authority, and that action to his right as a citizen, the person is always indivisibly the same, and we can never prescind from this. When a soldier is sent into battle, he is not merely risking his life as a soldier, but also his life as a man, as a father, a citizen, a person.[9] Whatever the common good of a particular society may be, it is always composed of people, and not of particular subsisting formalities.

This last consideration, that society is composed of persons and not just of formalities, is essential in order to show the possibility of any love of benevolence for it. A love of benevolence can be extended only to persons, to beings endowed with intellect and will, and not to this or that quality or formality considered apart from the person.[10] Not even the relationship which binds men together in the most perfect society could be the object of benevolence.

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9. Charles De Koninck, La philosophie au Canada de langue Francaise, Ottowa, 1949, pp.136, 137.

10. IIa IIae, q.25, a.3, c.: ". . .Friendship is toward one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses."

In order to decide how we should love ourselves, we must not only determine what our highest good is, but we must also determine whether rational love must always be greater for that higher good. If the latter answer is affirmative, it will show that we must love any given society more than ourselves as members of that society, and that even when we consider ourselves as ordained to a common good that transcends any natural society, we must love ourselves as having the nature of parts rather than as wholes.

But to return to the question of whether we must love more that good which we know to be higher, it is plain from the observations of the preceding chapters that this is not always so. Benevolence, the principal act of love, is certainly greater when love is greater, but it cannot be said that benevolence and love are always greater for a good which is known to be a better good. And so the question remains as to whether or no one may acknowledge that the good of society is a higher good and still not love it more. Reflection on our experience might help us to see whether the reasons for this disparity between our knowledge of the good of various persons and our love for them would be applicable also to our knowledge and love of self and of society.

Not only is the intensity of our love based on the nearness to the one we love, but we do not actually will a greater

good to a person known to be better, if the latter is too remote for us to experience his goodness. Kinship, claims of gratitude, personal experience, emotional appeal, all of these may cause us to will a good to someone we love without willing a proportionately higher good for someone who is better.

In the same way, some of these factors may prevent society from taking the place in our love to which it is entitled by its objective good, a good that our intellect accepts as higher than our own private goods. Very probably our recognition of the good of society is far from complete. Society, as such, may be too involved or extensive for us to actually experience its good,[11]--a psychological factor rather than a metaphysical one, but none the less real.

Love is chiefly judged greater or less by the perfection of the good we will for the one we love. Now, while a spiritual good, such as the possession of some knowledge, remains objectively the same, whether it is willed for one or for many, it is clear that, from a purely quantitative point of view, we cannot avoid willing a greater material good for all the members of a society that we love than we will for any one of them. But this benevolence extends to

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11. Frank Sheed, Theology and Sanity, p.160.

proper goods willed for all the members of a society, and it is no manifestation of the greatness of our love for society as such.

The common good, Saint Thomas expressly points out, is not a mere collection of proper goods, and the reason is that the nature of whole is essentially different from the nature of part.[12] The reason why some are led to believe otherwise is that, while they recognize on the one hand that the common good is greater than the proper, they, on the other hand, interpret this "greater" in a purely quantitative sense. Now it is true that in this latter sense the collection constitutes a greater good than any of its constituents, but this is not what is intended by the expression "common good," as is plain from what has already been said on its distinction from the proper good. The difference is one of quality, not of quantity. In the same way a society is not perfect merely in proportion to the number of its constituents--although it would be true to say that the perfection of such a society requires at least such or such a number[13]--nor in proportion to the individual goods

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12. Ia IIae, q.90, a.2, c.: ". . .Every part is ordained to the whole as imperfect to perfect. . ." IIa IIae, q.58, a.7, ad 2.

13. Ia IIae, q.92, a.1, ad 3; q.96, a.1, c.: "Because the community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; . . ."

the members strive for, but in proportion to the common good it pursues. The mere addition of units does not lead to a whole in the proper sense of this word, for by whole we mean essentially that to which nothing is lacking.[14] Now, the possibility of always adding another member to a mere collection makes the whole unattainable. Applied to the good, this means that the common good is as a limit towards which the growing number of private goods converges, but which is never reached.

If we acknowledge the good of each of two persons, if we love each of them, if our wills extend in well-wishing to each of them, we may, from a purely quantitative viewpoint, say that we esteem both of them taken together more highly than one, that we love both more than one, that the good we wish for both is greater than the good we wish for one. But when Saint Thomas says that anything which is of another, e.g., a part, naturally prefers the good of that of which it is, e.g., the whole,[15] he is not merely doing

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14. Ia, q.10, a.1, ad 3: "Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing."

15. Ia, q.60, a.5, c.; Ia, q.103, a.3, ad 3: "If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible." Ia IIae, q.109, a.3, c.; In III Sent., d.29, a.3, n.37.

addition. The part of which he speaks is what it is because of the whole; its primary function is to be a part, and so naturally it loves the whole to which it belongs more than it loves itself.

The illustrations here used by Saint Thomas tend to remove any doubt that love for society must be greater than the love for any member, even oneself. In pointing out that a virtuous citizen exposes himself to danger of death for the whole state, he does not rely explicitly on man's obligations to his Creator to account for this preference; he says that reason is here imitating nature, and that anything whose being it is to be part of another, as the hand of the body, naturally prefers the good of the whole. There are many who think that man is a part of society only because of his temporal requirements as an individual, but here Saint Thomas uses citizen and state to illustrate part and whole. He says further that every creature, by its nature, is a natural part of the universe, and hence loves the latter more than itself.[16] When he says that each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good, since the good of the species is better than

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16. IIa IIae, q.26, a.3, c.; Cajetan, In Iam, q.60, a.5, n.5.

the good of the individual,[17] he indicates no exceptions.

The principle that the whole is closer to its part than the part is to itself leads us to a consideration of the intensity of our benevolence for self and for society, for nearness to the one who loves is, as we have seen, the reason why a love of benevolence is greater in intensity. We saw in the preceding chapter that man's relationships to God, as effect to cause and as part to whole, are given as a reason for a natural love of God that is more intense than his love for himself. May we in any sense say also that society is closer to the individual than he is to himself?

Now while man does not depend so fundamentally on all the various societies to which he belongs, still it is clear that his very existence and maintenance is due to the society called the family;[18] it is clear that his physical and spiritual well-being, his moral and intellectual development, is largely an effect of the political society of which he is a part.[19] Man does not depend, however, on any of these societies for all that he is and has, and so would not, for this

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17. Ia, q.50, a.4, ad 3: "The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual."

18. Aristotle, Politics, I, chap.2, 1252b.

19. Ia IIae, q.94, a.2, c.; q.95, a.1, c.; Aristotle, Politics, I, chap.2, 1253a.

reason, necessarily have a more intense love of benevolence for them than he has for himself.

It may be well to point out what has already been at least implied, that the sacrifice of one's own greatest good for the greatest good of society is actually impossible. Neither of these is to be attained by sacrificing the other. Since an individual's sacrifice of his material goods for the good of the society to which he belongs only enhances his spiritual good, the possibility of increasing the good of a society which contains him as a part, by sacrificing his own genuine good, is self-contradictory and cannot even be conceived of. Likewise the notion of lessening the genuine good of society without simultaneously lessening one's own is self-contradictory. Because society's good is better than my own good as an individual, the latter good is better than it would be if I were not a part of society.[20] I can, of course, conceive of sacrificing my own good for the good of all <u>other</u> members of society or vice versa, although in regard to the highest good, even this is out of the question. Salvation is not secured for others by sacrificing it for oneself.

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20. Charles De Koninck, <u>De la Primauté du Bien Commun</u>, p.70: "Même le bien singulier de la personne est meilleur quand nous le considérons comme ordonné au bien commun de la personne."

So, it must be borne in mind that the good of society is our own greater good, though this does not mean that our love for society is primarily a love of concupiscence.[21] It is true that there is no good in the hand apart from the body, but it is true also that the hand loses its own being to save that of the body; it does not save the body for the sake of the hand. In sub-rational creation the good of the whole returns to the part so that the part may better serve the whole, but when we say that the individual good is inferior to the good of society, we do not mean that the individual is merely a means for the perfection of society. My own good is an end, but as the next chapter will show, it is an end which in turn serves a higher end, extrinsic to myself and society.[22]

Apropos of the question as to whether the goodness of self and of society are of necessity the determining factors in the order of rational love, we have the statement of

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21. IIa IIae, q.26, a.3, c. and ad 2: "The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole." Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q.26, a.3, n.3.

22. Ia IIae, q.2, a.8, ad 2; IIa IIae, q.39, a.2, ad 2: "Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in the multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is directed."

Saint Thomas that each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness.[23] It is a deordination, then, when the will tends toward the good because it is mine, rather than because it is good, but it is not clear that we could always perceive it to be a deordination, if we did not consider God. The very goodness of the object is derived from the divine good, and the degree of that goodness is the degree of its proximity to God. Hence, good can actually have no meaning, as it can have no existence, apart from a relation to God, the Divine Good. However, it does not seem necessary to consider expressly God's preeminent goodness in order to see that we must love more than ourselves any whole of which we are parts.

The following chapter will consider not merely the order our love must follow to preserve its rational character, but the order our love must follow inasmuch as we owe our being to a Creator and fit into the plan designed by Him.

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23. IIa IIae, q.26, a.2, ad 1; De Carit., q.1, a.4, ad 4.

CHAPTER IV

PURPOSE OF MULTIPLICITY IN CREATION

The preceding chapter has shown that because the individual is related to society as a part to a whole, he naturally loves the common good of society more than his own proper good.

Now, in the light of God's designs, we shall try to see more deeply into the reasons why we should love the whole of creation more than ourselves, and more particularly, why we should love, within the whole of creation, the whole of that rational creation which is to some extent capable of understanding the Divine plan, of cooperating with it, and, ultimately of sharing in God's own life.

Now, we do not really know the nature of a thing unless we know its final cause. So to understand my relationship to the whole of which I am a part, I must ask why did God make this universe and why did He make each of the multitude of individuals who compose it. This may help us to view in proper perspective and to understand to what extent man has the nature of part and why it must be so.

The only good for which God can act in the one eternal act identified with His essence is His own good, an infinite

good which cannot be enriched, which can only be diffused and shared.[1] Without creatures, God's beatitude is perfect and complete, but in His goodness, He willed creatures who might contribute to His extrinsic glory by sharing that beatitude.

No creature can approach to an adequate mirroring of the Divinity. Therefore, since God wished His glory reflected in creation, He provided finite multiplicity and variety and degrees of perfection, that the whole might approach a little nearer to infinite perfection than any one created individual, no matter what splendor of created radiance might be bestowed upon the latter.[2]

Any object is good to the extent to which it fulfills its purpose. The purpose of creation is the glory of God;

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1. In II Sent., d.1, q.2, a.3, Sol.: "Differenter tamen homo dicitur finis, et divina bonitas: quia ex parte agentis divina bonitas est finis rerum, sicut ultimum intentum ab agente: sed natura humana non est intenta a Deo quasi movens voluntatem ejus, sed sicut ad cujus utilitatem est ordinatus effectus ejus." Cajetan, In Iam, q.44, a.4, n.7; Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, I, c.81, n.1.

2. Ia, q.22, a.4, c.: "Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things." Ia, q.103, a.2, c. and ad 3; Q.D. de Potentia, q.3, a.16; In I Sent., d.44, q.1, a.3, ad 6.

the whole of rational and irrational creation, by its variety and harmony and degrees of perfection manifests God's goodness more perfectly, adds more to God's extrinsic glory, than does any part, however perfect in itself.

Within the whole, mankind was created to glorify God directly by a rational and voluntary service, and to be aided therein by sub-human creation, which gives God an indirect glory by its remote and imperfect reflection of His beauty and power, and by its utility for man.[3]

It becomes apparent now that the whole ordered human family, the members of which, made in the "image" of God, have nevertheless varying and harmonious degrees of perfection in that resemblance, proclaims the glory of God more perfectly than any one member alone can. Since that is the purpose for which man is made, his supreme good lies in the fact that he has an end transcending, and transcending infinitely, his own private end, that of contributing

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3. Ia, q.20, a.2, ad 3: ". . .God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself." Contra Gentes, III, c.112.

to the accidental and extrinsic glory of God by his union with Him.[4]

The fact that we are here concerned with a love of benevolence makes it necessary for us not only to distinguish rational creation from the whole created order which contains it, but also to make a further distinction within rational creation itself. We do love the whole created order more than the whole of rational creation, insofar as it contributes more to God's glory, but we cannot love the whole created order with a love of benevolence. In the same way we cannot actually have a love of benevolence even for the whole of rational creation but only for those who are ordered to God or are at least capable of such ordination. We cannot wish well to the damned. The love for that rational whole which embraces even those confirmed in evil is greater than the love for that part which is capable of beatitude, only in the sense that it has a greater good as

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4. Charles De Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun, p.39; p.77: "Niant l'universitalité de la fin à laquelle l'homme est ordonné, on nie la dignité que, l'homme tire de celle ordination. . ."

a whole, because of the very presence of individual evil that God somehow turns to the good.[5]

The good of the whole, which we have been considering, as well as the good of any part, may be extrinsic or intrinsic. The latter is always for the sake of the former. Now the ultimate extrinsic good of all beings is God, but the individuals are also ordered to subordinate wholes, and of these, one may be ordered to another. As we have seen, inanimate creatures exist to serve men; the good of the latter constitutes the extrinsic good of the former. The good of civil society is an extrinsic good for the citizen and the family. In man too, the intrinsic good of virtue is ordered to his ultimate extrinsic good, God. So the intrinsic good of the whole universe, the order of its parts, is ordered to the extrinsic good, God.

When we consider the individual with respect to the intrinsic good of the whole, the latter is better than the individual; and the same holds when we consider him with

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5. De Carit., q.1, a.7, c.; ad 2: ". . .Deus diligit omnia ex caritate, non ita quod velit eis beatitudinem; sed ordinans ea ad se ipsum, et ad alia quae beatitudinem habere possunt." Ibid., ad 5; ad 8; IIa IIae, q.25, a.11, c.; ad 2 and ad 3: "That the demons are useful to us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to our profit."

respect to the extrinsic good. However, when we compare the individual as related to God, the extrinsic good, with the intrinsic good of the whole, then the individual is better than the whole.[6]

If we apply these considerations to the society considered in Chapter III, we see more strongly confirmed the principle that the part naturally loves the good of the whole more than its own good. My good contributes to the intrinsic good of society, and both are ordered to an infinitely perfect extrinsic good. Now since the intrinsic good of society is closer to this extrinsic good, God, we see exemplified the truth of Aristotle's general statement that the common good is more divine than the proper.[7]

This concept of the creative purpose has shown the good of the individual self and of the whole to which he belongs in a new light. Yet, admitting that this rational whole is more lovable, does it follow that a man must love it more? Because the man whose love follows a rational order loves God more than himself, must he also love more than himself that which glorifies God more? And, in this case, is his love for this latter merely a love of concupiscence?

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6. Saint Thomas Aquinas, In XII Metaphysicorum, lect.12, nn.2627-2637; Ia, q.103, a.2, c.; ad 3.

7. Aristotle, Ethics, I, chap.2, 1094b. Cf. Contra Gentes, III, c.69.

The answer to the first question must be affirmative. If we genuinely love God more than ourselves, we must with the same natural love prefer whatever is nearer to Him.[8] We must prefer His glory to our own, and we have seen that the whole of mankind adds more to God's extrinsic and accidental glory than the individual does.

Nor does this love appear to be only a love of concupiscence for humanity, following a love of benevolence for God, a mere willing that mankind should give God glory. Rather the fact is that, since we love God the most, we acknowledge the good which is closer to God in perfection as a greater good for us. Our love is caused by the intrinsic good of mankind, which is more perfect than our own proper intrinsic good. Nevertheless, the good of mankind which we thus esteem, and to which we subordinate our own intrinsic good as individuals, derives its perfection from its greater nearness to the extrinsic good which is God.

It does, however, seem feasible to speak of a love of concupiscence for the whole of mankind, both because we love God and because we love ourselves with a love of friendship. On the one hand, humanity is for the sake of the glory of God Whom we love, and on the other hand, it enables us to

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8. IIa IIae, q.25, a.1, ad 1; q.26, a.9, c.

give God greater glory by our participation in it, than we could give Him in isolation. In other words, while our essential love for the human ensemble is a love of well-wishing, we may also love it for the sake of its contribution to God's glory, and for the sake of the help it gives us to glorify Him.

Analagous situations among individuals may help to illustrate the nature of our love for the whole of rational creation as nearer to God than any individual. When I love my friend's friend merely because of that friendship, it is a love of benevolence that I extend. So even if I loved humanity simply because God loved it, I would love it with a love of benevolence. It appears inevitable that, if I love God with a greater love of benevolence than I love myself, I must also love with a greater love of benevolence that which He loves more and that which glorifies Him more.

A principle that is of importance in a consideration of the greatness of love both from the point of view of the perfection of the good willed and from the point of view of the intensity with which it is willed is that anything whose whole being it is to be of another naturally prefers that other to itself. Now we saw in the preceding chapter that though society is a whole of which the individual is a part, and though the very nature of man ordinarily make the per-

fection of his human good dependent on society, still the individual person could not be said to owe his whole being and nature to society. This is undeniably true, but it does seem that this consideration of God's creative design has given us a more profound reason for considering the human ensemble, the whole, as a cause of which we, the parts, are effects in a sense somewhat comparable to that in which a house may be said to be the cause of its walls. If in God's creative purpose the whole of creation, and therefore, the whole of rational creation is for His glory, the parts owe their existence to the whole. God willed humanity to give Him glory. Had He not so willed the human race, we individual members would not have been created.[9] There remains, of course, the difference that the whole of humanity is not an intrinsically determined whole, that our nature as part is not primarily dependent on the need for other parts.

Moreover, it is not the same thing to say that God directly willed the human race and to say that individual human beings do not matter. One is not bound to choose between the two following alternatives. First, God planned humanity for His own greater glory, and I am just a part of

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9. Jean Mouroux, The Meaning of Man, New York, 1948, pp.123ff.: "This whole alone corresponds to the creative ideas which posited humanity in being and which multiplies man in space and time to bring humanity to realization." Theodore Wesseling, "Person and Society," Dublin Review, Vol.208, (April, 1941), p.223.

it, one of the ways in which this nature is realized. Second, God planned you and me and all the other individuals to give Him glory and gain happiness by our free conformity, and humanity is but the accidental whole which results therefrom. These two positions are in part complementary. Since the Divine Intellect is quite infinite and knows in one act all the universe, each individual of any species, surely the Divine Will can love simultaneously the whole human race and every single person which goes into its making.[10] Scripture says, "He has called us each by name," but it is an anthropromorphism to assume that God's love of the individual and His interest in him make of humanity a mere random unity.

To accept the foregoing statements requires us to accept a previous statement, namely that society is not inferior to the persons who compose it, merely because the unity characteristic of society is not a substantial unity. Analagously, whatever we might decide the final indivisible

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10. Ia, q.14, a.6, c.; a.11, c.; q. 19, a.2, ad 4: "As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness." De Pot., q.3, a.16, ad 15; De Verit., q.3, a.2, c.; In III Sent., d.39, q.2, a.2; J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Solesmes ed., T.I, (In Iam, q.14), disp.16, a.2, n.41, p.348.

particle in the world of nature to be, it could easily be seen as inferior to the accidental whole of which it is a part. In fact, there is a sense in which the very unity of society is a more perfect unity than that of the individual part, as the human person here on earth has a more perfect unity than has the soul of the departed in Heaven, even though the soul is simple and the person composite. The unity of any part, by the very fact of its being a part has something imperfect and incomplete about it. Not only is the good of a brick less perfect than the good of the house, but the very unity of the brick is inferior to that of the house. The house is in some sense more one than the brick, because of the latter's need to be complemented by other beings in fulfilling its end.

All analogies are defective but possibly the often used comparison of mankind to an orchestra will reveal the dependence of self on the whole without denying the fact that the self does have an end and an integrity of its own. The whole orchestra is ordered to an extrinsic end, but there is also an intrinsic order to which each player contributes as a part. To the director of that orchestra, each player, no matter how highly he may prize him for his own talent, is nevertheless for the sake of the orchestra as well.

Society does not stand, in such an understanding, as a barrier between man and his God. Each man has a direct and immediate relationship with his Creator, Who willed him for his own sake and consequently Who loves him directly and from all eternity. But if there is no deordination in the Divine act, the willing of the individual man for himself has God for an ultimate end.[11]

Certainly the individual player would not consider the orchestra as an interference with his ordination to an extrinsic end. He is capable of achieving that end more effectively and more fully, by his participation in the harmony of the whole, than he could by his solitary effort. So also man sees his greatest glory achieved in his participation in God's ultimate design.

Man's love for that which is nearer to God, as exceeding his love for that which is near himself, is thus seen as a natural love. Even if he had been the only human being created by God, a man would love himself naturally more for his ordination to God than for himself.

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11. Contra Gentes, III, c.112: "When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also referred to God and for the perfection of the universe."

Considering human nature as God actually created it, and as a consequence of the fall, man, unaided by grace, is incapable of this selfless love. Thanks to this supernatural aid he loves God both naturally and supernaturally. In other words, even the naturally selfless love is not the peak of love, for God has raised man to participate even in His own Divine life.

Now on this supernatural level to which sanctifying grace restores man, difficulties about the love of self and of society dissolve. We need not trouble ourselves to inquire whether the individual man owes his being to the whole of mankind or vice versa, in order to decide, by a comparison of the intrinsic good of each, which is to be loved more. Charity has God for its object as well as its end; it is an indirect love of that which God loves, simply because He loves it.[12] What God loves and in the order He loves, so do we for love of Him.

A comparison of the love between individual human beings may seem at first glance to nullify the judgment that I love more than myself the whole which God loves more than myself. For in individual human relationships, I do not love more than myself the one whom my friend loves more. While this

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12. De Carit., q.1, a.7, ad 5.

is true, we must not overlook that I cannot love the friend more than myself. To this rule there are only two exceptions, namely the very human nature of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, and His holy Mother which are to be loved more than myself.[13]

It might then be asked why I do not always apply this method of judging love. Why cannot I conclude from my preference for Christ and His Mother to a preference for other individuals more beloved by Christ and His Mother than I am, if I am inferring my own preference for the whole of rational creation from God's preference for it? One answer is that the good of this whole is by its very nature unalterably nearer to God than my good, whereas I cannot know the order of sanctity by which souls are dear to Christ and to Mary, until eternity shall reveal it.

We must keep in mind that we have been speaking of an order not only of charity but of natural love. The preceding chapter has shown us that the citizen naturally prefers the intrinsic good of the political society, to which he belongs, above his own. We have tried to see in the present chapter how a created rational whole, capable of ordination to God,

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13. J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Vivès ed., T.VII, (In IIam IIae, q.23-q.45), p.402.

is, because of its multiplicity and grades of perfection, nearer to Him, the transcendent extrinsic good, than any one person is. Since this person naturally loves God more than he loves himself, he naturally loves this created whole more than himself. It is true, however, that individuals do not always indicate by their actions, that they are motivated by a natural preference of this kind. However, throughout the course of ages, society has shown an understanding that the common good is to be preferred to the individual good, that the latter, if needs be, must be sacrificed for the former. Subjects have always been expected to risk their lives for the good of the city or the realm, even to risk their lives for the individual who most nearly embodies the common good in his own person, the ruler.[14] The phraseology in which the commendation of heroes, both ancient and modern, is worded, indicates that what has been found praiseworthy is not only their courage and foresight in self-defense, etc., but their willingness to subordinate their own welfare to the welfare of all. Today, conscription, and legislation touching the very things of which twentieth century democracy is most jealous, e.g., freedom of the press, speech, bargaining, etc., are indications that society

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14. De Carit., q.1, a.4, ad 2; a.9, ad 15.

regards it as natural that its members love the common good above the private good.

What individual men--rational beings, it is true, but impelled by strong sense appetites, victims of environment and hereditary tendencies, spiritually dulled and weakened by original sin--have actually done or failed to do is a different question from the one that we have tried to answer. This is not a statistical study of how many men have reached the heights of which their nature is capable.

To support the proposition that a study of the nature of self-love and of love for society need not be an a posteriori study, we shall see that our understanding of the natural love for God need not be based on the preferences of the majority. We have the authoritative word of Saint Thomas that man by his unimpaired nature loves God more than himself; yet we have, for example, as eminent a saint as Saint Bernard doubting that any man has ever loved God without consideration of Him as the object of his own beatitude.[14] We have seen that even unfallen man, as he came from the creative hand of God, required his Maker's help to do the very thing for which he was by nature made.

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14. Saint Bernard, De Diligendo Deo, XV, 39, quoted in Watkin Williams, The Mysticism of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, London, Burnes, Oates, and Washburne, 1931, p.78.

Certainly it seems reasonable that, with the antecedent help of God, the man who naturally loves God with an intensity and a benevolence surpassing his love for himself, would naturally prefer to himself that created object which is unalterably closer to God and a greater source of glory to Him, the human ensemble. Moreover, charity whose proper object and motive is God, does not alter the order of our natural dilection for self and for society.

CHAPTER V

CONFLICTING OPINIONS

We have shown in the two preceding chapters in what sense the individual person loves the whole to which he belongs more than he loves himself as a part of it. Therefore, considering the intrinsic good of society and of himself, the citizen naturally has a greater love of benevolence for the society of which he is a member than for himself. Moreover, both by natural dilection and by charity, every person who realizes that his own intrinsic good could never under any circumstances have been other than the good of a part, prefers to his own good, the good which is nearer to God.

Despite the apparently inevitable character of these conclusions, there are passages in Saint Thomas which at least appear to be at variance with them, and there are considerable differences of opinion between authors who claim his authority. In the latter case the difficulty is perhaps on the whole nothing more than a difference of emphasis or in the use of the same term with different meanings, but in some instances, we are apparently faced with opposing theories.

This chapter will have two divisions. In the first part we shall consider some statements which are beyond discussion,

such as those of the Supreme Pontiffs and of Saint Thomas. In this same section a few passages from Saint Thomas's classic commentators will be introduced. In the second part we shall deal with a wide variety of authors and ideas, mostly contemporary, in an attempt to combine, classify, and if necessary, refute their theories. Actually this section too, will be widely devoted to a study of certain Thomistic principles, but these latter are taken up here for two reasons: first because it is not so much the statement of Saint Thomas which seems to offer us some difficulty, as the contemporary interpretation that is made of it; secondly, if we are to consider the opinions of contemporary authors which are in opposition to this thesis, it seems more reasonable to consider here those Thomistic principles upon which they rely.

SAINT THOMAS AND TEACHINGS OF THE CHURCH

First to be considered are the passages in which Saint Thomas speaks of the order of love. For instance, he says, "Hence it is in the order of love that a man should love himself more than all else after God."[1] Why, if man is, in any respect, to love society more than himself, does not

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1. IIa IIae, q.26, a.3, ad 3.

Saint Thomas say so, and why does he expressly designate another object of love as next to God?

It is true that wherever Saint Thomas treats of the order of charity,[2] he mentions God, self, and neighbor, without designating any special place for society. But such a list is concerned with individual persons for whom an order of love can be simply stated, without distinctions regarding the aspects or ordinations under which we must consider them. Moreover, it does not really omit the society which includes both self and neighbor. Mention is made first of the only absolute direct object of charity, then of that being whose good affects even the order of charity, in order to show that all other loves are related to these two. Moreover, we cannot expect a passage to say more than its author obviously intends. Perhaps such a list should be interpreted to mean only that among the beloved objects enumerated, that is their proper order. To maintain that it is an exhaustive list leaves us with the problem of explaining the omission of Christ in His human nature and of the Blessed Virgin Mary, as preceding self.

Moreover, Saint Thomas says, in regard to the order of charity, "Therefore in charity that ought to be more loved

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2. De Carit., q.1, a.9, c.; In III Sent., d.38, a.7, n.66.

which is most loved by Him [viz. by God]. But among all created things it is the good of the universe in which all things are comprised that is most beloved by God."[3] It is true that this surpassing love of the good of the universe can be reduced to the love of God, but so also can the love of charity for self and for neighbor.[4] We have seen that of the universe, whose good is most to be loved by man, as it is by God, only the rational part can receive a love of benevolence.[5]

There may seem to be some difficulty when Saint Thomas uses the fact that charity perfects nature without destroying it, in order to prove a natural preference for God,[6]

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3. De Carit., q.1, a.7, obj.5: "Ergo oportet magis ex caritate diligi quod ab eo [scil. a Deo] maxime diligitur. Sed inter omnia creata maxime diligitur a Deo bonum universi, in quo omnia comprehenduntur."

4. De Carit., q.1, a.7, c.: "Unde diligendus est ex caritate Deus ut radix beatitudinis: quilibet autem homo debet seipsum ex caritate diligere, ut participet beatitudinem; proximum autem ut socium in participatione beatitudinis; . . .Secundo vero modo, prout scilicet dicuntur diligi illa bona quae volumus aliis, diligi possunt ex caritate omnia bona, inquantum sunt quaedam bona eorum qui possunt habere beatitudinem. Omnes enim creaturae sunt homini via ad tendendum in beatitudinem; et iterum omnes creaturae ordinantur ad gloriam Dei, inquantum in eis divina bonitas manifestatur. Nunc igitur omnia ex caritate diligere possumus, ordinando tamen ea in illa quae beatitudinem habent, vel habere possunt."

5. De Carit., q.1, a.7, ad 5; IIa IIae, q.25, a.3, c.

6. Ia, q.60, a.5, c.

and elsewhere says that, although in natural dilection that is more loved which is more like the one loving, nevertheless in the dilection of charity, that is more loved which is more one with God.[7] In other words, he seems to say in one place that charity does not alter nature, and elsewhere that there is a different standard for the love of grace and the love of nature. However, the difference does not show that charity has destroyed nature; it merely indicates that in love of charity, God is loved as He is in Himself, and in love of natural dilection, as principle and good of our nature.[8]

Furthermore, we might find another difficulty in the principle that in the dilection of charity that is more loved which is more one with God whereas the love of benevolence arises when one regards the beloved as another self.[9] This latter statement that all love originates in the consideration of the object as another self does not make love selfish. It does not mean that we love others only for

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7. De Carit., q.1, a.9, ad 5; In III Sent., d.31, q.2, a.3.

8. Ia, q.60, a.5, ad 4: "God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is loved with the love of charity."

9. Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, I, c.91, n.4, ii.

ourselves, but that the place which self holds of necessity in our affection, is accorded to others voluntarily.

Sylvester Ferrara's statement that the end and perfection of the human soul is that through knowledge and love it transcends the whole order of creatures[10] is not opposed to the conclusions of the preceding chapter. It simply means that the human soul as directly ordered to God, the extrinsic end of the whole universe, transcends the intrinsic good of the whole of creation, which is the order of its parts. The commentator does not mean that the proper good of the human soul excels the good of the universe even inasmuch as the latter contains other persons considered as ordered to that same transcendent good, for it is this participation which God primarily intends.[11] This of course refers to created good, but the created good of all the persons intended by God is better than that of any single one of them. Ferrara's commentary goes on to explain that the perfection of the universe requires some creatures resembling God even in their operations, though no creature can perfectly represent the Divine Goodness. He shows repeatedly, however, that this greater resemblance cannot be

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10. Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, II, c.87, n.5.

11. Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, II, c.46, n.3.

interpreted to exalt the intrinsic good of the rational creature above the intrinsic good of the universe of which he is a part, a universe whose good is the greatest of created goods, willed especially by God.[12]

Saint Thomas's position is clear: all the parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole, although the intellectual natures, having a greater nearness to the whole than any other natures, are the noblest parts of the universe, willed also for themselves as finis cui, whereas the lower creatures are both for the sake of human individuals and for the perfection of the universe.[13]

We shall next attempt to see that our notion of the love of self and of society conforms to the authoritative Church teachings. It is in no spirit of controversy that we venture to believe that even passages taken from papal Encyclicals need to be read in the light of the author's intention and of their context.

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12. Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, I, c.85, n.2; III, c.71, n.6.

13. Ia, q.22, a.4, c.; q.93, a.3, ad 3; Contra Gentes, I, c.86; Contra Gentes, III, c.64: "Quia principalius Deus vult bonum universitatis suorum affectuum quam aliquod bonum particulare, cum in eo completior inveniatur suae bonitatis similitudo." Ibid., III, c.112; In II Physicorum Aritotelis, lect.12; De Carit., q.1, a.7, ad 5: ". . .In bono universi sicut principium continetur rationalis natura quae est capax beatitudinis ad quam omnes aliae creaturae ordinantur, et secundum hoc competit et Deo et nobis bonum universi maxime ex caritate diligere."

It is true that Pope Pius XII says plainly that society is designed by the Creator as a means for the development and perfection of man,[14] thus echoing the words of his predecessor that society is a natural means for man's end, and that it (society) is for man and not vice versa, because by mutual collaboration, earthly happiness is attained, natural gifts developed, and the divine perfections more perfectly reflected for man's recognition.[15] However, we have already observed that the individual as ordered to a higher common good is superior to the common good of a lower order. Hence the good of civil society, although it is a bonum honestum, is not the ultimate good, but rather a means--not, however, a mere bonum utile--to the good of its members as related to a higher end. Pope Pius XI says that socialism is wrong in affirming that living in a community was instituted merely for the sake of the personal and temporal advantages which it brings;[16] its end is not the temporal proper good of the individual.

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14. Pius XII, Function of the State in the Modern World, (Summi Pontificatus) p.24.

15. Pius XI, "Aetheistic Communism," Five Great Encyclicals, Paulist Press, 1939, p.187. (Divini Redemptoris)

16. Pius XI, "Reconstructing the Social Order," Five Great Encyclicals, p.157. (Quadrigesimo Anno)

Such statements as, "Only man, the human person, and not society in any form is endowed with reason and a morally free will,"[17] would seem to preclude society's being the object of a love of benevolence, since we can have such a love only for beings with reason and will. But Pope Leo XIII speaks of society as possessed of virtue,[18] and says also that society not less than individuals owes gratitude to God Who gave it being, etc.[19] Surely a being, the chief good of which is virtue, and which owes gratitude, must in some way possess intellect and will. But of course there is no intellect and will in society over and above the intellect and will of the governing and of the governed. Is not the obvious solution that Pope Leo's society is the concrete being defined in Chapter II, and that of Pope Pius XI is the formality which specifies society, the relationship itself which binds men together in solidarity?

Another difficulty may arise from the following statement of John of Saint Thomas, since we have given as a rea-

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17. Pius XI, "Aetheistic Communism," Five Great Encyclicals, p.187. (Divini Redemptoris)

18. Leo XIII, The Condition of Labor, p.16. (Rerum Novarum)

19. Leo XIII, "The Christian Constitution of States," The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII, Benziger Brothers, 1903, p.110. (Immortale Dei)

son for our love of the greater good the fact that it is nearer to God and more loved by Him:

> . . .Nulla morali necessitate aut debito obligatur [Deus] ad eligendum id quod melius et perfectius est secundum se, etiam hoc intuitu ut inde resultet major gloria Dei. . . .Etiam in ordine ad gloriam suam prout tenet se ex parte creaturarum. . .; sed potest eligere id quod minus est.[20]

It is true that God is free to produce a more or less perfect universe, but whatever its degree of perfection, He loves the whole more than any of its parts.[21] It is as true to say that an object is good because God loves

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20. J. of St. Thomas, Cursus theol., T.III, Solesmes ed., (In Iam, q.19) disp.24, a.7, n.16, p.132. Cf. Ibid., disp.24, a.7, n.14, pp.131,132.

21. In I Sent., d.44, q.1, a.2; J. of St. Thomas, Cursus theol., T.III, Solesmes Ed., (In Iam, q.19) disp.24, a.4, n.4, p.88; disp.24, a.7, nn.4,15, p.132; Ferrara, In Contra Gentes, I, c.65, n.4.

it, as it is to say that God loves it because it is good. The very goodness which He loves He has bestowed upon it.[22]

God's love for Himself is a necessary love and so, though He is free to refrain from producing the created object which of itself would contribute more to His glory, nevertheless He produces each creature for His own glory, and loves each created being in accordance with its nearness

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22. Ia, q.20, a.2, c.; J. of St. Thomas, Curs. theol., Solesmes ed., T.III, disp.24, a.4, n.3, p.88 (In Iam, q.19): "Antecedens negari non potest; nam creaturae habent esse et bonitatem participatam a Deo; ergo sunt objectum amabile: quia bonum et appetibile idem sunt, et sunt cognitae et intellectae a Deo; ergo per ipsum velle divinum, ut actus immanens est, attingi et amari possunt." Ibid., T.III, disp.24, a.4, n.11: [D. Thoma] ponit differentiam inter nostram voluntatem et divinam, quod nostra supponit bonitatem quam amet, divina participat et causat (et videri potest hic, q.20, a.4). Idque manifeste constat; quia bonitas creaturae et esse illius, quod amat, est bonum non ex se, sed ex participatione; amor autem Dei est amor ex se, non ex participatione objecti; ergo bonitas creaturae non est diffusiva sui in Deum, sed diffusa ex Deo, nec ejus amorem antecedens sed 'ab ipso participatione.'"

to Himself, the necessary object of His love.[23] God does not actually love the better person whom He might, but will not create, but the person whom He does create He loves freely in bestowing upon it the good which is lovable. There can be no possibility of God not loving the better thing more, because the very reason why it is better is that God loves it more and wills for it a greater good.[24]

No matter how far beyond our capacity is this study of the mind and will of God, the plan directing our own love is simply and unequivocally stated, "In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more it is to be loved."[25]

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23. Ibid., T.III, disp.24, a.3, n.3, p.77: "Cum ergo omnes res creatae ita comparentur ad ipsam bonitatem, quae est finis supremus, quod sine ipsis haberi potest et stare illa bonitas (cum sit omnino independens a creaturis), non amantur secundum necessarium habitudinem ad ipsam. Ergo ex vi illius non necessario amantur. Deus autem non amat aliquid, nisi ex fine et propter finem, qui est sua bonitas: alias non ordinate nec perfecte amaret, si non ex fine amaret. Ergo, respectu eorum quae sunt ad talem finem, non habet necessarium amorem, sed liberum; licet respectu suae bonitatis necessarium amorem habeat, . . ."

24. Ia, q.20, a.4, c.

25. IIa IIae, q.26, a.9, c. Cf. Saint Thomas, De Regimine Principum, II, p.9.