

2. Two kinds of love of self

Cultivating the love of self does not necessarily debase a man. He should not seek to "mortify" it, for it is the basis of his excellence. No one blames a man for cultivating virtue, which manifests a love of self greater than that of most men (3).

One who desires greater things for himself loves himself more. What greater good is there than virtue (4)? As a head of state is his country, so a man is his intellect (5). The concept of continence confirms this identification. A man is said to be continent because he contains himself. He acts in accordance with his judgment (6). We impute to a man those acts which he performs voluntarily. The man of passion reacts, external factors determine his behavior, and to the extent that they do, he behaves sub-humanly (7). A man's greatest good, therefore, is a life according to reason.

Furthermore, the more important the part to which you are attached, the greater your love of the whole. Man's intellect is his characteristic power, and it governs all his other faculties. Virtue either perfects the intellect or causes the cooperation between it and the other powers. Man loves himself most, therefore, who pursues a life of excellence (8).

This love differs from selfishness. The latter is intent on gratifying passion, the former on developing the life of reason. True love of self seeks a real good, selfishness pursues goods which appeal to the subject but harm him (9).

The former is praiseworthy (10). It contains none of the characteristics for

which we judge selfishness with approbrium. Out of devotion for friend or country, the true lover of self spurns the goods which are the bone of contention in most quarrels (11). Because he prefers a short intense life to the humdrum of protracted mediocrity, and the performance of one great deed to the accumulation of lesser ones, he will risk death for a loved one or for his country (12). He prizes integrity above wealth, status and notoriety (13). He will step aside to let a friend distinguish himself, for he will deem it preferable to favor the great deed of a friend rather than to perform it himself (14). He has none of the odium which attaches to selfishness (15).

3. Love of self: cause of friendship

a. friendship originates in love of self

We choose a friend because we enjoy his presence, "he would be a friend to him whom he wishes to live with merely for the sake of his company and for no other reason (16)." We choose him not merely because we are alike, but because we want to live and feel with him.

For the friend wants, if possible, not merely to feel pain along with his friend, but to feel the same pain, e.g. to feel thirsty when he is thirsty, if that were possible, and if not, then to feel pain as like as possible. The same words are applicable to joy, which, if felt for no other reason than that the other feels joy, is a sign of friendship (17).

Our love of self is not merely a criterion whereby we see the similarity between ourselves and the other, it is the source of our goodwill, "Friendly relations with

one's neighbours, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself (18)."

We relate to the other in the same way we relate to ourselves, i.e. we want for him the same goods we desire for ourselves, and we want them for the same reason.

For a man seems to us a friend, who wishes the good or what he thinks to be such to some one, not on his own account but for the sake of that other; or, in another way, if he wishes for another man existence - even if he is not bestowing goods, still less existence - on that account and not on his own, he would seem most of all to be a friend to him (19).

We love ourselves most, love unites and no one is closer to us than ourselves (20). The virtuous man wants the greatest goods for himself. He applies himself to the cultivation of his mind and the integrity of his person, i.e. the care of his inferior powers and of his body that makes them servants of the intellect in the pursuit of wisdom. "But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at all events he assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best, and gratifies the most authoritative element in himself and in all things obeys this (21)." He will settle for nothing short of happiness, which is precisely what he wants for his friend.

The same reason motivates the love of this good, both for him and for his friend. We desire our own happiness for no ulterior reason, i.e. we want it for our own sake. We seek a friend's happiness in the same way, i.e. for his sake.

... for no one benefits himself for some further reason or speaks well of himself for a certain

consideration, because his actions are that of an individual;... . And wishing the existence above all of the friend, living with him, sharing his joy and his grief, unity of soul with the friend, the impossibility of even living without one another, and the dying together are characteristic of a single individual (22).

b. not for the immoral man

This implies that a true friendship presupposes an ordered love of self. An immoral man will not become a true friend because he is incapable of it. He is not in harmony with himself. His disordered will conflicts with his natural desires, the lack of moral virtue allows his appetite to operate independently of, even at cross purposes with his reason. The empirical psychologist would say that his personality is not integrated. Love unites. If he cannot be at one with himself, a fortiori can he not be so with another, one distinct from him by nature. "In the bad man, e.g. the incontinent, there is variance, and for this reason it seems possible for a man to be at enmity with himself (23)."

Furthermore, true friendship is a permanent union of persons who are alike. Dissociation from one's true ultimate good, the only adequate agent of personal integrity, results in internal anarchy. The bad man's activity follows now one impulse, now another. Or again, changing circumstances will prompt a change of heart. In other words he is fickle. If "the wicked man is not one but many, in the same day other than himself and fickle (24)," true friendship becomes impossible. You cannot unite permanently to the transient.

c. but for the virtuous

Virtue provides a solid basis for friendship. It is a permanent disposition thanks to which man pursues his ultimate end with pleasure. Consequently, he is stable. The moral virtues subordinate his lower appetites to his reason, in the manner described above (cf. section on human love). Thus, he is untroubled. If he has the good fortune to meet someone like him, nothing will prevent a stable union. If their similarity is that proper to friendship, their appetite will draw them towards intimacy.

It becomes obvious that the friend will be interested in his friend primarily for what he is, i.e. his character, his aspirations, the activity that brings them together. The latter's history and the vicissitudes of his life will concern the former only to the extent that they affect the friendship. As C. S. Lewis puts it, "Friendship, unlike Eros, is uninquisitive. You become a man's Friend without knowing or caring whether he is married or single or how he earns his living. What have all these 'unconcerning things, matters of fact' to do with the real question, Do you see the same truth (25)?" We borrow another apt analogy from the same writer, "Eros will have naked bodies; Friendship naked personalities (26)."

4. Objection

The concept of disinterested love (27) has been created to explain the nature of goodwill. The distinction between righteous love of self and selfishness makes this concept unnecessary. Besides, if love is a conformation of the

appetite, which appetite tends towards objects in reality, disinterested love is a contradiction in terms. The appetite is moulded by a singular existing object. The subject-object relationship is existential, i.e. entitative. One can recognize the superiority of one woman over another and prefer the latter (28).

This distinction also sheds light on the Eros-Agape debate (29), but this is a theological issue, and therefore outside the scope of this paper.

B. Cause of the acts of friendship

The marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself. (1166 a 1)

1. Beneficence

The man of virtue wants the best for himself. Being a realist, he appreciates goods at their true value, and knowing that man must work at his perfection, i.e. to acquire his good, he does not lose himself in idle dreams or wishful thinking, he acts (30). Since he is virtuous, i.e. good and disposed to act well, he pursues reasonable goods, i.e. goods of the intellect or that contribute to the operations of his governing power (31).

This appears from an analysis of the nature of beneficence. Admittedly, the benefactor loves the beneficiary more than vice versa. The reason generally adduced is that the former seeks to protect his own interest, consequently manifests more solicitude for the recipient of his gifts than the latter does for him. This explanation appeals to the widespread selfishness among men.

Aristotle rejects this argument and goes to the heart of the matter (32). He feels that the case as presented above was badly stated. It is more basic to discuss this point in terms of the nature of beneficence, rather than by comparing the benefactor with the creditor. Creditors do not love their debtors, they protect them out of self interest. The benefactor, on the contrary, really loves those whom he favors even if he never derives any advantage from them.

Aristotle defends his position by means of four arguments. In the first, he compares the benefactor with the craftsman. A craftsman always loves his own works more than he would be loved by them if, hypothetically, they were to come to life. This is most obvious in the case of the practitioners of the liberal arts. The beneficiary is the benefactor's work.

This attitude is based on the love which each man has for himself. To the extent that we exist, we are good. The good is lovable and worthy of choice. For us, to be means to live and therefore to act. There is no life without vital operations. Hence vital operations are desirable in themselves. To act is in a sense the work of the agent. The activity of the agent exists in the recipient. Therefore, in the same manner as a craftsman or a poet, the benefactor will love his work, because he loves himself which is most natural.

Aristotle elucidates his argument, namely that an agent loves his work because he loves himself, in the following manner. Man exists insofar as he has a rational soul. The soul is the first act of a natural body having life potentially, that is, which is capable of vital operations. Man's being consists primarily in having a capacity for vital operations. The actual exercise of these vital operations

reduces this capacity to actuality.

The second argument states that everyone loves his proper good. The good of the benefactor is his activity, which consists in bestowing benefits. This is an act of virtue. So, the benefactor loves the recipient in whom he finds his own good. But the recipient finds nothing praiseworthy in his part of the transaction. To accept a favor is not noble in itself. At best it is expedient, which is less desirable and enjoyable than virtue. It becomes obvious that the benefactor loves the recipient more than vice versa.

Aristotle substantiates this argument in a twofold manner. We enjoy our present activity, our hopes for the future and our memories of the past. We enjoy most of all present activities. The benefactor's worthiness remains with him for some time, he can enjoy it as a present good. For the recipient, the utility of the benefit quickly passes away, he remains with a memory. The present excellence which the recipient represents for the benefactor is more gratifying than the usefulness of the latter for the former.

Furthermore, the memory of a worthy deed is pleasant, that of useful ones less so if at all. We appraise hopes differently. We look forward with more eagerness to a useful good than we do to a noble one.

This is because a known good pleases more than an unknown one. Only the possessor knows a noble good. Only past works of excellence are known to others. Useful goods both past and to come are known, but the memory of past help soon fades away. We look upon expected help as a remedy against future needs. It pleases more than the memory of them or of worthiness. But the memory of the latter

is more pleasant than that of useful goods. A recipient is a reminder of the benefactor's excellence, while the benefactor reminds the recipient of a useful good. The benefactor's position is preferable.

Thirdly, Aristotle tells us, loving can be compared to making. The lover wishes well to and does well by the loved one. Now, love is active, to be loved implies passivity. Activity excels passivity. Understandably, agents like a benefactor, a craftsman and a poet will love and profit by their activity the way a lover does.

Fourthly, we appreciate most what we have earned, witness the handling of money by a man who worked for it, and the prodigality of his heirs. A beneficiary receives without having earned. To give requires consideration and effort. Whence, we expect a benefactor to love more.

This is why a mother loves her children more than does the father. Child-birth is more painful and demanding for her. Furthermore, she cannot doubt her parenthood with regard to her child. A benefactor loves more because giving cost him something (33).

Depravity makes this impossible. Passions and the will conflict, as is obvious in the case of incontinent man who covets things he judges to be bad. Others, through fear or laziness, remain inactive. The man lacking in virtue deprives himself of benefits because he indulges in harmful activities or because he avoids profitable deeds (34). If he cannot achieve his own good, he will be useless to another.

2. Goodwill

One of our most basic and strongest impulses is for self-preservation.

We want the survival of what we are, this particular human being. We desire the greatest goods for ourselves, within the limits of our capacity. We would not accept the world or even supreme wisdom, were the gift conditional on our being transformed into something or someone else, "For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one else (35)."

This applies only to the virtuous man. He is good, therefore loveable. The truly wicked man is a burden to himself and an object of hatred on the part of others. He seeks escape rather than living, but he doesn't truly love himself, hence he cannot love another. "And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy themselves (36)."

3. Unanimity

Unanimity with another follows upon unity within oneself. The good man is stable. His will being fixed in the good, there is continuity in his life and little room for regret (37). He enjoys life, a gratifying past because of its fullness, a hopeful future, based on this past, and a rich now, since he possesses ample matter for contemplation (38). His passions do not upset him. They obey the dictates of his conscience, thus eliminating inner conflicts. This personal integrity makes for a happy life and if he had to start over, he would not live different-

ly (39).

Not so the man of evil. He seeks his immediate advantage, grasping at unfair advantages, avoiding even his share of burdens. He doesn't make himself loveable, and his failure to contribute to the common good antagonizes others. His injustice creates conflicts, and generally a rather miserable existence (40).

He cannot live with himself, so he seeks escape (41). His past is no cause for joy. He views the future with misgivings. He finds nothing within himself worthy of love (42). Sensual pleasures bring little relief because he has an intellect which soon will condemn his disorderly conduct. This is why solitude becomes unbearable. He must avoid thinking in order to escape from himself, and palliates his anguish with external activity and the presence of others (43). If pleasures, particularly violent ones seem to help, they are quickly followed by a void (nausea?) and remorse (44). Happiness cannot be measured in minutes, it is "activity of soul in accordance with virtue, ...but we must add 'in a complete life' (45)." He cannot befriend himself, much less someone else.

II. Effects of friendship

A. Goodwill

For we define a friend as one who wishes... what is good,
or seems so, for the sake of his friend. (1166 a 2-3)

1. Object

The object of goodwill is the friend's existence and life. We want

his welfare for no reason other than his well-being itself. This is exemplified by a mother's attitude towards her son, for whom no sacrifice is too great. We see it also in friends who have had a temporary falling out, yet remain genuinely concerned for each other, "one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake; which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come into conflict (46)."

2. Definition

This act consists of a cool acquiescence of the will to the other's good, "proprie actus voluntatis quo alteri bonum volumus (47)." It is not to be confused with gift-love which is a component of the definition of friendship and was discussed above. We can experience goodwill on behalf of strangers. Friendship implies a minimum of familiarity. "Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but not identical with friendship; for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does not know (48)." The object of this goodwill can be unaware of it, not so with friendship, "for one may have goodwill...towards people...without their knowing it, but not friendship (49)."

Furthermore, the goodwill of which we speak here is not any of the forms of love discussed in Chapter III. Sensual love is impulsive, while goodwill is not. Passion is aroused and grows, whereas goodwill can be sudden and superficial, as exemplified in the custom of "betting on a corner" at a boxing match, where we want one of the contestants to win without knowing him, or caring what he does outside the ring.

But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel goodwill for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially (50).

We must not confuse, either, the goodwill of which we speak here with an act of spiritual love. The latter is an affection that seeks union with the loved-one, the former, a simple act that does not imply a desire to communicate with the person it intends, "we would not do anything with them (51)."

Nor must we confuse the goodwill of which we speak here with the virtue that Aristotle analyzes in IV Ethics (52), variously known as friendliness, affability or sociability. This virtue orders serious conversation and similar exchanges, most properly characteristic of man, who by nature is a social animal (53). The motive here is the agent himself and not someone else, much like a generous man who gives because he is generous (54). We are concerned here with a simple volition bearing on the good of another person.

3. Relation to friendship

Goodwill is to friendship what the pleasing appearance of a woman is to love for her. We cannot identify love with the delight of seeing, but there would be no love without it. "Goodwill seems then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love (55)." Just as the desire

to see differs from desire, goodwill differs from friendship. It isn't translated into action. Constant exposure, though, may lead to an effective will, and so goodwill can be considered as a dormant friendship, "And so one might by an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship (56)."

Since goodwill intends the good of a person, it does not grow into a friendship of utility or of pleasure. In these cases, the person is not loved for himself. This friendship stems from a need-love which goodwill excludes. Wishing someone well for what we can get from him is not loving another person as such. There is an exception in the useful friendship of a just man. He will experience goodwill for a benefactor.

The man who has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but in doing so is only doing what is just; while he who wishes someone to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him (57).

Goodwill, therefore, initiates friendship of excellence. The motive is a virtue of the person. This is true even in spectator sports where we want one of the contestants to win because of an excellence he possesses, skill, strength, or the like.

B. Unanimity

And others define him as one who lives with and has the same tastes as another, or one who grieves and rejoices with his friend. (1166 a 7-8)

1. Object

Friends, being two bodies in one soul, will have the same preferences and agree in their decisions. This we call unanimity, the second act characteristic of a friend. It concerns itself with the goods that determine the friend's moral character, a.v., what, above, we called his personality, in contradistinction to his person, the object of goodwill. Specifically, these goods are of three kinds, the friend's overt behavior (external acts), his choices and his passions.

"And others define (the friend) as one who lives with and has the same tastes as another, or one who grieves and rejoices with his friends (58)."

Unanimity has nothing to do with shared opinion. History offers clear examples of fast friends who followed conflicting schools of thought, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas for example, and closer to us, G.K. Chesterton and G.B. Shaw. Friendship concerns itself with objects of choice, and not with speculative matters. "It is not identity of opinion;... nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every subject are unanimous (59)."

It is sometimes heard that women do not make good friends, even for other women. If we recall Gina Lombroso's astute observations (60), a woman attaches to a person, not to a cause or goal. If such be the case, a clash of opinions means for a woman, a difference of personalities, whereas for men, even when their ideas differ, if they agree, for example, that thinking is important, they have found another self. Disagree with a man's friend and you may have a new friend, disagree with a woman's beloved and you have a new enemy.

Unanimity relates to operables. Harmony among states, unanimity writ large, exists when the states agree on what is mutually beneficial, a.v., the useful, which is operable (61). The agreement must bear on matters of some import, differences on minor issues do not disturb a friendship, and the objects of mutual consent must be within the realm of possibility for the parties involved. Furthermore, the good decided upon must be numerically one. To illustrate again by means of the city, if all the citizens vote for the same man, we have unanimity. If each one wants the position for himself, we have discord (62).

2. Definition

Unanimity, as we saw, concerns external behavior, choice and passions. It consists in eliciting all three in unision with the friend. This means shared activity, corresponding preferences and decisions, and sympathy in the literal sense of rejoicing and suffering with. Again mothers illustrate this best (63).

3. Relation to friendship

Unanimity is essential to friendship. It is identical with social friendships, a rather weak but universal form of friendship as the section on the kinds of friendship explained. To revert to the large script of political life, nations that agree on a course of action and are in accord on what is useful to each, are said to be friendly nations, or to live in harmony (64).

C. Beneficence

For we define a friend as one who...does what is good,
or seems so, for the sake of his friend. (1166 a 3)

1. Object

Beneficence, finally, is an activity proper to the friend. Its object is the same as that of goodwill.

Beneficentia nihil aliud importat quam facere bonum alicui. Potest autem hoc bonum considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem boni. Et hoc pertinet ad communem rationem beneficentiae. Et hoc est actus amicitiae, et per consequens caritatis. Nam in actu dilectionis includitur benevolentia, per quam aliquis vult bonum amico. Voluntas autem est affectiva eorum quae vult, si facultas adsit (65).

They differ in that beneficence perfects the external acts whereas goodwill regulates the internal, "beneficentia et benevolentia non differunt nisi sicut actus exterior et interior: quia beneficentia est executio benevolentiae (66)."

2. Definition

Beneficence consists in the willing gift of benefits. A friend gives spontaneously, real or apparent goods, for the friend's sake. He gives effectively, merely wishing to do so does not suffice. Friendship requires that the act not be performed without the other's knowledge, and it does not abide neglect, hence the importance of the flowers and/or the candy. Aristotle adds goods, real or apparent, because we decide according to the way we see. Finally, the gift must be for the sake of the recipient. To cultivate someone for an ulterior motive is unworthy of a

friend. We do the same for a horse (67).

3. Relation to friendship

Beneficence is essential to the perfection of friendship, and is a sign of it. Firstly, beneficence perfects and preserves friendship. The will is effective whenever possible. This requires both wanting and doing good in a friend's behalf. Since a deficiency vitiates the act, "ad hoc quod aliquid sit malum, sufficit unus singularis defectus: ad hoc autem quod sit simpliciter bonum, non sufficit unum singulare bonum, sed requiritur integritas bonitatis (68)", friendship requires that one give effectively except in cases of impossibility.

Beneficence is ordered to friendship, more specifically to gift-love whose object it attains, so it isn't a morally distinct act. However, like external acts, it contributes to the virtue that produced it, namely preservation and growth, for it intensifies and prolongs the internal act, and also occasions its repetition.

...si loquamur de bonitate exterioris actus quam habet et bonitate finis (and such is the case with beneficence), tunc actus exterior nihil addit ad bonitatem, nisi contingat ipsam voluntatem secundum se fieri meliorem in bonis, vel pejorem in malis, quod quidem videtur posse contingere tripliciter. Uno modo secundum numerum: ...alio modo quantum ad extensionem: ...tertio secundum intensionem:...(69).

Consequently, beneficence signifies friendship. It externalizes the internal disposition. "...Effectus, et signa charitatis ex interiori dilectione procedunt, et ei proportionantur (70)."

It follows from this that, although giving to a friend something that is dear

to us may produce an internal conflict, the internal repulsion does not detract from the friendship. On the contrary, it indicates a deeper attachment to the friend.

"Sed ex parte exterioris data collatio beneficii pertinet in generali ad amicitiam vel caritatem. Unde hoc non derogat amicitiae si aliquis rem quam concupiscit retinere det alicui propter amorem; sed magis ex hoc ostenditur amicitiae perfectio (71)."

Secondly, it is essential because friendship, like justice, consists principally in an ordination to another. Contrary to courage and temperance, beneficence perfects internal dispositions "ex consequenti." "Sed circa justitiam et injustitiam praecipue attenditur quid homo exterius operatur. Qualiter autem afficiatur interius non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, prout scilicet juvatur vel impeditur circa operationem (72)."

Now friendship consists in a "conversatio" and we communicate with others by means of external acts. In fact, without communication, there is no friendship, "for friendship depends on community (73)." Hence, the role of beneficence.

CONCLUSION: NEED OF FRIENDS

1. Happiness

By way of conclusion, a word on the need for friendship. "We must (rather) class happiness as an activity, ...those desirable in themselves...for happiness does not lack anything, but is self sufficient and of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake (1)." Happiness, therefore, comprises activity in accordance with virtue and self-sufficiency. We must note however that we cannot expect perfection in this life, were it solely for the possibility of great misfortunes (2). Hence, "we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions (i.e., virtuous activity and self-sufficiency) are, and are to be, fulfilled-but happy men (3)."

2. Pre-requisite

In order to be happy, man must be "sufficiently equipped with external goods (4)." One meets this condition with relative ease since "we must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or great things (5)." On this score, the happy man does not need friends, or at best he may desire a few useful friendships as a guarantee against the contingencies of life. "Friendship, then, is more necessary in bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case (6)."

3. Virtuous activity

a. Contemplation

"If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; (7). That this activity is contemplation we have already said (8)." Contemplation fulfills the two requirements of happiness that were stated above, "For, firstly, this activity is the best... and the most continuous (9)...and the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity (10)." Furthermore, "the philosopher, even by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is (11)." It would seem, therefore, that the truly happy man does not need friends.

This argument relies upon the abuse of a metaphor. Happiness or the life of the blessed, we take to be a participation in the life of God. God is absolutely self-sufficient, but this is because of His infinite perfection. Even a perfect man, were he to exist, would be finite, so the metaphor does not apply at this point.

The supremely happy man needs a friend, a friend in the primary sense of the term, and this for two reasons. (1) Man does not acquire the object of his contemplation by means of introspection. He needs objects distinct from himself even for knowledge of self. Objectivity requires nothing short of an alter ipse, where he can contemplate himself as in a mirror. The metaphor is St. Albert's. It clarifies not only his knowledge of self but all his thinking. (2) Furthermore, being a rational animal, he will suffer fatigue and distraction. Only another self can promote the continuity that happiness requires, especially if we recall that friendship

is based on unanimity and not identity of opinion. Without such a friend, a man is not using his powers fully and consequently does not achieve the pleasure attendant upon perfect performance (12).

We might add that "bonum est diffusivum sui." The inability to communicate one's insights adequately would produce frustration, and only another self can guarantee the adequacy of the communion.

b. action

With regard to the secondary form of happiness, i.e. the active life, the requirements are somewhat different. Besides the fact that the perfect exercise of social virtues like goodwill and beneficence require that they be performed in behalf of friends (it is the perfection of the act that provides the pleasure), his activity for the common good of both societies to which he belongs by nature, i.e. the conjugal and the political, necessitates at least useful friendships. A constitution, and consequently justice, provides the state with a structure, but not with the dynamism that makes it living and durable. The absolute minimum requirement in this respect is the unanimity discussed above, which Aristotle identifies with social friendship. This, however, need not be more than a useful friendship, since states are formed for the utility of its citizens and the common good of the state furnishes the grounds for this kind of friendship. If an official is to achieve anything, however, he needs the collaboration of his subjects or fellow citizens. This explains the importance of rhetoric for the statesman, and the need for an orator to win the goodwill of his hearers. Friends are "the greatest of external goods (13)."

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

- (1) Aristotle, Politics, 1253 a 2. All quotations from Aristotle, except when otherwise indicated, are taken from the Oxford Translation, Clarendon Press.
- (2) Gustave Bardy, quoted in, "Friends and Friendship for Saint Augustin," Sister Marie Aquinas McNamara, O.P., Alba House, St. Paul Publications; Staten Island, N.Y., 1964.
- (3) Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues. University of Notre Dame Press; Notre Dame, Indiana, 1966. p. 55.
- (4) For a good list of references in this regard, cf. Syntopicon vol. 1, art. "Love." Great Books, Mortimer J. Adler, edit., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, Ill., 1952.
- (5) Karl Stern, panel discussion at the Catholic University of America; Washington, D.C., June 1963. For a discussion of this evolution and the near monopoly of reason, at the expense of nature and appetite as a philosophical concern, cf. Karl Stern, The Flight from Woman, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1965.
- (6) Josef Pieper, op. cit. p. 112.
- (7) The first attempt to this writer's knowledge is Max Scheler's Nature et formes de la sympathie, Paris, Payet. 1928.
- (8) William H. Whyte, The Organization Man. Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y. 1957, and David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950. For a critical appraisal of this situation, cf. Sebastian De Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure, Twentieth Century Fund, N.Y. 1962.
- (9) P. Rousselot, S.J., especially, Amour spirituel et synthese aperceptive, Revue de Philosophie XVI (1910) pp. 225-240; L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas, Paris, Alcan, 1908.
- (10) Robert O. Johann, S.J., The Meaning of Love, The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1959.

- (11) For example: Le Role de l'amitie dans la vie Chretienne. Paul Philippe, O.P., Rome, Angelicum, 1938; Amour de soi, amour de Dieu, amour des autres, J.H. Nicolas, Revue Thomiste 1956, janvier-mars pp. 5-42; doctoral dissertations such as Benedict Endres, O.P. The Contact of Man with God. The Aquinas Library, River Forest, Ill. 1959; Baudoin de la Trinite, Nature de l'amitie selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin (on the virtue of charity), Romae, 1960; an excellent article on "communicatio" by L.B. Gillon, O.P., A propos de la theorie thomiste de l'amitie, Angelicum, 1948, pp. 3-17.
- (12) E.g.R. Johann, loc. cit.
- (13) E.g. Jose Ortega Y Gasset, On Love: Aspects of a Single Theme, Meridan Books, N.Y., 1957; Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, The Metaphysics of Love, Sheed and Ward, N.Y., 1962.
- (14) "...since the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold. Admit, for instance, the existence of a minimum magnitude, and you will find that the minimum which you have introduced, small as it is, causes the greatest truths of mathematics to totter. The reason is that a principle is great rather in power than in extent; hence that which was small at the start turns out a giant at the end." Aristotle, On the Heavens, I, c. 5, 271 b 9-14.
- (15) St. Thomas, In Ethic. n. 2,3; In de Anima, III lect. 12, n. 780.
- (16) Arist. Ethics., VIII, c. 5, 1157 b 13-19.
- (17) "...for in everything the essence is identical with the ground of its being, and here, in the case of living things, their being is to live... ." Arist. On the Soul, II, c. 4, 415 b 13. Cf. I q. 18 a. 2 corp. Alia vero actio est quae non transit in rem exteriorem, sed manet in ipso agente, sicut sentire, intelligere et velle: per huiusmodi enim actionem non immutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur.
- (18) I q. 54 a. 2 corp. "Sed in actione quae manet in agente, oportet ad hoc quod procedat actio, quod objectum uniatur agenti: sicut oportet quod sensibile uniatur sensui, ad hoc quod sentiat actu." I q. 56 a. 1 corp.
- (19) I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1.

- (20) Satire emphatically denies a given nature at birth, but he posits a given (existence) which is distinct (etre-pour-soi as opposed to etre-en-soi, i.e. non-human existence). We mean no more than this by "given nature" in this context.
- (21) I q. 5 a. 5 corp.
- (22) Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, The Knight's Tale, transl. Nevill Coghill, Penguin Books, Baltimore, Maryland, 1952, p. 59.
- (23) "In rebus contingentibus, sicut sunt naturalia et res humana, sufficit talis certitudo ut aliquid sit verum ut in pluribus." I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 3.
 "Omnis sermo qui est de operabilibus, sicut est iste, debet tradi typo, idest exemplariter, vel similitudinarie, et non secundum certitudinem." St. Thomas, In Ethic. II, c. 2 n. 258.
- (24) Arist., On the Soul, III, c. 10, 433 a 15. "...intellectus practicus. ...differt a speculativo secundum finem. Nam speculativus speculatur veritatem, non propter aliquid aliud, sed propter seipsum tantum; practicus autem speculatur veritatem propter operationem." St. Thomas, In de Anima, n. 820.
- (25) "For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study the eternal, but what is relative and in the present)." Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, c. 1, 993 b 20-22.
- (26) De Veritate, q. 3 a. 3 corp. Italics mine.
- (27) As the quotation above points out, this would be speculative knowledge only, and "...operabilia humana, secundum quod in se considerantur, non habent aliquam excellentiae altitudinem (II-II, q. 8, a. 3 ad 1)".
- (28) St. Thomas, In Ethic. n. 35; also I q. 14 a. 16 corp.
- (29) Aristotle, Ethics, I, c. 3, 1094 b 23-27.
- (30) St. Thomas, Q.D., De Veritate, q. 3 a. 3 corp. Cf. also I q. 14, a. 16 corp. and Cajetan in hoc loco.
- (31) Jacques Maritain's division of the practical sciences into the speculative-practical and practico-practical is of no help. It suggests the possibility of a valid theoretical science of practical matters, thereby denying the

essentially practical nature of moral philosophy. Distinguer pour unir, ou les degrés du savoir, Declee, 1932, pp. 618-627, and 879-896.

- (32) "In communi igitur scito quod, quemadmodum in speculativis, praeter prima principia communissima, inveniuntur prima principia per se nota in geometria, in arithmetica, etc.; ita in practicis, praeter communissima praecepta prima, scilicet esse bonum prosequendum, malum esse vitandum, sunt propria praecepta etiam prima in illo ordine; ita quod secundum unumquemque inclinationis naturalis gradus, sunt aliqua praecepta prima, ut principia propria per se nota, et reliqua praecepta secunda, ut conclusiones ex eis dependentes." Cajetan in I-II, q. 94 a. 4 n. 1.
- (33) "Ergo oportet, quod nullus sit auditor conveniens nisi habeat aliquam notitiam eorum quae debet audire. Sed juvenis non habet notitiam eorum quae pertinent ad scientiam moralem, quae maxime cognoscuntur per experientiam." St. Thomas in I Ethic., c. 3 n. 38. "Quarto in moralibus quae requiruntur experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum." Ibid. VI, c. 7 n. 1211. Cf. also nos. 2171, 2176, 2177.
- (34) "...Illud enim in quod omnes vel plures consentiunt, non potest esse omnino falsum. Unde in proverbio dicitur, quod non perditur omnino fama, quae apud multos populos divulgatur. Et hujus ratio est, quia natura non deficit, neque in omnibus neque in pluribus, sed solum in paucioribus. Unde id quod invenitur in omnibus aut in pluribus, videtur esse ex inclinatione naturae, quae non inclinatur neque ad malum neque ad falsum." Ibid. n. 1509.
- (35) For a study of the methodology of moral doctrine, cf. Lorenzo Roy, La certitude de la doctrine morale, Quebec, 1958.
- (36) "Et cum sermo moralium etiam in universalibus sit incertus et variabilis, adhuc magis incertus est si quis velit ulterius descendere tradendo doctrinam de singulis in speciali. Hoc enim non cadit neque sub arte, neque sub aliqua narratione. Quia causae singularium operabilium variantur infinitis modis. Unde iudicium de singulis relinquitur prudentiae uniuscujusque." Ibid. n. 259. For the irreducibility of prudence to ethics, n. 1200.

Chapter II

- (1) I q. 5 a. 1 c.

- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Q.D. De Veritate q. 21 a. 1 c.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) "...Inquantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur: ...primo et principaliter dicitur bonum ens perfectivum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur aliquid bonum, quod est ductivum in finem: prout utile dicitur bonum: vel natum est consequi finem..." Ibid.
- (8) 1 q. 5 a. 1 c. Cf. also De Verit. q. 21 a. 2 c.
- (9) De Verit. q. 21 a. 1 c.
- (10) St. Thomas, In Ethic, n. 275; cf. n. 269.
- (11) Ibid. n. 2039. Also: "...cum delectatio consequatur operationem, videtur quod unicuique rei sit propria delectatio, sicut et propria operatio. Quod autem sit propria operatio uniuscujusque rei, apparet ex hoc quod operationes sequuntur formas rerum secundum quas res specie differunt. Quod autem singulorum sit propria delectatio, apparet, si quis velit in unoquoque considerare. n. 2057. cf. Aristotle, I Rhetoric, 1370 a. 4-5.
- (12) Alia autem communitas est ex parte ipsarum rerum, de quibus est delectatio; consequitur enim ad omnia quae cadunt sub electione. Honestum enim est delectabile homini secundum quod est conveniens rationi: utile autem est delectabile propter spem finis. Ibid. n. 275.
- (13) Ibid.
- (14) I-II, 30, 3 c.
- (15) Aristotle, I Rhetoric 1370 a. 20.
- (16) In Ethic. nos. 275, 1552. cf. I-II, 30 1 c.

- (17) Ibid. n. 2039. Also: ...cum delectatio consequatur operationem, videtur quod unicuique rei sit propria delectatio, sicut et propria operatio. Quod autem sit propria operatio uniuscuiusque rei, apparet ex hoc quod operationes sequuntur formas rerum secundum quas res specie differunt. Quod autem singulorum sit propria delectatio, apparet, si quis velit in unoquoque considerare. n. 2057.
- (18) Ibid. n. 2058. Manifestum est enim, quod alia est delectatio equi et alia canis, et alia hominis, sicut Heraclitus dicit quod asinus magis eligit fenum quam aurum. Quia delectabilius est sibi nutrimentum quas exhibetur ei per fenum, quam aurum. Sic igitur patet quod eorum quae differunt specie differentes. Sed eorum quae non differunt specie, rationabile est quod sit indifferens delectatio consequens naturam speciei.
- (19) Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis rationabile videatur, quod indifferentium specie sit indifferens delectatio; et ita sit in alis animalibus; tamen in hominibus, qui omnes sint ejusdem speciei, multum differunt delectationes, sicut et operationes. Ibid. n. 2059.
- (20) Cujus ratio est, quia operationes et delectationes aliorum animalium consequuntur naturalem inclinationem, quae est eadem in omnibus ejusdem speciei. Sed operationes et delectationes hominum proveniunt a ratione quae non determinatur ad unum. Et inde est, quod quaedam quosdam homines delectant, et quosdam contristant. Et quibusdam sunt tristabilia et odibilia, quibusdam autem delectabilia et amicabilia. Ibid. n. 2060.
- (21) Ibid. n. 2064.
- (22) Ibid. n. 2062.
- (23) A break in one's work, whether of an hour, a day, or a week, is still part of the world of work. It is a link in the chain of utilitarian functions. The pause is made for the sake of work and in order to work, and a man is not only refreshed from work but for work. Pieper, p. 30. Italics in the original.
- (24) St. Thomas in II Ethic. lect. 3, n. 274.
- (25) Ibid. VIII Ethic. lect. 2, n. 1552.
- (26) Ibid.
- (27) Iq. 62, a. 9 ad 2.

- (28) Ibid. n. 274.
- (29) I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 1.
- (30) Cajetan in loc. cit. n. 11.
- (31) Cf. J. Pieper, op. cit.
- (32) Dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur "quasi honoris status." Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum. Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem: in VII Phys. (c. 3, 246 b 23; cf. 246 a 13). Et ideo honestum proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute. II-II q. 145 a. 1 c.
- (33) I-II q. 39 a. 2 c.
- (34) Malum culpaе opponitur bono honesto, malum vero poenae bono delectabili. Sed bonum honestum est melius quam bonum delectabile. Ergo malum culpaе est pejus quam malum poenae. Q.D. De Malo q. 1 a. 5, sed contra 3. ...pejus est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridion (c. 12: ML 40, 237). Unde majus malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum corporis. I-II q. 39 a. 4 ad 3.
- (35) In tota quaestione 145 hoc unum scribendum occurrit, quod honestum aliter sumitur hic, et aliter in Prima Parte (q. 5 a. 6), ubi bonum conversum cum ente divisum est sufficienter per honestum, utile et delectabile. Aliter autem dico, non in significatione, sed in amplitudine. Utrobique siquidem significat appetibile propter se: sed ibi in tota sua amplitudine; hic vero sumitur appropriate ad moralia. Et ideo honestum coincidit hic cum virtute seu virtuoso: ...- Et concurrit in idem subjecto tam cum utili quam cum delectabili, particulariter tamen, et non universaliter utroque sumpto: quia scilicet omne honestum est aliquod utile et aliquod delectabile (cf. a. 3). Cajetan in II-II q. 145 a. 1.
- (36) Cf. introduction.
- (37) The Idea of a University. Image Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1959.
- (38) "The 'common need' is an essential part of the 'common good'; but the no-

tion of 'common good' requires (as Aquinas says - Commentary on Sentences, 4, d. 26, 1, 2) that there should be men who devote themselves to the 'useless' life of contemplation, and, equally, that some men should philosophize--whereas it could not be said that contemplation or philosophy helps to satisfy the 'common need'." Leisure, The Basis of Culture, Josef Pieper, p. 62. The whole section follows this work.

- (39) In Boethium de Trinitate, 6, 1 c.
- (40) e.g. J. Maritain, "Scholasticism and Politics". Image Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1960.
- (41) Aristotle, Politics, VIII, 3, 1337 b 32.
- (42) Ethics, X, 7.
- (43) Ibid. 1177 b 26.
- (44) Metaphysics, I, 2.
- (45) II-II q. 145 a. 3 c.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) Ibid.
- (48) I, 5, 6 c.
- (49) Cajetan in I q. 5 a. 6.
- (50) I, 19, 9 c.
- (51) I, 5, 1 c. cf. De Veritate q. 21, a. 2 c.
- (52) "Falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subicitur. Et hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et convertuntur cum ente: unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in subjecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et omne falsum in aliquo vero." I, 17, 4 ad 2; Cf. I, 11, 2 ad 1.

- (53) "Evil destroys even itself," Ethic IV, 1126 a 11; Suppl., 86, 1 ad 2.
- (54) III Gent. c. 140, Item. Divina providentia.
- (55) I-II, 5, 8 ad 3.
- (56) I-II, 99, 6 c.
- (57) I-II, 87, 7 c.
- (58) I-II, 58, 2 c.
- (59) ...cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem: appetitus autem sensitive, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod 'finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum', I-II, 8, 1 c.
- (60) Malum autem quod conjungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui conjungitur malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. I, 19, 9 c.
- (61) Aquinas, In VII Ethic., lect. 9, no. 1438. Also: Si enim aliquis eligit vel prosequitur, idest quaerit hoc propter hoc, idest hoc loco hujus, puta si eligit fel loco mellis, quia scilicet propter similitudinem coloris aestimat illud esse mel, manifestum est quod per se loquendo eligit et quaerit hoc propter quod alterum eligit et quaerit, puta mel; sed per accidens eligit id quod pravum est, illud quod eligit loco alterius, puta fel. Ibid. no. 1437.
- (62) I-II, 17, 6 c.
- (63) Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. I-II, 27, 1 ad 1.
- (64) Aristotle, Ethics, 1146 b 22-23.
- (65) Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso: unde civitas

dicatur facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria rationi. I-II, 29 4 c.

- (66) Quod autem aliquis appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod inordinate amat seipsum. I-II, 77, 4 c.
- (67) Aristotle, VII Ethics, 1147 a 1-7. Cf. the whole passage: 1147 a 1 to b 3.

Chapter III

- (1) Dictionnaire des racines des langues europeennes, Larousse, Paris. R. Grandsaignes d'Hauterive. 1948.
- (2) Cf. also "friend" in Oxford English Dictionary and Webster New International Dictionary.
- (3) Aristotle, Ethics, 1155 b 16.
- (4) Q.D. De Veritate q. 22 a 1 sed contra 3. Cf. I q. 5 a. 4.c.
- (5) I-II q. 26 a. 1 c.
- (6) I q. 19 a. 1 c. Itlaics mine.
- (7) Cf. Gillon, L.B. La genese de la theorie thomiste de l'amour. Revue Thomiste, n. 46 (1946) pp. 322-329.
- (8) I-II q. 26 a. 1 c.
- (9) St. Augustin, Confessions, XIII c. 9. Cf. De Civitate Dei XI c. 28. Unless otherwise specified, love, in this paper, means neither the appetite, nor the act, but the modification of the former which causes the latter.
- (10) I-II q. 26 a. 1 c.
- (11) De Verit. q. 22 a. 1 c.
- (12) Ibid.

- (13) III Sent. d. 27, q. 1 a. 2; cf. III Gent. c. 24: Unde etiam patet... . Ortega y Gasset saw this, though confusedly. We will return to him later.
- (14) ...etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus rebus, causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit... . I-II q. 27 a. 2 ad 3.
- (15) The widespread obsession with the inability to love in an age of technology cannot be dismissed as a coincidence.
- (16) Aristotle, Physics II, c. 9, 199 b 34; 200 a 5 to 14. Italics in the Oxford translation.
- (17) Quodlibet I a. 8 ad 3. Italics in the original.
- (18) De Veritate q. 22 a. 1 c.
- (19) Aristotle, VIII Physics, c. 4, 255 b 29.
- (20) De Veritate q. 22 a. 1 c.
- (21) Cf. the difference between direction and appetite in the text quoted above from De Veritate q. 22, a. 1 c.
- (22) Aristotle, Physics, II, c. 1, 192 b 22.
- (23) I-II q. 26 a. 2 c.
- (24) De Verit. q. 22 a. 1 c.
- (25) De Verit. q. 22 a. 3 ad 2.
- (26) Aristotle, Ethics, IX, c. 5, 1167 a 4. Cf. c 12, 1171 b 29. ...bonum est causa amoris per modum objecti. Bonum autem non est objectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi. Et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est principium amoris spiritualis. Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum. I-II q. 27, a. 2 c.

- (27) I-II q. 26, a. 2 c.
- (28) II Contra Gent. c. 47.
- (29) Aristotle, On the Soul, II, c. 3, 414 b 1-5.
- (30) Cf. text quoted above from I q. 19, a. 1 c.
- (31) I q. 80, a. 1 c.
- (32) Ibid.; cf. I q. 78 a. 1 c.; De Verit. q. 22, a. 3 c.
- (33) I q. 59, a. 2 c.; cf. the whole passage.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) Ibid. Ortega y Gasset's failure to appreciate the analogy of the term love has spoiled an otherwise excellent analysis of love and desire; e.g. compare p. 12 with I-II q. 28 a. 1 ad 1 or I q. a. 1 c. of St. Thomas whose "... idea of love in summing up the Greek tradition is, obviously erroneous" p. 10.
- (36) I-II q. 26, a. 1 ad 3.
- (37) I q. 80, a. 1 ad 3.
- (38) Ibid. The meaning of appetite of the subject will be discussed in the section on the will.
- (39) In III Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 4 c. n. 134.
- (40) I-II q. 26, a. 1 c.
- (41) I q. 59 a. 1 c.
- (42) Q.D. De Verit. q. 23 a. 1 c.
- (43) II Contra Gent. c. 47, para. Amplius. Principium cuiuslibet.
- (44) I q. 59 a. 1 c. quoted above.
- (45) I, 60, 1 c.

- (46) De Verit., q. 23 a. 1 c.
- (47) I-II q. 1 a. 2 c.
- (48) III C. Gent. C. 18, para. Sic enim est. Cf. c. 2, 17.
- (49) Aristotle, On the Soul, III, c. 10, 433 b 22. cf, b 30; St. Thomas in hoc loco n. 832-835 and De Verit. q. 22 a. 3 ad 4.
- (50) Cf. De Verit. q. 10 a. 1 ad 2.
- (51) I q. 59 a. 1 c. Cf. ad 1.
- (52) II Gent. C. 82 para. Adhuc. In qualibet.
- (53) I q. 81 a. 3 c.
- (54) I q. 81 a. 3 ad 3. Cf. St. Thomas in De Sensu et Sensato, lect. 1, n. 12.
- (55) De Verit. a. 10 a. 1 ad 2.
- (56) In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 c. n. 39.
- (57) Aristotle, On the Soul, II, c. 4, 415 b 2-3. Cf. St. Thomas in hoc loco, lect. 7 n. 316; Aristotle, II Physics, c. 2, 194 a. 35-36; St. Thomas. lect. 4, n. 8; XII Meta. c. 7, 1072 b 2-3; St. Thomas lect. 7, n. 2528; I-II q. 1 a. 8 c. & q. 2 a. 7 c.
- (58) I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 3.
- (59) De Verit. q. 25 a. 1 c.
- (60) St. Thomas in II Ethic. lect. 3 n. 269.
- (61) De Verit. q. 25 a. 1 c.
- (62) II Gent. c. 47 para. Amplius. Principium cujuslibet.
- (63) I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 1.
- (64) II Gent. c. 47 para. Amplius. Principium cujuslibet.
- (65) I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 2.

- (66) I-II q. 26 a. 1 c.
- (67) Cf. II Gent. c. 82.
- (68) In III Sent. d. 27 q. 1 a. 2 c. n. 42.
- (69) Q. D. De Malo q. 6 a. unic. c.
- (70) I q. 81 a. 3c.
- (71) St. Thomas in II Ethic. lect. 5, n. 301.
- (72) II Gent. c. 82 para. Ex quibus sequitur.
- (73) II Gent. c. 82 para. Amplius. Cum delectationes.
- (74) Cf. II Gent. c. 82 para. Amplius. Cum delectationes, quoted above.
- (75) III Gent. c. 26 para. Neque etiam oportet.
- (76) I-II q. 34 a. 3 ad 3.
- (77) De Malo q. 6 c.
- (78) I-II q. 4 a. 4c.
- (79) De Malo q. 6 c.
- (80) II Gent. c. 82 para. Haec autem quae.
- (81) Aristotle, IX Metaphysics, c. 1, 1046 b 4. Cf. De Malo q. 6 sed contra 2, 3; I q. 83 a. 1 c.
- (82) De Malo q. 6 c.
- (83) I q. 59 a. 1 c. Cf. a. 4 c.; II Gent. c. 47 para. Amplius. Principium cujuslibet.
- (84) I q. 80 a. 2 ad 2.
- (85) Ibid.

- (86) Aristotle, On the Soul, III c. 9, 432 b 26 ff. Cf. I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 2; Q.D. De Virt. in Commun. a. 13 c.
- (87) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 2, 1139 a 35 - b 3. Cf. De Verit. q. 22 a. 4 ad 3.
- (88) In III Sent. d. 27 q. 1 a. 2 c. n. 40. Ortega y Gasset rightly insists upon the inseparability of love and knowledge. His error consists in identifying the two. Though he does not state this explicitly, he assumes it in passages like the following: "Mysticism... is a phenomenon of attention" p. 64; "Lust is not an instinct, but a specifically human creation--like literature. In both, the most important factor is imagination.", footnote 5, p. 109. However, on p. 132 his understanding wins out over his logic: "In order for a woman to fall in love with a man, or vice versa, it is necessary for her first to take notice of him. ... Such favor in attention knows nothing yet of love but is a preliminary condition to it." Italics mine. "On Love, Aspects of a Single Theme," transl. Toby Talbot. Greenwich Editions, Meridan Books Inc. N.Y., 1957. Compare with I-II q. 27 a. 2 c. "visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi."
- (89) I q. 80 a. 2 ad 1. Cf. I-II q. 30 a. 3 ad 2. This writer subscribes to Fr. Gillon's opinion that in the De Verit. St. Thomas was not yet fixed in his doctrine on love, on this point among others. L.B. Gillon O.P., Genese de la Theorie de l'amour, Revue Thomiste, n. 46 (1946), pp. 322-329. Fr. Nicolas' unqualified acceptance of such texts as: "voluntas et appetitu sensibili non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem hanc vel illam;" De Verit. q. 22 a. 4 ad 1; Cf. also ad 2 and ad 4, seems difficult to reconcile with the doctrine in the Summa Theologiae, but especially it does not adequately account for the specific difference between the two appetites. J.H. Nicolas, Amour de soi amour des autres, Revue Thomiste, T. 56 (1956), n. 1 janvier-mars, pp. 5-42.
- (90) Q.D. De Malo q. 6 a. unic. c.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Ibid.
- (93) I q. 82 a. 2 ad 2.
- (94) Q.D. De Malo q. 6 a. unic. c.

- (95) Ibid.
- (96) Q.D. De Malo q. 6 a. unic. c.
- (97) I q. 82 a. 1 c. Cf. a. 2 c.; De Malo q. 3 a. 3; III Gent. c. 26.
- (98) Q.D. De Malo q. 6 a. unic. c.
- (99) Ibid.
- (100) Ibid.
- (101) Ibid.
- (102) ...ille qui est in passione constitutus, non considerat in particular id quod scit in universali, inquantum passio impedit talem considerationem.
Impedit autem tripliciter. Primo, per quandam distractionem: sicut supra (art. 1) expositum est. Secundo, per contrarietatem: quia plerumque passio inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet. Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat; sicut etiam somnus vel ebrietas, quadam corporali transmutatione facta, ligant usum rationis. I-II, 77, 2 c.
- (103) Ibid. ad 4.
- (104) Cf. De Verit. q. 22 a. 9 ad 6 quoted above.
- (105) I-II q. 77 a. 1 c.
- (106) Ibid. and I-II q. 10 a. 3 c.
- (107) Q.D. De Malo q. 6 a. unic. c.
- (108) I-II q. 9 a. 2 c.
- (109) Cf. I q. 82 a. 4; I-II q. 9 a. 1 c.; II Gent. c. 26; De Verit. q. 22 a. 12; De Malo q. 6.
- (110) I-II, 9, 2 c.
- (111) I q. 83 a. 1 ad 5.
- (112) I-II q. 9 a. 2 c.

- (113) De Verit. q. 22 a. 9 ad 6.
- (114) Cf. De Verit. just quoted.
- (115) De Virt. q. unic. a. 5 ad 2.
- (116) I-II q. 77 a. 1 c.
- (117) Ibid.; I-II q. 9 a. 2 c.; De Verit. q. 22 a. 9 ad 6.
- (118) II-II q. 24 a. 11 c.
- (119) IV Gent. c. 95 para. Et hoc quidem.
- (120) Ibid. para. Hujusmodi autem dispositiones.
- (121) In Ethic VI, n. 1136.
- (122) Ibid. n. 1130.
- (123) Ibid. n. 1131
- (124) Ibid.
- (125) Ibid. n. 524.
- (126) Ibid. n. 1131
- (127) Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 982 b 25.
- (128) De Verit. q. 22 a. 6 c.
- (129) I-II q. 1 a. 2c.
- (130) I q. 59 a. 3 ad 3.
- (131) I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1.
- (132) Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in Walter Kaufman, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, pp. 289, 290, 303; also, Being and Nothingness, transl. Hazel E. Barnes: Washington Square Press Inc., New York, 1966; p. 78 and passim.

- (133) Being and Nothingness, p. 69.
- (134) Cf. Kaufmann, op. cit., 304.
- (135) Iq. 59 a. 1 ad 3.
- (136) Iq. 18 a. 3 c.; cf. q. 78 a. 1 c.
- (137) Iq. 18 a. 3 c.
- (138) Iq. 83 a. 1 ad 3.
- (139) Iq. 60 a. 2 c..
- (140) Iq. 60 a. 1 c.
- (141) Ibid. a. 2 c.
- (142) Ad has objectiones est dicendum breviter, quod hic est sermo de inclinatione actuali, quae est actus secundus; sed non est de qualicumque actu secundo, sed de illo tantum qui habet rationem tendentiae in aliud; et de natura, ut dicitur de substantia rei (in n. IV). Ita quod sensus est, quod commune est omni naturae, idest substantiae, habere aliquam inclinationem actualem naturalem. Et quoniam inclinatio actualis non convenit nisi mediante inclinatione habituali, consequens est ut omni naturae insit talis actus secundus, qui est inclinatio actualis, secundum inclinationem habitualem. Quae cum nihil aliud sit quam proprius appetitus fluens ex illa natura, oportet quod talis inclinatio actualis insit secundum appetitum. Et consequenter inclinatio actualis naturae intellectualis inest ei secundum proprium illius appetitum, qui est appetitus intellectualis, qui vocatur voluntas. -- Et sic patet quod non est par ratio de omni actu secundo, aut de omni potentia rei. Sed quemadmodum ex quaestione praecedente (art. 1) ostensum est quod ad omnem naturam sequitur potentia aliqua appetitiva, et consequenter ad naturam intellectualem appetitus intellectualis; sic nunc consequenter ostendit quod omni naturae convenit quod ex ea fluat actualis aliqua inclinatio determinata ad unum (hoc enim idem est dicere quod naturalis), et consequenter quod hoc conveniat naturae intellectuali secundum ejus proprium appetitum, quo habitualiter inclinatur ad aliud, ut inclinatio inclinationi respondeat. Cajetan in Iq. 60 a. 1 n. VI.
- (143) Iq. 60 a. 1 ad 1.

- (144) Iq. 60 a. 2 c.
- (145) Iq. 18 a. 3 c.
- (146) St. Thomas, In librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, C. 4, lect. 9 n. 402. *Italics mine.*
- (147) Iq. 83 a. 1 ad 3.
- (148) De Verit. q. 22 a. 6 c. end.
- (149) Cf. Iq. 81 a. 3 c. and ad 2.
- (150) Iq. 60 a. 2 c.
- (151) I-II q. 9 a. 1 c.
 Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum objectum: et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus: et universaliter omni illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis: ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona. I-II q. 10 a. 1 c. Cf. Cajetan in I-II q. 9 a. 2.
- (152) De Virt. in Commun. q. unic. a. 5. Ibid. ad 9.
- (153) Q.D. Veritate a. 12 c.
- (154) Aristotle, I Ethics, 1102 b 13.
- (155) Ibid. 1102 b 26-28.
- (156) Ibid. 1102 b 29-34.
- (157) Ibid. 1102 b 35.
- (158) Aristotle, I Politics 1254 b 2-4.

- (159) Cf. I-II, 56, 4 ad 3; 58, 2 c.
- (160) I-II, 17, 7 c.
- (161) Aristotle, I Ethics, 1102 b 14-25.
- (162) I q. 81, 3 ad 2.
- (163) Ibid.
- (164) I, 81, 3 c.
- (165) Ibid. cf. ad 3..
- (166) Aristotle, III de Anima, 434 a. 12-14, cf. I, 81, 3 c.
- (167) In Ethic. n. 2063.
- (168) Ibid. nos. 1370 to 1374.
- (169) I-II q. 34 a. 2 ad 1.
- (170) VIII Ethics, 1155 a 4.
- (171) Eudemian Ethics, 1237 a. 33-35.
- (172) Ibid., 1239 a. 33 to b 1.
- (173) Ibid., 1238 a. 8-10.
- (174) Ethics, 1159 a. 33-36.
- (175) E.g., Ignace Lepp, The Ways of Friendship; "...friendship, unlike love, is grounded in the spiritual, in what is permanent in human nature." p.56 and passim.
- (176) I-II q. 26 a. 4 c. Cf. Super Evangelium S. Matthaei, c. 22, n. 1819.
- (177) Cajetan in I-II q. 26 a. 4.
- (178) English does not have the equivalent of the dichotomy: "amor amicitiae - amor concupiscentiae." although goodwill is generally accepted as an equivalent of the former (cf. the Oxford translation of IX Ethics. c. 5). For the sake of clarity, this section will adopt the terminology of C.S.

Lewis (The Four Loves, Geoffrey Bles; London, 1960. cf. p. 9), i.e. gift-love and need-love respectively.

- (179) I-II q. 26 a. 4 ad 1.
- (180) I-II q. 26 a. 4 c. Cf. De Divin. Nom. c. 4 lect. 9 nos. 404-405; Super Evang. S. Joannis, c. 15, lect. 4, n. 2036.
- (181) Q.D. De Spe a. 3 c.
- (182) Ibid.
- (183) II-II q. 25 a. 3 c.
- (184) I-II q. 26 a. 4 c. Cf. Cajetan in hoc articulo.
- (185) Cajetan in ibid. Cf. I-II q. 28 a. 1 c.: Super Joan. n. 2036. On this division and the hesitations of the young St. Thomas, cf. Gillon, opus citatus.
- (186) In De Divin. Nom. n. 401.
- (187) Eudemian Ethics, 1236 a 13.
- (188) St. Albert, In IX Ethic. Tract. III c. 2 & 3.
- (189) Eudemian Ethics, 1238 & a. 3-4.
- (190) Leslie H. Farber, The Ways of the Will; Basic Books Inc., N.Y., 1966.
- (191) "Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia." Boethius, De Duabus Naturis, quoted in I, 85, 1 c.
- (192) "Materia est individuationis principium" I, 85, 1 c. "...materia signata, quae est individuationis" I, 75, 4 c.
- (193) I, 76, 2 ad 3. Cf. Also IV Gent. c. 65. Habet autem, and Manifestius est autem.
- (194) II-II, 32, 5c.
- (195) III, 6, 4 ad 3.

- (196) Aristotle, II De Anima, 412 b 27; cf. St. Thomas, In II De Anima, nos. 240-241.
- (197) Cf. Charles De Koninck, The Nature of Man and His Historical Being, in Laval Theologique et Philosophique, vol. 5 (1949), no. 2 pp 271-277.
- (198) Aristotle, IX Metaphysics, 1046 a. 11.
- (199) I-II q. 9 a. 2 c. "Unumquodque secundum se tendit in id quod sibi est conveniens," I-II q. 78 a. 3 c.
- (200) Ibid.
- (201) I q. 5 a. 1 c. and De Verit. q. 21 a. 1 c.
- (202) Cajetan in I-II q. 29 a. 5.
- (203) Cajetan in I-II q. 27 a. 3 n. 11. Cf. n. 111 for the argument based on the order of the articles in this question.
- (204) "Sed considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu: sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione, illud quod aliud habet in actu: sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens extra suum locum, habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco existenti. Vel etiam secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum: nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus." I-II q. 27 a. 3 c.
- (205) I-II ibid.
- (206) Ibid.
- (207) St. Thomas in Librum Boetii de Hebdomadibus Expositio, Lect. 2, n. 37.
- (208) IV Gent. C. 14 Similiter autem patet. cf. also Ibid. Quamvis autem.
- (209) Ethics 1156 a. 5.
- (210) Eudemian Ethics, 1236 a. 13.
- (211) For St. Augustin, only God can fulfill the role of the good that binds friends together, cf. Sister Marie Aquinas McNamara, Friends and Friendship for St. Augustine, N.Y., Alba House, 1964. Martin Buber is trying to say the same thing in I and Thou, N.Y., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

- (212) C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves; Geoffrey Bles, London 1960, p. 73.
- (213) Eudemian Ethics, 1236 a. 15.
- (214) Ibid, a. 16.
- (215) Ibid, b. 15. Cf. St. Thomas, In Ethic nos. 1654, 1649, 1790.
- (216) Ethics, 1107 a 1.
- (217) Ibid. 1109 b 1.
- (218) Ibid. 1159 b 19.
- (219) ...illi qui amant se adinvicem propter utilitatem, unus non amat alterum propter seipsum, sed secundum quod ab altero accipit sibi aliquod bonum. Et simile est in his qui se amant propter delectationem. Non enim unus amat alium propter hoc quod est taliter dispositus, puta, quod est eutrapelus, idest virtuose se habens circa ludos; sed solum inquantum est sibi delectabilis. (But this is not true of a spectator.) Et sic patet, quod tam illi qui amant propter utile, amant propter bonum quod eis provenit, quam etiam illi qui amant propter delectationem, amant propter delectabile quod percipiunt. Et ita non amant amicum secundum quod ipse in se est, sed secundum id quod accidit ei, scilicet secundum quod est utile, vel delectabile. Unde patet quod huiusmodi amicitiae non sunt amicitiae per se, sed per accidens; quia non amatur homo secundum id quod ipse est, sed secundum utilitatem vel delectationem. In Ethic. no. 1566.
- (220) St. Augustine, IV Confessions, Transl. Edward B. Pusey; Pocket Books, Inc., N. Y. Cardinal Edition, 1952; p 51.

Chapter IV

- (1) Eudemian Ethics, VII, 12, 1244.b. 28.
- (2) Ibid. b. 34
- (3) Ibid. 1244 b 34 to 1245 a 10.
- (4) Ibid. 1245 a 34.
- (5) Ibid. a 35.
- (6) Ethics, IX, 12, 1172 a 2-8.

- (7) Eudemian Ethics, 1245 a 36.
- (8) I-II, 28, 2 c.
- (9) St. Thomas, In Joan 16:25, no. 2147.
- (10) Ethics III, 5, 1114 a 33.
- (11) IV Gent. 19, Ad cujus evidentiam.
- (12) Ibid. Quod autem.
- (13) IV. Gent., 19. Sic igitur quod. -L'amour n'est pas simplement un acte de celui qui aime, il est une promotion mystérieuse de l'aimé au-dedans de l'amant; l'aimé devient pour l'amant un pôle intime d'affection et de vie, et comme un autre lui-même. Promotion réelle à sa manière, sur-existence originale de l'aimé dans l'amant: car l'aimé meut l'amant, au plus intime de lui-même, et tout moteur doit être au contact de celui qu'il meut (Comp. Theol. c. 45). Autrement dit, l'amour vérifie une présence active suī generis de l'aimé dans l'amant. Promotion, sur-existence immatérielle et admirable, qui tient sa qualité et son prix de l'amour même: être aimé de quelque grand cœur, peut nous être plus cher que la vie. H. F. Dondaine, O. P. Edit. Revue des Jeunes, Trinité, T. I, p. 228.
- (14) I Gent., 72, Adhuc, Cuicumque.
- (15) Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in ejus affectu: ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis ejus, apud praesentiam, vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. - E converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem concupiscentiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque concupiscentiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati: sed quaerit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, in quantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere, secundum Philosophum, in IX Ethic, et in II Rhet. Ut sic, in quantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. In quantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans, amicum idem sibi, sic

amatum est in amante. I-II, 28, 2 c.

- (16) Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis: inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur. Ibid.
- (17) Ibid. ad 1.
- (18) Ethics, VIII, 1156 b 27. Italics mine.
- (19) I-II, 27, 2 ad 2.
- (20) St. Thomas, De Occultis Operationibus Naturae, no. 462. I Gent. c. 42. Also: Item. Essé proprium unius cuiusque; III, 11, 1 ad 3; In Ethic, VI, lect. 71 III Gent. c. 75.
- (21) Cf. Charles DeKoninck, The Nature of Man and His Historical Being.
- (22) De Virt. in Commun. a. 6 ad 1; I-II, 77, 2 c.; In Ethic, VII, lect. 3; I-II, 57, 5 ad 3.; In Ethic, VI, lect 2.
- (23) I, 1, 6 ad 3.
- (24) Aristotle, Ethics, VIII, 1156 b 26.
- (25) Ibid. IX, 12 1172 a 9-14.

Chapter V

- (1) Ibid. VII, 5, 1157
- (2) Aristotle, Ethics, VIII, 1158 a 1-3.
- (3) Ethics, 1157 b 17-19. "...multi enim sunt benevoli; aliquibus, quos nunquam viderunt, inquantum ex auditis existimant eos esse epiiches, idest virtuosos, vel utiles sibi. Et potest esse quod idem patiaturs aliquis illorum ad eum qui sic est benevolus. Hujusmodi ergo homines videntur esse benevoli adinvicem, sed non possunt dici amici." In Ethic, VIII, no. 1560.
- (4) Ethics, 1157 b 21.
- (5) Ibid. IX, 12, 1171 b 29-32.

- (6) Ibid. b 32.
- (7) Ibid. b 33.
- (8) Ibid. 1172 a 2.
- (9) St. Augustine, Confessions, IV, c. 3. Translated by John K. Ryan, Image Books. Doubleday and Co., Inc. Garden City, New York, 1960, p. 101. Cf. also St. Thomas in Ethic n. 1949, 1968.
- (10) Ethics, VIII, 5, 1157 b 29.
- (11) Ibid. b 31.
- (12) Gauthier et Jolif in 1156 a 4.
- (13) In Ethic. IX, lect. 4, no. 1797.
- (14) St. Albert, In Ethic. IX, Tract. II.
- (15) Cf. L. B. Gillon, O.P. "A propos de la theorie thomiste de l'amitie" Angleicum, 1948, vol. 25, pp. 3-17.
- (16) e.g. In Ethic. VIII, lect. 9, no. 1657 s q.
- (17) e.g. II-II, 23, 1 c.
- (18) In Ethic. VII, lect. 1, no. 1292.
- (19) Ethics, VIII, 1155 a 5.

Chapter VI

- (1) Cf. C. S. Lewis below. note 17
- (2) Ethics, 1158 b 5-10
- (3) Magna Moralia, II, II, 1209 a 20-31.
- (4) Eud. VII, 2, 1236 a 16-20. Cf. the whole passage to a 33.
- (5) Ibid. 1236 b 3.
- (6) In Ethic., no. 1559.

- (7) II-II, 23, 5 c.
- (8) Ethics, VIII, 8, 1159 b 2.
- (9) Cf. I, 5, 6, c.
- (10) Ethics, VIII, 3, 1156 b 6.
- (11) Ibid. b 9.
- (12) Ibid. b 11.
- (13) Ibid. b 13. Italics in the original.
- (14) Ibid. b 18.
- (15) Ibid. b 24.
- (16) Ibid. b 24 sq.
- (17) C. S. Lewis, op. cit. p. 81. Here Lewis gives friendship a meaning much narrower than that of the classical formula. What he calls the ally (p. 82) and excludes from friendship is precisely the first imposition of the term for the Greeks and Romans.
- (18) Eud. VII, 2, 1236 b 21.
- (19) Ethics, VIII, 3, 1156 a 8.
- (20) It has given such derivatives as Philadelphia, philandering, philanthropy, philosophy.
- (21) Gauthier, A. and Jolif, J. Y., L'ethique a Nicomaque, T. II deuxieme partie, p. 655. Publications Universitaires de Louvain. 2, Place Cardinal Mercier, Louvain. 1959.
- (22) Dictionnaire de l'antiquite grecque et romaine, Ch. Daremberg & Saglio & Edm. Pottier, see "hospitium publicum," T. III, p. 297. Cf. also Percival, Geoffrey, Aristotle on Friendship, Cambridge U. Press 1940.
- (23) Liddell-Scott, A. Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edit. - Jones & McKenzie, 1940. U. Press, Oxford.
- (24) We find the same usage in Aristotle. He also uses the term philesis, but it usually means affection without implying reciprocity. In Nic. Eth. IX,

c. 7, 1168 a 19 it is called a passion. It is mentioned along with philia in ibid. VIII, c. 3, 1156 a 6 c. 8, 1158 b 19. Philesis and philia are explicitly opposed in ibid.

- (25) Schleusmer, Novum Lexicon Graeco-Latinum (New Testament)
- (26) Ethics, VIII, 3, 1156 a 10..
- (27) Eud. VII, 2, 1236 a 33.
- (28) In Ethic. lect.3, no. 1570. Cf. Ethics, VIII, 3, 1156 a 24-31.
- (29) In Ethic. VIII, lect. 6, no. 1614.
- (30) Eud. VII, 2. 1236 a 36.
- (31) Ethics, VIII, 4, 1157 a 16-19. Cf. Eud. VII, 2, 1238 a 35 to b 14.
- (32) Ethics, VIII, 6, 1158 b 2.
- (33) Cf. Ibid., IX, 1164 a 6.
- (34) Ethics, 1158 a 30-35.
- (35) Amicitiam dicimus esse benevolentiam in contrapassis, ut scilicet amans amatur. Habet enim quamdam commutationem amoris secundum formam commutativae justitiae. In Ethic., VIII, lect. 1, no. 1559
- (36) Ethics, VIII, 7, 1158 b 16.

Chapter VII

- (1) In Ethic. VIII, lect. 9, no. 1657.
- (2) Ethics, VIII, 9, 1160 a 9-12.
- (3) Ibid. a 13.
- (4) Ibid. a 14.
- (5) Ibid. a 23.
- (6) op. cit. pp. 42 ff.
- (7) Ethics, VIII, 9, 1159.

- (8) Ibid. b 27.
- (9) Ibid. b 31.
- (10) Ibid. 1160 a 6.
- (11) Ibid. I, 1; II-II, 58, 6 c.
- (12) Ibid. V, 1, 1129 b 25.
- (13) Cf. St. Thomas, In Ethic., V, lect. 3, no. 918.
- (14) Ibid. no. 919.
- (15) Ethics, V, 2, 1130 b 31.
- (16) Ibid. b 36.
- (17) Ibid. 1131 a 11-14.
- (18) Ibid. a 18-20.
- (19) Ibid. a 20.
- (20) Ibid. b 12-14.
- (21) Ethics, IX, 8, 1168 b 30.
- (22) Actus distributionis quae est communium bonorum pertinet solum ad praesidentem communibus bonis: sed tamen iustitia distributiva est et in subditis, quibus distribuitur, inquantum scilicet sunt contenti iusta distributione. Quamvis etiam distributio quandoque fiat bonorum communium non quidem civitate, sed uni familiae: quorum distributio fieri potest auctoritate alicujus privatae personae. II-II, 61, 1 ad 3.
- (23) Ethics, V, 4, 1131 b 34.
- (24) Ibid. 1132 a 4.
- (25) Ibid. V, 1, 1129 a 35.
- (26) Ibid. b 14-19.
- (27) Eud. Ethics, VII C. 10, 1242 b 18.
- (28) Aristotle, VIII Ethics, Loeb, 7-3 & 12-7; (ch. 9, 1158 b 29'); St. Thomas

no. 1631, lect 7; St. Albert, Tract, 2, c. 1, no. 34

- (29) St. Thomas In Ethic. no. 1632.
- (30) Ibid. no. 1633.
- (31) Ibid. no. 1634.
- (32) Ibid. no. 1635.
- (33) Ibid. no. 1636.
- (34) Ibid. no. 1637.
- (35) Ibid. no. 1638.
- (36) VIII Ethic. c. 13, cf. lect. 13; II-II q. 23 a. 3 ad 1.
- (37) "...but the law has compulsive power, while it is at the same time a rule proceeding from a sort of practical wisdom and reason," Aris. X Ethics c. 9, 1180 a 21-22.

 "The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make universal statements which shall be correct." V Ethics c. 10, 1137 b 11.

 "Law is a system of order; and a general habit of obedience to law must therefore involve a general system of orderliness." VII Polit. c. 4 no. 8, 1326 a 30.
- (38) Eud. Ethics VII, c. 6, 1240 a 23. Also: "Friendly relations with one's neighbours, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself." Nic. Ethic. IX, c. 4, 1166 a 1.
- (39) I-II, 94, 2 c. Cf. also III Gent., 129 Adhuc; In de Divinis Moninibus, nos. 404-406; 428-429.
Bonum autem suum, . III Gent. 24.
- (40) II-II, 47, 10 ad 2.
- (41) Aristotle, III Polit. 12, 1282 b.
- (42) II-II q. 26 a. 3 c.

- (43) I-II q. 28, a. 4 ad 2.
- (44) St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 21, a. 1 ad 4: ...Diffundere, licet et secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare habitudinem cujuscumque causae, sicut influere et facere, et alia hujusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum est diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda effusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. Dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis et non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, inquantum hujusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initium; tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum; sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni.
- (45) The common good is of such import, that even evil must be tolerated if its suppression endangered the former. I-II q. 91, 4. c.
- (46) Ad tertium dicendum, quod dupliciter aliquid dicitur esse commune. Uno modo per praedicationem: hujusmodi autem commune non est idem numero in diversis repertum; et hoc modo habet bonum corporis, communitatem. Alio modo est aliquid commune secundum participationem unius et ejusdem rei secundum numerum; et haec communitas maxime potest in his quae ad animam pertinent, inveniri.
In IV Sent. dist. 49, a. 1, a. 1, q1a. 1 ad 3.
- (47) Eudemian Ethics VII, 10, 1242 b 23-28.
- (48) "Le bien commun est meilleur, non pas en tant qu'il comprendrait le bien singulier de tous les singuliers: il n'aurait pas alors l'unité du bien commun en tant que celui-ci est en quelque façon universel; il serait pure collection, il ne serait que matériellement meilleur. Le bien commun est meilleur pour chacun des particuliers qui y participent, en tant qu'il est communicable aux autres particuliers: la communicabilité est de la raison même de sa perfection. Le particulier n'atteint le bien commun sous la raison même de bien commun qu'en tant qu'il l'atteint comme communicable aux autres. Le bien de la famille est meilleur que le bien singulier, non pas parce que tous les membres de la famille y trouvent leur bien singulier: le bien de la famille est meilleur parce que, pour chacun des membres individuels, il est aussi le bien des autres. Cela ne veut pas dire que les sont la raison de l'amabilité propre du bien commun: au contraire, sous ce rapport formel, les autres sont aimables en tant qu'ils peuvent participer à ce bien." De La Primauté du Bien Commun, Ch. De Koninck, Edition de l'Université Laval. Québec, 1943.
- (49) St. Thomas, Q. D. De Caritate, a. 5 ad 4.

- (50) III q. 1, a. 1 c. & Cajetan n. VI; I-II q. 1, a. 4 ad 1 & Cajetan.
- (51) "But that fable (loving things instead of God) did not die for me, even when one of my friends would die. There were other things done in their company which more completely seized my mind: to talk and to laugh with them; to do friendly acts of service for one another; to read well-written books together; sometimes to tell jokes and sometimes to be serious; to disagree at times, but without hard feelings, just as a man does with himself; and to keep our many discussions pleasant by the very rarity of such differences; to teach things to the others and to learn from them; to long impatiently for those who were absent, and to receive with joy those joining us. These and similar expressions, proceeding from the hearts of those who loved and repaid their comrades' love, by way of countenance, tongue, eyes, and a thousand pleasing gestures, were like fuel to set our minds ablaze and to make but one out of many. St. Augustin, Confessions, IV, c. 3. Translated by John K. Ryan, Image Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc. Garden City, New York, 1960 p. 101. Cf. Also St. Thomas in Ethic. n. 1949, 1968.
- (52) Ch. De Koninck, op. cit., p. 24.
- (53) II-II q. 58, a. 9 ad 3; cf. corp.
- (54) II-II q. 64, a. 2 c. & q. 65, a. 1 c.
- (55) De Caritate a. 2, para 8.
- (56) St. Thomas, in V Meta. lect. 21, n. 1093.
- (57) St. Thomas, in V Meta. lect 21.
- (58) Primaute, p. 40-41.
- (59) Ibid. 1489.
- (60) Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, c. 15, 1040 b 4-14; St. Thomas, lect. 16, n. 1631-1634.
- (61) St. Thomas in VII Meta. n. 1631.
- (62) Ibid. n. 1632.
- (63) VIII Ethics, 9, 1159 b 25 & 29.
- (64) VIII Ethics, 12, 1161 b 12.

- (65) Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, transl. Kathleen Freeman. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962; frag. 107 p. 103.
- (66) In VIII Ethic. I. 12 no. 1703.
- (67) I Polit. 8, 1256 b 18.
- (68) VIII Ethic. 12, 1161 b 16.
- (69) Cf. 422 to 424
- (70) VIII Ethic. 12, 1161 b 17 cf. whole passage
- (71) In VIII Ethic. I 12 no. 1703.
- (72) In Mathew. 1011. Triplex est communitas domus sive familiae civitatis, et regni. . . . Communitas civitatis omnia continet quae ad vitam hominis sunt necessaria. St. Thomas In Matthei no. 1011.
- (73) The Small Group, Michael S. Olmstead. pp. 46-8. Random House, N.Y. 1959.
- (74) Ibid. p. 49 & 52.
- (75) Aristotle I Polit. 2, 1252 b 27.
- (76) Ibid. 1253 a 31 & 36.
- (77) Cf. III Polit. c. 6, 1278 b 15-29.
- (78) I Polit. 1, 1252 a 3.
- (79) I Polit. 2, 1253 a 29.
- (80) VIII Ethics. I, 1155 a 22.
- (81) I Polit. 6, 1255 b 12.
- (82) I-II 95, 4 ad 1.
- (83) M. Olmsted, op. cit. p. 55.
- (84) Once Freud was asked for a definition of the capacities of the truly mature individual, he replied, "Lieben und arbeiten: - to love and to work. The loving is vital-without it men would dry up or blow up. Here the primary

group plays its absolutely essential role. But working is also necessary and for this the primary group, in its primary-ness, is not designed. For such ends men organize in terms of different principles.
M. Olmsted, op. cit. p. 64.

- (85) Ibid. p. 92.
- (86) VIII Ethics 10, 1160 a 32.
- (87) Ethics, VIII, 10, 1160 b 23 to 1161 a 6.
- (88) Ibid.
- (89) Ibid.
- (90) Ibid.
- (91) Ibid. a 7.
- (92) VIII Ethics, 11, 1161 a 30 and 1161 b 9.
- (93) In VIII Ethic 1. 12 no 1708.
- (94) VIII Ethics, 12, 1161 b 18.
- (95) In VIII Ethic. 1, 12 no. 1710.
- (96) VIII Ethics, 12, 1161 b 34.
- (97) VIII Ethics, 12, 1161 b 30.
- (98) Cf. St. Thomas no. 1717.
- (99) VIII Ethics, 12, 1162 a 27.
- (100) Ibid. a 17.
- (101) Ibid. a 25.

Chapter VIII

- (1) I-II, q. 28 a. 2 c.; Cajetan, In de Anima, vol. 2, #59.

- (2) In Ethic. #34; De Veritate q. 22, a. 1 ad 3.
- (3) In Ethic. #1866.
- (4) Ibid. #1867.
- (5) Ibid. #1869.
- (6) Ibid. #1870.
- (7) Ibid. #1871.
- (8) Ibid. nos. 1868, 1872.
- (9) Ibid. #1873.
- (10) Ibid. #1874.
- (11) Ibid. #1878.
- (12) Ibid. nos. 1879, 1880.
- (13) Ibid. nos. 1881, 1882.
- (14) Ibid. #1883.
- (15) St. Albert enumerates under four headings the advantages a virtuous man acquires for himself by acting for others.
 1. He will perform actions befitting him, for only a noble friendship can inspire them. Such a man likes to see good actions and men who are better than he is. A friend for him is a mirror in which he contemplates himself. Cf. Magna Moralia.
 2. It is difficult to maintain a life of good actions alone. A friend provides the assistance required to assure the best for oneself. Cf. Eudemian Ethics.
 3. The society of two such persons will provide a continual stimulus. As a result of acting together and seeing each other, each will emulate the other.
 4. A beneficiary of one's virtuous acts will become another self. His constant company is the best means of acquiring one's bonum simpliciter. St. Albert, In IX Ethic., Tract. III, cap. 2 and 3.

- (16) Eudemian Ethics, 1240 a 28.
- (17) Ibid. a. 36.
- (18) Ethics, 1166 a. 1.
- (19) Eudemian Ethics, 1240 a. 14-27.
- (20) I-II q. 27, a. 3 c. Also:
 Dicendum quod similitudo est quaedam unitas; unde id quod est simile, inquantum est unum, est delectabile, sicut et amabile, ut supra dictum est. Et si quidem id quod est simile, proprium bonum non corrumpat, sed augeat, est simpliciter delectabile; puta homo homini, et juvenis juveni. Si vero sit corruptivum proprii boni, sic per accidens afficitur fastidiosum vel contristans; non quidem inquantum est simile et unum, sed inquantum corrumpit id quod est magis unum. -- Quod autem aliquid simile corrumpat proprium bonum, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia corrumpit mensuram proprii boni per quendam excessum; bonum enim, praecipue corporale, ut sanitas, in quadam commensuratione consistit. Et propter hoc superabundante cibi, vel quaelibet delectationes corporales, fastidiuntur. Alio modo, per directam contrarietatem ad proprium bonum; sicut figuli abominantur alios figulos, non inquantum sunt figuli, sed inquantum per eos amittunt excellentiam propriam, sive proprium lucrum, quae appetunt sicut proprium bonum.
I-II q. 32, a. 7 c. Cf. II-II q. 26, a. 4 ad 1.
- (21) Ethic, 1168 b 28-30.
- (22) Eudemian Ethics, 1240 b 5-11.
- (23) Ibid. b 13.
- (24) Ibid. b 16.
- (25) C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, p. 83.
- (26) Ibid. p. 84.
- (27) This doctrine seems to have been generally accepted in the thomistic tradition until recently, following upon the work of Fr. Rousselot.
- (28) St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, a. 3 ad 4; In Ethic. #259.
- (29) Anders Nygren, Eros et Agape.

- (30) St. Thomas, In Ethic. 1804.
- (31) Ibid. 1805.
- (32) Aristotle, Ethics, IX, 7. Cf. St. Thomas, in hoc loco, lect 7; also II-II, 26, 12 c and ad 1.
- (33) Cf. I-II, q. 32, a. 6 c., ad 3.
- (34) In Ethic. 1814.
- (35) Aristotle, Ethics, IX, 1166 a 19. Cf. St. Thomas, In Ethic, nos. 1806-1807; II-II, q. 27, a. 2.
- (36) Ibid. 1166 b 11. St. Thomas, no. 1815.
- (37) In Ethic. 1837.
- (38) Ibid. 1808.
- (39) Ibid. 1809; II-II, q. 29, a 1.
- (40) Ibid. 1839.
- (41) Cf. The works of Erich Fromm mentioned in the introduction.
- (42) St. Thomas, In Ethic. no. 1816.
- (43) Ibid. 1817.
- (44) Ibid. 1818.
- (45) Aristotle, Ethics, I, 1098 a 16.
- (46) Ibid. IX, 1166 a 1-9; Cf. St. Thomas, In Ethic. nos. 1798-1800.
- (47) II-II, 27, 2 c.
- (48) Aristotle, Ethics, IX, 1166 b 30. St. Thomas, no. 1821.
- (49) Ibid.
- (50) Ibid. 1166 b 33 to 1167 a 3. Cf. II-II, 27, 2 c.
- (51) Ibid.

- (52) Chap. 6.
- (53) Cf. also II-II, 114.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Aristotle, Ethics, IX, 1167 a 3.
- (56) Ibid. a 10.
- (57) Ibid. a 14.
- (58) Ibid. 1166 a 6.
- (59) Ibid. 1167 a 21. St. Thomas, no. 1831.
- (60) Gina Lombroso, L'Ame de la femme, Pagot, Paris. 106 Boulevard St. Germain, 1937. We need not accept her inferences.
- (61) St. Thomas, In Ethic, no. 1832.
- (62) Ibid. nos. 1833-1835.
- (63) St. Thomas, In Ethic. no. 1800.
- (64) Ibid. 1836.
- (65) II-II, 31, 1 c.
- (66) Ibid. a 4, sed contra.
- (67) In Ethic. 1790.
- (68) I-II, 20, 2 c.
- (69) Ibid. 4 c.
- (70) II-II, 25, 9 c.
- (71) Ibid. 31, 1 ad 2.
- (72) St. Thomas, In Ethic. V no. 886.
- (73) Aristotle, Ethics, VIII, 9, 1159 b 31.

Conclusion

- (1) X Ethics, 6, 1176 b 1-8.
- (2) Cf. 1101 a 8.
- (3) I Ethics, 10, 1101 a 19.
- (4) I Ethics, 11, 1101 a 15.
- (5) X Ethics, 8, 1179 a 1.
- (6) IX Ethics, 11, 1171 a 24.
- (7) X Ethics, 7, 1177 a 11.
- (8) Ibid. 1177 a 17, cf. 1095 b 14 to 1096 a 5, 1141 a 18 to b 3, 1143 b 33 to 1144 a 6, 1145 a 6 to 11.
- (9) Ibid. 1177 a 19-23.
- (10) Ibid. a 28.
- (11) Ibid. a 35.
- (12) For the explication of Aristotle's text, cf. Eud. Ethics, VII, 12; W.D. Ross, Oxford translation of Nicomachean Ethic, footnote to IX, 9; also, Gauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomaque, commentaire pp. 757-760.
- (13) IX Ethics, 9, 1169 b 9.

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