SELF-LOVE AND HUMAN SOCIETY

A Thesis

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PREFACE

Man's obligations as a social being have always been of interest to him. He has always wanted to understand the proper reasons and justification for these obligations. During the twentieth century there has been an increase in this natural interest because of man's concern for self-fulfillment and for the individual rights, threatened or undermined by political domination.

Therefore, relying on the presupposition that the common good of society is greater in itself and greater for each of us than our own proper good, we are attempting in this thesis to determine which of these goods is to be loved more, and whether society or the self must be loved more.

Let us, however, state briefly this doctrine of the priority of the common good.[1] We distinguish the common good of persons from their proper good. The latter is a good which is proper to one person to the exclusion of another. For instance, my eyes are mine, my toothbrush of private use. Now, the personal or private good of my own is to another person an alien good so long as that good belongs to me. The house of my neighbor is to me an alien

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1. Charles De Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun contre les personnalistes, Montreal, 1943, pp.8-19, 55, 65.

good. But a common good is the good of many persons. It is not the good of this person to the exclusion of another person, but rather many share in the same good. For instance, peace in society which consists in the tranquillity of order, or a wise and practicable constitution, is a good which all the citizens enjoy. Even a home is a kind of common good for all the members of the family.

All of which does not mean that common good is opposed to proper good. This can be shown from the example of the geometer who knows that the sum of the angles of any triangle is equal to two right angles. To know this is a good. The knowledge of this truth is proper to the person who knows it, and proper to any one person who sees it. But the truth known is not proper to one person to the exclusion of the other person; it is a truth which is possessed in common; it is the same truth which is known by this person and by that. We may note, in passing, that no material good can be perfectly possessed in common in the manner of spiritual goods, no matter how much they may approach the latter.

Now, why is the common good of a given order better than a proper one in the same order? Merely because it extends to more people? This could not be the proper reason, but only a sign of it. If the perfection of a society, its common good, cannot be achieved by the single person, is it

not because it is too lofty to be attained and possessed by the individual? If, as the tyrant does, he appropriated the common good as a proper one, would he not be unjust?

But, one might say, this is not because the good of society is too great to be possessed by one, but because it was actually achieved by cooperation of the many who, as a consequence, have their right to share in it. Nevertheless it is plain that the good of civil society can no more be possessed by the single person than it can be achieved, as is seen from the fact that appropriation by the tyrant immediately destroys political society. On the other hand, the good citizen wants this good to be possessed by the many. St. Augustine and St. Thomas quote the words of Valerius Maximus on the early Roman citizens: they preferred to be poor in a wealthy republic than to be rich in a poor one.[2] Now this is surely a sign that the common good should not be appropriated by the individual person because it is superior to what the person can possess as a proper good.

And this leads us to a good which, though not possessed in common, can still be a common good. Suppose only one person knew a certain truth in geometry, would this truth cease to be a common good? Indeed it would if this truth could

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2. IIa IIae, q.47, a.10, c.

not possibly be known by another person; it would then be a proper good of this geometer. But if this truth is such that, whether actually known by many or not, it can be attained by many; if, by its very nature it cannot be exhausted by one, then it also has the nature of common good. It is in this sense that the objective good of supernatural beatitude, God, as He is in Himself, is a common good. For, even had He created and elevated only a single soul, this perfection could never have been attained by that soul as a proper good, for such appropriation could be true only if there existed between God and the soul a perfect commensurability such as that of God to Himself.

Hence, when we say that with respect to his ultimate good the person never transcends the nature of part, we mean that whatever good the person can attain to as a proper good, this good could never have more than the nature of part when compared to the divine good. It is because of this that the person himself receives the denomination of part.

The subordinate problem concerning the order of our loves for these goods requires first an analysis of love in general and of the kinds of love, especially of dilection or rational love, both as love of concupiscence and as love of benevolence. The meaning of self-love will be determined

by the definitions and classifications, as well as by the nature of self in the term "self-love." The meaning of society, as used in this study, will also be defined in order to arrive at a correct notion regarding the kind of love that we have for society.

The chapter following these precisions will present some principles according to which we can decide whether self or society is more to be loved. The order of the love of benevolence as accepted in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is an essential part of the background for the problem.

In the third chapter an attempt is made to solve the problem regarding the place of society in our love by considering the natural love of the part for the whole.

In Chapter Four the good of the individual and the good of humanity are seen from God's viewpoint insofar as the creature may presume to know it. This assumption of a Divine viewpoint is without the sacrifice of objectivity since things really are the way God sees them, and unless they could be seen as He sees them, they could not be quite seen as they are.[3]

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3. Ia, q.14, a.8, ad 3; a.13, c. and ad 3; a.14, c.; a.16, ad 2; q.16, a.5, c.

This is followed by a study of conflicting or apparently conflicting opinions, bearing directly or indirectly upon the question of man's relationship with society.

The final chapter is a summary and co-ordination of the conclusions reached, with the intention of understanding the proper attitude of each individual toward himself and society.

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CHAPTER I

ANALYSIS OF TERMS

Before we can compare our love for self with our love for society, we must see what love is and what kind of love we have for each of these two objects.

There have been many descriptive definitions of love, such as "a unitive force,"[1] "complacency in good,"[2] "principle of movement toward the good,"[3] and "affective union."[4] While these definitions do not tell us essentially what love is in all its latitude, they do bring out some aspects in harmony with the notion of love as a tendency or inclination toward the good.[5]

Love is both a generic and a specific term. As a generic term, it embraces, in its widest extension, natural

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1. Saint Thomas Aquinas, In III Sententiarum, d.27, q.1, a.1, ad 2; Ia IIae, q.26, a.2, ad 2.

2. Ia IIae, q.26, a.1, c.

3. Ia IIae, q.26, a.2, ad 1.

4. Ia IIae, q.28, a.1, ad 2.

5. Ia, q.60, a.1, c.: "But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love." Ibid., a.2, c.

love, sense love, and rational love.[6] Human love includes the love which is a passion, dilection, charity, and friendship.[7] There is also a division of love into love of concupiscence and love of benevolence.[8] That these divisions do not exclude one another will be evident.

The first division includes natural love, sense love, and rational love. By "natural love" we here mean simply the inclination which is found even in non-sentient beings toward a goal of which they have no cognition, as when a tree tends toward nourishment.[9] When Saint Thomas distinguishes between the natural love of man's last end and the love of choice which follows this, natural is used in a similar sense, inasmuch as his love may be either an inclination of the will as a nature, or of the will as free.[10]

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6. Ia, q.60, a.1, c.: "This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something." Ia IIae, q.28, a.6, ad 1.

7. Ia IIae, q.26, a.3, c.

8. Ia, q.60, a.3, c.; Ia IIae, q.26, a.4, c.

9. Contra Gentes IV, c.19; Ia, q.60, a.3, c; Ia IIae, q.26, a.1, c.

10. Ia, a.60, a.2, c.

The good tended toward in sense love is related essentially to the appetite of the senses whereas in rational love, the goodness of the object, whether material or spiritual, is also perceived in its proper formality as good by the intellect of man.[11]

This division into natural, sense, and rational love, is made from the viewpoint of knowledge, and its members are not all really distinct from those of the next group: love, dilection, and charity. Love, in this classification, is the passion common to all sentient beings; however, the term is extended to apply also to dilection and charity.[12] Dilection is love with free judgment and choice, an act of the will, identified in man with the rational choice of the foregoing division.[13] Charity, etymologically indicating an evaluation of its object as precious ("carum"),[14] is a love for the sake of the love of God, caused by Divine grace, and differing also from dilection because charity adds quickness and joy, and because the rational

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11. Ia IIae, q.24, a.1, c.; q.27, a.2, c.

12. In III Sent., d.27, q.2, a.1, n.106-n.108; Ia IIae, q.26, a.3, c.; ad 1; ad 3.

13. Ia IIae, q.26, a.3, c.

14. Ia IIae, q.26, a.3, c.; John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, Vivès ed., T. VI, (In Iam IIae, q.26-q.29), pp.205, 206.

choice made in natural dilection may be of a good that is only apparent.[15] More fundamentally still, charity in man differs from dilection because charity is a participation in the Divine charity infused into the hearts of men, who are thereby inclined to the end appointed by God, whereas in dilection we choose the object of our love.[16]

Human love may also be divided into love of friendship or benevolence and love of concupiscence. The former is the love by which I wish a person well; the latter is the desire for whatever contributes to that person's well-being.[17] Love of benevolence is love in a more essential sense than love of concupiscence.[18] The latter may nevertheless be directed toward a person as well as toward inanimate objects, as when a man loves another man because the latter contri-

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15. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Q.D. de Caritate, q.1, a.4, c.; Ia IIae, q.19, a.1, ad 2; q.109, a.3, ad 1.

16. Ia, q.23, a.4, c.; IIa IIae, q.23, a.2, c. and ad 1; q.24, a.2, c.; ad 1; ad 2.

17. Ia, q.60, a.3, c.: "Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. I, 6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name of concupiscence, while the first is called friendship." Ia IIae, q.26, a.4, c.; q.28, a.1, c.

18. Ia IIae, q.26, a.4, c.

butes to his pleasure or profit.[19] Since this desire for possession, this love of concupiscence, is always for the sake of some rational creature, it is clear that it is preceded by love of benevolence. Benevolence, therefore, is the first act of any love. However, benevolence is not wholly identical with love of benevolence, since it may be but a passing act of the will, without connoting the union which must exist in love.[20]

Self-love may be found in every kind of love we have so far referred to. Saint Thomas, however, following Aristotle, points out that self-love, in its most proper sense, is a love of one's nobler self, hence a rational love; while the spontaneous love of self which results in the desire for one's external and physical comfort, a sense love, though more common among men, is not love of the true

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19. Ia IIae, q.26, a.4, ad 3.

20. IIa IIae, q.27, a.2, c.: "But the love which is in the intellective appetite also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends toward him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him." Ibid., ad 1; ad 2.

self.[21] Neither a rational love for self nor a sense love for self is necessarily opposed to a natural self-love.

Likewise, self-love may be a love of passion, of dilection, and of charity. The first, as we have seen, is identical with sense love; the second, with rational love; and charity, too, whose proper object is God, extends to the self, a rational creature ordained to union with God.[22]

The love we call friendship supposes a mutual relationship between persons, a love which must, strictly speaking, be distinguished from self-love. It remains true, however, as Aristotle and Saint Thomas point out, that self-love is nevertheless the archetype, as it were, of friendship.[23]

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21. Ia IIae, q.29, a.4, c.: "And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature: therefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason." In IX Ethicorum, lect.8, n.1864: "The goods which many men desire--money, etc., pertain to the irrational part of the soul, the passions, and so those who desire them inordinately, love the irrational part of themselves." In III Sent., d.28, q.1, a.6, ad 5.

22. IIa IIae, q.25, a.4, c.: "Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity." In III Sent., d.28, q.1, a.6; De Carit., q.1, a.4, ad 2.

23. IIa IIae, q.25, a.4, c.; In III Sent., d.28, q.1, a.6; Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea IX, Oxford ed., 1925, chap.4, 1166a; In IX Ethicorum, lect.4, n.1812.

Obviously, love of self is a love of benevolence accompanied, as is all love of benevolence,[24] by a love of concupiscence, that is by a desire for those things which contribute to our well-being.

Since the self-love we intend to compare with love of society is the one we have called true self-love, it is a rational or intellectual love, though it does not exclude natural and sense love; it is a dilection, a prototype of friendship, and capable of elevation to charity.

Our next concern is to discover what kind of being society is, in order that we may see whether love for it is possible, and if so, what kind of love that is.

Society may be defined as an association of individuals for a common purpose.[25] The purpose for which these individuals associate must be a truly common one, if the association is to be a society, properly so called. If many individuals join together in order to more effectively attain

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24. In God's love alone there is no composition of love of benevolence and of concupiscence. His love is immanent and simple, inasmuch as the good toward which He inclines is His own essence. In our love for God, to Whom we can wish no additional intrinsic good, there is love of concupiscence in the sense that there is complacency in the good which He is Himself, and a desire for secondary goods of honor, etc. (Ia, q.20, a.1, ad 3; J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Solesmes ed., T. III, In Iam, q.20-q.21, disp.26, a.1, nn.11, 12,13, pp.284, 285.)

25. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p.803.

their own private ends by mutual help, as when neighbors assist each other in harvesting or in building, such a juncture cannot be called a society. If they are collaborating, not for a good that is really common, but that each in turn may gain the assistance of the others, the good achieved is in each case a private one.[26]

Father Gredt says that some modern masters of jurisprudence call society, this "moral" person, a real being; others, pure fiction. He himself inclines to the opinion that formally society is an ens rationis with a foundation in reality, but that its material parts are real.[27] This misconception on the part of Father Gredt arises from the opinion that every real being must of necessity be in a predicament, an unum per se.

One modern author speaks of societies as being impersonal and ontologically inferior to human beings, since the latter are real substances, to whom alone we can attribute such values as generosity, etc.[28] On the other hand, an

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26. Charles De Koninck, Le service social dans la communauté politique, pp.4, 5.

27. Josepho Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Friburg, Brisgoviae, Herder and Co., 1937, Vol.II, p.412.

28. Dietrich von Hildebrand, "World Crisis and Human Personality," Thought, Vol.16, (1941), p.461.

editorial in the Catholic World laments that institutions must nowadays be bolstered up by persons, and insists that "impersonal" is not synonymous with "lifeless" or "abstract," and that "there are entities other than persons which are living and concrete."[29] Another modern student of this problem admits that societies are not abstract and separated from the individuals who compose them.[30]

These contrary theses seem to have warm adherents and opponents. An article in a collection published for the six-hundredth anniversary of the cannonization of Saint Thomas quotes one author as calling society a "pure fiction," and a Paris sociological publication as maintaining on the contrary that society is a real being, as superior to the individuals as organic cells are to the chemical elements which compose them. The writer of the article himself steers a middle course. He insists that beings are more perfect as they are more perfectly one, and that since it is only unity of order which constitutes the social being, it is an imperfect being. He concedes, however, that our inability

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29. Gustave Thibon, "Nova et Vetera--Primacy of the Person," Catholic World, Vol.165, (July, 1947), p.365.

30. H. E. Langan, The Philosophy of Personalism and Its Educational Applications, a dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1935, p.54.

to form an image which corresponds to society is no sufficient reason for denying its existence as a real "moral person."[31]

While we can agree with the above author that an unum per se is more perfectly a being, we cannot agree that it is necessarily a more perfect being. A created substance is not called good except by the accidental good which perfects it.[32] Any devil, in his absolute being, is more perfectly one than any human saint in heaven.

We can concede to these adversaries of the reality of society that it is a moral whole possessing unity in operation rather than unity of being, that it is composed of subsisting rational beings who preserve their integrity in

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31. Et. Hugueny, "L'État et L'Individu," Mélanges Thomistes, Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1923, p.341-p.348.

32. Ia, q.6, a.3, ad 1: "One does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compound things are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above." Ia, q.6, a.3, ad 3; Ia IIae, q.18, a.4, c.; Q.D. de Veritate, q.21, a.5, c. and q.22, a.1, ad 7; C. De Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun, q.56; Karl Kreilkamp, The Metaphysical Foundations of Thomistic Jurisprudence, thesis, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1939, p.75: "Besides the unity of parts and powers of an individual--the undividedness of a substantial entity--there is the unity that organizes these separate existents into a higher (if not substantial) whole, the unity of order."

that union, and that its subsistence and specific operations are not separable from those of its members. None of these facts, however, make society inferior to the substantial wholes which compose it.

Modern writers have pointed out three typical mistakes that have been made in our notion of society: that of considering it as a mere collection of individuals,[33] that of thinking of it as a unit apart from and foreign to its members,[34] and that of identifying it with any particular form of political organization.[35]

Though the intrinsic formality which specifies society is a unity of order which involves relationship, society is not a mere relationship existing among human beings. Neither is society a mere aggregate of persons; rather, it is a whole, unified in virtue of some one good, the good being a real good of real persons.

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33. Sister Mary Joan of Arc Wolfe, "Social and Moral Relevants of Psychological and Philosophical Concepts of Personality and Individuality," New Scholasticism, Vol.18, (October, 1944), p.373.

34. Charles De Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun, pp.64, 68.

35. Ibid., p.75; Louis J. A. Mercier, "Primacy of God's Order," New Scholasticism, Vol.20, (April, 1946), p.162.

Reality is not to be confused with substantiality. Accidents too are real, and there are relationships which are real, not to speak of artifacts, which are not, as such, in a predicament. Society cannot be simply an ens rationis; its constituent parts are real human beings, and the relationships which make societies formally distinct from the mere aggregate of human beings are real relationships, real ends, real loves, real racial affinities, etc.

Society is a reality, for surely an army marching into enemy territory is real as an army. None who have heard the tramp of invading feet, or who have seen the devastation left in the wake of hostile forces, attribute these effects either to so many thousand individuals acting separately or to an abstract bond which unites them. Whatever the type of unity in the society here considered, the effects produced are the effects produced by the whole, which has purposes and functions apart from those of its members considered individually and separately, and these effects are certainly effects of a real order.

The physical reality of society is an important consideration in defining love of society. One cannot love an ens rationis, especially in the sense of wishing well to it, and there is no doubt that love of benevolence for societies is possible. Experience confirms this statement. One has

only to think, among a multitude of examples, of a religious order with a strong "esprit de corps" to be convinced that the love of benevolence felt by its members is directed toward the society, and not alone toward the members composing it and considered separately. Actually they are considered not only for their own individual goods, but they are also viewed as concerned with the good which is the society's principle of unity.

This love of society is a rational love, a dilection. Though we have insisted that society is a concrete reality, composed of rational beings, and therefore capable of being loved with a love of benevolence, it is not, as such, a sensible reality, and so does not necessarily comport the emotional appeal which would cause the love that is a passion.

Moreover, friendship requires a certain equality between lover and beloved, and this would preclude our speaking of a friendship for society.[36]

We conclude then that love of self and love of society must first be compared on the rational level. Consideration will be given in a later chapter to the charity that lifts

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36. IIa IIae, q.25, a.3, c.; Aristotle, Ethics, VIII, chap.3, 1156 b; VIII, chap.6, 1158 a.

both these loves to the supernatural plane.

Since love is an appetite for the good, it is necessary to make the following distinctions of the good in order to fix precisely what is the object of our love in self-love and in the love for society. There is first the transcendental good which is convertible with being, the good that every being is merely because it is.[37] Then there is the good which divides being. In regard to this good, Saint Thomas says that a being is not called an absolute good simply by reason of its absolute being, for a person may be truly a person without being a good person. To be good in this sense, a being must be perfected by reason of its proper ordination to its end and by reason of the superadded accidental determinations which make it good absolutely.[38] A finite being is not necessarily as it should be. So long as Socrates is not a virtuous man, he is not a good man, he is not as he should be. Now the question arises: who is the self that Socrates naturally loves and must love? Is

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37. Ia, q.5, a.1, c.

38. Q.D. De Verit., q.21, a.5, c.; q.22, a.1, ad 7: ". . . Secundum esse substantiale non dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter et absolute, nisi superaddantur perfectiones aliae debitae; . . ."; Ia, q.6, a.3, ad 3: "The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end." IIa IIae, q.58, a.2, c.

it a self which prescinds from its being as it should be? And the same may be asked of society? And it seems that the answer must be in the affirmative, inasmuch as we seem already to love Socrates when we wish him well. How could we love the common good for society, if we did not already love society? In other words, there seems to be a good in the person, whether physical or moral, which is loved prior to his being good absolutely, and this prior good is quite inalienable.

Nevertheless, the self we love does not mean the self considered as good merely in the first sense of good, transcendental good. No person can be loved just for the good that he is by reason of his absolute being. Even a devil is good in this sense. No person confirmed in evil can be the proper object of an ordinate love.[39] If the sinful man is to be loved, it is not because he remains fundamentally good in an absolute way, but merely because of the good of which he remains capable.[40] In other words, the absolute

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39. IIa IIae, q.25, a.11, c. and ad 2.

40. IIa IIae, q.25, a.6, c.: "According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness on the fellowship of which charity is based. . . .Wherefore we ought to love sinners out of charity, in respect of their nature. . . .For it is our duty to hate in the sinner his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God's sake."

good is always the reason why a person is lovable, and why we wish him good.

Self-love refers, then, to a love for that self which is or may be an absolute good by reason of certain added perfections. This does not mean that we can love ourselves only if we are morally good. Yet self-love can be good only inasmuch as, even in sin, one loves the self as capable of the absolute good.

These same distinctions apply equally to our love for society. That society is a being does not constitute the good for which we love it. A society may be more or less perfect, and our love varies accordingly, because we first love that good which perfects society and makes it to be good absolutely. Although the common good of society, inasmuch as it is wished to society, does take on the formality of a concupiscible good, it is nevertheless, at the same time, that by reason of which society is a good society, either actually or potentially.

Another difficulty concerning the nature of good may possibly arise from the definition of love as a tendency toward the good. To call a being good because it is appetible may make it seem that the goodness of an object consists in the actual relationship to an appetite. It is not the same thing, however, to say that it is being good which

makes an object lovable, and that it is being loved which makes an object good. The goodness is the foundation for the appetibility, and an intrinsic good; it is not merely a relationship of suitability for another.[41] In other words, lest we fall into a relativist conception of good, we must point out that the order men have followed in the love of self and of society is not necessarily the proper order of the good of each.

Since love is an inclination toward a good, the principal act of which is benevolence, and since the love with which we are concerned begins on the rational level, it follows that there are three aspects from which to consider love in any comparison. Briefly, we may consider the love itself, or a knowledge of the good which is its object, or the good which is wished for that object. In the following chapter we shall first see whether the objectively more perfect good must be loved more. We shall also study the different ways in which love may be said to be greater or less, and the reasons for this diversity.

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41. J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Solesmes ed., T.I, disp.6, a.1, nn.12, 14, 27, 31, pp.520-526, (In Iam, q.5-q.6); Cursus philosophicus, Reiser ed., T.II, Phil. Nat. I, q.13, a.1, p.274.

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY PRINCIPLES

From a definition of terms we proceed to a study of what must be known about the love of benevolence in order to decide whether we must love ourselves or society more.

It is clear that love of benevolence is not just the esteem of virtue.[1] For example, if a person has two friends whom he loves with the love of benevolence, there is in each of his friends some quality which accounts for the origin of his love. Let us suppose that it is on account of their generosity that he loves them. Obviously, the generosity itself is not the object of his love; it is the men whom he esteems because of this virtue who are the objects of his love.

This love is likewise no more to be identified with its effect (benevolence) than it is with its cause (esteem)[2]. Love is a tendency, an attraction, a "pondus." Still since benevolence is the first act of love and the act by which love chiefly manifests itself, we can judge

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1. Ia IIae, q.27, a.2, c. and ad 2.

2. IIa IIae, q.27, a.2, c.; ad 1; ad 2; In IX Eth., lect.5, n.1822.

the greatness of our love by the benevolence in which it issues.[3] At first glance it would seem, then, that if man is reasonable in his love, his benevolence is greater for the man whose virtue is greater.

Before we can decide whether or not this is the case, we must first see that there are two ways in which the act of benevolence itself may be greater or less.[4] It may be divided according to the perfection of the good wished or according to the intensity with which it is wished. If we consider the example of the two friends who are loved because of their generosity, we see not only that we may wish a greater good for one than for the other, but that, even when the same good is wished for both, e.g., health or success, it is willed more intensely for one than for the other.

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3. IIa IIae, q.27, a.2, ad 1: "The Philosopher, by thus defining to love [viz. to wish a person well], does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly manifested."

4. Ia, q.20, a.3, c.: "Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. . . .In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense." IIa IIae, q.26, a.6, ad 1; Contra Gentes, I, c.91.

The general principle is that the perfection of the good wished is measured by the goodness of the person we love, while the intensity of our benevolence depends upon his nearness to us.[5] The picture is seldom so neat as this, however. Not only is there a distinction between knowledge of good and love for the good, but experience also shows a divergence. We may not only love the less generous friend with a more intense benevolence, but we sometimes wish for him a greater good. Now this discrepancy between knowledge of a person's virtue and our benevolence toward him must be rationally accounted for if we are to speak of rational love. There must be some justification in reason when we have a greater rational love of benevolence for an inferior good.[6]

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5. IIa IIae, q.26, a.7, c.: "Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover. Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, ... On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them." In III Sent., d.31, q.2, a.3, n.135.

6. J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Vivès ed., T.V (In Iam IIae, q.13) disp.6, a.2, n.9, p.559: "Sit ergo unica conclusio: simpliciter, et absolute potest voluntas eligere minus bonum, aut aequale; sed ad hoc necessario requiritur, quod concurrat novum motivum, vel judicium, aut propositio intellectus, ita ut magis emineat aliqua ratio, vel motivum ut moveat ad unum prae alio."

The nature of love itself, which consists in union, does not demand that the objective goodness of a being must be the same as its goodness for us. It is quite possible to find a reasonable explanation in personal experience, kinship, etc., for this difference. Perhaps we have been personally the recipient of the kindness of the less generous friend. For the present it is merely requisite to see that a rational love must have a rational cause.

The expression, "rational love," at least in a broad sense, may also be used when our love cannot be so reasonably accounted for. It is so defined simply because the knowledge of the good as an end arises in human reason. It need not be directed by right reason, for rational love may have as its opposites either non-rational or irrational. For example, the love of moral power is always rational in the sense that such a power is not a sensible good, but the love of that power might easily be irrational in the manner of loving. Our concern in this thesis will be with rational love in the strict sense, a love which has its cause in right reason, because of the very nature of the objects compared, namely self and society. It is difficult to see that either society or the true self could be loved in the irrational manner just referred to.

Man tends in love toward the good, real or apparent. Before we can apply the preceding distinctions to the love of self and the love of society, we must first see whether or no there is a determined objective order of goodness.

Of fundamental importance is the fact that God is at least implicitly always the primary object of our love,[7] for not only is God at the apex of all good; He is the source of all good. No being except God is good by his own essence.[8] The fact that goodness is defined as perfection which is desirable indicates that it has the aspect of an end.[9] This makes it clear that the objective order of the goodness of creatures is due, in the last analysis, to their relationship to the final end.

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7. Ia IIae, q.2, a.8, c.: "Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation." IIa IIae, q.26, a.3, c.

God is the primary object of our love even from a point of view that does not especially concern us here, that of the love of concupiscence, for man's happiness is attained by the possession of God. (Ia, q.60, a.5, c.)

8. Ia, q.6, a.3, c.; ad 2; ad 3.

9. Ia, q.5, a.1, c.; a.4, c.; Ia IIae, q.18, a.4, c.; IIa IIae, q.19, a.1, c.; q.23, a.7, c.; De Verit., q.21, a.1, c.; ad 1; ad 4: ". . .Sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni."

The ultimate extrinsic good by which every creature is perfected is God,[10] Who is directed to no other being as an end and Who is Himself the final end of all creatures. However, the intrinsic good of the creatures imitates the perfection of that end in varying degrees. Lest we be inclined to think that, if the creature is not good by its own essence, it cannot really be loved, we must remember that the goodness of the creature, communicated to it by God, is intrinsic to it, and because of this, the creature itself is lovable. If the created good can have the nature of final cause, it derives its attractive power from the goodness of God, and is a reflection of that goodness. This does not prevent the creature's good from being inherent and from being sought simply and formally for the good that it itself is.[11]

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10. Ia, q.6, a.3, c.; a.4, c.; Ia IIae, q.1, a.8, c.; De Verit., q.21, a.4, ad 2: "Ergo creatura non denominatur bona ab aliqua formali bonitate in ipsa existente, sed ipsa bonitate divina."

11. Ia, q.6, a.4, c.: "Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses." Ia, q.44, a.4, c. and ad 3; Ia, q.103, a.2, c.; Ia IIae, q.9, a.6, c.; J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Vivès ed., T.VII (In IIam IIae, q.23-q.45), disp.8, a.3, n.12, p.423; Joseph Buckley, Man's Last End, St. Louis, 1949, pp.60, 63.

Before we make any application of this principle that all objects of love except God depend for their objective goodness upon Him, we shall first see if this eminent goodness of God necessitates that our love for Him be supreme in all the ways discussed at the beginning of this chapter. This is necessary to enable us to decide how essential a role objective goodness plays in determining the order of our love.

As we have seen, finite goods exist only because God's creative act brings forth from nothingness these imperfect reflections of His own infinite goodness. From Him alone, creatures, animate and inanimate, draw whatever goodness they possess. Therefore, no matter what good creatures may tend toward, they tend toward it only insofar as it is a participation in the infinitely perfect.[12]

But it is by the faculties of intellect and will that man's capacity for loving is distinguished from that of non-rational creation. It is in this psychological aspect of

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12. Ia IIae, q.2, a.8, c.; q.9, a.6, c.: "Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination." Contra Gentes, III, c.24; De Verit., q.22, a.2.

human love that we are interested, that we may see whether man surrenders his human faculties in ready acknowledgment of his complete dependence on God.

It is this intellectual knowledge and love that will give us the distinctions already considered between knowing, loving, and wishing well. We see first that there is no question regarding the intellectual acceptance of God, as the object most worthy of love, once He is known as the supreme Good.

Furthermore, in a state of integrity, man's will would keep pace with that cognition and, with the utmost intensity of which it would be capable, would wish God the most complete fulfillment of His Will, that God be God.[13] Man's benevolence cannot be a desire for something lacking to God, but he can take joy in God's possession of the greatest possible good.

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13. Ia, q.60, a.5, c.: ". . .He naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature." Ia IIae, q.109, a.3, c.: ". . .Man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, . . ."

However, as the sad history of mankind has shown, it is possible to turn will and intellect to the contemplation of inferior goods and to the preference for them. The substitution of a merely apparent good for a genuine good, because the former is one's own proper good, is always possible, but the possibility of such an irrational love does not alter our consideration of the love befitting man's intellectual nature.

Although according to the natural love that is common to them all, the creatures always implicitly love God first, nevertheless the explicit knowledge of God does not imply that He is loved first in the temporal order.[14] The youthful intellect may turn to the consideration of many goods. Moreover, the primal fall has made it more difficult for man to seek the greater good.[15]

If man fails in some respects to give God the place in love to which His goodness entitles Him, it is quite possible, of course, that all men will not in practice evaluate self and society in the way that this study will indicate as theoretically right.

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14. In III Sent., d.29, a.3, ad 3; Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Translation--A.H.C. Downes, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936, p.270.

15. J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Vivès ed., T.VI, (In Iam IIae, q.109) disp.19, a.4, n.16, p.751.

To aid in that evaluation, however, we shall see the order in which the goodness of the creatures naturally follows upon the Divine good. Inasmuch as the relative goodness of the absolute being of a creature consists in its nearness to God,[16] intellectual creatures stand next among the individuals constituting the universe. We cannot attain the quod quid est of the angelic world by merely rational knowledge; hence we shall limit our scrutiny to human beings. Although God's purpose in the whole of His creation is His own glory, nevertheless, in God's providence, man himself really matters.[17] This makes his position in material creation unique, for non-rational individuals exist only for the good of the species, and have for their purpose to serve man either explicitly or implicitly.

We have considered the objective goodness of human beings, their nearness to God. This brings us to the second term of the distinction with which this chapter opened, benevolence. Since, from the objective point of view, the good we wish a being is in proportion to its good, and since spiritual values transcend the merely material, and the

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16. IIa IIae, q.23, a.2, ad 1; q.26, a.9, c.; Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q.27, a.5, n.7.

17. Contra Gentes, III, c.112.

good of grace transcends any natural good, it follows that we wish all men the same good, eternal beatitude.[18]

Now despite the two facts that we will all men the same supreme good and that love is judged greater or less by the good willed, we cannot presume that we have the same degree of love for all men. Individuals differ both in nearness to God and in nearness to us. Among these human beings whom we are considering next in the order of our love, we must first of all consider the self, for the one who loves is always a self. Our self is of course, of all created individuals, the nearest to us.

Therefore, because of the very nature of love, which consists in union, the intensity of man's love varies according to the nearness of its object to himself. He wishes all men the same basic good, but he wishes it with greater intensity for himself and those near to him.[19]

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18. Ia IIae, q.113, a.9, ad 2: "The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe." IIa IIae, q.26, a.6, ad 1.

19. IIa IIae, q.26, a.6, ad 1: "In this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally." Ibid., q.26, a.7, c.

Here below, moreover, since growth in nearness to God is possible, a man may will glory for himself and those near to him without at the same time willing a greater degree of glory for one whose more outstanding merit he may acknowledge, but who is too remote. However, in Heaven, conforming with the Divine Will, he will explicitly rejoice in the greater glory of those nearer to God, although he will still place himself before other creatures in the intensity of his will.[20]

Saint Thomas insists that we cannot love another creature as we love ourselves. The latter love is a necessity of nature. The one who loves has, himself, a share in the divine good, whereas his neighbor is a partner with him in that sharing.[21]

This intensity, due to the identity of the one who loves and the one who is loved, together with the fact that we must

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20. IIa IIae, q.26, a.7, c.; q.26, a.13, c.: "In the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good, less than himself; because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice." De Carit., q.1, a.7, c.; q.1, a.9, c.

21. IIa IIae, q.26, a.4, c.: "Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share." Ibid., ad 1; In III Sent., d.29, q.1, a.5.

wish all men eternal beatitude, indicates the God-given plan by which we must judge all our love. It does not depend on any creature in an absolute sense; it depends on the creature's relationship, not only with God, but with the one who loves.[22]

Self-analysis reveals the part that nearness to ourselves plays even in our most unselfish loves. This does not mean that our well-wishing cannot be pure benevolence, but it does show why, in willing the good of those we love, we at least concomitantly will our own joy in their good, whether we bring ourselves consciously into consideration or not.

This priority of love based on closeness to the one who loves does not lower God's preeminence, even in the intensity of our love. As the cause of our entire nature and existence, as the whole to which we compare as a part, not as partaking of His essence, but as owing our whole being to His causality, which implies that we owe our goodness to

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22. IIa IIae, q.26, a.6, c.: "The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the one or the other of those principles." IIa IIae, q.26, a.9, c.

His essential goodness, He is closer to us than we are to ourselves.[23]

This does not make our love for God merely a love of concupiscence. It is true that the part cannot exist except in relation to the whole, but that does not constitute its proper reason for loving the whole. For to love the whole in such a sense would be to love it for the sake of the part alone. We love God for His own sake and not for the sake of our sharing in Him. The latter is the object of hope, whereas the former is the object of charity.[24]

While the love for God is not the subject of this study, it is necessary for us to understand the nature of that love, the only absolute one, if we are to understand all other loves, which are relative.

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23. In III Sent., d.29, a.3, n.37; Ia, q.60, a.5, c.; ad 1: "But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself."

24. Ia, q.60, a.5, ad 2; IIa IIae, q.17, a.1, c.; q.26, a.3, c.; ad 2; ad 3: "That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him."

Saint Thomas's order of love is summed up in the following table:

ORDER OF CHARITY

ON EARTH

1. God
2. Self
3. Relatives, friends, etc.
4. Others
5. One's own body

IN HEAVEN

DEGREE OF BEATITUDE WILLED	INTENSITY OF WILL
1. God	1. God
2. Better people	2. Self
3. Self	3. Better people
4. Other people	4. Other people
5. One's own body	5. One's own body[25]

So much for human individuals. Does the pattern change when we replace our neighbor by society?

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25. IIa IIae, q.26, a.7, c.; q.26, a.13, c.; De Carit., q.1, a.7, c.; q.1, a.9, c.

Our wills must be conformed to God's, here as well as hereafter, in willing a greater degree of beatitude to whomsoever He wills it, but since we do not know the order He has willed, it is possible for us, in this life, to will virtue and beatitude for ourselves and those near to us without actually and simultaneously willing a higher degree of both for some better person.

It seems clear that if I must love myself more than my neighbor, the case can be no different for two or three or any number of neighbors, as set off from myself.[26] Mere arithmetical repetition cannot alter the matter essentially. From the principles we have considered in this chapter, we would judge that society can have no claim to any priority over self in our love, unless it can be seen to have a greater objective good or a greater nearness to the one who loves. Actually, as we have seen, this greater good consists in nearness to God, but even an unbeliever could weigh objective goodness in some manner. Therefore, the next chapter will attempt to study the objective goodness of society and of self, prescinding from their nearness to God. An adequate solution requires that we consider also the nearness of society to the one who loves since it is upon this nearness that the intensity of love depends.

We have seen that the love with which we are concerned is caused by an intellectual knowledge of the good, and that it manifest itself by benevolence. We have seen two ways in which benevolence, and therefore the love which it manifests,

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26. Charles De Koninck, In Defence of Saint Thomas, Quebec, 1945, p.88.

can be greater or less. We have seen that God, the Highest Good, is to be loved the most, and in what order his creatures are to be loved. With this background, we can approach the study of our love for society and for self from the point of view of knowledge of the good of each and from the point of view of the good willed for each. In the latter we shall consider both the perfection of the good and the intensity with which it is wished, remembering that the relative magnitude of our loves may be judged primarily, though not entirely, by the greatness of the good we wish for the object loved. We shall try to see how the principles according to which Saint Thomas has determined the order of love for individuals may be applied to self and society.

CHAPTER III

THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD

If we apply the principles laid down in the preceding chapter, we see that to answer the question as to whether I must love myself or society more, I must first discover whether the good of society or my own personal good is higher.

We have seen that the good of any reality is that which perfects it as an end, a final cause. Now the final cause which is more universal is higher,[1] inasmuch as it is a more perfect reflection of the ultimate final cause, the Divine Common Good, from which all created goods derive their own causality.

Now the good of any whole is a more universal good, since the part as part depends for its goodness as part upon the good of the whole. The walls of a house, considered as

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1. In I Eth., lect.2, n.30: "Unde et bonum, quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est quanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo si idem bonum est uni homini et toti civitati; multo videtur majus et perfectius suscipere, idest procurare et salvare illud quod est bonum totius civitatis, quam id quod est bonum unius hominis. Pertinet quidem ad amorem, qui debet esse inter homines, quod homo conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini. Sed multo melius et divinius est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti et civitatibus."

such, have no good apart from the good of the house. From the fact that the good of the whole is more universal it follows that it must be a better good than the good of a part.[2] Therefore, the good of any society, which good as well as society itself has the nature of a whole,[3] is higher than the proper good of any member as such.[4]

Clearly then, the good of society is to be preferred to my own private good, when the latter is in the same order. My own supernatural, spiritual good is to be preferred to the natural, material good of society.[5] Of course, the

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2. Ia IIae, q.109, a.3, c.; Contra Gentes, I, c.41; Saint Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, Bk.II, chap.9; Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, I, c.41, n.1; Aristotle, Ethics, I, chap.2, 1094b.

3. Ia IIae, q.21, a.3, c.; q.90, a.2, c.; IIa IIae, q.58, a.5, c.; q.61, a.1, c.; q.58, a.9, ad 3: "The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part." Ibid., q.58, a.7, ad 2: "The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the many and the few, but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good, even as the aspect of whole differs from that of part."

4. IIa IIae, q.58, a.12, c.: "I answer that, if we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person."

5. Ia IIae, q.113, a.9, ad 2; IIa IIae, q.152, a.4, c.; ad 3: "The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better generically."

good of society is, in a sense, my good, inasmuch as I can share in that good.[6] In fact, my private good is not a genuine good, unless it is somehow in conformity with, or ordered to the common good, or indeed to the ultimate common good that is God.[7]

We might immediately and unquestionably assume the good of society to be greater than the good of self, from the fact that society includes the self as a part, that it is greater than the individual who is only a part, as it were. So that a society of good persons is a greater good than any one of its members taken separately. However, membership in a society must be defined by the good, the common good of that society. Now the common good of a society is not necesaarily the highest good its members are capable of. In other words, the capacity of an individual member may extend beyond the

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6. IIa IIae, q.61, a.1, ad 2: "Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own."

7. Ia IIae, q.19, a.10, c.; q.92, a.1, ad 3; IIa IIae, q.23, a.7, c.: "Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because considered in itself it can be directed to the principal good which is the last end."

good of this or that society. Hence, in the same individual we may find different formalities, subordinated one to the other, according as one relates him to a higher good than the other. Now, if we compare the perfection of the individual, as belonging to a higher order, to the perfection that is his in relation to the good of a lower order, the individual may be called more perfect than the lower society to which he also belongs. Hence, not only is the good of the family subordinated to the good of the state, and the good of the individual member of the family subordinated to his good as a citizen, but the good of the family as such is subordinated to the good of the citizen.[8]

These qualifications concerning the good of the part and the good of the whole must be taken into consideration in a discussion of self-love and the love of society. The self considered in relation to the common good is more perfect than the self considered in relation to a private good of the same order. This holds true of neighbor who is better in his capacity for the common good than in the good which is his own. From this it is plain that the self, as ordered to God, the highest common good, is more perfect

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8. Charles De Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun, p.69.

than all other persons taken together, so long as we consider them with respect to a created common good. But from this it does not follow that the person of the self is above all other persons. For the other persons too are capable of that supreme common good, and in that order, one is superior to another, although here below we cannot love anyone of them more intensely than ourselves. However, when we consider the ensemble of created persons as ordered to the supernatural end, then every individual person is inferior to that ensemble inasmuch as its members are ordered in varying degrees to that highest perfection.

Perhaps we should not overlook the fact that a society, composed of individuals, who are at the same time related to a good that is above the good proper to this society--whether that greater good is a personal one or a common one--such a society gains in perfection from such members. For instance, the family gains in perfection, as a family from, the fact that it lives in a political community.

In other words, as we have already intimated in defining society, we must be on our guard against an all too abstract conception of a given society. The father of a family is not a complete being as a father of a family; he is also a citizen, as well as a member of the Church. Although <u>this</u> action of his is attributed to his paternal