.v. knowing what one is doing. These two forms of consciousness of self are mutually exclusive. We can think only one object at a time.

II. Mutual indwelling

A. Based on love of self

Again we must recall that a man's attitude towards himself will determine his choice of friends. If one's greatest desire is for consciousness of self, in the sense just explained, a friend's greatest desire will be for the consciousness of his friend according to the same meaning of the term.

B. Another self

One wants his friend to be a separate self, "But none the less does a friend wish to be as it were a separate self (4)." He wishes to be conscious of the friend in the way he is of himself, "Therefore to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know one's self (5)." Only shared activity can provide this. Friends will seek to share the kind of activity they identify with living, the one they love best.

> And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together (6). So that even the vulgar forms of pleasure and life in the society of a friend are naturally pleasant (for perception of the friend always takes place at the same time), but still more the communion in the diviner pleasurers (7).

C. Mutual indwelling

1. by means of knowledge

To identify living with knowing and being known is to resolve spiritual life in its principle. The above analysis accounts for the indwelling of one person in another's consciousness. The loved one is in the lover as the object of his cognition. The latter lives in the former in that, not satisfied with a superficial knowledge of the object of his affections, the lover follows every lead and seeks out all the facts that are pertinent to the comprehension of what makes the loved one "tick."

> Amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; ....Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed utitur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora ejus ingreditur (8).

But we have not yet defined intimacy for "duo sunt quae dant homini... familiaritatem, scilicet notitia et dilectio (9)." Living consists in activity and activity proceeds from an appetite.

2. By means of love

"But the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character (10)." What a man is determines what he wants and what he does. Since living follows upon knowledge, the nature of man's inclinations correspond to the intelligible forms that make up his character. "Quale enim est unumquodque, talis operatur; et in sibi convenientia tendit. Unde etiam oportet quod ex forma intelli-

gibili consequatur in intellegente inclinatio ad proprias operationes et proprium finem. Haec autem inclinatio in intellectuali natura voluntas est (11)."

Although we cannot love what we do not know, the loved one informs the lover's awareness according to a mode distinct from that of the abstract concept. "Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante ordinem quandam habet ad conceptionem qua ab intellectu concipitur, et ad ipsam rem cujus intellectualis conceptio dicitur verbum: non enim amoretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognoscere-tur; nec solum amati cognitio amatur, sed secundum quod in se bonum est (12)."

We explain both knowledge and love in terms of assimilation, but they differ considerably in spite of their interdependence. Where the intellect possesses a similitude, in the form of a species, the will conforms to the reality which polarizes its energy.

> Sic igitur quod amatur non solum est in intellectu amantis, sed etiam in voluntate ipsius: aliter tamen et aliter. In intel-lectu enim est secundum similitudinem suae speciei: in voluntatem autem amantis est sicut terminus motus in principio motivo proportionato per convenientiam et propor-tionem quam habet ad ipsum. Sicut in igne quodammodo est locus sursum ratione levi-tatis, secundum quam habet proportionem et convenientiam ad talem locum: ignis vero generatus est in igne generante per simili-tudinem suae formae (13).

The distinction between intellect and will, against a Socratic "knowledge is virtue," and emphasis on the primacy of the intellect, against a kantian volun-tarism, must not blind us to the inseparability of these two powers. The will is not just another power that follows the intellect, it is in it, and of necessity.

> Adhuc. Cuicumque inest aliqua forma habet per illam formam habitudinem ad ea quae sunt in rebus natura: sicut lignum album per suam albedinem est aliquibus simile et quibusdam dissimile. In intelligente autem et sentiente est forma rei intellectae et sensatae: cum omnis cognitio sit per aliquam similitudinem. Oportet igitur esse habitudinem intelligentis et sentientis ad ea quae sunt intellecta et sensata secundum quod sunt in rerum natura. Non autem hoc est per hoc quod intelligunt et sentiunt: nam per hoc magis attenditur habitudo rerum ad intelligentem et sentientem; quia intelligere et sentire est secundum quod res sunt in intellectu et sensu, secundum modum utriusque. Habet autem habitudinem sentiens et intelligens ad rem quae est extra animan per voluntatem et appetitum. Unde omnia sentientia et intelligentia appetunt et volunt: voluntas tamen proprie in intellectu est. (14).

Intimacy, therefore, consists of the mutual appetitive indwelling of friends. The loved one exists in the lover by means of the connaturality or fittingness we discussed in the section on love. It elicits delight in the friend's company, desire in his absence. Conversely, the lover occupies the loved one, not by possession as in need-love, but by means of an identity of intentions. To the extent that I concern myself with him and his (another self), I am in his life. Inasmuch as I treat him the way I do myself, he dwells within me (15). Friends are persons who relate thusly to each other. They add reciprocity to what was just said (16). Friends live in and for each other. "Amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est impressum in affectu ejus per quandam complacentiam. E converso, vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum sequitur aliquo modo illud quod est intimem amati (17)."

D. Objection answered

We read in the Nicomachean Ethics that "nor do they admit each other to

friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by each (18)." It might be objected that since the individual is ineffable, even a relatively perfect friendship can never occur, since we cannot love what we do not know. We answer with St. Thomas that perfect love does not require perfect knowledge. Some knowledge is required. We cannot desire an object whose very existence we ignore. We satisfy this requirement if we know the object under some aspect, either 'in universali,' in its effects, or because we have heard it praised.

However, to know is not to know perfectly and perfect love does not require perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge requires more than perfect love does. Knowledge concerns the reason, which must distinguish those things that are joined in reality (analyze), and compose in a way (synthesize), those things which are diverse, comparing one to the other. Therefore, the perfection of knowledge requires that a man know separately whatever exists in reality, like the parts, the faculties and the properties. But love concerns the appetite, which bears on the thing as it exists in itself. Hence, for the perfection of love it suffices that the object which is apprehended be loved in its physical existence. From this follows that a thing can be loved more than it is known. It can be loved perfectly even if it is not known perfectly. This is very obvious in the case of a student desire to learn a science. This love requires no more than a superficial knowledge of the science or of some of its characteristics. This also occurs in the love of another human being; it obviously does in the case of man's love of God (19). It is the basis of the living together which makes a friendship grow.

As we have said, human beings and their acts are singulars (20). Furthermore,

men are historical beings (21), hence contingent. On both counts, knowing a friend cannot be the proper object of doctrine, so a metaphysics of intersubjectivity must needs be inadequate (22).

However, we saw in our discussion on the act of the will in Chapter III that man can elicit judgments by mode of inclination. This cognitive act is specified by a good, always a singular, and illuminates an otherwise unknowable object (23). (The unintelligibility can be supra-, infra-, or para-rational.) Our habits are formed by a repetition of acts. The subjective disposition that renders a friend knowable is the result of intimacy, living together.

We can now appreciate the importance of the proverbial peck of salt, "as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have 'eaten salt together' (24)." A "copain" is one with whom we share our bread.

III. In all friendships

Since intimacy is the essence of friendship, any kind of relationship to which the name friendship can apply will be characterized by it. We find it in each kind of friendship and in all types of people.

> Thus the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve- whence the saying 'noble deeds from noble men' (25).

Chapter V - Friendship: Act and Habit

I. Act

A. An sit

1. As in regard to the virtues, some men are called good in respect of a state of character, others in respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship. (1157 b 5-6)

The term friendship applies both to the activity and to the habit. Aristotle gives three reasons to justify this division. 1. We still call friends persons who are proximately disposed to intimacy, but who are not together at a given moment. Intimacy, for them, bears the same relation to the habit that a virtuous act does to the corresponding virtue. The repetition of acts firms the habit, their cessation weakens it to the point of disappearing. "But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind' (1)."

"Absence makes the heart grow fonder" expresses a dubious wisdom. Like love of which it is a king, friendship depends on knowledge. Repetition may dull one's awareness of a friendship until absence focuses anew one's attention on the object of his affection. Too often, we don't appreciate a good thing until we have lost it. Absence, therefore, doesn't intensify the love, it revives one's awareness of it.

A forced separation can be overcome to a certain extent by means of tele-

communication. The letter seems to be the least inadequate of these means, at least in the case of virtuous friendships. It permits some self-expression and the pursuit of a common leisurely activity, primarily philosophizing as we will see shortly, more adequately than other forms of communication, but it always remains a very poor second. The telephone seems better suited to friendships of pleasure and utility if we can infer anything from the widespread addiction to this tool of teenagers, and its importance in the business world.

2. Some people are incapable of friendship. They are persons who make disagreeable companions, and are, therefore, generally avoided. "Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch as they are less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for these are thought to be the greatest marks of friendship and most productive of it (2)."

3. In common usage, friendship does not connote every acquaintance with regard to whom there may exist mutual goodwill. There must be some shared activity. "Those, however, who approve of each other, but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends (3)."

B. Quid sit

> For there is nothing so characteristic of friendship as living together. (1157 b 19)

The act of friendship is "living together," (to suzen, convivere), for "even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together (4)." Aristotle's comparison between friendship and love also confirms this. As seeing is to the lover, so doing things together is to the friend. "Does it not follow, then,

that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because on it love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends the most desirable thing is living together (5)?" This comparison makes the point that the act proper to each requires the presence of the other person.

Aristotle offers three arguments in support of this position. (1) Friendship consists in a relationship. The ultimate in inter-personal relations is intimacy. It is therefore, most properly characteristic of friends and what they desire, "for friends the most desirable thing is living together (6)." (2) We relate to a friend as we do to ourselves. Our greatest desire and ultimate joy is to be alive, i.e. to be aware of ourselves in act. A like awareness of one's friend is equally good and pleasant. But this constitutes intimacy, living together the same consciousness of the friend that it does of the self.

> For friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this (7).

(3) Experience proves this out. Friends are persons with whom one wants to indulge in his favorite occupation. That activity for which one lives, the one that makes him feel most alive, he wishes to perform with friends. "And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends (8)."

N.B. The term "togetherness," in this regard, may lead to confusion. If by that term we mean the physical presence of two or more people in the same place, then, togetherness does not necessarily promote friendship. If it means "doing things together," then, it is "convivere" but the activity may require their being in different places.

Again, St. Augustin illustrates this well:

> But that fable (loving things instead of God) did not die for me, even when one of my friends would die. There were other things done in their company which more completely seized my mind: to talk and to laugh with them; to do friendly acts of service for one another; to read well-written books together; sometimes to tell jokes and sometimes to be serious; to disagree at times, but without hard feelings, just as a man does with himself; and to keep our many discussions pleasant by the very rarity of such differences; to teach things to the others and to learn from them; to long impatiently for those who were absent, and to receive with joy those joining us. These and similar expressions, proceeding from the hearts of those who loved and repaid their comrades' love, by way of countenance, tongue, eyes, and a thousand pleasing gestures, were like fuel to set our minds ablaze and to make but one out of many (9).

III. Habit

A. Habit

Now it looks as if...friendship (were) a state of character. (1157 b 29)

But friendship also refers to the habit. Aristotle gives two reasons for this. Firstly, he infers this from the difference between love and friendship. "Now it looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love may be felt

just as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice springs from a state of character (10)." The second, he bases on the fact that emotion, as opposed to goodwill, is completely subjective, i.e. capable of nothing more than a private good, "and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of character (11)."

We might add that in his definition of friendship in Ethics, VIII,2, Aristotle states that the mutual goodwill must be "recognized" (non latens). He doesn't require actual cognition, as indication that he defining the habit (12). St. Thomas adopts this reading since in the II-II he uses this doctrine to explain theological charity, a virtue. He confirms this interpretation in his commentary on Ethics IX when he labels as effects of friendship, the operations which above we called the acts of friends, "enumerat hujusmodi effectus vel actus (13)."

St. Albert, on the other hand, takes Aristotle's definition to be that of the act. The acts of the friends he calls the essence of friendship (14). Consequently, he becomes involved in the hopeless task of trying to explain how there can be a "communicatio" where there is no active reciprocity, for example, between a father and his baby (15). This further resolves the apparent inconsistency in St. Thomas who tells us that friendship "in communicatione consistit (16)," and "fundatur super aliqua communicatione (17)." The act of friendship consists in shared activity, while goods held in common constitute the basis of the habit. St. Albert's father and son will not actually be friends until the boy can posit human acts.

B. "Cum virtute"

Friendship....is a virtue or implies virtue.

Aristotle assimilates friendship to virtue but does not identify them. St. Thomas justifies the order of Aristotle's treatise by telling us that "amicitia... est effectus virtutis (18)." This probably refers to the most obvious differences between the two, namely, the autonomous character of virtue and the dependence for friendship upon someone else. Moral virtue falls completely within the scope of a subject's responsibility. He cannot develop a friendship at will but is subject to the contingencies of finding another self and having the opportunity to live with him.

There are other differences. Virtue is morally good by definition. Although a true friendship is also, there are bad ones to which we cannot deny the name. Furthermore, as we will try to manifest in the conclusion, virtue and friendship do not play the same role with regard to happiness. Friendship is an end, this was Aristotle's first reason for discussing it, virtue a mere means. Or, in other words, they are both useful for man's fulfillment, but in different senses of the word useful. We saw above that utility signifies either the means to an end or a component of that end. Only friendship is useful in the second sense. Our only reason for cultivating virtue is to facilitate the act and make it pleasurable (in the broad sense of pleasure), but "without friends no one would choose to live, though he has all other goods (19)." We have now to classify the variety of relationships to which this analysis applies.

PART II - KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP

Chapter VI - Personal Friendship

I. Friendship, An Analogous Term

> Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the friendship of the good (1157 b 35).

The widespread use of the word friendship that we have found in the ancients has met with some opposition (1) and given rise to attempts to restrict its meaning to perfect friendship. Friendship does have a precise meaning, yet applies to a great variety of social relations.

> But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be friendships,...they appear not to be friendships...because of their unlikeness to the friendship of virtue (2).

We are dealing with an analogous term (3). Friendship is not a genus that subsumes so many species. It has a primary meaning, that we must now explicate, and all other relationships must be recognized as friendships to the extent that they resemble the primary analogate.

> There must, then, be three kinds of love, not all

> being so named for one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet having the same name quite by mere accident. For all the senses of love are related to one which is primary, just as is the case with the word 'medical,' and just as we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument, or act, but properly the name belongs to that primarily so called. The primary is that of which the definition is implied in the definition of all (4).

"... The primary friendship, that of good men, is a mutual returning of love and purpose (5)," amicitiam dicimus esse benevolentiam in contrapassis (6)," or again, "Diversae autem amicitiarum species accipiuntur quidem uno modo secundum diversitatem finis: ... Alio modo, secundum diversitatem communicationum in quibus amicitae fundantur (7)." Perfect friendship comprises two elements, (1) equality, the perfection in reciprocity, (2) likeness. In Chapter III, we saw that the good which motivates a friendship also forms the character. Men become friends because they share a common goal, consequently, because they resemble each other. "Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue (8)." We have a situation similar to that of justice, where the cardinal virtue manifests the nature of all the social virtues because of the elements common to each. A social virtue may fall short of perfect justice on one or both of two counts, otherness (equality) and obligation. Friendships are greater or lesser according as they resemble the perfect friendship in equality and likeness.

II. Primary Analogate

A. Friendship As Likeness

Now equality and likeness are friendship (1159 b 2).

Chapter III explained the nature of this likeness and its role in friendship. This likeness follows upon the good that motivates the friendship, which good is itself analogous (9). This was sufficiently discussed above. This section will be limited to a few remarks that point out the timeliness of the division and indicate its applicability. The three kinds of activity that determine the degree of perfection of friendship are, as we saw, leisure, recreation, and work. The object of each kind of activity determines its nature and not subjective dispositions, e.g. woodworking or football are not leisurely activity though one may choose to occupy his leisure time in these pursuits.

1. virtuous

True friendship consists in living the life of leisure together. Aristotle tells us why. (1) It is a friendship per se. "Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good, in themselves (10)." It follows from this, that as the per se is greater than the per accidens, so does this friendship surpass all others. "Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally (11)." This also accounts for the stability of the commun-

ion in question, "therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good - and goodness is an enduring thing (12)."

(2) This friendship lacks in nothing.

> And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like (13).

This guarantees the permanence of the relationship.

> And such a friendship is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure - good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling - and is based on a certain resemblance (14).

Nothing that we can expect of a friendship is lacking, and it binds persons who are good in an unqualified sense and similar. Furthermore, this is the ultimate in Friendship and the criterion for all others, "Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men (15)."

(3) A sign of this perfection can be found in the fact that it is so rare. If we reflect upon the requirements of such a friendship: being virtuous, finding another virtuous man, the opportunity for prolonged familiarity in order to test each other and grow together, we readily see it as a gift of God (16).

2. useful

The possibility of a friendship of utility has been contested be-

cause, the objection goes, if we cultivate a friendship for its usefulness, we do so for our own good, which is not friendship (17). As the Eudemian Ethics tells us, people customarily call these people friends. To deny them the name involves overlooking some pertinent facts.

> To speak, then, of friendship in the primary sense only is to do violence to facts, and makes one assert paradoxes; but it is impossible for all friendships to come under one definition. The only alternative left is that in a sense there is only one friendship, the primary; but in a sense all kinds are friendship, not as possessing a common name accidentally without being specially related to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as in relation to one and the same thing (18).

One of these facts is custom which is reflected in language. Another is experience which shows that we have preferences among business associates and tennis partners as well, "for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another (19)."

The etymology of both philia and amicitia underline this view. The term "philia" (20) is a late comer in Greek vocabulary (21). As far as can be determined, it must be identified with the primitive "Xenia." Its evolution would be parallel to that of the Roman "Hospitium Publicum." Originally it signified "establishing friendly relations."

In the Illiad, "philotes" was the peace which followed a war, an agreement among peoples or their leaders. It was applied to international law and

came to mean a treaty. Latin documents used the term amicitia.

In Rome, Hospitium publicum denoted the city's relations with a foreign city. (1) It signified a covenant of friendship. Both the terms philia and amicitia were used. It meant peace and the inscription of the party's name on Rome's official list of "friends" (formula amicorum, to ton philon diatagma). (2) It expressed a mutual pledge to protect one another's liberty and possessions. (3) It came to mean an exchange of ambassadors, and (4) finally, legislation regulating relations between private parties (22).

The obvious elements are reciprocity and utility (life and property). Not until Plato does philia mean affectionate regard or friendship as we understand it today, among equals (23). We find the same usage in Aristotle (24). In the early Christian era, its derivatives came to mean sex, especially in its perverted forms (25).

We know little more about the word amicitia than what has just been said. Already in Cicero's time the origin of the term had been lost.

Useful friendships are of the weakest. At the lowest limit, they resemble the relationship of affable people involved in a business transaction. Mutual consideration for each other makes it a friendship of this kind.

Of the three basic kinds of friendship, it is the least perfect, for the good that motivates the goodwill is least of all part of the person of the friend, usually external goods that he can provide. With regard to likeness, we saw that, as a rule, the requirements of this kind of friendship are fulfilled by per-

sons who are opposites with respect to the basis of the friendship.

Furthermore, the friend is loved not for his sake, but for the lover's. "Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves, but in virtue of some good which they get from each other (26)." It engages a minor part of a man's interests, and since it deals with needs, a good deal of which can be easily met, rests on an unstable foundation.

It is the most common, "the friendship based on usefulness is of course that of the majority (27)." It prevails among the elderly, to compensate for a waning vigor, among the young, usually in the hope of future pleasure, among men generally, for purely pragmatic reasons which are typified by the need a traveler has of the people he meets on a trip," ... ad amicitias quae sunt propter utilitatem quidam reducunt etiam amicitiam peregrinorum, qui seinvicem amare videntur propter utilitatem quam unus ab alio habet in sua peregrinatione (28)."

3. pleasant

In the hierarchy of friendship, the friendship of pleasure holds a middle ground between the virtuous and the useful, but it is much closer to the useful. Like the latter, one loves another for one's own good, however one is more apt to love the other for one of his qualities, wit, dexterity, etc., and though opposites may attract here also, this need not be the case.

This friendship excels the useful variety for it is more liberal. From the latter one expects profit, and this smacks of the business transaction.

> In amicitia delectabili amici magis liberaliter se amant quam in amicitia utili, in qua requiritur recompensatio lucri. Et sic hujusmodi amicitia videtur esse quasi negotiatio quaedam. Et ita amicitia quae est propter delectabile est potior, utpote similior perfectae amicitiae, quae est maxime liberalis, inquantum secundum ipsam propter se amici amantur (29).

It is also very common and characteristic of youth, "But the friendship based on pleasure is that of the young, for they are sensitive to pleasure (30)." As in the case of the useful friendship, pleasurable friendships can exist among anyone. "For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person (31)."

4. heterogeneous

A final possibility, the motives that bring the friends together may differ in each one of them, "for the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for utility (32)." The fact that each acts for a different good reduces the likeness even more and increases the occasions for quarrelling (33). All combinations are possible, the moral value and strength of each follows upon the weaker part of the friendship.

B. Friendship As Equality

The aforesaid friendships involve equality (1158 b 1).

Equality of partners properly constitutes personal friendship. This relationship obtains between private parties. A comparison with commutative justice would make this point more manifest. However, for the time being, suffice it to note "that the good man is at the same time pleasant and useful, but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is surpassed also in virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally exceeded in both respects (34)."

III. Summary

1. A personal friendship is one in which the partners are equals (with respect to the good that binds them) and the form of reciprocity parallels that of commutative justice.

2. Perfect friendship (per prius) exists when there is complete likeness and absolute equality among the friends. This obtains among men of character, their likeness alone is per se, whose intimacy is occupied with leisurely activity, i.e. philosophizing and, when possible contemplation. They are equal in all respects, consequently the quality of the persons does not constrain the freedom of give and take (35). This relationship alone deserves the name friendship of itself. Other forms of social relations are called friendship only to the extent that, and because they resemble this one.

3. Companionship can fall short of the perfect friendship on two counts, likeness or equality. With regard to likeness, the good which motivates the

goodwill will determine the quality of the association, virtue, pleasure, utility in the order of degradation. The value of the heterogeneous friendship depends upon the goods that inspire it, but it is as weak as its weakest member.

Friendship among unequals must be seen in the context of the society that fosters it. At this point we can say merely that the friendship varies inversely to the distance between the friends. Furthermore, distance usually implies a heterogeneous friendship, "nor is even that (the friendship) of father to son the same as that of son to father, not that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband (36)." We might note, however, that imperfect friendship often comprises intense love, e.g. the parents' affection for their children.

Chapter VII - Social Friendships

1. Among unequals

But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an inequality between the parties. (1158 b 12)

Friendships among unequals are parts of the city and must be seen within the context of that society. Aquinas summarized Aristotle's argument thusly: "Omnis amicitia in communicatione consistit. Omnis communicatio reducitur ad politicam. Ergo omnes amicitiae secundum politicas communicationes sunt accipiendae (1)."

All these relationships resemble political associations. They come to be for the purpose of providing the necessities of life, and so does the city.

> Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community; for we journey together with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both to have come together originally and to endure (2).

Aristotle gives two reasons for this: (1) "for this is what legislators aim at," (2) "and they call just that which is to the common advantage (3)."

Furthermore, friendships are parts of the city. All associations other than the city seek to provide some particular advantage (4), even those that exist in view of pleasurable activities, like social clubs, athletic leagues, committees

for organizing festivities and the like. Their function resembles that of recreation with regard to work. They fit within the context of the city which they serve. The reason was just given. They pursue particular goals, whereas the city promotes "what is advantageous for life as a whole (5)."

This was true of religious gatherings in the past and the nature of man hasn't changed. Pieper rightly maintains that the good life requires the practice of a public religious cult (liturgy) (6). The virtue of religion does not suffice. Though Christianity transcends the city the way ancient religions did not, it nevertheless provides the same benefits.

All other associations, therefore, form part of the city just as the good they provide is part of the common good for which the city exists. Friendship must be numbered among these associations, consequently, the diversity of friendships corresponds to the diversity of political regimes.

In conclusion, friendships among unequals participate, according to both meanings of the word, in that association which is the city. We must see, therefore, how this kind of friendship is (1) like political relations, and (2) a component of the city.

II. Like the city

Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community (1160 a 9).

A. Friendship is like justice

This appears from the fact that "in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too (7)." General usage corroborates this, "men address as friends their fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and so too those associated with them in any kind of community. And the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them (8). The ancient "proverb ' what friends have is common property' expresses this truth (9)," as well as popular expressions like "what is mine is yours", "make yourself at home" and the like. "And the demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have equal extension (10)."

B. Justice

1. Legal justice

The individual relates to the society in which he lives as part to whole. In order to integrate the whole, he must be ordered to it, i.e. he must be governed by its unifying principle, the common good. A man so ordered we call law-abiding or a just man according to the first meaning of the term legal justice (11). From this determination, there follows a special relationship to the other parts of the same whole. This virtue we call legal justice in a special sense. It regulates the relationship among individuals inasmuch as they are ordered to the same common good. "This form of justice, then, is complete

virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbor (12)."

2. Particular justice

This ordering of part to whole, as it were, does not cover all the bonds established by the society. Particular justice, within the same social context (13), perfects one's relationships with regard to the other members, i.e. to the parts as such. This virtue rectifies external acts and the exchange of goods which are the means of communication among men (14).

There are two kinds of particular justice. One governs the community's treatment of the individual in a movement from whole to part that protects the individual's position in the society. It "is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (15)." This is distributive justice. The other kind "plays a rectifying role in transactions between man and man (16)." It regulates exchanges between part and part. This is commutative justice.

a. distributive justice

Distributive justice protects each man's position in the society. This balanced coordination of the parts we call equality, and since the balance can be upset by the attribution of either an excess or a deficiency of goods or burdens to one of the parts in relation to the others, the object of justice is a mean, and a medium rei because there are others involved.

Now it is clear that there is also an inter-

> mediate between the two unequals involved in either case. And this is the equal; for in any kind of action in which there is a more and a less there is also what is equal. If, then, the unjust is unequal, the just is equal, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argument. And since the equal is intermediate, the just will be an intermediate (17).

Upon examination, we discover that we are dealing with four elements: two persons who are the terms of the relation, and two things by means of which they communicate. "The just, therefore, involves at least four terms for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects distributed, are two (18)."

Justice requires that the relation between person and thing remain constant. If, before an exchange, one man contributes or is worth twice as much as another, a fair transaction will give that man twice as much, "And the same equality will exist between the persons and between the things concerned (19)."

The mean of distributive justice is proportional (geometric proportion). One man's share in the common distribution will compare with another's the way his contribution to the common good compares to the other's. "Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows that the whole is to the whole as either part is to the corresponding part (20)."

A community as such cannot act For purposes of transactions, the community is concentrated in its ruler, "a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it (21)." Since

the distribution of community property falls exclusively within the scope of his competence, he is primarily the subject of distributive justice. However, this virtue also informs his subordinates in that they willingly accept a just distribution. What was said of the state applies also to imperfect societies and their authorities, e.g. a family and the head of the family, though he be a private citizen (22).

b. commutative justice

Commutative justice also promotes and preserves equality among citizens. Its mean however consists in a numerical equality, i.e. arithmetical and not geometrical. "But the justice in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion (23)."

This is because the quality of the person does not enter into account. The function of commutative justice is to regulate the communications between part and part. The balance is upset when one person receives more or less than the other in an exchange. It is restored by eliminating the difference. In other words, both parties are treated in the same manner, everyone is equal in the eyes of the law, "the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal (24)."

C. Justice compared with friendship

1. In what they are alike

Men structure their society by means of laws which become the norm of what is just and unjust, "the just, then, is the lawful (25)." Justice governs a man's actions in a way such that he maintains a relationship with others

that contributes to the attainment of the end of that society.

> Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society (26).

This holds true of friendship also. The law determines the relative position of each of the friends, and this position determines the right exchanges or transactions proper to their "conversatio."

2. In what they differ

a. equality

Since a friend is another self, whereas equality is the end to be attained in justice, it is a principle in friendship.

Justice is preoccupied primarily with guaranteeing that each person will receive in accordance with his situation or dignity. Making equals of the parties involved is foreign to justice. Friendship, on the other hand, presupposes some kind of equality among persons. If follows that communication between unequals in friendship reverses the procedure proper to justice. The equality of justice consists in maintaining the same proportion between things that exist between persons. Friendship seeks to make the persons equal (27).

The reason for this difference is that friendship is a kind of union or society that cannot exist among persons who are very distant; they must strive for equality. Hence, friendship uses goods equally in a pre-established equality, while justice

reduces inequality to equality. Equality is the end of justice, it is the beginning of friendship (28).

We get a sign of this in the fact that distance discourages friendship (29). Aristotle gives us three examples of this. Spirits do not cultivate friendships with men, such as to converse and live with them, kings do not frequent beggars, and the virtuous and vicious do not mix (30).

One might ask just how much distance a friendship can brook, and still survive. This cannot be answered determinately, but the margin is considerable (31).

This seems to impose limitations upon one's goodwill for a friend. One would not want the greatest goods for his friends, for in so doing he would lose him (32).

We can answer this in two ways. (1) As was said above, a friend wants goods for his friends for his own sake. We must suppose, that coming into these goods, he will remain himself in some way (33). (2) A friend wants goods for his friend, but not at all costs. Because each one wants most of all his own good, he cannot want for a friend those goods by means of which he would lose him (34).

b. obligation

The basis for one's rights in friendship also differ from that of justice. Justice deals with operations related to others under the law, but friendship is based on moral obligation, it is gratuitous (35).

The difference parallels that of servile and free act. The former is imposed by law, and therefore performed under a form of external coercion e.g. the fear of punishment. A free act proceeds from an interior inclination, it is spontaneous (36).

The obligation of justice being legal, its principle, ultimately, is reason (37).

The principle of friendship is love of self, "By a man's attitude to himself the other modes of friendship, under which we are accustomed to consider friendship in this discourse, are determined (38)." Consequently, we call the obligation moral, i.e. appetitive.

III. Part of the city (principle of division)

All the communities, then, seem to be parts of the political community. (1160 a 28)

A. The city: common good

1. It is a good

a. object

It is a common good that specifies the city. We saw above that an object can be called a good only if it answers a need on the part of the subject. However, we must not confuse a proper good with a particular good. The two are formally distinct.

> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum communē civitatis et bonum singulare unius personae non differunt solum secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam: alia enim est ratio boni communis et boni singularis, sicut et alia est ratio totius et partis (39).

b. reason

By nature, man desires to live in society. He attaches to the commonweal because: (1) he needs society, (2) there is a social dimension to his being.

> Ille qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis ex consequenti etiam quaerit bonum suum, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia bonum proprium non potest esse sine bono communi vel familiae vel civitatis aut regni. Unde et Maxumus Valerius dicit de antiquis Romanis quod malebant esse pauperes in divite imperio quam divites in paupere imperio. - Secundo, quia, cum homo sit pars domus et civitatis, oportet quod homo consideret quid sit sibi bonum ex hoc quod est prudens circa bonum multitudinis: bona enim disposito partis accipitur secundum habitudinem ad totum; quia ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Confes. (III, 8, 15), turpis est omnis pars suo toti non congruens (40).

c. greatest good

Aristotle tells us that it is the greatest good: "In the most sovereign of all the arts and sciences...the end in view is the greatest good and the good which is most pursued. The good in the sphere of politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest (41)." Man loves most a good which transcends him, "unaquaeque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium (42)."

2. Common

a. what it is not

This good must have an amplitude and a perfection such that it can be enjoyed in its integrity by several people at once (43). It is not the sum total of the particular goods of each member of a given society. Nor is it the

proper good that benefits a member by means of the other members. Nor is it the attraction exercised on others from the fact that it is a good, what we mean when we say that of its nature, a good is diffusive of self (44).

b. what it is

It is the end of the society whose goodness is based upon the fact that it is shared or susceptible of being shared (45). We define it as "aliquid commune secundum participationem unius et ejusdem secundum numerum (46)." The Eudemian Ethics gives us the example of two citizens, an Athenian and a Megarian (47). In spite of what they have in common, they cannot be friends on this score, not only because they do not live together, but because they do not have a common cause to unite them.

We call it common because it is communicable (48). The object exercises an attraction on more than one subject. The community of this causality, the object's power to perfect several subjects is a component of its attractiveness. In other words, the relative universality of the end attaches to the formality of the object (49).

The existence of the object does not depend upon a "de facto" communication to several subjects. Communicability, not actual communication defines the good. A private good does not become a common good by the decision of one pursuing that good. On the other hand, if one rejects the communal aspect of a good which is common objectively, his end cannot become the basis of a society. A husband and wife can genuinely dedicate themselves to the upbringing of their

children, but as competitors in a struggle for influence. Besides the harm done to the children, this will produce two strangers living under one roof (50). There will be no genuine "convivere" (51).

The common good is concretized in that in which it exists primarily, as an army's good consists in the attainment of the general's goal, the good of the state in that of its ruler. In the natural order, the hand can be said to prefer the safety of the head to its own, witness the instinctive warding off of danger, because the body's good is primarily that of the head (52).

3. Subject of the common good

a. part and whole

In any society, the individual benefits from the good of the whole. One member does not intend the good of another immediately: "bonum commune est finis (53)." The person relates to the community as a part does to the whole, and the parts exist for the sake of the whole (54).

To desire the good of a society in order to possess it or for the purpose of attaining one's particular end is a tyrannical love, selfishness. Love of the common good seeks to preserve, protect and promote the welfare of the society in question, at the expense of the private good and with personal risk when required (55).

b. kinds of parts

A member relates to a society as a part does to the whole.

The term part can be variously conceived. It may mean (1) the result of a quantitative division (56), (2) the object of a distinction, as a species is part of its genus, (3) an essential component, (4) a concept contained in a more universal one (57).

c. priority of whole

We are concerned here with the third meaning, since the common good is a reality of which the private goods are components. The parts are prior to the whole as simple entities that go to make up the composite, but, in the order of nature, they are posterior, since outside the whole they lose their identity as parts.

Applied to our problem, this means that there would be no common good unless there were private goods, and in this sense, the private good is prior. However, the good of the individual member of a society cannot exist apart from the good of the society as a whole.

We noted above that the very notion of person implies capacity for communication: "rationalis naturae individua substantia - the individual substance of a rational nature," where nature means a principle of operation. The person is not wanted for the sake of its incommunicability. On the contrary, far from being "for itself," it makes communication with itself possible "actiones sunt suppositorum (58)."

A person separated from the society is a person, i.e. a social animal, only in an analogous sense. The social animal's individual good cannot exist without that of the society, whereas the latter's good can subsist without some of its parts, i.e. without the private good of some of its individuals.

We say "some parts" because there are some which, though not prior to the whole in the meaning taken here, i.e. though they cannot exist independently of the whole, are nevertheless indispensable. They are said to be simultaneous because the whole depends upon them for its existence. Such is the case of the vital organs in an animal (59).

In Book VII of the Metaphysics (60), Aristotle makes even more explicit, the priority of the whole. Here he shows that the components do not exist in act, but only potentially (61). That the components exist in potency only is obvious from the fact that they have no separate existence. Furthermore, they are parts to the extent that they are united to the whole (62). A chemical compound illustrates this point. The elements that compose it do not exist in act, they lose their properties, but do exist in the compound, potentially. This will be one reason why happiness requires friendship.

4. Conclusion

In sum, since we are dealing with a good, and therefore a reality, not a definition, the whole precedes the parts, i.e. the common good takes precedence. The whole is prior to its integral parts, so the purpose of the community comes before that of the persons involved.

A friendship among unequals, therefore, has its 'raison d'etre' outside itself. It is preserved by promoting not its own good, but that of the community to which it belongs.

B. Principle of division

1. Kind of community

a. friendship and justice

The reciprocity that constitutes friendship parallels that of justice. This was brought out in the previous section. Relationships among unequals manifest more clearly that friendship accompanies justice. They are not only alike but together. In justice, we treat the other in accordance with the dictates of reason (the law proximately), in friendship, the same person in the same social context becomes an object of affection. "Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with the same object and exhibited between the same persons. ...and the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them." (63).

b. friendship and community

We saw that the community produces and fosters friendships among unequals. Resemblance in this case, becomes common interests. The first division that imposes itself corresponds to the two kinds of natural association, the family and the state.

1) family

a) nature

(1) home

"One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship of kindred and that of comrades (64)." The family, being a distinct kind of community, gives rise to a distinct kind of association. Family friendships are distinct relationships for as Democritus had observed relatives aren't necessarily friends. "Not all one's relatives are friends, but only those who agree with us about what is advantageous (65)." As St. Thomas points out family friendships are genuine friendships that depend upon a choice (love) and agreement (reciprocity). They differ from civic friendships not in that they do not depend upon an agreement, but in that the latter is less obvious. "Distinguit secundum communicationem species amicitiae, de quibus minus videtur (66)."

The family exists to provide and foster the individual's esse, as Aristotle explains for example, "The art of household management must either find ready at hand, or itself provide such things necessary to life (67)." It is natural in the primary sense of the term, i.e. based on blood. All the associations of this kind are friendships to the extent that they participate in the father-son relation, "The friendship of kinsmen itself, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on parental friendship (68). Though it begins the education of the citizen its mode of operation resembles that of nature, i.e. instinct (69). The proper cause of this kind of love is closeness, "for parents love their children as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being something originating from them (70)."

(2) related associations

Just as the family's proper function is education as well as procreation, so the associations that produce "family friendships" are not limited to the family proper. "Et dicit, quod secundum diversitatem communicationis protest aliquis distinguere adinvicem et ab aliis amicitam cognatam, idest quae est inter consanguineos, et etairicam, idest quae est inter connutritos. Cognati enim communicant in origine, etairi autem in nutritione (71)."

These groupings include extensions of the family, i.e. relatives (uncles, cousins, etc.) and the circle of family friends. They also comprise the neighborhood and relation associations like the gang and in our mobile society, the city. With the formation of kingdoms and nations, the city had already assumed the functions of the ancient family (72). Technology has brought its members closer to each other.

(b) characteristics

We will readily recognize in these associations what sociologists generally refer to as primary groups. They answer the needs of the individual (as opposed to the citizen) (73), stress love, educate, and gather for reasons of pleasure. Negatively, they may inhibit maturity by perpetuating a need for undue dependence upon the group, and foster narrow minds and provincialism (74).

2) state

a) nature

The state complements the family's life-preserving role but must assume responsibility for providing the means for the good life. "When several villages are united in a single complete community large enough to be nearly or quite self sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life (75)." Where the family centered around its origins, the state draws its unity from its goals. Whereas the former inspires loyality to blood, the latter rallies around the standard of excellence or virtue. "For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; ...But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is justice is the principle of order in political society (76)." It satisfies his social instinct and fits him for the good life (77).

It provides man with his greatest good, and concerns itself with his bene esse. "But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good (78)." Consequently, just as virtue is inchoately natural and formally man's doing, so the state is the product of both nature and human industry. "A sociai instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors (79)."

Reason prevails over blood, and the resulting friendship will bear this mark.

b) related associations

Here as above, we have derivative forms, the most obvious being the organizations within the state whose specific goals contribute to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," i.e. business, social, cultural or professional organizations, together with political parties.

In this context also, we must envisage the broader community of mankind, which transcends the artifical boundaries of the statesmen (i.e. the bond created by particular constitutions) but nonetheless can thrive only on the grounds of justice, i.e. the philanthropy of the ancients. Aristotle recognized this broader foundation for goodwill in the friendships of traveling companions. Presumably among people who travel abroad, "We can see even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other (80)." Furthermore, slaves can be friends, precisely because they are human beings, though incapable of governing themselves. "Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true (81)." Further study should be made of the suggestion of Pope John XXIII in Pacem in Terris to the effect that this foundation is the

> jus gentium est quidem aliquo modo naturale homini, secundum quod est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege naturali per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota a principiis. Unde de facili in hujusmodi homines consenserunt. Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime ab eo quod est omnibus animalibus commune (82).

c) characteristics

These friendships answer the description of the sociologists' secondary groups. The good which forms such groups is man's bene esse. "The protection of social and political freedom is thus the chief positive function of the group..." (83). Reason has priority over nature in these associations. They are fundamentally utilitarian as opposed to primary groups (84). So where family friendships would be "warm, solidary, person-oriented" (85) political friendships are cool, practical and businesslike.

2. Principle of sub-division

Since law provides the framework for friendship, the kinds of friendship will correspond to the kinds of consitutions.

a. kinds of constitutions

1) good

There are three basic kinds of regime, depending on who embodies authority. There is (1) monarchy, one man rule; (2) aristocracy, the rule of the most qualified and therefore the few; (3) timocracy, (for the sake of clarity, The Oxford-Ross rendering is retained (86), the rule of the free and equal, both rich and poor, therefore the rule of the majority. There is a variety of other forms of government, but they are all combinations of these three types. (Aristotle analyzes several of these mixed forms of government in Politics IV.)

2) deviations

There exists perversions of each of these forms: (1) tyranny, one man rule primarily for the personal advantage of the ruler; (2) oligarchy, rule by the wealthy with a view to class interests; (3) democracy. In this context, we mean the rule of the majority, the poor, without regard for excellence.

b. family

1) good

The associations that form the household follow the same patterns. (1) "For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children;...it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule. (2) The association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. (3) The association of brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal, except in so far as they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the friendship is no longer of the fraternal type (87)."

2) deviations

Corrupt forms of each of these also exist. (1) A father's rule is tyrannical when he treats his children like slaves, or otherwise rules for his

personal advantage (88). (2) If a man rules in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in doing so he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth (89)." We have an oligarchy also when the woman rules, be it for reasons of character or family wealth (90). (3) "Democracy is found chiefly in masterless dwellings (for here every one is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and every one has licence to do as he pleases (91)."

IV. Corresponding friendships

The particular kinds of friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of community. (1160 a 29)

A. In general

In each of the good associations of the above division, whenever there is goodwill based on the association (we saw above that this is not automatic), the love corresponds exactly to the specifications of justice that obtain in that particular relationship.

In the case of the corrupt relationships, friendship seldom exists. The possibility of friendship is in inverse proportion to the distance between the parties. Consequently, friendship is practically non existent between a tyrant and his subject, and what friendship there is exists mostly among the members of a timocracy, or its domestic counterpart, i.e. brothers in an anarchic household. "But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no friendship...in democracies they

exist more fully; for where the citizens are equal they have much in common (92)."

B. Some particular cases

Within the family closeness, generally, determines the intensity of a friendship. "Ratio dilectionis in omni amicitia cognata est propinquitas unius ad alterum (93)." Some consequences, however, must be noted.

1. Parents and children

In the parent-child relationship we must distinguish friendship proper and love. As children mature and acquire an identity of their own, the good that is the ground of their intimacy with their parents becomes more and more limited. Where the son pursues a career other than that of his father, the convivere is often limited to visits to and from "the grandparents," i.e. exercises of filial piety. Friendship is a matter of choice, and tenuous in this case.

However, the love that binds parents and children is the strongest of human affections. The heterogeneity which characterizes this kind of reciprocity, as we saw above, does not detract from this affection, which follows upon nature and not choice. It is the strongest bond that exists because we want our existence most of all and "parents love their children as being part of themselves, and children their parents as being something originating from them (94)."

In this perspective, a mother loves more than a father does. Her parenthood is more obvious, and she begins to communicate with the child sooner than the father. "Magis enim possunt, scire matres qui sunt eorum filii quam patres.

Similiter etiam quantum ad tempus. Prius enim tempore matres ex convictu concipiunt amoris ad filios affectum quam patres (95)."

2. Siblings

Because of the causal role of proximity, a brother and sister who differ in age by one or two years will develop a more intense family friendship than two brothers who differ considerably in age (96). Fraternal communion follows upon paternal affection, "for their (the children's) identity with them (the parents) makes them identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of 'the same blood,' 'the same stock,' and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing though in separate individuals (97)."

Brothers may well become fast friends in the primary sense of the term. To this end they have a head start since they have more in common with each other than with anyone else, and know each other much sooner. However, if a friendship in the primary sense develops between them, it is a relationship formally distinct from that of fraternal friendships (98). The two associations would strengthen each other.

3. Man and wife

The man and wife relationship is essentially natural, "children seem to be a bond of union (which is the reuson why childless people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is common holds them together (99)." Procreation is a work of nature, the child is the good upon which

this union is based, so it is natural. Man is inclined to form couples - even more than to form cities (100).

However, a marriage in its origin is the result of a choice. To the extent that partners accept each other, their mutual love approximates that of the perfect friendship. As man and wife, they cannot realize perfectly the primary analogate of friendship, marriage is based on their differences. Nevertheless, their union is human (not natural) in origin, so "this friendship may be based on virtue, if the parties are good; for each has its own virtue and they will delight in the fact (101)."

In contemporary western society, the choice is usually made by the parties themselves. When the choice is motivated by virtue and similarity of interests, the friendship can come that much closer to the ideal.

PART III - EFFECTS OF FRIENDSHIP

Chapter VIII - The Effects of Friendship

1. The cause is love of self

A. Love of self

The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most, or some one else. (1168 a 28)

1. All love is love of self

All love is the connaturality for the object of an appetite which has received the imprint of that object. There must of necessity be "something in it for me (1)."

Though the inclination may be innate, as a man's desire to exist, live and know; or acquired, as an overindulged passion, it is essentially a subjective disposition, and in this sense, natural for the person. The object will be loved either because it has a perfection to which the subject is disposed as an individual, or because it is a perfection like that of the subject himself. In the former case, the subject improves, in the latter, he considers the object as an extension of himself or as an increment of his own perfection. In either case the subject gains, and existentially (2).