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
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THE SOUL:

AN APPROACH

TO

THE SECOND DEFINITION

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## Introduction

Aristotle's short "historia"<sup>1</sup> of the soul, Peri Psyche, is the foundation and starting point of psychology in the Western World. His very clear-sighted, rational, and --- one could even say --- scientific approach to the soul, is quite distinct from the mystical and mythical outlook of the East. When modern psychology rejects the Peri Psyche, it rejects the corner stone on which it is built; when, however, psychologists make an honest study of the soul, many are led back inevitably to the basis on which psychology was established as a true science.

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle laid out the general format of the scientific procedure which he used in the Peri Psyche. One of the basic rules of procedure deals with the prerequisite knowledge for demonstration. Among these prerequisites is the need for a definition of the subject. The definition of the subject is the principle of the science, for it is through this definition that the properties are known scientifically.<sup>2</sup> In his introduction to the Peri Psyche we

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 1, 402 a 3. This and all subsequent references to Aristotle's De Anima in Latin, unless otherwise stated, are from William of Moerbeke's translation as cited in St. Thomas, In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium, 3d edition, ed. Pirotta, Turin, Marietti, 1948.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, c. 1, 71 a 10. This and all subsequent references to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in Latin are from William of Moerbeke's translation as cited in St. Thomas, In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositia, ed. Spiazzi, Turin, Marietti, 1955.

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find a statement of this rule of scientific procedure:

Omnis enim demonstrationis principium est, quod quid est. Quare secundum quascumque definitiones non contingit accidentia cognoscere, sed neque coniecturari de ipsis facile, manifestum est quod<sup>1</sup> dialectice dictae sunt et vanae omnes.

After he has discussed opinions about the soul held by philosophers before him, Aristotle opens the second book of the Peri Psyche by stating his intention of beginning his own treatment of the soul with a definition.

Quae igitur a prioribus tradita de anima sint, prius diximus. Iterum autem nunc tamquam ex principio redeamus, conantes determinare quid sit anima,<sup>2</sup> et quae sit communissima ratio ipsius.

Carrying out this stated intention, Aristotle gives a universal definition<sup>3</sup> which is appropriate to every soul: "primus actus corporis physici organici."<sup>4</sup> He goes on to explain this definition and concludes his consideration with this evaluation of it: "Figuraliter quidem igitur haec definita de anima sint, atque descripta."<sup>5</sup>

Aristotle is not satisfied merely to give us this definition of the soul. He sets about demonstrating it and, as the minor premise of the demonstration, he gives us his second definition of the soul: "The soul is that by which, primarily, we live, perceive and think."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, I, c.1, 402 b 25.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 412 a 1-5.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 412 b 10.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 412 b 5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 413 a 10.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, Aristotle: De Anima, II, ed. Ross, Oxford, 1961, Clarendon Press, c. 2, 414 a 12.

It is the purpose of this thesis to present a reasonable approach to this second definition. A detailed analysis of this definition seems necessary not only because the science of psychology is based on it but also because of the many problems it presents. In our approach to the definition these problems will be grouped under two main headings. The first group of problems centers on the interpretation of this definition while the second group focuses on the demonstration of the first definition by the second.

The first problem, involving the proper understanding of the definition itself, arises because St. Thomas commented on a faulty presentation of the definition by William of Moerbeke. The textual origin of this problem can be seen by a consideration of the following texts.

In Bekker,<sup>1</sup> Trendelenburg,<sup>2</sup> Torstrik,<sup>3</sup> Hicks,<sup>4</sup> and Ross<sup>5</sup> we have a definition of the soul as follows:

Ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ὃ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ  
διανοούμεθα πρῶτως.

William of Moerbeke gives this definition: "Anima autem hoc quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, Aristotelis Opera, 5 vols., ed. Academia Regia Borussica, Berlin, Reimer, 1831-1870. Text in vols. I and II, ed. Bekker, c. 2, 414 a 12.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, De Anima Libri Tres, II, ed. Trendelenburg, Ienae, Sumtibus Walzii, 1833, c. 2, 414 a 12.

<sup>3</sup>Aristotle, De Anima: Libri III, II, ed. Torstrik, Berlin, Apud Weidmannos, 1862, c. 2, 414 a 12.

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, ed. Hicks, Cambridge University Press, 1907, c. 2, 414 a 12.

<sup>5</sup>Aristotle, Aristotle: De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 12.

<sup>6</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 12.

In the Latin translation of Michael Scot, the definition appears as follows: "Anima est illud per quod primo vivimus et sentimus et distinguimus."<sup>1</sup>

The English translation given by Sir David Ross has already been cited above.

It is to be noted that only in the translation of William of Moerbeke does the word movemur (or its equivalent) appear. In view of the normal faithfulness of Moerbeke's translation to the text of Aristotle, we can only assume that he had a faulty manuscript.

The addition of the word movemur takes on significance in view of the fact that St. Thomas based his commentary on this faulty translation. St. Albert, on the other hand, commented on the definition as actually conceived by Aristotle, assuming that our modern texts containing this definition are correct. The fact that these two eminent commentators disagree in their interpretation of this definition presents us with our first problem.

The second problem arises out of the contradiction between the commentaries of St. Thomas and St. Albert concerning the demonstration of the first definition of the soul by the second. According to the interpretation of St. Thomas, the demonstration proceeds from effect to cause, i.e. the demonstration is an a posteriori demonstration; but according to the interpretation of St. Albert, the demonstration proceeds from cause to effect, i.e. the demonstration is an a priori demonstration.

St. Thomas in his commentary states that the second definition of the soul is the minor premise in an a posteriori

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<sup>1</sup>Michael Scot, Aristotelis De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 12. References to Scot are from Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, eds. Wolfson, Baneth, Fobes, Cambridge, Mass., The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953, vol. VI, 1.

demonstration of Aristotle's first definition.<sup>1</sup> The reason he gives for this interpretation is the fact that the soul is the principle of vital operations because it is the form of the living body and not vice versa. Therefore, any demonstration that proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations, these being effects following on animation, must be an a posteriori demonstration of the soul as the form of the body.<sup>2</sup>

In this demonstration St. Thomas reveals his interpretation of Aristotle's second definition of the soul. He maintains that it is a definition of the soul as "principium operum vitae."<sup>3</sup> This position is based on his understanding of the words (as given in the translation of Moerbeke) vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus as referring to vital operations.

For St. Albert, Aristotle's first definition of the soul is demonstrated a priori by the second definition. The first definition of the soul as the first act of a physical organized body can be proven a priori through the proper cause of the soul's inherence in the body, which for St. Albert is life.<sup>4</sup> Since the second definition states that the soul is the principle of the life which it has (exercetur) in a physical organized body, the second definition of the soul is the minor premise of an a priori demonstration of the first definition.<sup>5</sup>

From a consideration of St. Albert's commentary on the demonstration, we can see his interpretation of the second

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<sup>1</sup>"Primus actus corporis physici organici." Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 1, 412 b 5.

<sup>2</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 2, n. 253.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>St. Albert, De Anima Libri Tres, tract. I, c. 6, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, Paris, Vives, 1890, vol. V, p. 203, col. a.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., c. 5, p. 201, col. b.

definition. In his opinion the second definition states that the soul is the principle of the essential act (to live). According to St. Albert, this essential act, to live, is the proper act by which soul and body are united.<sup>1</sup> The words vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus are used to signify the principles according to which the soul is the act of the life of the body, "actus et forma et ratio vitae viventis corporis."<sup>2</sup> It is obvious that St. Albert is not interpreting the second definition as a statement that the soul is the cause of the effects following on the composition of body and soul, but rather it is the "ratio" of that which causes the union of body and soul, life.<sup>3</sup> For this reason the demonstration of the first definition of the soul by the second definition is an a priori demonstration.

If St. Thomas and St. Albert had arrived at the same interpretation of the definition, we might overlook the addition of the word movemur as of no significance. However, since their interpretations contradict one another, we must view the addition as significant, and reconsider the second definition in order to discover the true meaning of Aristotle.

The difficulty inherent in a consideration of this definition under these circumstances is evident. We have no sure guide, and if ever we needed a master, it is in a consideration of the soul, for as Aristotle observes: "Omnino autem et penitus difficillimorum est, accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa."<sup>4</sup>

Due to this difficulty, the first section of this thesis will present four different commentaries on the definition. The principal interpretations will be those of St.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., c.8, p. 207, col.b.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 1, 402 a 10-11.



Thomas and St. Albert. To these will be added the commentaries of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas as representatives of the Latin Scholastic tradition, since the difficulties which this thesis will discuss are germane to that tradition. St. Thomas holds a unique position in this thesis. We will regard him as the most authoritative commentator on Aristotle. However, we must question the accuracy of a commentary based on a faulty text.

In the second section, entitled Critical Analysis, a critical examination will be made of these commentaries. The second definition of the soul will be analyzed first and then the demonstration of the first definition. In the analysis of the definition each word in the definition will be examined to discover its meaning. The word movemur in particular will be investigated to see whether the addition of this word to the definition could have any serious effect on the meaning of the definition. Finally, the definition as a whole will be critically examined. After the definition has been considered in itself, it will be considered as the minor premise of the demonstration of the first definition. An analysis of Aristotle's demonstration will be made, and it will be determined whether it is an a priori or an a posteriori demonstration.

Since this is an attempt to understand the thought of Aristotle, a strict adherence to Aristotelian thought has been attempted, especially with respect to the application of the hylomorphic theory. In the final section, therefore, a conclusion is drawn which is at once based on a critical text of Aristotle and given in the light of his own principles.

FIRST PART

DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECOND DEFINITION OF THE SOUL

## Chapter I

### ST. ALBERT

St. Albert does not have a detailed consideration of the second definition of the soul, but his interpretation can be gathered from his commentary. In order to bring out this interpretation, passages from his other works will be used, as well as passages from Boetius and St. Thomas.

St. Albert's commentary will be easier to understand if we consider two fundamental aspects of it. The first aspect, which will be called "The Definition," deals with what St. Albert understood by the parts of soul and the way in which soul is predicated of its parts. The second aspect, which will be called "The Demonstration," deals with the relation of the second definition of the soul to the first, and the foundation for this relation, which is essential to an understanding of his interpretation of the second definition of the soul.

## 1 - The Definition

St. Albert begins his commentary on the second definition by pointing out that the first definition is inadequate and, therefore, we must have another definition formulated according to the parts of soul. He bases this opinion on what Aristotle pointed out in his proemium: "Quare secundum quas-cumque definitiones non contingit accidentia cognoscere, sed neque coniecturari de ipsis facile, manifestum est quod dialectice dictae sunt et vanae omnes."<sup>1</sup>

Following the words of Aristotle himself, the first definition by itself is certainly inadequate. Aristotle said of it: "Figuraliter ( τὸν ) quidem igitur haec definita de anima sint, atque descripta."<sup>2</sup> St. Albert described it as follows: "Figuraliter quidem igitur hoc est, superficialiter et universaliter sic determinatur et describitur anima definitione universali solum quid est anima dicente."<sup>3</sup>

Aristotle's evaluation seems to give grounds for Albert's discontent with the first definition as a universal definition which does not allow the discovery of the properties. However, after stating the inadequacy of the first definition, he goes on to say,

. . . quia oportet nos cognoscere non solum quid est anima in se, sed etiam partes animae cognoscere, et causas accidentium per se ipsis partibus demonstrare, Accidentia per se et opera animae maxime secundum partes ei attribuuntur, et ideo oportet nos aliam investigare quae in partibus animae propriam naturam et esse demonstret . . . .<sup>4</sup>

In the mind of St. Albert the second definition expresses what would seem to fulfill the requirement which St. Thomas made for a complete grasp of the nature of the soul: "Comple-

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 1, 402 b 25 - 403 a 3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., II, c. 1, 413 a 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 4, p. 199, col. a.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., c. 5, p. 199, col. b.

bitur enim determinatio de anima quando pertinet usque ad  
intima ut determinatur natura uniuscuiusque partis ipsius  
animae."<sup>1</sup>

The question immediately arises as to what is meant here by the parts of soul. St. Albert sheds some light on what he means by using the word parts when he says, "Hoc autem in dicta superius definitione contingit, in qua etiam si definitionia animam univoce sumerentur, non sufficerent ad naturam animae in proprio partium esse cognoscendam."<sup>2</sup> He goes on to explain the words "in proprio partium." The intellectual soul and the sensitive soul do not share in the same ratio of act, nor do the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul. The basis of this distinction is the relation which each part has to matter. The intellectual soul is separate, the sensitive soul is a power in a body but capable of knowledge, and the vegetative soul lacks the elevation over the potentiality of matter which is required for knowledge. On the basis of this distinction, he feels justified in saying that the soul is not taken univocally according to its parts.

In order to understand St. Albert, it will be necessary to consider what kind of parts soul has and from this we will be able to see why he does not consider it possible to have a univocal ratio of soul according to its parts. Also, we will be able to understand St. Albert's consideration of the mode of this definition.

Boetius has a passage in the De Divisione<sup>3</sup> where he is treating the division of whole into its parts, which explains

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 2, n. 244.

<sup>2</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 5, p. 199, col. b.

<sup>3</sup>Boetius, De Divisione. The text is found in St. Albert, Commentarium in Librum Boethii De Divisione, tract. IV, c. 1, 2, ed. De Loe, Bonn, Sumtibus P. Hanstein, 1913 (Copied from the original by Michel Doyon, Quebec, Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1956), pp. 75, 77.

the meaning of the words whole soul and parts of soul.<sup>1</sup> After he has mentioned the integral whole and the universal whole, he mentions the potestative whole, which is constituted by its powers. He gives as an example the soul, which is constituted by the powers of understanding, sensing, and vegetating. These powers are not species of soul but parts. Since this whole is made up of its powers, it is also divided according to its powers. The soul, therefore, is divided in this way: one part of the soul is in plants; another part, the sensitive part, is in animals; and another part, the rational part, is in man. The soul is not a genus with respect to the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers, but a whole of which these are parts --- not quantitative parts, but potestative parts. These parts constitute the substance of the soul, and for this reason the division of the potestative whole is similar to both the division of the genus and the division of an integral whole. The word soul can be predicated of any of its parts, e.g. the vegetative part is a soul. In this respect it is like a genus which can be predicated of its species, e.g. man is an animal. However, since not every soul is made up of all the parts, it is necessary to use the word soul to refer to the nature of the whole.

In his commentary on Boetius, St. Albert shows us his understanding of the soul as a potestative whole.<sup>2</sup> He remarks that besides the integral and essential whole there is a third kind of whole which is called a potestative whole. This whole is, as it were, between the integral and essential whole. It is made up of its powers. In this way, the whole soul, as it is the principle of life and motion, is constituted by the powers of reason, sense, and vegetation.

St. Albert points out that since a potestative whole

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 1, 402 b 10.

<sup>2</sup>St. Albert, In De Divisione, tract. IV, c. 1, 2, pp. 76, 79.

is constituted by its powers, it should be divided according to them. This also holds true for the soul, which is the principle of life and motion. One part of the soul is in plants through the vegetative life of nutrition and growth. Another part of the soul is in animals through sensitive life and motion. The part of the soul which is in animals is further divided according to whether it has powers of reason or the sensitive power only. If it is necessary, this division can be carried to the final subdivisions of the powers.

The soul is not related to this division as a genus to its species, but rather as a potestative whole to its parts. The parts of the soul are not quantitative parts but rather parts according to the power of the soul. The substance of the soul, as it is the principle of life and motion, is composed of these powers. However, the principle and motion is called a potestative whole and not substance in an absolute sense.

The division of the potestative whole has something in common with the division of a universal whole and something in common with the division of the integral whole. Soul can be predicated of a part whether it is in plants, animals, or men. In this respect, the division of a potestative whole is similar to the division of a genus. A genus is predicated of a species as the soul is predicated of a part. Since the whole soul according to its complete power is not constituted by any single power, it is necessary for soul to refer to the nature of the complete whole (ad totius integri naturam). For this reason the division of the potestative whole is between the division of the universal whole and the division of the integral whole. The explanation for this was given in the De Anima.<sup>1</sup> The soul, just like any other potestative whole, is similar to the case of figure. In the case of figure one part is in another according to its power, as a triangle is

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 3, 414 b 20.

in a square. Thus, in such cases, the completion of a power (complementum potestatis) is in the highest part. Whatever an inferior power is capable of, a superior is capable of but in a more excellent manner. Soul is similar to figure in that the vegetative power is the principle of life and motion but the sensitive power surpasses the vegetative in this respect, i.e. as the principle of life, and the rational power surpasses both. Thus it is evident that the inferior power is limited but the highest power contains the complete power of the whole.

As we can see in the passage from Boetius and in the commentary of St. Albert, the soul, as it is the principle of life, is a potestative whole, and not an absolute substance. It is constituted by the vegetative part, or power, in plants, the sensitive part in animals, and the rational part in man. As it is the principle of life, the soul is similar to a genus. However, it is not a genus, for it can be predicated of its parts, but it refers most properly only to the totality constituted by all the parts. We can see the truth of this if we consider the parts. The vegetative part is said to be a soul only as it is the principle of vegetative life and not according to the total power of the soul. The sensitive part is said to be a soul only as it is the principle of vegetative and sensitive life and not according to the total power of the soul. However, the rational part is said to be a soul according to the complete power of the soul because the power of the vegetative part and the sensitive part as well as the rational power constitute the rational soul as the principle of life. As Aristotle pointed out in the De Anima, this is similar to the case of figure. The square is more truly a figure than the triangle, as figure is taken according to its power, for the square has the power of a triangle and more besides.

Taking the soul as a potestative whole, is it possible to have a definition of it? St. Albert maintains that it is.



Nihil autem prohibet quod totum potestativum  
definitur per partes suas, sicut compositum  
per partes definitur. Est enim potestas totius  
expleta in<sup>1</sup> partibus et in partium collectione  
et unione.

It seems evident that this is the kind of definition St. Albert had in mind when he said: "Ideo oportet nos aliam investigare quae in partibus animae propriam naturam et esse demonstret."<sup>2</sup>

What St. Albert goes on to say, however, presents a new difficulty.

Quoniam nos in proemiis iam invenimus quod secundum unamquamque partem animae, altera et altera est ratio animae et non est definibilis anima una ratione universali, quae applicetur omnibus partibus eius. Hoc autem in dicta superius definitione contingit, in qua etiamsi definientia animam univoce sumerentur, non sufficerent ad naturam animae in proprio partium esse cognoscendam.<sup>3</sup>

Is the word soul univocal or not?

If we note what St. Albert has to say in the beginning of his commentary on the De Anima, we will have an approach to the problem. Aristotle has pointed out the fact that the dialectician and the natural philosopher do not define in the same way and gives the example of anger.<sup>4</sup> St. Albert in his commentary points out this difference too.<sup>5</sup>

The dialectician defines through common formal intentions, which are not the true proper cause of a thing but

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<sup>1</sup> St. Albert, De Fortitudine, tract. II, q. 2, a. 3, Summa Theologiae, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, Paris, Vives, 1890, vol. 32, n. 4, sol., p. 102.

<sup>2</sup> St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 5, p. 199, col. b.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 1, 403 a 29.

common notions according to intentions found in many things but proper to none. This is what is meant when it is said that the dialectician considers only the form. Form can be considered in two ways. In one way it is the act of a thing and part of its essence, and in this way it is not predicated of the thing. In another it is an intention of the thing abstracted from it; and it is in this way that it is predicated of a thing, for it is the intention of the whole and not a part. The whole is signified by whatever form of this kind is in it, whether this be the genus, species, or difference; and thus, because the thing is under all of these forms, from it the universal is abstracted. This universal is the intention of the whole and thus predicated of it. Now, it is these which the dialectician considers.

The natural philosopher, on the other hand, considers the real principles which give esse to the thing. He does not consider matter alone. If he considers matter, it is the matter of this physical form. In this way matter as it is taken together with form (secundum quod concipitur a formae nomine et ratione) is a principle of knowledge but not through itself. However, since the natural philosopher considers the forms of change according to esse (formas transmutationis secundum esse), and since these forms have a mode of existence subject to change because of physical matter and those things composed of physical matter, he is said to consider matter. Thus, he may be said to consider all the causes as they refer to the esse which they have in matter and it is this esse which is that of nature. The natural philosopher considers the efficient cause as that which changes matter; the form according to the esse which it has in matter; and the end as that which is the terminus of that change by which matter is changed. Lastly, he considers matter itself as it is the subject of form according to the esse which form has in matter.

In the introduction to his commentary on the Physics, St. Albert also draws this distinction between the considera-

tion of the dialectician and that of the natural philosopher.<sup>1</sup> Science is had when the proximate principles, causes, and elements are known. If these are not had, there is not real science but the "scientia topica" of the dialectician. This science does not have principles, causes, and elements from which it proceeds, but it has general notions which are taken from common intentions. These common intentions are appropriate to nothing properly but are found in many things as common to them. This mode of procedure is appropriate to a dialectical consideration and not a scientific one, for none of these common intentions is a principle, cause, or element. Principles, causes, and elements are essential and proper to a thing, whereas the common intentions are not.

In the Metaphysics Aristotle used the word τότω in referring to the definition of substance as that which is not said of a subject but as that which other things are said of.<sup>2</sup> The commentaries of St. Albert<sup>3</sup> and St. Thomas agree on this passage but the commentary of St. Thomas brings out the significance of this passage more clearly.<sup>4</sup> He quotes the translation of Aristotle, "solum typo," and then shows the meaning of this expression. This definition of substance is only in the universal, but for science it is necessary not only to know substance and other things through a universal and logical definition but also through a definition which touches the principle of the thing. For the knowledge of a thing

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<sup>1</sup>St. Albert, Liber I Physicorum, tract. I, Commentarium in VIII Libros Physicorum, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, Paris, Vives, 1890, vol. III, c. 5, p. 10, col. b.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, In XII Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, ed. Cathala, Turin, Marietti, 1950, c. 3, 1029 a 7.

<sup>3</sup>"Sic igitur figuraliter sive superficialiter et topice in quantum communi signo apparere potuit, dictum est quid est substantia. Topica autem et ex probabilibus logicis sumpta ratio substantiae est quae secundum suum nomen videtur convenire . . . ." St. Albert, Liber VII, Metaph., tract. I, c. 5, p. 410, col. b.


<sup>4</sup>St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 2, n. 1280.

depends on a knowledge of its principles and not on a common condition of the thing through which a universal or logical definition might be given.

Due to their different modes of considering things, the definitions of the dialectician and those of the natural philosopher differ. From this it can be seen that a word will not signify something in exactly the same way for a logician and for a natural philosopher. This is brought out by St. Albert in his commentary on the Physics where motions are being compared.<sup>1</sup> Considering the words "multum" and "duplum," he observes that they can be defined in two ways. If they are defined in the universal by common intentions according as they are abstracted from this or that, the definition will be a logical definition and according to this definition they will be the same in all. Since the dialectician and the natural philosopher define all of their subjects, properties, and operations differently, the natural philosopher must define according to the esse which these have in their appropriate substances. According to the natural philosopher, then, "multum" and "duplum" in air and water are not of the same ratio; and when they are used according to a common definition to refer to what are according to their physical esse diverse, they are equivocal, i.e. analogical. Therefore, for the natural philosopher it is not sufficient that they be one according to a common notion and differ according to the subject in which they are found, for in natural philosophy all things are referred "ad esse" and not considered according to logical definitions which are given of them in common.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St. Albert, Liber VII Phys., tract. II, c. 2, p. 508, col. a.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. St. Thomas who in his commentary on this same passage expresses his opinion clearly and precisely as follows: "Est autem considerandum, quod multa quidem secundum abstractam considerationem vel logici vel mathematici non sunt aequivoca, quae tamen secundum concretam rationem naturalis ad materiam applicantis, aequivoce quoddammodo dicuntur, quia non secundum eandem rationem in qualibet materia recipiuntur." Thomas, In VII Phys., lect. 7, In VII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio, ed. Maggiolo, Turin, Marietti, 1954, n. 936.



A little farther along in the same book of the Physics Aristotle makes the following remark:

Et significat ratio haec quod genus non unum  
aliquid est. Sed iuxta hoc latent multa; suntque  
aequivocationum aliae quidem multum distantes,  
aliae vero habentes quandam similitudinem, aliae  
vero proximae aut genere aut similitudine. Unde<sup>1</sup>  
non videntur aequivocationes esse, cum sint.

In his commentary on this passage St. Albert shows that even though a word may have a common logical definition, it is not necessarily univocal. The unity of the genus can conceal many things because many genera contain equivocations. Certain equivocations are of those things which are very far removed from one another, as in the case of the word dog as applied to the animal, the fish, and the star. Other equivocations, those which are analogies, pertain to those things which have a similarity and proportion insofar as they refer to one nature. Analogies pertain to those things which are not so far removed from one another, due either to their differing within a genus or to the similarity in their relation to one nature. If they differ within a genus, they are not far removed from one another because they are not far apart in relation to the nature according to which the name is imposed, although they are different natures in themselves. They are not far apart according to a similarity of relation or proportion when the common nature according to a logical definition (ratio) is one. In this case there is one proportion to one subject and another proportion to a different subject. Since these proportions are not far apart, someone could easily be fooled into thinking that the word is univocal when it is actually equivocal, i.e. analogical.

If the common nature is the same according to a logical definition (ratio) in one and in another, then there is not

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, Phys., VII, c. 4, 249 a 22; cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, c. 13, 97 b 30.

equivocation in virtue of the application (intentio) of the name but rather in virtue of the similarity of the proportion in esse which it has in one and in another, e.g. multum and duplum which are not equivocal in virtue of themselves but in virtue of the similarity of the proportion or relation to water and air. If the nature is different in one and in another, then the equivocation is caused by the very application (intentio) of the equivocal name, e.g. dog, as said of the animal and the star.<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas teaches this same doctrine in a passage in the Sentences which perhaps brings it out more clearly.<sup>2</sup> He points out that things are said analogically in three ways. First, according to intention and not according to esse. This is where one intention refers to many things according to prior and posterior but has esse in only one, e.g. health as referred to animal, urine, and diet. Second, according to esse and not according to intention. This happens when many things are made equal according to a common intention but this common intention does not have natural esse of one kind in all these things. All bodies share in the one common intention of body. The logician, who considers only intentions, takes the word body, therefore, as predicable of all bodies univocally. However, body according to the esse which it has in corruptible and incorruptible bodies does not have the same ratio. Therefore, the metaphysician and natural philosopher, who consider things according to their esse, do not use this word body or any other word univocally of the corruptible and incorruptible. The third way in which things are said analogically is according to intention and according to esse. This happens when things are neither made equal according to a

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<sup>1</sup> St. Albert, Liber VII Phys., tract. II, c. 3, p. 511, col. b.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, Commentum in IV Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, Opera Omnia, ed. Parma, Typis Petri Flaccadori, 1858, vol. VII, art. 2, ad 1.

common intention nor in esse. In this way being is said of substance and accident.

If we apply this teaching to the word soul, we see that according to a common intention the word is univocal. However, in psychology, we should consider soul according to the esse which it has in matter; it will then be analogical.

Nunc autem non univoce sunt sumpta: quoniam non una et eadem ratione actus est intellectiva anima cum sensitiva, cum una sit separata, et altera sit virtus in corpore. Neque in una et eadem ratione actus corporis physici est sensitiva cum vegetativa, cum videamus sensitivam esse cognitivam et acceptivam spiritualium specierum a sensibus et vegetativa<sup>1</sup> nihil spiritualiter accipit vel operatur.

In this definition, then, we have soul defined as the word soul signifies analogically "secundum esse," i.e. according to its parts. In the first definition we had soul defined as the word soul signifies univocally according to a common notion. Aristotle indicates this by his use of the word τόμα in his evaluation of the first definition, just as he used this word in his evaluation of the universal or logical notion of substance.

## 2. - The Demonstration

After having shown what kind of definition the second definition of the soul should be according to St. Albert, we will turn our attention to his demonstration of the first definition of the soul by the second. St. Albert reveals his interpretation of the relation of these definitions by first considering the mode of procedure and then the demonstration itself. In presenting the demonstration he shows the foundation

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<sup>1</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 5, p. 199, col. b.

on which he built his interpretation of this demonstration. Since this foundation includes the second definition of the soul, a consideration of the foundation reveals his interpretation of the second definition.

In his consideration of the mode of procedure, St. Albert distinguishes two different modes of procedure. The first mode of procedure refers to the process by which we go from a knowledge of the parts of the soul to a knowledge of the soul itself. This process is from that which is more known to us to that which is according to nature more known. This mode of procedure was indicated by Aristotle in the opening sentence of his consideration of the second definition.

Et quia res manifesta que est magis propinqua  
in sermone ad intelligendum est ex rebus latentibus, sed magis apparent, querendum<sup>1</sup> est  
etiam ut tali cursu curramus in anima.

The second mode of procedure refers to the process by which the first definition of the soul is demonstrated by the second. He interprets Aristotle as saying that the first definition states merely the fact that the soul is the form of the body but the second definition gives the cause why the soul is the form of the body. Thus, for St. Albert the first definition is demonstrated a priori by means of the second. St. Albert draws this interpretation from the statement of Aristotle which could very easily be understood in this manner.

"Oportet enim ut sermo diffiniens non tantum demonstret quid est res, sed etiam causa erit inventa et manifesta in eo."<sup>2</sup>

In order to understand St. Albert's interpretation of the passage, "Et quia res . . . ," it will be necessary to bear in mind his opinion of the first definition.

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 11 (trans. Scot). Michael Scot's translation seems more appropriate as a foundation for St. Albert's interpretation of the mode of procedure.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 413 a 13. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 13 (ed. Ross), p. 215. "A definition should not, as most definitions do, state only the fact; it should give the reason. As things are the definitions of terms that are offered are like conclusions."



Figuraliter quidem igitur, hoc est, superficialiter et universaliter sic determinatur et describitur anima definitione<sup>1</sup> universalis solum quid est anima dicente.

Because of the nature of this first definition, St. Albert considers it necessary to attempt to discover another definition of the soul, i.e. one that will lead to a knowledge of the properties. This second investigation of the nature of the soul will be made with respect to the parts because the properties are caused by and belong to the parts. Now, by virtue of this mode of procedure, i.e. the investigation of the parts, that which is according to its nature more known in itself will be made certain to us. St. Albert is taking the parts as more known to us because the operations of the soul fall under our senses and they belong to the parts, whereas the soul itself is that which is more known simply and furthest from sense.

After St. Albert shows how this mode of procedure applies to the acquisition of a knowledge of the nature of the soul, he then interprets Aristotle's statement that a definition should state not only the fact but also give the cause of the fact, as well as the example of this which Aristotle furnishes, to indicate that the second definition demonstrates the first a priori.

First, he points out the difference between the two definitions. The first definition merely states what the soul is, i.e. the form of the body, but the second definition states not only what the soul is but also gives the cause for the soul's being the form of the body. Next, he states that the first definition is like a conclusion which needs to be demonstrated by another principle. The first definition states what the soul is, but it must be known scientifically through something else, for it does not con-

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<sup>1</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 4, p. 199, col. a.

tain its reason or cause in itself but needs a middle term. This middle term is the second definition which states at the same time the fact and the cause of the fact, thus being, in itself, a demonstration and the principle of demonstration for the first definition.

St. Albert follows up this general consideration first with an analysis of the example in geometry which Aristotle furnished and then with an analysis of the demonstration of the first definition of the soul. Concerning the geometric example, St. Albert observes that the first definition, since it merely states that a property is in a subject, is the conclusion of a demonstration because it is the proper function of a demonstration to establish that a property belongs to a subject. The definition states that a square is in an equilateral rectangle to which it properly pertains to be equal to an oblong rectangle. The second definition is the principle of the demonstration because through it the property is proven to be in the subject. It states that a square is the discovery of the mean or of that proportion of the quantities from which the equilateral and oblong rectangles arise. The discovery of the mean is the cause of the equality of the equilateral and oblong rectangles.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, St. Albert applies this mode of procedure to the problem at hand.<sup>2</sup> It is necessary for that which is attributed "communiter" to a thing to be proven through its proper cause. Since to be the act of a physical body is attributed to the soul in this way, it must be demonstrated through the cause for the soul's being the act of the body. Since he considers that the second definition gives the reason why the soul is the act of the body, he is able to give an a priori demonstration of the first definition. This

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<sup>1</sup> St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 5, p. 200, col. a.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 201, col. b.

demonstration is given in two different forms. The first proof is offered immediately after he has explained the geometric example and the second proof is offered when he interprets the passage where Aristotle demonstrates that the soul is form.

The first demonstration proceeds according to the mode established in the geometric example, i.e. a priori. The statement of the first definition as the first act of a physical organized body is to be proven through the proper cause of its inherence. Therefore, a new definition which gives this cause must be found. St. Albert sees this fulfilled in the definition which is given according to the parts of soul, which he sees as the principle and cause of the life which is exercised in a physical body. This demonstration proceeds as follows:

Cum enim habuerimus quod quidquid essentialiter est principium, et causa huius vitae quae exercetur in corpore physico organico, est actus physici corporis organici, et conjunxerimus istam, quod anima essentialiter est principium et causa huius vitae quae exercetur in corpore physico organico, concludemus demonstrative quod anima<sup>1</sup> est actus primus physici organici corporis.

The second demonstration which St. Albert gives is an interpretation of the demonstration as given by Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> It is much more complex than the first demonstration but also more explicit.<sup>3</sup> He proceeds as follows: with respect to the powers by which we exercise the operations of life, we speak of that by which we live in two senses. This can be seen by considering two examples. We are said to know or to be healed in two ways. To the question, "By what do we know?" we might give the answer, "By the soul," or we might say, "By know-

<sup>1</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 5, p. 201, col. b.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 5.

<sup>3</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 9, p. 207, col. b.

ledge." So also we might say we are healed either by health, or the heart, or some other part of the body. When we say that we know by knowledge or are healed by health, we are signifying the form and first act or ratio of knowledge or health in that which knows or is healed. The act of a form is in the thing receiving it, or that which is suffering the act or that which is disposed to it. Therefore, that which is the act of a form is in that which is disposed or informed by that form, so that its proper act is the esse which is from that very form. When we say that we are healed by the heart or we know by the soul, we are signifying that which is disposed by science or health, in which the act of these forms is. It is necessary that that which receives the form be as the agent of an operation whose principle is the form, just as an instrument operates. We have a similar situation when we say that we live by the soul. The soul is the act and form and ratio of the life of a living body according to all the principles mentioned above (vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and intellectual). And also it is the same when we say that the soul is that by which we sense and understand. Therefore, the soul is the species and ratio and form of the body and is not a body, for a form is never able to be matter.

If we analyze these demonstrations closely, we realize that St. Albert is using the second definition of the soul according to his own interpretation. We can see this very clearly if we consider the demonstration in the light of his interpretation of the word vivere.

Activarum enim formarum actus est in patiente, hoc est, suscipiente, et dispositio ipsius: et ideo omne quod est actus formae cujuslibet, est in eo quod disponitur et formatur per formam illam, cujus actus proprius est esse quod est ab ipsa forma . . . . Et similiter cum dicimus quod anima vivimus, anima est actus et forma et ratio vitae viventis corporis secundum omnia principia superius enumerata. Si<sup>1</sup> militer ipsa est quo sentimus et intelligimus.

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<sup>1</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 9, p. 207, col. a-b.

To see that St. Albert's conclusion, i.e. the soul is the form of the body, follows from these premises a priori, it is necessary to understand his interpretation of the word vivere.<sup>1</sup> For St. Albert vivere is the essential act of the soul. This act is presupposed as a foundation of the operations of the soul. This is evident from the fact that every soul causes this act in the body which it animates in such a way that this act flows into the body from the principal member of the body, i.e. the heart. Thus it is that vivere is the esse of living things. However, although soul as form gives esse to that of which it is the soul, it does not give it except through life (per vitam). Now, this can be considered from two points of view: in the first place as life is from the soul, and in the second place as life is in the body. Insofar as it is in the body, it formally adheres to the body. For this reason we speak of living flesh, or a living body, and also we speak of all the parts of the body as being alive although all the parts do not sense. Furthermore, the soul is said to live causaliter since the soul in itself lives and causes life, as light is said to be luminous and to cause other things to be luminous. Therefore, life is the act of the soul which gives continual life and esse to the living body; for, just as esse generally is the act of the essence in that which actually is, so also vivere is the act of the soul in that which is animated.

We are now in a position to understand more fully, St. Albert's interpretation of the second definition of the soul. As we have seen, the soul, as it is the principle of life, is a potestative whole. It is constituted by potestative parts, or powers, i.e. vegetative, sensitive, and rational. The word soul can be predicated of these parts. However, the word is not predicated univocally but analogically.

This furnishes us with the information necessary to give an interpretation of the words of the definition according

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<sup>1</sup>St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

to the mind of St. Albert. The words hoc quo indicate that the soul is being defined as a principle. The words vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus indicate that of which the soul is a principle, i.e. life according to all of its powers which are secundum esse diverse. St. Albert does not directly treat the word primo but perhaps from his commentary we could conclude that it indicates that the words vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus are to be taken as the essential actuality, i.e. life (insofar as vivere is the esse of living things), of the diverse parts of soul instead of as the operations which are secondary actualities. This interpretation could perhaps be derived from the statement of St. Albert in his demonstration of the first definition.

. . . et ideo omne quod est actus formae  
cujuslibet, est in eo quod disponitur et  
formatur per formam illam, cujus actus  
proprius est esse quod est ab ipsa forma.<sup>1</sup>

This is a general statement which holds good for the soul. In order to show the relation between these statements, the word primo had to be used because of the possible interpretation of the words vivimus, etc. to signify operations. Finally, the words et . . . et indicate the composition of the parts St. Albert thought necessary for a definition of a potestative whole.

We have seen that the value of this definition according to the judgment of St. Albert lies in its double function as the principle of a knowledge of the properties and of a demonstration of the first definition. The first definition of the soul is dialectical and vain because from it the properties cannot be known. However, the second definition, since it is a definition of the soul in terms of its parts, leads to a knowledge of the properties, for these are caused by and belong to the parts. The second function of this definition is to demonstrate the first definition a priori. The first

<sup>1</sup> St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 9, p. 207, col. b (italics mine).

definition states that the soul is the form of the body. It does not state why the soul is the form of the body. The second definition states the cause of this union. It is because the soul is the principle of life that it is united to the body as its form, for it is through life that the soul gives esse to the body.

## Chapter II

### ST. THOMAS

In St. Thomas' commentary the second definition is treated within the context of the demonstration of the first definition. He neither explicitly analyzes each word of the definition nor indicates what kind of definition it is. His explanation of this definition is ordered to and limited by the use of it in the demonstration of the first definition. Therefore, it will be necessary to see the remarks which he makes concerning the definition itself in the light of more extensive passages from other parts of his commentary. It will also be necessary for a complete grasp of this definition to see its role in the demonstration of the first definition.

The first and by far the most important aspect of his consideration of the definition in itself is St. Thomas' understanding of the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus. There are two reasons for the importance of this consideration. The first reason is the fact that it is with respect to one of these words (movemur) that the text



of Moerbeke differs from the texts that we now have and the text which evidently was used by St. Albert. The second reason is the pivotal nature of these words in any interpretation of this definition. However, for a proper understanding of the definition in itself we must also consider the other words in the definition according to St. Thomas' commentary.

St. Thomas' interpretation of the role of the second definition in the demonstration of the first definition reveals much of his interpretation of this definition. The fact that for St. Thomas the mode of the demonstration is a posteriori allows his interpretation that the second definition is given in terms of the effects of the union of body and soul, i.e. operations. His understanding of the demonstration itself also supports his analysis of the definition. The major premise states that of two things by which a thing is said to be something or to operate, one is the form and the other is the matter. Since in the interpretation of St. Thomas the second definition states the nature of the soul in terms of the operations which are the effects of the union of body and soul, this definition serves perfectly as the minor premise in relation to this major which St. Thomas gives. In the mind of St. Thomas even the instances which Aristotle gives to illustrate his major are similar to the case of the soul.

## 1 - The Definition

In order to understand St. Thomas' interpretation of this definition, we will try to see the meaning which he attaches to the words in the definition. All of the words are important in an analysis of the definition. However, the key words to an interpretation of this definition are the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus. Therefore, we will first consider these words at some length and then the other words in the definition for which St. Thomas has an

interpretation.

The words vivimus, etc. have a natural context in what Aristotle calls the parts or powers of soul. In the light of this context we will try to understand St. Thomas' statement concerning these words. "Et referuntur haec quatuor ad quatuor genera vitae de quibus superius fecerat mentionem."<sup>1</sup>

The reference which St. Thomas makes in the words "de quibus superius fecerat mentionem" is to a passage in Aristotle's approach to the second definition.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle begins by pointing out that a thing is said to live if it has even one of the powers of intellect, sense, locomotion, or nutrition. He goes on to discuss these various powers and sums up what he has said by pointing out that the soul is the source of and is distinguished by the vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and intellective powers.

St. Thomas in his commentary on this passage points out the difficulty resulting from the fact that Aristotle here gives four modes of living whereas previously he had given five genera of operations.

He says, therefore, first that in order to carry out our intention of demonstrating the definition of the soul we should accept this as a principle, that animate things are distinguished from inanimate by the fact that they are living. For animate things live, but inanimate things do not live. But since the manner of living is manifold, if only one of these is in something, that thing is called living or animate. Moreover, he gives four modes of living, of which one is through the intellect, the second through the sense, the third through local motion and rest, the fourth through nutrition and growth. Moreover, he gives only four modes of living when above he had given five genera of operations of the soul, because he intends here to distinguish the modes of living according to the grades of

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 273.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 22.

living things, which are distinguished according to these four. For in certain living things, namely in plants, only nutrition and growth are found. However, in certain others, as in imperfect animals like the oysters, sense is found without local motion. Moreover, in certain others, as in the perfect animals which are moved by a progressive motion, like the cow and the horse, motion according to place is found also. In still others, namely in man, intellect is found in addition to these. However, the appetite, which is a fifth besides these four, does not cause any diversity in the grades of living things. For,<sup>1</sup> wherever there is sense, there is also appetite.

The passage in Aristotle that St. Thomas referred to in the above quotation concerning the five genera of operations comes at the end of the First Book of the De Anima where Aristotle is considering the parts of soul and their operations.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle gives various operations of the soul which can be classified into five genera of operations. In St. Thomas' treatment of this passage he distinguishes two ways of considering these operations.<sup>3</sup> One way is according to the mode of operation (secundum modum operandi). Understanding the operations in this way, there are three powers of the soul, i.e. the vegetative, sensitive and intellective, and all the operations of the soul are attributed to these. The basis for the distinction of these powers is to be found in their relation to matter. The vegetative power acts by means of active and passive qualities such as hot and cold. The sensitive power although it does not need sensible qualities does need a bodily organ. The intellective power, however, is able to operate without either a dependence on sensible qualities or a bodily organ. The other way which St.

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 254-255 (my translation).

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 5, 411 a 25.

<sup>3</sup>St. Thomas, In I De Anima, lect. 14, n. 199-201.

Thomas gives for considering these operations is according to the genera of actions (secundum genera actionum). From this point of view there are five powers of the soul, i.e. the vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, appetitive, and intellectual.

After Aristotle has demonstrated the first definition of the soul, he treats the soul according to its parts, or powers. He begins his treatment by enumerating the powers of the soul. "Potentias autem dicimus, vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, intellectivum."<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas points out that this is the beginning of Aristotle's consideration of the parts of the soul, understanding the powers of the soul as its parts, i.e. potential parts.<sup>2</sup> Concerning this statement, St. Thomas asks two questions. Why does Aristotle give five powers of the soul when he customarily said the soul is threefold, i.e. vegetative, sensitive, and rational? Also why does he give five powers here when he gave only four powers in his treatment of the second definition?

St. Thomas first sets out to answer the question concerning the relation between the three souls and the five powers. He points out that every potency is named from the act which is proper to it. The operative potency is named from the act which is operation. The potencies of the soul are operative because the soul is a form and the potencies of a form are operative potencies and not passive potencies.<sup>3</sup> Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the powers of the soul according to the different operations of the soul. However, an operation of the soul is the operation of a living thing.

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 3, 414 a 31.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 5, n. 279-287.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q.55, ed. Caramello, Turin, Marietti, 1948, a.2, c.

Therefore, since the proper operation of a thing belongs to it as it is (a thing operates insofar as it is a being), it is necessary to consider the operations of the soul as they are the operation of a living thing.

Living things have basically two different modes of existence (duplex esse). The first of these is material and the second immaterial. According to the first, living things are like other material things and according to the second they are something like the separated substances. The difference between these modes of existence can be seen through their relation to matter. A living thing which has a material mode of existence is limited by matter in such a way that it can only be that which it is, e.g. a rose is a rose. However, a living thing which has an immaterial mode of existence is not only what it is, e.g. a dog, but in a certain way other things as well, e.g. when it sees or hears something else. This is due to the fact that it is not completely determined or limited by matter. In living things this immaterial mode of existence has two grades. The highest grade is completely immaterial. This is the grade appropriate to the intellect for in the intellect a thing exists without matter or even its individuating conditions, and the intellect needs no bodily organ. Sensible existence is midway between material existence and intellectual existence, for in the senses a thing is without matter but not without the conditions of individuation caused by matter nor are the senses able to function without a bodily organ.

The operations of a living thing according to a material mode of existence are those of the vegetative soul. Although these operations are ordered to attaining and conserving existence as are the operations of inanimate things, these operations come about in a higher and nobler way. Inanimate things are brought into existence and preserved in existence through extrinsic causes. Animate things generate in virtue of an intrinsic principle, i.e. seed, and are preserved by

an intrinsic principle through nutrition. The operations of a living thing which are according to a wholly immaterial mode of existence are attributed to the intellective part of the soul, and those which are in between are attributed to the sensitive part of the soul. Therefore, according to this threefold existence (triplex esse) we differentiate the soul generically into three parts (triplex anima): the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.

Having shown the basis for the division of the soul into three parts, St. Thomas proceeds to give the foundation for the division of five powers. It must be recognized that existence is always in accordance with a form. Sensible existence is in accordance with a sensible form and intelligible existence is in accordance with an intelligible form. It is from this form that an inclination arises and from this inclination arises an operation. Therefore, an inclination follows on the sensible form which is called sensible appetite and an inclination follows on the intelligible form which is called intellectual appetite, or will. From appetite comes the operation which is called locomotion. Therefore, we have five powers: the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, locomotive and appetitive.

In his approach to the second definition, Aristotle was trying to establish the soul as the principle of living in all living things. He, therefore, distinguished life according to the grades of living things and not according to the operations of life (non secundum operationes vitae), as he did when he distinguished the five genera of powers. Appetite does not constitute another grade of living things because whatever has sense has appetite. As a consequence there are only four grades of living things.

We can now see that it is possible to speak of the powers of the soul from different points of view. Depending on the point of view, the soul has either three, four, or five

powers, or parts. First, the soul is said to have three parts, i.e. vegetative, sensitive, and intellective, if they are distinguished from the point of view of the mode of operation, or mode of being. Second, the soul is said to have four powers, i.e. the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, and locomotive, if they are distinguished according to the grades of living things. Third, the soul is said to have five genera of powers, i.e. the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, locomotive, and appetitive, if life (vivere) is distinguished according to the operations of life (secundum operationes vitae) or if vital operations are taken according to the genera of actions (secundum genera actionum).

We are now in a position to see why St. Thomas interpreted the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus as referring to the four genera of life. It is only as referring to the genera of life as distinguished on the basis of living things that we get exactly four words.

Due to his interpretation of the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus as referring collectively to the four genera of life, St. Thomas is forced to interpret these words taken singly as signifying the operations of life, "opera vitae," belonging to the four grades of living things because the "triplex anima" is distinguished on the basis of a "triplex esse."

St. Thomas does not give interpretations for all of the other words in the definition, but he does furnish an interpretation for the words vivere, primo, and quo. The word vivere for St. Thomas signifies vegetative operation. He derives this interpretation from the words of Aristotle, "Vivere igitur, propter hoc principium inest omnibus viventibus."<sup>1</sup> We might also add these words of Aristotle: "Et namque quae non moventur, neque mutant locum, habent autem

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 b 1.

sensum, animalia dicimus, et non vivere solum."<sup>1</sup> For a thing merely to live it is enough for it to have the vegetative principle.

St. Thomas has an interpretation of the word primo in line with his understanding of the words vivimus, etc. If vivimus signifies operation, then vivimus primo would be an impossible combination for it would mean vivimus signifies first act instead of second act, i.e. operation. Therefore, although Aristotle omitted this word from his examples of knowledge and health, St. Thomas adds it to the examples so that there will be a perfect parallel between the examples and the definition of the soul as he interprets it, for he maintains that the word primo combined with the first word in the definition, quo, indicates that the soul is the first principle of life.<sup>2</sup> In the example of health, although we are said to be healthy by the body and health, health is the first principle by which we are said to be healthy. The reason St. Thomas gives for this is the fact that the body is not said to be healthy unless it has health. So also the body is not said to be living unless it has a soul. For St. Thomas this, then, is the reason why Aristotle used the word primo in the definition: to indicate that the soul is the first principle by which we live, sense, etc. From these considerations it is also evident that St. Thomas interpreted the word quo as indicating that the soul is a principle. St. Thomas does not give a detailed interpretation of the other words in the definition.

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 b 3.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 253.



## 2 - The Demonstration

St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's demonstration of the soul as form can be divided into two considerations. The first of these deals with the mode of procedure. This consideration is important because St. Thomas and St. Albert do not agree as to the mode of procedure appropriate to this demonstration. The second consideration deals with the demonstration itself. The importance of this demonstration in the mind of St. Thomas can be gathered from his frequent use of it in his other writings.

Aristotle's statement of the mode of procedure appropriate to this demonstration is very brief. "Quoniam autem ex incertis quidem, sed tamen manifestioribus, certum fit id quod est secundum rationem notius, tentandum est iterum sic aggredi de ipsa."<sup>1</sup> However, he has treated this subject at some length in both the Posterior Analytics and the Physics. Because the demonstration which Aristotle gave of the soul as form is an a posteriori demonstration, it seems appropriate to consider this mode of procedure as it is delineated in St. Thomas' commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and the Physics.

Since St. Thomas has two statements of the demonstration in his commentary on the De Anima, for a better understanding of his interpretation, both of these passages will be given. Included in this consideration will be his analysis of this demonstration in the light of his judgment of the minor premise. However, in this section we will limit our consideration of his interpretation of the demonstration to his commentary on the De Anima. In the section devoted to the "Critical Analysis" we will return to St. Thomas' interpretation of the demonstration as exhibited in his other works as well as his commentary on the De Anima.

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 12.

Aristotle begins his consideration of the demonstration with a statement of the mode of procedure to be followed. This statement concerning the proper mode of procedure is very appropriate at the very beginning because, as he has pointed out in the Metaphysics, it is absurd to seek both the knowledge of something and the mode of procedure for attaining such knowledge at the same time.<sup>1</sup>

The mode of procedure which Aristotle points out here in a very summary fashion he has treated both in the Physics<sup>2</sup> and in the Posterior Analytics.<sup>3</sup> We will begin with a consideration of this mode of procedure as set forth by Aristotle in the Physics and then compare this treatment with that in the Posterior Analytics.

In the Physics Aristotle, in presenting the order of proceeding in natural science, first shows that it is necessary to begin from a consideration of principles and then that it is necessary to begin from more universal principles. Where he shows that it is necessary first to determine the more universal principles, he makes the distinction between what is more known and more certain with respect to us and what is more known and more certain to nature.

Innata autem est ex notioribus nobis via et certioribus, in certiora naturae et notiora. Non enim eadem nobis nota et simpliciter. Unde quidem necesse secundum modum hunc procedere ex incertioribus naturae, nobis autem certioribus, in certiora naturae et notiora. Sunt autem primum nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis: posterius autem ex his fiunt nota elementa et principia dividendibus haec. Unde ex universalibus ad singularia oportet procedere.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Propter quod oportet erudiri quomodo singula sunt recipienda; et absurdum est simul quaerere scientiam et modum sciendi." Aristotle, Metaph., II, c. 3, 995 a 15.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, Phys., I, c. 1, 184 a 17 - 184 a 24.

<sup>3</sup>Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, c. 2, 71 b 29 - 72 a 6.

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle, Phys., I c. 1, 184 a 17 - 184 a 24.

St. Thomas in his commentary on this passage gives his version of this demonstration.

Innatum est nobis ut procedamus cognoscendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota, in ea quae sunt magis nota naturae; sed ea quae sunt nobis magis nota sunt confusa, qualia sunt universalia; ergo oportet<sup>1</sup> nos ab universalibus ad singularia procedere.

In explaining the first proposition, St. Thomas points out that the same things are not more known to us and to nature. What is more known to nature is less known to us. However, since it is natural for us to go from what is known to us to what is unknown, we must proceed from what is more known to us to what is more known to nature.

What is more known to nature is the same as what is more known simply or secundum se. Now, what is more known secundum se are those things which "plus habent de entitate."<sup>2</sup> A thing is knowable insofar as it is a being. A thing is more truly a being which is more in act. It is these which are more known to nature, or more known simply.

With us, however, it is the reverse. We proceed from potency to act. The principle of our knowledge is from the sensibles which are material and only intelligible in potency. It is these which are more known to us rather than separated substances, which are more known according to nature.

With respect to the second proposition of this demonstration, St. Thomas first explains the word "confusa." Those things are confused which contain in themselves something which is in potency and indistinct, for that is indistinct which is half way between pure potency and perfect act. Since our intellect goes from potency to act, it first knows something confusedly and then distinctly. According to St. Thomas

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In I Phys., lect. 1, n. 6.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., n. 7.

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this distinct knowledge is attained by the process of resolution. In this regard an important comment to note is this: ". . . sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et elementorum."<sup>1</sup> We do not begin with a distinct grasp of our subject, e.g. the parts of the soul, but we begin with a confused grasp of, for instance, the soul and by resolution come to a distinct grasp of its parts.

Universals are confused in the sense that they contain in themselves their species in potency. Whoever knows something in the universal, knows it indistinctly, but when what is contained in the universal in potency is known in act then it is known distinctly, so that to know animal is to know man in potency. Therefore, since we go from potency to act, we know animal before we know man.

St. Thomas contrasts what Aristotle says here with what he said in the Posterior Analytics. We have in the Posterior Analytics: "Sunt autem quidem longiora universalia maxime autem propinquiora sensui singularia, et opponuntur haec ad invicem";<sup>2</sup> whereas here in the Physics we have: "Unde ex universalibus ad singularia oportet procedere."<sup>3</sup> There is a confusion based on the word "singularia." St. Thomas points out in the Posterior Analytics that Aristotle is taking "singularia" for individual sensibles; whereas in the Physics he is taking it for species. The reasonableness of this distinction can be seen, for when we proceed from sense knowledge to intellectual knowledge, the individual sensibles will be known first as to sense. However, as was shown above, when we are on the intellectual level, we proceed from the universal to the species. The species are that which is more known to nature, "utpote perfectiores existentes et distinctam cogni-

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<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas, In I Phys., lect. 1, n. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, c. 2, 72 a 5.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, Phys., I, c. 1, 184 a 24.

tionem habentes";<sup>1</sup> whereas the genera are prior known to us since they contain knowledge in potency and indistinctly.

According to St. Thomas, Averroes in his commentary on this passage interprets Aristotle as showing here the mode of demonstration in this science and not the process in determination. He interprets that which is more known to us as the composed, which he takes for "confusa," and that which is more known to nature as the simple. The Commentator finally concludes that we must proceed from the more universal to the less universal as a corollary.

St. Thomas considers the commentary of Averroes as inadequate because Averroes does not consider Aristotle as having a unified exposition of a single point but credits him with confusing the mode of demonstration and the process in determination. St. Thomas maintains that Aristotle actually treated the mode of demonstration in its proper place in the Second Book. St. Thomas also objects to Averroes' commentary because Averroes takes "confusa" as meaning "composed" instead of "indistinct." Adopting Averroes' position, we can see the absurdity to which it leads. If we take this as a consideration of the mode of demonstration and begin by demonstrating from the more universal, Averroes would not be able to conclude anything because the genera are not something composed of species but contain their species in potency.<sup>2</sup>

Turning our attention now to the consideration of this mode of procedure in the Posterior Analytics, we find that Aristotle treated it when considering the kind of premises which are necessary for demonstration. He demands that the premises be "et notioribus, et prioribus et causis conclusionis."<sup>3</sup> His explanation of these terms is given in the fol-

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<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas, In I Phys., lect. 1, n. 8.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 1, n. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, c. 2, 71 b 22.

lowing passage:

Causas quoque notiores oportet esse et primas causas: quoniam tunc scimus, cum causas cognoscimus; et priores si verae sunt causae, et notiores, non solum altero modo intelligendo, sed in sciendo quoniam sunt. Priora autem et notiora dupliciter sunt: non enim idem est natura et ad nos prius; neque notius natura et nobis notius. Dico autem priora ad nos et notiora, proxima sensui: simpliciter autem priora et notiora quae longius sunt. Sunt autem quidem longiora universalis, maxime autem propinquiora sensui singularia; et opponuntur haec ad invicem.<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas' commentary brings out the meaning of this passage.<sup>2</sup> He first points out that the premises must be the cause of the conclusion. This will follow if the premises contain the cause of the effect to be demonstrated, for we know scientifically when we know the cause. From this it can be concluded that since a cause is naturally prior and more known than its effect, the premises are prior and more known than the conclusion. Since prior and more known are said in two ways, to us and according to nature, it must be understood that those things from which demonstration proceeds are prior and more known simply or according to nature.

Those things which are prior and more known simply are those things which are remote from sense, as the universals. Those which are prior and more known to us are near to our senses, as are singulars. Now this seems to be exactly the opposite of what was said in the Physics, i.e. that the universals are prior to us and posterior according to nature. However, here it is a question of the order of singulars to universals simply. In this order it is evident that sense knowledge precedes intellectual knowledge in us, so that in the order of our coming to know something, the knowledge of the singular is first and more known to us than the universal. In the Physics it was a question of the more universal as

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<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, c. 2, 71 b 29 - 72 a 6.

<sup>2</sup>St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, n. 42-43 bis.

opposed to the less universal, e.g. animal as opposed to man. When something is generated, what is in potency is prior in time and posterior in nature, what is in act is prior in nature and posterior in time. The knowledge of a genus is potential in comparison to the knowledge of the species in which everything essential to the thing is known in act, so that in the generation of our knowledge the more common is known before the less common.

In the Physics also, Aristotle points out that it is natural for us to proceed from what is more known to us, so that a demonstration would not be from those things which are more known simply but from those things which are more known to us. Here in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle says that demonstration is from what is prior and more known simply. However, in the Posterior Analytics it is a question of the relation of sense knowledge to intellectual knowledge where what is more known to us is sense knowledge rather than intellectual knowledge. In the Physics it is a question of intellectual knowledge only, so that what is more known to us is also in the intellect. Since there can be no demonstration from singulars, it will only be possible on the level of the universal which is in the intellect.

Nothing can be known by us except through that which is more known to us. In mathematics it happens that what is more known to us is also more known simply because mathematics abstracts from matter and thus all of its demonstrations are from formal principles. It is here that we find all of the demonstrations given from what is prior and more known simply. However, in natural philosophy what is more known to us is not more known simply. This is the case because in natural philosophy we do not abstract from matter and motion and thus the essences to be known, since they are in matter, are hidden. These essences can only be known by what appears to us, such as operations. Therefore, in natural science demonstrations for the most part are from effects, which are more known to

us and not simply. So that we can see here in the Posterior Analytics when Aristotle says demonstration is from what is prior and more known simply, he is considering only the demonstration propter quid and not the demonstration quia.<sup>1</sup>

Returning now to the De Anima and the statement of Aristotle concerning the mode of procedure to be followed there, the question immediately arises which mode Aristotle is considering here, that of demonstration or that of determination. St. Thomas interprets him as considering the mode of demonstration by which the first definition of the soul is demonstrated by the second. As Cajetan points out, Themistius, Averroes, and Albert understand this to be a consideration of the mode of arriving at the second definition.<sup>2</sup> It is evident that St. Thomas is aware that Aristotle's statement of the mode of procedure with respect to the second definition could be applied either to a consideration of the order in demonstration or in determination. However, he chooses to interpret this statement of the mode as appropriate to the order in demonstration. If this statement of mode is interpreted as referring to the order of determination in the science, there is no unity in the text of Aristotle; for in the first sentence he would be discussing the order of determination<sup>3</sup> and in the second sentence, the order of demonstration.<sup>4</sup>

Since we have already seen St. Thomas' position concerning what is more known to us and to nature, it remains only to see how he applies this to the passage at hand. He begins with a flat statement of Aristotle's intention: "Primo determinat modum demonstrationis, quo uti intendit in demonstran-

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, n. 43 bis.

<sup>2</sup>Thomas De Vio Cardinal Cajetan, Commentaria in De Anima Aristotelis, Scripta Philosophica, ed. Coquelle, Rome, Apud Institutum "Angelicum," 1939, vol. II, c. 2, n. 84.

<sup>3</sup>Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 11.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 413 a 13.



do."<sup>1</sup> He then follows this up with a commentary in line with this statement. He first shows the way in which it is necessary for us to proceed; that is, from what is more known to us. From what is known to us we come to know what is unknown to us and since every demonstration is had by virtue of a cause of our knowing something, it is necessary that every demonstration proceed from what is more known to us, whether this be the cause or the effect. On this basis, then, St. Thomas goes on to make the distinction between demonstration in mathematics and demonstration in natural philosophy. In considering the procedure in natural philosophy, he mentions that in natural things, for the most part, the sensible effects are more known than their causes and, therefore, demonstration in natural philosophy proceeds from these effects.<sup>2</sup>

St. Thomas concludes that Aristotle intends to demonstrate according to the mode which is appropriate to natural philosophy because he is dealing with a subject which is part of natural philosophy.<sup>3</sup> He weaves the thread of his argument around the words "certum fit"<sup>4</sup> for something is made certain by demonstration. Then applying the distinction concerning what is more known to us and what is more known simply to this demonstration, he maintains that what Aristotle intends is, by demonstration from what is uncertain according to nature but more certain to us, to make more certain to us what is certain according to nature and according to its ratio more known.

In virtue of this interpretation, St. Thomas is able to consider the demonstration of the first definition by the

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<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 245.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., n. 246.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 12.

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second as an a posteriori demonstration; whereas St. Albert is able by his interpretation to consider the demonstration as an a priori demonstration.

If we turn our attention to St. Thomas' commentary on the demonstration itself, we notice that he gives two versions of it. The first of these he enunciates immediately after stating the mode of procedure which he understands Aristotle to be following. The second of these versions St. Thomas gives just prior to his commentary on Aristotle's demonstration of the first definition.

The first version of this demonstration is very short and is based on the notion that the form is the first principle of operation.

Illud quod est primum principium vivendi  
est viventium corporum actus et forma: sed  
anima est primum principium vivendi his  
quae vivunt: ergo est corporis viventis  
actus et forma.<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas points out his interpretation of this demonstration immediately after giving it. He understands this as an a posteriori demonstration based on the premise that the soul is the first principle of our operations, for the soul is the cause of operations because it is united to the body and not vice-versa.<sup>2</sup>

The second version of this demonstration must be understood in the context in which St. Thomas placed it. He brings out the fact that the first thing Aristotle did in approaching this demonstration was to establish that the soul is the principle of vital operations and only then that the first principle of vital operations is the form of the living body. Before Aristotle began his demonstration that the soul is form, he established the modes of vital operations according to the

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 253.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

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grades of living things. Next, he established the soul as the principle of vital operations. Finally, he showed the relation among the parts of the soul because it is according to these that the soul is the principle of vital operations.

St. Thomas begins his commentary on Aristotle's demonstration that the first principle of vital operations is the form of the living body by giving his own version of this demonstration.

Duorum, quorum utroque dicimur esse aliquid aut operari, unum, scilicet quod primum est, est quasi forma, et aliud quasi materia. Sed anima est primum quo vivimus, cum tamen vivamus anima et corpore: ergo anima est forma corporis viventis.

With respect to this demonstration, St. Thomas points out that the conclusion corresponds to the first definition of the soul. He points out, further, that the middle term of this demonstration is a definition of the soul as that by which primarily we live.

St. Thomas proceeds to comment on the demonstration as given by Aristotle. He points out the four steps Aristotle takes in this demonstration. First, he gives the major premise; second, the minor premise; third, the conclusion; and fourth, he shows that the conclusion follows from the premises.

The major premise is based on a twofold way of speaking of "that by which we live, etc." In one way we speak of living in virtue of the form; in another way, in virtue of the matter. Two instances of this way of speaking can be seen if we analyze what we mean when we are said to know or be healthy. In one way we say we know by knowledge, and in another way by the soul. Also, we are said, in one way, to be healed by health, and in another way, by the body. Now both knowledge and health are as the forms of that which is able to know or able to be healed, which are as matter. From these instances

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271.

it can be seen that the act, or form, such as knowledge, seems to be in something passive, such as the soul, which is disposed to the final perfection, or form, induced by the agent.

The minor premise according to St. Thomas is the second definition of the soul: "Anima est primum quo et vivimus et sentimus, et movemur, et intelligimus."<sup>1</sup> He moved the "primum" in order to show that the soul is the "primum principium"; for, as he points out, although we are said to be healthy both by the body and by health, we are said to be healthy primarily by health. So also we are said to be knowing beings both by knowledge and the soul, but knowledge is the primary principle by which we are said to be knowing beings, because the soul is not said to be knowing except when it is informed by knowledge. The same thing applies to living things. We are not said to be living by virtue of the body unless it has a soul. So that we are said to be living primarily in virtue of the soul in that when the body has a soul we are living and when it no longer has a soul we are not living but dead. This is why the soul is defined as "primum quo et vivimus, etc."

Having given the premises, Aristotle simply states the conclusion which naturally follows from them: the soul is the form and not the matter of living beings.

For the perfection of the demonstration, Aristotle shows that the conclusion follows from the premises. He does this by giving the different meanings of substance. Now, substance can be said of matter, form, or their composite. Matter is the patient, or potential principle; whereas form is the act, or actualizing principle and the composite is the living being. The body, then, is not the act of the soul, but the soul is the act of the body, which is in potency to it. In conclusion, St. Thomas points out the need for this consideration of substance in order to perfect the demonstration when he says: "Et ideo cum consequatur ex praedicta demon-

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 273.

stratione, quod vel corpus vel anima sit species: et corpus, ut dictum est, non sit species animae, sequitur quod anima sit species corporis."<sup>1</sup>

St. Thomas points out that Aristotle draws certain other conclusions from this demonstration. The first of these deals with the opinion of those who said that the soul was not without a body and yet was not a body. The truth of this opinion is shown by this demonstration. The soul is not a body because it is not matter, but it is not without a body because it is the act of a body. Since every act is in that of which it is the act, the soul is in the body. Therefore, the second conclusion is that the soul is in a body and a determinate body, i.e. a physical organized body. This follows because an act is naturally in its proper and determinate matter. Since the soul is act, it is received into its proper matter, i.e. a physical organized body. As a kind of resume, Aristotle concludes that the soul is the act of that which has a nature (esse) in potency to living operations.<sup>2</sup>

There are several things which should be noted about St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's demonstration. The first and most important fact is that he understands the middle term to be a definition of the soul as the first principle of vital operations. The second is that, according to St. Thomas, there is a parallel between the principles by which we are said to be something and the principles by which we operate. The third point to be noted is the fact that the proper conclusion of the demonstration is that the soul is act as form, from which it follows as a corollary that the soul is the form of a physical organized body. The final aspect of the demonstration which should be noted is the mode of procedure. St. Thomas maintained that this demonstration is an a posteriori demonstration, i.e. from effect to cause.

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<sup>1</sup>St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 275.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., n. 278.

### Chapter III

#### CAJETAN

Cajetan considers the second chapter of Aristotle's De Anima to be devoted to the discovery and presentation of a second definition of the soul by which the first definition can be demonstrated.<sup>1</sup> In his commentary on this chapter, Cajetan analyzes this demonstration in seven steps. In his third step he deals with the middle term. Since the middle term is the second definition of the soul, we will consider this third step by itself in the part of this chapter entitled "The Definition." The other six steps of the demonstration will be considered in the part entitled "The Demonstration." A comprehensive grasp of the second definition can only be attained by a consideration of it as the middle term of this demonstration after it has been thoroughly analyzed in itself.

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<sup>1</sup>Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, Introduction, p. 76.