Cajetan notes that there are seven points with respect to the second definition which have to be considered. The first of these deals with the word _quo_.[1] The word _quo_ is appropriately used to signify a principle as the _ratio_ of the essence or of the operations; for we speak of the principle of life as the _ratio_ of living by which we live, or we speak of the principle of knowledge as the _ratio_ of knowing by which we know. However, according to Cajetan, _quo_ is to be understood in abstraction from whether it coincides with _quod_ or not. He interprets _quo_ in this way in order to avoid the difficulty presented by the expression _quo intelligimus_, for he interprets this as equivalent to _quod intelligit_. Therefore, _quo_ does not exclude an identification with _quod_.

The second point to be noted is the word _vivimus_. Cajetan distinguishes this word from _vivitur_ because it is not a question of the metaphysical notion of life, i.e. as it applies to separated substances or God, but simply of sensible animate substances.

The third point also has to do with the word _vivimus_. According to the interpretation of Cajetan this word can be taken in two ways. It can be taken to refer to "esse vitali," or in another way it can be taken "pro operatione vitali." The same distinction could be made concerning the words _sentimus_, _movemur_, and _intelligimus_. However, it might be objected that these other words are proper names of operations and not common to both operation and _esse_ as is the word _vivere_. In answer to this objection, Cajetan notes that this twofold manner of speaking flows from the fact that the words can be taken for that which they signify, i.e. the operations, or for the roots of these operations. In this way, properties are used in the place of unknown specific differences, so that here _sentimus_ would be taken to refer to "esse sensitivo," _movemur_ to refer to "esse motivo," and _intelligimus_ to

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[1] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 99.

refer to "esse intellectivo," just as _vivere_ is taken for "esse vitali." However, for Cajetan, the truth, efficaciousness, and quality of the demonstration is the same for either interpretation.[1]

The fourth point, as well, has to do with the word _vivimus_. As we noted in the interpretation of St. Thomas, the word was taken to refer to the vegetative grade of living things but in the interpretation of St. Albert, it was taken to refer in a generic way to all four grades of living things. Cajetan argues for both interpretations but in the end he agrees with St. Albert. He maintains that the word _vivimus_ should be taken "formaliter," i.e. as it signifies life according to any and all of the modes of life, i.e. vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and/or intellective. It should not be limited to the vegetative grade of living beings but should extend to each and every grade of living beings.[2]

The fifth point concerns the joining of the grades of living things in the words _vivimus, et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus_.[3] Cajetan points out three interpretations of these words taken in conjunction. According to the first interpretation the words are to be understood separately and only joined, as it were, accidentally for the sake of brevity. With this interpretation we would have four middle terms for the demonstration of the first definition of the soul: _the soul is that by which we live_ would be one; _the soul is that by which we sense_ would be another; _the soul is that by which we move_ would be the third; _the soul is that by which we think_ would be the fourth. The second way of understanding these words is to take them together, so that the middle term would signify that the soul is the principle of all of these joined together. This, of course, limits the definition to the

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[1] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 101.
[2] _Ibid._, n. 102
[3] _Ibid._, n. 103

human soul, for it is the only one which has all of these.
Cajetan considers both of these interpretations inaccurate.
The second is inaccurate because it limits the notion of soul
to that of the human soul, and Aristotle criticized the an-
cient philosophers for just this error.[1] The first is unac-
ceptable for we would have more definitions of the soul than
we have souls to define. There are only three souls but in the
definition there are four words. This situation arises as a
result of the fact that even though locomotion constitutes
another grade of living things, another soul is not determined
according to it. The third way of taking these four words is
what Cajetan calls "coniunctio explicativa,"[2] and it is this
interpretation which he considers accurate. In this interpre-
tation the middle term, i.e. the definition, is both common
to every soul and proper to each grade of living things. The
word _vivimus_ is here taken "formaliter" as common to every
and proper to each grade of living things, and the words
which follow, _sentimus_ et _movemur_ et _intelligimus_, merely
explain its meaning.

The sixth point concerns the word _primo_.[3] The interpre-
tation which Cajetan puts on this word can be expressed tren-
chantly in Latin by his phrase "secundum quod ipsum." This
can be seen in the relation of _lucere_ to _lux_, for _lucere_ be-
longs to _lux_ _primo_, i.e. "secundum quod ipsum" or in virtue of
itself and not through something else but other things through
it. In applying the word _primo_ to the expression _quo vivimus_,
Cajetan points out that _vivere_ does not belong primarily to
that by which we live but primarily to that which lives.
Therefore, he interprets _primo_ to signify that soul is primari-
ly that _by_ _which_ we live and not that life primarily belongs

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[1] Aristotle, _De Anima_, I, c. 1, 402 b 5.

[2] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 103.

[3] _Ibid._, n. 104

to soul. In Latin this is neatly expressed by "cui primo convenit quod sit quo vivimus."[1] This interpretation seems to agree with that of St. Thomas, who simply refers to the soul as the first principle by which we live.[2]

The seventh point concerns the whole definition, or the middle term of the demonstration of the first definition of the soul.[3] Here, Cajetan makes a distinction between taking the definition in abstration from actual exercise and taking the definition to refer to soul as it is actually exercising its function as the principle of our life. In the first case, soul would be that to which it belongs to be the first principle of our life whether it actually carries this into effect or not. It is this sense which Cajetan thinks is the more profound.

## 2 - The Demonstration

Cajetan makes a sevenfold division of his consideration of the demonstration. First, he distinguishes the different ways in which the intention of Aristotle in this demonstration can be understood, and second, he considers which of these seems in keeping with the text. Third, he examines the middle term, i.e. the second definition, which examination we have given above. Fourth, he considers the minor term. Fifth, he treats the propositions from which the demonstration proceeds. Sixth, he evaluates the force of the demonstration. Seventh, he makes apparent the mode of the demonstration, i.e. a *priori* or a *posteriori*.

Concerning the first, there are three possible inter-

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[1]Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 104.

[2]St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 253.

[3]Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 105

pretations of Aristotle's intention to prove that the soul is
act.[1] First, he could intend to prove that soul in itself is
form and substantial act; second, that it is form and sub-
stantial act formally giving existence to an organized body;
or third, that it is the form and substantial act of the body,
in whatever way this may happen, e.g. as a sailor in a ship
or as a principle of operation which is intrinsic and propor-
tionate to the body. In the first way, God is also act; in the
second way, material forms are acts; in the third way, the soul
of the heavens, according to some, or the intellective soul,
according to Averroes, is act and form.

The second step which Cajetan takes is an evaluation of
the above interpretations in the light of the text of Aristo-
tle.[2] As a conclusion of his demonstration, Aristotle states
that the soul is species and ratio, not matter and subject.
However, all the commentators agree that Aristotle is demon-
strating the first definition of the soul by the second. The
first definition does not merely state that the soul is first
act in itself but that it is the first act of a physical or-
ganized body. Therefore, the first interpretation seems insuffi-
cient.

Cajetan next considers the third interpretation which
leaves the meaning of the word act open to various accepta-
tions. According to this interpretation the soul is the act
of the body but the word act is taken as common to various
uses of the word, e.g. as a sailor is the act of a ship in the
sense of the mover of the ship. This interpretation is favored
by Averroes because of his insistence upon the use of the word
soul as "fere pura equivocatione,"[3] and the fact that the first
definition applies to the intellective soul as well as to the
vegetative and sensitive soul. However, if the definition has

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[1]Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 95.

[2]Ibid., n. 96.

[3]Averroes, In Aristotelis De Anima, II, n. 7; cf. n. 21

different meanings as applied to the different souls, then it could not be demonstrated by means of the same middle term, for that which is said equivocally is not demonstrated by one and the same middle term. Since Aristotle demonstrated through one and the same middle term that soul is act, this interpretation cannot hold. But this interpretation seems to be fostered by Aristotle himself by the statement that it is not manifest if soul is act like the sailor of a ship.[1] However, this is a point in which all of the Peripatetics agreed that Aristotle differed from Plato. For a proper interpretation of Aristotle's statement it is necessary to realize that at this point in Aristotle's treatment of the first definition, i.e. before the first definition had been demonstrated by the second, he had not yet established the definitive _ratio_ of soul sufficiently to refute the opinion of Plato.

Cajetan saves the second interpretation for his final consideration because it is this interpretation with which he agrees. This interpretation neither limits Aristotle's meaning as does the first nor leaves it open to equivocation as does the third. What Aristotle intends to conclude is that the soul, because it is that by which we live, sense, move, and think primarily, is the act and substantial form of such a body. However, the soul can be the act of the body in two ways: either as actually united to the body or by leaving out of consideration whether it is actually united or not. Cajetan considers the second of these to be intended by Aristotle as the conclusion of the demonstration, for Aristotle later gives a corollary in which he concludes the actual union of soul and body. It is because the soul is here demonstrated to be that kind of thing which is essentially the perfection of a body, that it can further be shown to be in a body and a body of such a kind.

Since we considered Cajetan's third point, i.e. the

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[1] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 1, 413 a 8.

middle term, when we considered the definition itself, we
will now take up the fourth aspect of the demonstration, i.e.
the minor term.[1] Under this heading there are four interpre-
tations of the minor term, soul. The first interpretation
takes the word soul as signifying in communi. Just as the
subject of the major term is soul as it signifies in common,
so also should the minor term signify in common, for in a de-
monstration they have to be the same. The second interpretation
takes soul for each soul in particular. This opinion comes
from the understanding that in the first definition soul was
defined in common, but in the second it was defined according
to what was proper to each soul. The third interpretation
takes soul to refer only to the human soul. This interpretation
follows if we take the words vivimus et sentimus, etc. con-
junctively. The fourth interpretation, which Cajetan favors,
takes the word soul formally according to its total formal ex-
tension (secundum totam suam formalem latitudinem). When the
word soul is taken in this manner, i.e. formally (formaliter),
it coincides not only with the common notion but also extends
to what is proper and thus contains the whole notion of soul.

The fifth step is a consideration of the propositions
of the demonstration.[2] Cajetan gives the demonstration as
follows:

> Quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus
> primo est ratio et species et non ut materia et
> subiectum; anima est quo vivimus, sentimus, et
> movemur et intelligimus primo; ergo anima est
> ratio et species et non ut materia et subiectum.[3]

The minor Cajetan considers per se nota. The major,
however, he proves by considering the twofold way in which it
is possible to speak of that by which we live and sense. He
uses the examples of knowing and being healthy. Since know-

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[1]Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 106.
[2]Ibid., n. 107.
[3]Ibid.

ledge and health are that by which _primarily_ we know and are healthy, they are the form and species and _ratio_, as the act of that which is in potency to them. It is because the act of that which is actualized is in that which receives it and is disposed to it that that by which primarily we live, sense, etc. is species and _ratio_.

The sixth step is an evaluation of the force of the demonstration.[1] There are two difficulties which must be cleared up: the first has to do with the whole force of the argument simply, and the second has to do with the force of the argument with respect to the intellective soul.

The first difficulty arises out of a doubt as to whether the argument proceeds from particular propositions or from a false universal proposition which is not explicitly stated.[2] If Aristotle proceeded merely from the propositions expressed, he proceeded from particular propositions, e.g. "quo vivimus et sentimus dupliciter,"[3] "quo scimus et quo sanamur dupliciter,"[4] "horum scientia et sanitas est species."[5] The one universal proposition which he does express, "Videtur enim in patiente et disposito activorum inesse actio,"[6] has no dependence or relation to the particular propositions except in the sense of a certain reasoning from precedents. However, if, as Averroes asserts, the argument proceeds from the universal proposition, not expressly stated by Aristotle, that every action is attributed to a being because of two principles, one of which is the form and the other the matter,[7] the argument proceeds, in that case, from what is false,

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[1] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 109.

[2] _Ibid._, n. 112.

[3] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 2, 414 a 4.

[4] _Ibid._, 414 a 5, 414 a 7,

[5] _Ibid._, 414 a 9.

[6] _Ibid._, 414 a 11.

[7] Averroes, _In Aristotelis De Anima_, II, n. 24.

according to Cajetan. It would be possible to say that we
are healthy in virtue of our body and medicine, and yet
neither of these is form. However, if we limit our understand-
ing of this proposition to refer to the essential principles,
there is in the minor an assumption of the conclusion: the
body and soul are essential principles.

As a solution to this difficulty, Cajetan suggests that
Aristotle is proceeding according to a certain proportion be-
tween the twofold way of speaking about that by which we know
and are healthy and the twofold way of speaking about that by
which we live, sense, etc. Aristotle assumes this is obvious
and according to common speech. He is proceeding from what
is obvious to all to what is more difficult. Once it is ac-
cepted that we know by knowledge and the soul, knowledge being
the form and the soul the matter, then we can infer that it is
the same for that by which we live. The only thing that is
passed over in silence by Aristotle is the fact that form is
that by which _primarily_ the agent operates. However, this is
contained in the middle term.

The second difficulty has to do with the force of the
argument with respect to the intellective soul.[1] Here, either
that which is false is assumed, or else the demonstration is
without force. Since the foundation of the syllogism is the
fact that that by which we live and sense is said in a two-
fold way, either explicitly or implicitly, this distinction
applies to that by which we think, or else it does not apply.
However, we do not think by the soul and the body. If that by
which we think is included, the demonstration proceeds from
what is false. If it is not included, then the conclusion
loses its force with respect to the intellective soul. The
soul as the act of a physical organized body is established
only if there are _two_ principles of which we can say they are
that by which we live and sense, etc. That by which _primarily_

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[1]Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c.2, n. 111.

we live, sense, etc. is the form. However, if there are not
two principles by which we think but only one, it would be
impossible to conclude that there is a _primary_ principle by
which we think, which is the act of that which is capable of
receiving this act.

The solution which Cajetan finally gives to this dif-
ficulty[1] is based on something Aristotle brings up later on
in this book.[2] The grades of souls are related to one another
like the different kinds of figures. A four-sided figure con-
tains potentially a three-sided figure. So also the vegetative
soul is contained in the sensitive and the sensitive in the
intellective. Therefore, since in the intellective soul the
sensitive and vegetative are included potestatively, it is
necessarily the act of a body. In the text of Aristotle, this
can be seen by the way in which he proceeded. First, he estab-
lished that that by which we live and sense is said in a two-
fold way.[3] He then expanded it in the definition to include
the intellective soul by saying that the soul is that by which
we live, sense, move, and think. Therefore, soul, including
the intellective soul, is the act of the body.

The seventh point which Cajetan treats in his consi-
deration of the demonstration deals with the relation of the
middle term to the conclusion.[4] It is necessary here to recall
Cajetan's commentary on the middle term. As we have seen, he
distinguished two senses according to which the words _quo
vivimus_, etc. can be understood. In one sense the soul is un-
derstood as actually acting as the principle of life, i.e.
"cui primo convenit quod actualiter et exercite [sit] ratio
vitae nostrae."[5] In the other sense the soul is taken abstract-

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[1] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 114.

[2] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 3, 414 b 20.

[3] _Ibid._, c. 2, 414 a 4.

[4] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 115.

[5] _Ibid._, n. 105.

ly as the principle of life. In this sense the soul is that
to which it belongs to be the primary ratio of our life, whe-
ther it is actually exercising this function or not. Cajetan
adopted the second interpretation as the correct understanding
of the definition.

If we interpret the middle term in the sense that the
soul is actually exercising its function as the principle of
life, then the demonstration is an a posteriori demonstration.
In the order of nature the soul is the act of the body before
the operations of living and sensing actually arise from it.
Cajetan understands this to be St. Thomas' interpretation of
the demonstration.

Cajetan's interpretation of the demonstration is based
on his understanding of the definition taken abstractly, i.e.
leaving out of consideration whether or not the soul is actual-
ly carrying into effect the fact that it is the ratio of life.
If the middle term is taken in this way then it is prior in
nature to the conclusion. The soul is essentially the act and
perfection of the living body because it essentially belongs
to it to be primarily that which is the ratio of our life and
not vice versa. This can be seen in the case of other forms,
e.g. health is the perfection of the healthy body because in
itself it is the first principle of our being healthy (prima
ratio nostri esse sani); it is not the first principle of our
being healthy because it is the perfection of our body. The
basis of this reasoning is found in the fact that it is ap-
propriate or inappropriate for something to be perfective of
that which is receptive of such a perfection in virtue of that
by which something is primarily located among beings. A con-
sideration of forms reveals the truth of this statement ac-
cording to Cajetan. Because form is the first principle of the
being of something, it holds the first place among beings.
Therefore, the specific difference of each form is primarily

located in the universe because it is the first principle of
such a nature (primo ratio talis esse). From this it follows

that the soul is primarily distinguished from others and con-
stituted in itself because it is the first principle of the
life of that which is living.

The difference between the first definition and the
second now becomes apparent.[1] The first definition indicates
that the soul is perfective of matter. The second definition
primarily locates the nature of the soul among the parts of
the universe. In the light of this interpretation of the de-
finition, it is evident that the second definition states both
the fact (quia) and the cause of the fact (propter quid). The
second definition states that the soul is perfective of matter
and why it is perfective of matter, i.e. because it is the
first principle of our life (prima ratio nostrae vitae).

Cajetan clearly presents his interpretation of the se-
cond definition of the soul and the demonstration of the first
definition in these seven steps. However, in conclusion we might
point out what seem to be the main lines of his thought.

In his consideration of the definition he maintains that
it must be understood by abstracting from whether the soul is
exercising its function as the principle of life or not. Un-
derstanding the definition in this way, it would make no dif-
ference whether the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and in-
telligimus were interpreted as referring to the "esse vitali"
or taken "pro operatione vitali." In his consideration of the
demonstration, his interpretation of it is determined by the
interpretation which he placed on the second definition.
Since the soul is the ratio of our life, the soul is the form
of the body. For Cajetan this is an a priori demonstration
that the soul is the form of the body, for that which is the
principle of the life of such a kind of being, i.e. a sensible
animate substance, must be the form of a body.

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[1]Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 116.

# Chapter IV

## JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

John of St. Thomas follows St. Thomas in accepting the second definition of the soul as: "Anima est id, quo vivimus, sentimus, movemur et intelligimus primo."[1] He also locates it in the context of the demonstration of the first definition. For this reason, he divides his consideration into two parts. In the first part he considers the definition and in the second part he considers the demonstration of the first definition by the second.

The first thing that John of St. Thomas sets out to show with respect to the definition is, as he says, that this definition is "recta et exacta."[2] The reason which he gives for this is the fact that it expresses everything which pertains to the soul in virtue of its grades and functions. He shows

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[1] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Naturalis Philosophiae*, IV Pars: "De Ente Mobili Animato," q. I, art. 2, 9th edition, ed. Reiser, Rome, Marietti, 1936, p. 21, col. b.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 22, col. b.

the truth of this by a detailed consideration of the words of the definition.

The second thing that he questions with respect to the definition is whether it is an essential definition or only descriptive.[1] He brings out the opinions of those who interpret this as an essential definition, e.g. Cajetan, and the opinions of those whom he considers as interpreting it as descriptive, among whom he includes St. Thomas. In the light of his interpretation of the definition, John of St. Thomas concludes that the second definition of the soul is an essential definition.

In his consideration of the demonstration of the first definition by the second, he brings out two problems.[2] The first problem deals with the difference between the two definitions. He maintains that they differ both in their manner of defining and in what is used in the definition. The second problem deals with whether the second definition demonstrates the first a priori or a posteriori.

1 - The Definition

John of St. Thomas' analysis of the definition begins with a consideration of the words id quo.[3] He maintains that the last word in the definition, primo, must be considered together with the words id quo. He interprets this combination as indicating that the soul is a first principle. He combines these words with the words vivimus et sentimus and interprets them as indicating that the soul is the first principle of the vital operations of living beings (vivendi). The word quo

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[1] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col. b.

[2] Ibid., p. 24, col. b.

[3] Ibid., p. 21, col. b.

signifies the form or intrinsic principle since the extrinsic
principles are not that by which something is constituted in
its nature (esse). The efficient cause is that by which some-
thing is moved, and the final cause is that for whose sake
something comes about. The word primo denotes that the soul
is a substantial principle. The operative powers are not that
by which we primarily (primo) operate or live, but are the in-
struments of operating and living. The rest of the words in
the definition denote the principal grades and operations of
the soul. The words quo vivimus indicate the vegetative grade;
quo sentimus, the sensitive grade; quo intelligimus, the in-
tellective grade; and quo movemur, the operation of the appeti-
tive and locomotive powers.

John of St. Thomas brings up three objections to his
position.[1] The first objection deals with his interpretation
of the word "vivere." It could be objected that the word is
common to all the grades of living things and, thus, does not
signify the vegetative grade of living things in particular.
The second objection involves the word "locomovemur." It
either signifies a grade of life or an operative power. It does
not signify a grade of life because it follows on the sensi-
tive and intellective grades of life even more than appetite
does because progressive motion depends on appetite. Nor does
the word "locomovemur" signify a power; for if it is taken
for a power, then it could be asked why the appetitive power
was omitted from the definition, especially since the appeti-
tive power is more basic than the locomotive power and just as
evident to us as the locomotive power. The final objection
deals with the fact that the soul is defined as the first
principle by which we live and sense and think. It seems that
the definition applies only to us and not to all living beings.
This interpretation seems to be fortified by the conjunction
and (et), for only the human soul has all of these grades of
vital operation.

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[1] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col a.

John of St. Thomas answers the first objection by point-
ing out that the word "vivere" can be understood in two ways.[1]
In one way it signifies abstractly and in common. In the other
way it signifies that which is the first genus of vital opera-
tions and the foundation for the other genera of vital opera-
tions. It is in this second sense that the word is used in the
definition. John of St. Thomas appeals to St. Thomas' commenta-
ry to justify his interpretation.[2]

In his reply to the second objection, John of St. Thomas
holds that the appetitive power is implicitly entailed by the
locomotive power because the locomotive power carries out the
inclination of the appetite.[3] He maintains that Aristotle used
the word "locomovemur" to signify both the locomotive and ap-
petitive powers. He gives two reasons for this usage. The first
is the fact that progressive motion carries out the desires
of the appetite; the second, that since progressive motion is
an effect more known to us, we come to know the appetitive
power through it.

The word we (as included in the word vivimus in the de-
finition) does not indicate, according to John of St. Thomas,
that the definition refers only to human beings as the third
objection held, but to all living beings.[4] With respect to the
word and (et) he distinguishes two possible interpretations.
According to the first interpretation the word is taken con-
junctively; according to the second, distributively. It is
according to this second interpretation that John of St. Tho-
mas understands the word to be used in the definition. Accord-
ing to this interpretation any soul would have at least some
one of these operations and thus be included in this definition,
even though the human soul would be the only one to have all of

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[1]John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col. a.

[2]"Vivere enim refert ad principium vegetativum, quia su-
perius dixerat, quod vivere propter hoc principium inest omni-
bus viventibus."St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 273.

[3]John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col. b.

[4]Ibid.

them.

John of St. Thomas, in his consideration of the definition
as a whole, maintains that it is an essential definition. He
notes that Cajetan held that this is an essential definition,[1]
but that St. Thomas understood it as a descriptive definition.[2]
The reason he gives for maintaining that St. Thomas understood
it as a descriptive definition is the fact that St. Thomas
saw the definition as given in terms of the operations of life,
which are posterior and accidental.[3]

The reasoning John of St. Thomas used to determine that
this is an essential definition is based on the fact that it
is an ex additione definition. This definition, as well as the
first definition, are essential definitions, but they connote
something extrinsic, and it is in virtue of the order to that
which is extrinsic that the soul is defined. In the second
definition that which is connoted as extrinsic is an effect of
the soul as efficient cause and something which is more known
to us. The basis for this interpretation is the fact that the
soul is not a complete substance. A form, such as the soul,
cannot be defined absolutely but must be defined in relation
to something extrinsic. However, this order of the form is
intrinsic and essential. A form is essentially ordered to
another which it informs or composes. Moreover, this order is
twofold. The first is the order of informing (ordo informan-
di) and the second is the order to operation (ordo operandi).
With respect to the first, the form is the principle of the
nature (esse) and has an order to its matter or subject. This
first order is more basic and prior since what is brought a-
bout is the nature (esse) and substantial species. This order
between matter and form is reciprocal,  for they are causes

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[1] Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 105, 116.

[2] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col. b.

[3] "Ex eo enim quod anima est forma corporis viventis,
est principium operum vitae, et non e converso." St. Thomas,
In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 253.

with respect to each other. The form is the cause as that which informs the matter, and the matter is the cause as that which receives the form and depends on it for existence. With respect to the second order, the order to operation, the form is the principle of operations, or second act. It is not the proximate principle of operation as is the power but the remote or first principle of operation. Although the substantial form is by its very essence the source of the powers and operations since it is not their source in virtue of something else but in virtue of itself, nevertheless, it is not related to the operations except as effects. The form is not related to the operations as if it were caused by them, in the sense of specified by them.

In his application of these considerations to the second definition of the soul, John of St. Thomas concludes that the second definition is an essential definition of the soul.[1] The second definition is given in terms of the soul as the primary source of the vital operations since it states that the soul is that by which we live and sense primarily. Although these operations are extrinsic to the soul as its effects, nevertheless, the basic order to these operations is essential to the soul. Therefore, the second definition is an essential definition.

There is another interpretation of the definition which, according to John of St. Thomas, shows even more forcefully that the second definition is an essential definition.[2] If by the words "vivere et sentire, etc.," we understand the very act of informing or formal effect by which something is essentially constituted as a living being or a sensing being, then it is obvious that the definition is essential. According to this interpretation the definition is given in terms of a formal effect of the soul which is intrinsic and essential and

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[1] John of St. Thomas, _Cursus_, p. 24, col. a.
[2] _Ibid._

to which the soul has an essential order.


2 - The Demonstration

The basic question posed by John of St. Thomas in his
commentary on the demonstration of the first definition is
how the first definition of the soul is demonstrated by the
second.[1] Within the framework of this basic question, he poses
two problems. The first problem is concerned with how the se-
cond definition differs from the first in view of the fact
that they are both given in terms of an order to operations.
The second problem is whether the second definition demon-
strates the first a posteriori or a priori.

The first problem he poses seems to have very little
bearing on his basic question. However, he reaffirms the basic
difference between these definitions. He interprets the first
definition as basically a definition of the soul as the prin-
ciple by which the body is informed, although there is added
a relation to vital operations in the words "potentia vitam
habentis."[2] He interprets the second definition as stating
that the soul has an essential relation to those effects
which result from such a form. He distinguishes two kinds of
effects which could follow from such a form. The first he
calls formal (formales). The soul would be defined in relation
to its formal effects if the words vivimus et sentimus were
interpreted as referring to substantial life. The second kind
of effects are operations and are in the order of efficient
causality. The soul would be defined in relation to this kind
of effect if to live and to think were interpreted as signify-
ing operations.

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[1] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 24, col. b.
[2] Ibid.

The second problem which John of St. Thomas addresses himself to is whether the second definition demonstrates the first a priori or a posteriori.[1] He notes that Aristotle intended to demonstrate the first definition through what is more known.[2] However, an a posteriori demonstration, since it proceeds from the effects, only establishes the existence of the cause. If we wished to prove the existence of the soul, this could be done through its effects. Through vital operations, such as sensing and thinking, we could prove the existence of the soul a posteriori. But this is not what Aristotle intended to prove. Aristotle intended to prove that the first definition of the soul was correct. According to John of St. Thomas, Aristotle did not take the operations of the soul as its effects but as the very function of the soul (munus seu officium animae) insofar as it is the source of its operations. The demonstration proceeds from the premise that the soul is that to which this function belongs and, therefore, the first act of the body.

John of St. Thomas relies on the commentary of St. Thomas to give weight to his interpretation. He gives the version of the demonstration which St. Thomas used just prior to his commentary on the demonstration of Aristotle.[3] John of St. Thomas maintains that this demonstration does not proceed from an effect.[4] The soul is not demonstrated to be the act of an organized body from vital operations as an effect. The demonstration proceeds from the fact that in a living being there are two parts, the body and the soul, and that part which is the first principle by which a living being lives and senses is the form or first act.

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[1]John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 25, col. a.

[2]Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 12.

[3]"Duorum, quorum utroque dicimur esse aliquid aut operari, unum, scilicet quod primum est, est quasi forma, et aliud quasi materia. Sed anima est primum quo vivimus, cum tamen vivamus anima et corpore: ergo anima est forma corporis viventis." St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271.

[4]John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 25, col. b.

The examples of Aristotle are brought forward to show the truth of this interpretation.[1] Knowledge and health are that by which primarily we know or are healthy or, in other words, that by which we are said to be knowing beings or healthy beings. The form is that by which primarily a thing is said to be of such a kind. Thus, knowledge and health are forms. The soul is that by which primarily we live and sense. Therefore, it is the form or act of the body. The soul is understood here as that by which we are said to be living beings. John of St. Thomas considers it evident from this that the demonstration does not take the operations of the soul as a middle term and proceed from what is extrinsic, i.e. an effect, to the cause.[2] He understands the demonstration to proceed from what is intrinsic to the soul itself, i.e. to be the first principle of those operations. From this fact, the demonstration establishes something else intrinsic to the soul, i.e. that it is the form and act of a physical organized body. This demonstration, according to the mind of John of St. Thomas, proceeds from one intrinsic function (officium) of the soul to demonstrate another intrinsic function (officium) of the soul.

The next question that John of St. Thomas entertains is whether the demonstration which he has just described is an a priori or an a posteriori demonstration and in what sense it proceeds from what is better known.[3] With respect to the first part of the question, he distinguishes two senses according to which the demonstration would be an a posteriori demonstration and another sense according to which it would be an a priori demonstration.

The first interpretation, according to which the demonstration would be an a posteriori demonstration, he

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[1] Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 5.

[2] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 25, col. b.

[3] Ibid.

attributes to St. Thomas.[1] He thinks that this interpretation
is true if the second definition is considered according to
that which is connoted obliquely (in obliquo).[2] The second
definition states that the soul is the principle of living
and sensing. Since living and sensing are operations which
are posterior and more known to us, and these are obliquely
connoted in the definition, if considered in this way, the
demonstration proceeds from posterior effects and is thus an
a posteriori demonstration.

The second interpretation, according to which the de-
monstration would be an a posteriori demonstration, is taken
from that which is directly placed in the definition.[3] The
soul is the principle or source of the operations of living
and sensing. The fact that the soul is the principle or source
is that which is directly placed in the definition. It is evi-
dent that this is not posterior as an effect, for to be the
root of operation is not an effect of the nature but, according
to John of St. Thomas, the nature itself. However, in the na-
ture of the soul the order to operation is a formality which
is posterior to the formality which is the order to matter.
Thus, this demonstration can be considered an a posteriori
demonstration in the sense that a prior formality is demonstra-
ted by a posterior formality.

The final interpretation of this demonstration is one
according to which it would be an a priori demonstration.[4]
This interpretation is based on an understanding of the words
sentimus et vivimus not as signifying operations but the very
nature (esse) of the living and sensing beings. The soul is

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[1] "Illud quod est primum principium vivendi est viven-
tium corporum actus et forma: sed anima est primum principium
vivendi his quae vivunt: ergo est corporis viventis actus et
forma." St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 253.

[2] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 26, col. a.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

that by which the nature is primarily brought about. According
to this interpretation, then, the soul is demonstrated to be
act or form in virtue of a function (officium) required of a
form. Since the soul is that by which primarily something is
constituted and called such a kind of thing, the soul is the
form of such a thing. John of St. Thomas attributes this in-
terpretation to St. Thomas also,[1] although St. Thomas himself
clearly states that the demonstration is "ex posteriori."[2]

John of St. Thomas poses the following objection to
this final interpretation.[3] To be act or form is not an effect
following on the soul but something essential to the soul.
Likewise, to be that by which primarily something is constitu-
ted is not a formal cause or efficient cause or any other kind
of cause of something being act or form. Therefore, this de-
monstration of the first definition is not an a priori demon-
stration.

In answering this objection John of St. Thomas disting-
uishes two ways in which the words form and act can be taken.[4]
In one way the words are considered entitively as they are in
themselves and are said in contradistinction to potency. In
the second way the words are considered under the aspect of
form and according to its function of informing. It is not
possible to demonstrate that something is form according to
the first way in which the word form is taken because the
essence of a thing is indemonstrable. However, according to
the second way it is possible to demonstrate that something
has the function of form. In order for something to have the
function of form it is necessary for it to be that by which
something is primarily constituted in such and such a nature.

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[1] St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271.

[2] Ibid., lect. 3, n. 253.

[3] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 26, col. b.

[4] Ibid.

John of St. Thomas considers this a valid demonstration
because whatever is said with respect to something else is
able to be demonstrated by means of that which is absolute.
The absolute is the foundation as a prior reason or ground
(ratio) for the relative. In this way one divine attribute
can be demonstrated by another.

Since the original objection to this a priori demon-
stration was based on the fact that for something to be a
form was not an effect and, thus, could not be demonstrated
through its cause, John of St. Thomas shows to what genera
of causality this demonstration could belong.[1] He first ar-
gues that this demonstration could be reduced to a demonstration
which proceeds according to formal causality. His opinion is
based on the fact that the foundation of anything is the cause
of that of which it is the foundation, in the sense that the
foundation specifies that of which it is the foundation, and
that of which it is the foundation is derived from the founda-
tion.

He next says that at least such a demonstration could be
reduced to a demonstration which proceeds from material cau-
sality, in the sense that the foundation holds up that of which
it is the foundation. Finally, he argues that even if the de-
monstration only proceeds from an essentially required con-
dition, it could be reduced to a demonstration which proceeds
from causality. It would not belong to the genus of formal
causality in the sense of informing something but in the sense
of modifying or adding a requisite condition for the constitu-
tion of something.

John of St. Thomas gives an analysis of this demonstra-
tion to show that it proceeds from what is more known to us.[2]
For something to be the act of a physical organized body is

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[1] John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 26, col. b.

[2] Ibid., p. 27, col. a.

not as evident to the senses as that something is a being of
such a kind, i.e. living and sensing, because this latter is
known through the operations. Therefore, in this demonstration
it was necessary to place that by which primarily something is
constituted as a living being and this, then, ought to be the
act informing such a body. It is this formation and actuation
which is less known to us.

John of St. Thomas seems to be fully aware of the dif-
ference between the interpretation of this definition by St.
Thomas and St. Albert. However, for the most part, he is able
to see truth in both position. With respect to his interpretation
of this definition as an essential definition, he considers
himself as disagreeing with St. Thomas, for he maintains that
St. Thomas understood the definition as given in terms of the
operations of life. John of St. Thomas based his own interpre-
tation on an understanding of the soul as being essentially
an order to something else, i.e. the body or operations. If
the words _vivimus et sentimus_ were interpreted as signifying
the act of informing, then, according to John of St. Thomas,
it would be obvious that the definition is an essential de-
finition.

He maintains that the demonstration of the first defi-
nition of the soul by the second is either _a posteriori_ or _a
priori_ depending on the interpretation of the second definition.
The demonstration would be _a posteriori_ if the second defini-
tion is interpreted as giving the effects, operations, or a
posterior function of the soul, i.e. to be the _root_ of opera-
tions. The demonstration would be _a priori_ if the second de-
finition is interpreted as stating that the soul is that by
which primarily something is constituted what it is. For John
of St. Thomas, therefore, the interpretation of the demonstra-
tion hinges on the interpretation of the second definition and
that in turn depends on the interpretation of the words _vivi-
mus, sentimus, movemur_ and _intelligimus_.

SECOND PART

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

An introduction to this section seems necessary in order to indicate the procedure to be followed here. We intend to establish an approach to the second definition of the soul in line with a critical edition of the _De Anima_ and with the principles of this science as laid down by Aristotle. In order to do this a critical analysis of the different scholastic interpretations which have been presented will be given in this section. This analysis will attempt to show what runs counter to the thought of Aristotle as well as what seems consonant with his teaching so that we may lay the foundation for an approach to a better understanding of this definition.

The commentaries will be considered in order to see, first, what can reasonably be said concerning the second definition itself and, second, what can reasonably be said concerning the relation which it has to the first definition. In Chapter V entitled "The Definition," the first of these considerations will be taken up. Both the mode of the definition and the parts of the definition will be considered in order to arrive at an understanding of the definition as a whole. In the treatment of the mode of the second definition a parallel will be drawn between the mode of the first definition and that of the second definition. In the treatment of the parts of the definition each of these parts will be considered consecutively in detail. Special emphasis will be placed on the interpretation of the words _vivimus, sentimus,_ and _intelligimus_ taken together, because a proper understanding

of the definition depends on a correct interpretation of the conjunction of these words. A detailed consideration of the word _movemur_ will also be made since, as we have noted, St. Thomas' commentary was based on a translation of the definition in which this word appeared. Finally, the definition will be considered as a whole.

In Chapter VI entitled "The Demonstration," an analysis of the demonstration of the first definition of the soul by the second will be made. The first thing to fall under consideration will be the mode of procedure which Aristotle proposed to use. It must be established that this proposed mode of procedure was actually followed by him. If he proposed an _a posteriori_ mode of procedure and then demonstrated the first definition _a priori_, we could question the interpretation of the mode of procedure proposed or the interpretation of the mode of the demonstration given or the unity of Aristotle's treatment itself. Finally, for a complete grasp of the second definition a consideration of the demonstration itself must be made. An analysis of the shortcomings of St. Albert's interpretation of the demonstration as _a priori_ as well as a critical analysis of the interpretation of St. Thomas will be made. We hope that this analysis will provide an approach to a fuller understanding of the definition.

Chapter V

THE DEFINITION

1 - The Mode of Definition

In St. Thomas' commentary on the De Anima, he deline-
ates the mode of definition appropriate to the soul.[1] He
points out that a substance and an accident are defined in two
different ways according to the teaching of Aristotle.[2] In the
definition of a substance nothing is placed in the definition
which is extrinsic to that which is being defined. In the de-
finition of an accident, on the other hand, something is placed
in the definition which is extrinsic, i.e. the subject of the
accident. This difference arises due to the fact that a defi-
nition states what a thing is. Since a substance is complete
in its being (esse) and in its species, it is not dependent

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[1] St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 1, n. 213.

[2] Aristotle, Metaph., VII, c. 5, 1030 b 14.

on anything else in its definition. However, since an accident is not a complete being in itself but depends on its subject, a substance, it must be defined with its subject in the definition, e.g. a virtue is a quality of the soul. The same is true of the definition of a form. A form does not constitute a complete species in itself since matter belongs to the understanding (ratio) of form. Although matter is not part of form, it is necessary to place it in the definition of form because form cannot be understood except in relation to matter. Thus, just as accidents are defined by addition of their subjects to the definition, so also forms are defined by addition of their proper matter to the definition. This kind of definition is commonly referred to as an ex additione definition.[1]

Since the soul is a form, this second mode of definition is appropriate to it. However, in the case of the soul this mode of defining can be further subdivided insofar as the soul is defined either as a form or as a principle. Insofar as the soul is a form, it must be defined according to the mode appropriate to the definition of a form. Insofar as it is a principle, it must be defined in relation to that of which it is most properly the principle.

The mode of procedure appropriate to the definition of a form is a definition ex additione in which the proper matter is stated in obliquo as the difference. This is the mode of definition which Aristotle used in the first definition of the soul.[2]

The mode appropriate to the definition of a principle is an ex additione definition in which the word principle, or its equivalent is given in recto as intrinsic to the essence, and what is principiated is stated in obliquo as extrinsic to

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[1] Aristotle, Metaph., VII, c. 5, 1030 b 14 - 1030 a 15; cf. St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 9, n. 1477; ibid., lect. 4, nn. 1342-1355.

[2] St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 1, n. 213.

the essence. This is the mode of definition which Aristotle used in the second definition of the soul,[1] as well as in the definition of nature.[2]

In recto the second definition of the soul states that the soul is hoc quo, i.e. a principle. It does not state what kind of principle it is beyond the indication that it is a quo principle. It states in obliquo that which it is most properly and proximately the principle of, i.e. vegetative, sensitive, and intellective life, where life is understood in the light of Aristotle's statement that "vivere autem viventibus esse est."[3] Since the essence of the soul is not its potency[4] and life is the potential principle of vital operations,[5] life does not belong to the essence of the soul. However, since esse is not an accident,[6] life belongs to the integrity of the soul insofar as it is a potestative whole.[7] Thus, the soul is said to be vegetative, as it is the principle of vegetative life; sensitive, as it is the principle of sensitive life; and intellective, as it is the principle of intellective life. Insofar as the soul is the principle of all of these substantially different genera of life, it is a potestative whole.

Our contention that life does not belong to the essence of the soul but must be stated ex additione can be seen in the light of the distinction of potency and act. That which is act, such as the soul, is not in potency to operation insofar as it is act, but it is in potency only insofar as something is added to it.[8] Thus the act of the body is not in potency to

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[1] Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 12.

[2] Aristotle, Phys., II, c. 1, 192 b 22.

[3] Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 4, 415 b 13.

[4] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 77, a. 1.

[5] Ibid., q. 51, a. 3.

[6] St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2.

[7] Ibid., c.

[8] St. Thomas, Ia q. 77, a. 1.

operation precisely insofar as it is act but in virtue of life. "Unde nihil potest habere opus vitae, quod non habet vitam quae est potentiale principium talis actionis."[1] St. Thomas expresses the same idea in the De Anima. "Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod anima est actus quidam et ratio habentis esse huiusmodi, scilicet potentia viventis."[2]

It can be seen that this is a ex additione definition of the soul, as it is a potestative whole, if we keep two things in mind: first, that this is a definition of the soul as a principle, as we have seen above; and second, that the soul is a potestative whole insofar as it is the principle of life, as we have seen in St. Albert.

> Ex his potentiis sive potestatibus iungitur sive componitur substantia animae secundum id, quod anima est, quia sic est principium vitae et motus. Principium autem vitae et motus totum potestativum nominat, et non substantiam absolutam.[3]

We must consider the nature of a potestative whole in order to see what it means for the soul to be a potestative whole. It is necessary to realize that there are three kinds of wholes: universal, integral, and potential or potestative. Each of these wholes is composed of parts which are appropriate to the whole. Integral parts enter into the constitution of an integral whole, as the foundation, walls, and roof enter into the constitution of a house. However, house cannot be predicated of the foundation, for house is not present to the foundation according to the totality of its essence nor according to the totality of its power. A universal whole is able to be predicated of its parts, as animal can be predicated of man, because the universal whole is present to its parts both according to the totality of its essence and the totality

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[1] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 51, a. 3.

[2] St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 278.

[3] St. Albert, In De Divisione, tract. 4, c. 2, p. 79; cf. St. Thomas, Ia, q. 76, a. 8.

of its power. A potential part, on the other hand, does not enter into the essential constitution of that which is a potential whole, nor is a potential whole properly predicated of its parts according to essential predication as is a universal whole but "quodamodo potest praedicari de qualibet proprie sicut totum universale."[1] A potential part can participate in the potency of the whole in such a way that the potency of the whole is found completely in one of the parts and in a progressively diminished way in the other parts. According to its complete _ratio_, then, a potestative whole is in one of the parts and, according to a certain participation, in the others. Applying this to soul, we see that the rational soul is that in which the complete potency and _ratio_ of soul is found, so that the rational soul is called "tota anima." The sensitive soul in brutes and the vegetative soul in plants have the potency of soul only in a diminished way and have the _ratio_ of soul by a certain participation. These souls are said to be parts of soul in such a way that plants and brutes do not have "tota anima" but parts of soul.[2]

As St. Thomas points out, the potential parts of the soul are the intellective, the sensitive, and the vegetative.[3] Plato maintained that these were souls in such a way that man would have three forms or souls: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective.[4] However, Aristotle understood the unity of the _ratio_ of soul to be the same as the unity of the _ratio_ of figure. Just as there is no figure above and beyond triangle, square, or any of the other particular figures which would be common, so also there is no soul, having, as it were, separate

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[1]St. Thomas, Ia, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1.

[2]St. Thomas, In II _Sent._, d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; cf. In I _Sent._, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, c. and ad 1; In IV _Sent._, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2; Suppl., q. 37, a. 1, ad 2.

[3]St. Thomas, In I _De Anima_, lect. 1, n. 14.

[4]Plato, _Phaedrus_, _Great Books of the Western World_, ed. Hutchins, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952, vol. 7, n. 246, p. 124c; n. 253, p. 128a. Cf. _Timaeus_, n. 69, p. 466b.

existence, which would be over and above the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective parts of the soul. However, it is possible to have a common definition of figure which is appropriate to all but proper to none. In the same way it is possible to have a common definition of the soul which is appropriate to all the parts of the soul but proper to none. The definitions of the soul which Aristotle has given are of this kind, but he considers it ridiculous to give only these common definitions without giving the proper definition of each part of the soul. However, before he begins his consideration of the parts of the soul, he notes that they are related in a way similar to the way in which the different figures are related. A square contains a triangle in potency, for a square can be divided into two triangles. Thus, each subsequent figure is said to contain the previous figure in potency, e.g. a six-sided figure contains a five-sided figure in potency and the five-sided figure in turn contains a four-sided figure in potency and the four-sided figure contains a three-sided figure in potency. The parts of the soul are related in a similar way. An animal is able to nourish himself and grow so that the sensitive part of the soul is said to contain the vegetative part as an active potency, or power. Thus, each subsequent part of the soul is said to contain the previous part as one of its powers (_quasi quaedam potentia eius_),[1] i.e. the intellective part of the soul contains the sensitive part as one of its powers and the sensitive part contains the vegetative part as one of its powers.

It seems reasonable to say in conclusion that the mode of the second definition is not that which is appropriate to a substance but rather that which is appropriate to the soul as the principle of life. Since a principle must be defined in relation to that which is principiated and since that which is principiated is extrinsic to its essence, the kind of definition appropriate to the soul as a principle is an _ex_

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[1] St. Thomas, In II _De Anima_, lect. 5, n. 298.

additione definition. Furthermore, since the soul is the principle of life and as the principle of life it is a potestative whole, the soul must be defined in terms of all of its parts in conjunction.[1]

## 2 - The Parts of the Definition

Since we already have a basic understanding of the second definition of the soul from our considerations in the previous chapters, we will begin our own consideration of the definition with an analysis of it. In this analysis each word in the definition will be considered with a view to understanding the whole definition. However, since each word has its meaning as a part of the whole and not independently, we will attempt to reveal the meaning of each word in its proper context, showing the foundation for the interpretation of it and what is entailed by this interpretation.

### a) Quo

The first word of the definition is the word quo. There is general agreement and it seems evident that the word quo designates the soul as a principle. Furthermore, Aristotle is clearly stating that the soul is not a quod principle but a quo ( ῷ ) principle.[2] However, there have been different interpretations put on the soul as a quo principle. Since an interpretation of the word quo can only be understood in the light of that which is principiated, a reasonable interpretation cannot be made until we have considered the other words of the definition. Therefore, our consideration will be limited to contrasting the different interpretations concerning the soul as a quo principle and to seeing what is understood by

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[1] St. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q. 10, 9th edition, ed. Spiazzi, Turin, Marietti, 1953, a. 1, ad 2.

[2] Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 414 a 12.

a _quo_ principle.

Neither St. Thomas nor St. Albert directly comments on the word _quo_. St. Thomas combines the word _primo_ with the word _quo_ and speaks of the soul as the "primum principium" of the "operum vitae."[1] St. Albert, on the other hand, speaks of the soul as a principle in the sense of the act or _ratio_ of life, understanding by life not vital operations but the foundation for vital operations.[2]

Both John of St. Thomas and Cajetan give a direct commentary on the word _quo_. John of St. Thomas is very clear in the statement of his position:

> Et illa particula 'quo' denotat formam seu principium intrinsecum; extrinseca enim principia non sunt id, quo aliquid constituitur in esse, sicut causa efficiens et finalis non est id, quo aliquid constituitur, sed a quo movetur vel cuius gratia fit.[3]

He is also clear in his statement of the position of St. Thomas. He understands St. Thomas as interpreting the soul as an efficient cause of vital operations.[4] However, John of St. Thomas also thinks St. Thomas interpreted the soul as the principle of vital operations not in the sense of effects but as the very "munus seu officium animae ut est radix suarum operationum."[5]

Cajetan gives a very succinct, if somewhat obscure, statement of his interpretation of the word _quo_. "Primum est circa ly quo quod est vocabulum accommodum valde ad denominandum principium ut rationem essendi vel operandi."[6] However,

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[1] St. Thomas, In II _De Anima_, lect. 3, n. 253.

[2] St. Albert, Liber II _De Anima_, tract. I, c. 8, p. 207, col. b.

[3] John of St. Thomas, _Cursus_, p. 21, col. b.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 23, col. a.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 25, col. a.

[6] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 99.

this interpretation is made clear when Cajetan, in agreement
with St. Albert, refers to the soul as the "ratio nostrae vitae."[1]

A quo principle can be understood in two frames of re-
ference. The most basic distinction is that between a quo prin-
ciple and a quod principle. According to this distinction a
quo principle is not a complete substance. It is only a co-
principle and demands another principle, in conjunction with
which it brings about an effect. An example of this would be
courage, which comes from both virtue and the soul so that
courage is a certain habit of the soul. The virtue or quality
is the formal quo principle and the soul is the material quo
principle, both of which are necessary in order to have the
virtue of courage. A quod principle, on the other hand, is a
complete substance and can bring about its effect without the
cooperation of any other principle, e.g. we see.

Quo principles can also be distinguished among themselves
according to the different species of causality. A quo principle
may be either an efficient cause, a formal cause, or a material
cause. As an extrinsic, i.e. efficient, cause, a quo principle
is referred to as an instrumental efficient cause. It is that
person or thing which is extrinsic to the principal efficient
cause but by means of which the principal efficient cause
brings about an effect. The power of sight is a quo principle
of seeing. It is we, complete substances, who as quod prin-
ciples see by means of the quo principle, the power of sight
which is extrinsic to our essence. As a formal cause a quo
principle is a co-principle with the material cause in the
constitution of a material substance and a cooperative cause
of the effects of existence and operation as they flow from the
substantial nature or, more properly, the supposit. This en-
tails the fact that the quo principle as a material cause is
a co-principle with the formal cause. It is essential to re-
alize that cooperative causes cannot bring about their effects

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[1]Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 115.

independently of one another. Neither matter nor form as a
*quo* principle has independent existence or operation prior
to their union. This is why we say that existence belongs to
the supposit.[1]

As a final note it should be pointed out that in St.
Thomas' interpretation of the soul as the cause of the vital
operations, he is not considering the soul in the order of
extrinsic efficient causality but rather as the intrinsic
principle of the motion of the body, as the form of that body.

> Ostendit quod anima est principium moventis
> corporis, sicut unde motus: et utitur quasi
> tali ratione. Omnis forma corporalis naturalis
> est principium motus proprii illius corporis,
> sicut forma ignis est principium motus eius.[2]

### b) Vivimus

With respect to the word *vivimus*, we must first try to
determine whether Aristotle intended to signify by this word
all living things or only vegetative life. Next, it will be
necessary to discover that from which the word is taken and
that to which the word can be applied. Finally, we must see
what is entailed by the different applications of this word.

The extension of the word *vivimus* in the context of
this definition can be gained from Aristotle himself for he
began his consideration of this definition with an analysis of
the word *vivere*. A thing is said to be alive if it has any of
the powers of intellect, sense, locomotion, or only the vege-
tative powers.[3] It is, however, to these vegetative powers
that Aristotle seems particularly to reserve the word *vivere*,
for when speaking of animals, he says: "Et namque quae non
moventur, neque mutant locum, habent autem sensum, animalia

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[1] St. Thomas, I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, c.

[2] St. Thomas, In II *De Anima*, lect. 7, n. 323; cf. *De Ver.*,
q. 22, a. 3; I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3; *De Veritate
Catholicae Fidei Contra Gentiles*, II, c. 57, *Opera Omnia*, ed.
Parma, Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1855, vol. V.

[3] Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, c. 2, 413 a 23.

dicimus, et non vivere solum."[1] Perhaps this is because, as
St. Thomas points out, Aristotle maintained when speaking of
the vegetative principle, "Vivere igitur, propter hoc prin-
cipium inest omnibus viventibus."[2] From Aristotle's own usage
of the word, we can interpret his meaning of *vivimus* in the
definition as limited to vegetative life. This interpretation
is reinforced if we make a certain parallel between the de-
finition and the passage:

> Nunc autem intantum dictum sit solum, quod est
> anima horum quae dicta sunt, principium; et
> his determinata est, *vegetativo*, sensitivo, in-
> tellectivo et motu.[3]

If we take, as St. Albert did, the word *vivimus* for
all the grades of living things, we will end up with a very
strange combination of words.[4] *Vivere*, taken in this way, will
signify analogically all the grades of living things and the
other words will signify univocally two of those same grades
of living things. The vegetative would not be explicitly men-
tioned. This interpretation seems to have very little founda-
tion in Aristotle.

We can discover that from which the word *vivimus* was
taken and that to which it can be applied if we consider the
way in which we name things. Our process of naming follows
our knowing process. By our senses we know the external ac-
cidents of sensible things and by our intellect we know the
essence of sensible things. However, it is through our senses
that our intellect gains knowledge. Thus , it is from external
appearances that we get the knowledge of the essences of things.
Since we name things as we know them, we often use words to
signify the essence which were taken from external properties,

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[1] Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 b 2.

[2] Ibid., 413 b 1.

[3] Ibid., 413 b 11 (italics mine).

[4] St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 7, p. 207,
col. b.

e.g. rational in the definition of man. Sometimes these words are used in a strict sense to signify the essence and sometimes less properly to signify the property from which the word was taken.

The word _life_ was taken from an external accident, that is local self-movement. However, the word is most properly used to signify the substance which moves itself or performs self-initiated operations. Thus, the expression _to live_ is synonymous with the expression _to be_ in the case of things which move themselves. Just as the word _running_ expresses the same thing as the words _to run_, but in the abstract; so too the word _life_ expresses the same thing as the words _to live_, but in the abstract. Thus, life is not an accidental predicate but a substantial one, most properly speaking. However, the word _life_ is sometimes used to signify that from which it was taken, the operations of life, but this is a less proper use of the word.[1]

Thus, we see that the word _vivimus_ was taken from the operations of life. However, that from which a word is taken is not necessarily that to which it is applied. Thus, the word _vivimus_ could be used in either of two ways: less properly it could be used to signify the operations of life, more properly it could be used to signify the "esse viventis."[2]

What is entailed by the word _vivimus_ depends on what the word is used to signify. If it is used to signify the "esse viventis," it entails the notion of the soul as the form of the body which immediately makes each part alive. If, on the other hand, the word _vivimus_ is used less properly for the operations of life, it entails a notion of the soul as the _motor_ which first makes the heart live and through it the

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[1] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 18, a. 2, c.

[2] St. Thomas, I _Sent._, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3; cf. Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 4, 415 b 13; St. Thomas, IIaIIae, q. 179, a. 1, ad 1.

rest of the body.

> Ad tertium dicendum, quod vivere in animali
> dicitur dupliciter: uno modo vivere est ipsum
> esse viventis, sicut Philosophus: Vivere viven-
> tibus est esse; et hoc modo anima immediate
> facit vivere quamlibet partem corporis, inquan-
> tum est eius forma; alio modo dicitur vivere
> pro operatione animae quam facit in corde prout
> est motor; et talem vitam influit primo in cor,
> et postea in omnes alias partes.[1]

The importance of this distinction can be seen if we
recall the observation which Aristotle made after his consi-
deration of the first definition of the soul. "Amplius autem
immanifestum si sit corporis actus anima, sicut nauta navis."[2]
Plato maintained that the soul is united to the body as its
mover but not as its form. If the second definition establishes
the soul only as the principle of vital operations, "ut motor,"
we do not yet have the soul as the form of the body, for it
is possible to have two things united in a contact of power
without being substantially one and, thus, be one in vital
operation but not one in being.[3]

There are many objections which can be brought up to
refute Plato's position, for example the following argument.
What is one only by a contact of power is not substantially
one but only accidentally one. An example to the contrary,
however, is the fact that from the union of body and soul
there results one substance, e.g. a man. Plato's response to
this criticism is that man is not a being composed of body and
soul but that the soul itself using a body is man. This can
be easily refuted if we recognize that man and animals are
sensible and natural realities; this would not be the case if
the body and its parts did not belong to the essence of man
and animal, since the soul itself is not a sensible nor ma-
terial thing.

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[1] St. Thomas, I _Sent._, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3.

[2] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 1, 413 a 9.

[3] St. Thomas, _Cont. Gent._, II, c. 57.

Another argument in refutation of Plato's position that the soul is only the mover of the body follows from the fact that a mobile being does not derive its species from its mover. If this were the relation of body and soul, the body and its parts would not owe what they specifically are to the soul. In this case, after death the body and its parts would remain specifically the same. However, this is not the case, for, as an example, the hand of a dead man is only equivocally a hand because it no longer has its proper operation.

From the point of view of the interpretation of the word vivimus, the most important argument which St. Thomas gives in refutation of Plato is based on the distinction between the soul as the principle of the movement of the body and the soul as the principle of the esse of the body. The mobile does not owe its esse to its mover but only its movement. If the soul were united to the body merely as its mover, the body would indeed be moved by the soul, but it would not owe its esse to the soul. However, to live is the esse viventis. On Plato's assumption the body would not live and be in virtue of the soul.[1]

Even more significant for the interpretation of the word vivimus are the two arguments which St. Thomas uses to prove that the soul is united to the body as its proper form. The first argument is based on an interpretation of the word vivere as the esse viventis. The second argument is a paraphrase of what St. Thomas considered to be Aristotle's proof of the first definition of the soul by the second. St. Thomas treats these as two distinct proofs of the same conclusion.

The first argument assumes the distinction of potency and act. It begins by pointing out that that by which something becomes a being in act from a being in potency is its form and act. However, it is through the soul that the body becomes a

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[1]St. Thomas, Cont. Gent., II, c. 57.

being in act from being potentially existent, for _vivere_ is the
_esse viventis_. This can be seen in the case of seed which before
animation is living only in potency but in virtue of the soul
becomes actually alive. Therefore, the soul is the form of the
animated body.

The second argument which St. Thomas gives draws a paral-
lel between to be and to operate. He points out that neither
to be nor to operate are attributed only to the form or only
to the matter but rather to the composite, so that to be and
to operate are attributed to two things, one of which is related
to the other as form to matter; as, for example, we say that
man is healthy in virtue of the body and health, or that man is
a knowing being in virtue of knowledge and the soul. Now, know-
ledge is the form of the soul of a knowing being and health is
the form of a healthy body. Moreover, to live and to sense are
attributed to the soul and to the body. We are said to live and
to sense in virtue of the soul and in virtue of the body, but
we are said to live in virtue of the soul as the principle of
life and sensation. Therefore, the soul is the form of the body.[1]

Since St. Thomas attributes this second demonstration to
Aristotle, there are two differences which must be noted between
this demonstration and that of Aristotle. In his demonstration
Aristotle simply says that that by which we live and sense is
said in a twofold way. St. Thomas interprets this to mean we are
said to be something or to operate by two principles. Also,
Aristotle's consideration of the relation of matter and form
according to potency and act is missing in this second demon-
stration of St. Thomas.

What these two demonstrations bring out is the fact that
it is necessary to proceed in two different ways to demonstrate
that the soul is form on the basis of these two interpretations
of _vivere_. If _vivere_ is interpreted as signifying the _esse_

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[1]St. Thomas, _Cont.Gent._, II, c. 57.

_viventis_, then the demonstration proceeds on the basis of mat-
ter and form being related as potency and act, so that that by
which something becomes a being in act from a being in potency
is its form. The soul is that by which the body becomes a being
in act, for the soul is that by which we live and _vivere_ is the
_esse viventis_. Therefore, the soul is the form of the animated
body. If _vivere_ is interpreted as signifying the operations of
life, then the argument must proceed on the basis of the fact
that to be and to operate both proceed from a composite of mat-
ter and form. To live is attributed to both body and soul, but
we are said to live in virtue of the soul as the principle of
life. Therefore, the soul is the form of the body.

These demonstrations reveal what is entailed by these
two interpretations of the word _vivimus_, but which of these is
the proper interpretation depends on the signification of the
words _vivimus_, _sentimus_ and _intelligimus_ taken in conjunction
as well as an understanding of Aristotle's demonstration of the
soul as form. Therefore, the final interpretation of this word
will be put off until after these considerations have been made.

c) _Sentimus_

We have only one difficulty to consider in our treatment
of the word _sentimus_. This difficulty arises as a result of the
fact that St. Thomas has two interpretations of this word. In
his commentary on the _De Anima_ he seems to interpret the word
as signifying vital operation, whereas in the _Summa Theologiae_
he maintains that the word can be taken "pro ipso esse sic
operantium."[1] The problem of interpretation is further compli-
cated by the fact that St. Albert in his commentary on the _De
Anima_ took the word for the _esse_ of sentient beings, and by the
fact that Cajetan and John of St. Thomas maintained that the
word could be taken to signify either vital operation or the
_esse_ of sentient beings.

It is evident that the word _sentimus_ was taken from the

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[1] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1.

sensory operations of sentient beings and it seems to be in this
sense that St. Thomas understands the word in the second defini-
tion of the soul, for he speaks of the soul as the first princi-
ple of vital operations (_operum vitae_).[1] In fact, St. Thomas
seems to rule out the interpretation of the words _sentimus_ and
_intelligimus_ as signifying the _esse viventis_ in a passage in the
_De Veritate_.[2] He begins his consideration by pointing out that
the word _vivere_ can be used in two ways. The first way is as it
signifies the _esse viventis_. This signification follows from the
fact that the soul is united to the body as its form. The other
way is as the word _vivere_ signifies the operations of life. In
the mind of St. Thomas, it is according to this second mode of
signification that Aristotle distinguishes _vivere_ into _intelligere_
and _sentire_ and the other operations of the soul in the _De Anima_.[3]

However, just as with the word _vivere_, the word _sentire_
was used by Aristotle to signify not only the sensory operations
but also the _esse_ of sentient beings. "Hoc autem, quoniam senti-
mus vel intelligimus, quoniam sumus. Esse enim erat sentire vel
intelligere."[4]

St. Thomas in his commentary on this passage indicates the
possibility of using the words _sentire_ and _intelligere_ to refer
to the _esse_. "Dictum est enim supra quod esse et vivere hominis
principaliter est sentire vel intelligere."[5] Furthermore, St.
Thomas in the _Summa Theologiae_[6] gives another interpretation of
Aristotle's use of these words in the _De Anima_. This interpreta-
tion is found as the reply to an objection which St. Thomas gives

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[1] St. Thomas, In II _De Anima_, lect. 3, n. 253.

[2] St. Thomas, _De Ver._, q. 13, a. 4, ad 2; also _In Aristotel-
is Libros De Caelo et Mundo Expositio_, II, lect. 4, ed. Spiazzi,
Turin, Marietti, 1952, n. 5.

[3] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 2, 413 a 22.

[4] Aristotle, _Nicomachean Ethics_, IX, c. 9, 1170 a 35, as
cited in St. Thomas, _In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad
Nicomachum Expositio_, ed. Spiazzi, Turin, Marietti, 1949.

[5] St. Thomas, In IX _Eth. ad Nic._, lect. 11, n. 1908.

[6] St. Thomas, Ia,q. 18, a. 2, ad 1.

when he is considering whether life is an operation. He poses
an objection which flows from the principle that nothing is
divided except by what is in the same genus. Since Aristotle in
the De Anima divided vivere into four operations, i.e. to nourish,
to sense, to move locally and to think, life is some kind of
operation.[1] In his answer to this objection, St. Thomas gives
what he considers a better interpretation of sentire and in-
telligere and one which is consonant with the teaching of Aris-
totle.

> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus ibi
> accipit vivere pro operatione vitae. Vel di-
> cendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere,
> et huiusmodi, quandoque sumitur pro quibusdam
> operationibus; quandoque autem pro ipso esse
> sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod
> esse sentire vel intelligere, idest habere na-
> turam ad sentiendum vel intelligendum. Et hoc
> modo distinguit Philosophus vivere per illa
> quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor
> sunt genera viventium.[2]

St. Albert interpreted the word vivere as the essential
act of the soul which is the foundation of every operation,
". . .et ideo viventibus est esse."[3] Furthermore, in his demon-
stration of the soul as form he maintained that the words sen-
timus and intelligimus are used in a way similar to that of
vivimus. He showed this by pointing out that when we say that
we live by the soul, the soul is the act and form and ratio of
the life of the living body. In like manner when we say that
we sense by the soul, the soul is the ratio of the life of the
living body.[4] Thus, we could conclude that if vivere is the esse
of living beings; in like manner sentire is the esse of sentient
beings.

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[1] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1.

[2] Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 22.

[3] St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

[4] Ibid., p. 207, col. b.

Cajetan held two interpretations of the word _sentimus_.
He maintained that the word _vivimus_ could be taken for the
"esse vitali" or "pro operatione vitali."[1] Likewise, the words
_sentimus, movemur,_ and _intelligimus_ could be taken in the same
way "pro esse sensitivo, pro esse motivo, pro esse intellectivo,
sicut vivere pro esse vitali,"[2] or for vital operations. He con-
siders the former interpretation the more profound but the
latter the better known. However, according to Cajetan, it makes
no difference to the demonstration of the soul as form which
interpretation is adopted.

John of St. Thomas also gave two interpretations of this
word. He maintained that the words _vivere_ and _sentire_ could be
taken to signify vital operations or the "esse . . . sentiendi."[3]
He even attributed both of these interpretations to St. Thomas'
commentary on the _De Anima_.

From this brief consideration of the opinions of the com-
mentators we can at least say that it would be possible for us
to interpret the word _sentimus_ as signifying the _esse_ of sen-
tient beings.

d) _Intelligimus_

Since the word _intelligimus_ is subject to the same analysis
as the words _vivimus_ and _sentimus_, we will limit ourselves to a
consideration of a point which has been left obscure. It is not
immediately evident what is meant by the words _esse viventis_.
Therefore, we will consider a statement of St. Thomas concern-
ing the meaning of the word _intelligere_ in order to approach
this problem.

> Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima, in quantum
> est forma corporis secundum suam essentiam, dat
> esse corpori, in quantum est forma substantialis;

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[1] Cajetan, _In De Anima_, II, c. 2, n. 101.
[2] _Ibid_.
[3] John of St. Thomas, _Cursus_, p. 26, col. a.
[4] _Ibid._, col. b.

> et dat sibi huiusmodi esse quod est vivere, in
> quantum est talis forma, scilicet anima; et dat
> ei huiusmodi vivere, scilicet intellectuali na-
> tura, in quantum est talis anima, scilicet intel-
> lectiva. Intelligere autem quandoque sumitur pro
> operatione, et sic principium eius est potentia
> vel habitus; quandoque vero pro ipso esse intel-
> lectualis naturae, et sic principium eius quod est
> intelligere, est ipsa essentia animae intellectivae.[1]

In this passage St. Thomas first points out that the soul is the principle of the _esse_ of the body precisely insofar as it is the substantial form of the body according to its very essence. He next points out that the soul as soul, that is insofar as it is this particular kind of form, is the principle of a particular kind of _esse_, i.e. _vivere_. Furthermore, he says that the soul insofar as it is this particular kind of soul, i.e. intellective, is the principle of that _vivere_ which is in accordance with the intellectual nature.

St. Thomas' final consideration deals with the way in which the word _intelligere_ can be taken. In one way the word can be taken for operation and if it is taken in this way, its principle is then a power or habit. However, St. Thomas maintains that the word _intelligere_ can also be taken for the _esse_ of the intellectual nature. If it is taken in this way, its principle is the very essence of the intellective soul.

St. Thomas' interpretation of the word _intelligere_ as the _esse_ of the intellectual nature throws light on the meaning of the word _esse_. He clearly makes a distinction between the intellectual nature and its _esse_ when he says, "quandoque vero pro ipso esse intellectualis naturae." He even strengthens this statement by what follows: "et sic principium eius quod est intelligere, est ipsa essentia animae intellectivae." From this passage it is evident that St. Thomas understands _intelligere_ as signifying the _esse_ of the intellectual nature and not the

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[1] St. Thomas, _Quaestiones Disputatae De Spiritualibus Creaturis_, q. 1, a. 11, eds. Calcaterra and Centi, Turin, Marietti, 1953; cf. St. Thomas, In I _Sent._, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

intellectual nature itself. Thus we see that St. Thomas is not identifying _esse_ and intellectual nature but distinguishing them, and that he understands the _esse_ as caused by the essence of the intellective soul. This conclusion, but in a more general form, was expressed by St. Thomas in another context.

> Sed sciendum, quod esse dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quiditas vel natura rei. Alio modo dicitur esse ipsa actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus, non actus secundus qui est operatio, sed actus primus.[1]

e) _Primo_

There are two possible interpretations of the word _primo_. It could be interpreted as modifying the verb of the main clause, which is not stated in the Greek, or as modifying the verbs of the definition. In the former interpretation the soul would be a first principle, as in the interpretation of St. Thomas or the English translation of Sir David Ross: "Soul is that by which, primarily, we live, perceive, and think."[2] If _primo_ is interpreted as modifying the verbs in the definition, we would have the soul defined as that by which we live, perceive, and think primarily. In this interpretation the soul is defined as the principle of life, understanding life not as the secondary effect, operation, but as the primary effect, _esse viventis_.

The interpretation of the word _primo_ depends, then, on our interpretation of the words _vivimus, sentimus,_ and _intelligimus._ If these words signify vital operations, there is no sense in which these verbs could be modified by the adverb _primo,_ for operation is a secondary effect and _vivimus primo_ could only refer to life as a primary effect.[3]

In the interpetation of St. Thomas we saw that he took the

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[1] St. Thomas, In I _Sent._, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; cf. St. Thomas, IaIIae, q. 111, a. 2, c; Ia q. 76, a. 6.

[2] Ross, _Aristotle: De Anima,_ 414 a 12, p. 216.

[3] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1.

words _vivimus_, _sentimus_, _movemur_ and _intelligimus_ for vital operations.[1] Therefore, although Aristotle had placed the word _primo_, or rather its Greek equivalent, last, St. Thomas placed it just before the word _quo_. In the mind of St. Thomas, then, the word _primo_ was used by Aristotle to indicate that the soul is the "primum principium"[2] of the vital operations. This is a possible interpretation, for the soul is actually the first principle of vital operations. John of St. Thomas expresses this same idea very clearly.

> Dicitur 'primo' ad denotandum, quod anima debet esse principium substantiale et radicale, potentiae autem operativae non sunt id, quo primo operamur aut vivimus, sed instrumenta operandi et vivendi.[3]

This interpretation, however, entails several difficulties for St. Thomas. The first is simply the problem of moving the word _primo_. The second is the addition of this word to the examples which Aristotle borrowed from knowledge and health, for Aristotle did not use this word in these examples. The third is the problem of determining what the secondary principle of operation is if the soul is the primary principle. The fourth difficulty concerns the relation between St. Thomas' interpretation of the word _primo_ as indicating that the soul is the _first_ principle by which we live and his statement that the demonstration of which this second definition is the minor premise concludes to the fact that either the body or the soul is the species.[4] In order to see the relation of these difficulties to St. Thomas' interpretation of the word _primo_ we will consider each difficulty separately in the following paragraphs.

With regard to the first difficulty, it should be noted that the position of the word _primo_ in the definition does not determine its interpretation. The fact remains, however, that St.

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[1]St. Thomas, In II _De Anima_, lect. 3, n. 253.

[2]_Ibid_.

[3]John of St. Thomas, _Cursus_, p. 21, col. b.

[4]"Et ideo cum consequatur ex praedicta demonstratione, quod vel corpus vel anima sit species. . . ." St. Thomas, In II _De Anima_, lect. 4, n. 275.

Thomas felt constrained to change its position in the defini-
tion in order to bring out his interpretation.

St. Thomas' addition of the word primo to the examples of
Aristotle seems to have no other value than to make the corres-
pondence between the examples and the definition of the soul as
interpreted by St. Thomas more perfect. But the examples are
perfectly clear without the word primo. These are examples of
matter and form related as potency and act. The word primo in
such a context is superfluous, and, therefore, Aristotle left
it out.

The interpretation of the soul as the primary principle
of operation immediately brings up the problem of what the se-
condary principle of operation is. The secondary principle of
operation is said to be the appropriate power, e.g. the power of
sight is the secondary, or proximate, principle of seeing. However,
in the context of a demonstration of the soul as the form of the
body such a consideration is irrelevant. What is actually being
considered is the relation of body and soul as potency and act,
not the relation of soul and power as primary and secondary
principles of operation.

If, as St. Thomas does, it is maintained that the demon-
stration of the first definition concludes to the fact that
either the body or the soul is form,[1] then it must be maintained
that both the body and the soul are primary principles of vital
operations. But since the body can only be the principle of vi-
tal operations in virtue of the soul, it cannot be designated
a primary principle of operations.[2] Therefore, from the demon-
stration as interpreted by St. Thomas it cannot be concluded
that either the body or the soul is form, as St. Thomas did.
However, if only the soul is the primary principle of vital opera-
tions, then we have our conclusion, i.e. soul is form, and we do
not need the further consideration of body and soul as potency

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[1] St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 275.

[2] St. Thomas, Ia, q. 75, a. 1.

and act which Aristotle thought necessary.[1]

If the word _primo_ is interpreted as modifying the verbs in the definition, we can leave the definition in the form in which Aristotle wrote it. Our translation would then read: the soul is that by which we live and perceive and think _primarily_. Also, with this interpretation of _primo_, there is no need to add it to the examples which Aristotle gave of knowledge and health. Aristotle did not use it in these examples because there is no great problem involved in being, for example, healthy in first act and healthy in second act. However, there is good reason to add it to the definition of the soul for there is a difficulty with regard to the soul as the principle by which we live. Since Plato would readily agree that the soul is the principle of vital operations but he would not agree that together with the body the soul is the principle of the _esse_ of living beings, Aristotle deliberately indicated by the word _primo_ that the words _vivimus_, _sentimus_, and _intelligimus_ were to be interpreted as signifying the _esse viventis_. This interpretation of _primo_ further allows us to retain the parallel between the examples as Aristotle gave them and the treatment of the soul, whereas the other interpretation does not. In the examples it is not a question of health being primarily that by which we are made healthy and the body being secondarily that by which we are made healthy, but rather health is related to the body as the act of that which is in potency, and, therefore, health is the form. In the case of the soul, we live by the body and the soul, but the soul is related to the body as the act of that which is in potency, and, therefore, the soul is form. If, on the other hand, we state in the definition that the soul is the first principle of our life, we have no need for the distinction of potency and act, for whatever is the first principle is form.[2]

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[1] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 2, 414 a 15.

[2] This point was seen in our consideration of the word _vivimus_ where we treated St. Thomas' demonstration in the _Contra Gentiles_ of the soul as form. _Cont_. _Gent_., II, c. 57, p. 110.

If Aristotle had intended to define the soul in such a way as to indicate that it is the principle of the primary effect of animation, i.e. the *esse,* as opposed to the secondary effect, i.e. operation, it would be reasonable to interpret the word *primo* as modifying the verbs in the definition. The words *vivimus* et *sentimus* et *intelligimus primo* would then refer to the *esse* of vegetative beings, the *esse* of sentient beings and the *esse* of rational beings.

f) Et . . . et

In order to interpret the words *et . . . et,* we must recall what was established in the section on the mode of the definition, for the mode of this definition determines the use of these words. We must also consider the objection to the interpretation of these words as conjunctive.

An interpretation of the words *et . . . et* depends on a grasp of that which determines the choice of these words. The words in a definition are chosen basically to express what is being defined according to the appropriate mode, and it is the matter which determines this mode. In this case the matter is the soul as the principle of life and the mode appropriate to this matter is determined by the unity of soul as a potestative whole.

In our consideration of the mode of this definition, we saw that this is a definition of the soul as it is a principle, more precisely as it is the principle of life. To define the soul as the principle of life it is necessary to define it according to the mode appropriate to a potestative whole. Now, the definition of a potestative whole is not the same as the definition of a universal whole. The *ratio* of a universal whole does not contain its inferiors in act but only in potency, e.g. animal does not contain man and brute in act but only in potency. The fact that the parts are not being considered in act is the reason why the universal whole is predicated equally of its parts, even though its parts are not equal in act. They have been made equal according to a common *ratio.* The *ratio* of a

potestative whole, on the other hand, contains its parts in act. This is due to the fact that the parts constitute the very substance of a potestative whole precisely as a potestative whole.[1] The ratio of soul, then, has the same unity as the ratio of figure, that of a potestative whole, where there is not a simple essential unity but a unity which results from a composition of unequal parts. In such a whole one part includes the power of the inferior part and more besides until the total extension of the power of the whole is contained in the last part. In the case of the soul, the sensitive part contains the power of the vegetative part and more besides. The intellective part contains the power of the sensitive part and more besides, and since it is the last part, it has the total extension of the power of the soul. The definition of the soul as a potestative whole must, therefore, contain all of these parts and it must indicate the unity of the whole composed of these parts.

Aristotle brings up the question of the proper mode of defining the soul in his introduction to the De Anima. He indicates there the difficulties involved in a knowledge of the soul. The first difficulty which he points out is the problem concerning the mode of defining the soul, for it is a common difficulty to discover what procedure to use in knowing what a thing is. He mentions the procedures of demonstration, division, or some other method --- "aut etiam aliqua alia methodus."[2] St. Thomas in his commentary on this passage reveals the other method which Aristotle referred to. St. Thomas points out that certain people favor the method of demonstration; others, the method of division; while yet others favor the method of composition. It is this latter method which St. Thomas thinks Aristotle used in his definition of the soul: "Aristoteles autem voluit quod componendo."[3]

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[1] St. Albert, In De Divisione, tract. IV, c. 2, p. 79, col. b.
[2] Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 1, 402 a 11 - 402 a 25.
[3] St. Thomas, In I De Anima, lect. 1, n. 9.

To see the meaning of this mode of defining, we must consider what is meant by this "via compositionis." There are two ways of proceeding to a grasp of the truth. The first way, which is called the "via resolutionis," is a process by which we go from what is composed to its intrinsic causes or from a whole to its parts. The second way, which is called the "via compositionis," is a process by which we go from what is simple to what is composed. In this case we have attained a true knowledge of something when we come to a knowledge of the whole.[1] Applying this distinction to the process of definition, St. Thomas shows that there are two ways of defining a whole. An example of this application concerns the definition of a continuum. A continuum is a kind of whole and, therefore, can be defined in terms of its parts. If we defined the continuum "secundum viam resolutionis," the continuum is said to be that which is divisible to infinity. But if a continuum is defined "secundum viam compositionis," it is said to be that whose parts are joined in a common termination.[2]

If we now apply what St. Thomas said concerning the mode of defining which Aristotle used in his definition of the soul,[3] we can see that the words et . . . et are suitable for indicating the composition appropriate to the definition of the soul as a potestative whole. This same idea was very well expressed by St. Albert.

> Nihil autem prohibet quod totum potestativum
> definitur per partes suas, sicut compositum
> per partes definitur. Est enim potestas totius
> expleta in partibus et in partium collectione
> et unione.[4]

An objection to the interpretation of the words et . . . et

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[1] St. Thomas, In II Metaph., lect. 2, n. 278.

[2] St. Thomas, In IIIPhys., lect. 1, n. 3.

[3] "Aristoteles autem voluit quod componendo." St. Thomas, In I De Anima, lect. 1, n. 9.

[4] St. Albert, De Fortitudine, tract. II, q. 2, a. 3, n. 4.

as conjunctive arises from the belief that it would make the definition appropriate only to the intellective soul. This objection does not take into account the mode of definition appropriate to the soul as a potestative whole nor the mode of definition appropriate to the intellective soul. As we have seen  the mode of definition appropriate to the soul as a potestative whole, it only remains to see the mode of definition appropriate to the intellective soul.

Aristotle gives a general mode of defining which he finds appropriate to the definition of the vegetative soul.

> Quoniam autem _a fine_ appellari omnia, iustum est, finis autem est, et generasse quale ipsum est: utique prima$_1$ anima et generativa talis quale est ipsum.

In his commentary on this passage, St. Thomas brings out the meaning of a definition _a fine_. Among the operations of the vegetative soul there is an order. The first operation is nutrition, which is simply ordered to preserving something as it is. The second operation is growth, which is a more perfect operation, because by it the living body gains a greater perfection both according to quantity and according to power. The third operation is generation: it is the most perfect and definitive operation of the vegetative soul. By this operation, the living being, which already exists according to the perfection appropriate to it, passes on its perfection and being to another. For each thing is most perfect when it can make another being like itself. Since it is fitting that all things be defined and denominated from the end, or what is definitive, and since the definitive operation of the vegetative soul is generation, the vegetative soul should be defined as that which is generative of another like itself in species.[2]

If we apply this mode of defining to the intellective soul, the proper definition will be taken from the highest operation

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[1] Aristotle, _De Anima_, II, c. 4, 416 b 23 (italics mine).

[2] St. Thomas, In II _De Anima_, lect. 9, n. 347.

of the intellective soul, i.e. reason, so that the definition of the intellective soul will not contain a conjunction of its powers.

It seems reasonable to conclude that Aristotle used the conjunctions et . . . et according to their proper function; that is, conjunctively. The soul is being defined as a potestative whole composed of parts. All of the distinct parts must be mentioned. If any part is omitted, the definition is not complete. Also, the parts must be shown as parts, which only in composition constitute the soul. Therefore, these words, et . . . et, are not taken distributively or disjunctively but rather conjunctively.

g) Movemur

As we noted in the introduction, this word does not appear in the second definition of the soul according to the best critical texts.

Our problem is to determine whether the presence or absence of this word affects the interpretation of the definition. We shall consider first the opinions of the commentators to see if they saw any difficulty concerning the inclusion or exclusion of this word. The next investigation will be of the proper procedure to be used in determining the content of a definition which is compositive, for the mode of procedure appropriate to the definition of a potestative whole will aid us in determining the parts which should be placed in the definition. The third consideration will be of Aristotle's approach to the second definition of the soul to see how he determined what was to be included in this definition. Finally, we will propose a reason for Aristotle's omission of this word.

The commentaries are divided in their judgment as to whether the word movemur should be included in the definition or excluded from it. We will first present a commentary which finds no difficulty in including this word; then, a commentary which finds no difficulty in excluding it. We will also present two